Diplomacy & Crisis News

Non-Mexican migrants will be at greater risk of removal under Washington’s new policies.

The advent of ChatGPT, No-code AI, and voice cloning software only further demonstrates that digital technologies have advanced more rapidly than any innovation in mankind’s history, reaching around 50 percent of the developing world’s population in less than two decades and transforming societies. But though the United States is, as of 2021, the most digitally competitive country in the world, many often forget that not all of its citizens benefit from these advances. There exists the digital divide—the gap between those who have access to modern information technology and services, and those who don’t.

Many Americans are unaware that this is not just a problem for developing nations. A study by the Pew Research Center finds that 7 percent of Americans, approximately 23 million people, do not use the Internet, and 23 percent do not have access to a broadband connection at home. That includes nearly three in ten people—27 percent—who live in rural locations, as well as 2 percent of those living in cities. Additional data shows that 40 percent of schools lack broadband, as do 60 percent of healthcare facilities outside metropolitan areas.

But the impact of the digital divide goes beyond schools. A national assessment of the quality of infrastructure, inclusivity, institutions, and digital proficiency found significant gaps based on race, ethnicity, and income. In terms of economic impact, a Deloitte study projected that a 10 percent increase in broadband access in 2014 would have resulted in more than 875,000 additional jobs in the United States and $186 billion more in economic output in 2019.

This is extremely concerning, especially given that, in modern times, digital technology is considered the single most important driver of innovation, growth, and job creation.

The digital divide is a significant challenge, but solutions exist: funding and implementing digital inclusion policies, programs, and tools can help. Some of these include affordable, robust broadband Internet service; digital literacy training; quality technical support; and reading material designed to enable and encourage self-sufficiency, participation, and collaboration.

The U.S. government understands the importance of this problem and is moving to address it. In March 2022, the Biden administration launched a $45 billion initiative to bring high-speed Internet to everyone in America, although some assert that $240 billion will be needed to bridge the digital infrastructure gap. Congress has since appropriated more than $100 billion, including $65 billion via the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), to help states bring high-speed Internet access to every American household, much of which is allocated directly to state governments to implement it as part of BIL and the American Rescue Plan Act.

Creating and staffing new departments and planning how to deploy funds will be essential. Multiple stakeholders—including governments, the health insurance industry, Internet providers, and municipal bondholders—need to agree on precise plans and spending. The execution stage will also be lengthy, as the physical build-out of necessary infrastructure will take time.

Infrastructure needs aside, the affordability of digital services also plays a large role in the state of America’s digital divide. Europe, however, provides some salutary lessons from which the United States could learn. Because European standards mandate open access infrastructure—meaning that there are physical infrastructural that different service providers can all make common use of—multiple companies are spared having to invest in building physical infrastructure, enabling them to compete for customers in terms of a service level. As a result, European companies offer lower prices to attract customers, which benefits consumers.

The future that consumers are demanding is even more digital than today, even more connected, more global, and more intelligent. To achieve that future, with its growing demand for connection and data consumption, we need to invest more in digital infrastructure—whether that is a network, the Internet, data centers, storage, computers, transmission, systems, or applications. Of equal importance, we should make closing the digital divide for all Americans a priority of public policy. This task is one braced by inclusion and equity and aligned with our nation’s goal to compete and thrive in a digitally globalized world.

Jerry Haar is a professor of international business and executive director for the Americas in Florida International University’s College of Business. He is also a global fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC.

Image: Shutterstock.

Since dollars are policy in U.S. national security, it is not surprising that, given the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the increasingly aggressive Chinese behavior toward Taiwan, and the escalating federal deficit, the Fiscal Year 2024 (FY2024) defense budget proposed by the Biden administration has provoked comments from all parts of the political spectrum. To put these comments in perspective, it is important to analyze at least ten major questions that, as we previously noted, President Joe Biden had to answer in formulating his proposed defense budget.

First, in deciding on the size of his FY2024 defense budget increase, would Biden use the $813 billion he originally proposed for FY2023 as a base? Or would Biden use the $860 billion, which was approved in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2023?

