Diplomacy & Crisis News

Now, almost eighty years ago, over 23,000 airborne troops landed in Nazi-occupied France with 132,450 Allied forces crossing the channel via sea; 6,833 vessels—including 1,213 warships—took part with over 14,000 sorties flown during the previous evening and D-Day itself; five beach areas were devised, with the First U.S. Army landing on two and the Second British Army landing on the other three. By the end of August, over 2 million men, 3 million tons of supplies and stores, and almost half a million vehicles had landed in Normandy. 

But what led up to this moment was multiple years in the making. After the Dunkirk evacuation and the subsequent fall of France, Great Britain and its empire gallantly continued a lonely, year-long struggle as the only major power fighting German Nazism and Italian Fascism—until the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Although no clear victory was in sight, and with the Britannic world overstretched—battling over the air of Western Europe, on land in North Africa, and at sea in the Atlantic and Mediterranean—Prime Minister Winston Churchill had always planned for a later liberation of Western Europe.

In fact, after the United States’ direct entry into the war, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, Churchill crossed the Atlantic Ocean to meet with President Franklin Roosevelt for the Arcadia Conference. Arcadia set in motion the strategic and operational process that would eventually culminate in D-Day. It reaffirmed the position taken earlier in 1941 by British and American planners: should the United States enter the war, the first primary objective would be to defeat Germany.

That December, during the Arcadia Conference, Churchill presented the American Joint Chiefs of Staff with his general strategic concept to defeat Germany—agreed upon by the British Chiefs. It simplified as five key points: enact naval blockades against the Axis; heavy bombing campaigns against Germany; propaganda designed to incite rebellion in occupied countries and break German morale; a series of peripheral landings across the European coastline by small armored units; and then the “final assault on the German citadel.”

Such a plan clearly drew upon British history. In the words of American rear-admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, “They remembered they had got at Napoleon by the back door of the Iberian Peninsula, and that direct-attack strategy in World War I had cost them a million men killed and two million wounded.”

The Americans didn’t view such a plan favorably. While they agreed that such actions would weaken Germany, what was really needed was one powerful and major operation, meeting the Germans head-on. Many within the U.S. government were eager to open a second front as soon as possible.

However, psychologically, the British were met with two problems: first, the memory of the static warfare from the Great War. The fear of such a repeat was common among many in the upper echelons of British war planning. Secondly, Britain had already been kicked off the European continent three times by this point: in Norway, during the Fall of France—notably at Dunkirk—and in Greece.

Such psychology remained an essential part of the developments leading up to D-Day.

1942 saw grand movements in military decision-making. On March 27, 1942, Roosevelt was presented with a plan drafted as the Marshall Memorandum after Chief of Staff General George Marshall. Subsequently approved by the president on April 1, it was immediately sent across the Atlantic with Marshall and Roosevelt’s adviser, Harry Hopkins.

The plan outlined three operational phases: First, prepare for the invasion. Logistically, this was already in motion with Operation Bolero—the Combined Allied Chiefs of Staff planning for the transportation and supply of American forces and materiel into the UK. Part of the document’s preparatory measures included Operation Sledgehammer, an emergency cross-channel invasion of the Cotentin Peninsula to take pressure off the Soviet Union if it faced imminent collapse. 

The second phase was a cross-channel invasion codenamed “Roundup.” The final stage was the advance into Germany after consolidating the beachhead in France.

The British wholly rejected Sledgehammer as the Americans could have only provided “token forces” for such an operation at the time. Nonetheless, the Western Allies kept it “on the books” to satisfy Soviet demands for a second front.

Churchill instead argued for an invasion of North Africa in 1942, an idea with which Roosevelt agreed. This provided the U.S. forces with a direct opportunity to fight the Germans and Italians while securing Britain’s need for victory in Africa.

General Marshall, having failed to convince the British on Sledgehammer, agreed to the North African alternative—though he would later admit that his thoughts on the success of Sledgehammer were premature, especially given that D-Day required Allied mastery of the air, something that was lacking in 1942.

In June 1942, General Marshal was eager and fixated on Bolero. Logistics for Bolero remained an ever-present concern—and although America was eager to press onto the continent, it had caused some disagreements within Washington. This is perhaps best explained by Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke, who relayed the dissensions he witnessed with the Combined Chiefs of Staff back to Westminster. Written in the confidential annex of a War Cabinet meeting:

Other very high quarters in Washington were, however, apprehensive that if we concentrated on BOLERO to the exclusion of any other projects, either in 1942 or 1943, there was a danger that, if BOLERO was not practicable, large bodies of American troops would be locked up in Great Britain and remain indefinitely inactive.

Logistics would continue to compound problems. By November 1942, Bolero’s slowdown sent a somber message. As General Eisenhower told Churchill, they could not attempt any feasible and meaningful cross-channel invasion until 1944. 

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the Allies reaffirmed their commitment to a cross-channel invasion and, as such, to establish a joint Anglo-American planning staff in London.

Subsequently, the Washington Conference in May 1943, codenamed Trident, enacted the necessary compromise for D-Day. The British agreed to commit to a target date of May 1, 1944, for a cross-channel invasion. The Americans, in turn, agreed that such operations were best left until after the conquest of Sicily, continuing the commitments in the Mediterranean.

The Quebec Conference in August 1943 provided the next required stepping stone for D-Day: an American Allied Supreme Commander. Churchill had initially promised Brooke the position of supreme commander. Still, given the increasing number of American units likely involved in a cross-channel landing, it became imperative that a U.S. officer held the position. Thus, on December 7, 1943, Roosevelt met with Eisenhower and told him, “Well, Ike, you are going to command OVERLORD”—the codename for the future battle to come.

The lead-up to D-Day was complex and changing. The Germans were aware of an impending invasion based on their many intelligence reports and successfully tapping a telephone conversation between Roosevelt and Churchill in February 1944. Though unaware of this tap, the Allies nonetheless had a plan to deceive the Germans over the location of the invasion: Operation Fortitude South.

