Diplomacy & Crisis News

As these words are written, North Korea has halted the operation of the five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. This move is most likely intended to extract plutonium for weapons-grade enrichment and provide fissile material for more nuclear weapons. Late in September, North Korea amended its constitution to enshrine the goal of accelerating the production of nuclear weapons. Its focus remains on building up a significant force of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. These, it claims, are meant for deterrence. Nevertheless, Pyongyang could easily employ them for compellence and coercion.

Pyongyang continues a series of missile tests for weapons suitable to deliver nuclear warheads against South Korea, Japan, and United States military forces in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as against the continental United States itself. It has also unveiled a new conventionally powered but nuclear-armed submarine designed to give it a basic second-strike capability.

The Biden Administration isn’t really engaged with Pyongyang, even indirectly, in discussions on achieving the goal of comprehensive and verifiable nuclear disarmament of North Korea. If Donald Trump regains the White House after the 2024 Presidential election, it is unlikely that he will make meaningful progress toward that goal. Moreover, there will be no restoration of personal summit diplomacy, especially after the failure of the 2019 Hanoi summit.

Finally, lingering concerns remain that Pyongyang could conduct a nuclear weapons test, mainly to perfect the design of tactical nuclear weapons. If Russia follows through with its implied threat to withdraw from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and then tests a warhead, expect a North Korean test to follow soon after.

So what does this mean for North Korea’s future operational nuclear posture, and what are the implications for regional nuclear stability? Indeed, the nuclear dynamics will likely grow more dangerous and complex.

Of particular concern must be Pyongyang’s focus on tactical nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang must recognize the growing qualitative conventional imbalance with the ROK and seek to rely on tactical nuclear weapons to counter the conventional military superiority of South Korean forces. But it’s also conceivable that Pyongyang could choose to use the threat of tactical nuclear weapons coercively in a crisis—much as Russia has done regarding NATO during the war in Ukraine while relying on its strategic nuclear forces to deter American retaliation.

Such a scenario would likely prompt South Korea to look at its own nuclear weapons option, with President Yoon having already hinted that a South Korean independent nuclear weapons capability has been considered. Yet, in a crisis, Seoul is unlikely to have time to build a bomb. The concern in Seoul now must be that a change of administration in Washington could raise uncertainty about American extended nuclear deterrence security guarantees to both Seoul and Tokyo. Pyongyang, perhaps backed by Russia, might exploit such a scenario to challenge U.S. strategic influence in northeast Asia and coerce Seoul.

In a future scenario of weaker U.S. extended nuclear deterrence security guarantees, South Korea would likely need to move quickly to get nuclear weapons to avoid becoming vulnerable to nuclear coercion from North Korea. This would need to be followed by a similar Japanese move.

From Beijing’s perspective, such a nuclear future would complicate its strategic outlook immeasurably. Still, it would also emphasize a need for Beijing to move more rapidly and preemptively in its own nuclear modernization and expansion efforts to encompass a greater emphasis on sub-strategic and even tactical nuclear weapons as part of a move away from the traditional “no first use” and “minimum deterrent” force posture of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force.

Dr. Malcolm Davis is a Senior Analyst in Defence Strategy and Capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. His main research focus is on defense strategy and capability development, military technology, and the future of warfare. He tweets at @Dr_M_Davis.

Image: Shutterstock.

John Maynard Keynes famously wrote, “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?”

Now that the economic facts are rapidly changing for the worse, the Federal Reserve would do well to heed Keynes’s observation. Maybe then it would back down quickly from its current mantra that interest rates need to stay high for longer to bring down inflation. If, despite these new facts, the Fed persists with its hawkish monetary policy stance, we should brace ourselves for a hard economic landing.

Among the more disturbing new facts is the sudden loss of investor appetite, both at home and abroad, for long-term U.S. Treasury bonds. Investors are becoming increasingly concerned that the budget deficit is heading towards 8 percent of GDP at a time when the country is close to full employment. 

They are also concerned that given the political dysfunction in Washington, there is little prospect that this budget deficit will be reduced anytime soon.

The question investors are asking is: who will fund the government’s long-term borrowing needs and at what price? This question becomes all the more poignant at a time when the Fed continues to reduce the size of its balance by $95 billion a month by not rolling over maturing Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities.

It also becomes poignant at a time when we know that both China and Japan are reducing the size of their Treasury bond holdings.

The net upshot of this change in investor sentiment is that in the short space of two months, the all-important Treasury bond yield, on which many other interest rates are benchmarked both at home and abroad, has shot up from less than 4 percent to around 4.75 percent or their highest rate in sixteen years. This spike has already caused thirty-year mortgage rates to jump to close to 8 percent, making housing all the more unaffordable to the average American household. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. housing market and the auto market can withstand such high interest rates. 

Another major change in facts that the Fed will do well to heed is the cracks that are now appearing in the banking system. Already at the start of the year, we had the second and third largest bank failures in U.S. history when Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic Bank failed. These two banks failed mainly because of the damage that higher interest rates inflicted on their long-term bond and credit portfolios. With long-term interest rates now spiking even higher, the banking system is bound to take another big hit to its balance sheet from falling bond prices.

It also hardly helps that it is now all too apparent that we will have a wave of real commercial estate loan failures next year. That is when property developers will have to roll over $500 billion in loans at markedly higher interest rates at the very time that they are suffering from unusually high vacancy rates in a post-Covid world. This could constitute a significant blow to the regional banks, whose exposure to commercial property lending is close to 20 percent.

When he was Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan observed that no country is an island to itself in today’s highly integrated world economy. This is why the Fed would do well to pay heed to the rapid deterioration in the world economic outlook. China, the world’s second-largest economy, is now experiencing the slowest economic growth in decades in the wake of the bursting of its outsized housing and credit market bubble.

Meanwhile, Germany has already experienced three consecutive quarters of negative economic growth as it struggles with the combined impact of a Russian-induced energy shock and the slowing of the Chinese economy. With the European Central Bank raising interest rates at a time of economic weakness, it must only be a matter of time before the rest of the European economy succumbs to recession.

All of this would suggest that in setting interest rate policy, the Fed should be forward-looking and consider the major negative shocks at home and abroad with which the U.S. economy will have to grapple. Unfortunately, in clinging to its backward-looking, data-dependent policy, the Fed shows no sign of changing policy course anytime soon. By so doing, the Fed risks setting us up for a harder economic landing than would be needed to contain inflation.

American Enterprise Institute senior fellow Desmond Lachman was a deputy director in the International Monetary Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department and the chief emerging-market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney.

Image Credit: Reuters. 

Last week, a user on the War Thunder gaming forum named BarteG98PL posted a complete technical manual for the AH-64D Apache Longbow – a modernized iteration of the long-serving helicopter gunship that entered service in 1997 and continues to fly for the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and several other nations. Based on our research, this could be as high as the 30th time a document of this sort has found its way into War Thunder’s forums.

