Diplomacy & Crisis News

President Joe Biden’s approach toward the People’s Republic of China carefully balances on a knife’s edge. On the one hand, Beijing is the pacing threat for national defense and a long-term strategic competitor. On the other, it is an essential partner for tackling existential global challenges like climate change. The White House has paradoxically positioned itself to embrace Beijing in a narrow set of cooperative areas while simultaneously preparing for a protracted security contest because the future is clear as mud.

The United States and China have never “solved” their differences, but they always found ways to manage them. This system no longer operates because China has lost interest in playing, exposing the relationship to increased turmoil and uncertainty. The White House is trying to make the best of a very bad situation and remain flexible to prepare for any scenario that strategic competition may yield, up to and including war.

Diplomacy is the bedrock of international relations. Washington is thus prioritizing strengthening communication channels with Beijing in a bid to help stabilize their turbulent relationship. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s initial March 2021 summit with China was more akin to a verbal fighting match than a diplomatic meeting, ominously setting very low expectations for how relations would unfold over the coming years. Biden’s lone meeting in office with Chinese President Xi Jinping in November 2022 similarly did little to alter this bleak outlook.

Washington confronts the harsh truth that conducting meaningful diplomacy is difficult when the other party does not return the favor. Quite the contrary, Beijing has persistently weaponized high-level talks to signal its displeasure. The Chinese “great wall of pettiness” serves as an imposing barrier to achieving diplomatic breakthroughs. Nevertheless, the White House has put forth an honest effort.

In May, Washington offered for Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to meet his Chinese counterpart Li Shangfu on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Beijing declined, opting instead for a brief handshake. In June, Blinken traveled to Beijing to meet with Xi. Both sides paid lip service to the urgent need for stability, but the trip failed to achieve its core objective—a resumption of military-to-military talks. In July, special climate envoy John Kerry visited Beijing to attempt and broker a climate agreement between the world’s two largest emitters. This too, resulted in failure.

Despite all this talking, China has yet to reciprocate by sending even a single envoy to Washington. White House Press Secretary Jake Sullivan succinctly captured this unfortunate mismatch of effort and results by stating, “[we]… do not view these trips as about deliverables or particular policy outcomes.”

While Beijing’s cold shoulder has frozen diplomatic progress, its malign actions abroad have heated up the U.S.-China security contest and pushed several key actors to Washington’s side. In August, Biden participated in the first-ever trilateral stand-alone summit with the leaders of Japan and the Republic of Korea. The three sides issued joint remarks critical of Beijing and vowed to expand and deepen security cooperation. Notably, they also reaffirmed their commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, widely viewed as the region’s most likely flash point.

The Biden White House has given special focus toward Taiwan as it faces the grim prospect of annexation by China, which claims the self-governing island democracy as a renegade province. On multiple occasions, Biden publicly declared the United States would defend Taiwan if attacked, in contravention of decades of established protocol to remain ambiguous on the matter. Though not a formal change in policy, these statements underscore that a future potential conflict over Taiwan weighs on the President’s thoughts. With this scenario in mind, Washington approved Taiwan for the Foreign Military Finance program, usually used by sovereign states to finance American arms purchases, to go along with a $345 million arms package.

Red Shift Theory posits the universe is expanding in all directions—just like China’s territorial claims, which have brought India, Vietnam, and the Philippines closer to Washington. In June, the United States and India reaffirmed a burgeoning security relationship declaring themselves “among the closest partners in the world.” Pivotally, Washington secured Prime Minister Modi’s commitment to uphold the international rules-based maritime order paving the way for India’s contribution to push back against growing Chinese coercion in the South China Sea.

This September, Vietnam and the United States are expected to upgrade their diplomatic ties to a “strategic partnership” in a classic case of “ the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” This decision is undoubtedly motivated by Hanoi’s desire to retain its political and security autonomy from China. Vietnam is steadily building links with the U.S.-led regional security architecture as indicated by Hanoi’s upgraded ties with the Republic of Korea and announced plans to do so with Australia later this year.

U.S.-Philippine security ties have undergone a fundamental reset in the best way possible. Washinton gained access to nine new bases for joint training with the Philippine Armed Forces and hosted the largest-ever annual combined U.S.-Philippine military exercise this year. In a thinly veiled shot at China’s growing preference for using coercion to enforce its disputed maritime claims with Manila, Washington reaffirmed its commitment to Article V of the 1951 U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty.

However, Washington’s gains in the competition space are not limited to the Indo-Pacific. European attitudes toward China have soured amidst Beijing’s support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, creating opportunities for the United States. In July, all thirty-one NATO member states echoed Washington’s long-stated criticisms of Beijing in a sharp statement condemning Chinese political, economic, and military coercion targeting European allies. China’s failed attempt to portray itself as a neutral party in the Ukraine War also helped push the European Union’s pledge to join the United States in countering Chinese disinformation and anti-market trade practices.

The Biden administration’s approach toward China, while not universally successful, skillfully takes into account the fact that Beijing gets a vote. Leaving the door cracked open for diplomacy provides Beijing an off-ramp to deescalate tensions, but the decision to take it ultimately rests with Xi. The U.S. has led the horse to water but cannot force it to drink. Similarly in the security realm, Xi could easily choose to initiate a conflict over Taiwan or accidentally trigger one over a disputed South China Sea claim.

Strategic competition with China does not mean presupposing war is inevitable, but it does mean doing everything possible to prevent it by acting responsibly and being prepared should it occur. Steering the U.S.-China relations to greener pastures is beyond the control of the White House, Pentagon, or Congress. Until Beijing reciprocates Washington’s diplomatic gestures, strategic competition will lack clearly defined boundaries and the risk of instability will remain ever-present. Given a lack of clear alternatives, Washington’s best bet is to continue hoping for the best and preparing for the worst.

Ryan Bercaw is a Marine Corps veteran with a decade of public service in the U.S. government focused primarily on Indo-Pacific regional security. He completed his Bachelor's degree in International Studies at the American University in Washington D.C. His published works have also appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette and the International Policy Digest. He also speaks Mandarin Chinese.

The views/statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this piece are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or U.S. government. This essay does not imply DoD or U.S. government endorsement or factual, accuracy or opinion.

Washington and Beijing have been taking steps to resume normal diplomatic engagement, which had been largely suspended for several months after the “spy balloon” incident in February. A potential meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in San Francisco in November is widely viewed as the next opportunity to restore some positive momentum to the relationship. To that end, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently met with China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, and Secretary of State Blinken met with Chinese vice president Han Zheng on the margins of the UN General Assembly. 

However, frankly, it is getting increasingly difficult to anticipate any scenario for substantial rapprochement between the United States and China in the near term, if not the foreseeable future. This is because of the structural and historical forces driving their strategic rivalry, the adversarial dynamic of their interactions, and the domestic politics on both sides that thwart mutual understanding and accommodation. These drivers keep pushing both sides—despite their rhetoric about getting bilateral relations back on track—to exchange harsh rhetoric and pursue antagonistic and retributive policies toward each other, fueling competitive tensions and hindering progress toward détente.

The historical context is fundamental. The United States spent most of the past seventy-five years as the preeminent power in the world and got used to taking that position for granted and taking advantage of it. But the end of the Cold War, coinciding as it did with China’s economic rise, began an incremental realignment of the balance of global power and influence that was accelerated by 9/11 and the Global Financial Crisis. The United States has resisted and even sought to deny its relative decline due to these developments. Washington continues to claim global preeminence—especially relative to China’s accumulation of wealth, power, and influence. The Biden Administration’s National Security Strategy states, “The United States remains the world’s leading power.”

For its part, China has been the primary beneficiary of the historical shifts in the balance of power since the Cold War (even though it remains behind the United States in absolute terms by most development metrics). Beijing’s foreign policy for the past generation has aimed to claim what the Chinese see as their rightful place in the world and promote the “reform of global governance” toward a “community of common destiny” that more accurately reflects the twenty-first-century balance of power. This is the agenda for Xi Jinping’s signature “Global Security Initiative,” “Global Development Initiative,” and “Global Civilization Initiative.” Contrary to much commentary, this agenda does not intend to establish Chinese global hegemony—only to maximize China’s international influence and legitimacy and bring global attention to its interests and security. However, it is also intended to move the world beyond U.S. global hegemony. As China’s former top diplomat famously said during the Biden Administration’s first high-level exchange with senior Chinese officials, “the United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength.”

This is essentially the basis for the strategic rivalry and “intense competition” between China and the United States, thus, the backdrop for U.S.-China diplomatic interaction. The Brookings Institution recently hosted an insightful seminar addressing whether this rivalry constitutes a “new cold war.” That depends on how one defines the term and assesses the relevance of the example of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War and whether we view China and the United States as “existential” threats to each other (accurately or otherwise). My own view is that it doesn’t matter whether we call it a “cold war” or not because the strategic rivalry will persist and probably intensify regardless of the semantics.

This dynamic is further exacerbated by domestic insecurities in both China and the United States, which are reinforcing and even inflating perceptions of the threat from the other side. In America, political polarization and dysfunction, racial and ethnic tensions, and the erosion of economic competitiveness have increased a sense of national vulnerability that has fueled the exaggeration of the China threat. In China itself, the economic slowdown and accompanying risk of domestic unrest have heightened Communist Party leaders’ fears of regime instability and foreign subversion—especially from the United States. Both Washington and Beijing now talk increasingly about the growing risks to “national security,” and are expanding their definition of it and their requirements for maintaining it. It is now routine for both sides to perceive and characterize the other as an “existential” threat.

Given these mindsets and mutual suspicions, it is not surprising that both Washington and Beijing are so automatically antagonistic and even adversarial in their approaches and responses to each other. This was amply reflected during the “spy balloon” episode, during which both sides presumed the worst about each other’s actions and intentions and reacted accordingly—at the expense of mutual understanding and de-escalation. 

It continues to characterize and hinder most efforts at resuming constructive bilateral ties. Both sides now routinely blame each other exclusively for the poor state of the relationship. Wang Yi, during his meeting with Blinken in Beijing in June, reiterated Beijing’s view that “the root cause” of U.S.-China tensions is “U.S. misperceptions toward China, which have led to misguided China policies” in Washington. Similarly, the United States generally holds Beijing wholly accountable because of its authoritarianism and its coercive and predatory international behavior. Each side accuses the other of harboring hostile intentions, partly by exaggerating its strategic ambitions. Both sides also accuse each other of not being seriously interested in constructive engagement—perhaps as an excuse for not pursuing the kind of accommodative policies that rapprochement would probably require.

