Diplomacy & Crisis News

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's new Transferrable Rearming Mechanism (TRAM) allows surface warships to reload missile canisters at sea, potentially extending combat operations without returning to port. This innovation aims to address logistical challenges in conflicts, particularly against China.

-However, China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities pose significant threats that the Navy has yet to effectively counter. While TRAM enhances operational endurance, its effectiveness is limited if U.S. ships can't penetrate China's A2/AD defenses.

-Overcoming these advanced defensive systems remains crucial for TRAM's utility in future naval engagements. Until then, the Navy's new capability may be premature against a well-prepared adversary like China.

It takes many things to win modern wars. But the baseline requirement is a proper logistical supply chain linking your forces with their base of support. In the U.S. case, that means linking a forward-deployed military, in particular the Navy, with its homeland. America is blessed to be free of threats in its near-abroad. Instead, the U.S. moves its all-volunteer force to Eurasia and the rimland surrounding it. 

The Navy is therefore essential to America’s military dominance.

For the first time since the Second World War, though, American rivals are rising to challenge the Navy’s freedom of movement. 

The Navy’s primary role is what’s known as “sea control.” Essentially, it is the Navy’s job to ensure the Americans can access any waterway in the world quickly in order to win whatever conflict the U.S. is fighting. But the Navy’s ability to do this has shrunk as the capabilities of rival nation-states like China increase relative to America’s.

China’s threat is far away from the United States. The Pacific is a vast ocean separating the power base of the U.S. military from the possible battlefields of any conflict with the People’s Republic of China. Given the geography and disposition of the U.S. military, the Navy will play a leading role in any fight with China. That is why China has worked assiduously to undermine the ability of the U.S. Navy to reliably project power into contested regions in the Indo-Pacific. 

One likely area of attack from China would be against American logistics supporting any naval activity in the Indo-Pacific during a possible war with Beijing. Finally, the Navy appears to be on the brink of overcoming a deficit in this regard. A recent successful demonstration from the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Port Hueneme in California showed how the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet intends to keep besieged units in combat for longer. 

The folks at Port Hueneme proved they can reliably reload missile canisters into the Mk41 Vertical Launching Systems of U.S. Navy surface warships that are forward-deployed. 

Known as the Transferrable Rearming Mechanism (TRAM), it is believed that this new capability of reloading at sea will be decisive for the Navy’s surface fleet in any engagement with a hostile navy. 

Or, as the Navy’s official site exudes, “No longer will our combatants need to withdraw from combat for extended periods to return for vulnerable in-port reloading of weapon systems.” 

It’s an unqualified good that the Navy can now do this. But it might come too late. 

China has developed substantial countermeasures designed to overcome America’s perceived military advantages at sea. Its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are now the foundation of China’s military presence in the South and East China Seas. These defensive systems are built to deny U.S. access to a contested battle area. Advanced sensors, anti-ship ballistic missile systems, and hypersonic weapons define China’s A2/AD threat. 

Contrary to whatever the Navy’s official position on these A2/AD capabilities from China may be, the U.S. Navy does not have viable defenses against these systems. 

More than that, the Navy has not yet effectively demonstrated that it has the ability to produce directed-energy weapons or hypersonic weapons of its own that can reliably challenge China. This creates a severe strategic deficit and lends China significant tactical advantages that it otherwise would lack.  

America’s problem is the A2/AD threat. Being able to “fire two broadsides to the enemy’s one,” as Hunter Stires, a maritime analyst for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, described this new TRAM capability, misses the point. There’s no reason to reload at sea with TRAM if the surface fleet cannot get close enough to fire on Chinese targets that are protected by A2/AD defensive bubbles, nor is there any reason to reload at sea if China can simply sink U.S. warships with their A2/AD systems.

Will this capability be useful for the Navy? 

Undoubtedly, yes. 

Will it be useful before rival A2/AD systems can be overcome? Absolutely not. 

Are rival A2/AD systems being overcome by Navy innovations? Not yet. 

Once the A2/AD threat is mitigated, then the Navy surface fleet can be more fully used, and that reload-at-sea capability becomes more important. Until then, however, the Navy is basically putting the cart before the horse. This will have profoundly negative consequences for the U.S. military if a war with China erupts. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

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Summary and Key Points: During recent U.S.-led naval exercises near Hawaii, the Harpoon missile demonstrated its enduring capabilities by sinking two large warships. Used by over thirty nations, this American-made anti-ship missile has been a mainstay since the Cold War.

-Developed by McDonnell Douglas in response to the 1967 sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat, the Harpoon features a low-level, sea-skimming cruise trajectory with active radar guidance. Various versions, including the air-launched Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM), have been utilized in multiple combat operations, showcasing its versatility and effectiveness.

-Despite its age, the Harpoon missile remains a formidable force in modern naval warfare.

This month, two large warships were sunk by the U.S. Navy and its allies on a U.S.-led international military exercise on the Rim of the Pacific, near the Hawaiian Islands. These live-fire sinking drills included a consortium of twenty-nine nations, forty surface ships, three submarines, and roughly 25,000 personnel. 

Footage of these wargames showcases the capabilities of the naval capabilities of America’s allies, namely the Royal Netherlands Navy’s De Zeven Provincien-class frigate: the proud HNLMS Tromp with its advanced, and expensive, Harpoon missiles, valued at more than $1.4 million.

These resilient, American-made, anti-ship missiles have been used by America’s allies since the days of the Cold War. These systems, while aged, did so like fine wine, as they continue to play a leading role in America’s power on the high seas. Today, the Harpoon missiles remain in service, utilized by more than thirty nations as the world’s most successful anti-ship missile available.

Conceptualization for the Harpoon peaked in the 1960s, following the shocking sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat during the Israeli-Egyptian war of 1967. The warship was on patrol off the coast of the Egyptian town of Port Said when a Soviet-designed P-15 Termit/SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missile thoroughly destroyed the Israeli vessel. This attack began a new stage in naval warfare, as the first surface-to-surface missiles had sunk a warship at sea.

Militaries around the globe, including the United States, were shocked by the success of the Soviet weapon. Thick was the kick that American officials were looking for to prioritize constructing a more advanced anti-ship missile inventory. Manufacturer McDonnell Douglas was then tasked with developing the Harpoon to rectify the gap in capability.

The first Harpoon was delivered by the end of the 1970’s. Utilizing a low-level, sea-skimming cruise trajectory with active radar guidance, capable of using both anti-ship and land-strike missiles. Following its second anniversary in the service, air-launched Harpoons were developed on the Navy’s P-3C Orion aircraft and later for use on the Air Force’s B-52H bombers. Over time, multiple Harpoon variants have been created for the platform, retaining an edge over any competitors. 

The missiles could be launched from a range of systems, from surface ships and submarines to fixed-wing aircraft and coastal defense batteries. The Block 1E version of the missile, better known as the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) was first introduced in the 1990s, and the Harpoon Block II debuted in 2009.

While many Harpoon variants may differ slightly in terms of capabilities, the Block 1E (AGM-84E/SLAM) largely departs from its predecessors.

As outlined by the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), “An air-launched land attack missile, the addition of a Global Positioning System receiver, a Walleye infrared (IIR) optical guidance system, and a Maverick data-link system resulted in a significantly more precise weapon. The missile is 4.5 meters in length and 0.34 meters in diameter, with a launch weight of 628 kg. SLAM entered service in 1990 and was successfully employed in Operation Desert Storm and UN relief efforts in Bosnia.”

Since the Harpoon’s introduction to service, the anti-ship missile has been deployed in numerous combat operations. In its first decade of service, Harpoon missiles were used to sink the Iranian frigate Sahand during Operation Praying Mantis and against Libyan forces in the Gulf of Sidra.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

F-16 “Iron Eagle”, similar to the F-16s now making their way to Ukraine.

The 1980s was an era that was characterized by high levels of patriotism in he United States, supported by a generation of action films and accompanying stars. A few months before the release of Top Gun, there was a movie about a kid and his plane called Iron Eagle, a film built around the F-16A/B Viper (as opposed to the F-15 Eagle) being used to dominate a fictional country that played the role of fake Libya at the time. With new developments in Ukraine, the first F-16s are making their way to the war zone, a conflict that has had reduced air power due to the prevalence of so many anti-aircraft systems in the region.

While the renewal of patriotic movements remains to be seen, the promotion of the F-16 in Ukraine is seen as a game changer in the conflict despite the aircraft being a 1980’s classic, with non-stealth vulnerabilities and a limited fuel capacity. The F-14 from Top Gun, F-15 and F-16 were all designed in the late 1970s as a response to the prevalence of the nimble Soviet MiG-21, keeping their place in the front line of US Air Power ever since. While the F-14s have already been retired for sometime, the F-15 and F-16 are still considered some of the best aircraft in operation to date, even if being of an increasingly older design. Upgrades often are to the internal systems, software, radars and modernization of computer systems to keep the F-15 and F-16 potent on the battlefield. Much of these improvements have also been challenged by modern anti-aircraft systems, designed to kill an F-15 and F-16 through many layers of air defence. The narrative on the F-16s being a singularly awesome tool to turn the tide in the conflict comes with a softening of Russian Air Defence and good PR on the 1980s system. Perhaps they would do well with a promotional film after the success of Top Gun: Maverick, as wonder systems like the Leopard 2s and M1 Abrams have not matched the hype in performance, while still operating within successful realistic measures on the battlefield.

