Diplomacy & Crisis News

Overflowing graveyards and other parallels signal a threat to Vladimir Putin’s rule.

Washington and Hanoi have been inching closer, but it’s a complicated dance.

Moscow’s latest escalation came on the eve of its Victory Day, which marks the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany.

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is certainly on a path to enhance his country’s diplomatic profile by turning it into a “middle power,” a concept born during the Cold War to characterize states that “punch above their weight” in world politics. Considered to be neither big nor small powers, these countries can project a global significance that transcends a merely regional profile. Canada is the prototypical middle power. Australia is also frequently mentioned in this context.

Middle-powers are frequently associated with economic significance (for instance, due to their energy resources) combined with what scholars call their “norm entrepreneurship.” They typically do not exert influence through military force but rather through diplomatic means, often involving their role in conflict resolution.

Kazakhstan has all the classical characteristics of a middle power: strategic location, abundant natural resources, and commitment to international principles and cooperation. Kazakhstan has continuously emphasized multilateralism and conflict resolution in its international diplomacy.

One of the key factors contributing to Kazakhstan’s emergence as a middle power is its commitment to hosting and participating in international political conferences. In recent years, Kazakhstan has positioned itself as a neutral ground for dialogue and mediation. For instance, in January 2017, the country hosted high-level talks on the Syrian Civil War in Astana, bringing together the Syrian government, opposition forces, and regional stakeholders such as Russia, Iran, and Turkey in the Astana Process, which has since had a key role in promoting ceasefires and facilitating humanitarian aid.

In 2013, Kazakhstan also facilitated the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries (the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), which culminated in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. As a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 2017 to 2018, Kazakhstan emphasized such crucial issues as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conflict prevention, and counterterrorism. Likewise, it was instrumental in addressing the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan after the country’s political turmoil in 2021. 

Kazakhstan has coined its position on the Ukrainian crisis, a policy of non-recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. Such courageous consistency in pushing strategic neutrality in a region neighboring Russia and China has contributed to efforts to strengthen the UN principles in support of the world order, as well as the regional prospects for greater multilateralism.

It is remarkable that Kazakhstan is emerging as a middle power on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea at the same time as Azerbaijan is also doing so on its western shore. The promotion of their bilateral cooperation is driving deeper integration in the region, reinforcing its security structure. The recent agreement with Azerbaijan to leverage the full capacity of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TCITR) is an example. The TCITR, also known as the Middle Corridor, runs from China to Europe through Central Asia and South Caucasus.

The latest bilateral meeting between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan follows the 2021 transformation of the Turkic Council into the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Established in 2009, the Turkic Council was initially a platform for dialogue and collaboration between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey. The creation of the OTS was a natural development from the Turkic Council’s evolution, over the years, into a more comprehensive organization encompassing economic, cultural, educational, and security affairs.

Kazakhstan’s diplomacy was a driving force behind both the foundation of the Turkic Council and, under Tokayev’s leadership, its more recent institutionalization as the OTS. This shift has enabled countries like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to develop stronger ties and to work together more effectively on regional challenges. The OTS’s November 2022 Samarkand Declaration, adopted on occasion of its ninth summit meeting, laid out a broad but grounded multilateral program for cooperation in the foreign policy and security fields as well as in the economy and people-to-people relations and the reinforcement of the institutionalization of Turkic-world activities.

The country is well-placed to cooperate with Azerbaijan to play key middle-power geopolitical and geoeconomic roles in the Caspian Sea region. Each is the economic powerhouse of its area with vast energy resources and a stable political climate, making it an attractive partner for regional and global powers. Similarly, Azerbaijan is a crucial player in the South Caucasus, an important transit hub for oil and gas supplies, connecting Europe and Asia, including the westward transit of energy from Kazakhstan. Their recent bilateral agreement is in line with the 2022-2027 roadmap for the Middle Corridor’s development that Kazakhstan proposed trilaterally among Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey in Aktau last November at the foreign-minister level.

It is worth mentioning that Kazakhstan was among the first to rally for greater regional and intra-regional cooperation to confront global challenges arising from increased polarization and fragmentation. It has reached out to the middle powers around the world, as well as business and academia with the call to convene in Astana at the Astana International Forum on June 8-9. The forum will provide a new means to amplify voices standing for nonviolence in international politics to ensure sustainable economic growth, peace, and security. There is a hope that the call will resonate among “middle powers” to find the path back to peace.

Kazakhstan has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy aimed at maintaining the balance between major powers while advancing its national interests. This pragmatic foreign-policy approach, pioneered by Tokayev as the country’s foreign minister and prime minister in the 1990s and 2000s, has allowed it to thread the needle between Russia and China while deepening its ties to the West as well as to other Asian powers and regional players. This is the policy of an archetypal Eurasian middle power.

Harun Karčić is a journalist and political analyst covering the Balkans and Turkey. Over the past decade, he has authored numerous articles on Islam and foreign influence in the region, including Saudi, Iranian, Turkish, and more recently Chinese and Russian. He also regularly reports on Muslim minorities in Europe and rising right-wing nationalism. He tweets @HarunKarcic.