It ultimately fed and nurtured the Nazi preconception that the main Allied invasion was to be at the Pas-de-Calais, partly as it seemed the most logical military. Hence, General Bradley referred to it as “the biggest hoax of the war.” The perceived threat of an invasion of the Pas-de-Calais proved invaluable to the Allied cause. Best described by Eisenhower in his later report sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force:

The German Fifteenth Army, which, if committed to battle in June or July, might possibly have defeated us by sheer weight of numbers, remained inoperative during the critical period of the campaign, and only when the breakthrough had been achieved were its infantry divisions brought west across the Seine-too late to have any effect upon the course of victory.

From February to April 1944, the Fifteenth Army, north of the Seine, increased from ten to fifteen divisions. However, Nazi “intuition” on the dangers of an undefended Normandy led them to enact multiple division changes. The result was that in addition to their twelve SS Panzer Divisions stationed at Lisieux, three Panzer Divisions (between the Seine and Loire rivers) that could quickly respond to defend Normandy were brought.

Originally scheduled for May, D-Day was delayed a month to procure more LSTs (Landing Ships for Tanks). This was imperative as, in the early hours of April 28, 1944, eight American LSTs were conducting invasion drills off the English coast by Lyme Bay. Intercepted by German torpedoes, two were destroyed, and two were damaged—one beyond repair. The margins for available LSTs were so thin that the loss of three of them threatened the entire viability of D-Day.

The weather affected two principal parts of the operation: D-Day itself, the day the invasion was to take place, and the H-Hour—the hour the Allied assault craft needed to ‘touch down’ onto the beaches. Intended for June 5, Eisenhower again delayed the invasion by a day, but this time due to poor weather. 

As General Lord Ismay explained in his memoirs, airborne troops needed darkness “to conceal their approach, but sufficient moonlight to enable them to identify their dropping zones”—in other words, a late-rising moon. But there needed to be enough time after dawn to allow “the sea-borne assault to identify their beaches, and the warships to identify the target for bombardment” while not being long enough “to enable the enemy to recover from his surprise before the infantry assault started.” Furthermore, the tide had to be low enough “for the underwater obstacles to be exposed, but not so low as to involve the attacking troops in an unduly long advance across the beaches.” The Defence Committee assumed that the opening window for such particular weather in June would be between June 5 and 7. 

At 4:00 AM on June 5, Eisenhower’s command team met to discuss final preparations. The staff meteorologist, Captain Stagg, informed them that the weather was likely to improve the next day. Eisenhower then responded, “OK. We’ll go.”

Thus, all was set into motion. The following day, the largest land, sea, and air invasion in history commenced.

About the Author 

Andreas Koureas is an aspiring economist and historian. He is currently studying Political Economy at King’s College London. His main research focus is on Winston Churchill and the British Empire. He has written for publications such as The Spectator and academic institutions like Hillsdale College. He is writing a paper on the 1943 Bengal Famine for a peer-reviewed journal later this year. Follow him on X: @AndreasKoureas_.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary and Key Points: The modern aircraft carrier, once a symbol of naval dominance, faces obsolescence due to advancements in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems by adversaries like China.

-These systems can easily target and destroy carriers, making them liabilities rather than assets.

-To maintain naval superiority, the U.S. Navy should pivot towards more resilient platforms such as unmanned underwater vehicles and space-based systems like the X-37B spaceplane.

-Submarines and advanced drones should become the primary power projection platforms until effective countermeasures against A2/AD threats are developed.

The Decline of Aircraft Carriers: Are They Becoming Obsolete in Modern Warfare?

The modern aircraft carrier is the equivalent of a floating coffin. Its size, speed, and presence dangerously close to enemy shores were once benefits for the platform, but they have all been converted into liabilities. 

Such is the case with modern warfare. Platforms that created overwhelming advantages in previous conflicts can quickly become obsolete. Even worse, they can become strategic liabilities that adversaries exploit, and so it is with aircraft carriers today.

The Aircraft Carrier is This Era’s Battleship

In the case of large-scale conflict, the greater the gap between defining events, the more likely strategic platforms like aircraft carriers have become downright dangerous to operate in the interim. 

The British Royal Navy at the outset of the Second World War believed battleships were the essential platform for power projection. They invested heavily in this capability. 

Their most iconic battleship, HMS Hood, was the envy of the world during the interwar years. Most other navies assumed Hood, like the other battleships of the age, was the pinnacle of naval power projection.

Hood was sunk after minutes in its first major engagement of WWII with the far less capable German navy. The Brits had to lick their moral, psychic, and strategic wounds for much of the rest of the war over that loss. 

Sure, they ultimately won WW2. But the victory over the Axis Powers for the British Empire was pyrrhic. The massive defense expenditures on legacy systems that failed to live up to their hype, such as HMS Hood, ensured the glory days of empire were behind the British by the end of the war. 

Something similar may be afoot today with the United States. That is certainly what America’s enemies in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang, and Caracas all think. So do non-state terror groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. 

America’s Enemies Aren’t Stupid. There’s a Reason They’re Investing in A2/AD

That belief is one of the reasons these foreign actors have spent so much time and money developing arsenals of anti-ballistic missiles and wider systems, such as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), predicated on negating America’s aircraft carrier advantage. 

After decades of development and proliferation, these A2/AD systems are now ready for showtime. 

For a few million dollars, an anti-ship ballistic missile, or any element of China’s A2/AD systems, could damage or sink an American flattop worth tens of billions of dollars and housing thousands of sailors and dozens of aircraft. This is a humiliating blow that the self-styled anti-imperialists of the Chinese-led world fantasize visiting upon the United States. 

Will America Go the Way of Britain or Will It Chart a New Course?

The Americans have to decide whether they will play according to the old British Empire’s rules, where they ignore reality right up until the moment they no longer can, or if Washington will turn to the dynamism that made the United States the power it is today. 

Namely, will the U.S. Navy (and its supporting political leaders) have the courage to restructure the surface fleet away from a severe dependence on the highly vulnerable aircraft carrier, and toward something else entirely? 

The way forward is not massive, floating coffins such as the aircraft carrier. These systems are not entirely useless, but their worth is vastly decreasing as A2/AD systems become more widespread. 

In an ideal world, the flattops would be deprioritized at least until effective countermeasures against the A2/AD threat are in place. 

Rather than blowing billions of dollars on building new Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers, the Americans should be building a fleet of the U.S. Space Force’s unmanned “spaceplane” (it’s a space bomber), the X-37B. 

