Diplomacy & Crisis News

The win of Muqtada al-Sadr and his political alliance in the recent parliamentary election signaled that at least in this vote, sectarianism had supplanted populism as the dominant force in Iraqi politics.

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The real struggle in Asia is with China — and Trump is throwing away U.S. advantages.

Rep. Eliot Engel’s sanctions legislation offers the right response to the Myanmar military’s campaign of murder and displacement.

La manifestation a fait six morts et des dizaines de blessés. 18 d'entre eux ont entre huit et seize ans, et 14 entre seize et vingt ans. La presse dénonce ces gens « qui envoient leurs enfants manifester alors qu'eux restent à la maison ». Cette manifestation a bien eu lieu en Palestine... mais en (...) / Israël, Palestine, Enfance, Conflit israélo-palestinien - 2000/11

Istanbul’s massive new airport fits with Turkey’s grand neo-Ottoman ambitions, but it may be too big for its own good.

President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump pose for a photo with Chinese President Xi Jingping and his wife, Mrs. Peng Liyuan, Thursday, April 6, 2017, at the entrance of Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Fl. (Official White Photo by D. Myles Cullen)

In the midst of trade war threats between the US and China, Trump’s latest trade tariffs emerge as the new American strategy to weaken Xi Jinping’s plans to transform China into a major high-tech player.

Trump’s recent multi-billion tariffs, allegedly designed to protect the American economy from trade deficit, made global headlines. If at the beginning such tariffs involved most of the United States’ international economic partners, now it is increasingly clear that Trump’s main target are the rising Chinese strategic sectors, which pose a threat to the American technological leadership.

Xi Jinping’s tech goals: “Made in China 2025”

Launched in 2015, the plan “Made in China 2025” is to be considered Chinese President Xi Jinping’s economic pillar to grant the country a leading role in the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution, as well as to achieve self-sufficiency in terms of technology and development in strategic sectors. The disruptive technologies represented by artificial intelligence (AI), virtual reality and robotics, along with the concepts of data and connectivity, are now at the centre of a new global competition for power in which China is set to emerge as major player. With this blueprint, Xi aims at making China globally competitive in ten industries by 2025: next generation information technology, high-end numerical control tools and robotics, aerospace equipment, ocean engineering equipment and hi-tech ships, advanced railway equipment, power equipment, agricultural machinery, new materials (e.g. nano materials), biomedicine and high-performance medical devices.

Since China’s latest legislative amendment, which abolished the two-year mandate terms for Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping is now set to remain the leader of a country with a unique combination of elements powerful enough to dominate the high-tech race. The incredible amount of data available, the use of which is facilitated by the loosened privacy regulations and blurred lines between government and businesses in addition to the highly fragmented retail market, make of China a tremendous hub for technological innovation and development.

Trump’s America First as a pretext to hit China’s high-tech rise

Starting from last January, Trump’s America First rapidly emerged as a pretext to impose new tariffs, part of a protectionist wave that rapidly involved most of the world economies. Relying on the urgency to reduce the US bilateral trade deficit, which amounted to $375 billions in 2017, Trump’s determination is threatening to spread into a dangerous and unpredictable war trade with China.

On one side, a number of economists focus on the short-term cost of an eventual trade war. For example, Wei Li, senior China economist at Standard Chartered in Shanghai, estimatesthat a broad-based trade war between the US and China would cost China 1.3 per cent to 3.2 per cent of GDP, with the latter estimate representing an extreme scenario in which the US bans all Chinese imports. The US, in comparison, would lose 0.2 per cent to 0.9 per cent, thus supporting the theory according to which deficit countries (US) hold an advantage over those with trade surpluses (China).

However, by paying closer attention to the specific sectors and companies hit by Trump’s tariffs, it emerges that what triggered the US strategy is not the bilateral trade deficit with China, but rather the long-term Chinese threat in terms of high-tech rapid development. In fact, the Chinese market went from being considered complementary to becoming more directly competitive to the United States thanks to companies like Huawei, Tencent and Baidu, to name a few. If it is true that Trump can rely on intensive capital control that could damage the Chinese leverage against the US, China is a huge domestic market that the US can’t do without, as well as being the leading Asian high-tech exporter since overtaking Japan in 2014.

Is China stealing foreign technology?

Despite Beijing’s noteworthy technological development, the country still depends on foreign technology transfers to push forward its “Made in China 2025” agenda. Pressured by an aging population – with rising wages that are resulting in the relocation of low-tech factories to other countries – along with the goal of achieving 70% technological self-sufficiency by 2025 and of becoming a global leader in Artificial Intelligence research and development by 2030, Beijing is not sitting on its hands.

