Diplomacy & Crisis News

Alors que les relations entre la Turquie et la Russie demeurent marquées par l'ambiguïté et par une rivalité constante, celles qui lient Ankara et Minsk sont au beau fixe. La proximité entre MM. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan et Alexandre Loukachenko explique ce rapprochement qui permet au second d'écarter un (...) / Russie, Biélorussie, Turquie, Relations bilatérales, Armement, Autoritarisme, Diplomatie, Islam - 2020/12

James Holmes

Military History,

Not every military strategist withstands the test of time, but these guys do. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: These men were products of the times they lived in, but their words remain relevant today.

Ranking military strategists against one another is a slippery chore. Apart from the obvious differences among strategists—the historical epochs when they lived, the state of martial technology in their lifetimes, warmaking methods then in vogue—there's a more basic difference. Some strategists are mainly practitioners; others are mainly theorists.

So how do you judge, say, a field soldier like General Ulysses S. Grant—a victor whose bulldog approach to battlefield combat is Carl von Clausewitz's "principle of continuity” made manifest—against a Clausewitz, an indifferent soldier whose accomplishments as a man of letters shape strategic thought and actions to this day? Hard to say.

Oddly, many of the greats seem to be indifferent practitioners who started scribbling down their insights after being defeated, cashiered or both. Maybe failure clears the mind. It hardly renders their ideas moot. Indeed, you ultimately have to favor such teachers over doers. They mine the historical record—the record of the deeds of great captains—for insight into the arcane art of strategy. Napoleon and Frederick the Great are fixtures in Clausewitz's On War. Lord Horatio Nelson is the face of Alfred Thayer Mahan's sea-power theories. Thucydides has Pericles, Alcibiades, Brasidas, Lysander and many others. Practitioners supply the data for teachers to analyze and pass on.

You need both doers and thinkers to perpetuate strategic thought—but ultimately, the thinker with a feel for battlefield realities trumps the practitioner with little flair for analyzing his experiences, drawing out the takeaways and recording the results. Hence, wordsmiths, not commanders, dominate my list of “History's Five Greatest Military Strategists.” A ranking of self-made strategists might encompass warrior-statesmen from Julius Caesar to Nathanael Greene to Abraham Lincoln. With that disclaimer, onward!

Homer:

You've got to respect an author whose identity is lost in antiquity, yet whose writings still compel. As Lawrence Freedman notes, the chronicler of the Trojan War was among the first to explore two dominant themes in martial thought: biê, meaning brute force applied in frontal engagements, and mêtis, meaning craft, guile and subterfuge. It's commonplace to depict biê as the dominant strain in the Western way of war. And indeed, over the centuries, countless Western warriors and theorists have voiced discomfort with seemingly less-than-honorable methods.

Yet Homer reminds posterity that Europe has its own tradition of indirection and cleverness. This isn't just the province of Sun Tzu and his inscrutable Asian followers. Freedman sees Achilles as the face of biê, the Iliad as the chronicle of the direct approach. Trickster Odysseus is the face of mêtis, the Odyssey as Homer's brief for indirection. When you tote things up, the poet seems to conclude that both strands of thought are indispensable—but that biê harnessed by commanders with a gift for mêtis is best. Odysseus makes out better than Achilles. This is a discourse worth revisiting millennia hence.

Thucydides:

We return to the Aegean world for history's fourth-best military thinker. Many might give Thucydides pride of place on this list, and I might agree were this a list of grand strategists. But a treatise about boats and spears doesn't quite make the grade for a ranking of purely military strategy. Nor does the Athenian chronicler spell out his ideas with the clarity of a Wylie, Corbett or Clausewitz. Still, it's all there in Thucydides' History: the land power fighting the sea power, the importance of finance in warmaking, the imperative to build friendly and break enemy alliances, the calculus for opening secondary theaters or operations and much, much more besides. A work for all time.

J. C. Wylie:

Yet another dead white male! And yet I'm cheating here ... or, more charitably, deploying some mêtis of my own. Admiral Wylie acts as a proxy for non-Western strategists like Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong, who prize circumspection, as well as for Englishman B. H. Liddell Hart, the twentieth century's prophet of the indirect approach. Wylie is a kind of meta-strategist, using others' ideas to devise a unified field theory of strategy. He divides warfare into land, maritime, air and Mao schools of thought before concluding that Liddell Hart's big idea—indirection—is the one idea that spans them all. Wylie's compact volume is a tour de force. You might expect me, a maritime strategist, to reach for Mahan first when confronting difficult questions. Nope. Give me Wylie, who served on the Naval War College faculty in the 1950s, over Mahan, an NWC veteran from the 1880s and 1890s, any day.

Julian S. Corbett:

Clausewitz ventures onto the briny main in Corbett's writings. The English theorist wrote for global sea powers—the Royal Navy then, the U.S. Navy now—but any naval power, strong or weak, could press his ideas into service. He proclaims that the Mahanian idea—that the decisive fleet engagement is the route to victory at sea—is correct nine times out of ten. He then spends most of his book analyzing the remaining tenth. The upshot: sea powers can wage limited wars to shape events on land, and even the strong will find themselves weaker at certain times and places. To figure out how the weak can make themselves strong—and emerge triumphant from conflicts occupying that middle ground between peace and all-out war—ask Sir Julian.

