Diplomacy & Crisis News

« Ok, mon gars. C'est parti », lance Annalee Pearse en s'enfuyant du foyer pour jeunes filles où le tribunal l'a placée après qu'elle a tenté de voler un bijou. Elle emporte Daniel, son fils nouveau-né, dont « le père aurait pu être n'importe lequel parmi sept hommes ». Nous sommes vers la fin des années (...) / États-Unis, Criminalité, Drogue, Armement - 2018/01

The excitement with which diplomats and pundits reacted to the news about last week’s China-brokered diplomatic deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, would have led one to conclude that the “handshake heard around the world” wouldn’t only achieve peace between the most powerful Arab-Sunni state, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian-Shiite hegemon, Iran, but would also reshape the regional balance of power if not the entire international system, sidelining the United States and creating the foundations of Pax Sinica in the Middle East.

In a way, it evoked the memories of a historic event: the U.S.-brokered Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement that created the basis for Arab-Israeli peace and, in the process, remade the Middle East, sidelining the Soviet Union from the region and established Washington as hegemon in that part of the world for many years to come.

But that 1979 agreement, facilitated by then-U.S. president Jimmy Carter, was an earth-shattering event. It happened, against the backdrop of the Cold War, following the 1973 Yom Kippur war (which raised the nuclear tensions between the two superpowers) and after the earlier and costly U.S. diplomatic and military interventions in the Middle East that damaged America’s standing in the Arab World and led to a devastating oil embargo.

It was only in the aftermath of that successful 1979 diplomatic triumph that Washington established its dominant role in the Middle East—and it ended up paying higher diplomatic, military, and economic costs for doing so. These include the rise of anti-American terrorism (including 9/11), a series of long and destructive wars in the Middle East, and failed efforts to revive the Arab-Israeli peace process. All of these ended up destabilizing the region, instead of democratizing it, while eroding the U.S. global status, including vis-à-vis rising China.

Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to conclude in the aftermath of the US military interventions in the Middle East that the War on Terror ended—and China won.

While the Americans were fighting and dying in the region, China got busy. It joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001, exactly two months after the collapse of the World Trade Center. Facing no serious military challenges, it spent the following two decades strengthening its economy and emerging as a global power ready to compete with the United States. And thanks to the American military interventions in the Middle East, the Chinese benefited from free access to the energy resources in the region. Good deal!

In public discourse, there is now a notion that the Chinese will now replace the United States in a leadership role in the region: mediating between the Saudis and the Iranians, perhaps making peace between the Arabs and Israelis, securing the oil sites in the Persian Gulf, and using its power to stabilize the Middle East, and if necessary, being drawn this war or that war. To some Americans, this may even sound like good news: here are the keys, China; good luck with running this show.

But before Americans start debating “who lost the Middle East,” as Washington DC did so hysterically after the announcement of the deal, they should probably pause to consider a few plain realities. Americans find it difficult to assess the politics of the Middle East and U.S. policy there in binary terms and in a linear fashion: in trying to operate under the assumption that regional alliances are stable and partnerships with outside powers are sustainable, they are always surprised to discover that that isn’t the case.

Hence, in the Middle East, one doesn’t fantasize about remaking the Middle East through wars and regime change, or that a so-called Arab Spring would turn the region into a center of democracy, or that perpetual peace would supposedly flow forth from the Abraham Accords. One can only search for the diplomatic equivalents of one-night stands that may or may not facilitate some long-term changes and more stable relationships.

The United States, not unlike other great powers—including the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France—has discovered that it is impossible for outsiders to impose their agendas on the Middle East. In that region of the world, everything is tied to everything else—the boundaries between local, national, and international issues are blurred. Any attempt by an outside power to impose a solution results in counterforts set up by unsatisfied actors, aimed at forming opposing regional alliances and securing the support of other local players and international actors. As renowned Middle East historian L. Carl Brown suggested, “just as with the tilt of the kaleidoscope, the many tiny pieces of colored glass all move to a new configuration, so any diplomatic initiative in the Middle East sets in motion a realignment of the players.”

One Middle Eastern leader who clearly is familiar with the way things work in the region work is Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who at one point was imagined by Americans to be a progressive reformer, and then turned into the region’s butcher; a pro-American Arab moderate that would help form a regional NATO to contain Iran, make peace with Israel and help lower energy prices, ends up, to everyone’s shock, partnering with Russia’s evil Vladimir Putin, falling in love with China, and making peace with Iran.

But in fact, it is MBS and not the (Shocked! Shocked! Shocked!) Americans who has correctly read the map of the Middle East and perhaps even what is happening in Washington—and from there operates based on what he considers to be Saudi interests.

MBS, not unlike Israel, rejected U.S. pleas to join the pro-Ukraine camp over the Ukraine War. This is not because he opposes America’s alliance of democracies, but because Russia is Saudi Arabia’s key oil partner. Both states have a common interest to keep oil prices high. It is to Russia with love today, but affairs of that kind don’t last forever—as the Russians who were forced out of Egypt by the late President Anwar Sadat discovered.

MBS, like the Israelis, also recognized that, while America continues to maintain a military presence in the Middle East, it isn’t necessary to go to war against Iran to end its nuclear program or to protect Saudi security, regardless of whether the right-wing Donald Trump occupies the White House or the liberal Joe Biden who replaced him.

The evolving Saudi partnership with Israel—green-lighting the signing of the Abraham Accords and raising the possibility of normalizing relations with the Jewish state—was part of a strategy to counter Iran’s threat. The other side of this plan was a series of negotiations—mediated by Iraq and later by China—to reestablish diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic. Flirting with Israel doesn’t necessarily mean a full-blown divorce with Iran, and ending the civil war in Yemen is a good thing, even if China is the one that brokers the deal.

That the economic ties between Saudi Arabia and China—the latter of which receives 40 percent of its oil imports from the Middle East—have expanded demonstrates the extent to which “soft power” can play a role in the strengthening of the diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Beijing, despite the fact that China has been accused to persecuting its Muslim minority—a policy that also doesn’t seem to affect Tehran’s ties with Beijing.

But didn’t “soft power” attain a bad name after Germany’s ill-fated attempt to co-opt Russia failed when it came to Ukraine? The Saudis know that when push comes to shove and Iran violates any deal it signs with Riyadh or goes nuclear, China won’t save it from Iran’s military aggression.

Without all the drama surrounding the Iranian-Saudi handshake, it can be seen as another Machiavellian move by MBS to press Biden and his cadre of progressive Democrats to recognize that the Saudis can dance in three weddings at the same time: Riyadh can maintain its partnership with the United States while constructing one with China and trying to play nice with Iran. And that if the Americans would like to see normalization with Israel going forward, they need to provide Riyadh with more weapons and security guarantees. And, no less important, stop bashing MBS.