Not only could a swarm of these beauties in orbit provide precision strikes deep inside enemy territory, but they could also be used for anti-ballistic missile defense. What’s more, such systems might be the key to disrupting the space-based element of China’s A2/AD satellite constellation, which tracks U.S. military targets in real-time.

Meanwhile, the Navy needs to make the submarine, not another surface vessel, the primary power projection platform until the threat of A2/AD can be overcome. And not just submarines, but specifically unmanned underwater vehicles. Drones have already transformed the face of war, and the U.S. military has most directly experienced those changes. Yet the Navy is reticent to fully embrace the drone revolution. It’s inexplicable.

There is a Navy without the aircraft carrier at the center of it. 

But that requires the Pentagon to accept this fact and stop listening to legacy defense contractors who think that their Cold War-era products are still at the forefront of technological innovation. 

They’re not. 

Real innovation is right at our fingertips – and the technologies I’m talking about here are cheaper than flat tops! If we don’t radically reverse course soon, the U.S. will endure the same humiliations that the British experienced at their end of their empire. America will lose its vaunted flattops in battle. 

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: Russian tanks, particularly the T-72 model, have suffered significant losses in the Russo-Ukraine War.

-According to open-source intelligence group Oryx, Russia has lost 1,200 T-72 tanks in just one year. Initially, Russia had an estimated 6,900 T-72s, but recent estimates suggest only about 1,500 remain.

-The T-72, introduced in the 1970s, is outdated, and its high attrition rate may force Russia to rely on even older tank models.

-As Ukraine receives modern weaponry from Western allies, the aging T-72s are increasingly vulnerable on the battlefield, exacerbating Russia's equipment replenishment challenges.

Russia's T-72 Tank Losses Mount in Ukraine War: 1,200 Destroyed in a Year Russian tanks have fared poorly in the Russo-Ukraine War, and the Russian T-72 model has had an especially hard time surviving the battlespace.  According to open-source intelligence group Oryx, the Russians lost 1,200 T-72s in just one year. Such a loss rate will challenge the Russians’ ability to keep fielding the T-72. The Russians were understood to have as many as 6,900 T-72s available initially, but updated estimates suggest that as few as 1,500 might remain. The T-72 was introduced in the 1970s – it is hardly a modern warfighting machine. But if the Russians exhaust their reserve of T-72s, they might have to rely on even older, previously mothballed tank models.  High Attrition for T-72 Tank in Ukraine 

Battlefield losses on both sides of the Russo-Ukraine War have been staggering. The fighting is the most vicious on the European continent since the Allies encircled Berlin, and casualty rates reflect the brutality. Both sides have hemorrhaged troops and equipment. The battlefield has become a graveyard of tanks and armored vehicles.

As equipment is destroyed, the two nations turn to different sources for replenishment. The Ukrainians have been fortunate enough to have Western backers willing to resupply Kyiv’s resistance with everything from F-16s to NLAWs to HIMARS. Russia has had to rely “on its stockpiles of Cold War and World War II-era relics,” according to Maya Carlin. Unfortunately for Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kyiv’s Western replenishments “have crucified Russian tanks” like the T-72.

Oryx’s figure – 1,200 T-72s lost – may well be an undercount. The intelligence firm uses verified footage and imagery to arrive at its numbers, meaning Oryx’s standards for verification likely leave destroyed tanks unaccounted for. 

Either way, the Russians have a problem.

What is the T-72? 

The T-72 is somewhat out of place on a modern battlefield, as this main battle tank was designed in the late 1960s. In production since 1968, 25,000 T-72s have been built. 

The T-72 is an improvement on the T-62 model, built with both steel and composite ERA armor, a 125 mm smoothbore gun, and a V12 diesel engine. With a 320-gallon fuel capacity, the T-72 enjoys an operational range of 290 miles (or 430 miles with external fuel drums). The T-72 can achieve speeds of 47 miles per hour, but it only travels 2.5 mph in reverse.

Perhaps the most notable feature of the T-72 is its weight. At just 41 tons, the tank is small and compact relative to Western contemporaries, and this is not by accident. The Soviets designed their tanks to be small, then built their roads to match. The roads were thus big enough for Soviet tanks to use, but too tight for Western tanks. The original T-72 is underpowered, which might be part of why the tank has fared so poorly in Ukraine. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: On June 3, travelers at Japan's Aomori Airport witnessed a rare event when two Lockheed Martin F-35A stealth fighters made emergency landings.

-The Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) aircraft were on a training flight from Misawa Air Base when one developed a mechanical problem.

-The runway was closed for 20 minutes, but there were no injuries or damage to the aircraft.

-This incident follows a series of recent aerial mishaps, including a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B crash in New Mexico and a Japan Maritime Self Defense Force helicopter collision in April.

Mechanical Issue Forces F-35A Fighters to Land at Aomori Airport

Travelers at Japan's Aomori Airport in northern Honshu were treated to a rare sight on June 3 as two Lockheed Martin F-35A stealth fighters made emergency landings. 

Both aircraft are in service with the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF). They were on a training flight from Misawa Air Base when one of the Lightning IIs developed an unspecified mechanical problem and requested an emergency landing, the Associated Press reported.

The airport was forced to close its runway for about 20 minutes due to the emergency landing. There were no injuries and no damage to either of the F-35As – conventional takeoff and landing variants of the Joint Strike Fighter.

According to manufacturer Lockheed Martin, "As a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) participant, the JASDF has an established program of record of 127 F-35 Aircraft, consisting of 105 F-35 A models and up to 42 F-35 B models. Japan is acquiring the most of any international customer." Misawa is one of three air bases that host the fifth-generation multirole fighter. According to Simply Flying, Misawa AB hosts Japanese and American troops, including the U.S. Air Force's 35th Fighter Wing, which operates and maintains two squadrons of F-16CM (C and D model) Block 50 Fighting Falcons.

The incident in Japan comes just days after a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B – the short/vertical takeoff and landing variant – crashed near Albuquerque, New Mexico, during a flight from Fort Worth to Edwards Air Force Base.

Series of Aerial Mishaps

Fortunately no one was hurt on Monday, but this mishap followed another involving a C-2 transport aircraft that was forced to make an emergency landing at another commercial airport – this time in Central Japan – after a cockpit window reportedly slid open during a training flight. Eight people were on board, but there was no damage and no injuries were reported.