Carl von Clausewitz:

The grand master. Best known for appraising the relationship between politics and war, civil and military affairs, Clausewitz sees strategy as military strategy. It's about using battles and engagements to advance the purpose of the war. Think about the general surveying a Napoleonic battlefield—his vision clouded by fog and the smoke of cannon, overseeing a military machine encumbered by friction and dark passions—and you get the idea. There is a reason courses in military strategy, whether Western or Eastern, start with Clausewitz. And there's a reason Asian theorists like Mao incorporate the Prussian into their meditations on politics and war. That's because he articulates a universal logic and grammar of armed conflict. Doing so merits numero uno on my list.

Now, many of you will protest who made my list, who got left off and who was placed where in the pecking order. Good! Get out there, immerse yourself in works on strategic theory, and draw up your own catalogue of go-to scribes. The destination of your intellectual journey matters. But the journey is where you find enlightenment.

James Holmes is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific. The views voiced here are his alone. This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Warfare History Network

History, Europe

The forest was crawling with enemy soldiers. Third Platoon had to fight its way into its own company kitchen area.

The sound of German artillery shells shrieking overhead from across the Siegfried Line was not the wakeup call Technical Sergeant Robert Walter of 3rd Platoon, L Company, 3rd Battalion, 393rd Infantry Regiment expected to receive on the morning of December 16, 1944. 

He had experienced enemy shelling before. Since mid-November, when the 99th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the sector of the Ardennes Forest previously manned by the 9th Infantry Division, Sergeant Walter and his fellow 99ers had been the recipients of regular artillery barrages that were carried out with predictable German efficiency. Every day at the same time, the periscopes on the bunkers across the Siegfried Line rose out of their ports. A short time later, a half dozen rounds would come crashing down on the American lines. After that, the guns fell silent for the rest of the day.

“That Ends Our Daily Ration!”

The men of the Checkerboard Division had started calling this their “daily allowance” and even found some comfort in the routine. Sergeant Walter and his foxhole mates figured the present bombardment was just more of the same and that, for whatever reason, the Germans were getting things done a little early that morning—0530 to be exact.

Soon, though, it became apparent that something was very different about this day’s enemy fire mission. Rather than a leisurely six rounds for the entire attack, that number of shells now rained down in a matter of seconds. Bright flashes lit up the darkness, the ground shook, and the noise was incredible.

Also, instead of dying out after a few minutes the barrage continued for what seemed like forever—and only grew in intensity. “That ends our daily ration!” one of the men with Walter quipped over the din as they huddled in their foxhole. To the  22-year-old technical sergeant, however, something big was obviously going on.

What puzzled Walter was that none of the shells seemed to be aimed at the thin line of infantrymen stretched along the International Highway, a north-south road essentially marking the border between Belgium and Germany. Instead, the target appeared to be farther west. He concluded that the enemy gunners were trying to knock out the 99th Division’s artillery battalions located a mile or so northeast of the twin villages of Krinkelt and Rocherath, Belgium.

At approximately 0730, the shelling lifted. Third Platoon and the rest of L Company stayed low in their foxholes, however. The sound of artillery was now replaced by rifle and machine-gun fire coming from seemingly everywhere around them. The rate of fire was especially heavy to the south, in the vicinity of L Company’s brother companies I and K.

The Wahlerscheid Offensive

This baffled Sergeant Walter. He could understand it if all of the noise was coming from the north, in the direction of Monschau. For the past three days a regimental combat team consisting of two battalions from the 99th’s 395th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Battalion from his own 393rd had been supporting the 2nd Infantry Division’s efforts to seize the Wahlerscheid road junction inside the German border. The Wahlerscheid offensive was critical in the Allies’ larger effort to capture the Roer River dams, which were key to their advance across the Roer Plain. The Germans knew this, too, and had waged a ferocious defense to ensure the Wahlerscheid crossroad stayed in their hands.

To support the Wahlerscheid drive, the remainder of the 393rd and the 394th Infantry Regiment to its south (the third infantry regiment of the 99th Division) had staged limited objective demonstration attacks all along their front lines. Their goal was to occupy as many enemy troops as possible to discourage German commanders from relocating these resources to the battle up north. The action had been brisk at times but nothing like what Walter was now hearing to his right. A significant action was underway.

Robert Walter: Platoon Leader and Sergeant

As he continued listening to the unseen battle raging nearby, Sergeant Walter again focused on his unique, and not entirely welcome, position within 3rd Platoon. Like every platoon in the 99th, the 3rd had been led by an officer, a second lieutenant, when the division entered the line. Soon after arriving in the Ardennes, however, the lieutenant made a clumsy jump out of the bed of a truck and fractured an ankle so badly that he had to be removed from combat. Due to the manpower shortage at that point in the war, no replacement was immediately named. So, for the time being, Sergeant Walter had become 3rd Platoon’s leader as well as its sergeant.