Dr. Leon Hadar, a contributing editor at The National Interest, has taught international relations at American University and was a research fellow with the Cato Institute. A former UN correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, he currently covers Washington for the Business Times of Singapore and is a columnist/blogger with Israel’s Haaretz.

Image: Shutterstock.

As Taiwan approaches its next presidential election in 2024, the nation finds itself at a critical juncture, as voters face a choice about Taiwan’s future role in the Indo-Pacific region.

Although both major political parties have yet to decide on their presidential candidate, one emerging area of debate focuses on whether international efforts—particularly those of the U.S.—to support Taiwan's security should be seen as credible and trustworthy. Taiwan’s current Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration, led by President Tsai Ing-wen, has worked closely with the United States and international partners to carefully maintain the cross-Strait status quo and bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

On the other hand, narratives that portray U.S. support for Taiwan with skepticism and distrust have also emerged in Taiwan’s public discourse. While it is unsurprising that commentary from Chinese state media would actively seek to discredit international support for Taiwan’s defense, in recent years, politicians from Taiwan’s largest opposition party, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), have also adopted similar rhetoric. A closer analysis of these misleading narratives can reveal how shifts in public opinion in Taiwan could bring wide-ranging ramifications for regional security.

The KMT’s ill-timed delegation to Beijing

Amid heightened international criticism toward China, lately exacerbated by the Chinese spy balloon incident, the KMT sent a high-level delegation to Beijing led by Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia last month. At a moment when the international community seeks to firmly support Taiwan’s efforts to defend itself against China, the KMT’s actions to build ties with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) send a contradictory and confusing message.

Although the ill-timed delegation claimed to focus on economic issues, the trip also touched upon political statements, such as reiterating the KMT and CCP’s joint adherence to the so-called “1992 consensus”—a formula which the KMT defines as “One China, different interpretations,” but the CCP simply defines as “One China.”

Hsia’s delegation seems to have dispersed any notion that the KMT is trying to detach itself from its “pro-China” image at home and abroad. However, the delegation can only be seen as one of the several indicators that the KMT continues to face internal pressure to prioritize relations with China, as many prominent voices within the party have consistently expressed staunch opposition towards U.S. policies regarding Taiwan on a wide range of issues.

Misleading narratives on international support for Taiwan

Despite a historic background in anti-communism, the KMT has experienced a drastic realignment in ideology in recent decades. Although the KMT once branded itself as a force of stability in Taiwanese politics, today it risks alienating moderate voters as it increasingly adopts hardline narratives that echo Beijing’s views.

In recent years, leading voices within the KMT have often expressed distrust towards international efforts to support Taiwan’s security. Lazy comparisons with Afghanistan or Ukraine have been employed to question the actions of the U.S. or Western democracies in general – either arguing that the U.S. would “abandon” Taiwan in a potential conflict with China, or that the U.S. will somehow use Taiwan as “cannon fodder” against China to further its own interests.

By glossing over major differences in geography and context, KMT hardliners have used inflammatory slogans such as “Today Afghanistan, Tomorrow Taiwan” to argue that the United States cannot be trusted when it comes to statements about Taiwan. Many comments by KMT legislators have focused on comparisons with Ukraine to argue that the United States would leave Taiwan to fend for itself in the case of war with China.

Some discussions involve the spreading of false information through Chinese or Russian-linked sources. In a recent example, a former KMT legislator shared a translated version of a tweet by Radio Sputnik’s Garland Nixon, provoking media controversy and rebuttals from both Taiwan’s foreign ministry and the American Institute in Taiwan—the de facto U.S. embassy. The original tweet read: “White House insiders leak that, when asked if there could be any greater disaster than the neocon Ukraine project, President Joe Biden responded, wait until you see our plan for the destruction of Taiwan.”

On economic issues, the KMT legislative caucus has strongly expressed its opposition against semiconductor giant TSMC's investments in microchip manufacturing in the United States, accusing that the move would “hollow out” Taiwan’s economy. Research by the Taiwanese non-profit group IORG traces the trajectory of how arguments against TSMC’s investments started on Chinese social media platforms as early as 2021. By early 2022, these views were amplified by KMT-leaning media pundits in Taiwan, citing TSMC’s establishment of production lines in Arizona as a sign of impending American abandonment of Taiwan, while receiving extensive coverage by Chinese state media. Cases like this show how the cross-referencing of sources from both sides of the Taiwan Strait can be used to influence public opinion. 

False equivalence on China could destabilize the region

In other instances, the KMT seems to argue for Taiwan to maintain an equal distance between China and the United States. In a telling example, New Taipei City mayor Hou You-yi, seen as a potential 2024 presidential candidate for the KMT, recently said that “Taiwan should not become a chess piece for any powerful country.” Hou’s language echoes views often expressed by Chinese state media, which characterize Taiwan’s partnership with the United States in a negative light and describe Taiwan as a “pawn” instead of a partner.

Many of these comments essentially attempt to present a false equivalence between the United States and China by refusing to choose sides. However, given that China is not a neutral actor in the Taiwan Strait and continues to increase its assertive behavior, a failure on Taiwan’s part to pursue close cooperation with the United States and like-minded democracies would only enable China to expand its military influence in the Taiwan Strait and beyond, while further destabilizing peace in the Indo-Pacific. 

Views skeptical toward international support for Taiwan could erode public confidence in Taiwan’s security and undermine mutual trust between Taiwan and its international partners. This type of reasoning could also weaken Taiwanese society’s resolve to resist China’s encroachment, leading to greater calls for a policy of appeasement on China—which would drastically alter existing geopolitical conditions in the Taiwan Strait.

In this context, visible gestures of support for Taiwan from like-minded democracies remain crucial in reassuring the public; whereas conflicting messages or predictions about Taiwan’s security could lead to confusion, even inadvertently fueling further distrust.

Strengthening peace through close international cooperation

In contrast with the KMT, Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has focused its efforts on building trust with international partners. Over the past seven years, the current DPP administration has relied on several important policy positions which continue to serve as pillars for Taiwan’s security. Among these important guidelines include the preservation of the cross-strait status quo, a firm but cautious approach towards managing relations with China, close alignment with like-minded democracies, promoting a healthy environment for international trade, contributions toward global humanitarian issues, as well as bolstering Taiwan’s defense capabilities through much-needed reforms. 

Remarks by Vice President Lai Ching-te (William Lai), who recently succeeded Tsai as chair of the DPP, indicate that the DPP’s major policy positions on foreign relations and cross-strait issues will remain consistent under Lai’s leadership. The vice president has repeatedly emphasized strong support for Tsai’s “Four Commitments,” a series of principles on managing cross-strait relations announced during the 2021 National Day address. Through remarks following his swearing-in ceremony on January 18 and many other occasions, Lai has made clear his intention to continue Tsai’s stable approach to maintaining the status quo, as well as his willingness to further strengthen Taiwan’s friendship with the international community.