Air power in the War in Ukraine was met with some horrific tragedies, with Russian S-300 missile systems tracking Ukrainian aircraft from Belarus and shooting them down. Ukraine’s air arm, while flying in Ukraine, was in danger soon after takeoff in their own territory earlier in the conflict. Recent techniques to destroy Russian Air Defence radars and missiles have taken shape using drones and tactical ballistic missiles like Hi-Mars, focusing on larger and more complex S-400 missile batteries that are designed to challenge advanced ballistic missile systems, but fail against simple drones and is questionable in defending against Hi-Mars. While drone attacks have been able to avoid being shot down by advanced systems on both sides of the conflict, often the S-400 would carry a smaller missile capability and be covered by other shorter range missile systems and radar guided cannons. Why the recent S-400 system in Crimea was unable to be protected is likely due to the lack of the smaller missiles in its own battery. We also do not know if the battery was lacking cover from TOR and Pantsir systems in the area, designed for battery defence. Even with layered defences, swarming a radar with drones and using advanced missiles at the same time are difficult to defend against, especially since the last truly operational radar/gun system was the 1980s era West German Gepard, now dusted off to shoot down terror drones in Ukraine.

It is difficult to know the success rate of drones and Hi-Mars attacks as there is the possibility that many missiles were launched and intercepted until a Hi-Mars was able to complete its mission. These targeted assaults on S-400 systems looks to be preparing for an increased air campaign in Ukraine, likely using donated NATO F-16s. While F-16s have a better chance of surviving anti-air shields, there are so many different systems in Ukraine that the success of the F-16 will be probably come from launching longer range weapons from a distance as opposed to close in attacks. All Russian and Soviet systems were designed to kill F-16s, coming out in the late 1980s, possibly as a response to Maverick and Goose with the ability to detect a volleyball from many miles away. They did not prevent Maverick attacking another fictional country however, and the real risks to the F-16s going to battle in Ukraine comes at high risk as well. The pilots for those missions need to hope for the best, but expect the worst in order to keep themselves safe during missions.

Summary and Key Points: As tensions rise in the Pacific, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force has commissioned its latest Taigei-class submarines to counter Chinese and North Korean aggression.

-The diesel-electric Taigei-class, including the lead ship Taigei and Hakugei, features advanced stealth, high-strength steel, and sophisticated lithium-ion batteries for enhanced underwater endurance.

-Armed with Type 18 and Type 89 torpedoes, and UGM-48 Harpoon missiles, these subs significantly bolster Japan's naval capabilities.

-With a displacement of 3,000 tons and cutting-edge technology, the Taigei-class is crucial for Japan's defense strategy. Analysts predict at least ten of these submarines will be built by 2027.

As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to engage in hostile activity in the Pacific, East Asian nations are gearing up for a potential full-blown war in the imminent future. Earlier this year, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) commissioned its newest Taigei-class submarine. This diesel-electric boat dubbed “Swift Whale” is expected to officially commence its operational service with Japan over the next year. Since the South China Sea would serve as the hotbed for kinetic conflict, Japan’s growing naval capabilities are of the utmost importance to its security.

Japan’s Taigei-class submarines represent the country’s latest efforts to counter increased Chinese and North Korean aggression. The preceding Soryu boats were initially developed with this goal in mind and some of the class’s capabilities were transferred to the Taigei vessels. Before the final Soryu sub was commissioned, Japanese officials envisioned a “next-generation” submarine class that would prioritize stealth, dive speed, and other emerging technologies.

Evaluations for this future class’s sonar and air-independent propulsion system (AIP) were initiated in the early 2000s. This new AIP system was conceptualized to allow future submarine classes to expand their operational areas, a capability required by the JMSDF.

The lead ship of the Taigei class—Taigei—was commissioned in 2022 at the Yokosuka home port. It was followed by Hakugei one year later at the Kure home port. The Taigei submarines have a standard displacement of roughly 3,000 tons, which is larger than their Soryu predecessors. Each of these boas can carry a crew of about seven sailors and measures around 84 meters in length. These submarines notably feature sophisticated absorbent materials and high-strength steel to ensure a quieter operation and high water pressure resistance. When the fourth Taigei boat is introduced to service down the line, Raigei will notably feature the latest Kawasaki 12V 25/31 diesel engine unlike its sister ships.

Unlike other non-nuclear submarines that have been constructed, the Taigei boats feature lithium-ion batteries which provide faster recharge times, enhanced battery-discharge rates and higher energy density. The U.S. Naval Institute has previously outlined just how capable these batteries are: “The results are enhanced silent operations, better speeds and sprints, longer underwater endurance, and significantly greater overall performance when compared with more conventional undersea submarines. The use of lithium-ion batteries also saves weight and complexity by making an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system unnecessary to extend the submarine’s underwater endurance.”

In terms of armament power, the Taigei class is quite lethal. The submarines are able to launch Japan’s newest Type 18 heavyweight torpedoes or Mitsuishi-built Type 89 heavyweight homing torpedoes via its six 21-inch bow torpedo tubes. Additionally, the Taigei boats can launch UGM-48 Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The missile range of the Harpoon is 248 km—enough to provide Japan with a “counterattack” capability.

Although Japan has not confirmed the total class size of its Taigei boats, analysts predict that at least ten of these submarines will be introduced down the line. Tokyo’s Defense Building Program budget was approved in 2022 and indicates that the last ship in this class will be built in 2027.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: Corruption in Russia's defense and aerospace industry is a growing concern as the war in Ukraine intensifies. Western intelligence estimates that Russia loses over 20,000 artillery shells and at least 100 pieces of heavy weaponry daily.

-The recent arrests of high-ranking officials for embezzlement highlight the pervasive corruption within the industry. Established to streamline military procurement, the Military Construction Company has allegedly been exploited for personal gain.

-Despite Putin's crackdowns, corruption hampers Russia's military effectiveness. Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to suffer heavy casualties, with estimates suggesting losses will reach 700,000 by year's end.

A country’s industrial military complex is a key factor in its ability to protect itself and wage war. After all, a military needs heavy weapon systems and ammunition to fight. As the fighting in Ukraine continues to show, the demands of modern conventional warfare are very high indeed.

For example, Western intelligence estimates put the number of artillery shells used by the Russian military during heavy fighting at over 20,000 per day. In terms of attrition, moreover, the Russian forces are losing at least 100 pieces of heavy weaponry every day.

A military can’t sustain such losses and demand for resources without a robust industrial military complex. So, the fact that corruption runs rampant in the Russian defense and aerospace industry is concerning the Kremlin.

According to Russian media, Andrei Belkov, the head of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Military Construction Company has been arrested on charges of corruption for his activities during the procurement of military goods. Established in 2019, the Military Construction Company was created to streamline Russian military procurement and make it more efficient.

“In reality it is likely the company has been used to extract rents by corrupt officials,” the British Military Intelligence assessed in its latest estimate of the war.

In addition, last week, the former director of a tactical missile plant was sentenced to prison for embezzling military funds and inflating prices.

“Corruption is endemic in the Russian defense industry. In 2007, an audit commissioned by the then Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov revealed that 70% of Ministry of Defense budgetary resources were used for purposes other than those officially designated,” the British Military Intelligence added.

The Russian economy is heavily centered around corruption, with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the center and several oligarchs around the table. The transactional nature of Russian politics further encourages corruption.

“Some of this corruption is tolerated by the Kremlin, but there have been increasing crackdowns on those not sufficiently politically protected since the start of the war in Ukraine,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

Regardless of how much Putin and his Kremlin advisers would like it, the Russian defense and aerospace industry is inferior to that of the United States and the West. Corruption—which certainly exists in the U.S. and the West—is one of the main reasons behind the fact that Russia’s weapons and platforms are not as good as those of its adversaries.

Meanwhile, the Russian forces continue to take heavy casualties on the ground. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, over the last 24 hours, the Russian forces lost approximately 1,310 men killed, wounded, or captured, as well as 76 artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems, 62 tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, 39 unmanned aerial systems, 19 pieces of special equipment, 12 main battle tanks, 8 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and 1 anti-aircraft weapon system.

As with previous assessments here at The National Interest, the Russian forces are likely to close the year with 700,000 losses.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: Lockheed Martin is launching a competition to upgrade the cooling system of the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jet. The contenders are Honeywell Aerospace, which supplies the current system, and Collins Aerospace.

-This upgrade aims to reduce the aircraft's heat signature, enhancing its stealth capabilities. The F-35 Joint Program Office expects to award the contract in Fall 2024, ensuring maximum capability and cost-effectiveness.

