Diplomacy & Crisis News

The suffering of the Sudanese people becomes more dramatic by the hour: water and food supplies are shrinking while the injured are turned out of their hospital beds to make room for fresh victims of a pointless civil war, the third in as many decades. Hundreds have died and thousands have been gravely wounded in the crossfire as two generals fight for supremacy.

The shooting started the day following the Framework Agreement, which was supposed to enable the transition to a civilian government. Democracy in Sudan is always, tantalizingly, just out of reach.

Sudan’s politics live in a tragic loop. Since its independence from Great Britain in 1955, Sudan has been ruled by strongmen who are later replaced by coup leaders promising democracy, the rule of law, and, sometimes, the rule of Islam. Each time, from the coup leaders, a new strongman emerges.

After a bloodless 1989 coup, General Omar al-Bashir came to power along with his former classmates in what was then called Gordon College. Bashir, by 1996, had seized total power, pushing out the Islamists, former communists, and some northern tribal leaders. Bashir was himself was toppled in 2018 by protests, but the army quickly took control before democracy could break out. The doom loop cycled again.

Still, it would be wrong and dangerous to America’s security to assume a disintegrating Sudan poses no risks to the United States.

First, other global powers are already contending to control Sudan’s oil, gold, and strategic ports. If one Sudanese faction wins, then Russian demands for a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast would give Putin’s navy a global reach. If the other faction wins, Russia would also gain but Chinese influence in Sudan—already extensive, as measured by the Chinese-built skyscrapers in Khartoum and the bobbing oil derricks in the Nuba region—would surge.

During a visit to Khartoum in February, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov discussed the prospect of a Russian naval base with Sudanese leaders and the goal of completing it by the end of 2023, according to a document leaked online by a Massachusetts air national guardsman.

What’s important is that, left to its own devices, Sudan’s future will be controlled by America’s rivals. Those rivals, especially, include China.

China, already the world's largest consumer of energy, sees Africa as a “promised land’ of oil and gas. Sudanese crude alone satisfies more than 10 percent of Chinese oil needs. Beijing needs Sudan.

China’s Africa Policy Paper, released in 2015, calls for deep military engagement, technological cooperation, and a strengthening of African security forces. Although assistance initiatives to the African Union and its regional military pacts have multiplied considerably under this policy, Beijing channels most of its support bilaterally, from government to government. Often, this means arms sales. As a result, China is currently the largest arms supplier to sub-Saharan Africa with 27 percent of the region's imports between 2013 and 2017—an increase of 55 percent over the period 2008–2012, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Sudan represents a significant part of that increase in weapon sales.

China also rules sub-Saharan Africa through debt. Growing debts of China’s military partner countries to Chinese state banks that fund China’s megaprojects now worry officials across Africa. They also ruefully note that China hires few locals for its African mega-projects—creating African debt without African wealth.

If Sudan comes apart like Libya, refugees will follow the Nile north and swamp Egypt’s rickety refugee centers. If Egypt decides to become more involved in Sudan, as it did in years past, it will use its influence to stem the tide of refugees and oppose the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, on Ethiopia’s stretch of the Blue Nile. This will put Ethiopia into conflict with both Sudan and Egypt. East Africa could soon be aflame—risking U.S. counter-terror operations in the region.

Other U.S. allies have strategic interests at stake, too. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are pressuring both sides to adopt a diplomatic solution. Sudan was part of the original Abraham Accord normalization agreements between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. But after a military coup in Sudan in October 2021, the final steps of the process with Khartoum stalled. Israel is inviting Sudan’s warring parties to a peace summit in Jerusalem. For Egypt and Turkey, a civil war in Sudan would pose a significant threat to their naval presence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

For the United States, the options for mitigating the crisis are limited.  After successfully evacuating U.S. diplomats and citizens, the focus should shift to alleviating human suffering by establishing safe corridors to allow trapped civilians to escape.

This is an opportunity for America to impose its leadership and to restore the Framework for democracy with negotiation, not war.

The United States has left a vacuum in Africa and now its rivals have rushed in. It is not too late for America to offer the African continent what it really wants: peace, prosperity, recognition, and democracy. It could start with Sudan.

Ahmed Charai is a Publisher. He is on the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, the International Crisis Group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

From 2016 until February 24, 2022, most U.S. foreign policymakers focused on America’s strategy in countering a rising China. Many policymakers placed Europe on the backburner, taking for granted the endurability of American primacy on the continent. The invasion of Ukraine changed this dynamic. Since the start of this war, America’s attention has shifted back towards Europe and NATO.

However, many policymakers seem to be regurgitating old solutions to new problems. These include an expansion of NATO and sending more American troops to Europe. Essentially, such solutions are a Cold War and 1990s answer to today’s new security environment. Whereas America’s position in the 1990s as the sole great power permitted it to expand the alliance, today’s NATO faces a revisionist Russia tired of the status quo of NATO expansion. Moreover, unlike the Cold War, today’s international environment consists of multiple great powers.

All of these concerns beg the question: what is the United States to do about Europe? The answer lies in strengthening Germany’s military.

Germany remains one of the richest countries in the continent, possessing a GDP of $4.479 trillion in 2022. It possesses much latent power, a form of power that John Mearsheimer defines in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics as “the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power.” The more money, population, and resources a country has, the more likely it can use those resources to make a strong military.

In the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany seems to be attempting to transition this latent power into hard military power. As German chancellor Olaf Scholz stated in a speech to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, Germany and Europe are at a Zeitenwende, or a turning point. As Scholz late elaborated in December 2022, this Zeitenwende involves Germany’s plan to build up its military capabilities to serve as “one of the main providers of security in Europe.” Despite critics pointing out Germany’s lack of ammunition stockpiles, and that Germany’s rearmament plans are lagging behind schedule, there remains hope and reason for the United States to encourage German rearmament. 

The main reason why the United States should desire a formidable German military is the dilemma of extended deterrence, usually defined as the capability and willingness of a country to deter and defend its allies against a potential attack. The dilemma with extended deterrence lies in its difficulty to credibly defend an ally at risk of military attack, since (in the words of RAND’s Michael J. Mazarr) “an aggressor can almost always be certain a state will fight to defend itself, but it may doubt that a defender will fulfill a pledge to defend a third party.”

It is understandable for critics of this German strategy to be hesitant in loosening the leash on Germany’s military. After all, Germany was the primary antagonist of two world wars in the twentieth century. Thankfully, the German government has taken measures to prevent this from occurring within its country again, having implemented laws on hate speech, and the German government employed its first rabbis to serve as a chaplain within the Bundeswehr. To be clear, there is a difference between militarism and maintaining a strong military. Militarists glorify war and the military, whereas prudent military strategists understand the necessity of a military to protect their country’s national interests. In other words, the difference between militarism and having a military is in the ends of having a military: militarists see war and the military as ends to themselves, whereas prudent strategists view these as means to achieve the ends of security.

Another way to make certain that Germany does not fall back into its militarist past is for it to create a people’s military. Such an ideal is not unfamiliar to German thinking. In fact, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, a high-ranking Prussian military reformer, strongly advocated for such a military. As Trevor Dupuy details in his book, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, Scharnhorst sought to extend military participation to common Prussians and grant them rights in a new constitution. Scharnhorst’s logic was to create a common identity with the military and Prussian citizens, thereby improving Prussian morale and military effectiveness.

The good news is that today’s Germany has made considerable progress in creating this people’s military. As James Angelos notes, Germany possesses “homeland protection” units within its military reserves, many of its personnel serving as part-time soldiers. To further progress this people’s military, Germany might consider reintroducing military conscription, creating an increase in citizen-soldiers within Germany.

The United States should encourage this development of German civil-military relations. Creating a people’s military within Germany would water two plants with one hose: improve its military effectiveness and solidify its democratic governance amid a strengthened military.  

An independent Europe would be the goal of all this remilitarization and engaged civil-military relations within Germany. Essentially, this would involve Europeans providing for Europe’s security. Germany would lead the way in this increased defense spending effort.

The world is anarchic, meaning there remains no international government to induce order. Creating order and stability is left to the most powerful countries to compromise over their interests. In this world, states can only count on themselves to guarantee their protection. Amid the need for the United States to deal with its domestic issues, such as increasing economic inequality and a mental health crisis, and a world of multiple great powers, it will be difficult for Washington to continue to be the security guarantor in Europe. Prudency and careful analysis are needed in foreign policy. Such statecraft is especially needed in our present world, where history is back with a vengeance in international politics. If we are not careful, we may be at risk of repeating history’s gravest mistakes.

Benjamin Giltner is a student at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M.

This essay won the John Quincy Adams Society’s 2023 Student Foreign Policy Essay Contest.

Image: Shutterstock.

Late last week, Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Mark Warner described how over-classification of national security-related information is a key and neglected factor behind the latest, disturbing intelligence leak. “We need frankly a system that limits classification to really important documents and then have a process to declassify when appropriate.” His argument: fewer secrets shared with fewer officials are essential to keep our secrets secret.

He’s on to something. Just before the New York Times first revealed that top secret documents had been posted on social media, my nonprofit released a major study on over-classification. Those in the “know” understand that over-classification is bad but insist officials can’t help themselves: the penalties for letting a document leak far outweigh any professional rewards that might come from making secret information more available.

That’s the conventional wisdom. It’s also dead wrong. In fact, effective national security organizations have strong incentives not to over-classify. There are effective ways to avoid doing so, and one of the most important U.S. intelligence agencies—the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)—has done it.

This is the key conclusion of a classification project my nonprofit ran for two years. Last month, the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) asked that I privately brief them on the project’s final report. The study subsequently received national attention. It gave examples of how harmful over-classification has become:

• American troops in Afghanistan couldn’t get timely, properly classified imagery from our government. To fight effectively, they had to buy unclassified imagery from private firms, which they could share with their Afghan compatriots.