All of this is further reinforced by the paradox that both Washington and Beijing appear to calculate that they have the hard power upper hand and the moral high ground in the relationship. This is because both sides overestimate their relative leverage and underestimate the other side’s. Washington, confident in its relative strengths and its global influence, sees no need to make substantial concessions to Beijing. However, Beijing, weighing its own emerging strengths, relative U.S. vulnerabilities, and the hedging of much of the rest of the world, is not inclined to cede ground. Hence, a contest of wills.

Both sides thus appear inclined to disregard each other’s strategic perspectives. In Beijing’s view, Washington has shown little readiness to acknowledge any legitimate Chinese interests and concerns or to show any empathy for Chinese views of the bilateral relationship. For example, American observers routinely deride Xi Jinping’s statement earlier this year that the United States seeks to “suppress, encircle, and contain” China—without examining how Beijing might get that impression from a wide range of Washington’s actions. These would include export and investment restrictions clearly aimed at hindering China’s economic development; several United States-led multilateral initiatives in the Indo-Pacific (such as the “Quad,” “AUKUS,” and the recent Trilateral summit at Camp David) aimed at pressuring China across its periphery; and explicit calls by many in Washington for “containment” of China.

Also, from Beijing’s perspective, Washington appears disinclined to acknowledge that bilateral tensions are in any way attributable to American actions. An emerging theme in Washington is that the United States moved toward strategic competition with China only because Beijing had become more aggressive and expansive in its ambitions under Xi’s leadership. In a recent interview, scholar David McCourt—who examined the community of American China experts and their impact on U.S. policy over the past decade—deduced that Washington shifted from engagement to competition because of an assessment that changes in China necessitated a different American response. He concluded that the United States is unlikely to return to engagement because “the Chinese seem to have no real interest in changing any of the major actions and things that they are doing that prompted the shift to strategic competition in the first place.” This overlooks both the extent to which Chinese policy shifts responded to American policies and that Washington seems to have no real interest in changing any of its relevant policies or actions.

Beijing, of course, makes it hard to be sympathetic to its perspective. It similarly shows little empathy for the views of the United States and denies any culpability for bilateral tensions. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) acts and reacts in ruthless and offensive ways that both reinforce other countries’ resistance to Beijing’s agenda and undermine their willingness to engage with it. Indeed, Chinese leaders often appear either oblivious or indifferent to how China is perceived internationally. Like Washington’s rejection of the idea that it is engaged in encirclement or containment of China, Beijing appears dismissive of the reputation it has earned with its coercive international behavior, mercantilist trade practices, heavy-handed influence operations, acquiescence to atrocious behavior by other autocratic regimes, and brutal human rights practices at home. The CCP may calculate that it needs to act offensively in pursuit of its interests and security in a hostile international environment or that China has sufficient economic clout that it can afford to alienate other countries. However, its behavior is nonetheless counterproductive to Beijing’s efforts to win global hearts and minds in its pursuit of a “community of common destiny.”

Perhaps most importantly, domestic politics in both China and the United States are making it increasingly difficult to undertake the kind of constructive engagement policies that could avert an escalation of the strategic rivalry to more hostile levels. In Washington, the very notion of “engagement” with Beijing is denounced by those who equate it with a strategy aimed at liberalizing China, which they say has irrevocably failed in ways that compromised U.S. interests and security. In a recent article, scholar Michael Beckley warned against “reengagement” as perhaps “the most dangerous [approach] of all because it neither satisfies Chinese demands nor deters Beijing from taking what it wants by force.” This prematurely dismisses the possibility that it might actually accomplish both. Moreover, despite making a rhetorical distinction between engagement and “appeasement,” Beckley comes close to equating them with each other and with “capitulation” to China. In any event, it is misleading to characterize and reject engagement as a strategy; it is instead best understood simply as a tactic—synonymous with diplomatic interaction—and a necessary mechanism for pursuing American interests.

Yet, it has become politically risky for anyone in Washington to advocate for normal diplomatic interaction with Beijing on the grounds that it is inimical to U.S. interests and rewards Chinese bad behavior. Moreover, China is widely portrayed as a fundamental ideological and systemic challenger to the United States, requiring U.S. policy to adopt an adversarial, “all-of-government” and even “all-of-society” response to confronting the threat it poses. Although this mindset is helping to fuel the antagonism in U.S.-China relations, the delicate electoral balance and political volatility in the United States make it unlikely that any American leader of either party will be prepared in the foreseeable future to assume the political risks of significantly diverging from this approach toward China.

On the Chinese side, Xi faces no comparable electoral constraints. However, historically, Chinese elite politics has been even more potentially volatile, and a growing accumulation of domestic and foreign policy challenges has reportedly left Xi vulnerable to internal criticism, if not latent challenges to his authority or at least his policy direction. Moreover, given the intensity and centrality of nationalism in Chinese politics and the prevailing belief that the United States poses the most significant external threat to China, Xi can ill afford to risk being perceived as “soft” in confronting or responding to that threat. Accordingly, it would be neither politically easy nor personally instinctual for him to advocate an accommodative approach to Washington.

The Taiwan issue is a perfect illustration of all these systemic elements of the U.S.-China strategic rivalry. Historically, it was the linchpin of establishing relations between the United States and the PRC. Now, because of profound changes in the strategic environment and the balance of power in East Asia over the past forty years, the Taiwan issue has become the fulcrum of the U.S.-China competition in the region. Both sides have deemed it a vital interest, and each side blames the other exclusively for heightening the risk of conflict that now prevails across the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, domestic politics in both Washington and Beijing have proscribed a more flexible approach. This stalemate only increases the potential for escalation to a serious crisis or conflict.

So, this is the bilateral strategic context in which Washington and Beijing are ostensibly seeking to build a relationship that will not “veer into conflict.” Both sides see themselves in a zero-sum competition and an existential ideological struggle. The pursuit of détente is considered illusory and a sign of weakness. The United States and China have inflated perceptions about the other side’s strategic intentions. They find it easier to exaggerate the threat, accuse the other side of subverting constructive engagement, and blame the other for self-inflicted vulnerabilities than to consider accommodation or compromise seriously. In any event, domestic politics leaves little room for successfully advocating the latter. Instead, girding for intense competition across-the-board appears to be the only reasonable and viable option. Neither Washington nor Beijing seems able to recognize or be willing to acknowledge all of these symmetries.

It is hard to see the exit ramp that will allow the United States and China to escape this current path toward an adversarial relationship and instead find a way toward reciprocal accommodation and peaceful coexistence. The circumstances are reminiscent of the famous line in the classic film Cool Hand Luke, “What we’ve got here is…failure to communicate.” What can break the cycle of miscommunication, mutual miscomprehension, and mutual recrimination between the United States and China? What could?

Paul Heer is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. He is the author of Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia (Cornell University Press, 2018).

The Horn of Africa has long been synonymous with instability and insecurity, and for good reason. The region has endured numerous conflicts, including the Somali Civil War, the Eritrean War of Independence, the South Sudan War of Independence, intermittent disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and ongoing internal unrest within Sudan and Ethiopia. Eritrea remains the only country in the region that has yet to experience an internal civil war, thanks to the iron grip of its dictator, President Isaias Afewerki, who has ruled for over three decades. However, his reign cannot last forever, and in this region, a succession crisis boiling into a civil war is the norm rather than an exception.

The Horn of Africa has emerged as a magnet for insecurity, with Sudan and Ethiopia currently grappling with significant civil unrest. Somalia, too, faces non-state actors and a lack of centralized authority, while South Sudan is held together by a fragile peace agreement. Surprisingly, the most stable country in the region is Eritrea, a rigid Marxist dictatorship nicknamed the “North Korea of Africa.” The Horn of Africa stands at a crossroads, and the prospect of prolonged internal ethnic, political, and military conflicts in Ethiopia, with a population of 123 million, and Sudan, with a population of 46 million, threatens to engulf the region in perpetual instability. The Horn of Africa can ill afford another failed state like Somalia, and the notion of Sudan or Ethiopia joining the ranks of failed states in East Africa could plunge the region into a lasting quagmire of political, economic, social, and military unrest.

Sudan’s Two Lions

The likelihood of a negotiated cease-fire settlement and a pathway to peace negotiations in Sudan appears slim. The conflict between two key actors, General Abdel Fattah Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, informally known as “Hemedti,” has become a zero-sum game. In the quest for peace, stability, and security, one dominant Nubian lion must rule over Khartoum with an iron fist, relegating idealistic political agendas to the background. If the conflict persists, Sudan’s trajectory could mirror that of Libya, leading it to join the ranks of Africa’s “Mad Max” states, such as Somalia, Libya, Chad, and the Congo.

Military coups in Sudan are as customary as democratic elections in the West, with the country experiencing a staggering thirty-five military coups since gaining independence in 1956. The most successful Sudanese dictator, Omar Al-Bashir, maintained his grip on power for nearly three decades, from 1989 to 2019, by excelling in the art of authoritarian leadership. Al-Bashir manipulated the political landscape through the co-optation of the security apparatus, brutal repression, and the strategic utilization of two opposing organizations: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF, a paramilitary force, was created by the Sudanese intelligence sector in 2013, evolving from the Janjaweed militias with the primary aim of brutalizing and subduing the inhabitants of the Darfur region. Consequently, despite lacking formal military training, Hemedti emerged as the de facto commander of Sudan’s most formidable paramilitary force. 

Astute dictators like Al-Bashir do not maintain power for nearly three decades without political and military acumen. He intentionally designed the RSF as a bulwark against potential threats from the SAF. Yet, Al-Bashir made a critical mistake in the coup-proofing structure of his regime. He assumed that an individual like Hemedti, a power-hungry, morally bankrupt paramilitary leader and a product of the intelligence services, would not survive without the invisible hand of Al-Bashir’s regime, and the web of orchestrated state corruption that sustained both Al-Bashir, the RSF, and the SAF.

Contrary to popular belief, the RSF and SAF collaborated and orchestrated a coup in 2019, not to topple Al-Bashir’s regime or stabilize Sudan’s precarious political, social, and economic landscape but to squelch the nascent democratic movement and eradicate the non-violent political activism that had been gaining momentum since 2013. Dictators and the state apparatus organizations that enable and prolong their rule tend to be paranoid about grassroots democratic movements, especially when compounded by state oppression and economic crises, which can lead to a state’s terminal illness. Consequently, the RSF and SAR preemptively aligned with the populace as part of a power-sharing deal, not to address legitimate grievances but to co-opt, destabilize, and ultimately normalize institutionalized subversion.