The Trump administration and the other European and Asian economies potentially involved in China’s high-tech rise (especially Germany and South Korea) are concerned by the unfair trade practices implemented by the Communist country, such as intellectual property theft, massive Chinese government subsidies and forced technology transfer agreements. China’s restrictive market practices have in fact often forced foreign companies to transfer valuable intellectual property to Chinese partners in exchange for market access, thus exploiting the asymmetries in market access between China and the rest of the world.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, in reaction to these international condemnations, used the platform offered by the Boao Forum for Asia last April to pledge further measures to protect the intellectual property of foreign companies and a further opening of China’s economy. In addition, in an attempt to address and de-escalate Trump’s trade war threats, Xi finally affirmed that China is not seeking trade surplus and that a “Cold War zero sum game” is increasingly obsolete.

“We encourage normal technological exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and foreign enterprises, and protect the lawful IPR owned by foreign enterprises in China.”

With over 730 million internet users (double the US population) and a clear plan that sees China rivalling the current high-tech strongholds, it is foreseeable that Beijing won’t stop the building up of its technological capabilities and resources. In the short-term, Xi Jinping is empowered by the lack of vision demonstrated by Trump, who has been incapable of seizing this opportunity to build around him a consensus based on international law. However, in the long-term, if China wants a prominent role recognized by the other international powers, new measures complying with fair trade practices, along with the further opening of its economy are non-negotiable.

 

This article first appeared on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Gaia Rizza.

The post US seeks to weaken China’s high-tech global ambitions appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

西方新闻机构驻外分社里的色狼既有害于同事，也有害于新闻报道

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Rémy Hémez propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Christopher A. Lawrence, War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (University of Nebraska Press, 2017, 374 pages).

Les premiers modèles informatisés de combat, apparus dans les années 1950, créèrent le besoin d’une analyse quantitative de la guerre. L’historien militaire américain Trevor Dupuy (1916-1995) et les diverses organisations qu’il a dirigées furent des précurseurs dans ce domaine, constituant des bases de données statistiques sur les engagements au combat. L’auteur de War by Numbers s’inscrit dans cette lignée. Il a longtemps travaillé avec Dupuy et préside le Dupuy Institute. Après plusieurs années à étudier les insurrections, il insiste sur la nécessité d’exhumer la recherche sur les conflits de haute intensité. Pour ce faire, il présente des études menées par son institut, qui viennent compléter les travaux de Dupuy lui-même.

À partir de plusieurs bases de données recensant des combats de 1618 au début des années 2000, Lawrence revient, en chiffres, sur de nombreux sujets traversant les études sur la guerre : le rapport entre offensive et défensive, la valeur de la dispersion ou celle de la surprise, les rapports de force, les facteurs humains dans l’issue des combats, etc.

Il n’est pas possible d’être exhaustif ici. Trois thématiques majeures du livre peuvent néanmoins être soulignées. Tout d’abord, en ce qui concerne les rapports de force, l’auteur démontre que, dans 74 % des cas, lorsqu’un attaquant l’emporte, c’est qu’il se trouve en supériorité numérique. Lorsqu’on analyse les victoires des défenseurs, on s’aperçoit qu’ils étaient en infériorité numérique dans 64 % des cas. L’attaquant sort presque toujours vainqueur d’un affrontement lorsqu’il dispose d’un rapport de force supérieur ou égal à deux contre un.

Un chapitre particulièrement intéressant s’attache à démystifier ce que l’auteur appelle les « légendes urbaines », c’est-à-dire les idées préconçues sur le combat en ville. Les chiffres confirment qu’un attaquant progresse plus lentement en zone urbaine que sur les autres types de terrain : 0,96 km par jour contre 1,41. En revanche, les cas étudiés ne corroborent pas la croyance que les chars de combat souffrent plus de pertes en zone urbaine qu’en terrain ouvert. De même, le rapport de force nécessaire pour l’emporter ne serait pas influencé par ce terrain particulier. Pour l’auteur, ces biais sont la conséquence de la focalisation sur des études de cas extrêmes (Grozny), en oubliant qu’ils ne sont pas représentatifs.

Enfin, dans une partie consacrée aux pertes au combat, l’auteur fait remarquer que, de la guerre mexico-américaine (1846-1848) à la guerre du Vietnam (1963-1975), l’Army a compté 4 blessés pour 1 tué. Un changement majeur a eu lieu avec les engagements en Irak et en Afghanistan, où le taux est passé, respectivement, à 8,68 et 9,1 blessés pour 1 tué. Les évolutions liées aux prises en charge médicales, ou celles de la protection individuelle, y ont bien évidemment contribué. Mais les causes de blessures ont aussi un rôle clé. Les armes à tir direct (fusils ou mitrailleuses) tuent plus de 25 % des soldats touchés ; ce chiffre passe à 10 % pour les armes à fragmentation, ce qui inclut les engins explosifs improvisés (IED), omniprésents en Irak et en Afghanistan.