• The Pentagon recently used a new information restriction—controlled unclassified information (CUI)—to keep unclassified weapons test results from Congress.

• The head of the U.S. Space Force was prohibited from publicly uttering the name of our key spy satellite system (KH-11), even though the media has long and repeatedly referred to it.

• Official historians writing classified studies to help black program managers learn from past mistakes and successes have been unable to find key classified documents because routine archival classification reviews, which would otherwise assure proper document filing, are not being done.

• Wasteful, expensive, duplicative military space programs have been shielded from oversight by special access program classification barriers that effectively block cross-communication and information sharing.

• Draconian security rules discourage innovative firms here and abroad from sharing their best with the Pentagon. These same rules are blocking needed military collaboration with our closest allies.

• Previously unclassified U.S. civilian nuclear export and cooperation information is being kept from Congress even though such commerce might help countries develop nuclear weapons options.

What allows this? In a word, mismanagement.

Currently, our government has over 2,000 security classification guidebooks and roughly 1,400 original classification authorities. Nobody can consult them all, and they don’t. These numbers, and the impossibility of mastering their guidance, are why so many government officials over-classify—it’s safe, it’s easy, and it takes little or no thought.

Fortunately, our best government organizations disagree. A case in point is the NGA. Seven years ago, it recognized it could only succeed if it added value to its imagery and got it to its “customers” quicker than commercial, unclassified space imagery firms. If it continued to deliver its product too late, or made it difficult to share with critical allies and firms, the agency would effectively go out of business.

The NGA was floundering using sixty-five classification guidebooks to classify its imagery. So what did it do? It boiled these down to a single electronic guide, eliminating previously subjective, contradictory guidance. It also required classifiers to justify their proposals to an intra-agency group of users, de-classifiers, historians, and subject-matter experts, and made appeals easy and quick. Finally, it encouraged constant updating of its new consolidated guidebook.

One Senator—Mike Rounds (R-SD)—noticed. He asked the Pentagon to report on how well the NGA’s example is being followed. He saw its model as the one our government should replicate. If it doesn’t, automating the review of the millions of classified documents it generates will be pointless: even the best document filtering system will fail if it follows contradictory and vague guidance that’s inevitable with thousands of different guidebooks and officials acting as classifying authorities.

So, what’s yet to be done? The Biden administration has pledged to tighten up the current system. But Congress must also act. At a minimum, it should fund and authorize dedicated staff to its own declassification policy review unit, the PIDB, which it has so far failed to do. Congress almost did this last year. It needs to get on with it.

Second, Congress should task the PIDB to oversee any government bidding on advanced technology contracts aimed to help automate the classification process. It also should track how many guidebooks, original classifications guidebooks, original classification authorities, classified documents, and declassification requests are being generated and recommend how best to reduce these numbers. 

More, of course, is needed. But skipping these first steps will only ensure we still will have too many classified documents to track to ever keep America’s top secrets from leaking again.

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, served as deputy for nonproliferation in the Defense Department and is the author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future.

Image: Shutterstock.

The White House released a twelve-page summary report on the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan with little fanfare ahead of the Easter holiday. This low-key approach is unsurprising, given that America’s longest war ended in what Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley described as a “strategic failure,” and that the national security apparatus has moved on to strategic competition with China and the war in Ukraine.

Yet while the report ostensibly provides context for a series of disastrous decisions that culminated in the deaths of thirteen U.S. service members at the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in August 2021, it is also notable for what it doesn’t mention: what informed the decision to remove U.S. contractors as part of the operational retrograde. This is especially important considering the Biden administration’s plan relied on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to secure the country during the U.S. withdrawal and beyond.

Where Was the Air Support?

The February 2023 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) report, titled “Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed,” notes that many Afghans thought the bilateral U.S.-Taliban peace agreement was “an act of bad faith and a signal that the U.S. was handing over Afghanistan to the enemy as it rushed to exit the country.” Despite intelligence estimates about when the Afghan government would fall ranging from two years, to somewhere between six to eighteen months, to a month after the U.S. withdrawal, Milley noted that “There are no reports that I am aware of that predicted a security force of 300,000 would evaporate in 11 days.” That is how quickly the Taliban insurgency rapidly took over villages, then provinces, and eventually Kabul itself, as the ANDSF unexpectedly collapsed and the troops melted away. If there was a window to stop or at least slow the Taliban’s advance, it was in those eleven days.

It is here that questions should begin, because, in addition to a sizeable advantage in troop strength over the 80,000 Taliban fighters, the White House report includes the Afghan Air Force (AAF) in its overall assessment of ANDSF capabilities. Unfortunately, the AAF deteriorated before the United States completed the withdrawal and its demise was a predictable (and predicted) outcome not reflected in these intelligence estimates.

Former Afghan Army commander and three-star general Sami Sadat authored a blistering New York Times opinion essay expressing his anger over the peace agreement that cut off contractor support for the fledgling AAF attack and support aircraft fleet when it was critically needed to halt the Taliban offensive. In addition to military forces, the agreement specified that the United States would withdraw “all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel.” Accordingly, Sadat proclaimed that most of the 17,000 contractors were withdrawn by July 2021, “taking their proprietary software and weapons systems with them.” Consequently, the Afghan military lost its “superiority to the Taliban when our air support dried up and our ammunition ran out.”

The SIGAR report corroborates Sadat’s arguments and frustrations. Specifically, it states the AAF “was the greatest advantage the force had over the Taliban” but was not projected to be self-sufficient until at least 2030. The report also explains that the “decision to withdraw on-site contract maintenance from Afghanistan in May 2021 reduced the availability of operational aircraft and removed maintenance instruction at key regional airfields…As a result, ANDSF units complained that they lacked enough ammunition, food, water, and other military equipment to sustain military engagements against the Taliban.”

The SIGAR report concludes that the reduction of U.S. support “destroyed the morale of Afghan soldiers and police.” As demonstrated by Ukraine’s armed forces defending their homeland against a Russian aggressor more than a year after many analysts (wrongly) predicted the government would fall within days or weeks, morale and the will to fight can offset numeric superiority.

Questions to be Asked, Lessons to be Learned

If withdrawing contractors from the AAF was the seminal event described in the SIGAR report and by Sami Sadat, then these decisions warrant greater analysis and consideration going forward. The risk of prematurely cutting off contractor support should concern the Pentagon and policymakers. The demand for contractor support in efforts to advance U.S. national interests is unlikely to abate anytime soon. Moreover, some argue that such contractors have become a permanent element of the U.S. military force structure. If true, it behooves senior leaders in Washington to learn the right lessons from the Afghanistan experience and clarify policy going forward. The U.S. House’s various committees that provide oversight and perform investigations can positively contribute to these efforts by accessing classified reports and calling witnesses to provide a more robust analysis of the situation and the decisions made by military commanders and senior officials.

While one can criticize the United States for setting up the ANDSF for failure by providing an air force that is “too technologically advanced for its native country to sustain,” this risk was known to senior leaders before the withdrawal announcement. The White House summary report notes that President Joe Biden “took the advice of his military commanders on the tactical decisions regarding the operational retrograde of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, including the dates they closed facilities, and he regularly asked them if there was anything else they needed.” The House committees should summon these commanders to Capitol Hill and query them about these conversations and the impact of withdrawing AAF contractors. For example, there were legitimate concerns about force protection requirements for contractors in Afghanistan during the retrograde. What were the discussions regarding risk and was there a mitigation plan? Were there any deliberations about continuing AAF contractor work outside of the country?

In June 2021, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that “we should encourage the Afghan government to retain or engage contractor support for the Afghan Air Force and other key logistical and operational elements of the Afghan security forces – and we should pay for that support (including private security to protect those contractors).” Such an arrangement would allow American and other foreign contractors to remain in Afghanistan and maintain the AAF throughout the U.S. withdrawal and possibly beyond. House committees should inquire whether the Biden administration ever seriously considered such proposals.

Previously, I personally lauded the Biden administration for applying lessons learned from the botched Afghanistan withdrawal to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, I appreciated the extensive consultations and diplomatic efforts to rally NATO and lead a broader international coalition focused on countering Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ambitions and upholding the international order. That said, the “train, advise, assist” approach to build and sustain security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is not applicable to the Ukraine case because the United States does not have military troops conducting these activities in the country. Instead, training the Ukrainian Armed Forces is occurring in Europe and the United States. The contractor support issue will be interesting to watch as Ukraine receives and employs more Western equipment on the battlefield.

While I supported President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and am sympathetic to the constraints and deadlines inherited from his predecessor, he had agency for the withdrawal debacle that occurred on his watch. He should answer questions about whether his administration truly planned “for all contingencies – including a rapid deterioration of the security situation” as described in the summary report. Despite the political theater all too common in Washington these days, House committees should view the White House summary report as an opportunity for sober and bipartisan oversight to find out exactly what transpired, determine appropriate accountability, and codify lessons learned that can be applied in future operations.

Jim Cook is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own.

Image: Shutterstock.

Recently, it was reported that during the presentation of the teams participating in the European Weightlifting Competition, a man ran onto the stage and set fire to the Azerbaijani flag, as the crowd booed the appearance of the Azerbaijani athletes on stage.  Later on, it was reported that the man who did this was a member of the organizing committee of the championship, Aram Nikolyan.

This occurred after the Armenian government had assured the European Weightlifting Federation that they would ensure the security of all of the athletes at the championship including the Azerbaijani athletes throughout their stay in Armenia and prepare for all kinds of security incidents.   As a result of this incident, the Azerbaijani athletes were forced to forfeit their participation in the European Weightlifting Competition.