Until now, the young NCO had not found his dual role too overwhelming. But as the small arms exchange to the south continued growing in volume, the weight of his responsibilities began to press on him. He wished his company commander, Captain Paul Fogelman, would radio to let him know what was happening. The captain’s call finally came, but it was not at all what Walter had expected.

“Bob,” Fogelman’s voice crackled over the speaker, “I received a report that some Germans have infiltrated our kitchen area. Take your platoon back and clear them out.”

That was it? Along with the orders, Walter had hoped for an update regarding all that gunfire. But the captain did not act like he knew any more about the situation. “Yes, sir,” Walter replied. He was now more concerned than ever.

Clearing the Kitchen Area

Rousting his men from their foxholes, Walter briefed them on the mission and told them to take along only what they needed for the assignment, which in this case consisted mainly of rifles, ammunition, and grenades. The intent was to get the job done and get back to their foxholes as soon as possible, so everything not absolutely necessary was to be left behind. Within minutes, the platoon was headed west toward the company kitchen area located roughly three city blocks from the front line.

It might as well have been three miles. In the dense woods, the men could not see more than a few feet ahead of them. Not wanting to get separated and not sure what they were walking into, they proceeded with caution.

Before the platoon got halfway to its destination, Sergeant Walter’s worst fears were realized. Germans, a lot of them, began appearing all around the unit. This was much more than a few infiltrators. The forest was crawling with enemy soldiers. Third Platoon had to fight its way into its own company kitchen area.

Once there, the men began cleanup operations while Sergeant Walter radioed back to the front lines. “Hey, something’s really gone wrong!” he yelled into the handset. “There are more Germans back here than there are in front of us!” To Walter everything seemed to have gotten turned around and they were now fighting the war in reverse.

Despite the topsy turvy situation, 3rd Platoon’s order stood: clear the kitchen area. Surprisingly, the Germans there seemed more interested in continuing west than in trading bullets with Walter and his men. As the platoon moved in, these invaders moved out. Soon, the little patch of ground was back in friendly hands with the exception of one small building that no one had yet checked out.

Three Drunk Germans

By now, the sounds of battle from the surrounding woods had grown noticeably fiercer—and closer! Third Platoon went to ground, the men crouching or lying behind anything that offered even a measure of protection. Sergeant Walter desperately wanted to withdraw the platoon back to the company position, but he still was not sure about the status of that lone building. Under the circumstances, strolling up to the door and peeking inside did not seem particularly wise. The sergeant called to one of his men near the structure to throw a grenade at it, figuring the explosion would persuade anyone inside to come out.

The soldier’s toss missed the mark, and so did those of other platoon members who took a crack at the building. None could hit it. Since he had played a lot of softball as a kid, Walter finally decided he might have better luck. Rising to his feet behind a tree, he pulled the pin on a grenade, released the handle, counted to two, then stepped out and let fly.

Walter’s grenade did not hit its target either. But instead of falling short, it sailed over the roof of the building, exploding as it passed above the ridge. Shrapnel slapped down on the shingles; the noise inside must have been deafening. Despite being a serious overthrow, Walter’s effort had produced exactly the effect he had wanted.

At the same time, not 30 feet from where the sergeant made his throw, a flag rose from a foxhole that the L Company kitchen crew had dug sometime in the past. But its current occupants were not members of the 99th Division. Rather, they turned out to be three German soldiers with a machine gun who had decided to take cover there when 3rd Platoon showed up. Walter was stunned. He had no idea why they had not shot him down when he stepped out from behind the tree.

Third Platoon quickly moved to take the Germans prisoner. As these men were searched, Walter noticed something strange about them. They acted drunk. A couple of platoon members checked their canteens, and sure enough they contained alcohol.

“So that’s how they got them up for this fight,” Walter thought. “Sent them in drunk. Filled their canteens with liquor and then said, ‘Take off, boys.’”

“You Seem Kind of Lucky”

In the brief moments it took to disarm the Germans, the noise from the woods had turned into the zip and thwack of bullets cutting the foliage and striking objects all around, forcing the men of 3rd Platoon to take cover again. The battle was definitely headed their way. Everyone hugged the ground tightly.

During the firestorm, Private Snow managed to crawl up to Sergeant Walter, who was sheltering behind a tree. “Sergeant, do you mind if I stay near you?” he asked. “You seem kind of lucky.”

Lucky? Snow must have figured that since Walter had survived standing up to throw that grenade he had a streak of good fortune going. The sergeant and the private had trained together for two years, and Walter knew Snow to be a good soldier—quiet but competent. Snow was a Californian, and that had always struck Walter as funny—Snow from California. Right now, though, he could tell the private was scared to death. In the midst of the confusion, he felt compassion for the guy.

“Help yourself,” he replied.

Relieved, Snow moved close to Sergeant Walter, and the two men lay side by side as the gunfire intensified. A short time later, Walter said something to Snow, but the private did not respond. Glancing over at him, the sergeant was horrified by what he saw. Sometime in the last few minutes, a bullet had caught Snow between the eyes and he was dead. Walter never even felt him twitch.