In April, two Japan Maritime Self Defense Force SH-60K Seahawk helicopters collided during a night-time anti-submarine warfare training drill. The two rotary aircraft crashed into the Pacific Ocean south of Tokyo, killing one crew member while another seven were lost at sea. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The war in Ukraine has revived the possibility of nuclear warfare for the first time since the Cold War. During the early months of the conflict, there was significant concern that Russian President Vladimir Putin might order a tactical nuclear strike to avoid defeat.

-Although the situation has stabilized somewhat, the U.S. and Western governments remain vigilant, with contingency plans in place for a possible Russian nuclear strike. The Russian nuclear arsenal is extensive, including 1,710 deployed warheads and thousands more in storage, with a robust nuclear triad comprising land-based missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers.

-The potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia, while currently seen as unlikely, remains a serious concern, especially if the conflict turns against Moscow again.

The war in Ukraine has made nuclear warfare a possibility for the first time since the Cold War. 

During the first months of the war, when the situation looked especially bad for Russian forces – not that it is great now, but things have stabilized – there was a real fear in the United States and the West that Russian President Vladimir Putin would order a tactical nuclear strike on Ukraine to prevent a humiliating defeat. 

By late 2022, the CIA and other government departments and agencies had contingency plans for a Russian nuclear strike against Ukraine. Such a strike would most likely be a tactical one, meaning that it would directly target part of the battlefield, rather than taking out a city. 

But what is the state of the Russian nuclear arsenal today, and is Moscow still considering a nuclear strike against its adversary? 

Nuclear Weapons and Decisions 

In its latest report on Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the Congressional Research Service assessed that the Russian military currently has 1,710 deployed nuclear warheads (and many additional thousands stored). In addition, the U.S. government estimates the number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons between 1,000 and 2,000 warheads. 

The Russian military has a nuclear triad. On the ground, Moscow has 326 intercontinental ballistic missiles. At sea, the Russian Navy fields 12 ballistic missile submarines that can pack a total of 192 ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. In the air, the Russian Aerospace Forces flies 58 strategic bombers capable of launching or dropping a nuclear munition. 

Even though the war is going more favorably for the Kremlin right now, the U.S. government still believes that if Russia’s fortunes flag again, Putin and his Kremlin advisers would resurface the option of a nuclear strike. 

"Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they've faced so far, militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons," CIA Director Bill Burns said in a recent event in Atlanta.

Clearly, the Russian military has the capabilities to conduct a nuclear attack. Much then depends on the political will of Russia. A nuclear strike would likely have serious consequences on Russia, including the potential of a retaliatory strike by the U.S.

"We're obviously very concerned. I know President Biden is deeply concerned about avoiding a third world war, about avoiding a threshold in which, you know, nuclear conflict becomes possible," added Burns, who specialized in Russia and served as a U.S. ambassador in Moscow. 

A Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine would be the first nuclear weapon detonation in warfare since the U.S. military dropped two bombs on Imperial Japan during the final days of World War Two. 

About the Author: 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

The U.S. special envoy for Sudan warns that the geopolitical fallout from the spiraling civil war could be immense.

Economics pundit Noah Smith reports that a meme has been circulating among China-watchers of late. The meme holds that if you would just travel to China you would realize that China doesn’t want a war in the Taiwan Strait, or anywhere else. This is a form of argument from authority or, as Noah puts it, argument from tourism. Now, he and I don’t run in the same circles, but I’ve been hearing variants of the same storyline in recent months. Some who tout it claim, like Noah’s interlocutors, that China doesn’t want war. If not, they imply we should all heave a sigh of relief and stop preparing for Pacific combat. Other travelers maintain that China has burgeoned into such an industrial and military colossus that no eyewitness could countenance opposing it. Abandon all hope. Etc. The common denominator among these arguments from authority is their upshot: stand down. You need not—or cannot—buck China’s will.

To which I reply: Of course China doesn’t want a war over Taiwan. So what?

After all, wannabe conquerors love peace! They want to win without fighting. They long to cow their antagonists into submission, inducing them to lay down arms without putting up a fight. In so doing they spare themselves the ravages and unintended consequences inherent in the clangor of arms. That mode of proceeding has been baked into Chinese strategic culture since antiquity—witness the writings of Sun Tzu. Or ask Western martial sage Carl von Clausewitz. Writes Clausewitz, who took the field against Napoleon, the French god of war, “the aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country unopposed.” Bottom line: to prevent an aggressor from triumphing without firing a shot, “one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In other words it is the weak, those likely to need defense, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war.” 

Take it from the art of war. Taiwan and its friends had better arm themselves—pronto—lest freedom-loving islanders suffer a Napoleonic fate.

Seldom do senior officials speak so plainly. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin was correct to tell this year’s Shangri-la Dialogue that “war or a fight with China is neither imminent” nor “unavoidable.” That comes as cold comfort. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) magnates may not, and in all likelihood do not, relish war. But that doesn’t mean they are prepared to forego or indefinitely postpone their goals for the sake of regional concord. Just the opposite. The CCP leadership has made it glaringly clear that it will unsheathe the sword should it see fit. Short of that, it pursues warlike policies and strategies on a 24/7/365 basis, on the logic that peacetime politics is war without bloodshed.

Any strategy premised on communist goodwill is a strategy fated to fail. China will not relent in the Taiwan Strait. America, its allies, and its partners must deter it by mounting concerted, convincing, day-in-and-day-out displays of power and resolve.

Defense commentators are blunter than officials on occasion. Over at Defense One, science and technology editor Patrick Tucker hints at how China’s winning-without-fighting strategy works. The inauguration of William Lai, Taiwan’s latest Democratic Progressive Party president, occasioned the latest military outburst out of Beijing. Following Lai’s inauguration People’s Liberation Army warships and warplanes fanned out around Taiwan’s environs for two days of drills dubbed “Joint Sword 2024.” Chinese officialdom crowed that the maneuvers had meted out “strong punishment” for “separatist acts” on the part of the leadership in Taipei. According to Tucker, Beijing has talked itself into believing that it can overawe the balky island through domineering conduct underwritten by shows of naval and military might.