The civil war in Sudan diverges significantly from other African civil conflicts due to the size of the SAF, boasting 200,000 military personnel. They are pitted against the RSF, numbering between 70,000 and 150,000. Both factions vie for control of the state, with the vast natural resources of Sudan serving as a critical battleground. The RSF is not only a paramilitary organization; it is a highly profitable illicit business, with its economic reach extending into sectors such as banking, mercenary services, mining (particularly gold smuggling), media, and illegal cross-border trade, enriching Hemedti and his cohorts. Meanwhile, more than a formal military organization, the SAF manages over 200 commercial enterprises, including farming, gold mining, rubber production, and livestock processing. Thus, both belligerent actors are engaged in a resource competition stemming from institutionalized corruption. The multifaceted civil war has seen the breakdown of sixteen attempted cease-fires, resulting in the displacement of 3.7 million people, with more than 15 million individuals facing acute hunger.

As the crisis in Sudan continues to smolder, the likely outcome is a protracted conflict between the two factions. The absence of a dominant actor in both the political and military structure, as well as the lack of a monopoly on violence, creates a window of opportunity for external and non-state actors to exert their power, pushing Sudan in the direction of Somalia and Libya.

Ethnic Regional Militias and the Uncertain Future of Ethiopia

The ongoing ethnic and regional conflict in Ethiopia, involving Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s regime, the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups seemingly found resolution on paper with the signing of the highly fragile Nairobi Agreement on November 12, 2022. However, the resolution failed to bring about much-needed stability,. The enduring ethnic and regional strife among the Amharas, Oromos, and Tigrayans, combined with the resurgent Islamist militant group al-Shabaab and the uncertain actions of Egypt regarding the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam, portend increasing political, economic, and social instability in Ethiopia.

Since coming to power in 2018 following the resignation of his predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn, Abiy Ahmed has consolidated his authority. While he has managed to forestall the balkanization of Ethiopia through the cessation of hostilities with the TPLF, ethnic hatreds continue to simmer. Failed peace negotiations between the Ethiopian government and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLA) exacerbate this threat, particularly given the Oromo population’s substantial size, comprising 36 percent of Ethiopia’s populace. Meanwhile, Abiy Ahmed’s administration grapples with the Amhara militia, Fano, The Amharas constitute the second largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, comprising 24.1 percent of the population.

Somalia has languished without a central government for three decades, with al-Shabaab staging a worrisome insurgency. This poses a significant concern for both Somalia and Ethiopia, as they share a 1,024-mile border. The African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATIMS) will withdraw from the country by December 31, 2024, with 2,000 forces already pulled out in June and an additional 3,000 scheduled to withdraw by September 30. Ethiopia’s precarious situation is further compounded by its proximity to three countries in varying states of instability: Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan. Ethiopia shares borders with all three of these nations, and should they devolve into failed states, the region’s stability will be at grave risk. Adding to these challenges is the potential for Egyptian military actions if Ethiopia’s stability deteriorates further. Egypt may exploit such an opportunity, especially after Ethiopia announced its filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) reservoir.

Ethiopia has long projected an image of unity characterized by a single flag, language, and people. However, beneath this veneer lies a nation historically marred by divisions along ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines. If left unaddressed, these lingering rifts hold the potential to fracture the country from within. To forge a more harmonious future, both the Ethiopian state and its people must confront the difficult history of the Abyssinian Empire and its communist successor state. The path forward demands a transformative approach that prioritizes inclusivity for all Ethiopians while dismantling the remnants of historical ethnic hegemony. Only through such endeavors can Ethiopia hope to cultivate a more unified and equitable society.

The Horn of Africa: Perilous Pathways to Stability

The Horn of Africa teeters on the precipice of prolonged instability. Should Sudan and Ethiopia succumb to this fate, the region faces the grim prospect of decades-long instability. The potential collapse of these two nations, collectively housing a population of over 170 million, carries profound implications for the international economic corridor along the Red Sea, impacting the Middle East and Europe and intensifying migration crises in East and North Africa. Within the Horn of Africa, the situation is markedly fragile. Among the eight countries—Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda—that comprise East Africa, only Kenya stands as a relatively democratic and stable entity. Dictators lead Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, while Eritrea operates under a unique Marxist regime, and South Sudan navigates a perilous path characterized by extreme instability.

Furthermore, the presence of Islamic non-state actors in Somalia, sharing a border with Ethiopia, and Libya, sharing a border with Sudan, adds complexity to an already delicate situation. Neither country can afford the turmoil of an internal civil war. The crises unfolding in Sudan and Ethiopia are not issues that the international community can afford to overlook.

Daniel B. Haile is a writer and East African geopolitical specialist currently serving as an active-duty U.S. Army CBRN Officer. He holds an MA in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M and an MA and BA in International Studies from Texas State University. 

The ideas in this essay are solely those of the author and do not represent the official position of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

Mistaken beliefs in foreign affairs, including ones that are widely held and drive major policies, can persist for a long time. Contrary events sometimes force a re-evaluation of such beliefs, of course, but that depends on the nature and salience of the events. Dramatic, attention-grabbing happenings can suddenly overturn whole ways of thinking, such as how the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor turned many isolationists into internationalists overnight.

Developments that are less dramatic, less sudden, and less salient are unlikely to have much effect on popular beliefs even if their probative value is just as great as some of the more dramatic ones. They simply do not get enough public and political attention to change minds.

This is especially true of parts of the evidentiary record that involve things that do not happen, even though non-events can disprove some beliefs as much as things that do happen. Most people do not have the focus of Sherlock Holmes to draw appropriate conclusions from dogs that do not bark.

So it is with the role of Afghanistan in international terrorism. Americans have had etched in their minds—as a result of the 9/11 attack, one of those highly salient, attitude-changing events—the belief that the status and political future of Afghanistan is a major determinant of whether more Americans will fall victim to terrorism. That belief sustained support for what became America’s longest war, which cost more than $2 trillion and the lives of more than 6,000 Americans, both military and civilian.

Most of whatever that two-decade-long U.S. effort accomplished was accomplished in the first few weeks, with the rousting of the group that perpetrated 9/11 and the ousting from power of the Taliban regime that had been its host. What followed was a long, mission-creeping effort at nationbuilding, the fecklessness of which was demonstrated by the rapidity with which what was built collapsed in August 2021.

Over time, other issues were raised as reasons to continue a fight against a return of the Taliban to power—such as the group’s medieval attitudes regarding the role of women. But terrorism was the issue that, more than any other, sustained support for an ultimately unsuccessful war. The logic was that we needed to fight the bad guys over there so we do not have to fight them at home.

Based on that thought, much of the criticism when Joe Biden’s administration finally pulled the plug on the war in 2021 centered on terrorism. Nathan Sales, who was the State Department counterterrorism coordinator in the Trump administration, declared that the terrorism risk to the United States was going to be “dramatically worse” because “it is virtually certain that Al Qaeda will reestablish a safe haven in Afghanistan and use it to plot terrorism against the United States and others.’’ Republican critics charged that the withdrawal was turning Afghanistan into a “hotbed of terrorists.”

Partisan criticism then was as contrived as such criticism usually is, and in this case, conveniently overlooked that Biden was implementing a withdrawal agreement that the Trump administration had negotiated. But the criticism resonated with many Americans, beyond party affiliation. Polling at the time showed that the great majority of Americans believed that Taliban control of Afghanistan posed a security threat to the United States, with nearly half of those polled believing it to be a “major” threat.

Such a belief had two principal components. The first was that having a geographic safe haven similar to what the Al Qaeda leadership once had is a critical component of whether a group poses a significant terrorist threat. The second was that Afghanistan has a special status as a terrorist haven above all others.

Both of those components are false. As I wrote at the time of the withdrawal:

Of all the factors affecting the ability and willingness of any group to attack the United States, having a place to set up camp in a land thousands of miles away is one of the less important ones. The 9/11 operation itself is an example, having been prepared at least as much in apartments in Hamburg, resorts in Spain, flight schools in the United States, and cyberspace as it was in Afghanistan.

Moreover, I continued, “To the extent that an overseas physical safe haven matters at all, there is nothing unique about Afghanistan. If a group needs some unstable country for a place to pitch its tent, there are numerous other options,” with the closest calls in post-9/11 anti-U.S. terrorism originating in other countries such as Yemen.

I further explained why, considering the Taliban’s history and objectives, a re-establishment of anything like their previous arrangement with Al Qaeda was unlikely. The Taliban’s earlier hosting of Al Qaeda came amid an Afghan civil war in which the Taliban were dependent on what Osama bin Laden’s group could contribute to the fight—a circumstance no longer existent as of 2021. The Taliban is one of the most insular ruling groups in the world, with no interest in international terrorism. The biggest setback the Taliban ever suffered—its ouster from power when the U.S. military intervened in late 2001—was a direct result of a terrorist attack by a group with a presence in Afghanistan. Now back in power, the Taliban have every reason to combat—not to condone—anything that looks like an international terrorist operation brewing on Afghan soil.

More than two years later, it is the scenario I described, not the alarmist one pitched by critics of the U.S. withdrawal, that has turned out to be true. Washington Post columnist David Ignatius recently addressed this subject with a report, partly based on official sources, that describes how the Taliban regime has become a counterterrorism partner “as a matter of self-interest for the mullahs.” Ignatius quotes the head of the National Counterterrorism Center as stating that Al Qaeda “is at its historical nadir in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and its revival is unlikely,” with the group’s ability to threaten the United States from Afghanistan “at its lowest point” since the group moved there in 1998.

Ignatius describes how the Taliban have not only “suppressed any foreign operations” of the small, aging remnants of Al Qaeda in the country but also conducted “a brutal but effective campaign” against the Islamic State branch in Afghanistan, also known as ISIS-K. In the words of former National Counterterrorism Center director Michael Leiter, “We’re lucky, our interest and the Taliban’s interest align” as far as counterterrorism is concerned.

If the alternative, alarmist scenario about terrorism and Afghanistan had come to pass—especially if punctuated by an Afghanistan-originated terrorist attack against an American target—the public and political attention would have been great, no doubt accompanied by “I told you so” declarations from those who in 2021 were talking about Afghanistan becoming a hotbed of terrorists and about the supposed certainty of Al Qaeda mounting anti-U.S. operations from that country.

But the actual situation, offering no single dramatic event, has gone largely unnoticed. As Ignatius aptly puts it, “The villains just seem to have slipped off into irrelevance, with people paying little attention to their apparent demise…The calamitous story appears to be over, but we missed the ending.”