-The F-35 is already the most advanced fighter jet, with ongoing updates like the TR-3 software and Block 4 upgrade to maintain its cutting-edge status. Honeywell has expressed concerns about the timing of this change.

The F-35 Lightning II stealth aircraft might be the most advanced fighter jet in the skies today. Still, it continues to receive updates to make it more effective and competitive on the battlefield today and tomorrow.

As part of this update process, Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer, is expected to launch a competition for a new cooling system that will improve the stealth fighter jet's capabilities.

In the upcoming days, Lockheed Martin will launch a competition to replace the F-35 Lightning II’s cooling system. Honeywell Aerospace, which provides the existing cooling system, and Collins Aerospace are the two aerospace companies vying for the contract.

“Contract award for the upcoming phase of the PTMU [Power and Thermal Management Unit] program is expected in Fall 2024,” the F-35 Joint Program Office told Breaking Defense.

“We will work with Lockheed Martin throughout the entire process to ensure all known PTMU solution options are evaluated for performance and economical retrofitability to existing aircraft; bringing maximum capability to the warfighters while accounting for cost,” the F-35 JPO added.

The cooling system, among other things, reduces the heat signature of the fighter jet. The lower the heat signature of an aircraft, the harder it is for enemy sensors to detect it. As such, a reduced heat signature will improve the stealth capabilities of the F-35 Lightning II. (As an aside, stealth doesn’t mean invisible. Rather, it means harder to detect, and it is achieved through a combination of design, countermeasures, special paint coats, and tactics.)

“[We will] evaluate all solution options and determine the best path forward in terms of capability and cost to meet the F-35’s future mission requirements. We expect contract authorization from the Joint Program Office this fall, allowing down-select, development and deployment to new and fielded aircraft,” Lockheed Martin stated.

The F-35 Lightning II is the most advanced fighter jet in the world, but it has several updates and upgrades lined up. To begin with, Lockheed Martin is currently rolling out the TR-3 software update that is necessary for the aircraft to remain at the tip of the spear of combat aviation. Next, there is the Block 4 upgrade, which will allow the F-35 Lightning II to carry newer weapon systems and also improve its sensors. The modular design of the F-35 Lightning II allows these updates and upgrades to happen relatively easily.

Honeywell seems opposed to the need for a new cooling system, given the particular operational circumstances.

“When I think about what puts the F-35 program at risk the most is change,” Honeywell Defense and Space President Matt Milas said to Breaking Defense.  

“It is so integrated that it just begs the question of, why would we try to change out something that is so integral into the system, when we’re already having all these problems with TR-3, getting to Block 4, [and when] we have potential conflicts all across the globe? Now is not the time where you want to mess with the centerpiece of your defense strategy.” 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: Ukraine is set to receive its first batch of F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets in the upcoming weeks, potentially altering the air war and the broader conflict with Russia.

-While multiple countries have pledged up to 85 F-16s, not all are operational. Fearing Russian retaliation, Ukraine plans to keep the jets away from frontlines.

-The West's delayed provision of key weapon systems like the F-16s has hindered Ukraine's defense capabilities.

-Despite logistical and political challenges, the West's fear of escalation must cease to effectively support Ukraine. With Russian President Putin determined to continue the war, Western commitment is crucial.

The Ukrainian Air Force is one step closer to receiving F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets.

According to U.S. defense officials, the Ukrainian military will receive the first batch of F-16 fighter jets in the upcoming weeks—and most likely before the end of the summer.

If used right, the U.S.-made fighter jet has the potential to change the air war in the skies of Ukraine and even the course of the entire conflict.

According to the Washington Post, Ukraine will be receiving the first F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets in the upcoming weeks.

Several countries have committed a varying number of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine that can reach up to 85. However, not all aircraft are in operational condition, and some will serve as a ready reserve for spare parts.

Ukrainian defense officials suggest that they won’t be using the aircraft close to the frontlines out of fear of losing them to Russian action.

Anticipating the arrival of the F-16 fighter jets, the Russian military has been targeting suitable runways. A conventional take-off and landing aircraft, the F-16 requires a proper runway to operate. In extremis, long roads, such as highways, could still be used.

It is still not clear whether NATO will allow the Ukrainian Air Force to operate its F-16 fighter jets from neighboring countries, such as Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic.

However, as with many other weapon systems, the West has been late in transferring them to Ukraine. The fear of escalation has long gripped Western leaders, making them reluctant to provide Kyiv with the necessary tools to fight the Russian invading armies effectively. Indeed, despite the undeniable contribution of Western military aid to Ukraine, most of the weapon systems have arrived too late to have the most effect on the course of the conflict.

For example, it took the West about a year to commit main battle tanks, such as the M1 Abrams, Leopard 2, and Challenger 2, to Ukraine. And when they arrived, they didn’t arrive in the right numbers to make a difference in the large-scale counteroffensive of last summer.

Similarly, it took over a year to send Ukraine precision long range munitions, such as the Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG cruise missiles, and almost two years to commit MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). These munitions have allowed the Ukrainian military to strike deep behind the front lines and seriously harass the Russian command and control and logistical functions.

To be sure, coordinating an international, multi-billion security assistance lifeline to Kyiv isn’t a piece of cake. There are a lot of moving parts and serious politics involved in the process. However, the common thread of delayed transfers of key weapon systems and platforms out of fear of escalation must end yesterday.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is committed to winning this war, apparently regardless of the cost. It is estimated that more than 700,000 of his countrymen will have died or been injured by the end of the year. Putin and his Kremlin advisers are committed. The West must be, too.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Consternation grows that China will invade Taiwan. Numerous war games predict horrific outcomes. An invasion would be swift and sharp. As the United States did in the first Gulf War, China would likely knock out Taiwanese radar and air/sea defense capabilities first, followed by drops of airborne troops, including the seizure of airfields and ports. An amphibious assault would follow. The possibility of targeted special operations and cyber actions by embedded PLA assets in Taiwan could also not be discounted. Finally, an EMP attack might happen, shutting down communications and air defense batteries.

Despite this, while many consider a Chinese invasion to be inevitable if not imminent, Taiwan is sending a different, less convincing message—evidenced by the fact that it spends less as a percentage of GDP on its defense than the United States (2.6 percent compared to 3 percent). On top of that, Taiwan does not have a strong draft. During the second decade of this century, even as tensions with China grew, Taiwan reduced the term for compulsory conscription from two years to one and then from one year to only four months in 2017. Only since January 2024 has Taipei increased the term again to one year, but that level of commitment still pales when one considers that during the Cold War, the United States, facing no immediate threat of invasion by anyone, maintained a two-year draft. These facts raise the question of whether Taiwan is serious about resisting a Chinese invasion or even if it takes such threats seriously. 

Taiwan’s politicians likely realize better than Washington that Taiwanese voters may not be as inclined to make the kind of heavy sacrifices that are necessary to defend their freedom as the Ukrainians, Israelis, Finns, or Swiss. The reality is that Taiwanese public opinion on China largely supports the current status quo, which Beijing also tolerates so long as there is no talk of independence. This state of affairs is consistent with the original framework set out by the United States and China in the 1972 Shanghai Communique. The United States acknowledged that “there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China.” Washington reaffirmed its commitment to the “peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” In a 2024 survey, over 33 percent of Taiwanese said that they would like to extend the current status quo indefinitely, followed by about 28 percent who would like to decide the question of independence at some later date and 21.5 percent who would like to maintain the status quo for now but move gradually toward eventual independence.

Taiwan no doubt carefully follows Chinese military writings on its approach to war. Chinese military thinkers suggest that a full-scale, military-style invasion may not be the first option on Beijing’s playlist. Non-kinetic alternatives receive as much consideration in Chinese military thinking.

Without firing a shot, China is already waging war against Taiwan, and it is winning. Beijing’s present strategy is primarily focused on economic absorption, intimidation, and influence. Their aim is to conquer Taiwan by quiet integration into the Chinese economy while warding off, with military threats if necessary, any Taiwanese political momentum toward a declaration of independence. China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner. The Chinese in Taiwan (but not the indigenous population) share a common language and past with mainland Chinese. Hence, the primary attack strategy will continue to be in the information warfare and trade warfighting domains, where China already excels. Even the term “reunification,” as used by Beijing, should be viewed as just another facet of its misinformation tactics. Historically, Taiwan has never been an integrated part of China.

Beijing also takes maximum advantage of its sway as the world’s largest manufacturing partner to influence other countries not to stand in the way of its Taiwan ambitions. The relationship between Taiwan and the United States ironically provides Beijing an additional, convenient excuse for all manner of intimidation tactics, such as the practice drills it conducted offshore Taiwan that were prompted by a visit to Taipei by former House Speaker Pelosi. China’s varied information war tactics are aimed at ineluctably grinding down resistance to unification, eliminating the need for a real military invasion.