“In conditions when such an atmosphere of hatred prevails in Armenia, security is not ensured, the normal participation of Azerbaijani athletes in competitions is impossible due to the psychological pressure,” the Azerbaijani athletes said in a statement. “Politicizing sport is absolutely unacceptable,” it added, urging the European Weightlifting Federation to impose sanctions on Armenia.

Following the incident, the European Weightlifting Federation “strongly condemned the incident, considering it extremely serious and a regrettable gesture and an attack on the integrity of sport values and on the universal principle of fair play.”   The Israeli Canadian Council also condemned the burning of the Azerbaijani flag at the European Weightlifting Competition in Yereven, noting that they also burned a Turkish and Israeli flag.   They expressed their solidarity with the Israeli, Azerbaijani and Turkish people.

They continued: “It is important to remember that sporting events should be a platform for promoting peace and unity, not for fomenting hatred and violence.   The ICC remains committed to working towards a world where diversity is celebrated, and all cultures are respected.   The ICC will continue to promote understanding and dialogue among different communities and stand up against any form of bigotry, discrimination and hate.”

Zeynel Abidin Kiymaz, the head of the Union of Turkish Journalists, concurred: “I strongly condemn the burning of the Azerbaijani flag at the competition in Yerevan.   The burning of the state flag is unacceptable. I resolutely condemn the perpetrators of this incident at the weightlifting competition in Yerevan.”   The Dona Gracia Center for Diplomacy also issued an official statement, proclaiming that they would “like to condemn Armenia for burning the Azerbaijani flag at the European Weightlifting Competition,” emphasizing that a sporting event is no place to make political statements.

When Erion Veliaj, the reformist mayor of Albania’s capital, promotes his plans to modernize and transform Tirana into a high-tech hub offering jobs and promise to his country, he imagines the city as “the Tel Aviv of the Balkans,” alluding to Israel’s largest city—a vibrant metropolis that was celebrated by the New York Times as the “Capital of Mediterranean Cool” and the headquarters for the country’s high-tech industries.

With its large and innovative sector, Israel, which is celebrating seventy-five years of independence next week, has produced more start-up companies on a per capita basis than large, peaceful, and stable nations like Japan, China, India, Korea, Canada, and all of Europe, and has more businesses listed on the NASDAQ than those of any other foreign country. Hence the reference to Israel as “Start-Up Nation.”

But Israel’s technological miracle has to do with more than just the success stories of several Israeli companies. It reflects in many ways the ability of that nation, with its Western outlook and first-rate higher education system, to employ its scientific instructions, financial system, and talented workforce to emerge as a winner in the global economy at the beginning of this century.

To put it differently, the achievements of “Start-up Nation” and the market economy—which turned Israel into a hotbed of innovation in software, artificial intelligence, chips, medical equipment, biotech, electronics, and wireless communications—were built on foundations that reflect first and foremost the progressive values of a modern population that was adhering to liberal democratic principles, the rule of law, women rights, free press, and religious freedom.

Relatedly, this is why Tel Aviv Pride is among the biggest annual gay events in the world and certainly the biggest in Asian continent. The open and buzzing cultural scene of what many in Israel call “the State of Tel Aviv” goes hand in hand with the spirit of innovation of its technology industry and the strength of the Israeli currency, the shekel.

From that perspective, Israel’s recent political turmoil in Israel exposed the fragility of these foundations of Start-Up Nation; they are weakened by the hard-right-wing government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who tries to push through a package of legislation that would undermine the independence of the courts, ultimately weakening the shekel.

In a way, the crisis in Israel is pitting the residents of the State of Tel Aviv—Israeli professionals with academic degrees that constitute the cultural and commercial elites of Israel, including its high-tech entrepreneurs—against a coalition of ethno-nationalists and ultra-Orthodox Jews who in the name of the “people” are trying to take control of vast political power sans the checks and balances required for the functioning of a liberal democracy and a market economy, and who are turning it into an illiberal democracy a la Hungary.

It was not surprising that many of the protests against the Israeli government were directly coordinated by high-tech entrepreneurs and investors, warning that Israel’s “Startup Nation” reputation would be threatened if the rule of law became questioned at home and abroad. In one demonstration, the tech industry protesters put a mock locomotive in the middle of Tel Aviv, decorated with signs saying “High Tech is the locomotive of the Israeli economy and democracy is its fuel.” Some of these protesters are threatening to leave Israel for Silicon Valley if the government succeeds in passing the proposed legislation.

Their concern is that, even if some sort of a compromise between the government and the opposition is reached, the current uproar demonstrates the shape of things to come. The proponents of illiberal democracy in Israel want to turn the Jewish state into a theocracy, and will continue strengthening their political power in the coming years, particularly if, as expected, the percentage of ultra-orthodox in the country increases and the residents of the State of Tel Aviv become a minority.

Ultra-orthodox Jews, or Haredim, are the fastest-growing demographic group in Israel, already close to 14 percent of the total national population; with their current growth rate of 4 percent, they are expected to constitute 16 percent of the population by the end of the decade, or about a quarter of all Israeli Jews in 2040.

Young ultra-Orthodox men study religious texts in yeshiva seminaries, which are funded by the government but impart an exceedingly limited formal secular education. These individuals do not learn a core curriculum of math, science, and English. As a result, the majority of the members of the community, with the men (who unlike secular Jews don’t perform the mandatory military service) continuing to study the Torah are not part of the workforce and remain dependent on state funding.

A report published last year by the Programme for International Student Assessment, commonly known as PISA, last year suggested as the number of Jewish students learning in Yeshivas has been growing, Israel’s ranking for fifteen-year-olds has been steadily falling, with Israel ranking very low in math (32nd) and science (33rd), as the widening gap between Ultra-Orthodox and secular Jewish students continues to expand.

So while 10 percent of Israel’s workforce is now employed in the tech industry, the world’s highest proportion, many doubt that will last. Indeed, the dazzling high-tech industry is diverting attention from a changing reality in which a segment of Israeli society and economy has all the markings of a third-world culture.

As their numbers rise in the Israeli population, the political parties representing the ultra-Orthodox and other religious sects have gained more political power. For the first time in Israel’s history, with thirty-three seats in the Knesset (parliament), the religious parties constitute a majority in the governing Israeli coalition.

While in the past much of the demands by the religious parties centered on increasing government support for their religious institutions, the ultra-Orthodox and their religious allies are now trying to move beyond that limited agenda and transform the country’s political system through their proposed legislation.

That legislation weakens the current civil rights safeguards and allows the government to keep public transportation closed on the Sabbath and separate men and women in educational and public institutions. Not to mention that the religious parties are continuing to press for an ultra-nationalist agenda, including the building of new Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank, which they want to annex to Israel.

Considering that close to 25 percent of the Israeli population is now Arab, adding the percentage of ultra-Orthodox Jews and other religious Jews to that number, suggests that Westernized liberal secular Jews, whose ancestors were the driving force in the Zionist project, are gradually a minority in their own country. This raises the following question: would their children and grandchildren want to continue living in a country where the responsibility for securing Israel and developing its economy lies exclusively on their shoulders while they defend and subsidize a sizable percentage of the country’s population?

Moreover, the growing influence of Israel’s ultra-Orthodox and ultra-nationalists could lead at some point to the annexation of the occupied Arab territories, with Arabs constituting at least 50 percent of the population in the area between the Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. That raises the specter of Israel turning into a third-world Middle Eastern country, that, like Lebanon would be ravaged by ethnic and religious wars. The Start-Up Nation would turn into a distant memory.

Dr. Leon Hadar, a contributing editor at The National Interest, has taught international relations at American University and was a research fellow with the Cato Institute. A former UN correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, he currently covers Washington for the Business Times of Singapore and is a columnist/blogger with Israel’s Haaretz.

Image: David Cohen/Shutterstock.

On a recent state visit to Beijing, French president Emmanuel Macron declared that his country would not feel obligated to support the United States in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. “The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction,” Macron said.

These calculated remarks reveal a selfish and cynical perspective. Macron expects America to shoulder the lion’s share of the burden for the war in Ukraine, yet feels France has no obligation to support the United States in the event of war in the Pacific. So, to borrow Macron’s phrase from his remarks at the White House last December, we must be “brothers in arms” on Ukraine, but America must go it alone with China.

Macron’s statement should spark Washington to review the United States’ status as the lead donor to the Ukrainian cause. Congress should request that the Biden administration provide a full accounting of what France and other European partners have contributed to Ukraine over the last fourteen months, both individually and as members of the European Union. This request should also require a breakdown of the nature of that support. The House of Representatives should also make clear that it won’t consider any future requests for additional funding for Ukraine until it has received this accounting.

President Joe Biden has framed the war in Ukraine—most notably in his February speech in Warsaw—as an existential global struggle for democracy undertaken in conjunction with European allies. Macron’s comments expose this justification as disingenuous. The existence of Taiwan’s flourishing democracy, just 100 miles off China’s shores, disproves the PRC’s oft-repeated lie that the Chinese people do not want democracy as it is foreign to their cultural heritage. It is hard to imagine a more direct threat to freedom than a PRC invasion of a successful Chinese democracy. Yet, in the case of Taiwan, Macron finds no need to lend a hand in the struggle for democracy, nor any obligation to help those American brothers in arms who liberated his country in World War II.

Macron’s comments were so poorly received that even Chancellor Olaf Scholtz of Germany hurried to distance himself from them. Scholtz indicated that, in the event of a conflict, Berlin would not let either Taiwan or the United States down. He placed the burden on China not to escalate tensions around the island.

But all our European allies should be on notice that the days of the United States bearing a disproportionate burden for Ukraine while also being expected to go alone against China over Taiwan are running out, and that more will be required of them than “moral support.” While many partners in what Donald Rumsfeld once called “New Europe” are stepping up to the plate and contributing more than their fair share, this audit would provide clarity as to what France and Germany—the European Union’s two largest economies—are and are not contributing to the defense of democracy on their own continent.