With yet another batch of restricted documents now apparently leaked on forums associated with this popular game, these breaches of security have gone from semi-comedic novelty to what sure seems like a legitimate threat to the national security of more than one nation… But are they really?

In this era of internet trends collecting steam as they roll down the hill of online hyperbole, it can be difficult to assess just how grievous these breaches truly are, let alone how or why these leaks keep happening. But based on our findings, the ever-growing tale of War Thunder leaks seems to be less of a story about secrets being revealed by gamers, and more like media outlets and social media users really liking the idea of secrets being revealed by gamers.

WHAT IS WAR THUNDER ANYWAY?

War Thunder touts itself as “the most comprehensive free-to-play, cross-platform, MMO military game” available on various computer operating systems and console platforms. That modern acronym, MMO, stands for Massively Multiplayer Online, which denotes the ability to play in a single server shared with a large number of other real players.

The game advertises the player’s ability to control a wide variety of very real military platforms, ranging from aircraft to armored vehicles, to various warships and more. And it’s that ability to simulate combined-arms combat, along with its apparent dedication to realism, that has inspired a loyal fanbase since its initial beta release in 2012, followed by a mobile version of the game released for smartphone users just this year.

“The game is great for a combination of realism for some players, and arcade for others,” explains U.S. Army Sergeant First Class Ethan Long. Long is a Patriot Fire Control Operator and Maintainer by day, and a popular TikTok and YouTube content creator who goes by the name Habitual Line Crosser by night.

War Thunder‘s ability to pit vast numbers of real people against one another in highly realistic combined-arms battles, as well as the ability to play the game for free, has cultivated a massive player community. According to the gaming statistics site ActivePlayer.io, War Thunder sees a jaw-dropping 500,00 to 700,000 players each day. But War Thunder‘s online presence extends far beyond the confines of the game itself, with countless digital communities devoted to game-related discussions found throughout the world’s digital common areas like Steam, Reddit, and, of course, War Thunder’s official forum.

At the time of writing this piece, the official forum on Warthunder.com has a stated 31,885 users, and the War Thunder subreddit has more than 391,000. And despite writing this at 11 AM on a Wednesday morning, Steam not only shows more than 100,000 discussion threads related to War Thunder, but a mind-boggling 82,667 users currently playing the game through its platform and 3,000 more in the game’s group chat.

War Thunder users on Steam as of 9/29/23 at 11:07 AM EST

It’s safe to say that, while the MMO aspect of this game may scare off some old-timers like me, War Thunder has a massive following that includes many military technology enthusiasts and even many who are currently serving or have served in military forces around the world. But while its realism serves as a big part of War Thunder‘s international allure, it can also become the subject of some seriously heated debates within the game’s various online communities.

WHY DO LEAKS KEEP HAPPENING ON WAR THUNDER FORUMS?

War Thunder

For most players like Long, War Thunder’s realism adds to the fun of the game.

“The realism and simulation modes take [War Thunder] to the next level,” Long tells us. Aside from managing his growing media empire and serving on active duty, Long is also an avid gamer. “Level of penetration, weapons range, angle of the target, location of ammo storage… All of these things are taken into account.”

Long says that players who study real military systems often excel during gameplay, but for a handful of obsessive players, any departure from that realism can quickly become a sore spot… or even, an obsession. Debates about system capabilities are commonplace in the War Thunder forums, and sometimes, these debates lead to players posting restricted documents as proof that they’re right.

As far as we’ve been able to ascertain, there have been between 11 and 30 leaks of restricted documents in War Thunder forums so far (depending on how you count them), with the earliest dating back to July of 2021 and the most recent occurring just a few days ago. The problem has become so prominent that the War Thunder Wikipedia page has an entire section devoted to these leaks, though, to date, only 11 of the leaks we’ve identified are listed within it.

Of course, not all of the leaks that we could confirm to date came as a result of digital mudslinging. Some of these leaks came from motivated players who wanted to see their favorite platforms hurried into the game. They hoped that by providing very real technical data to the programmers at Hungarian-based Gaijin Entertainment – the developers behind War Thunder – they could expedite the process of getting them fielded on the virtual battlefield.

Gaijin, it is worth noting, may be headquartered in Budapest, Hungary these days, but it was actually founded in Moscow in 2002 by twin brothers Anton and Kirill Yudintsev. In 2012, the firm expanded into Germany and has since opened additional offices in Latvia, Cyprus, Armenia, and the United Arab Emirates. More than one gamer has accused War Thunder of embellishing the capabilities of Russian military hardware to give them an advantage, though these claims are hotly disputed by others within the player community.

The company was accused of providing indirect financial support to Russian-backed separatists in Eastern Ukraine in January of 2021 after logos for War Thunder and another popular Gaijin game, Crossout, were seen in a video tied to these groups. The company denied any involvement in the video in a statement released soon thereafter.

“We do not provide political support to anyone anywhere. We know nothing about politics and prefer to stay out of it. Our agency that ordered an ad in the video in question took it down when they realized they might drag us into a political discussion. We have nothing more to comment regarding this, we prefer to talk about games and games only,” reads the Gaijin statement.

So, with all that context out of the way, let’s run through each of the leaks to date, the systems or platforms that were compromised, and the severity of the breach in security to see if we can’t assess if the War Thunder community poses a serious threat to national security… or if it’s just prime headline and meme-fodder in a world full of sensational takes.

I want to make sure to credit Steam user VoidVexy, as his list of leaks in Steam’s War Thunder guide was the most extensive I could find in my research.

ALL OF THE WAR THUNDER LEAKS SO FAR (AND HOW SERIOUS EACH WAS)

UHT-665 Eurocopter Tiger

Date of Leak: Possibly 7/16/2021

System’s Nation of Origin: France/Germany

What was leaked: According to media sources, the armor layout of the Eurocopter Tiger. This leak is particularly difficult to nail down, as the post has been deleted and different media sources claim the leak occurred in July of 2021, while other sources claim it occurred in late 2022.

Severity: Because this rotorcraft has been in service across multiple nations over the span of two decades, it’s unlikely that adversary nations do not have any reference material regarding its armor layout, but without more information regarding exactly what was leaked, assessing its strategic value is difficult.

Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank

Date of Leak: 7/17/2021

System’s Nation of Origin: U.K.

What was leaked: A player who self-identified as a Challenger 2 Tank commander in the UK military posted excerpts from the tank’s AESP (Army Equipment Support Publication) to prove that the game developer didn’t “model” the Challenger 2 properly in the game. The AESP is, for lack of a better term, a user manual of sorts, which outlines things like maintenance and repair operations for operators.

The player claimed to be a Challenger 2 tank commander out of the Tidworth garrison in Wiltshire, which is the home of a Challenger 2 regiment. He also claimed to be a former member of the UK’s Armoured Trials and Development Unit and a qualified instructor in armored fighting vehicles and tank gunnery among other things.