Image: Shutterstock.

Patriot missiles have finally arrived in Ukraine, but the reality may not live up to the hype. Ukrainian air defense operators have been lauded in training, but the threat environment that Ukraine faces poses challenges that are daunting for the Patriot system.

Ukraine faces threats that run the span of Russia’s missile and drone arsenal. Russia’s unmanned aerial systems range from consumer-grade reconnaissance drones to more sophisticated Iranian-made kamikaze drones. Several classes of drones are interceptable by Patriot, but then it becomes both a tactical and economic issue: Drones can use their maneuverability and terrain-hugging flight patterns to remain undetected by Patriot radars. Moreover, it’s questionable to use $3 million interceptors to take out drones that cost orders of magnitude less. 

This is particularly the case when Ukraine’s supply of Soviet-era interceptors is slated to run out soon, and U.S. resupply of Stinger missiles remains similarly strained. This would leave Patriot as the sole defense Ukraine has against Russian air supremacy. The United States can’t just throw more Patriot interceptors at Ukraine, either. For one, they’re a precious commodity; Washington only bought 252 PAC-3 MSE interceptors this year for the entire U.S. Army, and many of these will be used to phase out more antiquated interceptors.

Patriot operating on its lonesome is a tenuous proposition at best; while a first-rate system technologically, the Patriot cannot be used to full effect if it is divorced from air defense doctrine. Patriot systems are limited to pinpoint defense of major assets and are designed to operate in tandem with air defenses engaging targets at higher and lower altitudes. Without these additions, Patriot will have too many threats to engage and the result will either be porous coverage that doesn’t protect its defended assets, or coverage that quickly subsides when Patriot runs out of interceptors.

Moreover, Patriot systems are themselves vulnerable. Operating a Patriot radar system gives away its location, making it an open target for Russian attacks. This means that Patriot is not a one-stop-shop for defending Ukraine’s military assets or its people.

The “do-somethingism” of handing over this advanced weapons system is also divorced from the strategic ends that the United States could reasonably achieve from doing so. Patriot coverage, or lack thereof, will not bring the war in Ukraine to an end. The air war in general is a means of shaping operations for maneuver forces, and on this front Ukrainian and Russian forces remain stalemated. Insulating Ukraine against air attack also discourages negotiation by providing a false impression that the air threat can be mitigated indefinitely. The longer the negotiation process is delayed, the more Ukrainians are killed and the more damage is done to Ukraine’s infrastructure in the long term. 

Given these tactical and operational flaws, there is dubious strategic value for the United States in sending further systems to Ukraine. Patriot systems are not going to bring the war in Ukraine to an end or enable Kyiv to negotiate for or reclaim Crimea or the Donbas. What they do signal is a false American commitment that may prolong Ukraine’s carnage.

The ideological framing of the sanctity of territorial integrity needs to end, as it exacerbates Kyiv’s more maximalist—and unachievable—aims of retaking Crimea. The end state of the Russia-Ukraine War will likely not look like the status quo ante, and Washington should recognize this. Ukraine managed to make gains in the Donbas in 2022, but both sides’ long-anticipated spring offensives have yet to materialize, with a Stalingrad-esque deadlock in Bakhmut preventing any territorial gains.

The United States can follow a different model, namely one of mediation and deescalation. The United States cedes initiative and influence when it allows others to be the dealmakers, such as China’s recent brokering of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement or Turkey’s facilitation of Ukraine and Russia’s grain export deal during the war. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has begun undertaking the groundwork along with China for a negotiated end to the war. Germany likewise has not done much to decouple or rearm as its rhetoric suggested early in the war. The United States can take advantage of a stagnant front line to bring about a negotiated end, or at least a ceasefire. Waiting to do so limits what Washington can accomplish when Ukraine’s military means are exhausted.

Washington has misstepped by giving Ukraine Patriot systems that will likely produce few benefits. However, there is an opportunity for Washington to still play a needed role in concluding the war. Tactical means cannot achieve these strategic ends; weapons systems will not prove decisive, but diplomatic power might. Washington can still achieve much by doing less. The path to peace in Ukraine may not be paved with weapons but with diplomatic finesse.

Geoff LaMear is a Fellow at Defense Priorities.

Image: DVIDS.

How to understand one of the most important elections of 2023.

Beijing is looking for ways to harm its neighbor other than invasion.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni believes in the racist great replacement theory—and is putting it into in practice.

Friday, April 28 marked the one-hundredth day of Dr. Najat Saliba and lawyer Melhem Khalaf’s parliamentary sit-in to demand accountability from Lebanese lawmakers and follow the constitution. In over ten sessions, Lebanese members of parliament have failed to elect a successor after President Michel Aoun’s mandate expired in October 2022. Rather than continue the process, everyone decided to return to their homes and wait until a “suitable” candidate appears. Najat and Melhem, however, chose an entirely different approach.