Recent intelligence leaks disclosed, among other state secrets, that the Defense Department assesses that Ukraine is running short of a range of supplies. This suggests that Biden’s oft-repeated strategy for Ukraine—“as much as it takes for as long as it takes”—is failing. In addition, these documents have revealed a contingent of Special Forces Operators stationed at the U.S. embassy in Kiev, despite frequent administration assurances that there will be no U.S. boots on the ground in Ukraine. As well as an accounting of the contributions our European partners are making, Congress must demand clarification of what Biden’s strategy on Ukraine actually is, that the administration provide a realistic assessment of what it will take to make it successful, and how that investment might impact our ability to counter China.

The bottom line on Ukraine is that, given the multi-valiant threats the United States faces around the globe, America cannot care more about European security than the Europeans do, especially if continental leaders such as Emmanuel Macron openly declare their intent to abandon America when the United States might need them the most.

America needs allies who understand the unique pressures the United States faces and can see the larger picture beyond what is happening in their own backyards. And if that is too much to ask, those same allies can start taking the lead in a war that is, after all, a far more direct threat to them than it is to America.

James Jay Carafano is a Heritage Foundation vice president, responsible for the think tank’s research on matters of national security and foreign relations.

Victoria Coates is a senior research fellow at Heritage’s Thatcher Center for Freedom.

Image: Shutterstock.

Asked at a recent event, when asked what possible plans his country had or would support for its relationship with Russia once the conflict between it and Ukraine ends, a senior member of a NATO-country parliament and political party official replied, “None at all. At least while Putin is still in charge.” That would be a serious mistake, not only because of Russia’s inherent, domestic attributes but also because of its relations with other countries, especially (but not only) with China. NATO allies, and Ukraine itself, need to find an acceptable blueprint for engaging with Russia after the war.

The palpable fury at the Kremlin by Ukraine and the NATO allies is driving their policies toward Russia. We have not seen such an intentional, deliberate, indiscriminate, barbaric assault turning entire regions and towns, hospitals, schools, nurseries, homes, and power plants into rubble and concrete graveyards since the Wehrmacht attack against Poland and the Soviet Union.

President Volodymyr Zelensky has established the unambiguous Ukrainian objective: "We will only stop when we bring our country back to the borders of 1991. We will return the Ukrainian flag to every corner of Ukraine." That understandable ambition is almost certainly beyond the grasp of the Ukrainian forces. Yet Russia is also unlikely to achieve Vladimir Putin’s goal of terminating Ukraine’s independence, decapitating its government, re-occupying all or almost all of the country, and absorbing it within a Greater Russia. It seems unlikely to even recapture all of the Donbas at this time. Short of resort to its tactical nuclear arsenal, it does not have the military resources—troops, hardware, munitions, leadership, strategy or elan—to do so. Still, neither side is (yet) willing to settle for a ceasefire in which, like World War I, the two forces are dug indefinitely into trenches running down half of the Donbas.

Zelensky has rightfully noted that 2023 is key to Ukraine’s goal. Ukrainian forces must be able within the year to turn the tide and make significant advances expelling Russian forces in the east and the south. If they cannot, the tide of the war will most probably turn against them and in favor of Russia or of a stalemate. The Ukrainian people cannot indefinitely withstand the desolation visited upon them. Their remarkable valor, endurance, and granite resistance cannot last indefinitely, nor will their own assets or the economic, political, and military support of allied countries. None of that portends a Russian victory—it means only that at least parts of the Donbas and probably most, if not all, of Crimea would remain in Russian hands, meaning that de jure borders would sooner or later adjust to the de facto realities. Ukraine’s allies will need to work with Kyiv to develop and support a realistic strategy through 2023 and, preferably, to some kind of victory acceptable to and achievable by Ukrainians.

Still, notwithstanding NATO outrage at Russian aggression and atrocities, international ostracism does not provide a judicious prescription for relations particularly for a country as large and important as Russia once the wanton carnage has ended or abated. True statecraft requires a sagacious perspective on long-term as well as immediate-term policies. Russia will not disappear, although Putin might.

If anger and hostility are to be the hallmarks of NATO-country policies toward Russia, the result would be a line of enmity from the Barents Sea, down the eastern frontiers of Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine to the Black Sea and, depending on the disposition of Turkey, possibly to the Mediterranean—in effect, a recreation of the Cold War 450 miles to the east. It would mean a border of animosity between whole civilizations, each with huge armies and economies, and with nuclear armaments capable of turning one another into a pulverized (and now also radioactive) wreckage. The celebration of the end of the last Cold War three decades ago and its replacement by a peace, however stoney and contingent, would be reversed. Surely that cannot be the only or let alone the best option.

Justifiable anger toward toward Russia cannot blind policymakers to what it really is: an expansive county with extensive human and natural resources; a federation of republics, the largest country in the world spanning eleven time zones; really, a kind of empire in its own right. Moreover, it has a long history and a commensurate sense of itself as great power in Eurasia and an imperial chronicle three centuries old. It commands very substantial armed forces, however much now depleted, and it has nuclear weapons and systems of delivery that could obliterate an adversary even if Russia itself were also devastated in the process. In addition, even if Russia could be ostracized from the West, it cannot be sequestered from the rest of the world, and although it would pay an enormous price were it to be isolated by the West, so too would the countries attempting the isolation. Finally, it cannot be in the U.S. interest to see Russia pushed into the arms of China and thus find itself confronting two colossi rolled into one challenger. Russia is not some barely inhabited Pacific atoll, and it would be both foolhardy and arrogant, even self-defeating, to try treating it as one.

By far the better strategy is, if possible, to induce Putin (or his successor) with his enervated forces and economy to negotiate a tolerable resolution, and to provide clear benefits for doing so. Among those benefits would be a return to global commerce, an end to sanctions, and—unlike the end of the Cold War—treatment as the global power that it is rather than the humiliation it felt in the 1990s. Instead of “no relationship at all,” Russia—with or without Putin—should be integrated as far as practicable into the European family not as a supplicant seeking the forbearance of its superiors. None of that requires restraint in supporting Ukraine now or restraint in responding to Russia’s barbaric aggression. It requires only that carrots, not just sticks, be available in the process and that the NATO allies keep in mind that the objective is a better status quo not a worse one.

Gerald F. (“Jerry”) Hyman has been a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies since 2007. He held several positions at USAID from 1990–2007, including director of its Office of Democracy and Governance from 2002–2007. He has published widely.

Image: Shutterstock.

While this week’s White House meeting between Colombian president Gustavo Petro and U.S. president Joe Biden saw no major announcements, the meeting itself was historic—and shows that both countries understand the importance of maintaining a close relationship in spite of policy differences.

The irony of his Washington visit was probably not lost on Petro. The Colombian leader has often commented on the way that his transition from Marxist guerrilla to mainstream politician—and his country’s first progressive president—has shaped his view of the United States. After shaking hands and exchanging gifts with CIA director William Burns in Bogota in October, Petro remarked: “A few decades ago we might have been enemies, today I’m giving him a hammock and a bag of sugar.”

This relationship has not been easy. Petro has been deeply critical of Colombia’s traditional counternarcotics approach, which has been a pillar of the U.S.-Colombia relationship over the last three decades. While coca cultivation and cocaine production numbers have reached record highs, Petro is emphasizing the need to provide economic opportunities in rural areas over conventional military-led crop eradication.

The Colombian president’s trademark domestic policy is a plan for “total peace” that includes dialogue not only with that country’s last remaining rebel army, the National Liberation Army (ELN), but also with other organized crime groups that control much of the countryside. His administration is attempting to address inequality by proposing major pension, healthcare, and labor market reforms, and has promised to better address the needs of underrepresented indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.

The ambitious agenda isn’t surprising. Petro took office in August promising to lead an agenda of change to reshape Colombia’s political and economic landscape. That’s precisely what he is working for.

While there will inevitably be points of disagreement between Washington and Bogota, the historic and strategic nature of this partnership needs to be preserved. One year ago, Biden called Colombia the “linchpin” to the hemisphere. The United States needs to preserve and strengthen its linchpins. In a rapidly changing global order, and with geopolitical rivals trying to shore up their own relations in our hemisphere, it is more important than ever for the United States to deepen alliances with longstanding hemispheric allies.

It's a relationship that is far deeper than policy and economic interests. Even at the level of people-to-people diplomacy, Colombia and the United States have a special relationship. Colombians have among the most favorable views of the United States in the region.

Productive engagement with the Petro administration—both on the issues where there are disagreements and those where there is common cause (including a resolution to the Venezuela crisis and addressing climate change)—should be a top priority during and after the White House visit. Rhetoric aside, U.S. policymakers should operate under the reality that Petro understands the value of a productive relationship with Washington. He knows U.S. cooperation is essential to enact his domestic agenda.

Progress won't be easy, but it is possible for both the U.S. and Colombian administrations to chart a way forward based on shared priorities of peace, prosperity, security, and regional diplomacy. This approach—one of patient engagement that prioritizes interests over ideology—is gaining traction in Washington. On Capitol Hill this week, Senators Ben Cardin and Bill Hagerty presided as Honorary Co-Chairs over the launch of the US-Colombia Advisory Group, a high-level group of experts, policymakers, and private sector and civil society representatives.

The group aims to encourage productive bilateral engagement for this new chapter in U.S.-Colombia relations. As Colombia tries to move beyond its armed conflict and address the needs of areas hardest hit by violence, there is a clear role for the United States in supporting efforts to build state presence and rule of law across its territory. Doing so may require taking a hard look at best practices in security and drug policy cooperation.