The user wrote:

“Linking those screenshots with the following edited image from the AESP’s which is meant to show the relationship of the various components. The image isn’t exactly to scale as its only meant to show the position of components relative to each other but it works for the point I’m trying to make here. The trunnion’s sit centrally of the rotor. The trunnions support the rotor in the turret structure and the GCE sub components as previously stated are all mounted to the rotor.”

According to multiple sources, the documents had the words, “UK RESTRICTED” crossed out, with an “unclassified” stamp over them, and did have some portions covered over.

According to a forum moderator, they received written confirmation that the images posted remained classified at the time. They posted the following response:

Severity: While certainly restricted, the document leaked was, in effect, the Challenger 2’s user manual, which is fairly widely distributed to all Challenger 2 crewmen and maintainers both within and beyond the UK’s borders. As such, it’s somewhat unlikely that this leak provided adversary powers with information they were not already able to gain access to during the quarter-century this tank has been in service.

LeClerk Main Battle Tank

Date of Leak: 10/6/2021

System’s Nation of Origin: France

What was leaked: During a debate about the turret rotation speed of the LeClerk main battle tank, one user – who claimed to be a LeClerk crewman in the French Army – resorted to posting portions of the tank gunner’s manual along with some details about the speed in which the turret in the LeClerk Series 2 tank they served in could rotate.

After the user’s claims were not taken at face value during the debate:

The same user then returned to post portions of the platform’s gunnery manual in an attempt to prove that they were correct.

Within a few hours, the document was taken down and the moderators served up a heap of admonishment for the breach of security.

Severity: Once again, despite the information in this manual being restricted, the manual itself is fairly widely distributed among tank crews and maintainers. As a result, it’s unlikely that adversary nations gained any new insight into the platform or its performance as a result of this leak.

DTC10-125 Armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS)

Date of Leak: 6/5/22

System’s Nation of Origin: China

What was leaked: In the first leak to emerge in the War Thunder forums from a non-NATO nation, a debate about the penetration capabilities of the Chinese DTC10-125 tungsten penetrator, a tank-killing round leveraged by a variety of China’s tanks, one user posted an image of the round resting atop what appears to be a previously unreleased technical diagram of the weapon.

Severity: Although the technical diagram shown in the image does not appear to have ever been released to the public, we were able to verify that most of the information visible has been released in various foreign sales brochures and similar documentation (though to be clear, it’s possible that some of this information hadn’t been previously).

Likewise, we found multiple reports that this image had been shared on other websites previously, particularly some within Chinese internet websites, but we were unable to conclusively prove it. However, because we were able to verify much of this information was already publicly available rather quickly, it seems unlikely this leak truly compromised secret details about this weapon.

F-15E Strike Eagle

Date of Leak: 1/18/2023

System’s Nation of Origin: U.S.

What was leaked: In what may be among the largest leaks of restricted documents, a slew of Operational Flight Program (OFP) software manuals for various F-15E Strike Eagle systems were all uploaded at once by an overzealous user. The list included manuals for the AN/APG 70 radar, as well as more specific manuals for the radars operating in air-to-air and air-to-ground modes, among others.

Severity: All of these documents were dated between 1998 and 2000, and to be clear, they’re all from Operational Flight Program Suite 3, which has been subject to a series of updates and replacement efforts in the years since. The Air Force fielded OFP Suite 9.1 in the Strike Eagle in Fall, 2022 – making these documents rather dated. That does not, however, mean there are no commonalities between the dated systems and their more modern iterations.

The documents themselves were declassified, though their distribution is still considered restricted. Nonetheless, because of the age and fairly widespread dissemination of these documents, it’s unlikely they produced any revelations for adversary nations.

F-16A Fighting Falcon

Date of Leak: 1/18/23

System’s Nation of Origin: U.S.

What was leaked: Shortly after the F-16 Fighting Falcon was introduced to the game, one user took to the forums to highlight something about how the F-16A leveraged America’s long-serving radar-guided AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air missile, or AMRAAM, along with documents to support his position.

“Interesting thing I found during my research. During early AMRAAM testing you can see how F-16A would equip the AIM-120 and use TWS on the non-MFD stores control panel “SCP”,” the user wrote.

In this context, TWS stands for “track while scan,” MFD stands for “multi-function display,” and SCP stands for “Stores Control Panel.” The Stores Control Panel has since been replaced by the Multi-Function Display.

Severity: As you might imagine, documentation associated with the F-16A, which is the earliest iteration of the fighter that began production more than 45 years ago, is rather dated – and the documents themselves have been declassified. However, moderators argued that sharing these documents still amounted to a violation of America’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) export manual.

With 25 or so countries operating the F-16 and these documents being both widely distributed and rather dated, it’s unlikely this leak resulted in any actionable intelligence for foreign adversaries.

Shenyang J8-B

Date of Leak: 1/31/23

System’s Nation of Origin: China

What was leaked: Despite entering service in 1980, China’s J8 can be thought of, to some extent, as an enlarged and improved version of China’s previous J7 – itself a licensed copy of the Soviet MiG-21 that’s been flying since the 1950s. The J8-B, however, saw significant reworking, incorporating more modern design elements borrowed from aircraft like the MiG-23 and F-4 Phantom to keep it competitive.

This time, the leak came as a result of a user’s complaint about the game’s depiction of the J8-B’s avionics – specifically, its ballistic computer in the Heads Up Display lacking a Constantly Computed Impact Point (CCIP) to show the pilot where their ordnance would impact.

Along with his argument, the user also posted a file called “Printout for the modification of J-8II, pt. Flight Operations,” said to be “composed by Institute 601, Ministry of Astronautics Industry.”

Severity: Despite being rather dated, the J-8 is actually still in service, transitioning from its original interceptor role to serve as a “scout aircraft” in China’s air force. Because these aircraft have not been sold to foreign operators, it stands to reason that documentation regarding its avionics may be limited, so it is possible this leak resulted in some gained insight into the fighter’s onboard systems, but significant value remains unlikely, particularly since the aircraft’s radar and fire control systems were updated in 2000.

Eurofighter Typhoon DA7

Date of Leak: 8/30/23

System’s Nation of Origin: France/Germany

What was leaked: In a first for War Thunder leaks, this time a restricted document wasn’t uploaded to win an argument, but instead because the user really wanted another aircraft added to the game as a playable platform. To expedite that process, the user uploaded a complete 730-page manual for a specific Typhoon prototype known as Development Aircraft 7 (DA7). The DA7 prototype was built for testing by the Italian Armed Forces.

Severity: Once again, nothing in the document posted was considered “classified,” with seven of its pages marked as “NATO Unclassified” and the rest marked as “NATO Restricted” – denoting that these portions were not meant to be shared outside of NATO member nations.

This specific document has been available online in other places for a few years now, which is likely where the user got his hands on it in the first place. As such, it’s unlikely this leak resulted in any actionable intelligence for adversary nations.