No Sign of I Company

German infantrymen started pouring through the area. From the woods behind the Americans came the growling sound of enemy tanks—something 3rd Platoon was not at all equipped to handle. There was no time to contact the captain. Sergeant Walter knew he had to get his men out of the way. Otherwise, they would be prisoners or worse. But returning to L Company was out of the question. Motioning for the others to follow, he headed south toward I Company. They had no choice but to leave Private Snow’s body behind.

This move did little to improve the platoon’s circumstances, however. No matter how fast they traveled, they could not find the enemy’s flank but seemed permanently stuck in the middle of the German advance. Machine guns chattered and grenades exploded. Rifle fire filled the air. Guessing, dodging, hoping, and praying, 3rd Platoon kept pushing south, looking for any spot that could provide a defensive advantage.

The force of the attack carried the platoon completely through the I Company sector. As they passed through, the men were shocked not to find a single I Company soldier anywhere. By this time, I Company and the rest of L Company had pulled back to form a perimeter defense around the 3rd Battalion command post northeast of the twin villages, but no one in 3rd Platoon knew this at the time.

Worse yet, groups of enemy soldiers traveling west began cutting across the platoon’s route, separating some of its members from the rest of the unit. Sergeant Walter now found his already small command getting smaller by the minute.

Bad News from K Company

Third Platoon was finally able to stop its flight in the K Company sector, south of I Company, and what its men found there left them numb. As soon as the German artillery barrage lifted that morning, two battalions of Volksgrenadiers from the I SS Panzer Corps had slammed into K Company, wiping out two of its three platoons. A few survivors of this onslaught were still in the area, and they told Walter and his men that maybe 17 soldiers were left from both platoons. The rest had either been killed or captured.

More bad news followed. The traumatized K Company men reported that a couple of their buddies taken prisoner during the assault were wearing German belt buckles when captured. This infuriated their captors, who assumed these GIs had removed the buckles from the bodies of dead German soldiers they had killed, so they “re-removed” these souvenirs by slitting the Americans open with their bayonets.

The report sent a panic through 3rd Platoon, and each man did a quick inventory to ensure he did not possess anything that had once belonged to a German. Days earlier while on a patrol, some platoon members had come across a hollow tree stuffed with German money. Clueless as to why the stash was there, they decided some extra funds would come in handy once the 99th crossed into Germany and had stuffed their pockets full. Now, they pulled these bills and coins back out and threw them as far away as possible.

While this was occurring, Sergeant Walter remembered his own German item, an eye-catching little pin he had picked up in Krinkelt shortly before the 99th entered the line. The townspeople told him this decoration was given to any Belgian woman who became pregnant by an SS trooper as a reward for her contribution to the master race. Walter thought the pin was beautiful and carried it with him so he would not lose track of it. Taking it out of his pocket, he admired its beauty one last time and then tossed it into the underbrush.

Lying Low

Again, the roar of tank engines was heard, this time coming from the direction of the unpaved road from Hollerath, Germany, a southwestern route that intersected the International Highway and served as the dividing line between I and K Companies. Investigating this latest threat, Walter and his men could hardly believe their eyes. Scores of panzers accompanied by infantry were rolling down this muddy trail and headed west. The Americans had thought the road was impassable and probably mined as well. Now, the Germans were using it as a thoroughfare for their armor.

With no opportunity for other action, the soldiers of 3rd Platoon dove for cover wherever they could find it, hiding behind trees and bushes or burrowing into the snow. Walter found a spot in a clump of shrubbery so close to the road that if he had had a rod no longer than a fishing pole he could have tapped each tank as it drove by. It was the end of the line for Walter and his men. All they could do now was stay hidden and wait for the invaders to pass.

That did not happen soon. Hour after hour, the German tank and infantry procession continued. Eventually, the squeak of tank treads became so unnerving that one 3rd Platoon rifleman took a shot at a panzer. All this did was invite the next tank in line to fire a round in the direction of the shot. No one was wounded by the blast—the tank could not get its barrel down low enough.

Walter crawled around to all the men. “It’s no use firing at them,” he whispered. “We’re not going to stop them with rifles, so just lay low.” To the sergeant, he and his soldiers resembled ostriches helplessly sticking their heads in the sand. “What the hell am I going to do now?” he asked himself as he settled back into his hiding place.

“If Anyone Wants to Surrender, There Will be No Repercussions”

Late in the day, gaps started appearing in the enemy column, so Sergeant Walter decided to cross the Hollerath road with the prisoners his platoon had captured earlier and hike north in search of L Company. Despite the dense forest and the growing darkness, somehow he finally managed to find the company headquarters. Releasing his prisoners to headquarters personnel, he reported to his company commander.

Captain Fogelman had no new information he could share with his NCO platoon leader. The extent of the German offensive was still unclear; under these circumstances it was best for 3rd Platoon to remain where it was rather than risk trying to rejoin the company. Then the captain said something that sent a chill through Walter.

“If anyone wants to surrender, there will be no repercussions.”