Why did they start the sit-in?

In a press conference held in January, both Najat Saliba and Melhem Khalaf announced their intentions to remain in parliament until every other MP assembles to have successive and open-ended sessions to elect a new president. At the conference, Khalaf highlighted that Article 75 of the Lebanese constitution obliges parliament to meet regularly until a person wins the necessary votes to become president.

The present situation and recent developments:

Saliba had to temporarily stop her side of the sit-in to travel abroad to Geneva and the United States. Her goal on the trip is to speak with high officials from the United Nations who share her conviction that the rule of law is being usurped in Lebanon. Once she returns to Beirut, Najat intends to return to parliament alongside her colleague and comrade. She is being accompanied by journalist and supporter Lebanese Australian film director Daizy Gedeon who produced the movie “ENOUGH! Lebanon’s Darkest Hour.” Although the sit-in received enormous praise for its tenacity and courage in defiance against a failed system at the beginning, there is now a sense of indifference and criticism.

Many are now seeing the sit-in as a waste of time and do not believe it can move the needle regarding the presidency. I have come across several people in Lebanon saying, “Why are they still sitting in there? They should be working.” My reply is always the same: “If they weren’t in Parliament, you would say they are no different from the rest.” The irony of such criticism is that Melhem and Najat are working. Everyone else is at home. Some have also taken shots at the sincerity of the sit-in. Najat and I spoke on this matter, and she explained her position.

“I think the sit-in with the values and principles should not be questioned anymore. Because this is the only way we can regain our democracy. People who are thinking the sit-in can do the miracle that the other MPs could not do, they are mistaken. So, I think instead of asking us about how much the sit-in has made a difference, I think they should be asking the other Parliamentarians who are really on vacation and doing nothing. They are not attending to people’s needs. This needs to be asked. I think we have stopped our lives for a beautiful and excellent cause that is to regain our anchor and point of reference, that is the Lebanese constitution.”

It is clear from speaking to both Najat and Melhem they have no regrets for initiating the sit-in. Nevertheless, it does beg the question … Why haven’t other MPs from the so-called “Change” bloc followed their example? The arrival of more MPs could solidify and strengthen the sit-in and may push for more people on the ground to come out to support them. Ordinary Lebanese citizens have asked me questions such as, “Why are they not coming together?” Can they at least agree on a name? There is growing resentment on the streets towards some of the Change MPs.

There is truly no reason for all other independent and opposition MPs to be sitting at home. This notion of the “right timing” for a bargain to be struck by all the political bigshots is an insult and anyone who abides by it is breaking the law. MPs are supposed to be legislating and working on behalf of their constituency. Not ignoring them until a political breakthrough manifests out of thin air.

There is no perfect candidate. There is no international or regional solution for Lebanon. There is only the Constitution. If it is followed accordingly, Lebanon would have had a president by now. When will the rest of parliament understand this?

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Karim naamani / Shutterstock.com

On May 14, Turks will be going to the polls in one of the more consequential elections of this year. Turkey is a critical country, and the competing alliances and leaders promise distinct solutions and approaches to awaiting challenges.

This is the first in a series of articles analyzing the consequences of the different electoral outcomes. I start with a possible defeat of the incumbent president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). This starting choice reflects neither an expectation nor a preference. However, the fact is that tumultuous days await Turkey if Erdogan were to be defeated after a twenty-year reign. This is because the Turkish polity is deeply divided and polarized and needs a well-defined road map for a political transition. Moreover, the structural political changes pledged by the opposition coalition led by the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and its head, Kemal Kiliçdaroglu, represent a complete regime transformation.

The transition will be challenging as the new government will be confronting three immediate problems: the economy, the status of state institutions, and governing amidst disarray at all levels of society and politics. The most pressing one is the dire economic situation caused by mismanagement and exacerbated by the devastating February 6 earthquake. Therefore, the government must quickly introduce a financial package that tackles the high inflation rate, the dismal current account crisis, and the declining value of the lira and address the dramatic loss of confidence in the Turkish economy.

The earthquake’s cost is estimated to be between 8 and 12 percent of GDP—an immense amount. Considering how poorly the Erdogan government performed after the quake, expectations that a new government will quickly rehabilitate its victims and the affected provinces’ infrastructure are bound to be high. However, such expenditures will collide with the introduction of more orthodox economic policies, including interest rate hikes. In such a challenging environment, the new government must win domestic support by becoming as transparent and truthful as possible in explaining its policies to a public that has lost faith during the last decade of Erdogan’s rule.

The good news is that the Turkish manufacturing base is solid and capable; it needs to double its efforts at increasing and diversifying its exports, primarily geographically, and once again attracting direct foreign investment. Turkey’s advantageous location is conducive to landing some “friend-shoring” types of investments. Turkey will require sizeable foreign assistance to accomplish these and obtain restructuring funds; this support is likely to come mainly from the United States and Europe.

