Diplomacy & Crisis News

La dixième Coupe du monde de rugby à XV se déroule en France du 8 septembre au 28 octobre prochains. Instaurée en 1987, cette compétition a accéléré le passage au professionnalisme en 1995. Un siècle exactement après que les clubs du nord de l'Angleterre ont fait sécession pour pouvoir indemniser leurs (...) / Sport, France, Histoire, Royaume-Uni - 2023/09

« Coup d'État de trop », selon la ministre des affaires étrangères sénégalaise Aïssata Tall Sall, l'intervention des militaires, le 26 juillet dernier à Niamey, suscite une agitation inhabituelle en Afrique et dans le monde. Le Niger est en effet un pays-clé de la lutte contre le djihadisme au Sahel. (...) / Afrique, Niger, Sahel, Coup d'État, Armée, Relations internationales - 2023/09

Après un accident de ski-rando apparemment anodin, Jean-Claude Gast est hospitalisé à Marseille. De là, des questions sur sa capacité à redevenir autonome — à 79 ans, surgissent. Quand la mort approche, le plus important reste de pouvoir choisir. / Bioéthique, Médecine, France - (...) / Bioéthique, Médecine, France - 2023/09

Flambée du pétrole, guerre dite de Kippour, putsch d'Augusto Pinochet : 1973 a marqué le siècle dernier. Pour l'Occident, l'année est restée associée à une grande rupture, celle de « la crise ». La fin des décennies de croissance continue, l'instabilité monétaire, l'envol du prix des matières premières ne (...) - 2023/09

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What the diplomat got right about Russia and the West.

How America can win over the continent.

Repairing military equipment in a high-intensity conflict against a great power competitor should be identified as a gray rhino—a high impact, high probability event that, unaddressed, will lead to dire consequences. U.S. warfighters need a plan to tame this beast, or at least divert it, since the ability to repair equipment in the field will be a significant friction point in any mass great power competition for American ground forces.

The U.S. military’s system was for uncontested logistics, with the ability to conduct depot-level maintenance after evacuating vehicles from the front lines and heavy reliance on a contractor workforce for highly technical repairs. It also relies upon air superiority on the battlefield, which is not a given in combat against a peer competitor. While the Marine Corps published an updated doctrine for logistics in a contested environment in March of this year, it will continue to face the problem of sustaining Marines serving far forward as Stand-in Forces (SIF) or conducting Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations (EABO) in a conflict versus China. Former Commandant Gen. David Berger stated that in a great power war in the Pacific, “It’s just fuel and bullets, that’s what I’m going to resupply. The rest you’re going to have to forage.” These logistical limitations will be acute when repairing damaged military equipment. Absent repairs, it may be impossible for Marines to get back into the fight. Fielding simple and easily repairable weapons and equipment should be a priority for outfitting Marine forces operating within the East Asian first island chain.

Despite disadvantages in size and ammunition supplies compared to the Russian invaders, the Ukrainian military has put up a vigorous defense—and is now on the offensive—through a culture of grit and improvisation widespread throughout the society and its military. One example is Ukraine’s ability to repair in the field by sending mechanics forward, which has proved a combat multiplier. They have successfully repaired donated NATO equipment using parts supplied by the West and leftover Soviet gear by cannibalizing vehicles and using scavenged parts from so-called “boneyards” built up from wrecked equipment. In contrast, a primary problem for U.S. forces is the complexity of the vehicles, weapon systems, and equipment we rely on, frequently making field-expedient repairs impossible. While 3D printing and rapid manufacturing technology may allow for the fabrication of numerous spare parts, even in an expeditionary environment, it cannot facilitate repairs of sophisticated armor nor fabricate semiconductor chips for complicated electronics in devices such as radios, onboard ballistic computers, or guidance systems.

Besides the astronomical costs of many of America’s boutique and exquisite systems, the trade-off between the price of these systems and the systems that can kill them is becoming unsustainable. The Ukrainians have repeatedly demonstrated how cheaper weapons, like the two Neptune anti-ship missiles that sank the flagship Moskva, can destroy top Russian equipment. Russian anti-tank weapons have also made quick work of German Leopards and American-provided Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles. Sophisticated Russian electronic warfare has limited the effectiveness of precision-guided weapons. Adversaries are developing various methods of targeting the U.S. military’s high-tech vulnerabilities, from attacking satellites to eliminating GPS use for navigation or precision guidance to preemptive electromagnetic or cyber-attacks and even malicious code implanted in systems through susceptible supply chains.