The statement caught the sergeant by surprise but needed no further explanation. Captain Fogelman was acknowledging that 3rd Platoon’s situation was grim. If any platoon member decided to save himself rather than continue holding out, he would not face official punishment. It was a sobering consideration.

Unsettled, Sergeant Walter wrestled with himself all during his return to the platoon. He didn’t want to surrender and was sure his men didn’t either. So what should he tell them? It was a difficult call, but by the time he sneaked back across the Hollerath road, he had made up his mind. The company was not ready for 3rd Platoon to come in yet. They were to remain in place until a way out could be found. As he repeated this message to each group of men, he omitted what the captain had said about surrender and hoped he was doing the right thing.

Meanwhile, the enemy kept coming.

Word of the Malmédy Massacre

Sunday, December 17, brought more uncertainty to Sergeant Walter and his “lost” platoon. There seemed to be no end to the Germans’ advance down the Hollerath road. How did they ever manage to get such a large force that far forward without being noticed? And with the odds against it, how would 3rd Platoon survive? Increasingly, it looked like a hopeless situation.

As if the platoon’s predicament was not bad enough, late in the day word arrived that some Nazi outfit had gunned down a large group of American prisoners west of 3rd Platoon near a place called Malmédy. Walter and his men were aghast.

When this news broke, Sergeant Walter felt vindicated for not sharing what Captain Fogelman had said about surrender. On the other hand, every hour that passed put 3rd Platoon farther and farther behind enemy lines. The longer this battle continued, the harder it would be for soldiers on either side to abide by any form of recognized rules. By now, he was convinced the Germans knew where his platoon was hiding. If one of the passing units decided to take them prisoner, would they end up like those poor GIs near Malmédy? The Army never used the word retreat but referred to such actions as a “strategic withdrawal.” As he watched the enemy race by, Walter hoped somebody somewhere was working on a strategic withdrawal plan and would get it to them soon.

At roughly 2300 that night, during a lull in the traffic on the Hollerath road, 3rd Platoon was startled to hear the sound of a vehicle coming up the road from the west. The vehicle turned out to be an American medical jeep that had been sent forward to evacuate the wounded. The fact that this driver got through was miraculous to Sergeant Walter; Germans were thick on all sides. Apparently, they had seen the jeep’s Red Cross symbol and respected it—a heartening sign after the Malmédy news.

Despite their surprise, Sergeant Walter, his best friend Staff Sergeant Walter Levdansky, and several other soldiers came out of hiding to assist the driver. After helping load three litter cases onto the jeep, they watched the driver speed off into the night headed west. “Where in the hell do you think you’re going?” Sergeant Walter thought. The idea that the driver could make it back to the safety of the American lines was harder to fathom than the possibility of reaching 3rd Platoon in the first place.

Late on the morning of December 18, Sergeant Walter received word from Captain Fogelman that 3rd/393rd had been ordered to pull back to a new defensive position near a place called Elsenborn. Not certain what this meant for 3rd Platoon, Walter made another trip to L Company, seeking more information.

Two Disturbing Sets of Orders

“We think we’ve found a route back to our lines,” Fogelman said after Walter arrived. He explained that about 100 yards west was a little valley bordered on its far side by a hill. The valley ran north for some distance before turning west, and L Company was going to use this defilade to withdraw. But to mask this movement, one unit would have to create a diversion. Then he dropped a bombshell. That unit was 3rd Platoon. “I want you to keep your platoon where it is and give us covering fire while we pull out,” he added.

Taken aback, Sergeant Walter began to wonder what his commanding officer thought of him and his men. Did he consider them expendable? Who was going to cover their withdrawal? This “plan” sounded more like a suicide mission.

Captain Fogelman next briefed the sergeant on when and where 3rd Platoon was to reconnect with the company after the withdrawal, and then dismissed him to return to his men. As he was leaving headquarters, Walter overheard a directive that was even more disturbing than the orders he had just been given. An officer told several GIs to take the three prisoners he had brought in two days earlier into the woods and shoot them. Later, while Walter was still en route to his destination, gunshots sounded from the area where the officer had pointed.

“Okay, Let’s Go”

Back with 3rd Platoon, Sergeant Walter gathered his men and briefed them on their mission. Then he had them cross the Hollerath road in small groups. The platoon moved north to take up new positions nearer to L Company. At the time when the company’s pullback was to begin, 3rd Platoon cut loose with a brief but intense rifle volley in the direction of the advancing Germans.

This ignited a hailstorm of bullets and mortar rounds from the other side. But instead of being directed at 3rd Platoon, this barrage thundered down on the valley where L Company was trying to make its escape. How had they known, and how bad were things in that valley? Suddenly, the sergeant felt much better about the role his platoon had been given in this operation. Maybe the captain had done him and his men a favor after all.

Now, a game of chicken began as Sergeant Walter tried to determine whether the Germans that blasted L Company had left the area or were still out there waiting for 3rd Platoon to make its move. After an hour and a half, he called the men together.