For FY2024, Biden used the latter—the congressionally approved FY2023 level of $858 billion—as a base and proposed a total budget for FY2024 of $886 billion, an increase of 3.2 percent. Had he used his $813 billion as a base, his budget proposal would have amounted to $47 billion less. Even if Congress does not add to his FY2024 proposal, which appears unlikely, this would mean that, since the Biden administration came into office, the defense budget will have grown by $146 billion, or 20 percent. This is exclusive of the military assistance to Ukraine, which now amounts to over $50 billion, and nearly all of the weapons going to Taiwan. Moreover, it does not include the $100 billion the federal government spends each year amortizing the military retirement system and the approximately $325 billion the Veterans Administration will spend in FY2024. As the Pentagon comptroller noted, the United States is inevitably moving toward a trillion-dollar defense budget.

Second, after deciding on the base, which rate of inflation would the Biden administration use to determine whether to maintain the current spending level in real terms, as he did last year, or potentially provide a real increase, as Congress did previously? The yearly inflation rate in January 2022 was 6 percent, the second highest in forty years. Even with no real growth, a 6 percent increase above the amount Biden requested for FY2023 means an FY2024 budget request of about $870 billion. Using the NDAA level as a base would have resulted in a budget request of approximately $900 billion.

For FY2024, Biden assumed an inflation rate of 6 percent. Using an inflation rate of 6 percent and the Congressionally approved budget for FY2023 as a base would have meant a proposed budget of $912 billion for FY2024. Therefore, in real terms, the FY2024 Defense budget is $26 billion below the FY2023 level.

Third, in addition to deciding on which base and which rate of inflation to use in determining the top line, Biden had to take into account at least three different perspectives from members of Congress. First, that of the members of the House Republican Freedom Caucus, the Democratic Progressive Caucus, and sixty-two religious groups, who want to return the FY2024 defense topline to the FY2022 level of $775 billion. While many see this as an extreme measure, it is important to keep in mind that this figure would be $35 billion, or 5 percent, above the Trump administration’s last budget. It is also more than twice as much as China and Russia combined are spending on defense, and about the same amount Biden himself had projected in his first year in office. While many would argue that the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s aggression toward Taiwan have significantly changed the international environment, it is important to remember, as noted above, that U.S. support for Ukraine is funded separately from the regular defense budget and that Taiwan is paying for almost all of the weapons.

A second group consists of those members who rely on the unfunded priorities list. These priorities, which by law must be submitted directly to Congress by the services and the combatant commanders, outline those programs that the Secretary of Defense eliminated from their original budget request. For FY2023, this list contained $21 billion in unfunded priorities, most of which were added to Biden’s FY2023 proposal. For FY2024, the list amounts to “only” $17.1 billion. However, this amount does not include the list from the Cyber Command, the National Guard Bureau, the Strategic Command, and the Missile Defense Agency.

A third group is composed of the defense hawks, who, given the Chinese military build-up want to increase defense spending from its current level of 3 percent of GDP to as much as 5 percent.

Fourth, would the Biden administration finally release its budget in a timely manner? During Biden’s first two years in office, the administration released its budget more than a month later than the normal practice. Such tardiness makes it much more difficult for Congress to pass the budget before the start of the fiscal year. This is particularly difficult for the Department of Defense, since, until a budget for the new fiscal year is passed, the Pentagon can only spend at the previous year’s level and not start any new programs, leading to a significant amount of waste and mismanagement.

Biden released his budget proposal on March 13, which is a month after the due date and makes it likely that Congress will only pass a continuing resolution for at least the first part of the new fiscal year, making it more difficult for the military to spend these funds efficiently and effectively.

Fifth, in addition to deciding on the base and the inflation rate, the president had to decide on the rate to increase military pay. The current basis for raising active-duty pay is the Employment Cost Index (ECI,) which as of September 30, 2022, was 5.2 percent compared to 4.6 percent a year before. This would be the highest raise in thirty years. For retired pay, the average cost of living increased by 8.7 percent from July to September 2022. No administration is bound by law to implement these levels, but most administrations do since they have a large impact on recruiting and retention. Since pay and benefits already consume one-quarter of the total defense budget, how much Biden raised them will have a significant impact on how much is left for investment in current nuclear and conventional procurement and research programs.

Biden proposed a raise that used the September 2022 ECI as the basis and proposed 5.2 percent pay raise for uniformed military and civil servants and 8.7 percent for military retirees. However, some critics, who support a larger raise, have pointed out that, since FY2021, military pay has increased by only 10.7 percent, while inflation has totaled 16 percent, and military housing allowances have dropped from 100 percent of rent and utility costs to 95 percent. These policies have contributed to the crisis in recruiting and retaining a sufficient number of qualified women and men in the active and reserve forces.