F-117 Nighthawk

Date of Leak: 9/11/23

System’s Nation of Origin: U.S.

What was leaked: According to multiple media sources, one user in the War Thunder forums leaked a series of screenshots taken of the F-117A’s flight manual, allegedly showing engine specifications, sensor locations, and more. Unlike in previous instances, where moderators simply removed the documents uploaded, the entire thread was taken down after the leak was identified.

Severity: Once again, this leak was not of “classified” materials, but rather material that is generally considered to be restricted, despite its availability to the public. In fact, a simple Google search for the F-117’s flight manual produces a number of interesting results that share more information than could be gleaned by these War Thunder leaks.

AH-64D Apache Longbow

Date of Leak: 9/15/23

Nation of Origin: U.S.

What was leaked: The Apache Longbow began production in 1997 and remains in service for a long list of nations including the United States. Once again, a debate between users prompted one to post a link to the helicopter’s technical manual in an effort to prove a point. The post was once again taken down by moderators and the user who uploaded it has been suspended.

Severity: Once more, the document uploaded is considered unclassified, though the documents themselves are said to have been marked “DOD AND DOD CONTRACTORS ONLY.” However, once more, you can easily find this manual in its entirety online with the right search terms, suggesting the intelligence value of this leak was all but moot.

MiG-29 and Su-57

Date of Leaks: 12/22 – 1/23

Systems’ Nation of Origin: Russia

What was leaked: In the first leak out of Russia, debate about the capability of the nation’s 4th and 5th generation fighters ultimately led to the posting of two different documents. One of these leaks highlights the Sukhoi Su-57’s radar cross-section, while the other focuses on the radar system capabilities of the MiG-29.

Severity: Once more, despite the restricted nature of at least one of these documents, the information contained within was hardly groundbreaking. While the thread has been taken down, the document showing the Su-57’s poor stealth performance was likely the Sukhoi patent paperwork that has been making the rounds on the internet for some time. Likewise, the excerpts from the MiG-29 user manual are equally easy to come by. In fact, the entire manual itself is available for download from multiple sources online.

SO, WHAT’S THE REAL STORY WITH THE WAR THUNDER LEAKS?

As is so often the case when stories about military technology reach the mainstream media, the real driver behind media coverage of these “leaks” isn’t their technical value at all, but rather, the public’s general interest in the story as a seemingly endless source of highly meme-able hot takes.

Throughout our research into these War Thunder leaks, we have been unable to identify anything that might provide foreign adversary nations with any truly valuable intelligence. In fact, aside from a few cases where the language barrier may have inhibited our ability to search through foreign websites, we were able to locate alternate sources for these documents all over the web. Often, these alternate sources had been hosting the documents for years, and in many, the documents remain available even after War Thunder moderators nuked the leaks on their forum.

Of course, that isn’t to say that posting these documents in an online forum is a good idea. It, of course, isn’t. But the truth is that national governments devote significant resources to gaining access to legitimately classified documents and designs, scour digital spaces for actionable intelligence, and go to great lengths to manipulate program insiders into revealing the latest breakthroughs in Defense technology.

For these War Thunder leaks to have real value to adversary nations, it would suggest that these nations have access to the War Thunder forums… but not the rest of the internet where these documents remain available.

At the end of the day, the War Thunder leaks story is an exploration into how pop culture shapes media coverage — with a number of outlets bending over backward to infer the severity of these leaks, but few making much of an effort to determine their actual severity at all. In a real way, a great deal of the coverage associated with these leaks could be summed up by the old adage, “Never let the truth get in the way of a good story.“

Of course, as our friend Habitual Line Crosser puts it, serious or not, “the cyber training guy would be very disappointed in War Thunder players.“

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Jason Wells / Shutterstock.com

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As the curtains fell on the UN’s annual high-level meetings last week, the world was left with an unsettling message: the international order is crumbling, and no one can agree on what comes next.

The focus of the week—the one time of the year that most of the world’s leaders are all in the same place—was meant to be on urgently accelerating global action on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Yet, against a backdrop of intensifying geopolitical tensions, the war in Ukraine, coups in Africa, the escalating climate crisis and the ongoing pandemic, a different theme emerged: the fracturing and fragmenting of the global order, and the urgent need to reform the United Nations before it’s too late.

Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s opening address to the UN General Assembly was both a rallying cry and a stark warning: ‘Our world is becoming unhinged. Geopolitical tensions are rising. Global challenges are mounting. And we seem incapable of coming together to respond.’

Describing a world rapidly moving towards multipolarity while lamenting that global governance is ‘stuck in time’, Guterres warned that the world is heading for a ‘great fracture’. Urging the renewal of multilateral institutions based on 21st-century realities, he left no illusions about what will happen if this doesn’t happen: ‘It is reform or rupture.’

Unsurprisingly, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky echoed this in a powerful address to a special UN Security Council high-level open debate later in the week. He warned that the gridlock over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the UN meant that humankind could no longer pin any hopes on it to maintain peace and security. He then called for meaningful reform—including on the use of the veto in the UN Security Council.

It’s a sentiment shared by Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong. In her address to the UN Security Council, she called for urgent reform, including ‘constraints on the use of the veto’. She condemned Russia’s use of its position as a permanent member of the Security Council to veto any action ‘as a flagrant violation of the UN charter’, and later told the media that ‘across many issues, the UN system is falling short of where we want it to be and where the world needs it to be, but what we want to do is to work with others to ensure that the United Nations evolves’.

While the existence of the veto prevents any Security Council action from being taken against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine (or against the other four permanent members), the UN charter more broadly—by design—makes any reform of the UN incredibly difficult and extremely unlikely. And given that US President Joe Biden was the only leader of a P5 country to actually show up to the UN for leaders’ week, it’s not clear that even Western countries like the UK and France are committed to the UN—the bedrock of the international system since World War II.

Where does all this leave a multipolar world teetering on the brink? With the existing order already so divided, how do we reimagine and agree on a global system that can meet the challenges of the 21st century?

After all, if, despite being a blatant breach of international law and the UN charter, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine hasn’t caused any meaningful reform to yet take place, what will?

Indeed, the fact that the broader international community is relatively ambivalent about holding Russia to account for its ongoing atrocities in Ukraine is a testament to Russia’s and China’s efforts to dilute multilateral institutions and create an alternative world order that’s more accommodating of autocracies.

Confronted with these dynamics, the international community stands at a pivotal juncture. The decisions made now will determine the trajectory of the global order for decades to come. As Guterres said in his opening address, the international community is presented with a stark choice: reform and rally behind a renewed vision of multilateralism, crafted collaboratively to meet the multifaceted existential challenges of our times; or continue to pursue self-interest above all else, and prepare for a rupture.

By the looks of things, in this rapidly changing landscape marked by division and lack of consensus, we must steel ourselves for what lies ahead: an era of ‘unhinged’ global disorder.

Mercedes Page is a senior fellow at ASPI.