In one particular respect, Taiwan should take a page from Hamas’ playbook to fend off China. It must turn more to political or media angles to neutralize China’s overwhelming military strength. Hamas’ slaughter of over 1200 Israeli civilians, taking others hostage, and engaging in rape and other abuses on October 7, 2023, has been overshadowed by global criticism of Israel’s intense military response to that vicious attack. Despite the IDF’s superiority and tactical successes in Gaza, Jerusalem may well have already lost that war in the court of world opinion thanks to Hamas’ “digital war” response.

Taipei, with support from Washington, should fashion the same kind of approach to deter invasion. Beijing must be made to understand that a bloody attack would create unacceptable diplomatic and economic consequences, seriously compromising its domestic economy and raising internal dissent while simultaneously destroying its global standing and trade relations. An effective information warfare campaign is as immediate a necessity for Taipei as is a heightened arms buildup. If Hamas can pull off success over Israel, then Taiwan should be capable of developing an equally effective digital war strategy for itself.

China, unfortunately, has already proven itself quite adept at winning that type of war so far. Nowhere has the product of its successful approach been better demonstrated than in the United Nations. Beijing marshals regular support for its policy on Taiwan in the UN General Assembly and UN agencies, skillfully out-maneuvering Washington and its Western allies. Beijing has successfully courted a voting coalition of countries that cooperate with it to deny Taiwan’s participation in various UN institutions. According to the Carnegie Endowment, China claims that “over 180 countries accept its ‘one China principle.’”

Outside the UN environment, China has also built new frameworks for exercising influence, particularly with the Global South. It helped to establish the BRICS+, a significant new geopolitical bloc that covers 45 percent of the world’s population. Members include Brazil, India, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Russia, the UAE, Ethiopia, and China. The June 2024 BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration called for major United Nations reforms, including in the Security Council, where Global South countries (except China) remain shut out as permanent members. BRICS is a powerful new coalition that will only help provide Beijing with more cover for its expansionist ambitions in Taiwan and elsewhere. Thailand and Malaysia have just announced that they intend to join BRICS, as well.

If Taipei is to win its current war, then Washington and its allies must develop digital strategies that lay bare China’s imperialistic ambitions for outright annexation of Taiwan. If Taipei and Western friends do not, then the quote often attributed to Sun Tzu will have been proven correct: “If one party is at war with another, and the other party does not realize it is at war, the party who knows it is at war almost always has the advantage and usually wins.” 

Brigadier General Rob Spalding retired from the Air Force after twenty-six years. He served as Chief China strategist for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as the defense attaché to the US Embassy in Beijing. He also served on the National Security Council at the White House as Senior Director for Strategic Planning. General Spalding is the author of Stealth War and War without Rules. He is currently the CEO of SEMPRE, a resilient 5G secure communications and hybrid cloud company.

Ramon Marks is a retired New York international lawyer and Vice Chair of Business Executives for National Security. The views expressed here are strictly those of the authors.

Image: DLeng / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: Germany's Technik Museum Sinsheim is set to showcase a retired German U-Boat, U17, joining its impressive collection of over 3,000 exhibits, including a Concorde and a Soviet-era Tupolev Tu-144.

-The U17, a Type 206 submarine, operated from 1973 until 2010 and undertook a challenging journey from the port of Hamburg to the museum, involving river transport and a 30-mile overland trip. This journey required careful navigation through narrow streets and under bridges, highlighting the logistical efforts involved.

-The U17's relocation adds another layer of historical significance to the museum, which also features the largest collection of Formula One race cars in Europe.

Germany's Technik Museum Sinsheim is already home to more than 3,000 exhibits including a former France Concorde and a Soviet-era Tupolev Tu-144 supersonic aircraft, the largest collection of Formula One race cars in Europe, and numerous military tanks. The museum will soon have a retired German U-Boat on display – which is all the more noteworthy because of where the Technik Museum Sinsheim is located.

The facility, in Baden-Württemberg, is about an hour and a half south of Frankfurt, and more than six hours from the port of Hamburg, which presented challenges in getting U-Boat U17 to the museum. The 350-tonne German Navy submarine, operated from 1973 until 2010, has slowly been making its final journey to the museum via rivers and roads.

After being moved on barge, on July 13, the submarine was put on a 30-axle low-loader and carefully driven to its new home, the museum announced in a post on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

While submarines can easily travel under the water – which obviously they are designed to do – there were "logistical challenges" that came with it being driven the 50 km (30 miles) on land, namely that it was too large to fit under several bridges. The 295-foot-long and 33-foot-tall boat had to be put on its side and then set upright again to squeeze through some of the narrow streets on the route to the museum.

As TheDrive reported, the straight shot would have been to take it on the Autobahn – cutting the distance down to 30 km (19 miles). However, the slightly longer route was chosen as it was more accessible for the U17.

"We have brought a fascinating exhibit to us in a large team in a spectacular transport," said project manager Michael Einkörn, a former submariner who will also give expert tours of the retired U-Boat at its new home.

The U17 was one of 18 Type 206 U-Boats designed to operate in the shallow Baltic Sea and constructed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) for the Bundesmarine between 1969 and 1975. Though not employed in combat, the Type 206 boats are noteworthy for remaining in service for nearly four decades, longer than any other U-Boat.

Moreover, in 2001, the German Type 206 U24 was deployed to JTFEX 01-2 naval exercises in the Caribbean Sea and managed to break through all the security around the USS Enterprise (CVN-65). The submarine fired green flares and took photographs of the U.S. Navy's flattop, essentially "sinking it."

All have been retired from service with the modern Deutsche Marine, while two remain active with the Colombian Navy.

When operational, the U17 was powered by two 4-stroke MTU 600-horsepower diesel-electric engines, and had a cruising speed of 10 knots surfaced and 17 knots submerged. For its final journey on the land, it moved far slower, taking nearly four weeks to travel the final distance to the museum.

The total cost of the move was estimated at around 2 million euros ($2.17 million), which was financed via donations. Even as the U17 has completed its trek, it will still be a year before it is on display. The submarine will be refurbished and painted, while it is on track to be on display next summer. The hardest part was simply getting it to the Technik Museum Sinsheim.

 Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons. 

In part one of this series, I suggested that political parties in most Western democracies are realigning along the schism of Court versus Country. This new division does not replace but instead cuts across the familiar cleavage of Left versus Right. That leaves four distinct factions in play: Court Conservatives, Court Progressives, Country Conservatives, and Country Progressives. The shifting alliances and tensions between these four factions play out differently in each nation. However, one consistent pattern is that rural, non-college-educated, and working-class voters are drifting away from Progressive factions toward Country Conservatives. This pattern is reshaping party politics throughout the Western world.

In the case of recent U.S. political realignments, the basic facts of the past decade are familiar to American readers. The big question is how to interpret those facts. Progressives, academics, the mainstream press, European leftists, and Democratic Party leaders agree that what we’re seeing inside America is a resurgence of a 1930s-style fascist dictatorship. They’re mistaken. Viewed in a more reasonable, fair-minded way, with appropriate comparisons to other Western nations along with other periods in American history, I believe what we’re seeing is a reworking of U.S. party politics along the lines of Court versus Country. And this realignment is playing out within the United States in a distinctly American fashion.

On the Republican side of the aisle, Court Conservatives have spent the past eight years in a state of deep internal division. Some have worked in a businesslike manner to pursue common policy objectives with Trump and his supporters. At the other end of the Court Conservative spectrum, a few have torn up their party affiliation and defected to the Democrats. Then, there is every position in between. These internal divisions have left America’s Court Conservatives, by historical standards, in an unusually weak position. First, their leaders failed to put forward a viable third-party candidate in 2016. Then, they failed to challenge Trump in either the 2020 or 2024 primaries successfully. Each new failure has only advertised Court Conservative weakness in today’s GOP.

Internal divisions among American Court Conservatives have been frustrating to Country Conservatives as well as to Court Progressives. Each faction feels that old-school Reagan-Bush Republicans ought, in principle, to side with them. Politically, however, these internal divisions have empowered other factions even while setting a limit on their total appeal. Donald Trump’s GOP, it seems, can count on some, but never total support from Court Conservatives. Similarly, Biden’s Democrats can always count on at least a few Court Conservatives to say nice things about them on TV.

Court Conservative disunity has not prevented Trump from going from one surprise win to the next. This is not because Trump has magical powers. It’s because anti-establishment right-leaning populists have rallied to him over time with unmatched enthusiasm. In the United States, Country Conservatives have greater numerical, institutional, and historical advantages than in any other Western nation. They’re not a majority of American voters, but they do form a plurality, and within today’s GOP, they far outnumber any other faction. In November 2016, Trump demonstrated that contrary to conventional wisdom, he could squeeze out an Electoral College majority with strong support from Country Conservatives and not much else. Democrats made a mistake by completely writing off these voters. It appears they’re making the same mistake again.