Building a more prosperous Colombia should also present new opportunities for investment. But many investors remain concerned by the rapid pace of changes to the country’s longstanding economic model – from major overhauls to tax policy to reforms of the health and pension systems. As a free-trade partner, Colombia has an opportunity to capture new domestic and foreign investment as momentum toward nearshoring advances in our hemisphere. Moving forward, with Petro’s robust social agenda, reassurances of a healthy investment climate will be essential.

Navigating tensions will require an approach that builds on consensus. While the two administrations may differ on their views toward Venezuela, the White House has applauded Petro’s plans to hold an international conference in the coming days in support of ongoing negotiations between the opposition and Maduro government to restore the country’s democratic institutions. This kind of coordination, based on a relationship of mutual respect, could provide a foundation for future cooperation on other complex diplomatic issues.

The fact that Biden and Petro reaffirmed shared interests at the White House is a good sign. But it is essential for this affirmation of common cause to be echoed more broadly. The leadership of the U.S. Senate, including Senators Cardin and Hagerty, to advance our shared agenda goes back to the core of what has made the U.S.-Colombia partnership successful: long-term, bipartisan Congressional prioritization of our bilateral ties alongside a willing Colombian government. Coming out of Petro’s visit, the greatest accomplishment will be agreement on a route forward to ensure that our partnership can adapt to the new reality of the relationship while ensuring that core U.S. strategic interests remain at the top of that agenda.

Jason Marczak (@jmarczak) is Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center/

Geoff Ramsey (@gramsey_latam) is the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Senior Fellow for Colombia and Venezuela.

The Center launched its new US-Colombia Advisory Group on April 18.

Image: Dmitrij Plehanov/Shutterstock.

The long-term energy crisis provoked by the war in Ukraine has been economically destructive to the entire world—Europe faces the prospect of deindustrialization, coal factories have been turned back on, countries in the Global South have been priced out of liquified natural gas markets, and so on. Yet demand for energy is expected to keep growing. Higher energy prices reverberate throughout the entire economy, and arguably where oil prices go, there go prices for everything since over 6,000 daily products emanate from petroleum derivatives.

Given this situation, one thing is very clear: only nuclear power is carbon-free and able to meet growing U.S. calls for electrification and global needs for basic economic growth. Nuclear power works to alleviate the dependence on oil and gas, since it is abundant, energy dense, and can be a tool against Middle East geopolitical mechanisms used against whatever U.S. president is in office.

America is Investing in Nuclear

Washington is cognizant of this necessity. In April 2022, two senators introduced the International Nuclear Energy Act of 2022 to enable a “whole-of-government” strategy for U.S. global leadership in civil nuclear technologies, including advanced nuclear technology (ANT). Nuclear power is now at the forefront of safe, reliable, emission-free ways to produce electricity and thermal heat. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, approximately 70 small modular reactors (SMRs) concepts are currently under research and development.

Globally, there are roughly nine different types of SMR designs. These are fluid projections since new Generation IV (Gen IV) technologies are rapidly changing. For the United States, companies such as NuScale Power’s VOYGR SMR design to Kairos Power’s Fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactor; and Westinghouse’s eVinci Heat pipe-cooled microreactor are leading the way for ANT.

Gen IV reactors and SMRs offer financial benefits and improvements from Generation III-III+ reactors with their ability to produce electricity at a lower operational cost over the life of the power plant. Moreover, SMRs offer lower initial capital investment, greater scalability, and sitting flexibility for locations unable or unwilling to accommodate larger light water reactor power plants. The potential for enhanced safety and security compared to previous designs makes advanced reactors desirable moving forward. This drives economic growth and high-paying professions in the nuclear industry.

Alternatives to Nuclear Aren’t Enough

Unfortunately, nuclear power has been demonized, and many believe it should be fought against at all costs. Nothing could be further from the truth. Approximately 200 people have died of radiation from nuclear accidents in over sixty years. These numbers are inclusive of accidents at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima. Counting cancer diagnoses among people exposed to radiation from these accidents, the harm from a nuclear power plant compared to the effects of coal pollution or methane emissions from natural-gas-fired power plants is definitive proof why nuclear power is the best choice for energy and electricity when all factors are considered.

Speaking of coal, the recent dramatic increase in coal use numbers more than echo the call for greater nuclear power. Despite global promises, 2022 witnessed “the coal fleet grow by 19.5 gigawatts, enough to light up around 15 million homes.” New coal plants were predominantly added in China and India, then Indonesia, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. If nuclear power were deployed instead of coal, global emissions would have declined instead of growth in the United States and abroad.

But what about the counter-argument of using renewables? The wind and the sun are always free, and no matter what OPEC, the international oil cartel, conjures up the change in energy prices can be countered with natural resources.

If only that were true. Renewables use enormous amounts of materials compared to nuclear and fossil fuels. It is a misnomer to say renewables are carbon-free compared to nuclear power. Whereas nuclear power accounts for all materials through the decommissioning phase—and surprisingly, 90 percent of all materials from a nuclear power plant can be recycled—compared to old wind and solar platforms, which generate millions of tons of waste. The International Renewable Energy Agency calculates that old solar panel disposal to meet 2050 Paris Accords “will more than double the tonnage of all of today’s global plastic waste.”

Of course, nuclear power plants themselves require enormous amounts of steel, rebar, concrete, wiring, plastics, and other materials. But a nuclear power plant reliably performs and isn’t intermittent, unreliable, or variable. As an example, a typical wind turbine demands “900 tons of steel, 2,500 tons of concrete and 45 tons of nonrecyclable plastic” to function. Solar power requires even more metals, cement, steel, and glass. Renewables have their uses in non-grid applications, some microgrids, and remote applications, but to build enough wind turbines and solar panels to supply at least half the electricity needed for global consumption “would require two billions tons of coal to produce the concrete and steel, along with two billion barrels of oil to make the composite blades. [And] more than 90% of the world’s solar panels are built in Asia on coal-heavy electrical grids.”

Nuclear power plants do not run into heavy fossil fuel conditions nor do they need to be replaced within a mere ten to twenty years the way industrial solar and wind farms need replacement under current technology. A nuclear power plant does not warrant nearly the amount of land renewables confiscate, and this is where the greatest advantage lies. True, coal-fired and natural-gas-fired power plants also do not require significant amounts of land. But it is the land-use issue that is crucial for why nuclear power can solve global and environmental energy woes. Nuclear will play a leading role in mitigating the effects of high land-usage renewables on the grid, and growing populations in India, Africa, and Asia gaining carbon-free electricity according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Nuclear’s Time Has Come

The United States’ nuclear industry has had a tough stretch, but the biggest obstacle to advanced reactor progress, lower emissions, and geopolitical stability is the modern environmental movement. What once was meant for good has taken on the stench of Malthusianism. Nuclear can also solve that woe.

Todd Royal is the Senior Project Analyst for E4 Carolinas, a non-profit energy advocacy firm located in Charlotte, North Carolina, where he is working on a three-year grant for the U.S. Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration focusing on a value chain study for the advanced nuclear technology sector (Generation IV reactors, SMRs, and advanced reactors). Todd lives outside of Dallas, Texas.

A rather poorly-formed argument questioning Hungary’s loyalty to NATO has emerged in recent months over its opposition to Russian sanctions and calls for negotiations with Moscow. Some have even called for the country’s suspension from the alliance. But critics ignore Hungary’s real-world military-industrial buildup and humanitarian aid support provided to Ukraine which, unlike the fuel sanctions against Russia, has actually produced results and ultimately serve to strengthen NATO.

Were NATO’s leaders to heed calls for Hungary’s dismissal, they would be playing right into the hands of Vladimir Putin by creating fissures within the alliance and ignoring the steps the country has made that benefit the alliance’s defensive posture.

Since former President Donald Trump’s call for European NATO members to step up their game, Hungarians have undertaken an unprecedented effort to modernize their defense forces; an act that was ironically characterized as “democratic backsliding” in 2020 before becoming in vogue again with Putin’s aggression. Whereas Germany mostly failed to deliver on Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s grand speeches of plans to expand his nation’s military might, Budapest has actually begun to push a lot more capital into the defense sector; as much as $1.4 billion.

Defense industry firms have taken note. Europe-based military contractors such as Dynamit Nobel Defense, Colt CZ Group, and Rheinmetall have been attracted to Hungary for its existing industrial base and its need to upgrade its national military arsenal. While the current focus is to modernize Hungary’s own forces, the country’s central location on the European continent makes it a prime logistics node for transporting products all around Europe to other NATO partners.

The most prominent example has been Rheinmetall. The German manufacturer has begun initial production of the Lynx infantry fighting vehicle with full production scheduled to commence in July of this year. The Lynx is predicted to become a favorite of NATO’s forces, potentially replacing the Bradley fighting vehicle, a long-time workhorse for Western militaries. Hungary was the first customer. The Lynx also has the potential to operate remotely without putting a crew in danger, which explains Rheinmetall’s manufacturing plant being built as part of the Zalazone complex in Zalaegerszeg,  a testing track as well as a research and development center for self-driving cars. Clearly, the industry considers Hungary important for the future of European defense.

All of these developments seem to escape Hungary’s fierce critics, who continue to paint the country as a traitor to the West rather than a crucial pillar for its defense due to its divergence from the collective message-signaling opposition to Russia.

With regards to Western economic sanctions, they are not a prerogative of NATO but rather of the EU, and Hungary has in fact voted in favor of every single one of them despite Budapest’s serious concerns that sanctions will not achieve their intended goal of debilitating Russia enough to end the war.

Besides ignoring the facts on the ground, there is clearly a double standard when it comes to judging Hungary versus the rest of Europe. If any deviation from mainstream EU position on the war or act of dissent is treasonous, then what do we call France after Macron’s calls for negotiations with Russia? Or Germany’s initial refusal to provide tanks for Ukraine’s war? Should these countries also be suspended from NATO? Don’t hold your breath for an answer.