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Reuters. 

Western efforts to choke Russia’s oil profits are failing as production cuts agreed with Saudi Arabia push the market price towards US$100 a barrel and Russia’s biggest customers—China and India—start paying close to full market price.

Russia is successfully evading the Western effort to impose a price cap of US$60 a barrel on a large share of its oil sales.

The price cap, devised by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and in place since December 2022, demands that Western insurance companies only provide coverage of Russian oil shipments if they can be certified as being sold at no more than the upper limit.

The aim was to curb Russia’s profits while allowing its oil to keep flowing to world markets. An absolute ban on Russian oil sales, as the US imposed on Iran and Venezuela, would have sent the global price rocketing and was, in any case, seen to be impractical with such a large supplier as Russia.

Since Western insurance companies covered around 90% of the world’s shipping, it was expected to be successful. The agreement on the price cap binds all European Union and G7 members, except Japan. Australia is also party to the arrangement. Japan secured an exemption, which was recently extended to the middle of next year, because of its extensive involvement in Russia’s Sakhalin-2 oil and liquefied natural gas project, in which Japanese trading companies have invested and which supplies 10% of Japan’s LNG imports.

Estimates by French trade data consultancy Kpler show that, in August, only 24 million barrels of Russian oil were delivered by ships carrying insurance, while no insurance could be identified for tankers carrying 67 million barrels. The share with identifiable insurance has dropped from 47% to 26% since May.

According to energy pricing company Argus Media, Russian oil was selling for US$87 a barrel on 22 September, only a few dollars short of the North Sea benchmark price of US$94, and far above the level set by the cap. Russia had been forced to accept discounts of as much as US$35 a barrel until April this year.

Yellen acknowledged last weekend that the prices being fetched by Russian oil showed the price cap wasn’t working as hoped. ‘It does point to some reduction in the effectiveness of the price cap,’ she said.

‘Russia has spent a great deal of money and time and effort to provide services for the export of its oil. They have added to their shadow fleet, provided more insurance and that kind of trade is not prohibited by the price cap,’ she said.

The ‘shadow fleet’ Yellen referred to is understood to comprise almost 500 tankers, often with obscure ownership and insurance details that can change monthly. Shipments are sometimes made in small tankers and then transferred to larger vessels in the Mediterranean for the journey to Asia.

Lloyds List analyst Michelle Wiese Bockman says prices for nearly all grades of Russian crude oil and refined products are now between 28% and 50% above the G7 price cap. She said a significant portion of Russia’s oil shipments were still using Western insurance, implying they were complying with the cap.

She suggested that false attestation documentation by the Russian sellers could explain how Russia was exceeding the limit. ‘There’s no suggestion sanctions are being breached by those ships, but I can’t see how so many volumes could be compliant. These documents aren’t publicly available, but would be available to regulators upon request. Perhaps enforcement needs to be stepped up to find out how these deals are being structured so they can remain below the cap.’

A Financial Times investigation found that on the Russia-to-India trade, oil was being loaded at Russia’s Baltic ports at a price below the cap, but was arriving in India at prices US$18 a barrel higher, which is about double the freight cost.

Russia’s most potent counter to the Western price cap is the deal it struck with Saudi Arabia 12 months ago to cut oil production, with combined OPEC and Russian output falling by two million barrels a day. The cut was supposed to expire last month, but Saudi Arabia and Russia recently agreed to extend it to the end of the year.

The International Energy Agency, which represents oil-consuming nations, commented, ‘The Saudi–Russian alliance is proving a formidable challenge for oil markets.’ It predicts demand will rise by 1.5 million barrels a day over the remainder of the year, with most of the increase coming from China, and says supplies will run short.

It’s a seller’s market for oil and this favours Russia getting the prices it wants. Shipping is too fragmented an industry—with its flags of convenience, tax-haven ownerships and a multitude of shippers who can operate from a post office box—to be corralled reliably by the G7 price cap, particularly when the biggest buyers of Russian oil—China, India and Turkey—are not parties to it.

Yellen is a formidable economist. She chaired the US Federal Reserve and the Council of Economic Advisers under President Bill Clinton, and has held significant academic appointments. However, the price cap may have been too clever, overestimating the power of financial regulators to dictate the terms of trade to the oil market.

There have been concerns that Russia may use the tight state of markets to generate a further global energy crisis over the coming northern winter, with suggestions that Russian President Vladimir Putin is keen to make life for US President Joe Biden as uncomfortable as possible in the lead-up to next year’s US election. Russia recently banned the export of diesel and petrol, claiming it faced a domestic shortage, which added to global anxiety about energy supplies.

While an energy crisis may suit Russia, it is not in the interest of Saudi Arabia. The alliance between the two is just one of convenience. The Saudis want to keep the oil price high, but not so elevated that it leads to either a global recession or a fresh surge of US shale oil production. It was only three years ago that a disagreement between Saudi  Arabia and Russia over production cuts in the face of the pandemic descended into an all-out price war which at one point sent the global oil price negative.

David Uren is a senior fellow at ASPI.

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Shutterstock.

When Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un met for their second summit last month in the Russian Far East, there was much discussion about the military consequences, including North Korean weapon sales to Moscow, as the war in Ukraine grinds on and a truce remains out of the question.

Since the end of the Cold War, contact between Moscow and Pyongyang has diminished. Still, the relationship between the two countries should be briefly revisited for context—and to understand how we “got here.”

We can perhaps start on October 14, 1945, when a young ethnic Korean man stepped out before a crowd assembled at Kirimri Stadium in Pyongyang. It was here that Kim Il-sung, a former trainee of the Soviet Red Army, was presented to the Koreans as an “outstanding guerrilla leader.” Kim’s appearance drew public skepticism, but the Russians were determined to position the 33-year-old man as their appointee on the Korean peninsula. To get the job done, they launched a relentless propaganda campaign that blurred the line between fiction and reality. To this day, propaganda plays an instrumental role in bringing the North Korean nation to life. Without Soviet propaganda, the current leader’s grandfather may have been relegated to the ash heap of history.

Kim Il-sung died in 1994, but across the decades of his rule, he leveraged the impact of images and their unlimited reproducibility in the modern age to strengthen his grip on power. He called filmmakers and other artists “engineers of the soul.” His son, Kim Jong-il, shared his father’s passion for the moving image. Kim Jong-il regarded cinema as an essential channel for ideological indoctrination. He instructed North Korean writers to “grasp the seed which fires [their] heart with an unquenchable flame.”

As an educated public, we must understand North Korea’s nuclear weapons stand for many things. They are obviously symbols of the nation’s defense policy. Still, given the regime’s historically heavy reliance on visual representation, we also must consider that they are a form of cultural expenditure that’s taking front and center at a time when the state has diminished its role. Increased marketization is generating change—spurring North Korean migration and movement in the twenty-first century.