Thus, mistaken beliefs about Afghanistan and terrorism will persist. Those who badly misanalyzed the situation as of August 2021 are not forced to admit their mistakes, and their mistaken beliefs will continue to color much discussion about policy toward Afghanistan today and about how to think of the U.S. withdrawal two years ago. The denouement of the Ashraf Ghani regime at that time exhibited a fragility that would have made messy any withdrawal, however carefully managed. The plug should have been pulled much earlier.

The mistaken beliefs also will infect discussion about counterterrorist policy generally, which is unfortunate in that international terrorist threats to U.S. interests certainly continue.

Paul R. Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. His most recent book is Beyond the Water’s Edge: How Partisanship Corrupts U.S. Foreign Policy. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

Image: Shutterstock.

In the race for control over the world’s energy market, China has set its sights on an unlikely target. Vast discoveries of offshore oil deposits in Guyana have turned the country of barely 800,000 into a global treasure. Given China’s current dominance in the region, the United States would be wise to combat the spread of authoritarian corruption by collaborating with the Guyanese government and investing in the region’s economic development.

Since 2015, a consortium of companies, including ExxonMobil and Hess, began to finance large energy projects that seek to tap into a projected 10 billion barrels of recoverable oil in Guyana. The former British colony’s economy is projected to grow by 23 percent in 2023 thanks to the oil boom and companies like ExxonMobil, which are developing most of the oil platforms.

To get in on this explosive growth, both foreign companies and governments—including China—have stepped up to provide loans for major infrastructure projects. Washington cannot allow China to secure another oil-rich ally in the region by buying up strategic assets in the country. Existing U.S. engagement in Guyana is minimal outside of public health programs. To combat China’s subversive influence, we must work together with established energy companies in the region to build ties with the Guyanese government.

Chinese investment in Guyana stands to yield major dividends for Beijing. China Railway Group, a state-controlled company, is currently building and funding the Amaila Falls hydroelectric plant, expected to produce 1,047 gigawatt hours (GWh) of electricity. China has also taken the lead in funding bridges, roads, and projects in Guyana’s interior to bolster its energy infrastructure. This is the largest roadblock to its economic development, but with Chinese help, it won’t be for long. Multiple Chinese state-owned enterprises have received contracts in the coastal capital of Georgetown to build a new harbor and expand the Cheddi Jagan International Airport. The Guyanese government is even working with Huawei on a smart cities surveillance plan.

It’s no wonder that Guyana’s politicians support Chinese expansionist projects in their country. Guyanese President Mohamed Irfaan Ali expressed support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI), as well as for greater collaboration in the mining, energy, and manufacturing sectors.

However, working with China involves hidden costs in the form of mounting foreign debt for Guyana. Recognizing this, the country’s former Auditor General––Anand Goolsarran––cautioned against accumulating too much debt with China due to the high cost of the harbor and airport projects.

These fears are well-founded: next door in Suriname, a Chinese state bank seized funds when the country could not keep up with debt payments. Opaque clauses and additional interest rates have caused some countries, most notably Sri Lanka, to be unable to pay back Chinese loans, having to exchange crucial strategic or economic assets for debt forgiveness.

While China, Venezuela, and Russia are already deeply involved in Guyana, U.S. engagement is almost nonexistent outside private energy companies. Even worse, the projects that American companies have invested in are mired in geo-political conflict. ExxonMobil just announced its sixth Guyanese project, worth $12.9 billion and projected to produce 250,000 barrels of oil per day. Yet the country’s hundred-year-old dispute with Venezuela threatens to undermine the project.

Though Venezuela has claimed more than 62,000 square miles of Guyanese territory since the nineteenth century, the Maduro regime has recently reignited these claims, which affect thirty of Exxon Mobil’s oil wells. Due to a collapse in oil production from Maduro’s socialist policies, Venezuela needs an economic lifeline to uplift its economy in the face of U.S. sanctions for human rights abuses. Maduro is visiting China this month to try and win economic support; Russia has already provided Caracas with security and economic aid, along with joint military exercises.

Greater collaboration between China, Russia, and Venezuela poses a direct threat to the United States. China has made its intentions clear by sponsoring an intelligence base in Cuba, one of Venezuela’s closest historical allies. Russia has repeatedly helped shore up Venezuela’s regime as well as Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua. If Venezuela were to capitalize on Guyana’s oil boom, then the Russian-backed regime of Maduro could encourage greater drug trafficking in the region, to the detriment of the United States.

The Venezuelan regime already allows cocaine growers and traffickers to operate within the country with impunity. Allowing Venezuela to access Guyanese oil profits via a Chinese state-owned bank or through collaborations with Chinese companies regarding economic development in Guyana would create a strong, anti-American front in South America.

To counter this authoritarian dominance, the U.S. government must build stronger ties with Guyana by ensuring that U.S. energy companies invest the profits gained from this oil boom into the nation’s economy, public education, and standard of living. In this way, the United States can keep Guyanese profits from getting tied up in Chinese debt schemes and ensure that they are instead used to improve the standard of living in Guyana. Championing anti-corruption and closer collaboration with Guyana’s government will benefit both Guyana’s future and America’s diplomatic and security interests.

Roy Mathews is a Writer for Young Voices. He is a graduate of Bates College and a 2023 Publius Fellow at The Claremont Institute. He has been published in the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Law & Liberty.

Image: Shutterstock.

In June, the European Union issued its first-ever European Economic Security Strategy, and this week, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen delivered a powerful State of the Union address. Simply put, the world’s largest trading bloc has a new economic compass and has charted an ambitious new course.  

Considering these developments, it’s hard to fathom that just over two-and-a-half years ago, the EU was on the precipice of launching into its EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. After seven years of negotiations, and having been championed by Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, the agreement was wisely frozen by the European Parliament. After an examination of the new economic security strategy and the detailed points in von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech, it is clear the EU is on a very different course.

In our geopolitical world, nothing is static. With the EU being well known for its bureaucracy and deliberate methods for administering the business of the union, it is interesting how fast the EU has responded to a plethora of new challenges. The thematics behind both the security strategy and the State of the Union speech are complimentary and outline a pragmatic view of the EU’s required responses to today’s economic and geopolitical challenges. The State of the Union address was notably short on diplomatic ambiguity and remarkably high on pragmatism.

Perhaps more than any other event, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been an awakening for the EU. Efforts to wish away the inconvenient truth of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and half-hearted sanctions only encouraged the bully in Vladimir Putin. The ominous clouds of war preceding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were equally dismissed with the desperate hope that it would be a bluff designed to gain some type of concessions. At the same time, China’s role in supporting Russia was recognized for what it was—a threat to the world order, and specifically to the EU. The state of denial is now over. An indisputable change in the global order has been accepted, demanding the EU navigate a new and very different course.

In a changing global economy, the EU’s focus on strengthening competitiveness is inherently related to economic security. Yet to be competitive, it is essential that de-risking be part of the formula. Ensuring resilience across all supply chains to achieve greater diversity in types and sources of critical needs will be a foundational element for moving forward. Promoting technological supremacy while seeking to maintain open markets will not be easy. As a result, a new initiative will be led by former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi to make Europe competitive globally.

The weight of the European market in the global economy has shrunk in the last twenty years from 20 percent in 2001 to 14.5 percent in 2023, while the Chinese economy has grown from 7 percent to 19 percent. Boosting competitiveness is key as the EU economy is forecasted to grow less than 1 percent in 2023, compared to almost 4 percent last year. As von der Leyen acknowledged, there is a critical need for policy changes to improve the ease of doing business for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The true backbone of the European economy, SMEs make up more than 99 percent of businesses and employ around 100 million people.

Tacking the issue of competitiveness will require actions to address the skills shortages that 74 percent of the SMEs are facing. Only by investing in programs that develop human talent can innovation be achieved and sustained. Research and development (R&D) is another area needing immediate attention. Compared to the United States and China, which spend 3.45 percent and 2.4 percent of their respective GDP on R&D, the EU only spends 2.2 percent or $328 billion. Chinese spending in R&D has increased eleven-fold since the early 2000s, reaching $439 billion in 2022. New European investments in automation, robotics, and artificial intelligence will prove to be cost-effective in the long term by providing security and prosperity within the community. However, investment in R&D needs to be structured as a proprietary investment for the benefit of the EU. In this regard, de-risking R&D activities requires a zero-based review of all ongoing R&D agreements between China and EU member states to protect the EU’s competitiveness.

When it comes to de-risking supply chains vis-à-vis China, there is a clear alignment between the Biden administration’s new economic doctrine and the EU’s proposals to establish export controls on specific technologies. Especially in fields such as cleantech, solar industry, and electric vehicles, these controls are based on the U.S. model. While the EU’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) regulation was established to make the European economies better equipped to identify and mitigate the risks of foreign investment to security and public order, it was a direct response to China’s increased influence in the European market using unfair practices and state subsidies. It remains to be seen whether the EU will also follow the lead of the United States in establishing an outbound investment screening mechanism, as it did for the inward FDI screening mechanism. In 2022, we witnessed a sudden increase of European FDI toward the Chinese market, despite slowing overall FDI in China, as EU investment grew by a staggering 92 percent.

While laying out an economic security strategy and a speech may be timely, there are other challenges affecting the state of the union—some acute. The impact of illegal migration in Italy and Greece has been neglected for far too long and needs a quantifiable solution. Without a doubt, the Western Balkans are the soft underbelly of Europe and a flashpoint for nefarious bad actors to cause problems. It’s time for the EU to amplify its efforts and serve as a forcing function to resolve disputes in the Western Balkans. The EU has the expertise and capacity to help advance aspirant countries’ compliance with achieving accession protocols and fast-track their entry into the EU. At the same time, the EU has unlimited tools to promote the rule of law and hold leadership accountable for not taking action that supports their people.

Von der Leyen pointed out that a new generation of voters is entering the stage. This new generation, guided by the wisdom and experience of the current generation of leaders, can achieve great things. This might be a defining point for the EU. Challenging and exciting times lie ahead.

Dr. Valbona Zeneli is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and a Visiting Scholar at the Minda de Gunzburg Center of European Studies at Harvard University.

Joseph Vann is a National Security expert and former Deputy Assistant Director of NCIS.