“First of all, I’ve been told if you want to surrender, it’s no disgrace,” Walter said, finally sharing what Captain Fogelman had told him earlier. “We aren’t trained this way, but do you see that hill behind us? Personally, I’m going over it. If you want to follow me, you can. If you have a route you think is better, take it. The main thing is to get out of here and get back to our lines.”

To a man, the platoon voted to follow their sergeant.

Walter had one more precaution to take. Directing his men to redistribute ammunition so that each soldier had at least one full clip, he ordered the platoon to fire another volley at the Germans to see if they would answer in kind. After roughly 10 minutes, when there was no return fire, he gave the order: “Okay, let’s go.”

Fighting the Germans and the Elements

Although unconventional, Sergeant Walter’s plan worked to perfection. He and his men were cresting the hill before the Germans, who had been waiting for the platoon, realized what was happening and opened up with machine guns. Even then, they had been anticipating another move through the valley and had registered their weapons too low to have any effect. The bullets chewed harmlessly into the hillside while the platoon made good its break.

The greatest enemy facing 3rd Platoon now became the weather. The snow was already two feet deep and more was falling. It was miserably cold, and the wind was whipping the heavy curtain of flakes around so hard that visibility was practically zero. Unlike some other soldiers he had trained with back in the States, Sergeant Walter had made the most of his time in compass school. Now that skill became a lifesaver, keeping him and his men on course for their hookup with L Company rather than wandering aimlessly around the woods.

Third Platoon’s route took it through the sector previously occupied by the 99th Division’s artillery battalions. There the unit found big guns and towing vehicles, jeeps mostly, that had been abandoned in place because the withdrawing units did not have time to ready them for travel. Determined not to leave anything useful for the enemy, the men paused long enough to drop grenades into gun breeches and engine compartments. Then, realizing that the explosions might attract the attention of any German units nearby, they made a hasty exit.

A short distance away, though, the platoon stopped again when it ran across the artillery unit’s food dump; not food in packages—a literal garbage dump. Hunger overcame fear as men who had not eaten in three days scrounged through other men’s castoffs looking for something edible. Sergeant Walter managed to find a piece of bread that had not been totally demolished by the elements. His buddy Sergeant Levdansky was the big winner. He found a whole raw potato.

Rendevous with L Company

That evening as darkness settled in, the worn out men of 3rd Platoon finally reached their rendezvous point with L Company, a section of woods to the east of the twin villages. The place was fairly open with sparse underbrush but still offered good concealment for L Company and the assorted stragglers from other units who had assembled there. Relieved to be back among so many friendly faces, Sergeant Walter and his men relished the prospect of catching a little shut-eye before making the final push to their new defensive positions.

But sleep was in short supply that night. As always, the Germans seemed to know exactly where L Company was and threw a steady stream of phosphorous flares over its position, lighting up the area like it was daylight. Instead of getting some much needed rest, the men of 3rd Platoon, along with the others, were forced to stay awake, bracing for sniper fire and an artillery attack that never came.

The flares finally tapered off around midnight on December 19. Shortly afterward, L Company crept away under cover of darkness, trudging northwest for hours through the snow and ice to rejoin 3rd Battalion at a place that was not even on the map but would soon become renowned because of its stubborn defense by the American units dug in there. They stopped SS General Josef “Sepp” Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army dead in its tracks. That place was Elsenborn Ridge.

Technical Sergeant Robert Walter had no inkling that this destiny lay ahead as he stared wearily at the boomerang-shaped piece of high ground in the faint morning light. After three gut-wrenching days behind enemy lines, caught between indescribable firepower while enduring fear, cold, hunger, and the threat of capture or death at any moment, he had already gone through hell and survived. Elsenborn Ridge was not heaven by a long shot, but at least it offered his 3rd Platoon the chance to live and fight another day.

And for now, somehow, that seemed like more than enough.

Epilogue

Sergeant Walter survived the war and returned to his home in Fostoria, Ohio, where he served as a police officer for nearly a decade before entering private industry. Throughout his working career, he also gave freely of his time as a volunteer to many civic organizations in the Fostoria community. Sergeant Walter passed away April 19, 2014, at the age of 91.

Jay Marquart is a freelance writer from Bluffton, Ohio, whose writing has appeared in such publications as Horse & Rider, Military Medical/ CBRN Technology, and Vietnam.

This article first appeared on the Warfare History Network.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Ari Heistein

Security, Middle East

While Israel is not a party to the war in Yemen, it does have interests in the arena.

The trajectory of the war in Yemen is now highly uncertain due to a number of factors which include the upcoming change in U.S. administrations as well as the failure of the Saudi efforts over the past year to maintain internal cohesion within its coalition and reach a negotiated settlement with Houthis. The present uncertainty provides an impetus for Jerusalem to recalibrate its approach to the Yemen conflict, and it should consider shifting its policy to one which more actively supports the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in South Yemen.

While Israel is not a party to the war in Yemen, it does have interests in the arena: preventing the Iran-backed Houthis from growing more powerful and acquiring advanced weapons from Tehran, extricating Saudi Arabia (Israel’s unofficial partner in the regional anti-Iran coalition) from the costly quagmire, and preventing the resurgence of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda. The current state of affairs, in which Saudi Arabia leads a coalition supporting the central Government of Yemen (GOY) headed by President Hadi, advances only one of Israel’s three interests in the theater.