The second challenge is executing a transition unlike any other in modern Turkey’s history. This is because, during his rule, Erdogan, the consummate populist-authoritarian politician, brought just about every state and societal institution of any significance under his domination. From the judicial system to the central bank, the public universities, most of the press, parliament, the military, and the bureaucracy were all stripped of their autonomy.

Yet, nothing can move forward without first reestablishing the rule of law; one cannot attract investments in an environment where legal norms are constantly violated. So how does the new government deal with pent-up expectations for redress and justice in a country where thousands have been imprisoned arbitrarily or dismissed from their jobs and professions? While 800 government officiald—including governors, ambassadors, heads of intelligence and religious affairs, and various agencies—will automatically lose their jobs, the judiciary and other critical institutions will continue to be run by Erdogan loyalists. So, the victorious coalition must devise an action plan to rebuild confidence in institutions.

The third task is to create a coherent governing structure out of quite a disparate set of coalition allies and outside partners while tackling raw and divisive issues that separate them. Understandably, the focus will be on the promise to return to a parliamentary system and do away with the exiting hyper-presidential one. This gargantuan task will require careful planning and debate and a few years to accomplish.

The leader of the opposition, Kiliçdaroglu, is a well-meaning if unimaginative person who comes from a bureaucratic background. Nevertheless, he has outperformed all expectations by running an intelligent campaign and eschewing a calm and non-confrontational style. This is in stark contrast to Erdogan, who has gone out of his way to employ divisive rhetoric in which criticisms of the president were often deemed treasonous and meriting prosecution.

Kiliçdaroglu has projected himself as the ideal transitional leader; expansively viewed, the opposition has many rising charismatic stars all chomping at the bit to play a more significant role. While it may be problematic at the beginning of a new administration, their diversity in background, experience, and worldview will bring much-needed dynamism to Turkish politics. This needs to be improved on the government side; paradoxically, when he came to power in the early 2000s, Erdogan had amassed a wide-ranging group of seasoned political personalities and others from different walks of life. Unfortunately, over time they were all discarded in favor of “yes-men.”

One of the immediate challenges for the new government will be to manage the pent-up frustrations of supporters who feel they have been wronged during the very partisan governing style of the incumbent administration. For those who have been in Erdogan’s camp, even if they may have prepared themselves for a possible defeat, the fact remains that the rug will have been pulled from under them. Absent partisan institutions they can turn to for support, they will find themselves without protection and thus quite fearful of a coming reckoning for their future. These are businesspersons, especially builders who have been accused of corruption and favoritism; leaders of a slavishly pro-Erdogan press; judges and prosecutors who, under orders from the presidential palace, concocted fabulous conspiracy theories that “legitimized” the jailing of opponents; and unqualified university leaderships that ran amok firing professors deemed insufficiently loyal to the regime. The latter has already taken steps by surreptitiously creating positions for themselves in university systems.

The press, both state-owned and private, is a particularly thorny issue. The Erdogan government tried to starve the “non-loyal” outlets by forcing TV stations and websites to close down temporarily or preventing state entities, be they state-owned banks or ministries, from advertising in “opposition” newspapers. Meanwhile, it lavished attention and resources on members of the dominant pro-Erdogan press who actively collaborated in repressing regime opponents by heaping made-up accusations on them.

Will Erdogan, who has a large entourage to safeguard in addition to his family and his allies in the press, bureaucracy, and other sectors, pull a January 6 or try to delegitimize the elections? He tried it once when his party lost the Istanbul mayoralty in 2019 and fabricated an excuse to have the local elections repeated. It backfired on him as Istanbulites voted in much larger numbers for his opposition. Then the Supreme Electoral Council had no option but to follow Erdogan’s illegal wishes because he effectively yielded enormous power. This time, it may be different as members of the council are unlikely to risk their well-being if he proves unsuccessful in returning to power. Already, there are indications that some members of the Constitutional Court are willing to defy him.

Still, for the sake of a peaceful transition, the incoming government may want to consider coming up with an understanding with Erdogan and his family that offers them immunity and a promise that they will be left alone, provided he does not engage in election chicanery and interfere with the incoming government’s efforts to constitute an administration.

The new leadership will likely face unexpected challenges; different groups previously targeted by the Erdogan government can be expected to move quickly against their former tormentors once election results are announced. One can envisage, as an example, Bogazici University academics and students, who have maintained a vigil against Erdogan-appointed cadres that ransacked one of the country’s best educational institutions, attempting to take over the university forcibly. On the contrary, such events will likely be replicated nationwide.

Given the monumental domestic economic, political, and social issues awaiting the new government, it will likely focus on improving relations with the West, whose support Turkey desperately needs to fund the massive post-earthquake reconstruction efforts and stabilize the economy. Unfortunately, at this early stage, foreign policy disputes would divert attention and energy from the task at hand.