As an American currently in Hungary, I am rooting for a victory for the West in the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II. Believe me: there is not a whole lot of sympathy for Putin on the streets of Budapest or in the countryside. Hungary has, in fact, shown greater support for Ukraine than anybody dares to give the country credit: over two million refugees fleeing the conflict have received safe passage and support from Hungary, with approximately 200,000 taking asylum here. That alone is equal to the population of Hungary’s second-largest city. Yet you don’t see refugee camps anywhere in Hungary. Why? Because Hungarians literally let their Ukrainian neighbors live with them in their spare rooms, vacation homes, or converted basements. Some have housed total strangers for over a year for free—a notable contribution for the citizenry of such a small nation. One is curious to know if other countries in the West have made such efforts.

Along with ignoring Hungary’s humanitarian efforts, the country’s loudest critics have no appreciation of the efforts of the country’s men and women in uniform to defend NATO’s eastern flank. Last year, a battalion of Hungarian troops deployed along the nation’s border with Ukraine, providing aid to Ukrainian refugees as well as standing ready to fight should Putin’s ambitions push farther westward. Last year, the Hungarian Air Force led aerial defense efforts patrolling the Baltic region, keeping watch for Russian incursions into NATO airspace.

At the heart of the conflict between Russia and the West lies the most important principle: freedom. Just as Ukraine has the right to self-determination, nations of the West cooperate in an alliance of consensus, not submission. One must not forget that Hungary has a long history of living under foreign oppression—including the Russians. The “obey or be punished” line brings back memories of imperialism and occupation the Hungarians suffered at the hands of the Soviets, not the democratic collaboration that America fosters.

The consequences have already become manifest. In the shadow of Budapest approving Finland’s application to the alliance is its continued deferment of approving Sweden’s admission. When Swedish prime minister Ulf Kristersson demanded an explanation, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s political director, Balázs Orbán (no relation), had an answer at the ready. During Kristersson’s previous position as head of Sweden’s Moderate Party, he had called for the EU to “break Hungary’s development” through financial pressure in response to “xenophobia,” and “renouncing support to Ukraine,” despite all Hungary’s actions showing directly the opposite. Asking for help from a nation that one previously tried to morally posture over does not make for good political optics. A recent Hungarian parliamentary delegation’s affirmative call for Sweden’s application to NATO lends hope that the storm will pass, but the affair demonstrates the folly of states sowing bad blood when bigger dangers loom.

Implementing a policy of conformity and “purification” within NATO will only widen fissures between member states. To avoid that, the West must prioritize unity along with tangible accomplishments like Hungary’s growing military industry and support to Ukraine’s exiles while setting aside the virtue-signaling that its detractors espouse. The former will strengthen Europe’s defense while the latter will strengthen the power that NATO is meant to keep at bay and out of Europe: Russia.

Logan C. West is an American visiting research fellow at the Danube Institute in Budapest, Hungary. His research focuses on geopolitics and cyber affairs of Eastern and Central Europe. Logan is also a graduate student at the Institute of World Politics in Washington DC.

The top UN Development Program official in Baghdad warned that an increase in global temperature will decrease the fresh water available to Iraqis by 20 percent. Basra, Iraq’s second most populous city, which sits at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, is already dying of thirst, its water contaminated and its population decreasing.

Israel, too, faces tremendous environmental stress on its water supply, yet has mastered the process of desalination. Its efforts are so successful, it has been pumping desalinated water into its natural reservoir, Lake Kinneret. So advanced is Israeli desalination that former Arizona governor Doug Ducey described the Jewish state  as “the world’s water superpower.” Accordingly, the arid southwestern state has awarded Israel contracts to deal with Arizona’s water shortage. Azerbaijan is also an Israeli customer.

Why not Iraq? Water can become the basis for formal peace between Israel and Iraq. The latter could reap the rewards of peace as soon as November when the United Arab Emirates (UAE) hosts the UN climate conference COP28.

At COP27, held in Egypt in November, the UAE brokered a water-for-energy deal between Israel and Jordan. Jordanian farms produce 600 megawatts of solar energy that it exports to Israel, which in turn uses the energy to desalinate sea water and pump it to Jordan, the second most arid country in the world. This water is just one of the benefits that flowed from Amman’s decision to make peace with Israel in 1994.

Iraq is the country fifth most vulnerable to climate change. Suffering through water shortages and sand storms prompted Baghdad to organize a conference last month in which Prime Minister Muhammad al-Sudani promised to plant five million palm trees to combat sand storms. The Iraqi Environment Ministry produced a documentary to spread awareness about global warming, while Iraq’s environmental NGOs—Humat Dijlah (Arabic for “defenders of the Tigris”) and Nature Iraq—have also launched several campaigns.

Yet Baghdad has no ideas on how to solve its water problem, other than having Turkey allow more flow on the Tigris.

Iraq desperately needs Israeli desalination technology, which in turn requires moving toward peace. Instead, Baghdad has been going in the opposite direction, passing an absurd law that punishes with death or life in prison anyone “who places a call to the Zionist entity.” Iraqis loyal to Iran and Qatar even criticized Sudani for participating in the U.S.-sponsored virtual Summit for Democracy because Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu also took part.

The Iraqi law says that its goal is to “preserve national, Islamic, and humanitarian principles and popular Iraqi wishes in defending Palestine, its people, and all the other Arab peoples whose lands are under [Israeli] occupation.”

Stoking popular resentment of Israel has a long history in Iraq, yet doing so now directly undermines the national interest in a secure supply of water.

Emirati plans include a Water Security Strategy 2036, which aims at reducing water consumption by 21 percent, increase water efficiency, improve water quality by reducing pollution, and achieving “universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water to all by increasing national water storage capacity.” Israeli universities and companies have been involved in jointly researching and achieving further efficiency in water production.

Gulf countries have already been trying to benefit from the Israeli desalination model.  Oman hosts MEDRC, a center established in 1996 as part of the Middle East peace process and tasked with finding “solutions to freshwater scarcity.” Members of MEDRC’s executive council include Israel, Oman, and Qatar, even though neither Gulf nation has relations with Israel. Water is indispensable.

Iraq—the second largest oil exporter in OPEC—should follow in the UAE’s footsteps, not only by switching to clean energy, but also by suing for peace with Israel and benefiting from Israeli innovation that can solve Iraq’s water problems.

So far, Iraq seems to be heavily invested in COP28. The Iraqi Embassy in Abu Dhabi has been recruiting young environmental activists to expand the Iraqi delegation at the summit. Just as Jordan benefited at the previous summit, COP28 offers Iraq a golden opportunity to enlist the help of the UAE and Israel in dealing with its thirst problems. The Iraqi government should convince parliament that desalination is a life-or-death priority, so now is the time to make peace.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow Hussain on Twitter: @hahussain.

Image: Luciano Santandreu/Shutterstock.

A major crisis in U.S.-China relations has just been averted. Speaking on April 14 at a news conference with the visiting German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang issued an assurance: “Regarding the export of military items, China adopts a prudent and responsible attitude. China will not provide weapons to relevant parties of the [Ukraine] conflict, and [will] manage and control the exports of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations.”

This episode is a textbook case of deterrence theory in action. It is a successful example of the United States practicing coercive diplomacy to deter China from providing military aid to Russia. The Biden administration directly warned China on several occasions not to provide Russia with military assistance. And after careful and repeated consideration over slightly more than a year, China has weighed the costs and benefits and complied with the threat.

A Year of Warnings

This U.S. diplomatic success came close to failing. The recent alleged leaking of intercepted U.S. intelligence records by Jack Teixeira, a member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, has provided us with some insight. According to a February 23 U.S. intelligence summary of Russian “signals intelligence,” China’s Central Military Commission had “approved the incremental provision” of weapons and wanted it kept secret. Yet at some point between that date and April 14, Beijing changed its mind.

To best understand then why China opted not to arm Russia, it is necessary to highlight the critical role of a series of direct U.S. warnings to China that taken place for more than year.

The first warning occurred during National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s March 2022 meeting with Yang Jiechi, the then-Director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission. According to Sullivan, “we are communicating directly, privately to Beijing that there will absolutely be consequences for large-scale sanctions evasion efforts or support to Russia to backfill them.”

The warning was repeated by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to then-Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi at the United Nations in September 2022. A State Department readout for that meeting stated that Blinken “reiterated the United States’ condemnation of Russia’s war against Ukraine and highlighted the implications if the PRC were to provide support to Moscow’s invasion of a sovereign state.”

A few months later, at the 2023 Munich Security Conference (taking place between February 17 and 19), Blinken repeated the message. A senior State Department official privy to the actual conversation briefed reporters that Blinken “was quite blunt in warning about the implications and consequences of China providing material support to Russia or assisting Russia with systematic sanctions evasion.”

In deterrence, threats need to be accompanied by credible assurances that, if the warning is adhered to, restraint will ensue. The readout for Sullivan’s March 2022 meeting “underscored the importance of maintaining open lines of communication between the United States and China.” Similarly, the readout of Blinken’s September 2022 meeting indicates that he conveyed to Wang that “the United States remains open to cooperating with the PRC where our interests intersect.” And at the February 18, 2023 meeting, the readout noted while “the United States will compete and will unapologetically stand up for our values and interests…we do not want conflict with the PRC and are not looking for a new Cold War. The Secretary underscored the importance of maintaining diplomatic dialogue and open lines of communication at all times.”

Observations of Chinese Behavior

Washington’s consistent warnings to Beijing seem to have worked. But will China stick with this policy? Before that can be addressed, it is worth noting two preliminary observations.