Based on the events over the past five years, the second half of which has been a stalemate between Saudi-backed forces and the Houthis, Hadi’s government appears unable to eliminate or even diminish the Iranian proxy threat. If anything, recent years have seen the pace, accuracy, and sophistication of Houthi attacks increase considerably.

In addition, despite Saudi Arabia’s best efforts, it appears unable to extricate itself from the conflict that has already cost it dearly in blood, treasure, and international reputation. This is because if Riyadh withdraws before a political settlement has been reached—and any deal seems like a remote possibility at present—then the GOY could collapse under Houthi pressure and leave Saudi Arabia without any channel of influence in what is often described as its “backyard.”

The one Israeli interest that has been advanced in Yemen is the decimation of Sunni jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). However, this is hardly the handiwork of the Saudi-backed Hadi government. Rather, close cooperation between the United States, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and UAE-backed southern forces has led to the degradation of jihadists groups from their peak in 2015-2016 when AQAP took control of the Yemeni port city of Mukalla.

To ensure that its interests are protected in the face of potentially dramatic changes, particularly in Saudi policy, Israel should consider supporting Yemen’s STC in its ambitions to achieve independence for South Yemen. An independent South Yemen could safeguard Israel’s interests to a considerable degree: The STC and its UAE backers have already demonstrated willingness to take on jihadist forces, they are not dependent on Saudi support, and their rise could allow for Riyadh to end its costly involvement in Yemen. Geographically, they leave any future Iran-aligned Houthi state in north Yemen essentially encircled by hostile forces. The partition of Yemen would also deny the Houthis the fig leaf of legitimacy—a benign cover for malign activity—which would be granted to them in the event of a political settlement that maintained Yemen’s unity (a la Hezbollah).

However, it must also be acknowledged that Yemen’s STC will not resolve the Houthi threat. Given their southern separatist orientation, it is obvious why STC forces would be uninterested in conquering that very same northern Yemen territory from which they seek to secede. But in light of the fact that a unified and moderate Yemen is not a realistic possibility for the foreseeable future, partitioning the country may represent an optimal alternative between the extremes of unrealistic optimism regarding the prospects of the GOY and forsaking Yemen to the Houthis.

For Israel in particular, the rise of the STC could be a positive development given the organization’s apparent openness to Jews and the Jewish state. Two days after the UAE-Israel normalization agreement was announced, STC Vice President Hani Bin Brik declared his interest in visiting Tel Aviv, meeting with Jews from South Yemen, and then going together with them to Jerusalem to pray. Such public identification with Israel and Jews is quite rare in the Arab world and could mean that Israel has a potential ally conveniently located around Bab al-Mandeb—one of the most important maritime chokepoints in the world. In the Yemeni theater, all of the alternatives to the STC are far more hostile or at least standoffish in their approach to Israel.

At present, the STC is in control of Aden but it is not yet ready to govern the entirety of South Yemen because it lacks both the infrastructure to provide essential services and the adequate global support to delineate new international boundaries in rejection of those borders established when Yemen was unified in 1990. But it is worth remembering that there are no silver bullets or elegant solutions to this very messy conflict. Supporting the STC will not deliver a quick fix for Yemen because no such quick fix exists. Yet Israel might consider how it could support South Yemen’s aspirations as a means to ensure its interests in a strategic location at a time of great uncertainty.

Ari Heistein is a research fellow and chief of staff to the director at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Israel.

Image: Reuters.

Stephen Silver

Technology, Americas

The Spotify software, if implemented, would catch whether elements of songs, such as the chord sequence, melodic fragments, harmony, match those of existing music, in a process that would take place in near real-time.

This week, the timelines of many social media users are full of their annual reports from Spotify, stating which songs and artists they listened to most often in 2020. This was enough to get the names of multiple artists, including Taylor Swift, trending on Twitter Tuesday.

But this week, there’s some other news from the music streaming giant. The website Music Business Worldwide noticed a filing for a patent this week for “Plagiarism Risk Detector And Interface,” which will discover “methods, systems and computer program products . . . for testing a lead sheet for plagiarism.” 

It’s an extremely common occurrence in the music business for the writers of popular songs to be sued for plagiarism, by artists claiming they came up with the song first. In 2015, Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams lost a lawsuit over their hit Blurred Lines, and were ordered by a jury to pay more than $7 million to the estate of Marvin Gaye.

The Spotify software, if implemented, would catch whether elements of songs, such as the “chord sequence, melodic fragments, harmony,” match those of existing music, in a process that would take place “in near real-time.”

Spotify describes the tool as “a graphical user interface (GUI) that is more intuitive, more precise as to the portion of the work that may be considered plagiaristic, and that provides dynamic visual feedback in substantially real-time.”

The patent, which was filed in Europe, has just now been approved, indicating that its actual implementation in Spotify’s algorithms is probably a ways away. But the technology is already controversial. 