The ebullient Republican convention this summer was a clear demonstration of how Country Conservatives now dominate the GOP. Compared to eight years ago, few gestures were made toward the traditional Republican establishment. On the contrary, Trump doubled down by picking J.D. Vance as his running mate. Vance is unmistakably Country in this sense. His views on foreign policy, trade, immigration, and domestic economic policy are populist rather than Court-approved. Trump’s fist-shaking defiance right after the narrow attempt on his life only bolstered his status as a folk hero in the minds of his many supporters. That pugnacious reaction to danger is an instinct that Country Conservatives understand very well.

The Democratic Party, which in living memory possessed great strength among Country Conservatives, has long since pivoted toward Court Progressives for leadership, funding, votes, and ideas. The party has often been successful in winning elections by coopting Country Progressives while fending off the GOP. Four years ago, for example, Bernie Sanders energized left-wing populists, then dutifully led them into line behind the party’s Court nominee, Joe Biden.

Until recently, the conventional wisdom among Court Progressives was that they would defeat the GOP so long as it nominated Donald Trump. Our progressive superiors, therefore, made certain to hunt Trump through America’s court system and mockingly called on Republican voters to nominate him, even while backing MAGA candidates in Republican primaries—for example, in Michigan’s third congressional district during the 2022 campaign season. This was a strange move to make against figures simultaneously described as existential threats to democracy. In any case, it all backfired spectacularly. Court Party attempts to hobble Trump while boosting the MAGA wing of the party only made him stronger, ensuring his nomination and likely his election.

This summer, Court Progressives finally broke into deep division. This wasn’t because of any ideological split. Rather, it’s because the entire Democratic coalition was demoralized by the visibly decrepit condition of its leader, Joe Biden. Last week, Court Progressives solved that problem by engineering Biden’s removal and facilitating the succession of Vice President Kamala Harris. From a strictly professional perspective, one must admire their ruthless efficiency in doing whatever they must to survive. But their underlying problem is the same, with Harris at the top, and perhaps even worse than it was a few months ago.

Democrats have answered the immediate challenge of physical fitness for the nation’s highest office. Consequently, they’re experiencing a kind of sugar high, with a lot of help from the press. But Biden was never unpopular simply because of his age. He was unpopular because of his overly left-wing, demonstrably incompetent approach to one pressing U.S. policy challenge after another. Harris now inherits that unpopularity, and rightly so. She also has one major disadvantage, which Biden did not possess. Unlike Biden, Harris is one hundred percent politically correct. She is entirely a product of the twenty-first-century Court Progressive movement. Unlike Biden, she has no feel whatsoever for Rust Belt working-class voters that Democrats need to win back from Trump. Indeed, she may very well scramble the Electoral College map to the benefit of Republicans.

Harris and the Democrats also have another serious problem, one they and the legacy media prefer not to discuss. A significant percentage of Country Progressives have given up on today’s Democratic Party as hopelessly beholden to the nation’s Court establishment. They can see that Harris is an establishment figure par excellence. A good number of these left-leaning populists will, therefore, vote for third-party candidates, including Robert Kennedy Jr., Cornel West, and Jill Stein. Those candidates, combined, now poll around 8 percent. In a hard-fought race, that’s no small number, and it hurts the Democratic Party more than it does the GOP.

Still, the Democrats’ selection of Kamala Harris is an excellent indication of where the party stands now. As even liberal media outlets admitted not so long ago, Harris is disturbingly incompetent and (until recently) widely disliked within the party. Yet Court Progressives refuse to consider any other candidate. They refuse because they are captive to left-wing identity politics, and to pass over Harris would break that captivity. For this reason, among others, the Democrats will likely lose to Donald Trump in November. And I have to say, after the past eight years, they’ve really got it coming.

Colin Dueck is a professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Jonah Elkowitz / Shutterstock.com.

July 27 marked the seventy-first anniversary of the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953. The Korean Peninsula suffered a horrific war from June 25, 1950, instigated by North Korean forces, which resulted in millions of casualties and injuries and displaced up to 8 million people. The devastating war destroyed widespread infrastructure in both North and South Korea, including homes, hospitals, schools, factories, roads, railways, and bridges, pummeling cities [DM1] into ashes.

Therefore, our nation must never forget the horrific history of the Korean War started by Kim Il-sung, the leader of North Korea. Kim Jong-un, his grandson, has identified South Korea as “a state most hostile” to North Korea and boasted that in the event of a war, he would “use all our super power to wipe [our enemies] out.”

Former South Korean president Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un agreed to the Panmunjom Declaration in 2018, which established a peace process on the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Armistice Agreement. Moon proposed replacing the Armistice Agreement with a declaration of the end of the war, promoting coexistence between North and South Korea and asserted that the end-of-war declaration would lead to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. This was a misstep that failed to perceive the true ambitions and nature of the North Korean dictatorship, which has been preparing for armed reunification for more than half a century. Relying on the goodwill of a hostile country is a very dangerous idea.

I have experienced all three generations of North Korean leaders, from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, and have been in close proximity to them to understand their policies of armed reunification with the South for over thirty years. Until Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, slogans in the offices of the Workers’ Party and the military read, “Let’s unify the country in the leader’s era [Kim Il-sung].” During Kim Jong-il’s reign, the line went, “Let’s unify the country in the general’s [Kim Jong-il’s] era .” Kim Jong-un even openly stated that he would make 2013 the year of a “nationwide patriotic struggle for reunification” and accelerated preparations for war. These are examples that show the direct ambition of the Kim regime to invade South Korea.

Former South Korean presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in held five peace talks with North Korean dictators Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un. However, all those peace summits failed. Instead, North Korea received over a billion dollars in food and energy aid from the U.S. (until 2009) and ROK governments, advancing its nuclear missile development, and now threatens South Korea and world peace with nuclear weapons. Signing a peace agreement and coexisting with a hostile country that possesses nuclear weapons is as foolish as inviting a gangster into one’s home and trying to live peacefully with them.

The declaration of the end of the war is literally a declaration that the war is over. It is to confirm the complete end of the war state between the North and South to the 80 million people on the Korean Peninsula and the international community. Therefore, it must be clarified that the end-of-war declaration is different from the current Armistice Agreement system. Any peace must dismantle the demilitarized zone (DMZ), a scar of division and war. The ugly barbed wire fences stretching about 248 km should be removed, and the millions of mines cleared. At the same time, all the numerous military facilities, equipment, and soldiers stationed there should be withdrawn entirely, and the area declared a peace zone.

The North and South are historically one nation. Therefore, if the war is declared over, the land routes and railways crossing the thirty-eighth parallel should be immediately connected and opened, allowing residents of both the North and South to travel freely between Seoul and Pyongyang as they did before 1945. Moreover, peaceful cities and villages should be built together around the former DMZ, complete with “peace parks” and facilities for commerce and tourism.

Moreover, if an end-of-war declaration is made, the closed North Korean regime should open the country and announce a reform policy that guarantees freedom and human rights to its residents. Without such guarantees, residents of both the North and South cannot freely interact, and economic exchanges cannot occur, nor can separated families exchange emails or phone calls. The North Korean regime should also pledge to the international community and the people of both Koreas that it will make denuclearization irreversible. Such prerequisites must be met for a true end-of-war declaration, and it must be agreed upon by the parties involved and the United Nations and announced to the world. Without such binding guarantees, if an end-of-war declaration is made formally, the Kim Jong-un regime could change at any time.

In reality, peace cannot be achieved for free. Genuine peace on the Korean Peninsula can only be guaranteed if the oppressive Kim Jong-un regime falls. This would allow North Korea to open up, guaranteeing economic freedom, rights, and private property to its residents, liberating them from the shackles of slavery. Peace cannot thrive where there is tyranny. Therefore, if the cruel oppression of the North Korean dictatorship continues and the freedom and human rights of North Korean residents are not guaranteed, South Korea cannot even think about peaceful coexistence with the North.

Peace on the Korean Peninsula is not limited to the end-of-war declaration and peace agreements. Due to the ongoing confrontation between communist forces and the free world surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the stability of the peace regime requires the unification of systems between the North and South. In the 1970s, Vietnam also signed a peace agreement, but eventually, North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam and achieved reunification under communist rule. Therefore, peace on the Korean Peninsula will be complete when both the North and South are unified under a free democratic system.

The previous Moon Jae-in administration disingenuously claimed that the end-of-war declaration was not legally binding and merely a political declaration unrelated to the Armistice Agreement, with nothing to do with the dissolution of the UN Command or the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.[AL8] [DM9] 

If the end-of-war declaration lacks international legally binding power, there is a possibility that the North Korean dictator could reverse it at any time, exploiting it continuously. Especially if a declaration is made, the North Korean regime will demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea and the cessation of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, inciting protests within South Korea to drive out U.S. forces through candlelight protests. On October 27, 2021, at the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly, North Korea’s ambassador to the UN, Kim Song, demanded the dissolution of the UN Command in Korea. This should be seen as the true intention of the North Korean regime regarding the end-of-war declaration.