Sixth, after deciding on the base, would Biden increase the budget by just enough to keep pace with inflation, or would he accept a real increase of 3 to 5 percent, which some in Congress, including many in his own party, said is necessary to keep up with the growing threats from Russia and China? Increasing the budget by such in real terms, with an inflation rate of 6 percent and using the FY2023 NDAA as a base, would have resulted in an FY2024 defense budget request of about $922 billion—$110 billion more than Biden requested just a year ago, and $136 billion above what he proposed for FY2024.

Seventh, would Biden make any changes in the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons programs now that he has completed his Nuclear Posture Review? In his first two budgets, Biden ignored his own campaign pledges and the Democratic Party 2020 platform, which called for reducing overreliance and excessive dependence on nuclear weapons. Instead, in his first budget, Biden actually embraced the proposal he inherited to rebuild and modernize all three legs of the strategic nuclear triad—at a cost of $1.7 trillion—and provided funding for three new tactical nuclear weapons, including the low-yield nuclear cruise missile. Last year, Biden did try to cancel the low-yield warhead but was overridden by Congress.

The Democratic platform characterized the Trump administration’s nuclear proposal, as unnecessary, wasteful, and indefensible. Moreover, while running for president, Biden himself pledged to dismantle America’s commitment to increasing the role of nuclear weapons. Many of Biden’s supporters had hoped that his pledges would lead to his cutting back or even eliminating the land-based component of the strategic nuclear triad, which will cost $264 billion to maintain and modernize. Biden’s Nuclear Posture Review did not make such a recommendation.

The most likely cuts they suggested would be canceling one or more of the three tactical nuclear weapons programs: a new nuclear-armed cruise missile now in the research phase, a Cold War-era thermonuclear bomb, and a new low-yield warhead that the Trump administration wanted to deploy on attack submarines.

In FY2024, the Biden administration is once again including funding for all three legs of the strategic nuclear triad and two new tactical weapons, but not including any funding for the low-yield nuclear weapon, the SLCM-N.

Eighth, would Biden continue his “divest to invest” strategy for our naval forces, and what will be his goal for the ultimate size and composition of the fleet? In his FY2022 request, Biden proposed decommissioning fifteen ships, including seven cruisers and four littoral combat ships, and building only eight—four fewer than were funded in FY2021. Congress not only authorized an additional four ships that year but limited the ability of the Navy to decommission ships. In his FY2023 budget request, Biden proposed $27.9 billion for the purchase of eight new ships and retiring fifteen. But Congress again added $5 billion for six new ships and prohibited the de-commissioning of twelve of the fifteen.

In light of these changes over the last two years, the Biden administration had to decide whether to increase its goal for expanding the Navy from its present level of 296 ships to 321 by 2030. And if it did, will the administration take the money from the other services or increase the total budget topline?

In the $256 billion FY2024 budget proposed by the Navy, the largest of the five services, it has been allowed to once again repeat its divest-to-invest strategy. It proposes spending $32.8 billion to buy nine new ships, one more than it proposed last year, but two less than Congress approved last year. Moreover, it is once again proposing to retire eleven ships, eight of which have not reached the end of their intended service life, including three land-classed dock-loading ships that it proposed to retire last year but were saved by Congress. Because of its rising costs, which have grown by about 25 percent, Biden proposed in FY2024 to decrease the amphibious fleet below thirty-one, despite a Congressional mandate and an agreement with the Marine Corps on that number. This provoked outrage among the Marines and their supporters on the Hill.

Even in the unlikely event that Congress approves the Navy’s FY2024 request as is, it will mean that over the last five years, the Navy’s procurement budget will have grown by 54 percent and its operations and maintenance budget by 22 percent. However, it is much more likely that Congress will prevent the Navy from retiring many of these ships and will add funds to procure new amphibious ships.

Ninth, would Biden continue to try to slow down the production of the tri-service F-35 aircraft until it fixes its myriad problems? For FY2023, Biden requested sixty-one of these aircraft, down from eighty-fix the previous year, but Congress added eight more to bring the total to sixty-nine.

In the FY2024 proposal, Biden requested eighty-three F-35s—forty-eight for the Air Force and another thirty-five for the Navy and Marine Corps. This is not only fourteen more than Congress approved last year, but twenty-one more than Biden requested a year ago. The administration did this in spite of the fact that the F-35 has not yet fixed most of its problems, including whether it can use a revolutionary but costly new engine that Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has tried to kill. Moreover, the Air Force did not request any additional F-35s in its unfunded priorities list.