U.S. adversaries will not allow it to build up the proverbial iron mountain of logistics, nor will it be easy to evacuate vehicles or bring forward parts via “just in time” (JIT) delivery by ship or aircraft. Both the Air Force and Navy will be fighting their own existential battles versus Chinese advanced ballistic and hypersonic missiles, cyberattacks, and counter-space weapons. Designing rugged, reliable, and simple-to-repair weapons can help keep the Army and the Marines in the fight longer. Weapons design and procurement should take that into account going forward.

One of the reasons that the Afghan air force collapsed was the withdrawal of U.S. contractors. With the air force collapsing, ground units also gave up as they were no longer assured of resupply, medevac, or close air support. The U.S. military made the situation worse by having the Afghans move away from Soviet-era helicopters such as the Mi-17 and transition to the more technical and maintenance-heavy U.S. airframes. The U.S. military may face its own issues in high-intensity conflict, as defense contractors have withheld the intellectual property behind some of the newest systems, such as the F-35, effectively turning them into black boxes that only the contractors themselves can fully understand. American farmers can tell horror stories of the problems encountered with high-tech tractors and their fights with manufacturers such as John Deere over the “right to repair.”

The new Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV), which weighs 20,000 lbs, is too big and heavy to be easily deployed by the Marines amphibiously in the Pacific and can only be air transported by C-130 or larger aircraft. It has also suffered from issues of reliability and maintainability. A major issue that the Pentagon detailed in a 2019 report on the performance of the JLTV is that military mechanics cannot adequately maintain them without field service representatives from the manufacturer. As of mid-2023, the trucks were still not meeting maintenance goals in testing conducted by Marine and Army units.

In the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. automobile production declined by 93 percent. Shortfalls in the supply of semiconductors to auto manufacturers caused production to lag for years. In reality, U.S. car companies initially decreased their orders, assuming consumer demand would plummet. However, by the time they tried to increase their orders, other industries had already replaced them in the queue for chips. 90 percent of the world’s most sophisticated chips are manufactured by one company (TSMC) in Taiwan, which makes TSMC a critical choke point for modern products, including America’s most advanced weapon systems. The U.S. military should hedge against an over-reliance on microchip-powered equipment to minimize scenarios in which it would find itself in the position of Detroit’s “Big Three” or held hostage by whoever controls Taiwan and TSMC. This further highlights the risks of high-tech weapon systems requiring high-tech repair in high-intensity conflict scenarios.

In World War II, the Soviet T-34 boasted a simple design and was easy to build and maintain. Nonetheless, it had excellent armor, maneuverability, and a powerful gun. The tanks the Wehrmacht constructed to counter the Soviets’ main battle tank were in many cases superior but suffered from excessive degrees of complexity—Tiger tanks took one hundred times as long as T-34s to manufacture—and a resulting need for frequent repairs. Therefore, They were unreliable in the existential fighting across the Eastern Front. Quantity is at times preferable over quantity, and adopting a “high-low” strategy, as Admiral Elmo Zumwalt did in the early 1970s because of budget constraints, could not only reduce costs for weapons lost in combat but may also allow greater redundancy with simple systems easy to repair.

Ultimately, it is unlikely that the Army or Marine Corps will move to less sophisticated weapons and equipment predating the semiconductor revolution. Nevertheless, consideration of decreasing systemic complexity, increasing robustness, and reducing the necessity for repairs in likely austere and minimally supported logistical environments should all be given greater attention for procurement efforts going forward.

Christopher D. Booth is a national security professional, served on active duty as a US Army armor and cavalry officer, and was a fellow in the General Robert H. Barrow Fellowship for Strategic Competition and the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Creativity. He is a distinguished graduate of Command and Staff College–Marine Corps University and graduated from Vanderbilt University Law School and the College of William and Mary.