In 2021, several Democratic legislators, including Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA), proposed the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act. In response, thirty-five Republican House members sent an open letter to the White House, expressing deep concerns that the end-of-war declaration would seriously threaten security on the Korean Peninsula. Ironically, some Korean Americans have been lobbying for years to pass the legislation. If their families were living like slaves under the most closed and oppressive regime in the world, would they still advocate for a peace agreement with it?

Moreover, some Korea watchers argue that North Korea behaves better when the United States engages with and makes concessions to it. This logic overlooks why North Korean residents live like slaves and why Kim Jong-un pours the state’s resources into developing nuclear weapons. North Korea’s foreign policy has always been based on deception. For example, when the U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement was signed in Geneva in 1994, Kim Jong-il rejoiced that he had fooled President Bill Clinton. He boasted to senior officials, “We gained time to develop nuclear weapons and received free light-water reactors worth $4.6 billion and 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually until the reactors are completed.” This is what I heard directly from Kim Jong-il’s speech to senior officials in 1998 at the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party.

For the past half-century, the North Korean regime has had no intention of honoring agreements for reconciliation and cooperation with the South or the United States. Yet, some experts criticize Washington and Seoul for not keeping their promises to Pyongyang. Kim Jong-un sees nuclear weapons as a powerful means to ensure his survival and regime protection, a way to maintain a balance of power between the North and South and a tool to unify the South under his rule through nuclear force. North Korean dictators have been attempting to unify South Korea by force for more than half a century. Expecting the North Korean regime to honor the end-of-war declaration and peace agreements without changing the Kim family regime is an unrealistic fantasy.

Ri Jong Ho is a former senior North Korean economic official who served under all three leaders of the Kim family regime. His most recent role was based in Dalian, China, where he headed the Korea Daehung Trading Corporation, overseen by the clandestine Office 39 under the direct control of the ruling Kim family. Before his assignment in Dalian, Jong Ho held pivotal positions, including President of the Daehung Shipping Company and Executive Director of the Daehung General Bureau of the North Korean Workers’ Party, a role equivalent to Vice-Minister rank in the North Korean party-state. Subsequently, he was appointed Chairman of the Korea Kumgang Economic Development Group (KKG) under the North Korean Defense Committee by Kim Jong-il. Jong Ho is a recipient of the Hero of Labor Award, the highest civilian honor in North Korea. Following a series of brutal purges by Kim Jong-un, he defected with his family to South Korea in late 2014. Currently, Jong Ho resides in the greater Washington, DC area.

Image: KCNA Screenshot for main image. Intext image is from Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: During the Korean War, the U.S. Navy outfitted Iowa-class battleships with nuclear capabilities through Operation Katie, enabling them to fire Mark 23 "Katie" nuclear shells.

-The USS Iowa, USS New Jersey, and USS Wisconsin were equipped to carry these 15-20 kiloton nuclear projectiles, similar in power to the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

-This classified program, which began in 1952, aimed to provide the Navy with unparalleled firepower capable of destroying entire cities or Soviet battle groups. Although the Katie shells were never used in combat, their presence highlighted the extent of nuclear armament strategies during the Cold War.

With the Korean War in full swing in the early 1950s, the U.S. Navy had its own wants and needs, plus rivalries with other service branches. The Army, Air Force, and submarines with the Navy were armed with nuclear weapons, but no surface ships could fire atomic devices. One plan was to outfit three of the Iowa-class battleships so they could launch a nuclear shell from the vessels’ main 16-inch guns.

Operation Katie was the name of the program. The moniker came from the abbreviation for kilotons (kt). The idea was to take Army tactical nuclear shells and retrofit them for battleship use.

These were called Mark 23 "Katie" nuclear projectiles and fifty were produced beginning in 1952 and the first arrived in 1956.

The navy outfitted the USS Iowa, USS New Jersey, and USS Wisconsin with altered magazines on the ships to carry the shells. Each ship would have ten Katie projectiles and nine practice shells.

This would give the navy the biggest and most powerful nuclear artillery in the world – a total of 135–180 kilotons of yield.

The Mark 23 was derived from the Army’s Mark 9 – the first nuclear artillery shell. The Navy’s Mark 23 had a 15-20 kiloton nuclear warhead – about the size of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War Two.

So, the Katie would be able to take out a city day or night and in all weather. In a naval battle, it could destroy an entire Soviet battle group. The navy’s nuclear shell was thought to be accurate.

These shells required careful engineering. “Naval Gazing,” a blog dedicated to the USS Iowa and other battleships, had this to say about nuclear devices fired from artillery.

“An artillery shell is an incredibly difficult environment to put a complicated device like a nuclear warhead. It must withstand normal handling, thousands of Gs of acceleration as it’s fired, and the centrifuge of a shell spinning at 10,000 rpm or more.”

It was no surprise that the navy wanted to keep this under wraps, and they never confirmed or denied the presence of nuclear shells on the vessels.

But it is plausible that the shells were employed on the battleships. In those days nuclear planners believed the United States could “win” a nuclear war with the Soviets. The Katie shells showed just how far the military was willing to go with nuclear weapons. The nuclear option that would escalate from a conventional war was a real prospect.

Fred Kaplan, writing in his book The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War summarized the military’s thinking during the era.

“All of these options envision the bomb as a weapon of war, writ large. This vision has been enshrined in the American military’s doctrines, drills, and exercises from the onset of the nuclear era through all its phases.”

Thus, the Katie was part of a larger military strategy. By 1962, the Katie shells were removed and thankfully never used, although the USS Wisconsin may have fired a practice round in 1957. The body of a Mark 23 shell is on display today at a nuclear museum in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Brent M. Eastwood, Ph.D., is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood.

Image Credit: All Images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Essex-class aircraft carriers, with 24 built and 17 seeing combat in WWII, played a crucial role in U.S. naval dominance from the mid-20th century through the Vietnam War.

-Designed with input from naval personnel, these carriers were built for durability and combat efficiency, with innovations like Special Treatment Steel and advanced propulsion systems.

-They saw action in key battles across the Pacific, proving resilient against kamikaze attacks.

-The final Essex-class carrier, USS Oriskany, notably served in Vietnam. Decommissioned in the 1970s, these carriers leave a legacy of exceptional shipbuilding and naval combat prowess.

If you were a sailor assigned to U.S. Naval aviation during the middle of 1943 and onward, you probably served on one of the Essex-class of aircraft carriers.

Twenty-four were built though the Navy originally wanted 32. This stalwart served through the 1960s and 1970s when the new super aircraft carriers came online. 

These capital ships meant business. They beat back the Japanese and helped face down the Soviets during the Cold War after a sterling record toward the end of World War Two. One of the more famous carriers even served in Vietnam.

This is the story of the worthy Essex-class carrier that won’t leave you disappointed.

Of the 32 original Essex ships, the Navy cancelled eight while 24 were laid down. Seventeen of the Essex-class carriers saw combat in the Second World War. The Essex ships served at the end of the war in the Pacific starting in 1944, at a time when scads of Japanese kamikaze pilots menaced American vessels. The Essex-class were survivable carriers, some suffered damage from the suicide missions, but no ship was lost.

The Essex-class began in the late 1930s with the rise of Germany and Japan. Congress passed legislation in 1938 to increase the tonnage of ships in a departure from limitations imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty that ended in 1936. Designers wanted the carriers to sail through the Panama Canal, so this put a limit on their size. But engineers and officers who served onboard other carriers envisioned a flat-top that could bring the fight to the enemy and win major naval engagements.

The shipbuilding activity was a team effort from the beginning. In a process that was ahead of its time, feedback and opinions from pilots, catapult and arresting gear personnel, ship drivers, and maintenance technicians were gathered and used to design the Essex-class. 

Curiously, the Navy wanted to employ a concept called the “Sunday Punch.” This meant the flight deck would be capable of handling four squadrons totaling 90 aircraft for a decisive blow against the enemy with a single mission. Aviation chiefs envisioned at least 36 fighters, 37 dive bombers, and 18 torpedo bombers. This made it difficult to build the flight deck big enough to handle all those airplanes. But if the design eliminated some of the guns and allowed the deck to hang over the ship, the arsenal of aircraft would fit. 

The Navy determined that the island could be downsized to enlarge the flight deck too. Putting the folding elevators toward the edge of the ship also conserved space on the rectangular-shaped flight deck. The deck was finally designed to be 872 feet with two catapults and several arrestor cables.

In an innovation for that time, the shipbuilders used Special Treatment Steel (STS), which is a nickel-chromium steel alloy. This enabled many parts of the ship such as the hangar deck and bulkheads to have more protective armor. The ships displaced 34,000 tons.

In those days, the United States had several shipyards in Virginia, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. Construction began in 1941. The first of the class, the USS Essex, had its keel laid after Pearl Harbor. By 1942, five other Essex-class carriers were being built. 

Several design improvements were used in the ship's engine rooms. Steam turbines were implemented instead of the turbo-electric designs of Langley and the Lexington-class. There would be four boiler rooms and two engine rooms located at the center of the ship. Each boiler room had two Babcock and Wilcox boilers burning at 850°F. The engines were Westinghouse steam turbines with low-pressure and high-pressure turbines affixed to double-reduction gears. This enabled 15 to 20,000 nautical miles of range with a speed of 15 knots.