Tenth, the administration had to decide on the number of active duty personnel, it wishes to recruit and maintain. Because of the difficult recruiting environment, it reduced its active force for all the services except the Navy. This resulted in a decline of the force from 1.34 million to 1.308 million FY2023. Adding in the Reserves, the total force for FY2023 was 2,087,334.

In its FY2024 budget proposal, the Pentagon is asking for a Total Force of 2,074,000. This is 13,354 fewer than was authorized in FY2023, but 12,335 more than are currently serving, which, given the current recruiting environment, will be difficult to achieve.

No matter how much the nation spends on defense, it cannot buy perfect security. How Congress and Biden handle these issues will not only have a significant impact on our security and economy but it will also tell us a great deal about our values. As Biden himself said prior to becoming president, “Don't tell me about what you value. Show me your budget and I will tell you what your values are.”

Lawrence Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Image: Shutterstock.

A new project aims to link New Delhi to the Middle East through roads, rails, and seaports.

In communities abroad, the Erdogan regime has a head start. Democratic activists are responding to repression with mobilization.

Afghans, Syrians, and others have been given Turkish citizenship. They’ll say thanks at the polls.

A debt default would tank U.S. credit and credibility around the world.

Nikos Kazantzaki (Héraklion, 1883 - Fribourg, 1957) fut un écrivain prolifique à l'œuvre multiple (essais, romans, théâtre, poésie), principalement connu pour deux livres : Alexis Zorba (1946) et La Dernière Tentation du Christ (1954), dont l'adaptation cinématographique réalisée par Martin Scorsese en (...) / Grèce, Turquie, Littérature, Histoire, Conflit, Christianisme, Religion, Inégalités - 2018/03

It might be the case that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine depends greatly on the fate of Crimea towards the end of the conflict. Russia occupied the Ukrainian region of Crimea in 2014 when the larger conflict began between the two nations. While little was done at the time by Western allies to stop Russia from annexing Crimea in 2014, the historical roots of Crimea has long been established in that part of the world for both sides of the conflict.

In the last few generations, the region of Crimea has gained increased importance as the main base of the Soviet and Russian Black Sea fleet, with the city of Sevastopol remaining as fleet command for the Russian Navy even after Ukraine gained its independence in 1991. This peculiar arrangement of having Russia’s Navy based in another country’s territory is strategically significant in the Black Sea region, linked by historical ties to soldiers from both nations.

During the Second World War, Sevastopol held out against heavy German bombardment for an extended period of time. The heroic stand against the Germans by the Soviets was one of the key battles during the Second World War, and showed the resolve of both the Russian, Ukrainian and other Soviet people’s against the invading Germans. The ability to stand to the last solider at Sevastopol is remembered as a defining moment in Soviet, and now current history, and is likely the reason why the port city still remained the home of the fleet after 1991.

During the Soviet era, the region of Crimea was re-designated as part of the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic for various reasons despite its past as the location of important battles in history. The claims Russia made in 2014 over Crimea however did not come from an agreed upon transition, nor did it meet some coordinated approach considering the importance of Sevastopol to Russian and Ukrainian strategic interests. The importance of Crimea for Ukraine as a catalyst for the conflict comes from the fact that there is more of a balance of backgrounds living in the region, unlike in some parts of Eastern Ukraine, so they are fighting to free Crimea with a good amount of local support. The catalyst for Russia besides the fleet is that it has openly focused on Crimean resources being limited as one of the reasons for occupying other parts of Ukrainian territory, and this narrative drove many Russians to support the war. Crimea therefore is one of the main points of conflict and pride between Russia and Ukraine, and the loss or gain of the territory would be considered a demonstrative victory in the current conflict.

The ability for Ukraine to retake Crimea depends a great deal on the continued support it would get from the West for the rest of the year and past 2024. One of the major hurdles to Ukraine is the level of support their offensive receives from NATO and other allies in achieving long term strategic goals. With the politics of support for the war slowly gaining push back in the West, and equipment slowly becoming harder to acquire or simply out of stock, Ukraine must measure its response to Russia by taking key strategic locations without overburdening its forces and amount of equipment. If Ukraine can push Russia back to the 2014 regions, it could likely put up a defensive posture in the medium term and hope to retake the Eastern regions and Crimea at some point in the future. It would be hard to guess the level of Western support Ukraine would receive if planning to push Russia out of the regions occupied in 2014, but removing Russian forces out of the regions captured in 2022 would be a positive outcome.