Image: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com

The United States finds itself in a precarious position as tensions escalate between Canada and India. Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau’s startling accusation that India may have played a role in the death of Sikh separatist leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar on Canadian soil triggered the diplomatic row. The unanimous condemnation of this alleged violation of Canadian sovereignty by the Canadian government and opposition parties prompted Ottawa to expel a senior Indian diplomat, Pavan Kumar Rai, whom Canada claims heads the Canadian branch of India’s foreign spy agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). India vehemently denied the allegations, countering that Canada was diverting attention from separatist terrorism and extremism. New Delhi also expelled a Canadian diplomat in a tit-for-tat move.

The diplomatic tensions were apparent during Prime Minister Trudeau’s visit to New Delhi for the 2023 G20 Summit. Indian prime minister Narendra Modi expressed grave concerns about Sikh “Khalistan” protests in Canada, which he perceived as threatening India’s territorial sovereignty and integrity. Canada has the largest Sikh diaspora population outside Punjab, India. A segment of this diaspora advocates for an independent Sikh majority state known as Khalistan. Prime Minister Trudeau defended these protests as exercises of freedom of expression, assembly, and peaceful protest. He raised the alleged Indian involvement in Nijjar’s killing directly with Indian Prime Minister Modi during the G20 sideline meeting. Furthermore, Trudeau discussed this issue with President Joe Biden, British prime minister Rishi Sunak, and French president Emmanuel Macron at the G20 Summit. It complicates efforts by Canada and its allies to strengthen relations with India to counterbalance China’s rise.

Strategic Partnerships with India

For geostrategic reasons, India has long been considered an indispensable partner for Canada and its allies in their Indo-Pacific strategies. The United States, under the Bush Administration, recognized the strategic significance of India and initiated efforts to build a strategic partnership. One significant milestone in this partnership was the signing of the landmark 2005 India-U.S. nuclear deal. Washington agreed to lift all sanctions imposed on India after its nuclear tests in 1998. This strategic partnership is celebrated as a relationship between the “world’s largest democracy” and the “world’s oldest democracy.” India’s democratic foundations, diverse population, and growing economy are critical for strategic and economic considerations. India’s shared democratic values also serve as a pivotal asset in the ideological competition against authoritarian regimes like China. India’s perception of China as an antagonistic neighbor is vindicated by frequent Chinese incursions into disputed border regions. This threat perception prompts India to participate in Washington’s rebalancing policy actively. In this equation, America relies on India to counterbalance China’s growing assertiveness, while India looks to Washington to bolster its position vis-à-vis Beijing.

Additionally, India is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), comprising the United States, Japan, and Australia. This group of democratic nations serves as a forum for cooperation in countering Chinese authoritarianism. China has vehemently criticized this group, labeling it as Washington’s attempt to encircle and contain China’s rise and calling it an “Indo-Pacific version of NATO.” Concurrently, China seeks to expand its influence in the Southeast Asian and South Asian regions through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

India also holds a pivotal role in Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategic vision unveiled in 2022. In this official document, Ottawa designates China as a “disruptive power” and commits to strengthening relations with Indo-Pacific regional states, specifically focusing on India. The strategy acknowledges “India’s growing strategic, economic, and demographic importance” in pursuing Canada’s geostrategic objectives. Canada committed to negotiating a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with India as part of this strategy. However, following Canada’s allegations, diplomatic tensions have halted negotiations, and Canadian Trade Minister Mary Ng canceled her planned visit to India.

Response of Canada’s Allies

Canada has brought India’s alleged violations of Canadian sovereignty to its closest allies: the United States, Britain, and Australia. It is unlikely that these allies will openly condemn India due to concerns about the impact on their respective relationships with India. The United States expressed concerns over these allegations and called for India’s cooperation with investigations. It was also reported in media that the intelligence for this case is not exclusively sourced from Canada but has been corroborated and shared by fellow members of the Five Eyes alliance, comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These intelligence sources encompass both human intelligence and intercepted communications of Indian diplomats.

President Biden, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly, emphasized the importance of the “Quad partnership with India, Japan, and Australia to deliver concrete progress for the people of the region on everything from vaccines to maritime security.” Should diplomatic tensions between Canada and India escalate further, it will become increasingly challenging for Washington, D.C., to maintain a delicate balance between a NATO ally and an Indo-Pacific strategic partner.

The United Kingdom has announced its intention to continue free trade negotiations with India despite the “serious allegations” made by Canada. Australian Foreign Minister Wong announced that Canberra is “deeply concerned by these allegations” and “We have conveyed our concerns at senior levels to India.” These are all sympathetic but non-committal statements. London, Washington, and Canberra have prioritized forging stronger ties with India, recognizing its strategic significance in the Indo-Pacific region. These states are unlikely to align exclusively with Canada, given India’s continued strategic importance in the context of their Indo-Pacific interests.

The World’s Largest Democracy

India shares democratic values with Western countries, providing common ground for a strategic partnership against authoritarian China. However, in recent years, India’s democratic credentials have come under scrutiny. The Modi government’s pursuit of Hindu nationalism, allegations of minority rights violations, human rights abuses, and restrictions on free media and civil society have raised concerns among Western nations. During Prime Minister Modi’s state visit to the United States in June, the Biden administration faced pressure from lawmakers to address human rights concerns publicly. Seventy-five U.S. senators and members of the House of Representatives wrote a letter to President Biden, urging him to discuss human rights violations with Modi openly. Additionally, during Modi’s address to the U.S. Congress, several left-wing Democrats boycotted the event. The Biden administration opted not to publicly raise these human rights issues due to concerns about their negative impact on bilateral relations.

India’s recent reclassification from a “free” to a “partly free” country by Freedom House carries significant implications. Instead of serving as a champion of democracy to counterbalance authoritarian regimes like China, the Modi government’s policies appear to push India toward authoritarianism. The United States has been building its strategic partnership with India based on shared democratic values. If India continues on this trajectory towards authoritarianism, the very foundation of this partnership could become shaky. Given India’s status as the world’s most populous country, the fifth-largest economy, and possessing one of the most powerful militaries, such a shift could weaken the global order. The United States should hold India accountable for its deviations from democratic values and must not sacrifice its commitment to democratic values for short-term strategic interests.

Looking Ahead

Managing and containing the diplomatic tensions between Canada and India is crucial. Prime Minister Trudeau has clarified that Canada is not “provoking” India and expects full cooperation in the ongoing investigation. However, it is unlikely that New Delhi will readily cooperate with Ottawa. It is important to note that it is equally in India’s interest to improve its relations with Canada and its allies to counter China’s threat. India relies on Western countries as much as they rely on New Delhi. India’s response should ideally involve cooperation in the investigations if it believes it has nothing to hide. Unfortunately, India has chosen an escalatory route, issuing a travel advisory to its citizens in Canada and suspending visa services after vehemently denying Canada’s allegations. In this context, the United States must mediate to ensure that relations between its closest ally and strategic partner remain stable.

Saira Bano is an Assistant Professor of Politics at Thompson Rivers University. Her primary research interests are International Relations theories, great power politics, security issues, the nuclear non-proliferation regime, nuclear weapons concerns in South Asia, and the intersection of domestic politics and foreign policy. She received her PhD from the Centre for Military, Security, and Strategic Studies (CMSS) at the University of Calgary.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Throughout human history, technological progress has translated into military prowess. In most instances, the states that incorporate new technologies more quickly and effectively into their respective militaries have gained a significant advantage over their adversaries. The same is likely to be true for artificial intelligence (AI), with the United States and China currently locked in a competition for global AI superiority. This competition for AI and technological supremacy could very well dictate the future global landscape. 

Although China might disagree with the existence of such a technological competition, the United States firmly believes in it. This was evident in a speech by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks on August 28, 2023. Deputy Secretary Hicks’ speech was significant for several reasons, primarily because it gave valuable insight into the U.S. military’s strategic thinking about China, AI and autonomous systems, and technological innovation.

At the core of Deputy Secretary Hicks’ speech was that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) aimed to have a “data-driven and AI-empowered military.” Although AI has gained mainstream popularity within the past few years, great powers have been looking into the military applications of AI for decades now. From 2014 onwards, when the United States announced its Third Offset Strategy, it has been building the foundation for incorporating AI into its military. The 2021 report by the U.S. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) was perhaps the most telling. The report stated that the DOD was far from “AI-ready” and urged it to heavily increase investment by 2025 and “integrate AI-enabled technologies into every facet of war-fighting.” This same line of thought informed Deputy Secretary Hicks’ speech.

Deputy Secretary Hicks announced the “Replicator Initiative,” which she described as a new DOD initiative to develop quickly and field “swarms of low-cost air, land, or sea drones that could swarm an enemy.” She called it a “big bet” that could counter China’s most significant advantage—the ability to bring a mass of platforms and people to the battlefield. The DOD hoped to leverage “attritable, autonomous systems in all domains—which are less expensive, put fewer people in the line of fire, and can be changed, updated, or improved with substantially shorter lead times.” 

The initiative would focus on platforms that are “small, smart, cheap, and many.” The immediate objective of the Replicator Initiative is for the U.S. military to “field attritable autonomous systems at scale of multiple thousands, in multiple domains, within the next 18 to 24 months,” Hicks said. This statement deserves thorough analysis. 

Firstly, the scale of the autonomous systems is enormous and will apply to various domains. With the United States currently the technological hub of the world, the widespread use of autonomous systems by the U.S. military would likely force other states to adopt such systems to maintain strategic parity. Autonomous systems would likely proliferate to U.S. allies and strategic partners as well.

Secondly, and more importantly, is the stated timeline of the next 18 to 24 months. This is rather alarming, particularly given that issues surrounding AI ethics and regulation have gathered momentum recently. Although the United States claims to follow a “responsible and ethical” approach to AI in its Replicator Initiative, the specified timeline makes these claims hard to believe. However, it’s also important to note that the U.S. military has likely been working on this initiative for quite some time, so it would have specific rules to reduce the risks of incorporating AI in the military. How AI norms and regulations would affect a crisis, however, is a debate for another day.

Even if the United States had been planning such an initiative for years, it now feels confident enough to announce and implement it. Ukraine has acted as a testing ground for using drones and autonomous systems on the battlefield and has clearly demonstrated their power. Russia and Ukraine regularly deploy drones in military operations. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) estimates that Ukraine has lost a staggering 10,000 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) monthly. These drones are helpful for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes, as well as for direct targeting of the adversary’s military and civilian infrastructure.