The U.S. military faces a serious challenge. While China and other threats to American interests are becoming more acute, the defense budget and the size of the overall military are relatively static. Plans to field greater numbers of new, more capable platforms, like next-generation ships and aircraft, will take years to materialize. We need a shortcut. Better software that is commercially available might be the answer.

The Pentagon’s Problems…

Acquisition problems have been a long-term bugaboo of the Pentagon, leaving it with fewer planes, ships, and other weapons platforms than commanders and Congress say are necessary for today’s threats. For example, the Navy would like 321 to 372 manned ships for its current responsibilities. At present, it only has around 300. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall looked back on the development of the F-35 fighter—over half a decade of development time and tens of billions of dollars—and characterized it as “acquisition malpractice,” promising to do better with a new bomber under development.

Additionally, the Pentagon faces these challenges during a period of major transition from a force geared toward the counterinsurgency campaigns of the 2010s to deterring major powers, especially China’s fast-growing military. Various officials predict that Beijing could attack Taiwan, likely drawing the United States into conflict, before the end of the decade.

The late Donald Rumsfeld caused controversy when he said “you go to war with the army you have.” He wasn’t actually lamenting the state of the U.S. military; rather, he was observing the fact that changing the composition of the military takes years, especially if change requires building new ships, planes, and other complex platforms.

…Require Digital Solutions

One way America can have a big impact in deterring China rapidly is in the realm of software, especially commercially available software that can be adapted to military needs within months, not years.

Collecting, processing, and securing information better is a way to squeeze additional utilization out of the finite number of weapons systems we have today. Nowhere has this been more evident recently than on the battlefield in Ukraine. Both sides have made far more use of sensors and commercial communications compared to prior conflicts. These have often taken the form of relatively low-tech, quick-to-build, unmanned aerial vehicles. The software to process this information and the design principles to keep it secure have been crucial.

The U.S. military’s leadership understands the need to exploit technology more. For example, Secretary Kendall prescribed seven operational imperatives that included matters like resilient space architectures, optimized command-and-control that works across the military’s branches, scaling up the ability to track and engage moving targets, and communicating in hostile environments where adversaries are poking holes in our networks.

While each of these requirements needs a critical mass of old-fashioned hardware and personnel to match an adversary’s military, they can all be improved quickly with software that is better and more secure than that of the militaries we oppose. Furthermore, the software can often be retrofitted into existing weapons systems quickly and with far less expense than the hardware it is improving. This is especially true if the software can be adapted from the private sector rather than built as a “boutique” product by the government.

Take space for example. Using better software to secure space networks, which soon will include tens of thousands of private satellites in addition to the government and commercial ones already in orbit, can be a way for the U.S. military to understand the battlefield and direct its forces. It can also be necessary to collaborate with less-sophisticated partners. This has also been demonstrated in Ukraine, where commercial satellite imagery has also been used by fighters in near real-time. Government-operated spy satellites may still be the gold standard, but private-sector options are not far behind.

The thousands of satellites that private operators like SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Kuiper are placing into orbit, combined with government-owned satellites, will be a major force multiplier if exploited and secured properly with specialized software. Specifically, older satellites and new satellites need to be upgraded and designed to employ end-to-end encryption, zero-trust software design, and decentralized encryption-key management.

Software can also account for the fact that hardware in space will be disabled through enemy action in wartime, because software is what makes networks adaptable. Software that secures information at the data level means we don’t have to worry about relying on government-only networks. When an enemy inevitably breaches a network or takes out network nodes it won’t matter as much if the military can jump between multiple networks and nodes, whether they are military or commercial satellites, billion-dollar ships and submarines, or cheap drones.

A software revolution can help squeeze more capability out of our existing military force in a timeframe that can actually help deter war with China and other adversaries—and leave us better prepared to defeat cyber aggression that has also become the norm of peacetime. But the Pentagon needs to move fast and make greater use of existing commercial technology to keep an edge.

David Pearah, an MIT-trained computer engineer, is CEO of SpiderOak, a space cybersecurity company.

Image: Shutterstock.