The loss of Crimea for Russia would demonstrate that decisions made by their leadership gave up more than they had to lose in invading Ukraine, in territory, lives, and pride. The end result may topple the current Government in Russia, as Russia was and still is seen by many as several times more powerful than Ukraine in resources, technology and manpower. The after-effect of a loss for Russia may have consequences on unity in the country, but more likely it will change how the periphery responds to Russia as a hegemon in the Caucasus region and between Russia’s ties with China and the Middle East. The Caucuses would likely abandon Russian ties fairly quickly, as seen with some nations currently. China would certainly take territorial and energy advantages from Russia in the East, or may simply tie Russia’s export economy further my linking their natural resource wealth to China’s manufacturing needs. Russian allies in the Middle East would have to find other powerful allies, or have to face the consequences of poor decisions in dealing with larger powers like the US, China, Europe and India while targeting their energy supplies or bilateral relations. For this reason, Russia may escalate the conflict with its rocket forces if they may lose Crimea and Sevastopol. The fall of Sevastopol has many dimensions and levels of consequences for Russia, especially for the final narrative of the current war.

Au centre de Classé sans suite, Claudio Magris a installé un étrange personnage qui, afin de constituer un « musée total de la guerre, pour l'avènement de la paix et la désactivation de l'histoire », s'est obstiné à collectionner les armes de toutes sortes et à recueillir, sur le lieu des supplices, les (...) / Italie, Europe, Littérature, Culture, Histoire, Conflit - 2018/03

Les Égyptiens sont appelés aux urnes le 26 mars pour élire leur président. Le vote se déroule dans un contexte où les espoirs nés du soulèvement de janvier 2011 se sont évaporés, et où la population est confrontée à une dégradation de sa situation économique ainsi qu'à la main de fer du régime. / Égypte, (...) / Égypte, Proche-Orient, Armée, Audiovisuel, Censure, Médias, Mouvement de contestation, Police, Dictature, Répression, Printemps arabes 2011- - 2018/03

The East African country, once a beacon for change, now faces civil war.

The Russian president faces a growing threat from his own citizens.

One of the first high-level dialogues between the countries since the spy balloon incident shouldn’t be seen as a breakthrough.

This is the Israeli military’s largest strike on Islamic Jihad members in nine months.

Very few countries have proven to be hospitable to Syrian refugees in recent years as the country’s long-running war has resulted in a de facto partition of the country. Lebanon offers no exception to this dynamic, as proven by the numerous attempts by the Lebanese government to return some of the 800,000 to 2 million registered and unregistered Syrian refugees within its borders forcibly and illegally to their home country.

The latest iteration of this dynamic arose last month, as the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) arbitrarily detained hundreds of Syrians across Lebanon, turning them over to Syrian security services at the border. Yet while the army’s intervention in the refugee space is a new development, the political underpinnings behind the operation are not.

No Home for Syrians

Reports emerged in mid-April indicating Beirut’s renewed efforts to identify, detain, and return Syrian refugees after a brief lull in such efforts. In this context, an anonymous LAF official confirmed to local media that roughly fifty Syrians were deported in the first half of April, led by army intelligence. According to the official, the operation prioritized locating undocumented Syrians living in Lebanon. This is operationalized through a 2019 Higher Defense Council administrative procedure allowing immediate deportation of anyone entering the country “illegally” after April 24, 2019.

This number ultimately grew, with many reports indicating over 400 Syrian detainees across roughly sixty raids in April. Of this group, approximately 130 were forcibly returned to regime-held areas in Syria. Other reports highlight 1,100 arrests and 600 deportations across seventy-three raids as of May 4. The raids focused on individuals with invalid residency permits, supposedly under the orders of caretaker Social Affairs Minister Hector Hajjar. The Lebanese General Security Office (GSO) is not conducting deportations—an irregular move given they handle such cases.

Hajjar is a member of the Hezbollah-allied Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and has openly derided the presence of Syrian refugees, warning of a “big explosion” if tensions are not reduced between Lebanese and Syrians in his country. He has also claimed that Syrian refugees make up 40 percent of Lebanon’s population, arguing “no country in the world would accept” such conditions. The minister has plans to lead a ministerial delegation to Damascus to discuss the refugee issue in a similar fashion to previous Lebanese ministers.