Deputy Secretary Hicks also directly mentioned China as the sole target for the Replicator Initiative. She added: “We must ensure the PRC leadership wakes up every day, considers the risks of aggression, and concludes, ‘today is not the day’—and not just today, but every day, between now and 2027, now and 2035, now and 2049, and beyond.” She also mentioned that “all-domain, attritable autonomous systems (ADA2) will help overcome the challenge of anti-access, area-denial systems (A2AD). Our ADA2 to thwart their A2AD.” This is a critical point. China’s A2AD strategy focuses on the South China Sea. The United States stating that it would use drones to counter China’s A2AD strategy indicates that it is willing, directly or indirectly, to intervene militarily in the region.

China, on the other hand, holds an entirely different understanding of AI than the United States does. Although China aims to become the global leader in AI by 2030, it has so far remained characteristically secretive about its military incorporation of AI. However, this has not stopped the United States from viewing China’s AI progress as a major challenge to its global leadership.

Ultimately, the future of warfare will be data-driven and AI-enabled, and, in many ways, it already is. However, we must better understand the potential dangers of integrating AI into autonomous military systems. Given the rapid pace of advancements in AI and the importance given to the military applications of AI by major states, the incorporation of AI into the militaries of major states is a matter of when not if. Deputy Secretary Hicks’ speech mentioned the impact of the Replicator Initiative on the speed and scale of the U.S. military. That will likely be the character of future warfare: it will be fought rapidly, and human combatants will operate alongside many autonomous systems. Although this might seem to be a more effective method of warfighting for some, the risk of escalation from autonomous systems might be too great.

Shayan Hassan Jamy is a research analyst in emerging technologies and global power competition. He tweets @shayanjamy.

Image: Shutterstock. 

The United States and its allies face a comprehensive, multidimensional challenge from Xi Jinping’s China. One axis of this unfriendly competition runs through the ballot boxes of the liberal democracies, where the evidence continues to mount that Beijing is seeking to undermine democratic systems throughout the Western alliance.

Take Canada: founding member of NATO, partner in securing North American air defense, and one of the United States’ most important commercial and political relationships. To the extent that Americans think about security vulnerabilities stemming from thoroughly benign Ottawa, it might be related to the air quality from last summer’s wildfires or a wincing memory of learning about the War of 1812, where Canadians disproved of Thomas Jefferson’s optimistic conjecture that conquering our northern neighbor would simply “be a mere matter of marching.”

Beijing appears to have conducted a comprehensive attack on Canada’s political institutions: allegedly meddling in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections with the intent of producing a chaotic Liberal minority government; allegedly targeting critics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Parliament, such as the Tory shadow foreign affairs minister Michael Chong and the New Democracy Party’s Jenny Kwan; allegedly conducting efforts “to build a pliable cadre of politicians in the 2022 local Vancouver elections,” and, particularly shockingly, allegedly trying to recruit and run a candidate against Port Coquitlam, British Columbia’s anti-CCP mayor Brad West, that same year.

This unfolding scandal, the consequence of disquieting, anonymous leaks from the Canadian intelligence services, caught the Liberal government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau flat-footed. It took over half a year before the Trudeau ministry’s sluggish response finally yielded the necessary convening of a 9/11 Commission-esque public inquiry to, inter alia, “examine and assess interference by China, Russia and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, in order to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on” Canada’s 2019 and 2021 elections and “examine and assess the capacity of relevant federal departments, agencies, institutional structures and governance processes to permit the Government of Canada to detect, deter and counter any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada’s democratic processes.” Canada will now embark on a sorely needed public reckoning with the CCP’s electoral espionage, which will hopefully be able to provide conclusions and recommendations well in advance of the country’s next parliamentary elections.

Other U.S. allies have been publicly coming to terms with the threat of Beijing-backed interference. In August, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) took the unprecedented step of issuing a public report giving “the public … access to NZSIS’s consolidated analysis on New Zealand’s threat environment,” particularly singling out “the continued targeting of New Zealand’s diverse ethnic Chinese communities” via “activities carried out by groups and individuals linked to the intelligence arm of the People’s Republic of China.” In sum, Chinese political and election interference is likely to remain an ongoing concern for the foreseeable future.

At a minimum, this means that America and her democratic allies must “develop safety valves for swift and dispassionate reviews of election interference claims” to “speedily vet all interference claims and identify wrongdoers.” One can only hope that Canada’s public inquiry may ultimately show part of the way. (Nor, it must be noted, must other countries wait to learn from the Canadian experience via the public inquiry—Michael Chon testified in Washington about the Chinese party-state’s agenda of “transnational repression.”) But the development of these safety valves is only a first step, a means to an end of devising a real strategy to preclude China’s next move against a Western democratic election.

In his 2008 book Terror and Consent, Philip Bobbitt analogized the struggle against twenty-first-century globalized, networked asymmetric warfare using the concepts of supply and demand, noting that while “most analytic work on terrorism … focused on the demand side … the characteristics and the causes that motivate” terrorists, with the upshot that a strategy focused on driving that demand curve down necessitated a deterrence strategy with all the attendant “retaliatory requirements” of such an approach. Bobbitt argued that this focus ignored ways of reducing “the supply side of terrorism”—the field of risks and targets available to malign actors.

When it comes to handling covert election interference by China and other adversaries, however, the conversation often seems flipped, with a focus on how to control supply by hardening civil society against the effects of such chicanery. In Canada, one such proposal in particular, a foreign agents registry akin to the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act, has been bruited about for several years. No doubt the public inquiry will burrow into “the supply side of election interference,” and make recommendations on the advisability of a registry and other “supply” issues.

But the public inquiry, and any other reviews carried out against the People’s Republic of China’s electoral espionage operations, ought to also address the question of reducing demand. One downside of a supply-side strategy against foreign interference is the risk of going too far. Going to American history, neither the Sedition Acts of 1798 or 1918, nor the domestic anti-communism crackdowns of the 1950s, are fondly remembered for good and sufficient reason. Liberal democracies function best when they maintain “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”

To that end, the public inquiry ought to consider how to restore deterrence against further and future interference in Western elections, such as by signaling to China and other interfering states that efforts to co-opt political activists, launder funds into the Canadian political system, or engage in candidate recruiting is the functional equivalent of an attack on critical infrastructure. The integrity of an election, after all, may well have the same value as the integrity of a bridge or a communications system. If it takes that path, the inquiry ought to also deal with how red lines can be communicated to adversaries and what might be considered a proportionate response. After all, the Chinese do not have similarly situated popular elections that the Canadians (or anyone else, for that matter) can execute a retorsion against.

As a result, such a conversation will ultimately need to bring in all Western governments under the threat of potential Chinese election intervention. What Professor Bobbitt noted in the terrorism context likely also holds true in these circumstances as well: “with respect to global, networked agents … the effective deterrence policy of one target state simply diverts attacks to allied states.” And while public reporting suggests that China only considered, but ultimately declined, to substantially interfere in the 2020 American elections, we should not wait for that shoe to drop in future contests here at home.

Zac Morgan is an attorney specializing in First Amendment and campaign finance law. He previously worked for the Institute for Free Speech, and currently serves as counsel to Commissioner Allen Dickerson of the Federal Election Commission.

The views expressed in this article are his own and do not express an official view of the U.S. government.

Image: Shutterstock.

Longtemps, Singapour a fait figure de modèle de prospérité et de stabilité, inspirant la Chine. Mais la cité, qui a élu un nouveau président de la République — un poste en partie honorifique — le 1er septembre, connaît des ratés : migrants maltraités, hausse du coût de la vie... Le mécontentement populaire (...) / Singapour, Asie du Sud-Est, Chine, Autoritarisme, Société - 2023/09

On-the-ground help will bolster Kyiv without risking escalation.

The West Struggles to Understand Russia—But Can Still Help Ukraine Win.

Oleksiy Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, recently warned attendees at the Kiev Security Forum that “World War III is already underway.” He may be onto something.

The war between Russia and Ukraine began on February 24, 2022. In the first few weeks, it seemed as if the Russians would crush the Ukrainians in a blitzkrieg-style offensive. That prediction was wildly inaccurate. The Russian army was ill-prepared for the mission, and its equipment was far less effective than expected. To say that the morale of its soldiers was not high is an understatement.

By late Spring 2022, the Washington Blob was once again wildly off-base, with experts predicting that Russia would capitulate under the Western sanctions. Those expecting a calamity for the Russian economy learned nothing from Western sanctions on North Korea and Iran—two countries much smaller than Russia that have endured severe sanctions over many years. The sanctions undeniably damaged their economies but didn’t change the fundamental nature of the regimes.

Today, Russia and Ukraine appear locked in a “foxhole” war, similar to World War I, where both sides suffered massive casualties without significant territorial or strategic gains. It seems increasingly likely that this stalemate may last for years. There are several reasons to believe this could be the case.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine appears to have the military capability to defeat the other side. At the same time, neither Vladimir Putin nor Volodymyr Zelensky can quit. If Zelensky throws in the towel, his country will no longer be free, and he will likely fall from power. If Putin quits, he will demolish his image as Russia’s strongman and face challenges to his rule.

Some journalists have predicted that the war’s unpopularity, owing to the high casualty count, coupled with the heavy toll of the sanctions, could turn the Russian people against Putin. This, too, is wildly off-base. Russian history is replete with leaders who imposed enormous losses on the population without paying the price of regime collapse. Major strategic miscalculations by Joseph Stalin and his top brass led to humiliating military defeats to the invading Nazi army throughout Operation Barbarossa in 1941. The Soviets lost vast territory, and their casualties numbered in the millions even before the notoriously bloody Battle of Stalingrad commenced. As Russians still boast today, the hardship steeled the resolve of the Russian army and people, leading to a historic victory over the German invaders.

Of course, none of this means the world is marching toward a total war. But key scenarios still could precipitate a turn for the worst. For example, a collapse of the Russian frontlines (e.g., Ukrainian troops breaking through Zaporizhia, Kherson, and surrounding areas and establishing a significant bridgehead on the Crimea peninsula) could prompt Russia to deploy nuclear weapons (tactical or strategic) to restore the balance. Deputy Chairman of Russia’s National Security Council Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly warned that Russia won’t hesitate to use such weapons if necessary. Similarly, a sudden Ukrainian collapse—leading to the fall of Kiev—may cause the United States and its NATO allies to introduce new, more destructive weapons or even deploy “boots on the ground” to restore the balance. In either scenario, the road to WWIII is not only a scenario for science fiction.

More broadly, a miscalculation by either party could have unintended consequences. For example, a Russian anti-aircraft battery downing a NATO jet fighter crossing from Polish airspace into Ukraine due to a navigational error could push NATO to invoke Article 5. Similarly, if Russian long-range missiles accidentally strike a target in one of Ukraine’s NATO neighbors, causing significant fatalities, Article 5 invocation, again, is not out of the question.

Should another nation-state join the war, it could spark a wider war. During the last eighteen months, thousands of foreign fighters have joined both sides. The situation is reminiscent of the international brigades that fought for the Nationalists and the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). But, as the stalemate persists on the front lines, we may see other nations step in. Belarus, where President Lukashenko has sided with the Russians from the start, is an obvious candidate. Another candidate is North Korea. Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un recently replenished Russian stores of weapons and ammunition from his own arsenals. Kim will likely shed no tears if North Korean troops die in Ukraine, gaining him a more significant role on the world stage.

On the other side of the ledger, it remains unlikely that Western countries like Britain, Germany, or France would dispatch troops to Ukraine. But given the deep historical enmity and suspicion that some Eastern European nations, like Poland, harbor toward Russia, who knows what could happen?

So far, China has attempted to convey a policy of neutrality, even as Beijing helps Moscow behind the scenes. China understands that its current economic crisis is partially related to deteriorating relations with the United States. However, conflict may not be a deterrent for Beijing. The Chinese leadership is actively weighing a war of conquest or forced integration of Taiwan. President Xi Jinping could, at some point, offer the Russians a deal whereby they would back his invasion of Taiwan in exchange for Chinese support against the United States and Europe. While some might dismiss this, it is instructive to remember that the People’s Liberation Army (the largest in the world) is about to enter the fifth and final year of its major modernization plan. If the war between Russia and Ukraine is still raging in 2025, such a scenario may be more realistic. 

Thankfully, there are also good news scenarios that could end the conflict and, therefore, the diminished likelihood of a global conflict. In a sense, Ukraine and Russia have proven their ability to maintain some sort of ceasefire by avoiding an all-out war after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. Relative calm endured through 2022. It wasn’t a complete ceasefire, as regular skirmishes continued in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (where most of the population are ethnic Russians). Still, it was kept (more or less) under control. Thus, both sides might agree to a ceasefire if it means not accepting defeat.

One significant wildcard is former president Donald Trump. If Trump returns to the White House next year, he will likely uphold his promise and cut all aid to Ukraine. He could even apply pressure on his NATO allies to stop their support. In such a scenario, the Ukrainians may reluctantly agree to a ceasefire under disadvantageous conditions. 

While the chances for the war in Ukraine to evolve into a global conflict are not high, they are not nil either. Tensions are high, and European nations are increasing their defense spending. The fear of wider Russian aggression has many of these countries on edge. They understand that as the war drags on, as the casualties mount, and the sanctions pressure grows, the “wounded bear” can become even more dangerous and potentially more prone to miscalculation.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion. He previously served as Prime Minister Netanyahu’s national security advisor and the head of Israel National Security Council (acting).

Lt. Colonel (res.) Boaz Golany is a Professor at the Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, where he has served as a Dean, VP for External Relations & Resource Development, and Executive VP & Director General. His research interests cover diverse areas of applied operations research. He has also served as a board member and consultant to various companies and organizations.

Image: Shutterstock.

It is commonplace to observe that Beijing enjoys control over much of the globe’s rare earth and critical mineral extraction and processing industries. China built this dominance over two decades and is unwilling to give it up. On the other hand, America’s critical minerals supply chains feature extensive vulnerabilities that private enterprise cannot resolve independently. The U.S. government faces a daunting challenge in establishing resilient, competitive, and alternative critical mineral supply chains immune to disruptions and economic coercion.

The United States must cooperate with its allies on critical minerals for two reasons. First, its industries have expansive demands that cannot be met by increased domestic production alone. Second, it does not possess enough mines and accessible deposits of all the critical minerals industry needs.

The U.S. economy’s already extensive critical minerals demand will grow almost exponentially in the coming decades. Demand for lithium, a crucial input in electric vehicle (EV) batteries, is projected to increase by 4,000 percent in the coming decades. 

No single nation can meet the projected global demand for critical minerals on its own. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that fifty new lithium mines, sixty new nickel mines, and seventeen new cobalt mines will be required to meet global demand. These are only three of fifty minerals that the United States now classifies as “critical minerals.”

No nation has enough proven resources to meet this demand, but a few are key. The concentration of minerals is spread worldwide, including in China, Russia, the Congo, South America, and Australia. Many countries with large mineral reserves are strategic competitors or politically unstable.

China currently controls the critical minerals and rare earth marketplace. It is the global lead producer of twenty-nine commodities, including twenty-two metals and seven industrial minerals. It refines up to ninety percent of the world’s rare earth ore.

Where China does not possess a near monopoly, it can control the market through “monopsony”—a market condition featuring one overbearingly and singularly important customer. While it does not produce the most essential battery materials—lithium, cobalt, and graphite—it buys, refines, and exports them to incomparable degrees.

Beijing is using this market power in increasingly coercive ways. It has increased restrictions on its critical minerals exports nine times between 2009 and 2020, more than any other supplier. It has cut off Japanese supply for geopolitical reasons and threatened U.S. defense contractors’ supply chains.

Removing China entirely from global critical mineral supply chains is not economically feasible. But competition is needed. America’s critical minerals supply chains cannot depend on a single nation, especially an unreliable one.

With its unparalleled natural wealth in critical minerals, rare earths, and other vital commodities, Australia has emerged as the key ally to bolster the United States’ security and resilience in this vital domain.

However, Australia needs more capital and foreign investment to transform potential into viable supply chains. To date, Chinese state-owned investors have been more than happy to meet this need. 

As a global region, Oceania alone has outstripped Asia’s mineral production since 2000, and this growth has been driven almost exclusively by Australia. But China was also Australia’s largest buyer—fueling its growth with Australian raw materials. 

The Australian government has already acted to inhibit Chinese ownership of critical minerals mining projects, creating space for capital from the United States and like-minded nations.

Australia’s vastness and lack of funding have left significant natural reserves untapped. It has also left Australia, in mining terms, underexplored. Vast reserves might remain hidden in the Land Down Under. 

The United States is not alone in its demand for critical minerals. Global demand is increasing broadly across large economies, and there will be healthy competition from Japan, the EU, and India. The United States has already begun to deepen critical minerals cooperation with Australia, with President Joe Biden promising to designate Australia as a “domestic source” under the Defense Production Act (DPA), allowing Australia to benefit from the $369 billion Inflation Reduction Act clean energy incentives.

A solid economic incentive exists for mutual investment between Australia and the United States in critical mineral mining, refining, and manufacturing. U.S.-Australia ties are also significant and deepening in other areas, principally in defense through the trilateral AUKUS agreement.

At the 2023 Darwin Dialogue, a one-point-five track dialogue with representatives from the US, Japan, and Australia, a clear message emerged for the way forward. Australian, Japanese, and American governments and industry leaders must work together to develop viable, competitive alternative critical mineral markets that offer products through supply chains secure from domestic policy disruptions and economic coercion.

Dr. John Coyne is Head of the Australian Strategic Policy Institutes Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre.

Henry Campbell is the Coordinator of the Australian Strategic Policy Institutes Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau sparked a diplomatic crisis by accusing India’s government of complicity in the June 2023 murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canada-based Sikh leader, in suburban Vancouver. The Canadian government alludes publicly to supposed intelligence that it neither details nor releases. Trudeau’s publication of the matter comes against the backdrop of declining popularity and a frosty reception at the G20 Summit.

After Trudeau’s comments, both Canada and India expelled senior diplomats from the other’s embassies. Canada has reportedly sought U.S. support in the spat. The Biden administration denies rebuffing Canada, but appears wary of antagonizing India.

Frankly, Biden is right to avoid giving immediate support to Trudeau.

First, there is the problem of Nijjar himself. Canadians may say he simply was a plumber who was a political activist on the side. The reality is more complicated.

Nijjar lived in India for twenty years, during which he joined the Khalistan Tiger Force—a separatist group waging an insurgency in Punjab, an Indian state twice the size of Massachusetts with a population the size of Florida’s.

The Khalistan movement argues for a separate Sikh state, a goal the militants often seek to impose with violence since the majority of Sikhs reject such religious nationalism. In 1997, Nijjar reportedly fled to Canada using a fake passport under the name Ravi Sharma. Police at the Toronto airport arrested him, but he countered with an asylum claim based on alleged police harassment in India. The courts ultimately rejected his asylum claim, but then he sought citizenship based on a marriage to a Canadian woman. Immigration authorities initially rejected this, too, based on suspicion the marriage was fake. But on appeal, the Canadian government awarded him citizenship and a passport.

In 2015, Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency allegedly used Nijjar to help them establish a training camp for Khalistan militants near Mission, British Columbia. India accused Nijjar of involvement in a number of terror acts, including planning the 2007 bombing of a Ludhiana cinema, the 2009 murder of prominent Sikh politician Rulda Singh; a conspiracy to kill Hindu religious leader Kamaldeep Sharma in Jalandhar; involvement in a temple explosion in Patiala in 2010; and a number of assassinations.

In effect, Canada knowingly harbored a person suspected of having plenty of blood on his hands. India is right to be upset by Canada’s tolerance for Sikh extremism. Not only does the country harbor the Khalistan Tiger Force, but it also hosts the World Sikh Organization, Sikhs for Justice, and Babbar Khalsa International, all groups that Indian officials say promote violence and/or have links to foreign powers.

Canada, after all, would be right to be angry if a Quebecois fringe decided the proper way to pursue the goal of Quebec nationhood was to assassinate politicians and bomb cinemas. If such terrorists then based themselves in India, Canada’s rhetoric would be far different.

That might be hypothetical, but the inconsistencies in Trudeau’s approach to violence on his watch are real. Consider the death of Karima Baloch, a Pakistani human rights activist found murdered in Toronto. Canadian police took the lead on the case. Even after suggestions of Pakistani government complicity, Trudeau remained silent.

The Canadians also appear to blame India for what might simply be the manifestation of intra-Sikh violence on their own soil. Nijjar’s death could easily have been reprisal for an earlier killing. In July 2022, two gunmen murdered Ripudaman Singh Malik, a prominent Sikh once accused but then acquitted of the bombings of two Air India flights, in Vancouver.  Malik later became president of a large credit union, served as the chair of two schools, and managed the Satnam Religious Prachaar Society. Nijjar protested the group’s printing of Sri Guru Granth Sahib, a major Sikh holy book, without permission from other Sikh figures. Just days before Ripudaman’s murder, Nijjar led a group of Sikhs to storm one of his schools and seize its printing press. The simple reality is the situation is complex.

Could Indian agents have murdered Nijjar? Certainly, though it does not seem the likely scenario. After Saudi agents killed Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul, Turkey provided evidence to back its claims. That Trudeau is unable to do so suggests he may very well have shot from the hip and politicized an investigation.

Trudeau is cynical. Sikh activists are influential in key swing districts for the forthcoming election. Trudeau might simply have wanted to change the domestic political conversation when he accused India, without recognizing that he would create a diplomatic incident. Fair enough. American politicians do the same thing. Donald Trump promised to make Mexico pay for the border wall he hoped to build. As Senator Barack Obama’s running mate, Joe Biden unleashed a fierce broadside against Afghanistani president Hamid Karzai as a proxy for criticism about George W. Bush’s foreign policy prowess. The U.S.-Israel feud grew after a senior Obama administration official called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu an expletive. In each case, what essentially was rhetoric meant for the domestic audience snowballed into an international incident.

 Trudeau’s broadside against India is likely no different. The U.S.-India relationship is simply too important to sacrifice for the venality of a Canadian politician who increasingly shows himself to be shallow and unserious.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Shutterstock.

Alors que la Russie s'est retirée de l'accord sur les céréales ukrainiennes, menaçant de ce fait les expéditions par navire, Bruxelles tente de maintenir des corridors sécurisés, en évitant que certains États membres ne ferment leurs frontières aux exportations de Kiev. Au-delà du conflit en cours, cette (...) / Accord international, Céréales, Conflit russo-ukrainien 2022- - 2023/09

For Jim Hoge, editing was a form of public service.

Containment didn’t win the Cold War—and it won’t defeat China.

The world is in turmoil. Only thirty years after the fall of the USSR and the collapse of its proxy network in Eastern Europe, a land war is being fought in Europe between a democracy and a dictatorship. 

When the Cold War ended, we could have scarcely imagined that in just three decades we would be where we are now. We know now that the collapse of the USSR in 1991 did not bring about “the end of history” as prophesied. Instead, it bred complacency among the leaders of the Western democracies, great complacency which has sowed the seeds for the current global anti-democratic reckoning. 

Across much of the world, the ideas of a democratic liberal political order, of multilateral international collaboration, and of liberal free-market capitalism are now in retreat. Challenged not by a socialism as an alternative global, and universalist vision, but by an atavistic retreat to nativist, nationalist, and populist politics. This has been affecting both mature democracies and those states that made tentative steps toward a liberal political order in the aftermath of the Cold War. The result has been both a rise of authoritarian regimes, often through the degeneration of what were previously more functional democracies, and the decline of multinational coordination among countries now more likely to stress the primacy of the nation-state as the focus for the formulation of practical policies.

It is thus that in India, Narendra Modi is taking his country closer to Hindu chauvinism. In China, the Chinese Communist Party is ruling with an iron fist and perpetuating a high-technological genocide against the Uyghur religious and ethnic minority. In Europe and its surrounds, Turkey is sliding into autocracy under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Poland removes guardrails to keep its Law and Justice rulers in constitutional check, and Hungary under Viktor Orbán becomes a backchannel for other dictatorships as they shape the continent, before the backdrop of media consolidation, executive corruption, and the destruction of ordinary civil society.

The perplexing development with this anti-liberal backlash, however, is that nation-first chauvinist autocrats are now working together remarkably effectively in order to sidestep or undermine international liberal norms and institutions. In my book, Authoritarian Century, I call this key concept “Multilateral Autocratisation.” The emergent dictatorial systems are more alike than they are different, and they are remarkably good at working together for mutual advantage. Tyrannies of a feather flock together. 

But this development is no accident. This propensity among the autocrats and aspiring autocrats to cooperate with each other has not emerged purely organically. This has been a development that has been cultivated, coordinated, and even often sponsored (in direct cash terms) by powers that have decided that the post-Cold War liberal international order is a strategic threat to their own interests—above all by Vladimir Putin’s regime in Moscow, and the Communist regime in Beijing. 

Now, the two powers are distinct, both in their mode of operation and in the nature of the threat they pose. Moscow’s methods are mostly subversion and destruction—and the most they can produce is chaos. They are no less dangerous for it, but Putin does not have a positive vision of the world to offer anyone else. 

Beijing, on the other hand, does offer a path to an alternative, relatively well-ordered international settlement. It wishes to create a “multipolar world” in which the democracies of the Western alliance are overmatched by the world’s tyrannies. Beijing’s plans to reorientate the global economy along the Belt and Road Initiative are part of this process of building up the economies of the tyrannies and deepening their interconnection. 

Beijing also puts special effort into wresting control of already existing international institutions, which give it authority over global rules and norms, as it seeks to mold these to fit its immediate interests and its vision of the future. It was thus that the World Trade Organization was not able to curb China’s unfair trade practices, that the World Health Organization could not censor China over false COVID data, and thus how the United Nations Law of the Sea could not stop China from expanding in the South China Sea.

The problem with the future offered by China is what it implies for the well-being of billions of people later this century: Beijing supports every kind of political repression that aligns with its interests and has no qualms about carrying out a genocide of its own in its western province in Xinjiang, at the same time as it has utterly crushed the democratic culture of Hong Kong, and it is planning the annexation of the democratic country of Taiwan. As the pressures of climate change will continue to mount as we proceed through this century, Beijing will be responding purely in terms of political advantage, with no regard for human rights or international justice—and this will have life or death repercussions for untold millions of people around the world. 

But the fight over our future this century is not yet settled. Moscow has stumbled in its appalling invasion of Ukraine, and is already greatly diminished internationally. Putin himself may fall, if the circumstances align just right. And Xi has made a number of missteps both in domestic management and in international diplomacy which have set China’s rise back by at least a decade, giving liberal democrats around the world time to regroup. 

This then is the challenge that those of us who care about democracy and human rights have before us most acutely in the coming two decades, but really for the rest of this century: either we allow the international system to once again lapse into a state of complete anarchy, a state in which nations engage in a continuous “war of all against all” between empires and spheres of influence, with the notions of universal human rights and international law falling by the wayside; or we regroup and rebuild the postwar liberal international order which has enabled the most dramatic advancements in the human condition in our history as a species. As the threats of climate change and ecological collapse hang over us, the stakes could not be higher. 

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim is a Director at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington DC and Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College.

Image:  LEE SNIDER PHOTO IMAGES / Shutterstock.com

 

The potential for another border clash between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is becoming more likely as the two countries engage in an arms race. Territorial and water resource disputes characterized previous border clashes in 2021 and 2022. A renewed Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border conflict would be dangerous as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies Turkey and the United States find themselves supporting countries on opposing sides.

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington’s approach to security in Central Asia has become more modest as temporary U.S. military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have been closed. However, the United States is still involved in Central Asian security affairs as, since Tajikistan’s independence, Washington has provided Tajikistan with $330 million in security sector assistance. This sizable sum includes hundreds of vehicles, a comprehensive training center, and border management and customs control support. As a result, the United States has become one of Tajikistan’s top security donors despite Russia being Tajikistan’s most significant security and trading partner.

Meanwhile, pan-Turkic solidarity has prompted Ankara to support Kyrgyzstan in its conflict with Tajikistan by providing it with Bayraktar TB2, Aksungur, and Anka unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Turkey was the first country to recognize Bishkek’s independence and has since placed importance on maintaining stability and development in Kyrgyzstan. Additionally, Turkey can expand its influence among ethnically Turkic countries in Central Asia while Russia is tied up in its war in Ukraine.

With NATO allies supporting opposite sides of a conflict, tensions between Washington and Ankara will unnecessarily rise. Since the early 2000s, relations between the two countries have deteriorated, stemming from differences over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Indirectly competing with Turkey by providing military support to Tajikistan will compromise a troubled but important diplomatic relationship for the United States.

The United States is not directly impacted by security matters in Central Asia, especially after withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. Despite the withdrawal, the United States has been on a mission to preserve the sovereignty of the Central Asian states by working on security cooperation-related issues via the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, and the United Nations. Instead, security matters in Central Asia should be handled by countries more directly affected by unrest in the region.

Russia and China have much larger stakes in Central Asia, with Russia as the most prominent security provider and China as a significant economic investor. Moscow primarily aims to minimize the spillover of “radical Islam,” which it perceives was exacerbated by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Drug trading, human trafficking, illegal migration, and terrorism are Russia’s biggest security concerns in Central Asia. Russia’s security presence serves China as it protects its increasingly large investments in Central Asian transport and energy spheres.

With Russia’s security profile in Central Asia decreasing because of its focus on the war in Ukraine, China has become a more relevant security force in Central Asia. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have been responsive to the Chinese presence in the region, which includes military exercises, military equipment transfers, the construction of security infrastructure, and the deployment of private security companies. The United States risks unnecessarily raising tensions with Beijing by contributing to Tajikistan's security. 

U.S. support for Tajikistan’s defense capabilities is also awkward due to Tajikistan’s recent security cooperation efforts with Iran. Similar to Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, Iran and Tajikistan share ethnic and linguistic ties. In May 2022, Iran inaugurated its first drone production facility in Tajikistan, which will manufacture and export the multipurpose Ababil-2 drones. This year, Iran became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Eurasian political, economic, international security, and defense organization established by China and Russia. As a result, Tehran and Dushanbe will likely engage in further security cooperation.

The United States has little control over how its military resources are used once they are handed over to a foreign government. While the United States does not intend to support Tajikistan in its conflict with Kyrgyzstan, much of its equipment, such as night-vision goggles, has been utilized in the Kyrgyz-Tajik hot zone. Instead of needlessly contributing to escalating tensions in Central Asia, the United States should work with Turkey to encourage diplomatic talks between Bishkek and Dushanbe. As mutual NATO members, the United States and Turkey have the opportunity to avoid a plummet in relations by putting to rest a minor conflict of little strategic importance to Washington. 

Lastly, the United States should work to reduce and ultimately eliminate programs to send military equipment to Central Asian countries, including Tajikistan. With significant Russian and Chinese security presence and military assets in Tajikistan, Dushanbe has the means to defend itself. The United States has no justified reason to do Russia and China’s job by providing for Tajikistan’s defense. 

The United States should leave security matters in Central Asia to regional great powers, namely Russia and China. While the United States has been involved militarily in Central Asia, now is the time to recharacterize its engagement in the region by further distancing itself from this militaristic past.

Alex Little is an MS graduate of Georgia Tech and specializes in Russian and Central Asian affairs.

Image: Shutterstock.