The conceit being that Taiwan’s government, society, and armed forces would rather yield to China’s blandishments than fight against daunting odds to perpetuate their de facto sovereignty.

In other words, Chinese leaders believe playing head games with Taiwan’s leadership could deliver their most treasured goal, rule over the island, without firing a shot. If that happened Communist China would have scaled to the pinnacle of strategic excellence, achieving its aims at minimal cost, danger, and diplomatic and economic blowback. Clausewitz would instantly grasp China’s approach. The Prussian soldier-scribe declared that there are three ways to prevail in martial strife. One, vanquish the foe on the battlefield and impose terms. That charts the swiftest and surest route to victory, but also the one entailing the most forbidding hazards. Two, convince hostile leaders their predicament is impossible. The conviction being that rational but disheartened decisionmakers will decline to fight a fight they deem unwinnable. Or three, persuade hostile leaders they can’t win at a cost that’s affordable to them. Again, the Clausewitzian proposition is that rational cost/benefit analysis could net victory without violence. 

The latter two methods operate in encounters short of violence as well as in open war. These are Beijing’s methods of choice in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in maritime Asia. They inhabit the realm of coercion and deterrence.

But the CCP leadership has a problem. Namely, the leadership seems to have little idea of how to bring about a Taiwanese capitulation without unleashing violent force. Think of strategy as a theory of cause and effect. Strategy postulates that if friendly forces do X, Y, and Z they will generate desirable effects A, B, and C—the ultimate effect being military victory. Now consider China’s theory of success, such as it is. CCP overseers demand that Taiwan consent to its own death as an independent polity simply because China’s armed forces now outclass Taiwan’s by almost any conceivable measure. But what precisely does staging a military deployment—no matter how menacing—do to induce President Lai’s, or anyone else’s, leadership in Taipei to commit assisted suicide?

Precious little.

No obvious mechanism explains how cause begets effect in Chinese strategy, and so China’s theory of success fails the test of strategic and political reality. Beijing demands everything from the islanders yet offers them nothing. It has placed Taiwan on “death ground,” to borrow from Sun Tzu, and the revered general of yore advises a combatant bestriding death ground to fight to its utmost. Taiwan will. You would think Sun Tzu’s disciples on the mainland would get this intuitively. But they don’t.

It turns out nonstop bombast backed by cavalier displays of firepower makes a futile strategy for China, and yet that’s the only trick the CCP leadership knows how to play. Through misbegotten strategy, in short, China has deprived itself of options short of war. It may not want war, but years of overbearing diplomacy may compel it to go to war. It has little alternative.

That’s what we in the biz call self-defeating behavior. Nice work, Xi & Co.

About the Author: Dr. James Holmes, U.S. Naval War College

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The conflict in Ukraine has escalated as the U.S. and other Western countries have authorized Ukraine to strike high-value military targets inside Russia using advanced weaponry such as the M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS.

-This new phase in the conflict saw Ukraine successfully targeting Russian S-300 and S-400 air defense systems near Belgorod. Ukrainian forces continue to inflict heavy casualties on Russian troops, with recent reports indicating significant losses in personnel and equipment.

-Despite high casualties, Russia's ability to rapidly regenerate its forces, as demonstrated historically, poses a significant challenge. Ukraine and its Western allies must consider this force generation capability in their strategies.

Ukraine Authorized to Strike Inside Russia as Conflict Escalates

The fighting across Ukraine rages on as the Russian military continues with its offensive in the east toward the city of Kharkiv.

In response to the renewed Russian attack, the United States has allowed Ukraine to take off the gloves and use powerful weaponry inside Russia.

A New Phase in the Conflict

The war has entered a new phase after the United States, followed by several other Western countries, gave the green light to Ukraine to engage high-value military targets inside Russia with weapon systems provided as part of a security assistance package.

The Ukrainian forces can now use their highly effective M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) to launch precise munition and take out targets within Russia.

In the latest such strike, a Ukrainian M142 HIMARS took out two S-300 or S-400 air defense systems and their supporting vehicles near the Russian city of Belgorod, more than 30 miles from the border with Ukraine. These are the best air defense systems the Russian military has at its disposal and mark a significant loss. In the coming weeks, such incidents are expected to rise as the Ukrainians become more adept at identifying and tracking high-value targets within Russia.

Mounting Casualties and Russia’s Force Generation

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian forces continue to inflict heavy casualties on their Russian adversaries. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, over the past 24 hours, the Russian forces lost 1,280 troops killed, wounded, or captured, 69 support vehicles and fuel trucks,40 artillery pieces, 39 unmanned aerial systems, including several Iranian-made Shahed suicide drones, 16 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 12 main battle tanks, 12 pieces of special equipment, 3 anti-aircraft weapon systems, and 2 cruise missiles.

These casualties are quite heavy for 24 hours of fighting. Indeed, losing more than a battalion worth of men, as well as almost 200 pieces of heavy equipment in a day could be debilitating for military forces without Russia’s force generation capacity. But this is the capability that hasn’t only kept Moscow in the war but could eventually turn the tide on its favor.

On February 24, 2022, Moscow launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine with approximately 200,000 regular and paramilitary troops. More than 23 months later, Russian casualties are estimated between 320,000 and 515,000. Even at the lowest end of the casualty spectrum, the Kremlin has lost more than 150 percent of its initial invasion force. Nevertheless, today, the Russian military has approximately 470,000 troops in Ukraine and has mobilized many more within Russia. This ability to regenerate forces at rapid intervals has historically been an ace up Moscow’s sleeve. Russia is vast. Russian leaders have understood that they can buy time by giving up territory and sacrificing hundreds of thousands of troops, like in the Napoleonic Wars and World War Two.

Ukraine and the West should take Russia’s force generation ability into close consideration.

About the Author 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Summary: Recent months have seen several tragic military aircraft incidents. An F-35 Lightning II and an F-16 Fighting Falcon both crashed in New Mexico, while a vintage Supermarine Spitfire from the UK's Battle of Britain Memorial Flight (BBMF) crashed in Lincolnshire, killing Squadron Leader Mark Long.

-The UK's Defence Accident Investigation Branch is investigating the cause of the Spitfire crash.