En complément au reportage sur la situation délicate des joueurs en Côte d'Ivoire, Jérôme Champagne explique ce déséquilibre qu'il a pu observer au sein de la Fédération internationale de football (FIFA), dont il fut secrétaire général adjoint puis directeur des relations internationales. / Europe, (...) / Europe, Mondialisation, Sport, Inégalités - 2018/07

Le « défi opérationnel » au Sahel pourrait être relevé par des interventions africaines plus offensives. Le mérite du G5 Sahel est d'impliquer directement les États les plus menacés par l'implantation des organisations djihadistes de la région : Mauritanie, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger et Tchad. / France, (...) / France, Armée, Coopération internationale, Défense, Mali, Afrique de l'Ouest - 2018/07

Les contrats de travail de plus de trois millions et demi d'Italiens seront renouvelés cet automne. Il n'est pas certain que le ralentissement de l'inflation par rapport à l'an dernier et le « plan de relance » élaboré à Rome (3 500 milliards de lires d'investissements publics) suffisent à apaiser les (...) / Italie, Économie, Mouvement de contestation, Syndicalisme - 1975/10

How the United States became a leading exporter of white supremacist terrorism.

Why Beijing seeks to extend the hegemony of Mandarin.

The rise of artificial intelligence and machine learning gives new meaning to the measure-countermeasure dynamic—that is, the continuous evolution of defensive and offensive capabilities. The development of large language models, in particular, underscores the necessity of understanding and managing this dynamic.

Large language models, like GPT-4, can generate human-like text based on the input they receive. They are trained on vast quantities of data and can generate coherent and contextually relevant responses. Large language models hold great promise across a multitude of fields, including cybersecurity, healthcare, finance, and others. But as with any powerful tool, the models also pose challenges.

Bill Gates and other technology leaders have warned that AI is an existential risk and that “mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority.” At the same time, Gates recently posted a blog post entitled, “The risks of AI are real but manageable.” Part of managing AI will depend on understanding the measure-countermeasure dynamic, which is central to the progression and governance of AI development but is also one of its least appreciated features.

Policymakers consistently face the challenge of rapid technological advancements and their associated threats, outpacing the creation of relevant policies and countermeasures. In the field of AI, emergent capability crises—ranging from deepfakes to potential existential risks—arise from the inherent unpredictability of technological development, influenced by geopolitical shifts and societal evolution. As a result, policy frameworks will almost always lag the state of technology.

The measure-countermeasure dynamic arises from this reality and calls for an approach we term “sequential robustness.” This approach is rooted in the paradoxical persistence of uncertainty, influenced by factors such as rapid technology development and geopolitical shifts. Unlike traditional policy approaches, sequential robustness acknowledges and accepts the transient nature of current circumstances. By adopting this perspective, policymakers can immediately address problems with existing policy solutions, examine challenges without current solutions, and continue to study emerging threats. While pursuing an ideal solution is commendable, policymakers must prioritize actionable steps. Perfection is unattainable, but prompt and informed action is an essential first step.

Indeed, sequential robustness offers a reassuring perspective. Regardless of whether AI represents an existential risk or not, this approach reminds us that we are in a cycle of continuous action and reaction. Our focus should be on making the most informed next move. While it’s important to consider the long-term implications of our decisions, we do not need to have all the answers right now—which is a good thing because we certainly do not have them. We do not need to immediately address every AI challenge, just those that are most urgent. As we will discuss, the measure-countermeasure dynamic rarely provides a perfect solution; instead, it creates strategies that delay, deter, mitigate, or reduce harmful outcomes. This continuous cycle of less-than-complete but adaptive solutions characterizes the essence of the sequential robustness approach.

Sequential robustness has played out dramatically in recent history. The stunning rise of aviation made possible the tragic events of 9/11. In response, Congress established the Transportation Security Administration, which introduced the countermeasures of reinforced cockpit doors and intensive passenger screening. The agency later introduced the liquids rule, limiting the volume of liquids passengers can bring onboard, in response to the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot. Later, full-body scanners were introduced in response to the attempted “underwear bomber” incident in 2009.

Similarly, following the anthrax attacks in 2001, the United States took decisive measures to bolster its biodefense capabilities and responses. The Department of Homeland Security initiated the BioWatch program, designed to detect the release of aerosolized biological agents rapidly. Realizing the broad scope of potential biological threats, the United States released “Biodefense for the 21st Century” in 2004, emphasizing a comprehensive approach to tackle intentional bioterrorism threats. This focus was further honed with the emergence of global health threats like SARS and avian influenza, leading to the enactment of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act in 2006, which aimed to ensure the nation’s readiness for a wide range of public health emergencies.