Judging by the accounts of most North Korean defectors in the South, the state has achieved very little for its people following a widespread and preventable famine. Weapons of mass destruction have surged in significance for the leadership while grassroots changes continue to spread in the country. Unless the North Korean military loses its domestic role as a symbol of regime solidarity or its international role as a source of persuasive spectacle for the outside world, we should not expect any willingness to give up weapons.

As we have observed over the years, it is through the many apparatuses of postmodern globalization, including online platforms, that North Korea does not so much capture its enemies as captivate them. In doing so, the leadership is again successfully blurring the lines between the real and the imaginary.

Elizabeth Shim is an author and former journalist based in New York City and currently a principal at Haven Tower Group, a strategic communications consultancy. Shim’s forthcoming book, North Korea’s Nuclear Cinema: Simulation and Neoliberal Politics in the Two Koreas (Bloomsbury 2024), is the culmination of nearly a decade of journalism. She has reported for United Press International, Associated Press, and South China Morning Post.

Image: Reuters. 

The wages of hubris are dear. Four months into Ukraine’s vaunted counteroffensive—which, at a massive cost in men and materiel, has made minimal territorial gain—support for Kyiv is openly eroding. Frustration flows from the growing economic burden of war and continuing corruption scandals in Ukraine. But it is aggravated by the backlash against the overconfidence and arrogance of the Western, especially American, foreign-policy establishment. For months, skeptical voices were sidelined while the media contrasted Western military-technological prowess with Russian backwardness and disarray. NATO brains would defeat Russian brawn, experts confidently predicted in June, thus making the disillusion and distrust of October all the greater.

Who isn’t aghast at over 20,000 casualties for a gain of 100 sq. miles, evoking the carnage of WWI? Since Russia occupies 40,000 sq. miles of Ukrainian land, the unsustainability of such a campaign is evident. Yet officials in Brussels and Washington insist that Kyiv’s counteroffensive is succeeding, cheering minor advances and illusory breakthroughs. At the same time, a chorus of retired military officers exaggerate Russian weakness and see victory as just one more “game-changing” weapons transfer away. Why haven’t NATO-supplied armaments, including hundreds of modern tanks, worked as expected? Because of minefields and trenches, they lament, neglecting to admit that Russia is fighting fiercely with both tactical and technological prowess—from devious electronic warfare to devastating anti-tank drones. But weren’t we told that Russian technology lagged far behind the West’s? And that Ukraine had an army of drones while Russia’s demoralized draftees were poorly armed, poorly led, and perpetually on the brink of desertion? 

The brutality of war sparks passions—admiration for Ukraine, hatred and derision of Russia—that inflame public debate and impede objective analysis. The latter, by definition, must be dispassionate. If think tanks become partisan and the media act as cheerleaders, then we see only what we want to see. With Ukraine, the cheerleading mirrors that of our Iraq and Afghanistan debacles. As a result, we underestimated the adversary, leading to flawed tactics, failed operations, and now flagging public support. What next? As always, the default choice is escalation—providing Kyiv with more armaments and munitions. But will a few squadrons of F-16s and a few hundred ATACMS be enough to defeat Russia? 

Underestimating Russia

One morning in mid-June, Russian president Vladimir Putin awoke to bad news. In a pre-dawn raid, Ukraine struck the bridge linking Crimea and the Russian mainland. If he had followed U.S. media, Putin would have been truly distressed; experts described how the attack dealt a severe blow to Russia’s war because the bridge was the vital supply line for the front. But while pundits hailed this as a triumph for Kyiv, Putin merely shrugged while predicting Moscow’s victory. Was he in denial, or did he know something crucial about Russian resilience? In fact, notwithstanding initial hyperbole, only road traffic was disrupted while supply trains continued unimpeded. Moreover, Ukraine attacked the same bridge in 2022, and repairs quickly restored full operation despite similar predictions of doom. Indeed, the Crimean Bridge has symbolized Russian resourcefulness in the face of Western scorn for a decade; many initially sneered that Russia lacked the know-how to build Europe’s longest bridge, with some even predicting that it would collapse under its own weight. As such, this sturdy engineering marvel invites us to reconsider our stereotypes. 

“Russia is running out of ammunition.” A Google search of this phrase yields almost ten million hits, as versions of it appeared in Western headlines for a year. CNN, Newsweek, The Economist, Forbes, and Foreign Policy all joined the chorus, echoing assessments from U.S. and UK defense officials. In June 2022, the Washington Post predicted that Russian munitions would soon be depleted and Russia would “exhaust its combat capability” within months. Yet by June of 2023, all of these outlets reported that it was actually Ukraine that was critically low on missiles and artillery. How low? Russia now fires over 10,000 artillery rounds per day, while Ukraine manages just 5,000. It takes the United States weeks to produce what Ukraine expends in a few days, while NATO allies have reached “the bottom of the barrel” in donating their reserves to Kyiv. Meanwhile, Russia is still outproducing the West despite “crippling” sanctions that were supposed to strangle its war effort. Likewise, Russian missiles continued to strike Ukraine a year after reports that production would soon halt because arms manufacturers were reduced to cannibalizing computer chips from home appliances. And still, we scoff at Russia’s claim that it will increase tank production by 1,500 next year—three times the number of Western tanks provided to Ukraine. 

“So what if Russia makes more tanks? Ukraine will just destroy them with missiles and drones.” This follows the narrative of how Kyiv nullifies Russian quantity with superior quality, especially their hi-tech “army of drones.” Thus, we pay scant attention to news that belies this narrative, namely Russia’s adoption of new systems and tactics. Ukraine now loses up to 10,000 drones per month to Russian counter-drone weapons and electronic warfare. Russia also jams GPS signals to sabotage the guidance systems of U.S.-supplied armaments such as JDAM glide bombs and HIMARS artillery. And Russia is deploying a new line of unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the Lancent “kamikaze” drone, that have destroyed or disabled dozens of just-delivered Western tanks and armored vehicles—thereby thwarting the rapid breakthrough that was supposed to follow billions in NATO armor and months of NATO training. 

The Fog of War 

The Ukrainian battlefield is broad, flat farmland criss-crossed by strips of forest. It is covered by extensive air defenses, continually monitored by both Russian and Ukrainian ground and air-based systems, and blanketed by both sides’ surveillance drones. With night-vision capabilities as well, the “fog of war” has finally lifted—at least within a band of fifteen kilometers along the battlefront. Little can move far without being detected, and to be detected is to be targeted—by attack drones, by artillery, by rockets (such as the HIMARS), and by air-to-surface missiles (such as Russia’s LMUR). The Russians experienced this in the war’s first phase, suffering grievous losses as their drive on Kyiv was repulsed. Moscow’s last major advance, capturing the city of Bakhmut in May, came at the cost of tens of thousands of lives. But now Kyiv is suffering as its counteroffensive—meant as a blitzkrieg through Russian lines—instead advances at a bloody crawl. 