-This incident has reignited debates about the safety of flying vintage warbirds, following other recent crashes involving World War II-era aircraft.

-The BBMF has grounded its fleet, including Spitfires, Hurricanes, and a Lancaster bomber, pending investigation outcomes.

Vintage Spitfire Crash: UK's Battle of Britain Memorial Flight Under Scrutiny

The past few months have been a dark time for military aircraft. An F-35 Lightning II crashed last weekend after an F-16 Fighting Falcon crashed just weeks earlier – both in New Mexico. The F-35 crash overshadowed the loss of a military aircraft in the UK, this one involving a vintage Supermarine Spitfire.

On May 25, the World War II-era aircraft – part of the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight – went down in Lincolnshire near Royal Air Force Coningsby. Squadron Leader Mark Long, who was piloting the Spitfire, was killed. The UK's Defence Accident Investigation Branch has put out a request for images and video to help determine what led to the crash.

"An investigation into the cause of this tragic event has now begun," RAF Group Captain Robbie Lees, commander of the display air wing, said in a statement. "The RAF will not be offering any comment on the accident until that investigation has concluded."

The Battle of Britain Memorial Flight maintains a small fleet of vintage aircraft, including two Hawker Hurricanes, an Avro Lancaster four-engine bomber, a C-47 Dakota, and around half a dozen of the remaining airworthy Spitfires. All of its aircraft have been grounded, and its visitors center is also currently closed. It is unclear when the group’s flights will resume.

Another Old Warbird Down

Though this is the first fatal loss involving a BBMF aircraft since the unit was formed in 1957, some aviation experts are again questioning whether such flights should continue, given the age of the aircraft.

Last month, a World War II-era Douglas C-54 crashed in Alaska, killing two. In November 2022, a B-17 bomber and a P-63 Kingcobra fighter plane collided at the Wings Over Dallas air show, leaving six people dead. That followed another crash involving a B-17 in October 2019, when the bomber crashed at Bradley International Airport in Connecticut. Seven of the 13 people on board were killed, while the other six and one more on the ground were injured.

The Spitfire – The D-Day Warbird

As reported by 19FortyFive.com, the Spitfire is most closely associated with the Battle of Britain, even though the Hawker Hurricane shot down more enemy planes over the course of that campaign in 1940.

The Spitfire’s close association with that campaign might have been helped by the 1968 film Battle of Britain – far more Spitfires were available for filming, and few scenes showed the Hurricanes. As a result, many now believe that the Spitfire was the dominant fighter used at the time.

The Spitfire went on to play a significant role in the D-Day landings 80 years ago, with a total of 55 squadrons supporting the invasion of Normandy.

About the Author: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary and Key Points: Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree made dubious claims over the weekend that the Houthi rebels had successfully targeted the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) in the Red Sea. Following these claims, images purportedly showing damage to the U.S. Navy's Nimitz-class aircraft carrier circulated online.

-However, these images were quickly debunked as they actually depicted the Russian Navy's Admiral Kuznetsov, currently undergoing extensive repairs in Murmansk.

-The Pentagon has denied any damage to the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. The incident highlights ongoing issues with misinformation on social media, particularly on X (formerly Twitter).

Houthi Claims of Attacking Aircraft Carrier USS Eisenhower Debunked

We'll be the first to suggest it: Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree should be dubbed the Lying Yemeni – as his claims are as dubious as those of the now infamous "Baghdad Bob" more than two decades ago. Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf earned the nickname "Baghdad Bob," as well as "Comical Ali," for his outrageous claims made during the U.S.-led coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003.

While Saree hasn't declared anything quite as outlandish as "The infidels are committing suicide by the hundreds on the gates of Baghdad," the Houthi rebel mouthpiece claimed twice over the past weekend that the Iranian-back insurgent group had successfully targeted the United States Navy's Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) in the Red Sea. . 

Following those claims, images were posted online that purported to show damage to the U.S. Navy's warship, the second oldest nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in service. An example is at the very top of this post. 

"CONFIRMED: uss eisenhower (pictured docked for repairs in souda bay) hit and severely damaged by multiple houthi ballistic missiles. judging by extensive tent city developing on the flight deck, we assess it is unlikely eisenhower will return to service in the foreseeable future," noted @iAmTheWarax on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

That Image Is Wrong on So Many Levels: No Aircraft Carrier Damage 

The image shared on X isn't actually of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, and it isn't even a Nimitz-class carrier.

Moreover, it isn't even a nuclear-powered vessel, and that's because as many users on social media quickly pointed out, it is the Russian Navy flagship Admiral Kuznetsov, which as The National Interest has reported on multiple occasions is undergoing an odyssey of a refit at the 35th Ship Repair Plant in Murmansk since 2018.

About the only part of the post that was believable and fairly accurate is that the carrier (Admiral Kuznetsov) is unlikely to "return to service in the foreseeable future."

Misinformation and disinformation remain serious problems on X, and the issue has gotten worse since tech entrepreneur Elon Musk acquired the service in late 2022 for $44 billion. Many of the guardrails that attempted to quickly dispel such disinformation have been removed, and it was only thanks to more qualified users that the warship was quickly identified. Now in fairness, it is possible that the original post was made in jest, but it is still hard to tell for certain.

Another giveaway that the photo was a fake was that it suggested that CVN-69 was in Souda Bay on the Greek island of Crete. Here is where there was an inkling of truth – notably that the carrier and elements of her strike group did make a port visit to the port earlier this spring. However, anyone with knowledge of geography or access to a map would quickly point out that it would require transiting the Suez Canal and sailing approximately 4,000 nautical miles. It would take days, and perhaps a week for the carrier to reach that point.

Finally, if the warship had taken any damage and needed repairs it would have almost certainly traveled to Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent U.S. military in Africa.

The Pentagon has denied that the carrier took any damage.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit for main image X. All others are Creative Commons. 

The United States has the power to halt ongoing atrocities in El Fasher.

Summary: The success of the D-Day invasion of Normandy was pivotal in World War II, but it almost ended in failure.

-Issues such as missed landing spots, strong currents, and heavy German defenses, especially at Omaha Beach, caused significant casualties and nearly led to the operation's abandonment.

-Had D-Day failed, it would have boosted German morale, potentially shifted Nazi forces to the Eastern Front, and put immense strain on British resources.