The Essex-class would have early types of shipborne radar for tracking enemy ships and aircraft. It could carry 1,600 tons of munitions. Armaments included eight five-inch dual-purpose guns, thirty-two 40mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns, and 46 Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns. 

The Essex-class was busy during the Philippines, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima campaigns. The carriers often launched all their airplanes for attacks to soften the beach landings and to conduct close air support for the marines fighting on the ground. Enemy airplanes, especially the occasional Japanese bomber that made it through the defenses, and the kamikaze pilots, took their toll and caused damage, but no sinkings occurred. 

The last of the Essex-class was the USS Oriskany made famous by one of its pilots, John McCain, who was shot down and taken prisoner in 1967. The Oriskany made multiple tours in the Vietnam War. My father-in-law Eddie Sanchez served on the Oriskany toward the end of the war as a flight deck crewman. The Oriskany was performing numerous sorties around the clock in those days. I asked Sanchez if he worked on the flight deck for 24 hours and 24-hours off to rest up. He said, “We worked 48 hours straight and only about 10 to 12 hours to rest after each rotation. Then it was back on the flight deck. Countless airplanes landed and took off. I remember constant action.” The duty was dangerous. Sanchez once saw a sailor cut in half with a broken arrestor wire whipped across the deck. Some sailors were lost overboard due to various accidents. 

The Essex-carriers were decommissioned in the 1970s. USS Lexington became a training carrier in Pensacola, Florida, and was finally taken out of service in 1991. Now USS Lexington and her sister ships USS Yorktown, USS Intrepid, and USS Hornet are preserved as four of the five aircraft carrier museum ships in the United States.

Naval aviation would never have dominated the air without the Essex-class. The carriers served with distinction, from World War Two, until the Vietnam War. The battles were dangerous as the capital ships provided the Japanese with large targets to hit. And the Oriskany proved it could hold its own in battle during Vietnam. The Essex leaves a proud legacy of combat and shipbuilding prowess with innovative design. It would be difficult to imagine today’s industrial base building that many carriers in such a short amount of time. 

Dr. Brent M. Eastwood is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Foreign Policy/ International Relations.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: Lockheed Martin's European F-16 Training Center (EFTC) in Romania has successfully graduated its first class of mission-ready F-16 pilots. Located at the Romanian Air Force 76th Air Base near Fetești, the center, supported by the Netherlands, trained seven Romanian pilots in advanced flight operations and tactics.

-Opened in November, the EFTC aims to enhance NATO's air defense capabilities by providing comprehensive training, including night missions and dissimilar air-to-air exercises.

-U.S. Ambassador Kathleen Kavalec praised the pilots and highlighted future plans to extend training to other regional allies, including Ukraine. Romania continues to modernize its air force with additional F-16 and F-35 acquisitions.

Last summer, aerospace giant Lockheed Martin announced it would establish the European F-16 Training Center (EFTC) in Romania to enhance mission readiness throughout Europe by training Romanian pilots to fly and operate the F-16 Fighting Falcon to hopefully expand and include training for other nations.

The flight training facility, located at the Romanian Air Force 76th Air Base near Fete ti, Romania opened in November. The Netherlands, a fellow NATO member state, supported the EFTC by supplying fourteen F-16s to train Romanian and Ukrainian aviators.

Less than a year after the effort was first unveiled, Lockheed Martin acknowledged that the facility released its first batch of "mission-ready F-16 pilots." just last week.

"This milestone enhances Romania's air defense capabilities and mission readiness with our 21st Century Security training solutions. We appreciate Romania’s trust in us and are committed to supporting their pioneering efforts, including hosting the first European F-16 Training Center, which underscores their strategic importance within NATO and European defense," said OJ Sanchez, vice president and general manager of the Integrated Fighter Group at Lockheed Martin.

According to defense contractors, the EFTC has seen its training capabilities expanded, and the Fighting Falcons have been employed in "night training missions and executing dissimilar air-to-air training exercises with allied NATO air forces." Seven Romanian pilots completed the program, while the second and third classes began in early July and were set for September of this year.

"I want to convey my hearty congratulations to the seven Romanian Air Force pilots who have successfully completed a demanding course of instruction over the past eight months, which included rigorous academics, simulator flights, mission planning, airborne missions, and much more," said U.S. Ambassador to Romania Kathleen Kavalec.

"Throughout this course of instruction, these pilots have learned not only to operate an advanced fighter jet but how to employ it as a team in formations while executing modern air-to-air and air-to-surface tactics," added Kavalec, who also stated, "We look forward to Romania opening up training to other regional allies and partners, especially Ukraine."

Romania has looked to bolster its air force capabilities, replacing the Soviet-era MiG-21s with the far more advanced F-35 and F-16 fighters. In 2023, Romania had committed to acquiring thirty-two Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning IIs, with plans to add 16 more to form three full squadrons by the decade's end.

While the fifth-generation aircraft are set to arrive by the end of the decade, Romania will continue to operate refurbished F-16 Fighting Falcons acquired from its great northern NATO ally: Norway. Romania formally requested those second-hand Lockheed Martin-made fighters in 2021 and completed the order in 2023 in a deal worth $418 million.

The first batch of the Fighting Falcons landed in November and joined the seventeen F-16AM/BM fighters the Romanian Air Force already operated – purchased from Portugal. The remainder of the twenty-six fighter jets, along with parts and services, are set to be delivered by 2025.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Northrop Grumman CEO Kathy Warden announced that the U.S. Navy is expected to select a partner for its F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter program next year.

-Despite budget cuts, Warden is confident in the continuation of the competition. The F/A-XX aims to replace the F/A-18 Super Hornet, featuring advanced capabilities such as manned and unmanned operations, directed energy weapons, and drone control.

-While Northrop Grumman hasn't confirmed its participation, it stands well-positioned after exiting the Air Force's NGAD program. The Navy's decision will be pivotal as it navigates budget constraints while ensuring future air dominance.

Over the course of last week, Northrop Grumman CEO Kathy Warden has announced expectations that the United States Navy will select its partner for the next generation fighter sometime next year. The sea service has kept its cards close to the chest regarding its F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter, but Warden expects that the U.S. Navy will formally announce which company will build the aircraft, even as the funding for the program has been scaled back.

"We have not received any updates that would suggest the Navy is changing their approach. They are in competition now for selection to occur next year," Warden stated during the company's second-quarter 2024 earnings call last Thursday.

The future of the U.S. Navy's Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program – not to be confused with the U.S. Air Force program of the same name – has been in question, since the service announced it will be cutting $1 billion from its Fiscal Year 2025 (FY25) budget proposal. This development was closely followed by calls from Capitol Hill to trim defense spending, this was grim news for the U.S. Navy, as the service already has several big-ticket programs in the works.

"In terms of our overall collection of opportunities, we continue to believe that the Department of Defense will move forward with sixth-generation platforms. The timing is a bit in flux on many of them as they sort out budget priorities, but we are confident that we're well positioned when and if they do move forward," Warden added. With so much funding flying over to these sixth-generation flighters, what can be expected from the U.S. Navy’s latest improvements in aerial capabilities?

The U.S. Navy's F/A-XX program seeks to develop a replacement for the carrier-based F/A-18 Super Hornet. Similar to the Air Force's NGAD effort, the F/A-XX has reached a pre-Milestone B phase, a point in the federal funding timeline that is just ahead of awarding a contract for engineering and manufacturing development.

"The F/A-XX will be a sixth-generation fighter jet with manned and unmanned capabilities," reported Stavros Atlamazoglu for the National Interest.

"The Navy is looking for an aircraft that would be able to operate from aircraft carriers­it will require a stronger structure and landing gear compared to aircraft designed for conventional operations," Atlamazoglou added. "In terms of capabilities… the Navy is looking for a fighter jet that would have directed energy kinetic capabilities (laser weapons) and the ability to operate with and control drone swarms. As for mission sets, the Navy is looking for an aircraft that would be able to operate in permissive or semi-permissive environments with potent adversary air defense systems and establish air superiority through long-range kill chains."

The timeline isn't yet clear, but it is expected that the F/A-XX could enter service by the mid-2030s. That would line up with the U.S. Navy's current contract for the Super Hornet with aerospace giant Boeing, which will continue to produce the advanced Block III variant of the F/A-18 through 2027.

These developments supplement previous statements made by the United States Department of Defense's (DoD's) Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Bill LaPlante, "I think they’re going to figure it out," LaPlante proclaimed during a speech at Farnborough, the largest aviation event in the United Kingdom. "It's not going to stop. It's going to continue. It's just going to be, well, better informed."

The programs will continue, possibly evolving from the original program’s goals.