At the top of the agenda is Sweden’s application to NATO which the Erdogan government has blocked because Stockholm has refused to extradite so-called terrorists. Not only does the opposition have a different outlook on this issue, but traditionally Turkey’s center-left has had a favorable view of Sweden. U.S. President Joe Biden has indicated that he wants to sell Ankara F-16 aircraft, especially in light of Turkey’s ejection from the fifth-generation F-35 fighter program following its acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system. Congress, however, is unlikely to approve any arms sales, F-16s in particular, and offer substantial support to Turkey if the veto on Sweden is maintained. The much thornier S-400 problem, for which no immediate solution exists, will have to await an imaginative answer. Therefore, a new Turkish government will have to kick this can down the road. 

Not everything will change in foreign policy; Turkey’s center-left has its nationalistic attitudes. Kilicdaroglu, once in power, will continue to pay lip service to traditional issues that have been the hallmark of Turkish foreign policy, such as Cyprus and the Aegean, absent Erdogan’s combative style. It is worth noting that since the earthquake, the Turkish Air Force has stopped overflying Greek islands for fear of antagonizing Western donors.

Kilicdaroglu will push to restore relations with the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, especially if this would occasion some Syrian refugees' return. The recent “rapprochement” between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the apparent efforts at reintegrating Assad by Gulf countries may result in an attempt to end the Syrian stalemate. With Assad still firmly in power, Riyadh and Tehran could agree to enshrine the status quo, provided the regime makes some concessions. Given its support for the Syrian opposition and its military presence in northern Syria, Turkey’s participation would help ensure this agreement’s success.

Washington and Ankara are more likely to come to an agreement on the presence of U.S. forces stationed in northern Syria that partner with local Kurds in fighting the Islamic State, or ISIS. This had been a significant source of tension between the two countries.

Finally, Europe and the United States want to see Turkey reverse the path to authoritarianism under Erdogan. To this end, it is also in their interest to be as accommodating of a new government as possible.

Henri J Barkey is the Cohen professor of international relations at Lehigh University and an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council of Foreign Relations.

Image: Shutterstock.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently announced a joint American-Turkish effort to sanction two individuals with ties to radical entities inside northern Syria. Specifically, the U.S. Treasury Department and its Turkish counterpart designated Omar Alsheak and Kubilay Sari as supporters of terrorism for their role as “financial facilitators for designated terrorist groups Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad.” This collaborative move represents a seemingly renewed era of cooperation between Ankara and Washington, just ahead of Turkey’s impending national elections on May 14. While the effort will and should be welcomed by the Biden administration, it should be perceived as a token move—one that is intended to facilitate a reset in the beleaguered bilateral relationship between the two NATO allies.

Just days before this announcement, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, announced that the country’s intelligence service operatives had successfully neutralized the current leader of the Islamic State (ISIS), Abu Hussein al-Qurayshi. The new decision to sanction two individuals affiliated with radical entities in Syria builds upon a previous collaborative effort between U.S. and Turkish authorities that succeeded in disrupting ISIS’ financial networks at the beginning of January. On the surface, it appears as though Turkey has begun to substantively cooperate with its Western partners in the counter-terrorism efforts. However, that would be a hasty conclusion.

For one thing, the designation of a relatively few number of terrorist entities in 2023 misses the fact that radical entities and their operatives inside Syria are large in number. More importantly, for years, Turkey has provided support to entities that include, but are not limited to, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Erdogan’s quest to topple the Assad regime resulted in Turkey making a series of terrible choices. Ankara provided salaries, weapons, equipment, and logistical information to a plethora of jihadist organizations. Moreover, since 2015, Erdogan parted ways with the United States, as Washington was primarily focused on eliminating the ISIS threat, mainly by partnering with the Syrian Kurds under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey chose to label this organization a terrorist group due to its affiliation with its parent organization inside Turkey: the Kurdistan Worker’s Party. In doing so, Erdogan chose to ignore the real terrorist threat posed by ISIS and chose to back jihadi entities to fight against the Assad regime.

Erdogan’s jingoism in foreign policy can no longer continue, however, and Erdogan is aware of this. For one thing, he has had to abandon his fixation to topple Assad, as he is now likely to remain in power. Second, if Erdogan wins Turkey’s elections in the days to come, he will need to reset ties with Washington and the West in general. This is likely due to the serious amount of economic support that Turkey’s economy will require from Western creditor institutions. Turkey’s central bank spent over $14 billion to prop up its national currency in the past month. Following the elections, the ability to maintain the present level of exchange rate will be impossible. Bottom line: Erdogan (or whoever is in charge of Turkey) will need a Western lifeline, however, he has shown little that would convince lawmakers in Washington to sympathize with Turkey’s economic woes.

Erdogan has initiated a series of regional resets with Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. What has been lacking is positive overtures toward the West—Washington in particular. Ankara, under Erdogan’s continued tutelage, is attempting to buy American support, particularly if Turkey decides to knock on the IMF’s door. To be sure, sanctioning individuals affiliated with jihadist organizations and disrupting their financial networks will be welcomed. However, these initiatives represent only a fraction of the moves that Ankara could make if it was serious about counter-terrorism. To demonstrate that intent, it could definitely withdraw its support from radical groups in Syria and provide sustained information of more high-profile individuals to sanction. We have yet to see this happen.