La lecture de cet ouvrage technique, entrecoupé de nombreux tableaux et statistiques, quelque peu rébarbative, n’est à conseiller qu’aux spécialistes. Pour ces derniers, il s’avérera un outil de travail particulièrement précieux.

Rémy Hémez

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

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SI les observateurs ont beaucoup disserté sur les motivations des puissances voisines, qui ont voulu profiter de la faiblesse d'un géant réduit à l'état de bateau ivre, on ne sait, en revanche, quasiment rien sur les mouvements qui affectent la société du Congo-Kinshasa elle-même. Or, aussi bien à (...) / République démocratique du Congo - 1999/01

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Cybercrime-as-a-Service opens up a realm of worrying new possibilities for opportunistic individuals and ideologically motivated groups, as well as a new front for law enforcement and security services to secure.

As early as 2013, cybersecurity experts noted that Cybercrime-as-a-Service (CaaS) was a burgeoning business. It is an industry as straightforward as it sounds – professional cybercriminals maintain and sell the means of committing cyberattacks to anyone with the motivation and money to do so.

In 2013, hiring a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack (a cyberattack that uses a network of subverted computers around the world to flood targets, such as websites and other infrastructure, with requests to impair or crash them) cost $535 for a month’s use. Today, a month’s rent for a DDoS can cost as little as $28.99. Falling prices are driven by competition in the CaaS market, enabled by the accessibility of the technologies.

Last week Europol and associates struck a blow against professional cybercriminals by taking down WebStresser – a website offering rental DDoS attacks, masquerading as a “stress tester.” The criminals behind the service were also arrested. Whilst it indicates the threat is being taken seriously and combated, it is little more than a proverbial drop in the ocean.

DDoS attacks are not the only service offered by professional cybercriminals. Ransomware is another, arguably more dangerous threat that is available. Ransomware is a type of software that stealthily makes its way onto PCs before encrypting the user’s files, or even the boot files for the machine itself, so when the computer is switched off, it refuses to start up again. In both cases, users are presented with a message demanding a ransom in order to de-crypt the files and restore ordinary usage.

These services are currently overwhelmingly used by opportunists seeking profits, and businesses seeking to disadvantage their competitors. However, with the increasing prominence and accessibility of these services, they will soon come to the attention of those with more nefarious intentions.

Prominent precedents

Britons in particular may be familiar with ransomware after it crippled the UK National Health Service in May 2017. The malware spread across NHS computers with outdated operating systems, locking out staff and directly leading to the cancellation of 6912 appointments, including operations. The attack has been attributed to the North Korean government, or state-sponsored groups in the country by senior figures across government and the tech industry.

Ransomware has also caused significant trouble across the Atlantic in the US city of Atlanta, where various IT systems used by the city administration were infected with ransomware in March 2018, costing the city millions of dollars in disruption.

However, the most prominent example of professional cybercrime must be the concerted Russian campaign against the United States in the build up to the 2016 Presidential election. The hacking of Clinton campaign emails, and the manipulation of individuals by professional cybercriminals via social media were just two of the prominent tactics employed by state-sponsored Russian groups.

The Russian attacks during the 2016 Presidential election are part of a wider Russian strategy of subverting US democracy. It is an ideologically motivated, targeted campaign against a predetermined enemy. At the other end of the spectrum, the more recent attacks against Atlanta city appear to be an opportunistic money-spinner by a group of professional cyber criminals.

The WannaCry attack highlights an interesting hybridization of ideological motivations and outright opportunism. Like the Russian campaign, the power of a nation-state is reflected in the virulence of the attack. However, it lacked the sophistication of previous state-sponsored attacks, as well as any sort of relevance to a longer-term plan. It was a cyberspace smash and grab, and it is in this niche, where ideology and opportunism intersect, that CaaS will come to find a great deal of traction in years to come.

Outsourcing IT

CaaS provides ideologically motivated groups with a means of carrying out ambitious cyberattacks like WannaCry even if they lack the manpower or technical means of doing so. Undoubtedly, these groups will begin to see the opportunities offered by professional cybercrime services.

The global jihadist movement is one such movement that could take steps towards purchasing CaaS programs to launch attacks on their enemies. The movement already possesses a number of organisations operating in cyberspace, such as the Caliphate Cyber Army and Islamic Cyber Army, demonstrating they are conscious of the potential of cyber-terrorism. However, experts have ridiculed their capabilities, with the groups incapable of making simple chat apps for themselves, let alone develop expansive campaigns of cyber-terrorism.