Warden has not confirmed that Northrop Grumman is competing to win the F/A-XX contract, but the company bowed out of the U.S. Air Force's NGAD program last year – leaving Boeing and Lockheed Martin to fight over scraps. As noted, Boeing produces the F/A-18 Super Hornet, while Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor on the F-35 Lightning II, including the F-35C carrier-based variant operated by the U.S. Navy.

Northrop Grumman is the prime contractor on the U.S. Air Force's B-21 Raider, the long-range strategic bomber that will replace the aging Rockwell B-1B Lancer and Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit. In addition, Northrop Grumman manufactures components for both the F/A-18 and F-35.

In its Q2 2024 earning call, the company announced its "sales increased 7% to $10.2 billion, as compared with $9.6 billion in the second quarter of 2023."

Moreover, second-quarter 2024 sales reflected "strong demand" for its products and services, while Northrop Grumman's net earnings totaled $940 million, or $6.36 per diluted share, as compared with $812 million, or $5.34 per diluted share, in the second quarter of 2023.

"The Northrop Grumman team extended our strong performance into the second quarter with continued double-digit earnings growth, fueled in part by a 7 percent sales increase and expanding operating income. Our diverse portfolio includes capabilities in high demand and we have invested to create capacity and drive productivity to deliver differentiated capabilities for our customers," said Warden. "We are laser-focused on performance and continue to expand profitability through the deliberate actions we are taking. With strong support for our programs, growing global orders for our products, and solid execution in our business, we are increasing our revenue and EPS guidance for the year."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Naval exercises have revealed vulnerabilities in the U.S. Navy’s supercarriers. In 2005, a Swedish Gotland-class submarine successfully "sank" the USS Ronald Reagan during war games, evading an entire carrier strike group's defenses.

-Similarly, in 2001, a German Type 206 submarine breached the USS Enterprise's defenses, while an Australian Collins-class sub captured photos of the USS Abraham Lincoln in 2000.

-These incidents highlight the underestimated threat of diesel-electric submarines, which have outmaneuvered advanced sonar systems and demonstrated their ability to strike powerful carriers, raising questions about the future role and security of supercarriers in modern naval warfare.

Naval exercises are conducted to help ensure that sailors are prepared for the "real deal" – hoping it will never come. It is often said that "We train like we fight;" and valuable lessons are learned from that training. 

The National Interest has previously reported how during a 2005 war game involving the U.S. and Swedish navies, a $100 million Gotland-class submarine successfully foiled an entire American carrier strike group (CSG) that included the $6 billion Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier USS Ronald Reagan.

As noted by Harrison Kass, "During the war game, the Gotland was tasked with attacking the Ronald Reagan against the entire might of the CSG defending it. The CSG was the heavy favorite, but the Gotland was able to elude the supercarrier's passive sonar defenses and land multiple virtual torpedo strikes. The hypothetical damage inflicted would have been enough to sink the carrier."

That incident served to question the future role of supercarriers – yet, it wasn't exactly news, as the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered flattops had previously fallen victim to old-school subs.

In 2001, the German Type 206 diesel-electric submarine U24 – designed to operate in the shallow Baltic Sea and built in the 1960s – was deployed to JTFEX 01-2 naval exercises in the Caribbean Sea and managed to break through all the security around the USS Enterprise (CVN-65). The submarine fired green flares and took photographs of the U.S. Navy's flattop, essentially "sinking it."

"The U-24 could have rammed the aircraft carrier, the boat was that close," a submariner serving on the U-24 told the German outlet T-Online in 2013.

Months before the U24 "sank" CVN-65, an Australian Collins-class submarine was also able to penetrate the powerful surface and underwater naval defenses of a carrier strike group and close-in photographs of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) through its periscope during the RIMPAC 2000 naval exercise off Hawaii.

HMAS Waller managed to avoid detection from surface ships, as well as Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered fast attack submarines throughout the RIMPAC exercise. The vessel performed far better than expected in the exercises.

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) boat performed similarly during the Operation Tandem Thrust wargames in 2001 when she "sank" two USN amphibious assault ships in waters just over 70 meters (230 ft) deep; although the submarine was "destroyed" later in the exercise. Two years later, during a multinational exercise in September 2003, which was attended by HMAS Waller and sister boat HMAS Rankin, Waller successfully "sank" a Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine, prompting claims from the United States Navy that diesel submarines such as the Collins-class remained one of the major threats facing modern navies.

The RAN has a total of six Collins-class submarines in service – the first built in Australia. The submarines, which are enlarged versions of Swedish shipbuilder Kockums' Västergötland-class, were originally referred to as the Type 471 before being named to honor Australian Vice Admiral John Augustine Collins. The boats were constructed between 1990 and 2003 in South Australia by the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC).

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: In a daring operation, Ukraine employed drones to strike a Russian Tu-22M3 bomber at the Olenya military airfield in Murmansk Oblast, deep within the Arctic Circle.

-This marks the first time Kyiv has targeted Russian territory so far north, highlighting the reach of its drone capabilities.

-Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky praised the precision of the attack, which aimed to reduce the Russian air threat. The Kremlin claimed it shot down several drones but has not confirmed damage to the bomber.

-The incident raises questions about Ukraine's drone launch points and Russia's defense vulnerabilities.

Earlier this month, the Kremlin took much glee in declaring that its Federal Security Service (FSB) "thwarted" an attempt by Ukrainian intelligence to recruit a Russian pilot to hijack and defect with a Tupolev Tu-22M3 (NATO reporting name Blackfire) supersonic strategic bomber. However, this past weekend, Kyiv opted for a different tactic – it employed drones and reportedly flew it more than 1,000 miles to damage, and possibly destroy, at least one of the bombers.

If true, this could be the second Tu-22M3 bomber to have been destroyed on the ground, while another was shot down in April.

It was just over a year ago that a Ukrainian drone was employed to strike the first Tu-22M3 at the Soltsy-2 air base in Novgorod Oblast. It was noted for being especially daring as it was several hundred miles from Ukraine – but this week, Kyiv's forces struck even deeper.

On Saturday, Ukrainian forces struck the Olenya military airfield in Russia's Murmansk Oblast, more than 1,100 miles from the front. It marked the first time that Kyiv had struck Russian territory within the Arctic Circle – and not far from Severomorsk, home to the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet.

Similar raids were carried out against the Engels airfield in the Saratov Oblast and the Diagilevo air base in the Ryazan Oblast. An oil refinery near the latter air base was also targeted.

"Each destroyed Russian airbase, each destroyed Russian military aircraft – whether on the ground or in the air – means saving Ukrainian lives. Guys, our warriors, I thank you for your precision!," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in a statement.

Moscow hasn't confirmed that the Tu-22M3 was damaged in the recent raid, but the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that it had shot down a dozen "kamikaze drones" in five regions.

There has been much speculation as to where the drones were launched from on Saturday, and if from Ukraine it meant the unmanned systems were remotely piloted vast distances without being observed. Alternatively, it has been suggested that Ukrainian operatives launched the drones from well within Russia.

The Kremlin may have assumed the region would be safe, as Kyiv is currently prohibited from employing Western-made long-range weapons on targets within Russia out of fear that it could escalate the war. However, Ukraine has employed drones instead, hitting military positions deep inside Russia, oftentimes without claiming direct responsibility.

The Olenya military airfield made for an inviting target.

"Some of the largest wilderness areas in the European part of the country are on the Kola Peninsula, and south of the Murmansk region is Arkhangelsk and Karelia, two sparsely populated large regions mainly covered by forest," The Barents Observer reported.

"It was a question of when, not if, Ukraine was going to strike the base," Associate Professor Lars Peder Haga with the Norwegian Air Force Academy also told The Barents Observer. "Still an impressive feat, with Olenya 1,800 km from the Ukrainian border, with more or less continuous GPS jamming in the region."

Russia has tried to downplay these strikes, and when acknowledging them, has labeled the attacks as acts of terror. 

The Tu-22 was originally introduced in 1983, and it is in some ways analogous to the United States Air Force's B-1 Lancer.

Yet, whereas the B-1 has greater range and is a true intercontinental bomber, the Backfire is faster but is essentially a "theater" bomber in that it was designed to strike continental Europe and possibly some targets in the Atlantic. It also has far less bomb load capacity. The Federation of American Scientists reported, "Its low-level penetration features make it a much more survivable system than its predecessors."

The bomber saw limited use at the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, and Russia currently maintains a force of more than 100 Tu-22M bombers in all configurations. The Backfire also was used in nearly 100 operational sorties against rebels in Chechnya in the mid-1990s and Georgian forces in the 2008 South Ossetian war. One of the Tu-22Ms was lost in combat, shot down by a Georgian missile in the latter conflict.

The Tu-22M3 is a modernized version, developed in the early 1980s and it officially entered service in 1989. It has an operating range of 7,000 km (4,350 miles) and is capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It was on April 14, 2022, that Tu-22M3s were employed in the conflict in Ukraine for the first time, where the bombers dropped "dumb bombs" as part of the Kremlin's campaign to take the then-besieged city of Mariupol.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.