Sinan Ciddi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he contributes to FDD’s Turkey Program and Center on Military and Political Power. Follow Sinan on Twitter @SinanCiddi.

Image: Shutterstock.

The opposition could win. But what happens if Erdogan loses?

It ensured that even in the worst-case scenario, Iran would be proliferating from a lower baseline.

Lu Shaye keeps alienating his foreign hosts.

For a decade, as democratic institutions in Venezuela crumble, the United States has been paralyzed by a single choice: to engage President Nicolás Maduro or not. As his grip over the country remains steadfast, Washington is working for a breakthrough in supporting ongoing negotiations between the Maduro government and opposition. A potential opportunity opened last week when the United States hosted the first-ever Cities Summit of the Americas.

The United States has long overlooked the role of mayors and governors in restoring democratic institutions from within, yet the Cities Summit presents a unique opportunity to redefine U.S. policy towards Venezuela. The U.S. Department of State invited mayors from across the Western Hemisphere, including Venezuela, for a two-day conference to help local leaders develop solutions to global challenges, including “democracy renewal”—signaling a growing focus on city and state diplomacy. By applying this subnational approach to U.S.-Venezuela relations, the United States could breathe new life into a protracted situation.

Venezuela’s humanitarian and economic crises cause ripples across the hemisphere that will fundamentally alter regional stability if gone unresolved. With over seven million migrants and refugees, Venezuela’s population is the third largest group of internationally displaced people after Syrians and Ukrainians. The crisis leads to a steady stream of human suffering, strains host countries’ resources, and facilitates the rise of criminal networks. Formerly the United States’ largest single supplier of crude oil, Venezuela is entrenched in debt. At a time of growing tension with Russia and China, the decade-long crisis in the United States’ hemisphere weakens the country’s ability to compete across the world.

Some of the few bright spots in Venezuela over the last decade have been driven by local leaders. The United States should support this momentum and reorient its strategy around a new objective—not only presidential elections in 2024, but gubernatorial and municipal elections in 2025. By using a variety of levers across government and multilateral agencies, the United States can help support a long-term approach to restoring Venezuela's democratic institutions. The upcoming regional elections are an opportunity to show support for democratic actors across the political spectrum.

A closer look at the landscape of city and state leadership in Venezuela reveals great potential. Venezuela’s tradition as a federal republic has allowed local and regional leadership to continue exercising public functions and representation. Municipal elections have been held since 1989, and the 2025 subnational elections will appoint leaders to over 3,000 positions. While many Venezuelan opposition leaders have boycotted elections in recent years, individual candidates have had unexpected victories that revitalize the country’s opposition movement.

In 2021, opposition candidate Sergio Garrido defeated Maduro’s former foreign minister and preferred candidate in Barinas after a series of political setbacks. The opposition’s victory in what’s considered the political cradle of Chavism reignited hope in the promise of regional elections. The United States should set its sights on replicating victories such as Garrido’s, but local Venezuelan leaders currently face systemic obstacles that make Garrido an exception, not a rule.

The Maduro government has tried to marginalize local opposition politicians by limiting subnational resources and centralizing programs. As of 2020, the largest share of local government revenue came from central government grants and subsidies, which allows Maduro to control levers that reduce the power of mayors and governors. Starting in Hugo Chávez’s time, opposition leaders have lost authority to administer airports, toll roads, and local police. The tactic of weaponized centralization is most evident by the decrease in local government expenditures, which have dramatically declined from 7.1 percent of GDP before 2014 to 1.8 percent in 2020.

The launch of the first-ever Cities Summit is an opportune moment to kickstart a new approach to subnational engagement in Venezuela. As State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and Unit for City and State Diplomacy brainstorm next steps after the Summit, they should consult with partners in the Venezuela Affairs Unit and on the ground to understand how future summits could fit into broader U.S.-Venezuela policy. The United States could consider convening country-specific subnational conferences or regional conferences between mayors from border communities, and should start by helping to connect Venezuelan cities to international networks such as C40 Cities, Metropolis and Strong Cities Network. In the coming months, the State Department should consider including a Venezuelan city in the Cities Forward initiative, a three year program announced at the summit that will help cities in Latin America and the Caribbean develop and fund action plans.

The United States should also take decisive action to include subnational diplomacy in its long-term approach to Venezuela. In calling for a timetable for credible elections to be announced in the context of Venezuelan-led negotiations, the United States should also urge the Maduro government to reinstate the powers of municipalities. According to the Venezuelan constitution, municipalities have a broad mandate to govern policies relating to their interests and local life, including urban roadways, waste collection, and city police services—many of which have been assumed by the central government.

In addition to restoring municipal powers, it’s also crucial to help Venezuelan cities access funding sources so that they can implement programs for their communities. While Maduro has abolished many of the revenue structures established in the constitution, the United States should pull together experts from domestic and multilateral agencies to identify strategies for supporting local private sector investment that supports city budgets. Specifically, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security could lead this initiative, in consultation with the Inter-American Development Bank given their regional expertise on subnational financing.