The jihadist movement and other terrorist groups will develop cyber capabilities, but for the time being, they will turn to existing services as they have done with sites like Twitter and Facebook, and apps like Telegram and WhatsApp. This is where CaaS vendors stand to benefit from increasing awareness of their services and the havoc they can wreak.

It will be a mutually beneficial partnership that will overcome any aversion that the parties may have to working together. In many cases, professional cyber criminals hold the West in similar contempt to the jihadist movement, overcoming any moral dilemmas they may feel about working with terrorists. On the other side, jihadists curse the West and much of modernity, yet have no issue with adopting technology when it serves their needs, which CaaS undoubtedly will.

International Terrorism and Information Technology

This presents a daunting picture of a future whereby terrorist groups extort funding from governments, businesses and civil society via ransomware, DDoS attacks and other capabilities that they have rented from professional cyber criminals. The precedent is clear in examples such as the WannaCry attack – disruption in cyberspace is increasingly felt in the offline world too, with severe financial and practical consequences. The good news is that with foresight and planning, Western nations can build up their deference before the threat reaches a critical mass.

 

This article was first posted on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Phin Roberts.

The post Hire Powers: Cybercrime-as-a-Service and Terrorism appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Rachid Chaker propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Laurence Louër, Sunnites et chiites. Histoire politique d’une discorde (Seuil, 2017, 252 pages).

Qu’est-ce que le chiisme ? Qu’est-ce que le sunnisme ? Chiites et sunnites ont-ils toujours été en guerre ? Assiste-t-on aujourd’hui à une nouvelle guerre de religions au Moyen-Orient ? Qui sont les Frères musulmans et que veulent-ils ? Alors que les réponses les plus simplistes à ces questions circulent fréquemment, l’ouvrage de Laurence Louër tombe à point nommé pour quiconque désire une compréhension approfondie et exhaustive des rapports entre les deux courants majeurs de l’islam.

Abordant leur naissance sur le plan à la fois théologique et politique, l’auteur analyse les divergences mais également les similitudes ­rencontrées par ces deux courants religieux dans leur développement au cours des siècles. Au-delà des préjugés les plus réducteurs, on y découvre que le chiisme s’est surtout avéré révolutionnaire lorsqu’il fut marginalisé et éloigné des sphères du pouvoir, puis s’est trouvé plus consensuel et moins radical lorsqu’il a pleinement été intégré aux sociétés musulmanes. Le sunnisme a également connu une trajectoire similaire, les oulémas adoptant l’obligation de suivre le gouverneur dès lors que celui-ci leur accorda statut et droit d’ingérence dans les affaires sociétales.

L’auteur analyse également les rivalités turco-persanes et explique le choix par les Safavides du chiisme comme religion officielle, et aborde avec précision l’émergence progressive, notamment avec la fin de l’Empire ottoman, d’un mouvement de renaissance islamique visant à rassembler les musulmans, par-delà les clivages confessionnels, dans une communauté de croyants pour faire face au colonialisme occidental. Y est ainsi abordée la naissance des Frères musulmans, fondés en Égypte par Hassan Al-Banna, qui parviendront via leur mainmise sur l’université Al-Azhar à influencer bon nombre de penseurs islamiques à travers le monde, au-delà des sunnites eux-mêmes, tandis que Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi fonda un mouvement quelque peu similaire en Asie. Dès lors, certains thèmes pourront fédérer les musulmans dans leur ensemble, à commencer par la cause palestinienne.

Un focus est notamment fait sur l’Arabie Saoudite, maison mère du wahhabisme, et sur la stratégie du royaume et son instrumentalisation du fait religieux pour contrer l’influence d’abord nassérienne puis khomeyniste, hostile à la monarchie en place. L’Iran est également abordé, et son soutien à des organisations telles que le Hezbollah est relié à la stratégie d’influence de la nouvelle République islamique, dans un contexte de marginalisation sur la scène internationale.

Enfin, l’ouvrage se termine par une analyse pays par pays des différents foyers de tension actuels entre chiites et sunnites, du Moyen-Orient au sous-continent indien, mettant en lumière, au-delà des divergences théologiques, les rivalités politiques qui sont à l’origine de ces crispations. On y voit notamment que, derrière l’apparente opposition confessionnelle, se cache une lutte d’influence politique entre deux poids lourds régionaux, l’Arabie Saoudite et l’Iran, chacun accusant sa minorité confessionnelle d’allégeance politique au rival, au-delà de toute idéologie religieuse.

Voici un ouvrage complet, qui intègre les dimensions théologiques, politiques et historiques, et donc indispensable à quiconque désire comprendre à la fois la complexité des sociétés du Moyen-Orient et les enjeux politiques régionaux.

Rachid Chaker

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

Amid the latest Ebola outbreak, the Trump administration is handing leadership to Angela Merkel — and she's not out to protect American interests.