First, no embargo is watertight. A variety of factors—ranging from profit seeking by individuals employed by the Chinese state, the historically porous borders of the twenty-first century, and the role of third parties—suggest that the transfer of a non-outcome determining level of dual-use Chinese technology on the battlefield would eventually occur no matter what. Indeed, declassified information released by the Biden administration in late February 2023 demonstrates that dual-use Chinese navigation, radar, drone, and electronic communication jamming equipment has reached the Russian military. There may even be other transferred equipment, such as high-level semiconductors, which simply hasn’t been detected.

Second, China has reason to provide military aid. In Beijing’s eyes, the notion that the United States—whose own State Department figures register $35.8 billion in security aid (as of April 4, 2023) to Ukraine’s war efforts against Russia—should issue warnings to China against aiding a belligerent in a conflict that is (in Beijing’s view) of Washington’s creation is the height of hypocrisy. That said, however sympathetic Beijing may be to Moscow, Qin Gang’s statement underlines the point that China has even more compelling reasons to exercise restraint. Accordingly, as long at the Putin regime’s survival is not at stake, Beijing will not provide Moscow with the military assistance necessary to turn the tide of the war.

China Will Keep Its Guns

Overall, China’s policy is determined by a political logic. As such, China’s restraint will likely continue. There are three specific political reasons for this.

First, Beijing understands the dangers of both escalation of the war in Ukraine and the risk of Chinese entanglement. Chinese policymakers are hard-headed realists who recognize the importance of balancing the competing imperatives of aiding Russia while avoiding getting involved in a conflict that attract the ire of the West and damage the pursuit of China’s own national interests.

Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine has generated highly critical internal commentary in China’s strategic studies community. Specifically, the January 12, 2023 issue of the People’s Liberation Army Daily, China’s leading official military periodical, contains rare direct criticism. That such appeared in a reputable and authoritative paper provides a window into internal Chinese views. The conclusion is clear: Chinese strategists understand that the provision of a politically untenable level of military support would be needed to change the military outcome in Ukraine in Moscow’s favour. They are also keenly aware that Chinese military support seriously risks drawing Beijing into a quagmire created by the U.S.-led NATO alliance. Accordingly, Beijing draws a clear distinction between diplomatic and economic support for Moscow on one hand, and a policy of military support on the other.

Second, providing outcome-determining military aid to Russia would inevitably trigger economic sanctions from Brussels and Washington, jeopardizing China’s economic growth prospects. The CCP’s domestic political legitimacy, especially in the post-coronavirus pandemic era, rests on its ability to deliver a sustained return to robust economic growth, which will itself rely on continued trade with the EU and the United States. The EU and the United States were China’s top two trade partners in 2021, representing 13.7 percent and 12.5 percent of China’s trade, respectively.

But much more than trade volume is at stake. European technology is increasingly critical to the quality of China’s economic development. Following the drastic reduction in U.S. technology transfer after Washington’s move in 2017 from a policy of “engagement” to what is being called “strategic competition” with China, Beijing is depending on Europe as a reliable alternative source of technology. Military support for Moscow would jeopardize that access.

This reality explains the accommodating comments that Wang Yi—promoted to the post of Director of the CCP’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission in January 2023—made to the substantial constituency of European attendees at the Munich Security Conference in February this year. According to Wang, “we need to think calmly, especially our friends in Europe, about what efforts should be made to stop the warfare; what framework should there be to bring lasting peace to Europe; what role Europe should play to manifest its strategic autonomy.”

Third and finally, China is intent on projecting a more positive image of itself in world politics, especially after the coronavirus pandemic. In February this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released two significant documents. The first was a systematic critique of U.S. hegemony, highlighting Washington’s alleged abuse of its power to maximize its political, military, economic, technological, and cultural interests. The second was more positive, outlining Beijing’s Global Security Initiative (GSI)—a Chinese alternative to the U.S. model of world politics. As things stand, a Chinese decision to provide military support to Russia would torpedo the GSI by causing many states to view Beijing as a facilitator of the very hegemonic behavior it critiques the United States of.

A Success for Washington

On the issue of China’s provision of military aid to Russia, a policy of U.S. deterrence has succeeded: Beijing will continue its diplomatic and economic support for Russia, but exercise restraint on military support. The reasons for this policy continuation reflects a combination of factors: the dangers of a Chinese military commitment to Russia; a concern that military aid to Russia will trigger economic sanctions from Brussels and Washington; and the imperative to improve China’s international image.

Short of an unlikely “fall of Putin” scenario, Beijing will not provide Moscow with the military capabilities it requires. Russia, it seems, must make do with what it has.

Nicholas Khoo is Associate Professor in the Politics program at the University of Otago in New Zealand. He specializes in Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, and great power politics.

Image: Shutterstock.

One could be excused for assuming all states operate as true equals in the international system and under international law. A brief observation of Lebanon quickly dispels such a conception, however, as the recent exchange of fire between it and its southern neighbor Israel depicted last week. The series of incidents mark a continuation of the small Mediterranean country’s unfortunate reality—namely one of fractured subservience or submission to various regional and international actors that are worsening its numerous ongoing crises.

Lebanon-Israeli Tensions

The escalation between Beirut and Tel Aviv began on April 6, when missiles flew over Lebanon’s southern border and into northern Israel. While unclear at first, many suspect the Palestinian organization and armed group known as Hamas for launching the rockets from positions it controls in Lebanon. This was likely in response to the brutal attacks of Muslim worshippers inside the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem during the holy month of Ramadan on April 5 which constituted major human rights violations. The worshippers wished to stay in the mosque overnight to practice Itikaf—essentially overnight stays in mosques to pray, reflect, and recite the Quran.

The Israeli military reported that thirty-four rockets had been fired into its territory from southern Lebanon, noting that it intercepted at least twenty-five while four landed inside Israel. Three people were harmed in the attack, which also caused material damage and sent Israeli citizens fleeing for bomb shelters across northern Israel.

Tel Aviv responded on April 7 with airstrikes supposedly targeting the origin sites of the attacks in Lebanon, also opting to strike Hamas positions in the Gaza Strip—the origin of additional rocket attacks on Thursday. Fortunately, no deaths were reported as a result of the strikes. Importantly, the Israeli military made a point to explicitly note that it was only targeting sites linked to Palestinian militants—likely a signal to Lebanese Hezbollah that it did not desire further escalation along its northern border with the much more formidable armed group.

Naturally, the series of events produced a flurry of diplomatic efforts to prevent a rapid escalation akin to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, which ravaged large parts of southern Lebanon. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the peacekeeping force operating as a buffer between Lebanese and Palestinian militants in Lebanon and Israel, was in close contact with both sides to prevent further violence.

But efforts by both parties to signal disinterest in any escalation ultimately won the day. Indeed, official Israeli statements did not blame Hezbollah for the attacks. This proved to be a crucial signal to Lebanon and Hezbollah, especially as many suspected the group green-lighted the strikes since Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah met in Beirut with senior Hamas officials and Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh just hours before the strikes. Lebanese officials reciprocated, with many—including Hezbollah-ally Gebran Bassil of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) political party—condemning “non-Lebanese” rockets fired from their country.

Not in My Backyard

While cooler heads prevailed amidst a context dominated by hawks, which should be welcomed, there is an inherent irony to statements from the likes of Bassil. Not only is it unlikely that Hezbollah was aloof to any Hamas efforts to strike Israel, but the concept of any rejection of “non-Lebanese rockets” is also hysterical and hypocritical.

Ultimately, the rockets fired by Hamas from Lebanon are sourced from the same country—Iran. Bassil and his Hezbollah-aligned FPM want to present a scenario in which Hamas rockets are “non-Lebanese” while pretending that Hezbollah rockets are somehow intrinsically different. In the real world, his party and the pro-Hezbollah bloc regularly point Iranian weaponry—namely “non-Lebanese” rockets—at their southern neighbor. Thus, Bassil presenting a “not-in-my-backyard” stance is as bad faith as it gets in Lebanese politics.

The Myth of Lebanese Sovereignty Today

Yet while Bassil’s newfound altruism regarding armed groups in Lebanon should be expected given his history of disingenuous and corrupt actions, such statements speak to the Lebanese reality today. Whether it be Iranian, Israeli, or other regional and international interests, it is clear that Lebanon has shed any remaining vestiges of sovereignty, opting instead to pawn this off to the highest bidder. Bassil’s statements are the epitome of this dynamic, as the “non-Lebanese” rockets commentary proves.

Indeed, regular Israeli military flights over Lebanese skies—22,000 as of mid-2022—mark one of the staunchest examples of the former’s violation of the latter’s sovereignty. This says nothing of unilateral military operations against Lebanon in recent decades that have resulted in tens of thousands of direct and indirect deaths.

To be sure, actors in Lebanon deserve some blame for these previous military operations. Iran regularly flouts Lebanese sovereignty through its Hezbollah and Hamas partners, the former of which essentially operates a state within a state as it erodes Lebanon’s institutions. In parallel, Hezbollah regularly smuggles essential energy supplies and other goods out of the impoverished country to Syria to prop up the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad—a country that occupied Lebanon for much of its existence in one form or another. Such actions are in support of Iran’s “resistance” efforts—not Lebanese interests. Still, they do not constitute many of the unilateral Israeli actions.

Regional states also have a long history of similar violations. Saudi Arabia is central to this reality as it has, until recently, long played a patron role in Lebanon, co-opting Sunni and Christian parties to counter Iranian influence in the country. This rarely meant support for basic human rights or anti-corruption efforts as regional states preferred Lebanon’s role as the Switzerland of the Middle East—namely for its incredibly opaque and corrupt banking system. A simple observation of the Lebanese political system shows that most politicians draw allegiances and legitimacy from ethnicity-based patronage systems that vertically span into both Lebanese communities and outside the country to various Middle Eastern states. Pro-Syria parties, such as Marada leader and presidential hopeful Suleiman Frangieh, offer perfect examples of this dynamic.