It’s true that the Ukrainians and their NATO advisers underestimated the density of Russian minefields. But while mines take a direct toll, they also work indirectly by restricting vehicles to secured routes and narrow paths where they are easier targets for Russian artillery and drones. In June, Russia decimated an entire column of Ukrainian armor—including just-acquired German Leopard tanks and American Bradley infantry fighting vehicles—in a clash on the Zaporizhzhia front. This morale-boosting victory for Moscow saw the site memorialized as “Bradley Square.” The lesson is that any large concentration of armor is quickly detected, and any major convoy of troops is similarly seen and targeted. 

With layers of surveillance, including swarms of drones providing real-time detection and targeting to Russian artillery, a grand Desert Storm-style offensive became impossible. Another problem is Ukraine’s inferiority to Russia in the air and its consequent inability to pave the way for its armor and infantry units by pounding Russian defenses from the skies. Even battalion-sized operations are problematic, much less the brigade-level blitzkriegs that many imagined. Ukrainian activity confines itself to company or platoon-level operations where a few dozen troops, supported by a handful of vehicles, advance stealthily under the cover of forest lines. Backed by drones—and supported by artillery fire—they seek to degrade the enemy enough to storm Russian trenches. 

Clumsy, Cowardly Russians?

Sometimes, they succeed. Sometimes, the Ukrainians are detected early, and the Russians ambush them with artillery fire. Snipers and stormtroopers contest every trench, with deadly drones buzzing above. The Ukrainians press on, their courage under fire reverently detailed in the media. But that of the Russians—also fighting fiercely and taking heavy losses—is nowhere to be seen. After numerous stories about disarray in command and desertion in the ranks, the fact that the Russians are fighting with discipline and cohesion has left those who predicted otherwise silent. The first direct acknowledgment of dogged Russian resistance in major U.S. media came only recently from CNN. This admission did not come from Western experts but from Ukrainian soldiers themselves. Frustrated that their NATO backers had faulted their meager progress, they lamented, “We expected less resistance. They are holding. They have leadership. It is not often you say that about the enemy.” 

Such observations are notably absent in U.S. media. Yet, is the aim of war reporting to celebrate one’s allies? Or is it to present a balanced assessment, regardless of whether the good or bad guys have the upper hand? This partisanship over the prowess of soldiers is also seen in coverage of the weapons they wield. Following the narrative of “Ukrainian brains over Russian brawn,” a succession of upgrades to Kyiv’s arsenal have been touted as wonder weapons. These include HIMARS artillery, Leopard tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, Storm Shadow missiles, and DPICM cluster munitions—“game changers” all. But these high hopes have been frustrated, in large part because of the weapons the Russians use to counter them. Moscow’s arsenal includes electronic warfare (EW) systems that down Ukrainian drones by the dozens and GPS jamming of U.S.-made HIMARS artillery and JDAM glide bombs. Untested on such a vast scale, their effectiveness has been a nasty surprise. Also unexpected was Russia’s introduction of new systems, such as the Lancet drone, which wreaks havoc on Ukrainian armor thanks to its expanded range, payload, and anti-jamming features. Others include new FAB glide bombs and the improved LMUR missile, whose range puts the helicopters launching it beyond the reach of Ukrainian air defense. These Russian weapons are blunting Ukraine’s advance, yet mainstream analyses rarely mention them. After all, Russia was said to be running out of precision munitions, not developing and deploying new ones. 

Instead of asking why they badly underestimated Russia’s resilience and innovation, the excuse for Kyiv’s failures is that “Moscow had months to prepare defensive lines.” Media experts—often the same ones who predicted rapid progress—now explain why progress could never have been rapid in any case. This is an incomplete and self-serving answer; the Russians clearly excel at building defenses more complex than just minefields and trenches, and proper appreciation of that is essential to analyzing Ukraine’s prospects and possible endpoints for this war. 

The Ever-Imminent “Collapse” of Russia

Many analysts remain bullish on Ukraine’s eventual victory, yet now see it resulting from a Russian collapse—whether of the Russian army or the entire Putin regime. In other words, these military experts base their prognoses not on analysis of military operations per se but on hunches about the perseverance and patriotism of Russian soldiers and citizens. Some, like General Mark Milley, say that the Russians “...lack leadership, they lack will, their morale is poor, and their discipline is eroding.” Others, like ex-CIA Director General David Petraeus, believe that Russian resolve might “crumble” in response to Ukraine’s drone attacks on Moscow. Such strikes “bring the war to the Russian people” and may convince them that, like the USSR’s 1980s quagmire in Afghanistan, today’s war in Ukraine is “ultimately unsustainable.” Even a largely sober analysis by Warographics concludes with a scenario based on hope; a Ukrainian reconquest of Bakhmut could deliver “a devastating psychological blow” perhaps sufficient to cause a Russian collapse. 

Wishful thinking is no basis for policy, nor is there reason to hope that a Ukrainian reconquest of Bakhmut would deliver a “devastating psychological blow” sufficient to cause a Russian collapse.  In fact, such a blow was already absorbed by the Ukrainians, who lost the indispensable cream of their army (to hordes of dispensable Russian criminals-turned-stormtroopers) in the doomed defense of a city that President Zelensky had vowed would not fall.  As seen, Ukrainian soldiers themselves rebut Milley’s claim that Russian forces lack leadership, will, and discipline. Petraeus is correct that Kyiv’s drone strikes unnerve Muscovites, and evidence from Russian social media reveals distress over high casualties. But these have not translated into broad anti-Putin, anti-war attitudes. On the contrary, support for Putin remains strong, and an anti-Western, rally-round-the-flag effect intensifies as Russia finds itself in a proxy war with all of NATO, per Kremlin propaganda. 

Petraeus’ hope that Russia’s elite will reject the Ukraine war as “unsustainable”—as the Soviet elite supposedly did with the Afghan war in the 1980s—is based on a flawed analogy. The old Soviet ruling elite did not see the Afghan war as unsustainable or worry much about public opinion. It took a new leader who prioritized improving ties with the West, China, and the Muslim world—all of whom made leaving Afghanistan a precondition of detente—to start working toward an exit. The point is not that war isn’t costly; the Afghan war was, and the Ukraine war is even more so. Accepting defeat in a major war—especially one that is justified in terms of “vital national interests”—is unlikely until there is both a new leader and elite turnover. For Putin and his political-military elite, the geopolitical implosion that followed Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and other outposts—particularly Central Europe—is precisely why they believe that Russia must stand firm in Ukraine today. 