Local Venezuelan leaders can also help implement the multibillion-dollar Social Agreement signed by the Maduro government and opposition in November 2021, in the context of the ongoing negotiations process. The Social Agreement aims to address crises in the electric, public health, and education systems, and when fully implemented will be managed by the United Nations. Mayors and governors are best equipped to help reconstruct state infrastructure given their first-hand experience helping communities manage blackouts, healthcare crises, and gaps in education, and the United States should encourage the UN to work with them to carry out this historic package.

The United States can tap into the momentum following the inaugural Cities Summit to initiate a new approach to Venezuela that sidesteps Maduro to engage directly with mayors. While most international attention is drawn to next year’s presidential elections, the United States must not lose sight of long-term strategy. There is still time to support transformative change ahead of the 2025 regional elections. In a broader region all too familiar with democratic backsliding, a U.S.-Venezuela subnational policy could inspire broader strategies for engaging with local leaders who are fortifying their base of democracy and sparking hope in future generations, against all odds.

Willow Fortunoff is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. She leads the Center’s work on city and state diplomacy and is a 2023 Fulbright recipient studying subnational diplomacy between the United States and Ecuador.

Adriana D’Elia is a senior counselor at the Office of the Executive Director for Panama and Venezuela at the Inter-American Development Bank and former General Secretary of Government of Miranda State, Venezuela (2008–2015). She is also a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Image: Edgloris Marys/Shutterstock.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent trip to Central Asia, where he emphasized that the United States supports the territorial integrity of regional countries and hopes to expand economic ties, missed the opportunity to highlight more substantial areas of cooperation—namely, nuclear proliferation and arms control. Amid Russia postponing New START meetings in late 2022 and China steadily increasing its nuclear warhead count, the prospects of arms control between Russia and the United States seem bleak. Moreover, worsening U.S.-Russia arms control relations could also threaten future cooperation on nonproliferation. However, one Central Asian country can play a critical role in these dire circumstances: Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan has been and can continue to be a partner for the United States in the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). After the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was left with one of the most significant remnants of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and associated nuclear infrastructure. Removing and dismantling these weapons was one of the outstanding achievements of U.S. nonproliferation policy, and it continues to be an integral part of U.S.-Kazakh relations.

Recently, the United States has taken the initiative regarding nonproliferation in the region. For example, Jill Hruby and Frank Rose, the administrator and principal deputy administrator, respectively, of the National Nuclear Security Administration, completed a trip to Kazakhstan on October 5 of last year to commemorate the achievements of U.S.-Kazakh joint nonproliferation efforts. Previously, these efforts brought about the successful 1994 “Project Sapphire,” which reduced the threat of nuclear proliferation by removing nuclear material from Kazakhstan as part of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. “Cooperation on nuclear security and nonproliferation is a cornerstone of the strong relationship between our countries,” Hruby said.

Since Kazakhstan dismantled these Soviet weapons, it has become a leader in arms control and disarmament diplomacy. Not only has Kazakhstan been able to secure nuclear weapons and material left in its territory, but it also has led nonproliferation efforts to make Central Asia a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone via a treaty signed in 2006.

Kazakhstan also has a track record of nonproliferation diplomacy beyond its backyard.  Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbayev participated in all four of the Nuclear Security Summits organized by the Obama administration. Nazarbayev articulated to Iran the drawbacks of operating nuclear programs and that it could choose peace like Kazakhstan. These efforts culminated in Kazakhstan’s crucial coordination of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This involved hosting two rounds of negotiations between Iran and P5+1 in 2013. Kazakhstan’s participation through hosting negotiations reinforced its status as a valued member of the nonproliferation community.

For the United States, WMD nonproliferation continues to be an avenue to work with the Russians, who historically share similar concerns about the spread of these weapons. Moreover, Russia understands the dangers of the spread of WMDs on its periphery. Therefore, the United States must make the case that adhering to nonproliferation norms promotes a more stable international security environment.       

Given Kazakhstan and Russia’s geographical proximity and historical bonds, Kazakhstan will likely be an increasingly critical partner for the United States in future arms control negotiations with Russia. Concretely, multilateral support for arms control treaties will be essential in maintaining accountability for nuclear stability. New START lasts through 2026 and is the only active arms control treaty aiming to provide guardrails between the United States and Russia. However, this area of cooperation stands on shaky ground due to the increasingly adversarial relations and limited diplomatic contact between the United States and Russia since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Russia’s suspension of New START talks is not great news, but a third-party country like Kazakhstan could potentially play a mediator role and host future arms control talks. Thankfully, Russia’s suspension does not mean the deal is nullified and that a buildup of Russian nuclear weapons is inevitable. U.S. policymakers should resist the pressure from defense hawks to expand nuclear buildup, considering that more nuclear weapons do not ensure U.S. security. Instead, they could easily have the opposite effect by raising threat perceptions in Moscow.

Despite the current dire straits that envelop the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the record of nonproliferation is impressive, given that no new countries have acquired nuclear weapons since North Korea acquired them in 2006. This speaks to the effectiveness of treaties like the Treaty of the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Arms control efforts to prevent the buildup of nuclear weapons among great powers have been an even more significant challenge. With regional partners like Kazakhstan that have a greater understanding of their respective regional landscape and security dynamics, the United States stands a better chance of fostering nuclear stability.

Alex Little is an MS graduate of Georgia Tech and specializes in Russian and Central Asian affairs.

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It is worth remembering, more than a year into Russia’s war in Ukraine, that the conflict was initiated not by an artillery shell or missile or any kinetic action, but with a cyberattack on the Ukrainian financial system with the deliberate aim of terrorizing Ukrainian citizens alongside more conventional cyberattacks on the Ukrainian Defence Ministry, according to Ukrainian intelligence services. As the world would later learn through more acute horrors in the physical world, such crimes were always the plan, not an accident of an army run amuck.

Although Russia has mostly used cyberattacks throughout the conflict for tactical support to its battlefield operations—including successful early efforts to knock out satellite communications—and not the more spectacular attacks on critical infrastructure we have become accustomed to seeing, it is noteworthy they began with an attack on the people of Ukraine themselves.

China is studying the progress of the war in Ukraine for lessons that might inform its own potential invasion of Taiwan, perhaps as early as 2027, according to CIA Director William Burns. But while Moscow has relied on nuclear weapons to deter decisive intervention by the Biden administration and NATO, Beijing is likely to wield a broader toolkit to keep Americans and our Indo-Pacific allies out of any future fight.

This includes the potential for “aggressive cyber attacks against the U.S. homeland” with the goal of “inducing societal panic,” according to the latest threat assessment from the U.S. intelligence community. Whereas the Kremlin has used its cyber capabilities to raise the perceived cost of resistance among ordinary Ukrainians while eschewing potentially escalatory attacks on the U.S. that might draw us into the conflict, Zhongnanhai is preparing to gamble that a shocking cyberattack on the American people—not just its military networks—would make a nation already weary from decades at war reconsider the cost of standing up for Taiwan’s democracy.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency director Jen Easterly warned about this recently when she alluded to plans that an invasion of Taiwan “might very well be coupled with the explosion of multiple U.S. gas pipelines; the mass pollution of our water systems; the hijacking of our telecommunications systems; the crippling of our transportation nodes.”

This problem is worse than it seems. Water systems in the United States are highly federated, matching thousands of individual municipal systems often defended by just a few employees benefitting from minimal cybersecurity investment against the skill and resources of China’s military concentrated at the point of cyberattack—a hopeless mismatch at present.

China’s ability to threaten U.S. infrastructure persists across sectors, driven not only by hacking power but including supply chain threats driven by its manufacturing prowess as well, with a commercial reach that already successful Russian cyber operatives would envy.

For example, natural gas systems have been mentioned in every Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. intelligence community for the past several years—two of which I coauthored—reflecting longstanding concern. Left unsaid is that many natural gas compressors in the United States are imported from China, meaning that if they are held at risk during a time of heightened tension or conflict the U.S. would be relying on its adversary for replacement parts. This is not a promising prospect for security and national success.

National efforts to address cybersecurity shortcomings too often seek to treat every problem like cybercrime—solutions meant to scale, at the lowest financial and political cost; the low-hanging fruit. But Beijing’s operatives include not only criminals turned to national purpose but uniformed professionals who rival our own in skill, professionalism, and access to cutting-edge resources. They won’t give up just because the front door is locked, and the United States needs to prepare more seriously for what a wartime conflict in cyberspace would look like if fought at home rather than in some distant continent.

2027 is closer than it seems. The kinds of engineering changes, investments, and policies that must be crafted to form a cohesive national defense against this kind of national digital attack take years to put into place under the best of circumstances.

The new U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy rightly calls for stepped-up responsibility from key private sector players, but the U.S. government must do more to show that it takes its own intelligence assessments of this cyber threat seriously and is taking action proportionate to the risk: unambiguously stating what escalation foreign nation-states can expect if they disable U.S. critical infrastructure by cyber means, akin to the warnings we give for impairing our key national space assets such as early warning satellites; more aggressively declassifying intelligence of a tactical defensive nature—even if it means accepting marginal increased risk to classified sources—with a recognition that it is the same private sector likely to be on the front lines of cyber war; and committing to the defense of critical but under-defended sectors, such as water systems, during wartime with priority more comparable to efforts made to keep U.S. military networks up.

America’s spies are telling us there is a direct, credible, foreseeable threat to U.S. citizens coming in only a few years; it’s past time to take them seriously and move beyond the standard toolkit for cybersecurity.

Christopher Porter is a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative. From 2019 to 2022 he was the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber, leading the U.S. intelligence community’s analysis of cyber threats and threats to U.S. elections as a member of the National Intelligence Council.

This article does not represent the views of the U.S. government or any current or past employer.

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