Ultimately, Lebanon’s sovereignty problem is a long-running net negative for the country, heavily contributing to the paralysis witnessed in its political and governing systems. While this does not explain the full story of despotic and nepotistic clientelism that has fueled corruption in the country for most of its existence, it is certainly a major impediment to reforms that could improve the reality of its people. 

If the region and world continue to view Lebanon as a playground for their geopolitical ambitions, the country will experience worsening economic and political degradation. As the recent Israeli strikes and political statements in Lebanon suggest, the situation is set to worsen so long as those in positions of power continue to reject the writing on the wall.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Andreas Zeitler / Shutterstock.com

A possible new trade route between Russia and India to take shape starting in 2023.

Diligent followers of international policy will likely see 2023 as the starting point for the official acknowledgment of a new power dynamic, one where the War in Ukraine will set the barrier between world powers old and new. Despite constantly changing predictions on the conflict in the East of Ukraine, there are no quick solutions, invincible tanks, massive advantages or much progress on the ground. The much discussed upcoming spring offensive may have already started due to mild weather and an influx of new equipment and conscripts, the result of which will likely determine the outcome of the war. A return to similar front lines as were static since 2014 may be the end result of both sides who have exhausted equipment supplies and have become increasingly entrenched. The dramatic loss of NATO sourced modern equipment, especially tanks, can change the narrative rapidly as the perception of weakness has rapidly shifted policy approaches since the fall of Afghanistan.

Sanctions against Russia have pressured countries dependent on Russian energy to take a policy stance on their future relations with not only Russian oil and gas, but all exports. Associated conflicts have or will erupt based on the response great powers see as beneficial to their future growth over the next generation. Smaller nations in regions south of Russia have been taking new positions, depending on where they see their future successes. The question of Russia’s relations with China, especially considering possible military support for Russia, is a major concern for those fighting in Ukraine. A new trade corridor through to China will be established, but with historical disagreements still on the minds of both sides, a cautious relationship is forming. Another possible trade route will link Russia’s economy closer to India, becoming a major influence over future politics in the region.

One nation that stands out as being in the centre of much of the new policy and trade shift is India. The future prospects of India’s economy is measured by its good relations with different countries abroad, high education, its ever growing population and military prowess. Despite being considered a close Western ally, India has benefitted from access to low cost Russian oil and gas along with good relations with both sides of the conflict in Ukraine. Little pressure has been put on India due to its position as a Western ally that acts as a bulwark against China and extremism in Asia, laying an international focus on keeping India strong and secure. India always stood out as an ally to those countries who seek trade, and their military being a mix of Western, French and Russian military designs is a reflection of their place in the security structure of their region. For this reason, trade with India may unlock a prosperous future, but conflict with India may end up being an economic disaster. One scenario sees ships being prevented from accessing ports in China if India supports an American blockade during a conflict against Taiwan. Regarding India, its always best to trade instead of compete.

The access Russia will seek with India travels through some conflicted territory in the Caspian Sea region and across Iran. India’s ever growing influence in the Caspian Sea region makes conflict between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia a possible choke point for Russian-Indian trade on this proposed route. Self inflicted flare ups between Iran’s government and minority groups inside Iran and on the border ties protests to Iran’s wider population. While human rights should be paramount for any country’s trade relations, the lack of attention seen in the West will do little to push Russia to avoid the region or motivate India to demand stability and freedom in the region itself. While a free Iran would benefit all powers and likely displace many security issues in the region, both sides need to consider the consequences of abandoning those asking for freedom. India can likely motivate their trade partners for a minimization of conflicts, peaceful government transitions, demand stability and basic human rights, and apply power in the new trade region with a voice that both sides will trust. Without this trade route, chaos west of India is assured, and Russia will be forced to expand its security structure even farther past its current borders. Even in this scenario, India will likely prosper due to its relations with strong allies in the West. It seems as if the choice is between internal conflict or peaceful trade with India. Each nation in the relationship will choose one or the other and it will establish the future for the next few generations.

The alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea) is a cornerstone of the U.S. security architecture in the Indo-Pacific and, increasingly, in the world. Both the United States and South Korea must do all they can to strengthen this vital alliance.

As this year marks the seventieth anniversary of the alliance, with an upcoming state visit of President Yoon Suk-yeol to Washington later this month, it is important to appreciate the historical significance of the alliance.

For South Korea, the alliance has been the guarantor of its security and the bedrock of its economic development and prosperity since the Korean War. For centuries, Korea had been under the suzerainty of China and its fate had been tied to that of its Chinese overlords. As the Chinese empire declined in the late nineteenth century and collapsed in the early twentieth century, so did the old dynastic rule in Korea.

As Korea fell under Japanese colonial rule for thirty-six years, it was the United States that played the greatest role in liberating Korea from Tokyo’s grip at the end of World War II. And when communist forces overran South Korea in 1950 in the Korean War after Korea’s division, the United States spearheaded the United Nations forces dispatched to repel the invasion. Though the UN forces failed to reunify Korea, they preserved the territorial integrity of South Korea in large measure.

The U.S.-ROK alliance, cemented in 1953 at the end of the Korean War, marked a historic shift in Korea’s fate. For the first time in Korea’s history, a Western democratic great power came to be the principal ally and security guarantor of a Korean state. With its fate tied to the United States, South Korea came to experience miraculous economic development and an impressive transformation into a mature industrialized democracy.

For the United States, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been indispensable in preserving and defending the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific since the Korean War.

As the Indo-Pacific now contributes the largest share of the global population and the global economy, it is arguably the most important region of the world for U.S. national security and prosperity. However, the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific faces grave threats from Beijing’s expansionism and Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation.

Although defending the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific is crucial for U.S. national security and prosperity, there is no NATO-like collective security mechanism in the Indo-Pacific to stem forces of autocracy. In the absence of a collective security mechanism, what Washington has put together is an uneven patchwork of bilateral alliances and cooperative arrangements with individual countries. In this less-than-optimal security architecture, the linchpin is the U.S.-ROK alliance, along with the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Other than the U.S. alliances with Japan and Australia, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been the only enduring bilateral alliance for Washington in the Indo-Pacific. Other U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization did not endure, and the United States has only a few reliable allies in the Indo-Pacific, as numerous Indo-Pacific nations have been neutral or leaning toward Beijing in the standoff between Washington and Beijing.

The geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Korean Peninsula cannot be overstated. Located within close proximity between Beijing, Tokyo, and Vladivostok and with substantial U.S. forces stationed in Japan and South Korea, it is the only place in the world where the national security and interests of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States—four of the world’s greatest powers—directly intersect in a visceral way.

South Korea’s importance as a key ally of the United States has been demonstrated over the decades since 1953. In the Vietnam War, for example, Seoul sent massive numbers of troops to fight in Vietnam alongside U.S. troops.

Today, South Korea is increasingly a key U.S. partner in defending the rules-based international order. As a leading trading nation with an export-based economy that is heavily dependent on the import of energy and raw materials from abroad, South Korea’s security and prosperity depend on the integrity of the rules-based international order, including the freedom of navigation in the high seas where its exports and imports are in transit.

Seoul’s importance to Washington has increased even more in recent years, as South Korea has become one of the largest advanced industrialized democracies in the world with a global leadership in key strategic industries such as semiconductors and electric vehicle batteries. With a military rated as the sixth most powerful in the world, South Korea today has become a major arms exporter, with its military hardware supplying nations including Poland and Australia. Seoul now has troops stationed in nations including the United Arab Emirates and is a regular contributor to international peacekeeping activities.

All this has resulted in a major upgrade of the U.S.-ROK alliance, with the partnership now expanding from the military sphere into economics and technology. Last year, South Korean firms invested billions of dollars in the United States, seeking to build factories in states ranging from Georgia to Ohio to Texas.

Given all these developments, South Korea today is undoubtedly among the most pivotal key allies of the United States, and Seoul has arguably become as important to Washington as Tokyo. Considering this seminal importance, what can be done to protect and further enhance the alliance?

For its part, Washington must refrain from taking measures that damage the national image of the United States and turn South Korean public opinion against it. The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act recently is an example of such measures, as it contains provisions favoring electric vehicles made in the United States over those made overseas. Such discriminatory measures that are seen as promoting U.S. economic interests at the expense of the interests of U.S. allies including South Korea do much more harm than good to the U.S. national interest. Such measures must be avoided if the United States were to protect its crucial alliances with key partners such as South Korea.

Washington must bear in mind that China is keen to capitalize on tensions between the United States and its key allies such as South Korea. Washington must realize that damage to its alliance with Seoul can push the latter closer to Beijing. Washington must understand that Seoul moving into Beijing’s orbit would devastate U.S. credibility and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and indeed around the world.

For its part, Seoul must recognize that its future survival and prosperity hinge on the alliance with the United States and therefore strengthen its ties with Washington. While South Korea needs to maintain good relations with China, its biggest trading partner and a key stakeholder in addressing challenges posed by North Korea, Seoul must guard against Beijing’s attempts to drive a wedge between it and Washington. Seoul must realize that, if it allows its relationship with Washington to deteriorate excessively, it could fall back under Beijing’s suzerainty as it used to be for centuries.

Clearly, the seventy-year-old U.S.-ROK alliance is critical to the national interests of both nations and is among the cornerstones of the rules-based international order. Both Washington and Seoul would be wise to refrain from taking steps that damage this alliance, and they would be wise to guard against attempts by third parties such as Beijing to undermine this alliance. Under careful stewardship, this key alliance will help guarantee continued security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and around the world for many years to come.

Jongsoo Lee is Senior Managing Director at Brock Securities and Center Associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He is also Adjunct Fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum and Contributing Editor at The Diplomat. He can be followed on Twitter at @jameslee004.

Image: Shutterstock.