-The failure could have prompted significant political repercussions in the U.S., including possible resignations and an election loss for President Roosevelt.

-The failure of D-Day would have dramatically altered the course of world history.

What If D-Day Had Failed? The Potential Consequences for World War II

What if the D-Day invasion of Normandy had failed?

What if U.S. forces had gained no footing in France?

Would the Soviets have been able to defeat Nazi Germany alone? If not, then what would a Nazi-controlled Europe have looked like? And if the Soviets had prevailed, how much of the European continent would they have claimed for themselves?  How far would the Iron Curtain have fallen? 

According to the Department of Defense, D-Day almost was a failure.

“While the ultimate goal of liberating France and ousting the Germans did happen, a lot went wrong on D-Day – especially for the Americans, who were the first to launch the invasion,” the DOD website reads. “Thousands of U.S. paratroopers died during their drop behind enemy lines at Utah Beach, having been shot out of the sky by enemy fire or weighed down and drowned in flooded marshlands. Many also missed their landing spots, as did the seaborne forces, which landed more than a mile from their intended destination, thanks to strong currents.”

Further problems awaited the Allies at Omaha Beach.

“The Omaha offensive turned out to be the bloodiest of the day, largely in part because Army intelligence underestimated the German stronghold there. Rough surf caused huge problems for the amphibious tanks launched at sea; only two of 29 made it to shore, while many of the infantrymen who stormed off the boats were gunned down by Germans. Gen. Omar Bradley, who led the Omaha forces, nearly considered abandoning the operation. Somehow, though, both sectors of U.S. troops managed to advance their positions for overall success.

Historians have spent decades considering what failure on D-Day might have meant.

“Had D-Day failed, it would have been particularly costly for Britain. They were already running out of manpower, particularly the Army,” Professor Gary Sheffield told the BBC. 

“Had D-Day failed, it would have given a major boost to morale in Germany,” Professor Soenke Neitzel added. “The German people had expected this to be the decisive battle, and if they could beat the Allies, they might be able to win the war. I think Hitler would have withdrawn his core division from the West to fight on the Eastern Front.”

In America, failure might have had significant repercussions, too. “Had D-Day failed, there would have been an agonizing reappraisal among the Americans who had pushed for a cross-channel invasion. Eisenhower would almost certainly have offered his resignation; it would almost certainly have had to be accepted. It’s also possible that US President Roosevelt could have lost the November 1944 election, so there could have been a change in administrations,” Professor Dennis Showalter said. 

D-Day was significant. Had the results of D-Day been different, world history would have changed in a big way.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is the Senior Editor with over 1,000 articles published. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

All images are Creative Commons. 

After a stinging election setback, the long-ruling party is assessing its coalition options.

How America can prepare for war in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.

Extreme weather now affects elections all over the world.

Summary: In late April, Ukrainian forces claimed their first strategic bomber kill, reportedly downing a Russian Tu-22M3. This significant loss marks a strategic win for Ukraine in the ongoing conflict.

-The Tu-22M3, designated "Backfire" by NATO, is a supersonic, long-range strategic bomber that has been in service for over five decades.

-Developed during the Cold War, the bomber has seen action in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, and most recently, Ukraine.

-Despite its capabilities, including the ability to launch Kh-32 and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles, the Tu-22M3's numbers are dwindling, highlighting the impact of the conflict on Russia's air force.

Ukrainian Forces Down Russian Tu-22M3 Bomber: A Strategic Win

In late April, Ukrainian forces achieved their first strategic bomber kill in the war against Russia. According to Kyiv, a Russian Tu-22M3 was destroyed for the first time since the invasion commenced back in February 2022. As detailed in a press release, “The enemy aircraft was shot down at a distance of about 300 kilometers from Ukraine. The damaged bomber was able to fly to the Stavropol region of Russia, where it fell and crashed.” The Kremlin also confirmed the destruction of its long-range bomber; however, its Defense Ministry insisted that the aircraft had crashed in a deserted area due to a “technical malfunction.” While both Ukraine and Russia have exaggerated incidents and numbers throughout the invasion, the loss of a Tu-22M3 is significant regardless of how it went down. According to the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, Moscow has lost an estimated number of 340+ airframes so far in the war. As the production line continues to be hindered due to budgetary and resource constraints, every Russian aircraft lost in the conflict is a big win for Ukraine.

Introducing the Tu-22M3 bomber

Designated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as “Backfire,” the Russian Tu-22M supersonic, long-range strategic bomber has remained in service for more than five decades. The aircraft was developed during the Cold War, designed by the USSR to operate in a missile carrier strategic bombing role. When the initial Tu-22 variant was first produced, it suffered from a range of issues that led to the platform’s unserviceability. To rectify these glaring design issues, Soviet engineers got to work on upgraded Tu-22 variants. The M3 models were officially introduced in the 1980s and continued to fly for Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Tu-22M3: Specs, capabilities, and operational history

While the Tu-22M3 in some ways resembles the American-made B-1 Lancer bomber, the Russian platform has far less bomb load capacity. In fact, the Tu-22M3 is virtually a “theatre” bomber designed primarily to strike inside continental Europe. In terms of armaments, the Tu-22M3 can sport the new Kh-32 missile- a heavily modified variant of the Kh-22. Additionally, the bomber is equipped with the subsonic Kh-SD or the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missile. Backfires were deployed in conventional bombing raids in Afghanistan during the 1980s and were again used one decade later in Chechnya and in 2008 against Georgian forces in the South Ossetian War.

Backfires in Ukraine

Throughout Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Backfire has been used to barrage the front lines and support the Kremlin’s offensive war efforts. According to Kyiv officials, the airframe has used KH-22 missiles to launch attacks targeting Ukrainian cities in the past, which is why the destruction of these bombers is key for the country. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that Russia’s air force possessed a total of fifty-seven Backfires today. However, as the war progresses, this number will likely dwindle further.

About the Author: Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

All images are from Creative Commons. 

Summary: The Su-25 "Frogfoot," or "Grach," is a subsonic, single-seat, twin-engine jet designed by the Sukhoi Design Bureau during the Soviet era.

-It is Russia's counterpart to the American A-10 Warthog, intended for close air support (CAS). However, it is less effective in combat due to its inferior armor and conventional 30mm cannon, which depletes ammunition quickly.