In an era in which autocracies seek to challenge the rules-based international order, Taiwan must not distance itself from longstanding partnerships out of appeasement or cynicism. Countering harmful narratives that seek to discredit Taiwan’s relations with international partners continues to remain an issue of great importance. 

Fei-fan Lin is former Deputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Progressive Party. 

Wen Lii is Director of the Democratic Progressive Party’s local chapter in the Matsu Islands.

Image: Shutterstock.

Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has threatened an invasion of its neighbor and NATO partner Greece. The disputes between the two countries are numerous but lately have settled on the “militarization” of Greek Islands near the Turkish Aegean coast. Turkey claims that the military buildups in the islands are in reaction to Greek violations of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Article 13 of the 100-year-old treaty states that “No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands.” However, the same Article 13 also states that “Turkish aircraft will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands” and that “The Greek military forces in the said island will be limited to the normal contingent called up for military services.” 

Greece’s counterclaim is that Turkey has repeatedly violated its historical treaty obligations through continuous military flyovers and a consistent naval presence in the region. Greece has said that this threatens not only the territorial sovereignty of the islands but also the economic sovereignty of Greece’s continental shelf. While this source of friction brought the neighbors close to war in the 1970s, the two countries largely agreed to try to develop a framework for drilling rights and natural resource extraction in the eastern Aegean.

Over the past year, Turkey has applied increasing pressure on Greece and has adopted aggressive rhetoric. Erdoğan has threatened to strike Athens with ballistic missiles if it insists on “occupying” islands in the Aegean. At the 2023 World Economic Forum, Erdoğan warned the current Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis that Türkiye “may come suddenly one night if they keep acting out” and that “[Mitsotakis] behave smartly or you will see the march of crazy Turks.” These bellicose statements follow other more ominous comments by Erdoğan: “We have only one word to tell Greece: Do not forget Izmir [Smyrna in Greek]” referring to the 1922 bloodletting that occurred when Turkish forces entered the Greek-occupied city of Smyrna. An estimated 100,000 people died in what Greeks have labeled as the “Catastrophe of Smyrna.” It is no surprise that such language alarms not only the Greek public, but also other NATO members.

It is difficult to assess whether Turkey will take the final plunge amid what will surely be a vitriolic reaction within NATO and elsewhere in the international community. But as Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute has made clear, Erdoğan’s government could find it irresistible to use the recent flareup of the islands dispute as a pretext for an invasion. Looming elections potentially furnish Erdoğan with ample material to drum up nationalistic sentiment. Moreover, now that the Turkish courts appear to have prevented Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu from running as a presidential candidate, Erdoğan may feel liberated from the constraints that may have heretofore stayed his hand.

Implications for NATO 

Another conflict between Turkey and Greece would confront NATO with difficult decisions. Turkey’s geopolitical significance cannot be overlooked. Beyond its control of the Black Sea straits, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, it has historically been a platform from which to block Russian penetration of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and from which America has been able to radiate its own influence. Over the last twenty years, Turkey simultaneously adopted a more populist and, given the pathologies of much of the Turkish public, anti-American approach. Since entering office, Erdoğan has empowered grassroots Islamism at the expense of the secular, pro-Western military elite. Similarly, Erdoğan’s adoption of Neo-Ottomanism and the Mavi Vatan sea strategy are at odds with American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Neo-Ottomanism attempts to build a coalition of nationalists and Islamists in Turkey, through the lens of Ottoman grandeur. In this way, a neo-Ottoman outlook offers both domestic groups something upon which they can agree. 

In contrast to souring relations between Washington and Ankara, the United States has vastly improved its relationship with Greece—the other half of NATO’s vital southern flank—since the election of Mitsotakis’ center-right government in 2019. This apparent shift in alliance relations multiplies the incentives for the United States to lean in Greece’s direction should hostilities occur, especially if Turkey is determined to be the aggressor. This appears to have shaped Erdoğan’s perception, with his blunt criticism of a new NATO base in Alexandroupoli, a Greek port sitting astride the Turkish border. This dynamic is further shaped by the diametrically-opposed trajectories of each ally’s domestic institutions, with Greece steadily liberalizing and Turkey moving in a more authoritarian direction. The Biden administration has positioned America to be one of the rallying democracies to oppose authoritarianism globally. A conflict between Turkey and Greece would provide this stance with a severe acid test. 

Geopolitical Impact 

The immediate implications of a Turkish invasion of the Greek islands are unclear. There are no provisions in the North Atlantic Treaty for sanctioning, expelling, or otherwise punishing a member state of NATO. In addition, NATO is constrained by procedure. NATO operates on the principle of unanimity is required, and unity amongst the twenty-nine member states requires compromise. For NATO to take any punitive action against one of its own would require the alliance to improvize its response to a Turkish invasion of the Greek islands. No real precedent exists. The closest analogy is the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. In this instance, NATO was helmed by leaders with clear priorities and strategic concepts which governed their actions—namely, holding NATO’s southern flank together and preventing Soviet penetration of the Eastern Mediterranean. Neither quality is present in NATO’s current leadership, as evidenced by the West’s essentially ad hoc reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in which no political objective has been set forth in spite of substantial efforts to tip the balance of forces in Ukraine’s direction. In the event of a conflict between two member states, NATO’s reaction is more likely to be paralysis than decisive action. 

The inherent ambiguity of the situation is unlikely to quell what will likely be intense international pressure to bring Turkey to heel, not only from within the alliance, but from the European Union as well. European leaders have maneuvered themselves into a position where they are bound to oppose aggression as a matter of principle irrespective of the context in which it occurs. 

Regardless of what NATO might do in reaction to a Turkish offensive, Ankara’s relationship with the alliance is bound to become more estranged, leaving Ankara with few good options. Turkey could potentially even leave the NATO alliance of its own volition, especially if Ankara finds American and European sanctions to be unbearable. Such an eventuality is unlikely, however, as there is no clear incentive for Turkey to make a demonstrative display of its departure from NATO, unless domestic politics demand it. Additionally, Turkey could withdraw from NATO’s command structure, similar to Charles de Gaulle’s symbolic display of defiance in the 1960s. The lack of any formal mechanism for the expulsion of a NATO member and the fact that “leaving” NATO’s command structure is more symbolic than tangible means that a more probable outcome would be Turkey retaining its official position while doing what it pleases, which is hardly a drastic change from its current posture. Turkey’s relationship with NATO is thus more likely to face slow erosion than a clean break. 

The most concerning implication of any diplomatic confrontation between NATO and Turkey is the threat of a deepening bilateral relationship between Ankara and Moscow effectively driving a wedge within NATO’s southern flank, essentially vitiating the purpose of Turkey’s presence in the alliance. Among the permutations such a new relationship could take is the increased sale of Russian weapons to Turkey, including the S-400 missile batteries that have been the source of so much consternation from Washington and Brussels. Ankara has slowly drifted toward Moscow under Erdoğan’s leadership, and the two countries already have close economic and investment ties. Hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens and businesses have invested in Turkey. Indeed, Antalya on Turkey’s southern coast is referred to as “Moscow on the Med.” Caleb Larson has previously covered the dangers posed by Moscow’s increasing presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is this that has the greatest geopolitical implications for the regional balance of power, and which American foreign policy in the region for the last seventy years has been designed to prevent. 

These trends are in part a reflection of Europe’s—and by extension NATO’s—receding coherence as a strategic entity, which the galvanizing impact of the war in Ukraine has partially obscured, but not absolved. Europe’s map is becoming more medieval in its complexion, with regions and subregions forming within NATO. Even the unifying effect of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has proven somewhat conditional, as each member of the alliance appears to be moving at a different pace in rushing to the ramparts of European defense. Turkey, for its part, is beginning to reckon with its newfound geopolitical weight given the recent instability in the Middle East and Caucasus regions and is willing to exploit it at the expense of the alliance to an extent not seen in previous decades. The looming confrontation between Turkey and Greece drives home the need for NATO to regain its bearings and focus on fundamentals. 

A Longer Perspective 

These trends in part reflect the relative decline of American power. Heretofore, the United States has been able to treat NATO as if it were the board of directors of a limited liability company wherein one’s contributions were proportional to one’s influence. Now, ever-greater American arm-twisting is needed to move the alliance in a given direction, while its most powerful members, feeling least in need of the alliance’s protection, feel at liberty to chart their own course when the alliance does not meet their immediate needs. Such is the case with Turkey offering its good offices to broker agreements regarding grain shipments from embattled Ukraine, and even an abortive effort to negotiate an end to the conflict. In other words, the United States can expect more demonstrations of defiance within NATO as its fissures, left latent under the nimbus of two superpowers, become explicit as power relationships across Eurasia begin to shift. 

A Russo-Turkish axis is unlikely to last. They may be tactical allies, but it is difficult to envisage Moscow and Ankara as strategic allies. They are historic foes in the Caucasus, most recently expressed in a massive victory for Turkish arms over Russian ally Armenia in late 2020 (a situation in which Russia was humiliated). A similar pattern was repeated in the early weeks of the Ukrainian conflict. Thus, inherent geopolitical tensions will likely overcome any temporary affinity between the two authoritarian leaders over time. By the same token, Turkey, whatever headaches it may provide American leaders in the region, remains a natural rival of Iran and thus a potential counterweight to Iranian influence in the contest, particularly regarding greater Syria. Even if Turkey is no longer a treaty ally of the United States, this does not mean that the geopolitical basis for their alignment will have simply evaporated.  

A good example is in the nineteenth century, when Britain, a liberal sea power and sympathetic to independence movements throughout the Balkans, nevertheless understood the geopolitical threat posed by Russian expansion at the expense of the decaying Ottoman Empire. Thus, however iniquitous they believed it to be, British leaders concluded that a relatively intact Turkish empire was vital to holding back a Russian drive toward the straits, and ultimately the Middle East. Liberalism was forced to compromise given the geopolitical realities. Britain’s defense of Turkey did not imply any degree of ideological approbation or compatibility of domestic institutions, nor did it require an alliance—the arrangement was pragmatic and conditional. The United States will be obliged to make similar calculations moving forward, wherein Turkey is neither entirely adversarial nor an ally, but something in between.

Brandon Patterson is a national security professional and recent graduate of the University of California, San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy. He is a military analyst with a focus on risk consulting.

Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D. is a lecturer in the Departments of Political Science and Global Studies at California State University, San Marcos, and in the Department of International Business at Kedge Business School. His research interests mainly revolve around global issues, including geopolitics, religion and politics, and comparative political economy.

Image: vaalaa / Shutterstock.com

March 19 will represent the 20th anniversary of the American invasion of Iraq, and already, many complicit in its bloodshed are attempting to rewrite history. From comfortable positions at the American Enterprise Institute, the Hudson Institute, and more, senior Bush administration officials have laundered testimony through mainstream media outlets on how they could not have predicted their project’s failure, or that it was never a failure at all.

For all the attention these efforts to revise the war’s legacy have gotten, they pale in comparison to the precise and concerted effort to mold the perceptions of the American people that occurred before the war. And Iraq War mania can happen again. If we don’t learn from it, a reprise of the febrile atmosphere of 2002–2003 could bring us into crisis with nuclear powers like Russia and China.

A decade of violence set the stage for the invasion. Following the heavy bombardment of Iraqi civilian infrastructure in the 1991 war, American policy toward Iraq in the 1990s focused on aggressive sanctions which immiserated the Iraqi people. Throughout the decade, the threat of American firepower loomed with ongoing combat operations like the no-fly zones and Operation Desert Fox.

Oceans away, the American public soaked in an entertainment-driven narrative through the twenty-four-hour war coverage of the 1991 Gulf War. Playing off this excitement, media baron Rupert Murdoch financed neoconservative Reagan/Bush official Bill Kristol in the creation of The Weekly Standard in 1995. This magazine would provide a loud public voice to the political movement to invade Iraq.

Under Kristol’s leadership, The Weekly Standard would publish cover stories like “Saddam Must Go: A How-To Guide” in 1997 and articles like “Saddam’s Impending Victory” in 1998, all comparing the isolated Iraqi regime to Hitler’s Third Reich. All this well-coordinated political pressure led to the 1998 passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, which declared America’s ultimate intention to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

The catalyst for the invasion was the September 2001 terrorist attack. While George W. Bush was officially focused on combating Al Qaeda directly through the Global War on Terror and subsequent toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, by September 14, just three days after the attack, Bush was rumored to have spoken about “hitting” Iraq. The facts did not support a connection between the 9/11 terrorist attack and Iraq. Nevertheless, with its monopoly on sensitive military intelligence, the federal government worked relentlessly to manufacture new facts.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith’s Office of Special Plans dealt in an effort to collect and circulate intelligence purporting to link Saddam to Al Qaeda, earning him the title of “Architect of the Iraq War.” The administration tasked the TV darling of the Gulf War, Secretary of State Colin Powell, with advocating for an invasion at the United Nations. Mainstream media outlets relished this straightforward path to war in the wake of 9/11.

Neoconservative Max Boot wrote an article in The Weekly Standard called “The Case for American Empire,” in which he compared the American interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Allied triumph over Nazi Germany. Reporting from The New York Times leaned heavily on the inaccurate testimony of Iraqi exiles who strongly supported regime change. The Washington Post editorial board penned a piece entitled “Irrefutable,” referring to the administration’s claims of an Iraq-Al-Qaeda axis and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Former Bush speechwriter David Frum branded right-wing opponents of the war “Unpatriotic Conservatives” in a feature for National Review. All opposition to the war was systemically marginalized.

With print media covered, “talking heads” populated the airwaves in pushing for, and later defending, the invasion of Iraq. Founding fathers of the Iraq effort like Kristol and Stephen F. Hayes appeared frequently on channels like Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, and C-SPAN. Neoconservative pundits and Bush administration officials were even sought by MTV.

Powerful Democrats and center-left public intellectuals also share complicity in the push to war. Left-wing media institutions like The New Republic backed the invasion. Ahmed Chalabi ally Entifadh Qanbar appeared on both NPR and Oprah. Then Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Joe Biden ignored concerns from fellow Democrats about the war. MSNBC host Phil Donahue was fired over concerns over his resistance to the war, as the network prepared for “24/7 war coverage.” Powerful figures did not merely endorse being pro-war—they mandated it.

Contemporary media continues to credential the Iraq War’s loudest cheerleaders as respected voices in U.S. foreign policy, and they employ many of the same suggestions that failed so clearly two decades earlier. Anne Applebaum brands anything short of regime change in nuclear power Russia “appeasement.” Those who led us into conflict in 2003 over nonexistent WMDs now lecture a more cautious public that if they fear nuclear war with Russia, they are apologists for Vladimir Putin.

Perhaps the most dangerous opinion-shaping regards China. Prominent public intellectuals and elected officials are attempting to define a war with China over Taiwan as an inevitability and an obligation. But more Americans are projected to die per day in the first three weeks of a Taiwan conflict than in any prior conflict save World War II. That figure is even optimistic given that it assumes the war won’t go nuclear. Such grim prospects demand a more sober debate than we had before Iraq.

And twenty years after Biden’s role in the Iraq mythology, his team has presented its own “axis of evil”—an existential struggle between democracies and autocracies. While many have addressed the hypocrisy in this, given our reliance on autocracies like Saudi Arabia, the dangerous reality is that these overheated narratives can make democracies behave like autocracies: stifling the open debate that helps democracies avoid disaster.

While autocracies kill or jail dissenting voices, democracies can quietly humiliate and marginalize the opposition, intimidating them into silence and creating a false sense of consensus. The resulting war fever can be widespread—some 76 percent of Americans backed the Iraq invasion. But when the fever broke and the delirium faded, we found ourselves standing in Iraq’s wreckage with no clear way forward. Two decades later, we’re still picking up the pieces.

As a new generation rises, one with no memory of the race to war in Iraq, we must not forget the madness that preceded this terrible blunder. It happened before, and it can happen again.

Patrick Fox is a Program Assistant at the John Quincy Adams Society and the Assistant Editor for Realist Review.

A.J. Manuzzi is a Program Assistant at the John Quincy Adams Society.

Image: U.S. Army Flickr.

L'anarchiste Emma Goldman (1869-1940) défend l'action des bolcheviks avant son expulsion des États-Unis vers la nouvelle Union soviétique. Arrivée à Petrograd avec son ex-compagnon Alexandre Berkman en janvier 1920, elle fait partie de ces libertaires qui sont proches des nouveaux dirigeants russes (...) / Anarchisme, Politique, Histoire, Marxisme, Russie, Révolution russe 1917 - 2018/01

The escalating superpower competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has gone from a trade dispute to a rivalry over the future of world order, technology, and values. Despite both sides being open to dialogue, President Joe Biden has made it clear that the United States will continue to compete vigorously with the PRC, aligning efforts with allies and partners around the world, and creating coalitions with like-minded countries on tech, intelligence, and strategy to counter Beijing.

Many poor countries in the Global South do not want to be caught in the middle of this competition; they want to improve their livelihood and develop their economies. China offers an easy solution via its now infamous “debt trap diplomacy,” where it provides massive loans without pre-conditions on issues of democracy or human rights, unlike the United States. Such loans enable China to influence these countries.

To counteract this, the United States established several coalitions with its partners, such as the AUKUS and the Quad. Creating these coalitions did not go smoothly, and it would be even more challenging to do similar with countries in the Global South. Nevertheless, Washington needs to adjust its strategy to expand its coalitions further. Bangladesh, a natural partner in the Indo-Pacific region, could be an excellent starting point.

Why Bangladesh?

Bangladesh has made remarkable economic progress in recent years, embracing various liberal economic policies under the guidance and support of Western financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the IMF. Bangladesh did take loans from China, but these only account for 8 percent of its foreign debt—unlike its neighbors Sri Lanka and Pakistan, which took on far more. Moreoever, Japan, a strategic U.S. partner, is the leading contributor of aid to Bangladesh.

Politically, Bangladesh has a special relationship with India. Despite efforts made by Sheikh Hasina’s government to normalize relations with Pakistan, Indian-Bangladeshi relations remain solid, which the United States can leverage to keep China at bay. As a Muslim-majority country, Bangladesh can project its principle of “friendship to all, malice to none” not only within the Indo-Pacific but also to the Middle East, creating a bridge between Asia and the Middle East.

Although Bangladesh aims to remain geopolitically neutral, it is very much involved in global politics—though not always by choice. Following the Rohingya crisis in neighboring Myanmar, Bangladesh opened its borders and gave shelter to around one million refugees, who are still living in camps dependent on international aid, almost six years after fleeing their homes. In addition, Bangladesh has participated in peacekeeping operations all over the world, being the leading contributor to peacekeeping officers with more than 7,000 personnel.

But can the United States really bring Bangladesh to engage more with its camp?

There are indicators that such may be possible. For instance, in the past, Washington’s close relations with Pakistan had a cooling effect on Bangladesh. However, with America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, its warming relations with India, and its increasing focus on countering China, the conditions are set for a better alignment between American interests and those of Bangladesh.

Moreover, in the last two months, Bangladesh has experienced firsthand what new the superpower competition looks like. In January, Bangladesh hosted two delegations from China, one led by Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang and another high-level delegation led by a senior Chinese official. This Chinese charm offensive was immediately answered by the United States: in January, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Donald Lu, visited Bangladesh, and in February, an official delegation led by Derek Chollet, held discussions with Hasina on the Rohingya and the Indo-Pacific, among other topics.

But if the United States wants to establish an advantage over China, then a game-changer move is needed. There is an open invitation for Biden to visit Bangladesh, made by Hasina at the last UN General Assembly. President Biden should accept the invitation. Such a visit could not only help provide assurances for protecting democracy and progress in Bangladesh, but could also help position Bangladesh as a valuable partner in the Indo-Pacific region.

Joseph Rozen, the Managing Director of Solaris Global Partners, is a leading expert in international relations, Asian affairs, and National Security. In his prior capacity, he was the director for Asia & Euro-Asia affairs in the Israeli National Security Council. Rozen was a driving force behind the Israeli Foreign Investments screening mechanism and the development of Israel’s bilateral relations with Asian powers.

Image: Shutterstock.

Tunisia is entering a difficult moment. Following the arrest in late January of a labor union official for organizing a strike by tollbooth operators, the government launched a relentless string of arrests against political opponents. The president accused the arrested individuals of “conspiring” against state security and/or labeled them as “terrorists” without in most cases presenting sufficient evidence for the charges.

This has given momentum to a protest movement organized by the trade union, known by its French acronym the UGTT (l’Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens). On March 4, the UGTT reportedly mobilized the largest number of people in any protests against Tunisian president Kais Saied since he took office, with similarly large protests being organized by a coalition of political parties, the National Salvation Front.

There are four imaginable scenarios for how this crisis would be resolved.

First, Saied could voluntarily step down in the face of rising opposition. This scenario is highly unlikely at this stage. In other cases of authoritarian leaders resigning under popular pressure, such as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt (2011) or Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Algeria (2019), important stakeholders upon whose backing these dictators relied influenced their decisions. For instance, Mubarak was urged to resign by the military (and the United States); Bouteflika by the country’s powerful ruling clans. 

In contrast, and particularly since his consolidation of control over the country’s institutions began in July 2021, Saied has appeared increasingly isolated and uninfluencable. Assuming he acts consistently with his prior behavior, he will only continue to deflect blame, regardless of any voices trying to get in his ear or conditions on the street.

Second, and in line with Tunisian tradition, is that Saied could agree to a National Dialogue, as the UGTT is demanding. Most famously, in 2013, following two political assassinations and under deteriorating security and economic conditions, Tunisian civil society—led by the UGTT—organized a National Dialogue for divided political parties to overcome their differences in drafting a new constitution. Through this mechanism, the party in charge of the then-coalition government, the moderate Islamist Ennahdha party, agreed to hand over power to a caretaker government charged with leading the country to new elections.

Unfortunately, there are several reasons to doubt that a similar scenario could unfold today. The context in 2013 was unique: the country was still gripped by revolutionary fervor following the ousting of former president Ben Ali, and there was significant popular demand to stabilize security conditions—for which Ennahdha was largely being blamed. Additionally, the takeover by General Abdelfatah Sisi of the elected Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt that same summer weighed heavily on the minds of Ennahdha leadership, which did not want to suffer the same fate.

Moreover, there was a clear objective around which to organize the dialogue: the finalizing of a new constitution, whose drafting process was launched based on consensus forged through popular mobilization. It is unclear what kind of broadly-agreed roadmap a new dialogue could hash out under current conditions. Agreeing on a new or revised constitution, or holding new legislative elections, wouldn’t make sense given that these were the culmination of Saied’s own unilateral roadmap declared in December 2021, which lacked popular legitimacy despite the fact that Saied still appears to retain a somewhat significant support base. 

Third, a military takeover is possible. This would be a clear departure from tradition in Tunisia, whose first post-independence president, Habib Bourguiba, deliberately cultivated a small and apolitical military. In 2011, the military secured its place as a beloved institution when it reportedly refused to fire on protestors, causing Ben Ali to flee. Since then, the armed forces have continued to enjoy a favorable reputation while also playing a key role in re-establishing security following a rise in terrorist activity between 2011 and 2015.

Under Saied, the military has expanded its prestige as well as its role in politics. The president, who was elected as an outsider without a clear support base, has always needed it as an ally. In July 2021, when tanks and troops blocked MPs from entering the parliament building following Saied’s dissolution of the body, observers grew concerned that the military was abandoning its traditionally apolitical role. All this makes it extremely murky how the military would respond in a situation of heightened unrest.

In the eventuality of a military coup, it is also unclear how those taking charge would proceed. The armed forces would almost certainly want to hand over power to a new civilian government as quickly as possible, but finding a neutral, caretaker government would be difficult given the highly fractured landscape. Even in 2013, when an effective caretaker government under the leadership of technocrat Mehdi Jomaa was established, the selection process was fraught. In the event that the military steps in to prevent violence from spiraling out of control, it is unlikely to be prepared to play such a role. 

Fourth is a prolonged stalemate in which arrests and protests eventually die down and Saied remains in power. This is the most likely possibility, especially given that the outbreak of widespread violence, at least at this point, does not appear imminent. Unfortunately, under this scenario, given that Saied has failed to deliver any meaningful change and will be increasingly concerned with safeguarding his own power, socioeconomic and political conditions will continue to fester and decline.

Given these prospects, Washington must be ready to support Tunisia economically, especially if other lenders don’t come through. It should leverage this economic support to push the president to be more inclusive and widen the base of consensus. A National Dialogue that produces immediate results offers the most hope for calming the protests and allowing longer-term plans to be put in place.

Tunisia’s current crisis only represents the tip of the iceberg, as the entire North Africa/Sahel region slips rapidly into a state of profound instability. The United States should work with European partners to develop a wider regional plan of political reconciliation, human rights enforcement, economic cooperation, and socio-economic development.

Dr. Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Sabina Henneberg is the Soref Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where she focuses on North Africa. Sabina was formerly a Senior Analyst at Libya-Analysis LLC.

Image: Shutterstock.

As the stalemate in electing a president for Lebanon drags on, tensions continue to simmer across the political spectrum, with clear indications of rising geopolitical concerns. These concerns have brought to the fore the rivalry and complex relationship between the Shiite militant Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The LAF’s commander, Joseph Aoun, appears to be among the most prominent candidates now in the presidential race, if not the lead candidate. 

Several days ago, Lebanese journalist Hassan Olleik, known to be very close to Hezbollah, released a podcast episode in which he directed a very strong rebuking message and harsh words towards Aoun. Olleik criticized the LAF’s participation in the ongoing International Maritime Exercise led by the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, in which Israel is also a participant. This is highly emblematic of the rising tensions between Hezbollah and Aoun and the preeminence of security issues in Lebanese politics.

The strong criticism by Olleik could be a direct message from Hezbollah to Aoun. Olleik claimed that he sent a request to the LAF for comment on the matter, and the army replied that it is only participating in the event as an observer. Olleik believes this was a dubious answer aimed at fooling the Lebanese people. Ultimately, Olleik framed the LAF’s participation in the maritime exercise as a “very dangerous matter,” and further characterized it as an exclusive appeal by Aoun to U.S. demands and pressure that aim to achieve the normalization of relations between most of the Arab world and Israel.

More seriously, on security tensions, almost two weeks prior to Olleik’s podcast comments, Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah threatened the United States in a televised speech on February 14 commemorating the group’s fallen leaders. Nasrallah warned that Hezbollah will respond with the use of its weapons if the Americans seek to create chaos that will push Lebanon into collapse, including going to war with Israel and creating chaos in the entire region. In a prior speech, Nasrallah called for the election of a president in Lebanon “who does not submit to American threats.”

The presidential election crisis in Lebanon has multiple underlying issues, including political divisions, sectarianism, and economic collapse. However, security concerns remain the most pressing, given Lebanon’s complex domestic politics, which are entangled with regional and geopolitical struggles in a volatile Middle East. Most notably, these struggles involve Iran and its proxies, including Hezbollah, on one side, and Saudi Arabia backed by traditional Western allies, including the United States, on the other side. Geopolitics continues to be of paramount importance in the Middle East, especially in light of the evolving global order, which has direct implications for the region.

As Nabeel Khoury writes at the Arab Center Washington DC, the upcoming Lebanese presidential election is primarily being played out against the backdrop of bloc politics. The March 8 Alliance, which is aligned with Syria and Iran, and the pro-Western March 14 Alliance, backed by Saudi Arabia, have been in opposition since the assassination of former prime minister of Lebanon Rafik Hariri in 2005, and the subsequent withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon. While these alliances are not as cohesive as they once were, the March 8 Alliance consists of the two leading parties, Hezbollah, and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, while the March 14 Alliance comprises Sunni Muslim and Maronite Christian parties. Although a dozen independent MPs won seats in Lebanon’s parliament in the May 2022 parliamentary elections, they largely alternate between the two alliances on major issues.

Since the withdrawal of Syrian military forces from Lebanon, the United States has become the primary partner of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). According to the U.S. Department of State, the United States has provided over $3 billion in security assistance to the LAF since 2006, with the vast majority of the aid coming in the form of critical training and equipment. A factsheet issued by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs states that the U.S. security assistance to the LAF is “a key component of US Lebanon policy to strengthen Lebanon’s sovereignty, secure its borders, counter internal threats, and disrupt terrorist facilitation.” The factsheet emphasizes the importance of LAF sovereignty and states that the LAF is “the sole legitimate defender of Lebanon’s sovereignty,” particularly in relation to the presence of Hezbollah as a military threat.

The situation regarding security arrangements in post-civil war Lebanon is paradoxical, as a result of military dualism involving the cohabitation of the LAF and Hezbollah. Although all Lebanese militias that participated in the civil war were disarmed under the Ta’if Agreement that put an end to the Lebanese civil war, Hezbollah was successfully legitimized in the name of “national resistance” against Israeli occupation and later against any future Israeli aggression with the regional backing of Iran and Syria.

The relationship between the LAF and Hezbollah is complex and multifaceted, encompassing military, security, and political aspects. Although both sides have coordinated on security matters since the end of the civil war in 1990, there has been competition between the two military institutions in developing their military power and autonomy.

While there have been a few military incidents between the LAF and Hezbollah that have exhibited friction since the end of the civil war, most recently, the LAF’s handling of the 2019 October 17 protests that erupted throughout Lebanon’s streets against the country’s political establishment including against Hezbollah and its allies, and the army’s role in preventing the advance of Hezbollah- and Amal party-affiliated armed men in Christian Tayoune area in central Beirut during protests that took place in October 2021 and were organized by Hezbollah and Amal to demand the removal of judge Tarek Bitar from the investigation into the August 4, 2020 Beirut port explosion—during which several armed men were killed—have, according to many commentators, heightened tensions between the two rivals.

The likelihood of this rivalry persisting and escalating to undermine the existing military status quo in the future will depend on several factors, most notably the geopolitical competition between regional rival states and the great powers in the Middle East region. However, this is unlikely in the short term, given that sectarianism infiltrates the Lebanese army ranks, and any serious confrontation between Hezbollah and the LAF could lead to divisions within the LAF. Additionally, Hezbollah is reported to maintain a weapons arsenal that outweighs that of the LAF.

In addition, the LAF is currently facing critical financial challenges as part of Lebanon’s severe economic crisis that began in 2019. The World Bank has described Lebanon’s current economic crisis as one of the worst since the 1850s, with three-quarters of the population living in poverty. This has led to the deterioration of Lebanon’s key institutions, including the impoverishment of the Lebanese army and police forces, who are not even able to fund basic operations and fulfill key security functions.

Most recently, in January 2023, the US allocated $72 million to Lebanon to supplement the wages of the LAF and the Lebanese Internal Security Forces for a period of six months, amid the worsening economic situation with the drastic devaluation of the Lebanese pound that has diminished the value of officers’ and soldiers’ wages. According to the U.S. State Department, the United States provided $236 million in military grant assistance to the LAF in the fiscal year 2021.

While there has been previous momentum building in Washington to end U.S. assistance to the LAF, with some conservative House Republicans arguing that U.S. material assistance to the LAF could be diverted to Hezbollah, several politicians and commentators have advocated for continued U.S. support of the LAF. They argue that funding and bolstering the LAF will help build a strong military in Lebanon as an institutional counterweight to Hezbollah. Some have noted that long-term aid has turned the LAF into a competent military force with recently proven battle victories.

For instance, commentators, including Nicholas Blanford at the Atlantic Council, cited the LAF’s recent successes in conducting counterterrorism operations and respective wins against jihadist groups thanks to military aid from the United States. These include the battle of Arsal in August 2014 against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat an-Nusrah (JN), and the Qalamoun campaign from July to August 2017 against ISIL and JN’s successor, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

So far, despite Hezbollah's antagonistic stance against U.S. interests in Lebanon and the region, the group has not interfered with the United States’ support of the LAF, nor made any attempts to stall cooperation. Hezbollah is cognizant of the particular confessional structure of Lebanese society and the entrenched Shia constituency in the army. As a result, any serious confrontation with the LAF is seen as only a remote possibility. Lebanese realpolitik has dictated that no confrontation occurs on either side. The historical precedence of the Lebanese sectarian civil war, which lasted over fifteen years with its dreadful consequences of warring sectarian parties controlling their own areas, is a real lesson. Perhaps, Hezbollah is also aware of the very implausibility of establishing military rule in Lebanon, given its very sectarian nature, where sectarian parties and elites hold sway over society.

Broadly speaking, Hezbollah has consistently praised its security coordination with the LAF as part of the larger goal of defending Lebanon. Although Olleik criticized the LAF’s participation in a maritime exercise, he claimed that the decision was made unilaterally by Aoun, not the LAF. The LAF is a widely popular institution, inclusive of members of all Lebanese sects, that has emerged as an institution of national unity after the Lebanese civil war and subsequent mass defections of officers and soldiers to confessional militias. Lebanon has elected four presidents who were LAF commanders based on the ideals of patriotism and national unity associated with their organization. However, given the recent U.S.-sponsored Abraham Accords and growing normalization of relations with Israel in the region, as well as the collapse of negotiations to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, any new power-sharing arrangement including electing a pro-U.S. army commander as president that undermines Hezbollah’s interests or demand its disarmament is unlikely. Hezbollah perceives Aoun as a potential presidential candidate close to the United States who may compromise the current security balance and lead Lebanon on uncertain terms. According to several observers, unless Hezbollah receives guarantees that Aoun will not interfere in its affairs, it will not nominate or elect him.

Rany Ballout is a New York-based political risk and due diligence analyst with extensive experience in the Middle East. He holds a master's degree in International Studies from the University of Montreal in Canada and a bachelor's degree in Linguistics from Uppsala University in Sweden.

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Public and especially political attention to the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic has not abated and recently increased. A House subcommittee held a hearing on the subject last week, and Republican senators have called on Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines to provide raw materials that underlay the intelligence community’s assessments on the subject.

The community has had insufficient information to reach even a moderately firm judgment about how and where the virus first infected humans. A plurality of member agencies has leaned toward the hypothesis that the pandemic, like many other viral diseases, began with a natural transmission from animals to humans. A minority of agencies have leaned toward the alternative hypothesis involving a leak from a virology laboratory in Wuhan, China. Other agencies have remained thoroughly agnostic and declined to lean either way. No agencies have offered judgments on this question with high confidence, and all agencies agree that both hypotheses are plausible and that China’s lack of cooperation in sharing information has impeded efforts to resolve the question of Covid’s origin.

Recent reports of thinking within the Department of Energy and the FBI have encouraged those favoring the lab leak hypothesis. But the question remains open, among government agencies as well as outside experts.

Before anyone—in politics, the scientific community, or elsewhere—devotes much more time to dwelling on this question, it is advisable to consider how much difference resolving the question would or would not make. Despite the immense worldwide economic and other consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, knowing exactly how the pandemic began makes less difference than the amount of attention devoted to this topic might suggest. It is hard to see how a definitive judgment on that question now would be of any help in further dealing with Covid-19 itself. Potentially there would be some beneficial lessons relevant to warding off or preparing for future pandemics—lessons on, say, how to get early warning of animal transmission or the importance of laboratory security. But this is unlikely to involve new knowledge, beyond what experts on infectious diseases could have told us before Covid-19.

The origin question potentially has implications regarding official Chinese behavior, but the most worrisome scenarios have already been ruled out, even by responsible proponents of the lab leak theory. It is implausible that Chinese leaders would have intentionally unleashed a disease that has wreaked tremendous damage on their own people and economy. Moreover, the scientific consensus about the nature of the Covid-19 virus is that it was not manmade, and not genetically engineered as a biological weapon or for other purposes. Thus, the remaining question about the Chinese is only whether they were sufficiently careful about security at a lab in Wuhan that was conducting research on viruses.

The origin of Covid-19 is very much a technical question, but American politicians have seized it and turned it into a political question. Most of the seizure is by Republicans, including such outspoken partisans as Representative Jim Jordan of Ohio and Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas. This is partly tough-on-China posturing, although Democrats, as well as Republicans, are trying to sound tough on China, in ways that are unhelpful in constructing sound policy.

Another probable motivation for the politicization is to get at Anthony Fauci, whom many Republicans never have forgiven for talking sense that contradicted then-President Donald Trump’s nonsense about Covid, and who has said that the preponderance of evidence favors the natural transmission hypothesis although he is keeping an open mind about the origins of the pandemic. Still, other Republican motivations involve making life difficult for a Democratic administration under whom the noncommittal intelligence assessments have been prepared, as well as making life difficult for the intelligence community itself, part of the supposedly nefarious “deep state” about which Jordan, Trump, and others have fulminated and never have forgiven for speaking other embarrassing truths during Trump’s presidency.

The origin of Covid-19 is hardly the only technical question that has gotten politicized. It can happen with the narrowest and most mundane question. The issue before a House committee in a hearing fifteen years ago was whether baseball star Roger Clemens had used performance-enhancing drugs. Clemens denied that he had. His former personal trainer, Brian McNamee, said that he had injected Clemens with steroids. Facing contradictory testimonies, the factual question before the committee was whether one man had stuck a needle into another man’s buttocks—a seemingly nonpolitical question. But the patterns of belief among committee members followed party lines. Democrats sided with McNamee, the little guy, while Republicans favored Clemens, the wealthy professional athlete. A further probable influence on Republican thinking was that the main report on steroid use in professional baseball—a report that fingered Clemens, among others—had been prepared by a Democrat, former Senator George Mitchell.

An example far more consequential for national policy was the issue of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as part of the George W. Bush administration’s case for invading Iraq in 2003. Much of the WMD question was highly technical, involving matters such as the tolerance levels of aluminum tubes and whether they were suitable for use in centrifuges for enriching uranium. But politicians determined to launch the war—and to use the WMD issue not as a technical question to be carefully explored but instead as one more talking point in their campaign to sell the war—took over the issue. Vice President Richard Cheney declared, in a speech delivered before the intelligence community had even begun work on an estimate on the subject that Congress had requested—that “there is no doubt” that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.

When technical questions get politicized, three harms follow.

First, the policy significance, if any, of the answer to the technical question gets badly distorted. The public as well as politicians come to believe that important policy choices hinge on that answer, even when they should not. The enormous attention devoted to the WMD question at the time of the Iraq War obscured how, even if false beliefs about Saddam Hussein’s unconventional weapons had turned out to be true, the war still would have been a huge blunder. All the mess that followed the invasion—including the insurgencies, the economic dislocation, the birthing of terrorist groups, the regional destabilization, and the American casualties—still would have ensued. And if U.S. forces had faced such unconventional weapons when they invaded, the costs and casualties would have been even higher.

Similarly, U.S. policy toward China should involve careful consideration of many important political, economic, and military matters that are far more significant than security measures at a single Chinese laboratory. There might be good reasons to be tough on China these days, but sloppiness at a lab is not one of them, regardless of how consequential possible past sloppiness might have turned out to be in the case of Covid.

Second, because politicians and the public are simply not qualified to assess many technical questions, for politicians to inject themselves into such assessments will inevitably produce many wrong answers. The public will be fed misperceptions, including ones that are less easily dismissed than Trump’s suggestions about ingesting bleach as a remedy for Covid.

Texas Republican Michael McCaul, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, recently stated that the Biden administration should conclude “what common sense told us at the start—the COVID-19 pandemic originated from a lab leak in Wuhan, China.” It is incomprehensible how the question about Covid’s origins—which is far outside the experience of ordinary Americans and which has tested even the expertise of highly trained virologists and epidemiologists—can be viewed as a matter of “common sense.”

Third, politicization of such issues can corrupt, subtly and even at an unconscious level, the judgments of the experts themselves, especially those in government bureaucracies who ultimately are answerable to political leaders. When the available evidence is fragmentary and uncertain, it does not take much of such back-of-the-mind considerations to influence judgments. The strong preference by leaders of the George W. Bush administration for the analysis of Iraq to come out in a way that would aid the pro-war campaign probably affected the analysis of Iraqi weapons programs in this way. There is no comparable policy imperative in the current administration regarding either China or Covid, and so it is not clear in what direction any political influence would operate on the question of Covid’s origins. But any such influence reduces the chance of getting the correct answer to the technical question at hand.

Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a Contributing Editor for this publication.

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