Today, sequential robustness is especially salient given the proliferation of large language models. Malign users could exploit these models to create malicious software or disinformation campaigns. Priority should be given to building ethically driven and robust algorithms while implementing comprehensive policies that deter misuse.

Interestingly, large language models can serve as potent tools to develop robustness. Large language models can be employed to improve code quality and strengthen defenses against cyberattacks. Industry could also use the models to spot disturbing user activity or to automate penetration testing, which simulates attacks to help make computer systems more resilient.

A poignant example of large language models’ potential national security benefit lies in the intelligence failures that preceded the 9/11 attacks. With the information overload and disparate data points at the time, as cataloged in The 9/11 Commission Report, critical dots—like the Phoenix Memo warning about possible terrorists at civil aviation schools, the cautions about Al Qaeda from former CIA officer J. Cofer Black, and the CIA’s “Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in U.S.” President’s Daily Brief on August 6, 2001—failed to be connected. The ability of large language models to parse vast amounts of information and uncover connections that humans could overlook might have prevented these catastrophic oversights through timely countermeasures. 

To address biological threats, international organizations pursue countermeasures such as strengthening international bioweapon conventions, enhancing bio-defense capabilities, and monitoring biotechnology research. Here, too, large language models can contribute by identifying malign activities. The models can also contribute to benign biological causes, such as aiding in the rapid development of vaccines, treatments, and cures.

As in other areas of national security, every countermeasure can lead to new measures from potentially malign users, requiring vigilance and adaptability yet again. Throughout this process, it will be essential that stakeholders at all levels—lawmakers, technologists, researchers, and the public—engage in this dialogue. All have a role in shaping the future of large language models and ensuring a balance between harnessing their benefits and mitigating their risks.

In seeking proactive responses to adversarial actions, red-teaming is an essential strategy. This approach involves simulating potential adversaries’ tactics, which allows defenders to identify vulnerabilities and prepare for potential threats effectively. By integrating red-teaming into the development and assessment of large language models, stakeholders can better anticipate misuse scenarios and formulate suitable countermeasures, thus contributing to a more resilient AI ecosystem.

As the United States progresses through this era of rapid digital advancement, it is crucial to recognize that transformative technologies should not be abandoned due to the risks they pose. Rather, the focus should be on understanding the threats, implementing necessary countermeasures, and continuing to utilize the tools in a safer and more secure manner. The dual role of large language models as both measure and countermeasure highlights the complexity of the challenge while also providing insight into effective management. Acknowledging the measure-countermeasure dynamic offers a valuable framework for addressing challenges, enabling the exploitation of technological innovation, and enhancing national security.

Embracing the sequential robustness framework ensures that our future is not solely determined by today’s developments and decisions. Instead, it will evolve through a series of choices made over time, each informed by updated data and shifting contexts, facilitating risk mitigation and maximizing previously unforeseeable benefits.

Christopher Mouton is a senior engineer at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.

Caleb Lucas is an associate political scientist at RAND.

Image: Shutterstock. 

As the global landscape adjusts to an emerging multipolar world, the United States must expand its diplomatic outreach beyond traditional Transatlantic alliances. This is particularly salient given the impending expansion of BRICS to include new member countries from Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. In this context, Central Asia—comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—is a region long neglected in U.S. foreign policy calculations.

Until its 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington viewed Central Asia as a logistical pathway to its military operations. This narrow viewpoint, however, fails to recognize the region’s broader geopolitical importance.

Bordering Russia, China, and Iran, the U.S. has the potential to become Central Asia’s additional partner for economic cooperation and development. This would give the U.S. strategic leverage in a region surrounded by geopolitical rivals. Long considered a crossroads for trade, Central Asian countries are integral players in several transnational projects and initiatives led by China, Russia, India, Iran, and Turkey. This importance stems from the region's central location in Eurasia and its abundant natural resources, including hydrocarbons and precious minerals. Failing to deepen engagement with Central Asia when the region faces a range of economic challenges would be a missed opportunity for the United States.

Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s largest country, has shown a marked interest in deepening its relationship with the United States. Despite its extensive economic and trade associations with Russia, Kazakhstan has refused to support its neighbor’s invasion of Ukraine. This stance aligns with Kazakhstan’s commitment to the UN Charter and its "multi-vector" foreign policy, which aims to balance relations with multiple powers. Kazakh president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has, on several occasions, publicly expressed his country’s position on the war, reiterating that while Kazakhstan maintains a positive relationship with Russia, it will not sidestep Western sanctions. This nuanced stance highlights Kazakhstan's potential as a strategic partner for the United States in the region.

Washington has much to gain from expanding its soft power influence in Kazakhstan and fostering closer political and economic relations throughout Central Asia.

Firstly, engagement with Central Asia allows the United States to diversify its geopolitical portfolio. The region could serve as a strategic intermediary in conversations with states that traditionally fall outside America's sphere of influence. Given the shifting landscape marked by the war in Ukraine and the expansion of BRICS, Washington is lagging in making diplomatic inroads into the developing world, particularly in comparison to Beijing and Moscow.

With traditional alliances under strain and the emergence of new global challenges, the United States should look beyond its historical partners to diversify its strategic relationships. In this vein, Central Asia presents a reservoir of untapped potential that could be pivotal for achieving American foreign policy objectives.

Secondly, the United States has a strategic interest in enhancing regional connectivity, streamlining supply chains, and optimizing energy routes in Central Asia. There are direct advantages for the United States and its allies, particularly in trade routes that bypass Russia. Last year, the Biden administration initiated the Economic Resilience Initiative in Central Asia. This program aims to stimulate economic growth, develop alternative trade corridors, boost shipping capabilities, and upgrade infrastructure along the Trans-Caspian trade route, which originates in Southeast Asia and China, traverses through Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea, and extends further into European countries. Echoing this sentiment, President Tokayev emphasized in his recent state-of-the-nation address the need for his country to evolve into a transit hub within the Eurasian landscape.

Thirdly, the United States can collaborate with Central Asian countries on global challenges, ranging from regional stability and climate change to global security. For instance, a coordinated effort between the U.S. and Central Asia could go a long way in mitigating threats like extremism and terrorism, as well as curbing the narcotics trade originating in Afghanistan.

For the Central Asian countries, closer engagement with Washington allows them to deepen relations with a global power, which would be particularly valuable in areas such as technology exchange, defense capabilities, and economic development, making it a win-win proposition for all parties involved. It is a welcome development that a bipartisan bill has been introduced to the U.S. Congress to end Cold War-era trade restrictions for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and grant those countries permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status.

The forthcoming C5+1 Leader’s Summit on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly this month presents another excellent opportunity for the United States to deepen its engagement with Central Asia. Established in 2015, the C5+1 platform—consisting of the United States and the five Central Asian countries—aims to foster dialogue and cooperation. With President Joe Biden slated to participate, the summit offers a prime occasion for the United States to strengthen its diplomatic bonds with the countries in the region.

Central Asia’s increasingly strained relations with Russia and growing wariness of Chinese influence have created a timely window of opportunity for the United States to enhance its position through sustained, long-term investment in the region. In the near term, American engagement is likely to concentrate on soft power avenues such as educational initiatives, consumer markets, and tourism, given the enduring relationships that Central Asian nations have with Russia and the expansive infrastructure projects underway by China.

However, looking toward the medium and long term, platforms like C5+1 should be catalysts for strengthening economic and political relationships. Proactive American investment in the education, economy, and culture of Central Asia’s emerging generations could yield significant benefits for the United States for years to come.

Failing to recognize and act on Central Asia's strategic significance would be a missed opportunity for Washington. The region will become a key node in a rapidly developing Eurasian network, linking countries, peoples, and industries. Ignoring this dynamic could leave America on the sidelines, forfeiting the chance to play a significant role in an increasingly important region.

Michael Rossi is a Lecturer in Political Science at Rutgers University of New Jersey and a Visiting Professor at Webster University Tashkent.

Image: Shutterstock.

The Kuomintang presidential candidate lays out a plan to avert war with China.