Putin is Now Weaker/Stronger than Ever

Yet, if the media and its commentators are correct, that leadership transition is coming soon. For months—especially since the abortive June mutiny led by Wagner Group boss Yevgeny Prigozhin—consensus has reigned on Putin’s weakness and potential ouster. Per one former KGB officer on CNN, Putin’s hold on power is now “almost nonexistent,” and state authority “is in free fall.” Another CNN guest—a top Ukrainian official—agreed about Putin’s waning authority and said, “The power he used to have is just crumbling down.” Further, this hastens Ukrainian victory because it has “greatly affected Russian power on the battlefield.” These predictions were wrong: Putin’s grip is stronger now than before; the mutiny failed to rally support; Wagner has been tamed, and its boss eliminated; and Putin has sidelined officials who echoed Prigozhin’s criticism of him or his top brass. As for the war in Ukraine, Russian resistance has actually stiffened since June. Who was this Ukrainian official who claimed that Putin’s army, like his authority, was “crumbling?” None other than Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. 

With all due respect to Zelensky and his office, a journalist’s duty is to push back against spin and insist on evidence for extravagant claims. Instead, the media meekly accepts arguments from officials—then repeated by commentators and pundits—because they fit our narratives of Putin the loser, of a collapsing Russia, or of Western superiority. In other words, because they feed our hubris. Consider the claim by UK intelligence chief Richard Moore that Putin was compelled to “cut a deal to save his skin.” In fact, it was the opposite. Prigozhin—to temporarily save his own skin since he faced summary execution for treason—was forced to accept Putin’s terms. Ridiculing Putin as the one who backed down in fear for his life has little to do with intelligence. It plays well in the moment, but people eventually notice the accumulation of flawed assessments and failed predictions. 

When the Going Gets Tough…Spin? 

This helps explain a recent poll showing that a majority of Americans now oppose more military aid to Ukraine. Here, they join EU countries where majorities already believed—even before Ukraine’s recent failures—that sending more weapons only prolongs an unwinnable war and delays negotiations for peace. The polls cannot tell exactly what measure of concerns lie behind such opinions—be it general “Ukraine fatigue,” loss of faith in Kyiv’s chances of victory, concern at the heavy burden borne by taxpayers, distress at the news of Ukrainian corruption, or alarm at the cost of assimilating millions of Ukrainian refugees. Yet underlying all is a broader loss of faith in their leaders and the NATO-EU elite still promising to fight for “as long as it takes” to achieve “decisive victory.” 

U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently defended Ukraine’s counteroffensive by arguing that, thanks to last year’s campaign, “They (Russia) have already lost,” and “(Ukraine) has already taken back about 50 percent of what was initially seized.” Yet the entire point of this year’s campaign is to retake the other 50 percent. Similar spin comes from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a highly regarded think tank but one whose pro-Ukrainian partisanship complicates its objectivity. ISW claimed that Ukraine regained more territory in under six weeks than Russia in the previous six months. Instead of assessing Kyiv’s campaign by its stated objective—a rapid thrust to sever Russia’s land bridge with Crimea—ISW relativizes its failures by comparing them with Russia’s. But even this doesn’t convince because Russia’s recent gains refer to the conquest of Bakhmut, a large and heavily fortified city (prewar population 73,000). By contrast, Ukraine’s recent gains consist of open fields and small villages like Robotnye (prewar population: 500). 

Maintaining public support for the war is tougher than in the early 2000s following the 9/11 attacks. The sense of outrage and the White House’s pledges of quick and remorseless victory convinced many to back ill-fated ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not only is the “hubris and mendacity” of those recent debacles still fresh in the public mind, but today, we have many more sources of critical information—from expert journals and websites to specialized analysts offering detailed, current information and independent critiques on the conflict. They subject the claims of our political-military leaders to close scrutiny, and unless there is a sharp reversal of fortunes in Ukraine, that scrutiny will be harsh.

Preparing for the Horrors Ahead

But is a sharp reversal of fortunes likely? After so many failed forecasts, many now doubt the assurances of Washington, Brussels, and Kyiv. And it’s not just the quantity of failed predictions that diminish faith in a Russian collapse. It’s also their quality, or the way those predictions have failed, that raises doubt about their authors’ insights into the system about which they prognosticate. Analysts who foresaw that economic sanctions would cripple Russia’s war effort have had to admit that they misunderstood key aspects of Russia’s economic resourcefulness. Others underestimated Russia’s military resilience—as detailed above—due to flawed assumptions about Russian ineptitude or Western military-technological superiority. 

Some fall victim to confirmation bias—finding evidence of Russian weakness because their assumptions told them to seek it. When attention focuses on disorganization and dissent in the Russian army—trumpeting incidents of soldiers’ and officers’ complaints, even desertion—it suggests imminent collapse. But how many Russian soldiers and officers are not complaining, and how common is disorganization or dissent in the Ukrainian military? And where is the analysis of why regular soldiers spurned the Wagner mutiny? A related problem is that of selective coverage. Among many examples was recent media coverage of Moscow’s “desperation” in seeking an arms deal with North Korea. Yet they simultaneously ignored signs of “desperation” in Kyiv, such as lowering fitness standards for military service or seeking to deport back to Ukraine men who are ducking conscription in countries of the EU. 

Ukraine could be closer to collapse than Russia. There may indeed be an “asymmetrical attrition gradient”—another way of saying that Russia is taking more casualties than Ukraine—but even some Kyiv officials admit that Russia can sustain them better than Ukraine. By late autumn, when weather slows the fighting and campaigns usually end, Ukraine may have clawed back another 100 sq. miles—but at what cost? Looking to 2024, Russia will draw on a manpower base far larger than Ukraine’s. Ukraine will receive more NATO missiles, but they are unlikely to “change the game” any more than HIMARS and Storm Shadows did before them. Kyiv will also receive a few dozen F-16 fighters, but their hastily trained pilots—confronting a dense and sophisticated belt of air defenses—may suffer severe losses with no major impact on the war. 

Faced with an asymmetrical armaments gradient—the inability or unwillingness of NATO states to continue providing Ukraine with sufficient munitions to keep pace with Russia—Ukraine will seek to change the equation. This means more drone strikes on Moscow and other Russian cities, raids on Russian border towns, and a ferocious battle over Crimea. Ukraine will expand attacks on Russia’s Black Sea ships and ports, perhaps finally destroying the Crimean Bridge. And Russia will do likewise, improving its drone and missile force (including reverse engineering of captured NATO weapons) to hit airfields, railroads, ports, and other infrastructure harder than ever. Civilian casualties will soar, as will the danger of chemical or nuclear “accidents.” 

Cheerleading that “Ukraine must win decisively, and with superior NATO armaments, it surely will” supports neither sensible military strategy nor responsible policy debate. Those who argue thus recall Britain’s WWII leader, Winston Churchill, who stiffened a nation’s resolve through its darkest hour and led it to triumph. Rarely do they recall Britain’s WWI commander Douglas Haig, whose insistence that Germany would collapse if only the Allies mounted just one more offensive ultimately prolonged a grueling war of attrition at the cost of a million lives. Hubris is not only our enemy but Ukraine’s too.

Robert English, a former Pentagon policy analyst, is the Director of Central European Studies at the University of Southern California. He is the author of various works on the Cold War’s end and aftermath, including Russia and the Idea of the West.

Image: Reuters.