-The Su-25's combat performance has been mixed, performing poorly in conflicts such as the Soviet-Afghan War and the Syrian Civil War.

-The aging fleet and lack of significant upgrades have rendered it less effective in modern combat, as seen in the ongoing Ukraine war, where several Su-25s have been downed by Ukrainian defenses.

Su-25 Frogfoot: Russia's Struggling Close Air Support Jet

The Su-25, fondly known as the “Frogfoot” by its Russian pilots and “Grach” or “rook” by its official name, is a subsonic, single-seat, twin-engine jet warplane that was built by the Sukhoi Design Bureau Joint Stock Company in the Soviet era. It’s the Russian version of the A-10 Warthog, a close air support (CAS) system, but it’s nowhere near as effective in combat as the A-10.

The Frogfoot, like its American counterpart, is a flying tank. Although it has less armor and a bit more speed than the A-10. The Su-25 can climb at the rate of 58m/s and has a maximum speed of about 590 miles per hour. This warbird is by no means the fastest plane in the pack.

But it goes fast enough to allow it to accomplish its CAS mission sets.

Some Specs on the Su-25 Flying Tank

Armed with a Gsh-30-2 30-millimeter cannon under its nose, which can spray 260 rounds of ammunition as well as carry a variety of air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles and rockets, the Su-25 has been likened to a Swiss Army Knife. Except, instead of a corkscrew, this bird has a cannon.

Bear in mind, though, one of the main reasons this bird is not as effective in combat as its American rival, the A-10, is because the Russians did not arm the plane with a cannon like the A-10.

The Su-25 is armed with a conventional cannon that will go through its rounds at a fairly fast clip whereas the A-10, with its Gatlin gun and armored cockpit, can loiter over a battlespace and annihilate anything it needs to at close ranges.

The combat record of this bird is mixed, at best.

While it has been effective in certain roles, its effectiveness in modern combat is not that great overall. It performed badly in its maiden conflict, the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s, and it has failed to deliver in subsequent campaigns, such as the Russian intervention in the ongoing Syrian Civil War. Again, this is because of its poor design.

A Close Air Support platform is required to have armor and a cannon that won’t run out of ammo quickly. This allows for the bird to sit atop friendly forces and provide air cover for them in tight combat. But that’s not what the Su-25 Frogfoot can do.

It is at risk of being taken down rather easily (far more so than the A-10) by enemy ground fire. It cannot last as long over a battlespace as can the A-10. And it’s basically a really cheap knock-off of the A-10.

An Aging Fleet and Less Relevant Capability

The aircraft’s aging fleet and lack of significant upgrades over the decades have made it less effective in the modern combat scenarios it has been sent to fight in. The ongoing Ukraine war, for example, has exposed these vulnerabilities in painful detail, leading to significant combat attrition.

As of March of this year, the Ukrainian government announced that at least six Russian Su-25s have been shot down by Ukrainian air defenses (with many more, according to the Ukrainians, expected to be downed over the course of the war).

A Missed Opportunity for the Russian Armed Forces

The Frogfoot is an excellent concept that has not performed as it was expected to. This is because the Russians built the planes on the cheap and have failed to maintain them to make them compatible with the needs of modern warfare, as has been demonstrated both in Russia’s Syrian campaign and the Ukraine War. 

It’s a great idea for the Russians to have CAS, especially considering the missions their government has sent the Russian military on over the last decade. But Russia has executed that good idea badly. The Su-25 is not performing as it should be.

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

This is the first time that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will have to work with coalition partners since securing power a decade ago.

Military leaders’ aggressive rhetoric may say more about China’s domestic politics than its position in the Indo-Pacific.

The war in Ukraine is still raging on, with the Russian military on the offensive. The Russian forces are looking to capitalize on their momentum to achieve an operational breakthrough.

On the other side of the sandbox, the Ukrainian military is trying to buy time and stave off Russian forces.

At the same time, it amasses enough troops and resources to launch its own large-scale counteroffensive.

The Situation on the Ground

Overall, there is fighting on three sectors: in the east around Kharkiv, the second-largest city in Ukraine.

In the Donbas, where two sides are fighting it off in more than 10 pockets along the contact line. And in the south, where the fighting isn’t as heavy as in the other sectors.

At this time, the Russian forces have the momentum and are pouring forces on the sectors in search of an operational breakthrough. However, any advances made by both sides are measured in hundreds of yards instead of miles and any breakthrough is still far off.

In the meantime, losses continue to mount.

Russian Casualties in Ukraine

Every day, the Ukrainian military releases an official estimate of the Russian casualties. Although the numbers are approximate, more than two years of combat have shown that Kyiv’s assessments are generally on target.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian military and pro-Russian rebel forces lost approximately 1,290 men killed, wounded, or captured, 18 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 15 main battle tanks, 67 artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 69 support vehicles and fuel trucks, 27 unmanned aerial systems, 12 special equipment systems, and 3 air defense weapon systems.

In total, since February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian military claims to have killed, wounded, or captured approximately 512,420 Russian troops and destroyed or damaged 18,228 support vehicles and fuel trucks, 15,020 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 13,345 artillery pieces, 10,766 unmanned aerial systems, 7,794 main battle tanks, 2,268 cruise and ballistic missiles, 2,211 special equipment systems, 1,092 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 827 anti-aircraft systems, 357 fighter, attack, and bomber jets, 326 attack and transport helicopters, and 28 surface combatants and submarines.

Although the Ukrainian government might be exaggerating some of these numbers—for example, the U.S. puts the number of Russian losses to around 320,000—it is undeniable that the Russian armed forces have suffered extremely heavy manpower and materiel casualties.

Today, it is estimated that Moscow has around 470,000 troops in Ukraine, showing an impressive ability to recover from extremely heavy losses and regenerate combat power. To be sure, the quality of the Russian troops is low, and their commanders have shown to be largely inept to conduct large-scale maneuver warfare. Moreover, morale among the Russian forces isn’t the best. For example, reports indicate that Russian troops who refuse to fight are forcibly sent to the frontlines instead of going through a court martial.

 But to win in a slugfest like the conflict in Ukraine, quantity might be enough on its own.

About the Author 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons.