Diplomacy & Crisis News

The Biden administration faces a massive foreign policy vulnerability because it has shown weakness in the face of multiple forms of Communist China’s aggression—and none more serious than espionage.

Chinese espionage and covert influence are likely only to increase as the 2024 presidential campaign heats up, as the U.S. government becomes less and less inclined to take bold action in advance of an election. 

China recruits spies inside the United States, including members of our military. In August, two Navy sailors were arrested for passing sensitive military information to Chinese intelligence.

One of the sailors was still a Chinese citizen when he enlisted in the Navy, making him a prime target for Chinese intelligence officers, who falsely believe that every individual of Chinese ethnic descent owes a duty of loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party.

China also sends operatives to penetrate our military bases. They pose as wayward tourists so they can test security procedures and learn how to circumvent defenses in a future crisis. 

These reports of human espionage come on the heels of news that Chinese hackers have penetrated the networks of U.S. critical infrastructure, giving China the ability to cripple power, water, and communications to American military bases in a time of crisis.

And just a few days earlier, press reports exposed a web of covert Chinese efforts to influence American politics flowing through left-wing activist groups such as Code Pink. 

China’s influence efforts targeting the U.S. are modeled on its successful campaigns in other English-speaking countries.

In Canada, the government has launched an investigation into reports that China’s Ministry of State Security secretly organized campaigns against members of Canada’s Parliament who advocated tough-on-China policies. China funneled money and votes toward Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party in advance of the Canada’s 2021 elections. 

And in Australia and New Zealand, China for years has attempted to use its economic clout to influence dozens of politicians and media outlets.

How has the Biden administration reacted? Last year, despite the realities of the espionage threat, Biden’s Justice Department shut down the China Initiative begun during the Trump administration, bowing to pressure from activists who said the initiative was inherently racist and xenophobic.  

At the same time, the Biden administration’s efforts to ban TikTok, the Chinese-owned social media app, have stalled. For more than two years, the administration has negotiated with TikTok through the interagency process of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States without reaching an agreement to mitigate the app’s enormous potential to influence American politics and blackmail targets of espionage.

Congress could still act, but TikTok is breathing a sigh of relief as the House and Senate face a jam-packed legislative calendar without a consensus on blocking the app. 

The dithering has extended beyond TikTok, as the White House spun its wheels for months on action to regulate U.S. investment in advanced technology research in China.

When an executive order arrived in August, it merely kicked off the start of a new deliberative process while the Treasury Department writes regulations that cover only a few industries, leaving most of China’s advanced research untouched. The result?  No action before 2025 at the earliest.

All the while, high-ranking U.S. officials have made pilgrimages to Beijing, hoping to secure a change in China’s behavior. Visits by U.S. climate envoy John Kerry, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and, most recently Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo (whose emails the Chinese hacked earlier this year) all delayed U.S. responses to China’s aggression while obtaining seemingly little in return. 

Through a combination of misguided decisions and inaction, the Biden administration has given up American leadership in the fight against the Chinese Communist Party’s influence. America deserves better.

Michael Ellis is a visiting fellow for law and technology in the Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

This article was first published by the Daily Signal.

Image: Shutterstock.

The US has received plenty of criticism for acceding to Iran’s policy of hostage-led negotiation for which Tehran has plenty of form. But there are a number of very knowledgeable Middle East hands in President Joe Biden’s administration with significant experience in the demanding theatre of negotiations with Iran. They include Biden himself, who was Barack Obama’s vice president when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was negotiated and signed. So, they are neither neophytes on this issue nor naive about the risks involved in achieving an obviously humanitarian outcome in this manner. Rather, to understand why the administration took this step it’s necessary to first understand how it viewed the detainee situation as part of its broader Iran policy.

First, the security priorities of both the Obama and the Biden administrations with respect to Iran have focused on counterproliferation. The JCPOA, as flawed as it was, represented the Obama administration’s belief that only a negotiated approach to limiting Tehran’s nuclear development program could work effectively. The unilateral trashing of the agreement under Donald Trump’s presidency provided the proof, if any was needed, of what Iran could do in the absence of any negotiated constraints on its program.

By contrast, Iran’s influence-peddling and military support for regional non- and semi-state actors represents a real, but nevertheless second-order, security priority. The prevailing political and social realities in countries such as Lebanon, Syria and Iraq mean that Iranian-supported groups are significant, if not the dominant political actors, and therefore eliminating Tehran’s influence is essentially impossible. Without changing the political system of the country or the behaviour of actors in that system, constraining Iran’s behaviour, rather than eliminating its influence, becomes the achievable short- and medium-term aim.

Given this, the Biden administration’s decision to secure the hostages’ freedom and to release Iranian funds frozen in South Korea is easier to understand. The release of detainees has been high on Biden’s list of priorities. As he said in March: ‘Returning wrongfully detained and people held hostage—and particularly Americans and their families—is a top priority for this administration. And we’ll continue our work to bring home all Americans held hostage or unjustly detained.’

Nobody begrudges the fact that the detainees have been returned to the United States. Rather, the questions are whether the type of exchange that was undertaken should have been done, the price that was paid and whether this simply reinforces the utility of such a strategy in the eyes of the Iranians. The price paid was probably the least contentious—the difficulty with blanket sanctions against totalitarian regimes is that those who suffer are often the least culpable. The funds frozen in Seoul were for Iranian oil imported by South Korea that hadn’t been paid for by the time Trump imposed his unilateral sanctions.

To the Biden administration, those funds were a casualty of a Trump decision it never agreed with, so it doesn’t feel beholden to. The current agreement also requires that the disbursement of the funds will be overseen by Qatar and they will be used only for humanitarian purposes. Whether that is the case in practice will remain to be seen, but throughout all the years of sanctions against it, Tehran was still able to fund its regional activities and so the release of these funds is no game-changer.

As to whether the exchange will lead to more detentions of US citizens, it’s easy to make that argument because the logic appears straightforward. Yet the jury is out on whether this has been the case in the past (given the current detainee exchange is by no means the first of its kind).

With that in mind, the Biden administration has taken a calculated risk while it continues to warn American citizens about the risks of travelling to Iran and the fact that Washington can’t guarantee their return if they are detained.

On the question of whether this swap should have been done (outside of the obvious benefit for the freed detainees), one must understand it as part of the broader counterproliferation policy of the Obama and now the Biden administrations.

If one accepts that the JCPOA was effective in limiting Iran’s nuclear program and the Trump policy of ‘maximum pressure’ achieved the exact opposite, then a negotiated limit to Iran’s nuclear program is the only real way to achieve meaningful counter-nuclear-proliferation outcomes with Tehran. And to get to the negotiating table, viewing the detainee swap as a preliminary step to such an outcome makes a lot of sense.

There has been media reporting that Iran’s supreme leader has given approval for direct talks with the US on the issue, though both countries have denied this report. Whether the restart of negotiations is possible therefore remains up in the air.

The Biden administration likely thinks the prisoner swap was worth trying as the only way of achieving its broader non-proliferation goal. But if it doesn’t establish the conditions for future negotiations, at least five people are no longer detained in Iranian prisons.

Rodger Shanahan is a former Australian Army officer and Middle East analyst. 

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Shutterstock.

 

Back in the summer last week, Iranian officials drew headlines with their claims of being able to detect and track American F-35s flying over the Persian Gulf. This prompted a flood of claims on social media about the $1.7 trillion stealth fighter program no longer offering a strategic edge over the aggressive nation.

“Over the past days, several of these planes were flying over the Persian Gulf and were fully monitored by our radars from the moment they took off,” an unnamed Iranian official was quoted as saying by the Beirut-based Al Mayadeen news, an outlet that is frequently criticized for its bias toward authoritarian regimes in Iran, Syria, and the militant group Hezbollah.

Is this claim true? The truth is… it’s pretty likely – but that wouldn’t have the implications many may think it does. Stealth fighters have long been detectable via certain radar frequencies and that’s neither new nor troubling for military planners. This story, like many that have come before it, is leveraging popular misconceptions about stealth, rather than the science associated with this technology, in an attempt to paint modern 5th generation fighters as less capable than they truly are. And make no mistake, the F-35’s detectability is not unique to its airframe – every 5th-generation fighter regardless of origin can be detected under the right circumstances.

It’s targeting those aircraft that can be tough.

THE CLAIM

According to several Iranian-bases news outlets, Brigadier General Reza Khajeh, the deputy commander of operations of the Iranian Army Air Defense Force, was the first official to come forward with the claim that Iran has been detecting and potentially even tracking F-35s in the region. This claim follows the deployment of about a dozen F-35s to the U.S. Central Command region following a series of aggressive encounters involving Russian aircraft over Syria and Iranian forces in the Strait of Hormuz.

According to General Khajeh, all flights in the region have been monitored by Iranian air defense systems, bolstered by what he referred to as “eavesdropping systems,” going on to claim that they have yet to detect a sortie via those listening methods that they weren’t also able to track on radar.

And based on the responses we’ve immediately seen popping up on social media, it’s clear that many are convinced, based on these claims, that Iran has cracked the code to peering through the most advanced fighter on the planet’s stealth capabilities.

THESE CLAIMS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT STEALTH FIGHTERS

Stealth aircraft are designed to delay or sometimes even defeat detection via a variety of means, including radar and infrared, but it’s commonly understood that stealth is not invisibility. That is to say that under the right circumstances, these aircraft are often detectable – especially when we’re talking about stealth fighters, in particular.

However, there is a significant difference between being able to detect a stealth fighter and being able to effectively target one, and these claims out of Iran (and subsequent media stories) rely on the average reader’s lack of awareness when it comes to this important distinction.

Modern stealth fighters are designed to delay or prevent detection specifically from high-frequency radar arrays that are capable of providing a “weapons-grade lock” – or radar arrays that can guide a missile to a target. Lower frequency radar arrays are not capable of guiding weapons with this sort of accuracy but are often capable of spotting stealth fighters in the sky. This is neither new nor unusual.

THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING ABLE TO DETECT A STEALTH FIGHTER AND BEING ABLE TO TARGET ONE

“The Radar Game: Understanding Stealth and Aircraft Survivability” by Rebecca Grant, Mitchell Institute, 2010

Different radar arrays broadcast in different wavelengths and frequencies for different reasons. The types of design elements that can help delay or prevent detection from one type of radar frequency won’t necessarily help prevent detection from another.

As a result, stealth fighter designs are specifically intended to limit detection from the types of radar arrays that can effectively guide a weapon to its position. While stealth aircraft are still not invisible to radar arrays that work within these bands, the goal is to make their radar returns small enough to delay detection, allowing the stealth fighter to either engage a target or escape without ever being targeted itself.

Radars operate by broadcasting electromagnetic energy (radar waves), usually in the L, S, C, X, or K bands. Each band uses a different wavelength and frequency, with only higher frequency (smaller wavelength) systems providing the image fidelity needed to accurately target an aircraft.

In other words, only certain types of radars can be used to guide a missile toward a target and get it close enough to destroy it. Lower frequency arrays are often capable of spotting stealth fighters in the air, but because of their larger wavelengths, can’t provide accurate enough data to actually lock onto an aircraft with a missile.

Stealth fighter designs only limit detection against higher frequency radar arrays, including parts of the S-band and the C, X, and Ku bands to prevent being targeted. Because these fighters are still visible on lower-frequency radar bands operating on S and C bands, these arrays can be leveraged effectively as early warning systems, notifying defensive forces that stealth fighters are in the area, and allowing for other defensive systems to be oriented in the right direction. But importantly, low-frequency arrays can do little more than point systems toward the area a stealth fighter is in. An effective stealth fighter design remains difficult to target via a high-frequency array even with this head start.

In fact, because most air traffic control towers operate radar arrays in the S-band, they can often spot stealth fighters without much difficulty.

Stealth bombers, on the other hand, are extremely difficult to detect via even lower-frequency arrays, thanks to their lack of common fighter design elements like standing vertical tail surfaces. As a result, when stealth fighters are operating over your nation, air defenses are often aware, but unable to target them. When stealth bombers are overhead, many national air defense systems may never even know at all.

In other words, it’s not particularly unusual to spot an inbound stealth fighter using even quite dated low-frequency radar arrays, but actually shooting them down is another question entirely. Low-frequency arrays aren’t capable of guiding a weapon accurately to a fighter-sized target. They can only point in a general direction and say, “There’s a target somewhere over there.”

STEALTH FIGHTERS HAVE MORE THAN ONE TRICK UP THEIR SLEEVE

It’s not at all uncommon for stealth fighters like the F-35 to fly with radar reflectors on to both render them more detectable and mask their actual radar profiles while operating in regions with enemy air defense systems that are eager to gobble up data about their radar returns. These reflectors, often called Luneburg lenses, aren’t always easy to spot with the naked eye, but they render even the stealthiest aircraft easy to detect on radar.

In other words, it’s entirely possible that American F-35s operating in the Middle East may be flying with these lenses on specifically to make it more difficult for enemy air defense systems to work toward figuring out how to detect these aircraft more readily.

And considering the United States sent these fighters to the region as an intentional message to aggressive Iranian and Russian forces, advertising their presence is an intentional decision. That much was made clear by the Pentagon’s public announcement of their deployment prior to the F-35s even arriving in the region.

“In coordination with our regional allies, partners, and the U.S. Navy, the F-35s will partner with A-10s and F-16s already in theater helping monitor the Strait of Hormuz,” Air Forces Central (AFCENT) spokesman Col. Mike Andrews said in a statement last month.

In other words, there’s a multitude of reasons why Iran might be able to detect F-35s operating over the Persian Gulf, from Luneburg lenses to low-frequency radar arrays. In fact, it would be somewhat damning if they couldn’t. But just as Russia leveraged confusion about the definition of modern hypersonic missiles to claim their Kh47M2 Kinzhal was more than a simple air-launched ballistic missile, Iran is now leveraging confusion around the word stealth in a similar manner.

So, did Iran detect F-35s over the Persian Gulf last week? It’s pretty likely. But is that anything American military planners are sweating?

Almost certainly not.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Shutterstock.

America’s next stealth fighter in active development is going to be very pricey, with some estimates now reaching as high as $300 million per airframe. But while that figure is sure to give plenty of folks a serious case of sticker shock, the truth is, even at that high a price, this fighter may still be a serious bargain.

There’s no denying that Uncle Sam has an affinity for expensive military platforms, with today’s F-35 Lightning II effort currently holding the title for most expensive military program in history at an estimated $1.7 trillion over the jet’s service life. And with the F-35A’s per unit price now floating at around $80 million each, forking over $300 million for another new stealth fighter does sound shocking.

But it’s important to remember that the F-35’s price has come down dramatically thanks to the fact that a whopping 17 countries have placed orders for the advanced fighter and more than 1,000 F-35s have already been delivered to customers. In other words, despite a high operating cost, the F-35 has become one of the most widely operated fighters on the planet, and high volume has a way of bringing down costs.

Conversely, the Air Force intends to purchase just 200 or so fighters from the Next Generation Air Dominance program, with these next-generation jets expected to fly alongside another 300 advanced new Block 4 F-35s and at least 1,000 artificial intelligence-enabled drone wingmen.

This relatively short production run will place the NGAD fighter on fairly equal footing, in terms of total numbers, with the very fighter it’s slated to replace: the F-22 Raptor. And the truth is when comparing the NGAD’s projected cost to fighters like the Raptor, or even the venerable F-14 Tomcat… that sticker shock soon gives way to a sense that NGAD may actually be a pretty good deal, even at $300 million per airframe.

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT NGAD FIGHTER AND ITS COST SO FAR?

The Next Generation Air Dominance program has been, until fairly recently, more about developing new aviation technologies than specifically fielding a new fighter platform. These technologies all fell within one of four categories:

1. Propulsion — The Air Force intends to field these new fighters with advanced adaptive cycle engines that will offer more power, more fuel economy, better heat regulation and power production, and greater loiter times than were possible with earlier engine designs.
2. Uncrewed Systems — The NGAD fighter will fly alongside a constellation of AI-enabled drone wingmen to extend sensor reach, increase combat capacity and survivability, and more.
3. Materials — Advances in material science are often among the most secretive elements of stealth aircraft design, as today’s Radar Absorbent materials are rated to absorb as much as 80% of inbound radar waves, but limit fighter performance due to their fragility. Improved RAM could reduce maintenance costs, improve stealth, and allow for greater performance.
4. Sensors — The NGAD program leans further into the F-35’s air combat methodology of detecting and targeting enemy aircraft from greater ranges than ever before, allowing the fighter to engage and destroy enemy jets before they ever even know the fighter was there.

However, as these technologies matured, the focus of the effort transitioned toward combining these new technologies into a single crewed airframe, culminating in a classified contract solicitation released last month for final design proposals. The Air Force now intends to choose a winning design next year, with aggressive plans to begin fielding operational jets by the end of this decade.

At this stage, the Air Force couldn’t offer an accurate projected per-unit cost for this fighter, as a design hasn’t even been chosen yet, but Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has gone on record to say that it will likely cost “multiple hundreds of millions of dollars” per jet.

While technically a separate program being developed under the same Next Generation Air Dominance moniker, the Navy’s forthcoming F/A-XX fighter is expected to share some common modular systems with the Air Force’s new fighter.

Based on renders we’ve seen of this new fighter released by the U.S. Air Force and defense contractors alike, it seems likely that the new jet will omit some traditional fighter control surfaces — namely the standing vertical tails, in favor of an even stealthier profile. The result may be a fighter that isn’t quite as aerobatic as previous top performers like the F-22 Raptor, but will almost certainly be the stealthiest fighter to see the sky to date.

NGAD WON’T NEED TO REPLACE OLDER FIGHTERS AT A 1:1 RATE

Arguably the most important difference between this new NGAD fighter in development and previous top-tier jets like the Raptor or Tomcat is how America’s next air superiority fighter is being designed to operate alongside a bevy of AI-enabled drone wingmen.

These wingmen aircraft will use onboard AI to allow them to complete complex tasks as assigned by the pilot onboard the NGAD fighter. They could extend the aircraft’s sensor range by flying out ahead, its payload capabilities by engaging targets on its behalf, and even its survivability by absorbing missiles on the crewed fighter’s behalf or engaging enemy targets before they have a chance to cause harm.

But importantly, these drone wingmen will also allow a single crewed NGAD fighter, flying alongside two or three drone wingmen, to replace entire formations of older generation jets that each require a pilot of their own. As a result, F-15s and F-22s won’t need to be replaced on a one-to-one basis in order to maintain the same level of combat capability.

Related: Voodoo II: Could a simple patch give us a sneak peek at NGAD?

AVOIDING THE F-35 PROGRAM’S ‘ACQUISITION MALPRACTICE’

The F-35 may be the most technologically advanced fighter in service today, but the budget-busting acquisition boondoggle that got it there is something the Air Force is working hard to avoid doing again. Sandboxx News has covered the poor decisions that led to the F-35’s ballooning development costs and production setbacks at length in previous articles. Among the most glaring issues that led to such costs were, first, giving Lockheed Martin an effective monopoly on aircraft design, production, and sustainment for decades to come with little incentive to come in under — or even at — projected cost; and, second, beginning production long before testing was complete, forcing older jets to undergo expensive refits once issues were identified.

In order to avoid these sorts of setbacks in the future, the Air Force is reshaping how it executes fighter contracts, separating design and production from long-term sustainment to force competition between firms, and perhaps most important of all, ensuring Uncle Sam owns at least a significant portion of the “data rights” or intellectual property associated with the new fighter and its design, rather than allowing a corporation to maintain a monopoly on the fighter going forward.

Of course, even if everything goes exactly as the Air Force plans (which is almost certainly not going to happen), that won’t alleviate the immense cost associated with fielding the most advanced fighter on the planet.

But then, paying a premium to own the skies is something Uncle Sam is already pretty accustomed to…

AN AIR FORCE STUDY SHOWED RESTARTING F-22 PRODUCTION WOULD COST $330 MILLION PER RAPTOR IN 2023 DOLLARS

Many have questioned the wisdom of developing and fielding an entirely new air superiority fighter to replace the F-22 Raptor at all. After all, despite being the first and oldest stealth fighter on the planet, it remains the stealthiest and arguably most dominant of the bunch. Rather than spending a fortune on a new jet, why not just build more F-22s?

Well, the Air Force thought of that. Back in 2017, the Air Force commissioned a secretive study into just how much restarting F-22 production would cost — and the report’s conclusions were bad news for Raptor fans. Because much of the F-22 production line was cannibalized for F-35 production after the Raptor’s cancelation, restarting the production line would mean establishing new production infrastructure practically from scratch.

As a result, with startup costs included, a batch of 194 new F-22 Raptors was projected to cost approximately $50.3 billion, which adjusted to 2023’s inflation, skyrockets up to around $62.5 billion. That averages out to a current cost of about $330 million per new Raptor if the U.S. were to restart production today.

It’s important to remember that the F-22’s first flight came more than 10 years before the first iPhone was released, and much of the aircraft was designed in the early 1990s. In other words, it would likely cost the same or even more to build new old Raptors than it would to simply start from scratch on a 21st-century design.

F-22S COST $270 MILLION APIECE WHEN ADJUSTED TO 2023’S INFLATION

Even when F-22 production was still going at full steam ahead back in 2010, the Congressional Research Service reported that the United States was paying approximately $186 million per aircraft — assuming you don’t roll research and development costs into the per-unit price, as that would skyrocket the Raptor’s price to $369.5 million each in 2010 dollars. However, $186 million in 2010 adjusts to approximately $260.4 million in 2023.

So, even if production had simply paused, rather than halted and we could somehow restart F-22 production today exactly as it left off, new Raptors would still be creeping up on the $300-million-per-airframe mark, especially if systems that were left out of the original Raptor but are now considered necessary, like infrared search and track or helmet-cued targeting, were incorporated into the design to bring it on par with its more modern competition.

Related: America’s F-22 will see serious upgrades before retirement

THE F-35’S ORIGINAL PER-UNIT COST WOULD BE MORE THAN $330 MILLION TODAY

As we discussed earlier, the F-35 Lighting II borne out of the vastly expensive Joint Strike Fighter program has been getting consistently cheaper over the years thanks to a laundry list of customers and high production volume. However, that wasn’t always the case.

Back when the F-35 began its production run in 2007, it was quite a bit more expensive… at approximately $221.1 million per airframe. When adjusted to 2023’s inflation, that comes out to approximately $331.5 million per fighter today.

However, it’s important to note that the F-35’s per-unit cost dropped dramatically in its first years of production, with Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 2 following that same year at just $161.7 million per aircraft, which shakes out to about $242.3 million per fighter. And by 2012, it had dropped all the way to $107 million per jet, or about $143 million today.

Related: What kind of fighter could the latest military tech really build?

ADJUSTED FOR 2023’S INFLATION, MAVERICK’S F-14 TOMCAT COST $270 MILLION EACH

Air dominance has always been expensive. Nowhere is that more clear than in the Navy’s legendary F-14A Tomcat made famous in 1988’s Top Gun.

In 1973, the U.S. Navy was purchasing these Tomcats at approximately 38 million each, which as compared to the numbers we’ve been throwing around thus far in this article, seems like a downright bargain. But inflation can be tricky, and many have forgotten in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union that the United States was sometimes devoting as much as a whopping 10% of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense during the Cold War.

For context there, America’s massive 2022 top-line defense budget of $857.9 billion represents a reported 3% of its GDP. If the U.S. were still spending at the rate it did during points of both the Cold War and Vietnam, today’s defense budgets would be closer to $2.5 trillion.

The Tomcat is a perfect example of just how much the U.S. was willing to spend on defense. Adjusted to today’s inflation, each F-14A would ring in at an astonishing $270 million.

AIR DOMINANCE AIN’T CHEAP

We may not know much about America’s next air superiority fighter being developed within the Next Generation Air Dominance program, but one thing we know for sure is… that it won’t be cheap. The United States has long led the world in airpower. From being the first country to field military aircraft; the first to arm aircraft; the first to conduct mid-air refueling; fly bombers around the world; build stealth attack planes, fighters, bombers, and more, America has long been willing to invest in the ability to take the fight to its opponents from the sky, and to do so with such overwhelming power, capability, and volume to dominate the airspace over any fight it’s in.

This approach to warfare is more than a habit, it’s baked into nearly every facet of America’s warfighting doctrine. America’s approach to war splits a conflict into six phases: shaping, deterring, seizing the initiative, dominating, stabilizing, enabling civilian authority, and then a return to shaping.

As Dr. Rebecca Grant, president of IRIS Independent Research, pointed out in Air Force Magazine some 13 years ago, airpower plays a role in each and every phase — and is absolutely vital for a handful of them.

The fact of the matter is, the United States’ way of war doesn’t include dominating the skies… it mandates it. And as we’ve seen from the 1970s straight through to today… dominating the skies is an expensive endeavor.

So, if we do come to learn that the NGAD fighter does indeed cost around $300 million per fighter, we should see that not as an immense leap in price over the jets that came before it, but rather as the going rate for air supremacy.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Mike Mareen / Shutterstock.com

Rassemblant plusieurs milices en son sein, le Hachd Al-Chaabi occupe une position prépondérante sur l'échiquier politique irakien. Fondée sur le modèle des gardiens de la révolution iraniens pour lutter contre l'Organisation de l'État islamique (OEI), cette coalition paramilitaire se permet de (...) / Terrorisme, Irak, Iran, État, Golfe, Défense - 2023/10

Over a year and a half has passed since the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine, violating international law as enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The core intention of the Charter remains the same today as when it was ratified: the prevention of a third world war and, secondarily, the institutional scaffolding needed to address the underlying causes of war, including systemic poverty, insecurity, and, most interestingly, grudges. 

One need not be an expert on international law to understand how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in March of 2022 has violated the laws’ core principles. The Kremlin’s pretexts, the alleged violation of Russia’s “sphere of influence,” cited by, for example, international relations scholar John Mearsheimer, remain inadequate to justify the invasion of an internationally recognized sovereign state. On top of that, in its prosecution of an illegitimate war, Russia continues to practice war crimes—systematically and deliberately attacking noncombatants, including medical personnel and facilities. We may continue to debate whether allowing Russia to reclaim the USSR’s sphere of influence is acceptable as a tradeoff to prevent a global conflict. Still, there can be no question that Russia’s continual rape, torture, and murder of noncombatants is illegal and damages Russia’s reputation on the world stage. 

The question, then, is, what explains Russia’s behavior? 

From Tsar to Commissar  

During the entire rule of Russia’s Tsars—from the very founding of the Russian state until 1917, Russia’s military was no more or no less brutal toward noncombatants than the militaries of any other state or empire. But the Russian Revolution and the horrific civil war that followed changed everything. In place of an aristocratic code of honor, Russia’s surviving officer corps were loyal to the person of Josef Stalin (although in 1938, he had three-quarters of them above the rank of lieutenant executed for treason) and, more broadly, to the international communist movement, which they believed was destined to liberate the world from its capitalist and imperialist chains. There is little difference between this messianic vision and the twelfth-century crusaders or Protestant and Catholic militaries of the Thirty Years War. The same is true of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge in Cambodia from 1972–75 or Iran’s theocracy after 1979. All militaries representing such a “messianic” or “revolutionary” ethos were deeply implicated in the mass killing of noncombatants. 

Operation Barbarossa, Stalingrad, and Berlin 

The logic of the revolutionary’s lack of restraint on the use of armed force is twofold. First, this ideology insists on the dehumanization of opponents: “Our enemies are not actually people. They cannot be bargained with, and will themselves acknowledge no limits in their use of violence against us.” Second, his ideology is self-justifying: “What conduct wouldn’t be justified in the pursuit of an earthly paradise, in which poverty and war are banished?’ 

Until 1941, Russia’s formative military experience had been its civil war (1917–1923), which displayed, to a terrible degree, both aspects of ideological warfare and their impact on civilians. As Vladimir Lenin famously insisted: “It is with absolute frankness that we speak of this struggle of the proletariat; each man must choose between joining our side or the other side.” But on June 22, 1941, 3.8 million German soldiers crossed the Soviet border in Operation Barbarossa, which by December would strike within a few kilometers of Moscow and result in the loss of 4.5 million Soviet soldiers killed or captured. 

In the late Summer of 1942, the Third Reich’s Sixth Army reached Stalingrad. By November 22, the Germans found themselves encircled by the Red Army, and on February 2, they surrendered. The fighting in that storied city on the Volga River remains among history’s most brutal. Given both sides’ commitment to zero-sum, totalizing visions of warfare, the campaign systematically repudiated the very idea of “noncombatant.” 

Revolutionary logic was a core component of Soviet practice as their armed forces advanced toward Berlin. Any Soviet soldiers refusing a suicidal attack or attempting a retreat, even for sound military reasons, were executed by special forces dedicated to that purpose. Soviet leaders did not acknowledge Soviet prisoners of war. Any soldier captured by the enemy must have been a counterrevolutionary, as evidenced by the fact that they still drew breath. There were no Soviet “civilians” in formerly-occupied territories either: any who were not active partisans were labeled “Nazi collaborators” and left to starve or die of exposure as Red Army advanced toward Germany. 

In practice, Soviet soldiers—particularly junior officers—often took pity on civilian survivors of Nazi occupation, even at the very real risk to their own lives. But upon reaching German territory, any pretense of the existence of “noncombatants” vanished. As historian Norman Naimark argues, while in a few formal documents the Red Army was ordered to respect noncombatant immunity, on the ground, Soviet armed forces understood they were in Germany to avenge the rapes, forced starvation, and murders their own citizens had suffered since the German invasion. Retreating German or German-allied soldiers understood that surrender was not an option. At best, a surrendering soldier could expect a stint of lethal hard labor in Siberia (of the 91,000 soldiers of the German Sixth Army taken into captivity by the Soviets at Stalingrad, only 5,000 would survive to return to Germany). And the most savage harm of all would fall on German women and girls: victorious Soviet soldiers raped girls as young as nine and women as old as seventy during their occupation of Berlin. According to one female contemporary of the Soviet occupation, rape was so universal that Berlin’s women lost even their shame at having been victims. 

Soviet to Russian Military Doctrine: Doctrinal Inertia 

It should now be much easier to understand the persistence of targeting noncombatants in Russian military culture. Indeed, the USSR’s last armed conflict—its ten-year effort to keep Afghanistan communist (1979–1989)—only further embedded this principle into Russian military thinking and doctrine. We could call this “doctrinal inertia.” 

Today, Russia’s military, in practice, ignores noncombatant immunity and systematically and deliberately targets medical facilities in areas of operations—a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1948 and 1949, to which Russia remains a signatory. In international law, the Additional Protocols of 1977—which were intended to protect national liberation movements from brutality of the sort for which Russia is now famous—did nothing to protect Chechen nationalists when they sought the independence to which they were entitled by law after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. 

In Syria after 2015, Syrian and Russian armed forces made no distinction between civilians and insurgents in areas of operations (sadly, this is hardly unique to Syria or the Russian Federation). But what is perhaps unique, again, is the deliberate targeting of medical personnel and facilities, the persistent use of starvation as a weapon, and systematic and intentional attacks on civilian infrastructure during combat operations. 

All of this matters as much for Russia’s security as it does for the world because Russia’s barbarism remains profoundly counterproductive. Fans of “taking the gloves off” in combat often forget that winning and losing are not just objective outcomes but are, to some extent, determined via social construction by audiences. So, in a boxing match where one fighter overcomes an adversary with an illegal move, a “win” could only happen if the cheating contender killed the entire audience. Since no one in history has managed that—not the Nazis, not Milosevic’s Serbs, not Rwanda’s Interahamwe—survivors will carry the grudges that, like the dragon’s teeth in Greek mythology, sooner or later sprout into visceral counter-violence. 

An Inconvenient Truth: It’s Not Just Russia 

We are likely to see more, rather than less, military barbarism in the future—not only from Russia, North Korea, Iran, and the PRC but also from the United States and its democratic allies. This is for two reasons. 

First, the world is becoming more urban, and urban environments complicate infantry tactics. Rather than ask soldiers to risk their lives breaching a building, scanning for and potentially engaging hostile troops, commanders yield to the temptation to back away and call in artillery or air support, then sort through the rubble later. Given the traditional proximity of “hostiles” to “civilians” in urban settings, this necessarily means more “collateral damage,” which then evolves into the systematic injury of civilians. 

Second, in the global north, our increasing interactions in cyberspace—including social media algorithms that trade rage for profit—have accelerated a trend toward political polarization—not just in the United States but everywhere. Democracy is, as the British might say, “on the back foot.” That means we’re likely to see more, not fewer, authoritarian states in the near future. To gain and maintain power, authoritarian leaders both require and remain gifted at “othering,” identifying a category of human beings—foreigners, counterrevolutionaries, enemies of the people, LGBTQ+, immigrants, religious minorities, artists, intellectuals, people of color, even women—as subhumans who become the targets of deliberate harm ending in what is known as “cleansing.” 

It’s clear that all militaries—especially in the prolonged conflicts that have become the norm—suffer from the dilemmas of conducting combat operations without harming noncombatants. But for the Russian Federation, whether in Syria or Ukraine (or in cyberspace), respect for noncombatant immunity in war or military occupation isn’t a dilemma; it died in the October Revolution of 1917. 

Ivan Arreguin-Toft, PhD (@imarreguintoft) is the author of How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. He is a founding member of the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre at Oxford University’s Martin School, where he served as Associate Director of Dimension 1 (cybersecurity policy and strategy) from 2012 to 2015. He is currently a Visiting Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts. 

Image: Shutterstock.

With the prisoner swap carried out last week between the United States and Iran after the transfer of $6 billion in Iranian oil revenues, critics of the administration are again voicing their opposition to making deals with Iran’s current government. Alongside the acknowledged terms of the agreement for the prisoner swap and transfer of funds, it also has become clear in recent months that there is a broader effort to incentivize Iran to slow the pace of its uranium enrichment program and reduce tensions in the Middle East. This has aimed to build informal “understandings” with Iran through a combination of communicating U.S. “red lines” and the apparent relaxation of sanctions targeting Iran’s oil exports rather than negotiating a formal agreement, which would be subject to Congressional review under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). This approach will have little overt support among the Washington political class of either party. However, in the absence of better alternatives, it presents an opportunity for the Biden administration to both prevent an escalating crisis with Iran and offset Saudi moves to raise oil prices, either of which could undermine Biden’s bid for reelection in 2024. 

The results of this effort on Iran’s nuclear trajectory thus far are modest but positive. The latest report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), circulated in early September in advance of its Board of Governors meeting, showed that they had slowed down their production of 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU), just short of weapons-grade, and diluted some of that material to reduce their inventory accumulation. They also have slowed down what had previously been a breakneck pace of installing additional advanced enrichment centrifuges. These actions do not lengthen Iran’s “breakout time” if they choose to enrich weapons-grade uranium, but this pause is a de-escalatory step that, if continued, should prevent an acute crisis. 

Iran also has apparently instructed its proxies in Iraq and Syria to cease attacks on U.S. military personnel deployed there, which had been frequent until last year. There have been no such incidents in Syria in over four months and none in Iraq in over a year. While Iran still opposes the U.S. presence in those countries and could decide to reverse this move, it removes for now another source of friction that could escalate into a crisis. 

On the oil front, it has become increasingly apparent over the summer that the United States has shifted even further toward lax enforcement of the sanctions aimed at Iran’s oil exports, allowing volumes to rise as the broader market has tightened. TankerTrackers.com reported that export loadings of crude and condensate in August averaged 1.9 million barrels per day (BPD), up from 1.5 million BPD in May and a full-year average below 1 million BPD in 2022. While the State Department has officially denied that a policy shift has occurred, U.S. officials have acknowledged on background that they have pursued sanctions enforcement with a “lighter touch.” Critics of the Biden administration’s dealings with Iran have certainly noticed. 

This comes as Saudi Arabia announced in June a 1 million BPD unilateral production cut beginning in July, in addition to the production curtailment as part of the OPEC+ framework, now extended at least through the end of the year. The move was a surprise, showing a very aggressive push to tighten the market and support prices. Crude is up more than 25 percent since the Saudi announcement, with Brent above ninety-four dollars, and OPEC’s own forecast shows a large supply deficit of 3.3 million BPD for 2023’s fourth quarter. While the Biden administration is pursuing a multifaceted deal to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which could improve U.S.-Saudi ties, there is no indication whatsoever that Saudi oil production policy is part of the current U.S.-Saudi discussions. With Wall Street commodities analysts again talking about the potential for $100/barrel oil and a U.S. presidential election approaching next year, it would be difficult for the Biden administration to take a harder enforcement line against Iran, to say the least. 

Thus far, The Biden administration has kept mum on its indirect discussions with Iran and has not acknowledged any deal connecting the apparent Iranian forbearance on enrichment and proxy attacks with the evident U.S. forbearance on sanctions enforcement. This is probably intentional, as a formal agreement would trigger an INARA review by Congress, which would be highly contentious and inevitably partisan in an election year. It also reflects that what seems to have been agreed upon is very narrow compared to any plausible formal follow-up to the JCPOA. 

Efforts by mediators, including Qatar and Oman, to build on this effort continue. Still, it is not likely that we will see any formal agreement before the November 2024 U.S. elections. Rumored efforts to engineer at least an indirect exchange between the United States and Iran during the UN General Assembly meetings in New York last week were apparently unsuccessful. Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian recently mentioned the possibility of taking up European-mediated talks with the United States again, picking up where they left off in September 2022, but this seems unlikely. The United States has clarified that the window for a return to the JCPOA has closed, and Iran’s demands for U.S. “guarantees” at the time seem even more far-fetched as President Joe Biden’s first term approaches its end. At present, trying to avoid disaster in the near term is the best available option. It is unsatisfying, but given the constraints under which they are operating, including the loss of U.S. credibility as a result of President Trump abandoning the JCPOA while Iran complied with it, the Biden administration deserves credit if they have indeed steered Iran away from a nuclear path which would have led quickly to crisis. 

If President Biden wins re-election, there may be room for renewed discussion of a more permanent accommodation. A second-term Biden would arguably reduce Tehran’s concerns about Washington again abrogating an agreement. Still, it is unlikely that the Biden administration can induce Iran to roll back its nuclear program to anywhere near the constrained levels imposed by the JCPOA, let alone the extension of some of those provisions that the United States had hoped for—a “longer and stronger” deal. Unfortunately, Iran is now a threshold nuclear state, a status that cannot be reversed permanently, even in the event of military conflict. A reasonable agenda for a follow-up agreement in a second Biden term would center on restoring transparency and lengthening Iran’s breakout time to allow the world more certainty that Iran remains a threshold state and does not become a nuclear power. 

Greg Priddy is a Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

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The rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its growing influence on the global stage has become a central theme in contemporary international relations, challenging the longstanding dominance of the United States and the Western world. This global rivalry spans multiple dimensions and is characterized by a complex interplay of economic, technological, geopolitical, and ideological factors. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is an exciting development in this context. It represents an alternative economic integration and connectivity vision that could counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The corridor could offer countries an alternative path to economic integration and development by connecting regions across Asia and Europe. However, it remains to be seen whether it can effectively challenge the scale and scope of China’s BRI.

The IMEC vision’s potential as a counterbalance to the BRI framework is rooted in its strategic positioning and objectives. The IMEC carries significant global geopolitical significance, reflecting Washington’s ambition to be more prominent in shaping connectivity, trade, and economic integration worldwide in the twenty-first century. By aligning the United States with the interests of India, Gulf states, and European nations, this initiative creates a global strategic partnership that has the potential to challenge the PRC’s dominance in the Eurasian landmass. Moreover, Eurasian countries concerned about over-reliance on China’s BRI can view the IMEC as an attractive connectivity, trade, and economic integration net alternative. Thus, the IMEC could emerge as a formidable initiative with the potential to alter the global economic and geopolitical landscape significantly. Nevertheless, IMEC’s potential as a game changer and counterbalance to the BRI remains contingent on Washington’s ability to manage and implement this ambitious project effectively. 

The BRI and IMEC: Comparative Analysis

On the sidelines of the G20 Summit in New Delhi 2023, the United States, India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to establish the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). IMEC aims to bolster economic development by fostering connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. It consists of two separate corridors: the east corridor connecting India to the Gulf region and the northern corridor connecting the Gulf region to Europe. This project aims to establish commercial hubs, expand access to clean energy, enhance telecommunication lines, and ensure secure and stable internet connections.

The IMEC, if executed, will have significant implications for Asia, the Middle East, and Europe’s political, economic, and energy dynamics. Economically, the corridor has the potential to transform the nature of international trade and transportation, ushering in a new era of inter-regional cooperation. The project will boost economic growth by strengthening regional connectivity, commerce, investment, innovation, logistics, and competitiveness, ultimately leading to sustained prosperity throughout the corridor. It could create new opportunities for economic growth, development, and stability in the participating states and regions outside of them (job creation, increased investment, financial improvement, and enhanced access to markets). According to estimates, the IMEC has the potential to make India-Europe cargo flows significantly faster (will reduce the transit time from eighteen to ten days) by a 40 percent reduction in travel time and a 30 percent reduction in transportation costs for goods. 

Energy, the corridor is set to play a vital role in facilitating the trade of renewable energy sources, including hydrogen, through its networks of pipelines. The IMEC aims to link the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel by railway and connect them to India by port, cutting shipping times and costs and reducing fuel usage. IMEC’s focus on sustainability and clean energy is consistent with the worldwide trend to develop environmentally friendly and sustainable infrastructure that addresses environmental issues.

Political, the IMEC can change and forge new alliances to transform world power relations amid a rising regional and global rivalry for economic integration and transportation corridors. The corridor allows member countries to diversify their economic partnerships and lessen reliance on powerful international entities. This change in power relations may impact traditional alliances and alignments, leading to a rebalancing of influence. Further, it holds significant potential to create complex interdependence among rival states (e.g., connecting Haifa port in Israel with the rail line passing through Saudi Arabia), which would be mutually beneficial and strengthen ties. More importantly, the corridor directly challenges China’s BRI by providing BRI member countries with an alternative for infrastructure development and economic cooperation. The planned transport corridor will shorten the supply chain and reduce the dependence of developing countries on China.

The PRC launched the BRI, a massive infrastructure project, in 2013 and has signed BRI-MoUs with nearly 150 countries (75 percent of the world’s population.) and over thirty international organizations, mobilizing almost $1 trillion and creating over 3,000 projects (financed and built roads, power plants, ports, railways, and digital infrastructure). However, there are signs that China is slowing down on BRI because of its flagging economy and the global economic slowdown, which coincides with rising interest rates and inflation. Recent reports indicate that China plans to introduce BRI 2.0, a revised version that aims to exercise greater control over project expenditures and implement stricter scrutiny when announcing new projects. Thus, the question inevitably arises as to whether the IMEC would complement or compete with China’s BRI.

While the IMEC and the BRI share similarities (they feature some of the same keywords such as “connectivity,” “integration,” and “development”) in promoting connectivity, trade, and economic integration, there are significant differences in terms of scale, funding, transparency, and objectives. First, The BRI is much more prominent in scale, the world’s largest global infrastructure undertaking, with nearly 150 member countries, thirty international organizations, and thousands of projects. At the same time, the IMEC includes several dozen countries (mainly from the Middle East and Europe) but does not include African, Central Asian, Southeast Asian, or other South Asian countries besides India. Second, the BRI has been operational since 2013, giving it a decade-long head start over IMEC. 

Third, China has funneled $1 trillion to BRI, and this number may grow to $8 trillion, dwarfing IMEC’s estimated cost of $20 billion. This IMEC is part of the Build Back Better World (B3W), now rebranded as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII), including the G7 nations. PGII aims to channel private capital to invest in four areas: climate and energy, ICT, gender equity, and health. Hence, the BRI is centrally designed and opaque, with its funding coming from just China. The IMEC corridor is based on consultations with all concerned for a while, and its focus is on viability backed by funding from multiple sources, primarily through public-private partnerships.

Fourth, the BRI has since outgrown its original corridors, becoming global in scope, and has always kept its participants from any state or region. The IMEC, in contrast, is aimed at linking India, the Middle Eastern nations, and Europe. Several IMEC member countries, including Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, are concurrently involved in the BRI. While still technically part of the BRI, Italy strongly desires to withdraw from the initiative. Finally, unlike the BRI, which aims at securing the PRC’s access to natural resources, the IMEC intends to serve the common benefit of all the participants while offering an alternative model of development based on shared values, transparency, sustainability, and respect for sovereignty.

Game-changer or Dud?

We can view the IMEC as Washington’s strategic response to Beijing’s growing influence across Eurasian through the BRI. By cultivating stronger bonds between these critical geopolitical zones, the corridor has the potential to offer an alternative pathway for states seeking to diversify their economic ties and reduce dependency on China. While complicated and multifaceted, the IMEC initiative has the potential to alter regional and global dynamics. The corridor is not only an economic project but also a political and strategic one that reflects the aspirations and values of its partners. Washington supports the IMEC to counter the PRC’s influence and challenge its BRI framework (as part of the PGII), threatening its interests and values. It also sees the corridor as a way to reshape global connectivity, enhance trade and investment opportunities, address common challenges such as climate change, terrorism, and pandemics, and strengthen its strategic partnerships with India, Europe, and the Middle Eastern countries.

Nevertheless, the future of the IMEC is uncertain, and it is premature to call this a severe counterweight to China’s BRI. The corridor is still in its early stages, and it is unclear how it will be implemented. The IMEC can be a major game-changer in global connectivity and economic integration by serving as an alternative option for states cautious about over-dependence on China. This would be contingent on IMEC’s ability to present a more sustainable and transparent model for infrastructure development, effectively addressing some of the criticisms directed at the BRI (debt concerns, lack of transparency, environmental issues, and geopolitical tensions).

The realization of IMEC (expected to take over a decade) hinges on many factors, including a significant Western commitment, navigating geopolitical tensions, addressing environmental concerns, ensuring security and stability along the corridor, regional cooperation, financial viability, and technological advancements. Therefore, while IMEC holds immense promise, its successful implementation necessitates meticulous planning, robust governance mechanisms, and unwavering commitment from all participating countries. Additionally, the corridor’s multimodal nature, spanning land and sea, will cost tens of billions of dollars and face substantial logistical challenges. The corridor’s potential as a game changer and counterbalance to the BRI remains contingent on the United States’ ability to manage and implement this ambitious project effectively. This endeavor holds far-reaching implications for the economic and geopolitical dynamics of the regions it encompasses.

In short, while the IMEC concept appears attractive as a vision or idea, much remains to be done to see it through to completion—a result that, with previous announcements concerning the B3W and the PGII schemes, leaves some skepticism as concerns the United States’ ability to make the corridor proposal a working reality.

Dr. Mordechai Chaziza is a senior lecturer at the Department of Politics and Governance and the Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Science division at Ashkelon Academic College (Israel) and a Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Department, University of Haifa, specializing in Chinese foreign and strategic relations.

Image: Shutterstock.

Russia is spent. Foreign investors and some of the country’s best minds have fled, the economy is hobbled by sanctions, and its military is bogged down in Ukraine, with many of its elite soldiers dead and best equipment destroyed. The revolt of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in June 2023 seemed a final humiliation, revealing a once-feared dictator reduced to bargaining with individual commanders. This weakness is real: if Russian president Vladimir Putin could turn back the clock, it is hard to imagine he would again choose to invade Ukraine. 

Russia’s massive losses will probably make Putin cautious about conventional military operations in the foreseeable future. Even if Putin were tempted, the United States has increased the number of its ground forces in Europe to their highest level in nearly two decades, and NATO’s conventional and nuclear deterrence is robust. Nor would the Russian people and elite be eager to support an invasion of a NATO country and risk escalation to nuclear war.

Yet Putin shows no sign of leaving power. He continues to harbor revisionist aims and expresses admiration for Russian conquerors like Peter the Great. Russia still seeks influence in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. As long as Putin is in power, he will undermine any future Ukrainian government and attempt to deter and punish Western countries that support Kyiv. The expansion of NATO to include Finland and eventually Sweden, the military build-up of NATO forces in Eastern Europe, and continuing military aid to Ukraine are particular affronts to Putin, even though they are justified as necessary responses to Russian aggression. Putin sees the United States, which he refers to as the “main enemy” (or glavny vrag), engaged in both hard and soft power actions to encircle and overthrow his regime.

There is a way for Russia to square this circle of maximal ambitions and weak conventional capabilities: gray zone warfare, which we define as covert operations, disinformation, subversion, sabotage, cyber-attacks, and other methods that advance a state’s security objectives but fall short of conventional warfare. Russia has numerous skilled intelligence officers, paramilitary forces, elite hackers, and other personnel who enable it to excel in this arena. Moreover, Russia’s track record in gray zone warfare is impressive, in contrast to its poor performance on the battlefield.

Russia’s future gray zone warfare will likely take many forms. European countries could suffer clandestine attacks against oil and gas pipelines and underwater fiber-optic cables. Border states like Poland, Finland, and Estonia could face a flood of illegal immigrants massing on their borders. Central Asian and African leaders who stand up to Moscow might find local insurgents awash in Russian weapons and trained by Russian special operations forces. Local critics of Moscow might suddenly suffer a series of suspicious accidents, including poisonings. Cyber attacks might take down financial systems and other critical infrastructure. Disinformation on social media platforms might be used to divide the West, while propaganda explains away Russian misdeeds, with artificial intelligence (AI) being used for even more creative mischief.

Despite Russia’s impressive gray zone capabilities, however, it has significant weaknesses. Moscow’s gray zone efforts are often uncoordinated, and the country’s technical talent is limited compared with that of the United States and Europe. Its private military companies, like Wagner, may face many additional restrictions as Putin questions their loyalty.

Bolstering U.S. and allied cyber and border defenses, sharing intelligence, and providing training and advice to local militaries can reduce the danger of gray zone warfare. But the West does not only have to play defense. Russia is also vulnerable to gray zone tactics by the United States and its European allies in Belarus, the Middle East, Africa, and even Russia itself.

Russia’s Gray Zone Toolbox 

Russia’s gray zone warfare draws on a long and robust history. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union excelled at conducting covert intelligence operations and subverting its enemies, tarnishing global views of the United States and at times creating opportunities for near-bloodless communist takeovers of governments. KGB active measures included creating front organizations, backing friendly political movements, covertly funding political parties, provoking domestic unrest, and churning out forgeries and other types of disinformation.

These operations continued after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia’s support for separatists in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria; assassinations of dissidents; cyber and information campaigns in the Baltic states; and use of private military companies in Africa and the Middle East to project its influence all are experiences on which Russia will build as it pursues an aggressive foreign policy while seeking to avoid all-out war. Such organizations as the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Foreign Security Service (FSB), and Spetsnaz have a robust history of gray zone warfare.

Gray zone warfare also fits Moscow’s worldview. Russian security elites, not just Putin, see the world as full of secret threats and have an operational culture that considers the best defense as a good offense. As former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper contends, Russians “are almost genetically driven to co-opt, penetrate, gain favor, whatever.”

Consequently, Russia poses a multifaceted threat through its use of covert action, cyber operations, disinformation, and political subversion. These components of gray zone warfare are not mutually exclusive. Moscow frequently uses a combination of them to weaken its adversaries and expand its influence.

Covert Action

Moscow has long conducted covert action to deter or punish defectors and opposition leaders, subvert U.S. and NATO policies, and expand Russian influence. During the Cold War, the KGB assassinated several foreign leaders, such as Afghan president Hafizullah Amin, in pursuit of Russian foreign policy interests. The KGB’s 13th Department was particularly notorious for targeted assassinations abroad, including the killing of Russian revolutionary leader Leon Trotsky in Mexico City in 1940.

Moscow targets political opponents abroad for two major reasons. The first is to exact revenge on Russian spies, diplomats, soldiers, and even journalists and academics who flee the country, criticize the Kremlin, and aid Moscow’s enemies. A second goal is to deter future betrayals and send an unambiguous message that defectors will be hunted down. In March 2006, Russian agents poisoned Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer who defected to the United Kingdom, at a London hotel. In March 2018, Russian agents poisoned Sergei Skripal, a former GRU officer that defected to the UK, who Putin called a “scumbag” and a “traitor to the motherland.”

Russia’s war in Ukraine triggered an exodus of technocrats, soldiers, spies, oligarchs, and journalists who fled to the West, disenchanted with Putin’s authoritarianism and strategic blunders. Those who cooperate with Western governments or publicly speak out against the Kremlin could become targets of Russian intimidation and even assassination.

Russian security agencies have also conducted paramilitary activity abroad to further Russian foreign policy interests and undermine its adversaries, including the United States. Perhaps the quintessential example was in Crimea in 2014. The Kremlin effectively used masked special operations forces, or “little green men,” to seize Crimea from Ukraine without firing a shot. Russia also conducted sabotage operations in Europe, including planting bombs at two weapons depots in 2014 in the Czech Republic that were allegedly storing arms headed to the Syrian opposition, which Moscow opposed. In March 2023, Polish authorities uncovered a GRU operation to bomb rail lines that transported weapons and other aid to Ukraine. Russian actors with ties to Russian intelligence also plotted to organize protests in Moldova in 2023 as a pretext for mounting an insurrection against the Moldovan government, which Moscow viewed as too pro-Western.

U.S. and European critical infrastructure are potential targets of paramilitary activity. One example is the underwater fiber-optic cables that connect Europe with North America and link European countries with each other. There are currently sixteen cables running under the Atlantic that link the United States with mainland Europe, which are critical for global communication and account for roughly 95 percent of all transatlantic data traffic. Russia has already signaled that it could target these cables with special operations forces, intelligence units, and submarines. In January 2022, the Russian Navy allegedly mapped out the undersea cables off the coast of Ireland and carried out maneuvers, raising serious concerns in Europe and the United States about Russian sabotage.

Other potential Russian gray zone activities include weaponizing immigrants and targeting Europe’s intricate network of gas and oil pipelines, which serve as the lifeblood of European energy. Migration, especially from Africa and Muslim countries, is an emotional issue in Europe. In 2021, Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko threatened to “flood” the European Union with “drugs and migrants.” His government then sent thousands of migrants from Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, and Afghanistan to the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and especially Poland. In August 2023, leaders from Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia warned that they were seeing growing tensions on their borders with Belarus and threatened to seal their borders if Lukashenko weaponized immigration. The Italian government claimed in 2023 that the Wagner Group was behind a surge in migrants from Libya, where Wagner is active.

Despite Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin could also use private military companies in the Middle East, Africa, and other regions to increase Russian influence, undercut U.S. leadership, present itself as a security partner, and gain military access and economic opportunities. Russia could also work with partners like Iran to covertly target U.S. or other NATO forces overseas. During the war in Syria, Russia and Iran worked closely with Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militias to retake territory for the Bashar al-Assad government. These covert tools give Moscow numerous options to hit back at the West.

Cyber Operations

Russian security agencies, such as the GRU, SVR, and FSB, have increasingly conducted cyber attacks to target critical infrastructure, undermine democratic institutions, steal government and corporate secrets, and sow disorder within or between Western allies. In some cases, Russia has conducted cyber attacks in tandem with military or paramilitary operations.

One frequent tactic is to sabotage adversaries’ critical infrastructure or to plant malware in critical infrastructure for use in a future war. Russian malware is designed to do a range of malicious activities, such as overwriting data and rendering machines unbootable, deleting data, and destroying critical infrastructure, such as industrial production and processes. Russia and Russian-linked hackers use a range of common intrusion techniques, such as exploiting public-facing web-based applications, sending spear-phishing e-mails with attachments or links, and stealing credentials and using valid e-mail accounts.

In 2017, for example, the GRU deployed NotPetya, a data-destroying malware that proliferated across multiple networks before executing a disk encryption program, which destroyed all data on targeted computers. NotPetya’s global impact was massive, disabling an estimated 500,000 computers in Ukraine, decreasing Ukraine’s GDP by 0.5 percent in 2017, and affecting organizations across sixty-five countries. Global victims included U.S. multinational companies FedEx and Merck, which lost millions of dollars because of technology cleanup and disrupted business.

In 2022, Russia conducted multiple cyber operations against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. A day before the invasion, Russian attackers launched destructive wiper attacks on hundreds of systems in Ukraine’s energy, information technology, media, and financial sectors. Russia’s goal was likely to undermine Ukraine’s political will, weaken Ukraine’s ability to fight, and collect intelligence that Russia could use to gain tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. Over the next several weeks, Russian actors linked to the GRU, FSB, and SVR conducted numerous cyber attacks utilizing such malware families as WhisperGate and FoxBlade.

The West is also a target. In 2020, the SVR orchestrated a brazen attack against dozens of U.S. companies and government agencies by attaching malware to a software update from SolarWinds, a company based in Austin, Texas, that makes network monitoring software. The DarkSide, a hacking group operating in part from Russian soil, conducted a ransomware attack against the U.S. company Colonial Pipeline, which led executives to shut down a major pipeline for several days and created fuel shortages across the southeastern United States.

In 2023, Polish intelligence services claimed that Russia hacked the country’s railways in an attempt to disrupt rail traffic in the country, some of which are used to transport weapons to Ukraine. According to U.S. government assessments, Russia has targeted the computer systems of underwater cables and industrial control systems in the United States and allied countries. Compromising such infrastructure facilitates and demonstrates Russia’s ability to damage infrastructure during a crisis.

Russian agencies also use cyber attacks during elections to undermine faith in democracy by influencing public sentiment during an election campaign and raising questions about the democratic process. Moscow has targeted specific candidates by stealing or forging documents and then leaking them on public websites or social media platforms. Often referred to as “hack-and-leak operations,” the objective is to undermine faith in political candidates. Another tactic is to disrupt the voting or counting process by targeting computer systems. In addition, Russia has conducted cyber attacks during elections in an attempt to influence issues of importance to Moscow. For example, Russian security agencies have conducted cyber attacks during multiple European elections to weaken support for the European Union, NATO, and the United States.

The breadth of Russian activity is impressive. Russian cyber campaigns have attempted to disrupt elections in the United States, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, and dozens of other countries, according to the Dyadic Cyber Incident Database compiled by U.S. academics. These attacks are likely to continue, including during the 2024 U.S. presidential election campaign.

Disinformation

Russia has long used disinformation, often more effectively than its rivals, to supplement other tools and as a weapon by itself. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union successfully promoted the falsehood that the CIA was linked to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and that U.S. scientists invented the AIDS virus, a campaign referred to as Operation Denver.

Russia uses information campaigns abroad to make the Putin regime look good at home. By highlighting pro-Russian sentiment in Europe, the corruption of Russia’s enemies, and unpopular European policies on immigration, Moscow tries to make its own regime more popular as well as discredit its enemies. Similarly, Russia has tried to create an image of itself as a muscular Christian nation, contrasting its policies with LGBTQ+ and immigrant-friendly Europe and the United States.

Beyond bolstering Putin, disinformation is a way to weaken and divide Russia’s enemies. Famously, the Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll farm, used disinformation in an attempt to influence the 2016 U.S. election, seeking to discredit Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and promote Donald Trump. On YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms, trolls pushed propaganda on immigration, race, and gun rights to conservative accounts while other parts of the Russian effort encouraged Black Americans to protest, inflaming tension among Americans.

In subsequent years, Russia has spread disinformation related to COVID-19 and other conspiracies, used a false news site in 2020 to get legitimate U.S. journalists to write stories on social disruption in the United States, and magnified the potential side effects of COVID-19 vaccines to decrease support for the Biden administration.

Ukraine is both a subject and a target of disinformation. In the years between Russia’s 2014 proxy war and 2022 invasion, Russian propaganda stressed that Ukraine was a failed, Nazi-led state, whose army was brutal to the local population. After Russia invaded Ukraine, the disinformation machine kicked into overdrive, both to justify the invasion at home and to undermine support for helping Ukraine abroad. To European audiences hosting large numbers of refugees like Poland, Russian propaganda claimed that the government was helping refugees over their own citizens. In Africa and other parts of the developing world, Moscow pushed the idea that the EU had banned Russian agricultural products while keeping Ukraine’s grain, causing a global food crisis.

Russia exploits overt and covert information sources, ranging from official government media to disinformation via government agencies, often in combination. Russia’s Foreign Ministry, for example, has played up false reports from Russian media of immigrants raping a thirteen-year-old Russian-German girl to stir up divisions in Germany and accusing the German government of not doing enough to protect its people, a sentiment that undermined German confidence in government and bolstered Russia’s image as tough on criminal immigrants. Even the Russian Orthodox Church, whose patriarch is staunchly pro-Putin, is involved. The church spreads propaganda while allowing its facilities to be used as safe houses for Russian priests to work with Russian intelligence agents.

Social media offers numerous, and cheap, additional ways to spread disinformation. Moscow uses fake accounts, anonymous websites, bots, and other means to spread its message, often using these sources to spread RT and Sputnik propaganda and to provide “evidence” for further lies from official media. Some of this involves troll accounts monitored by humans. Moscow also uses bots to try to amplify content and tries to exploit social media company algorithms to target particular audiences. At times, Russia will create innocuous accounts focused on health, fitness, or sports and then later, when they have a substantial following, begin to introduce political messages.

The wide array of actors each has its own audience. In addition, they amplify each other, with state voices and seemingly independent ones validating each other. Halting some are more difficult than others: it is one thing to block Russian state television or take down fake accounts, but it is another to block the Orthodox Church with millions of adherents outside Russia.

Generative AI offers a new means of disinformation. At the outset of the Ukraine war, Russia attempted to use a deepfake of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that led it to appear that he had fled the country and was urging troops to lay down their arms. Less dramatically, Russia spread deepfakes on Facebook and Reddit that showed Ukrainian teachers praising Putin. The technology has improved by leaps and bounds since then. Deepfakes will be increasingly cheap and easy to produce, and this can be done at scale, allowing Russia to flood the zone with convincing falsehoods.

There are myriad potential uses of deepfakes. Russia’s attempt to blame Ukraine for instigating the 2022 invasion could be more convincing in the future by “leaking” deepfakes of Ukrainian generals planning an attack on Russian territory. Moscow can spread scurrilous rumors about anti-Russian leaders and undermine their political support by releasing fake videos of them in compromising situations or saying offensive remarks. Moscow could try to further polarize the United States or other countries, worsening existing racial tension by releasing videos of supposedly violent Black Lives Matter rallies or of police abuses of members of minority communities. In Europe, variations of this might play out with anti-migrant videos showing migrants committing rape and murder, often mixing genuine crimes and violence with false information.

Such efforts might not sway people to Russia’s position. However, they are likely to sow discord and decrease confidence in government in general. All information, even the truth, would be suspect.

Political Subversion

In the Soviet days, Moscow aggressively subverted unfriendly governments, and these efforts helped it install Communist regimes in several Eastern European states at the end of World War II. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union infiltrated trade union movements in Africa, encouraged radical nationalist parties, and otherwise tried to shape the politics of countries it sought to influence.

Although Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and disinformation related to the Brexit vote that year correctly gathered considerable attention, Russia has also subsequently interfered in elections throughout Europe. In 2017, Russia pushed conspiracy theories and other radical ideas into the Czech Republic, played up migrant crime in the March 2018 Italian election, and used fake news, social media trolls, and other means to target Emmanuel Macron’s campaign in France. In Sweden, Russia spread disinformation about a joint military exercise with NATO. Russian disinformation also heated up during large-scale protests, such as pro-independence ones in Catalonia in 2017 and “yellow vest” demonstrations in France in 2018-2019. Russian propaganda regularly questioned the legitimacy of the European Union, blaming it for problems with migrants, and used disinformation to try to depress turnout in the May 2019 EU elections. Indeed, data from the University of Toronto suggests that almost every European country was targeted in one way or another. 

At times, Russia supports political parties that share its interests. Some of these are anti-establishment parties, like the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany or Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, the latter of which also received a loan from a Russian bank. In Greece, Russia backed both far-left and far-right parties, as both were Euro-skeptical. A 2020 study by the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy found at least sixty cases of Moscow supporting political campaigns outside Russia, although the evidence on some cases is weaker than others. As of August 24, 2023, the figure was 199 cases of interference overall, with techniques including “malign finance,” information operations, and civil society disruption.

Russia also seeks to create, and then exploit, economic dependencies. Russia uses its extensive energy sector to create links to its oil and natural sectors with leaders in other countries, giving them a personal and financial interest in having a country with a strong relationship with Russia. Moscow also has developed close relationships with smuggler networks in neighboring states.

Instigating protests is another way of shaping perceptions and increasing support for Russia in preparation for more aggressive measures. In Ukraine, Russia originally sought to use its agitators to create extreme right-wing anti-Russian protests, infiltrating them with paid criminals and agent provocateurs who would then attack the police. Russia would then use these protests as proof of a “far-right coup” to justify its invasion. Indeed, Russia intended to defeat Ukraine quickly in 2022 in part by fomenting instability and chaos in Ukraine itself and, in so doing, undermining trust in government, tarnishing Ukraine as an ally for potential partners, and promoting pro-Russian voices in the country.

Russia sees such subversive operations in part as a tit-for-tat response to Western pressure. Moscow viewed the various color revolutions in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine as fomented by the West, and it also blames the United States and the West for anti-government street protests in Moscow, such as those that occurred in 2011 and 2012. U.S. efforts to promote democracy and build the rule of law are viewed as transparent attempts to undermine Moscow and its allies.

Russian Weaknesses

Gray zone warfare is a necessity for Russia in part due to its weaknesses. Russia’s military is a shell of the Red Army that posed a serious threat to Western Europe during the Cold War. Its economy is stagnant, even without the impact of Western sanctions, and is roughly the size of Canada. The threat from Russia is not a return to the Cold War when two superpowers wrestled over control of the world. Instead, Russia is a weak challenger trying to play a bad hand to its advantage.

Although numerous Russian actors are involved in gray zone activities, they are generally uncoordinated. These actors include military intelligence, domestic and foreign intelligence services, state-owned enterprises, official media, private military companies, self-proclaimed patriotic groups in Russia including biker gangs, various oligarchs, co-opted hackers, the Russian Orthodox Church, and many others. This broad set of actors allows more opportunism and creativity, but it makes unity of effort harder. Many of Russia’s front groups and local allies are also of limited loyalty, especially in a crisis. In Ukraine, Wagner Group contractors and the Russian military clashed over high casualty rates and a shortage of ammunition. Even some structures created by Russian intelligence in Ukraine, such as organizations composed of retired KGB special forces, stayed loyal to Ukraine when the invasion occurred.

Although Russian cyber attacks can be disruptive, Moscow’s capabilities are limited if countries can build a strong defense. Ukraine successfully blunted Russia’s cyber attacks during its 2022 invasion, thanks to help from the United States, the United Kingdom, and private companies such as Microsoft. Russia is at best middling in its AI capabilities and comparable to Canada, rather than to the United States or China. The exodus of much of Russia’s tech talent following the 2022 invasion and subsequent conscription only worsens Moscow’s problems.

Russia itself is also vulnerable to gray zone activity. Views of Russia across the globe are highly negative, according to a 2023 Pew Research Center poll that covered twenty-four countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A median of 82 percent of respondents had an unfavorable view of Russia, and 87 percent had little or no confidence in Vladimir Putin. These sentiments create opportunities for subverting Russian diplomatic, military, and other actions.

The same is true of Russian private military companies, which are active in Africa, the Middle East, and even Latin America. Prigozhin was instrumental in expanding Russia’s influence by using his Wagner Group to train foreign forces, conduct military operations, extract resources, and help coup-proof local regimes. But Prigozhin’s death in August 2023, almost certainly at Putin’s instruction, is likely to undermine the morale, leadership, and effectiveness of some Russian private military companies. Social media channels linked to Wagner blamed Putin and other Russian officials for orchestrating Prigozhin’s death and threatened retaliatory action against Moscow. Leaders in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Sudan, and other countries may opt to break ties with Wagner and consider alternatives to improve security.

Recommendations

Training and aid packages must focus not only on stopping Russian conventional aggression but also on fighting gray zone warfare. Russia’s efforts are most successful when a country has weak border controls, poor counterintelligence, internal divisions, is awash in firearms, and is unprepared for Russian machinations, according to a RAND study. All these conditions can be countered or at least reduced.

The specifics will vary by country and area. Efforts to combat corruption, improve border security, fight low-level insurgencies, and encourage political reform are vital for reducing Moscow’s influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. In Europe, assistance should focus on intelligence coordination, cyber defense, and border control measures. Europe must prepare for a surge of migrants facilitated by Russia, especially in such frontline states as Finland, Poland, the Baltics, and Romania. Finland is building a three-meter-high fence made of steel mesh and barbed wire in case Russia attempts to flood its 1,343-kilometer border with illegal immigrants. But it could use additional assistance in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection from drones and other systems. The Baltic states’ military leaders warned that they would shoot any “little green men” and otherwise quickly respond to covert Russian military attacks.

Moscow’s cyber and AI skills, while impressive, are far less than those of the United States and its European allies, and bolstering cyber defenses will reduce some dangers. Intelligence sharing and training of allied militaries can diminish the impact of Russian support for insurgency and terrorism. Public exposure of Russian election manipulation can, in some cases, reduce its impact, and U.S. influence operations may prove more effective given the shaken condition of the Russian regime today. Most of all, the United States and its allies should link sanctions relief and other current punishments to Moscow’s gray zone meddling as well as its invasion of Ukraine.

The United States and its allies should also prepare efforts to discredit Russian private military companies around the world and counter Russian propaganda that promotes Putin as a successful leader. This would involve highlighting increases in terrorism in areas where groups like Wagner are used in Africa, the corruption of Russian officials, and videos that highlight the challenges for ordinary Russians due to Putin’s rule. More specific information efforts may target Russian elites that help hold up the regime: this may decrease their support for Putin or at the very least increase mistrust within elite circles.

Allies need to stand firm against Russian gray zone warfare—and Washington must back them. Moscow may be economically weak, and its conventional military is a far cry from the feared Red Army of the Cold War. But Russia is not down and out. The most effective way to contain Putin is to limit his ability to operate in the gray zone.

Daniel Byman is a professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a senior fellow with the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His latest book is Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism.

Seth G. Jones is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He was a plans officer and adviser to the commanding general, U.S. Special Operations Forces, in Afghanistan, as well as the author of In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (W.W. Norton).

Image: Shutterstock.

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