However, Hajjar claims that GSO is leading deportation efforts—conflicting reporting focused on the LAF. In this regard, Acting General Security Director Elias Baissari—officially tasked with the refugee file—reportedly visited Damascus last week to meet with Syrian officials about refugees. Following up on these efforts, Prime Minister Najib Mikati on April 27 assigned Baissari with the task of developing a mechanism for returning Syrians.

In parallel, Lebanese interior minister Bassam Mawlawi ordered his ministry to survey and register Syrian populations on May 2, demanding municipalities ensure Syrians are documented before permitting them to buy or rent property. This coincides with a slew of curfews for Syrians in many municipalities, as well as checkpoints and roadblocks to identify undocumented migrants. Finally, Mawlawi, alongside other ministers, demanded the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) revoke the refugee status of any Syrians who go to Syria and return to Lebanon.

Government Failure and Scapegoating

These evolving dynamics surrounding the refugee file suggest a new level of engagement on the part of the Lebanese government. While the GSO has traditionally held authority over the refugee file, the inclusion of the LAF and multiple ministers suggests Beirut is shifting toward a whole-of-government approach as it prioritizes the issue even further in 2023—although such an approach could be decentralized along political alliances. For example, some have argued that the LAF’s involvement suggests Joseph Aoun is catering to the public and other politicians in support of a presidential run.

To be sure, this does not suggest the existence of any serious or effective strategy, nor that multiple governing entities were not previously working on the file. Rather, the intensity of anti-refugee efforts is increasing, albeit amidst a government that is incapable of doing much of anything well—which lies at the core of the situation.

Just as Beirut failed to implement its 2022 refugee return plans, stipulating the return of 15,000 Syrian refugees a month, recent efforts suggest the limits of and impediments facing the Lebanese government. Indeed, while any illegal returns in violation of basic non-refoulment clauses—the international legal statute outlawing forced returns to unsafe conditions like Syria—must be actively fought at all levels, recent efforts to return between 130-600 Syrians highlight Lebanon’s limited capacity to operationalize and scale such a program or any other serious government action today.

This suggests what many migration experts and human rights advocates have argued for years: that Lebanese political figures and elites continue to operationalize a Syrian refugee scapegoating strategy as opposed to any serious return program or domestic reform agenda. Given Lebanon’s historic economic collapse at the hands of a septuagenarian elite that is primarily interested in retaining a corrupt and sect-based political system, defenseless Syrian refugees present an easy target.

Human rights groups have rightly condemned this approach, with Amnesty International releasing a statement on April 24. The NGO cited previous research documenting human rights violations experienced by Syrian refugees upon return to regime-held areas in Syria—not limited to arbitrary detention, torture, and disappearance. Given that these constitute the norm under Assad’s government, Amnesty put it simply: “The Lebanese authorities must immediately stop forcibly deporting refugees back to Syria.”

Syrian Refugees and the Future

Unfortunately, Lebanese officials are not listening. Indicative of broader anti-Syrian hate speech prominent across Lebanon, FPM minister of parliament George Atallah stated that Amnesty should “mind its own business” and “not interfere in the sovereign decision of Lebanon.” This echoed responses to the human rights organization’s tweet on the issue, in which many identified Syrians as synonymous with violence, economic collapse, and land theft.

The heightened rhetoric draws a direct path to Lebanese political actors, producing increasingly violent hate speech and actions against Syrians in Lebanon. The unfortunate reality of this dynamic is circular in that elite rhetoric informs the population, which in turn expresses support for increasingly brutal anti-refugee policies. This scenario mirrors hate speech against Syrians in Turkey.

Thus, 2023 will likely continue to present a rapidly deteriorating situation for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The latest iteration of efforts to make conditions unbearable for refugees will not be the last this year, especially amidst rapidly evolving re-normalization efforts between Arab states and Damascus. 

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Richard Juilliart / Shutterstock.com

COVID-19 isn’t a pandemic anymore. It’s just a never-ending nightmare.

The group’s Afghanistan branch is capitalizing on the Russia-Ukraine war to recruit, fundraise, and incite violence.

Elections still matter in Turkey, and not every strongman is strong.

Beijing’s conversion into a major creditor has upended international finance—and not in a good way.