“They should use AI to invent technology that pays artists fairly,” one Twitter user said. Another speculated that the new tool would “single handedly cause the sample scene to flock to bandcamp.” 

Back in September Spotify, which competes directly with Apple’s music streaming service Apple Music, issued a statement objecting to Apple’s announcement of a new Apple One bundle for its different services.

“Once again, Apple is using its dominant position and unfair practices to disadvantage competitors and deprive consumers by favoring its own services,” Spotify told the media following Apple’s September event. “We call on competition authorities to act urgently to restrict Apple’s anti-competitive behavior, which if left unchecked, will cause irreparable harm to the developer community and threaten our collective freedoms to listen, learn, create, and connect.”

Spotify, throughout the year, has been moving further into the podcasting world, in an attempt to diversify beyond merely music streaming. The company reached an exclusive deal to carry “The Joe Rogan Experience” podcast, while also paying nearly $200 million in February for the Ringer, Bill Simmons’s podcast-heavy media company. Spotify also was reportedly looking to launch a subscription podcast service, according to a report by The Verge in November.

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

Security, Asia

China is not happy about this at all.

With U.S. help, Taiwan is building its own new, indigenous fleet of attack submarines to protect waters off its shores and better safeguard maritime passageways between the island and mainland China, a move which is being criticized, downplayed and dismissed by Chinese military analysts. 

Following a celebration at one of Taiwan’s Southern ports commemorating the start of construction of Taiwanese “domestically developed” submarines, Chinese military analysts were quoted in a Chinese government-backed newspaper saying “the Taiwan island does not have what it takes to build advanced submarines, and even with U.S. help, the underwater vehicles could not make waves in the Taiwan Straits, and may suffer from technical difficulties that hinder combat capabilities.”

These remarks stand in stark contrast to comments from a Taiwanese leader cited in the paper saying the emerging submarines will help prevent hostile ships from “encircling Taiwan.” The Chinese experts quoted also questioned Taiwan’s industrial capacity to build the submarines, even though the island of Taiwan has long been known for having a range of production facilities as well as the technical knowledge to move forward. 

A Chinese military analyst was quoted in the paper saying “…with the help of the US, which could involve technology transfer, the island could eventually make the submarines work, but due to the inexperience of the island’s industry and the complexity of submarine development, the submarines could suffer technical difficulties that hinder their combat capabilities.”

The expert also claimed that Chinese Y-8 sub-hunting planes could easily monitor the activities of new Taiwanese submarines. “Many mainland warships are equipped with towed sonar systems, anti-submarine warfare helicopters and torpedoes, plus Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft,” the Chinese military analyst said in the paper. 

The issue of U.S. technological help seems quite significant, as while the new submarines are not likely to fully mirror the U.S. Virginia-class attack boats, Taiwan could benefit substantially from U.S. technological sophistication when it comes to attack submarine technologies. The U.S. has in recent years been progressing rapidly with new attack submarine weapons, sonar, sensors, command and control and quieting technologies. 

For example, new Taiwanese submarines could incorporate some of the quieting technologies now being built into Virginia-class boats, many of which were first prototyped years ago on the USS South Dakota, a now deployed Virginia-class submarine which began as a prototype test bed for a new generation of undersea technologies. While details related to many of these systems were naturally not available for security reasons, Navy leaders did explain that they included newer coating materials to lower a submarine’s acoustic signature and reduce the possibility of being detected by enemy sonar. The innovations also include newer kinds of propulsion technologies and command and control systems engineered to give modern U.S. attack submarines at technological edge over adversaries when it comes to reconnaissance, quiet coastal patrols or even surveil high-risk areas.

Taiwanese submarines could also benefit from U.S. innovations in the realm of firepower, as the U.S. Navy’s emerging Block V submarines are built with new, extended Virginia Payload Modules. Those modules are new 80-foot long sections of the submarines adding Tomahawk missiles to the boat’s overall firepower. Adding the modules brings the total number of Tomahawks on board a block V Virginia boat from twelve up to twenty-eight, a massive increase in firepower. 

Moving beyond firepower, the greatest technological advantage Taiwan might gain from U.S. assistance might be found in the realm of command and control, given that the Virginia-class submarines operate with a modern Large Aperture Bow sonar array bringing greater range, signal fidelity and sensitivity to submarine sonar detection. This, coupled with computer enabled, fly-by-wire navigational and sensor controls, could give the new Taiwanese submarines an edge when it comes to conducting clandestine reconnaissance missions off the coast of contested areas in the South China Sea or near mainland China. 

None of this is to say that new Taiwanese submarines will incorporate all of these systems, as much of that likely remains to be seen, but rather to point out that, with U.S. input, new Taiwanese subs may have a range of advanced and highly impactful technologies to evaluate.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. 

Image: Reuters

Shaul Chorev

Energy, Middle East

Once an agreement is in place, and the Lebanese people see a marked improvement in their economy, we may see decreased tension between the two countries and maybe even—one day—some sort of peace.

This week, Israel’s Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz issued an open invitation of sorts via Twitter welcoming Lebanese President Michel Aoun to meet in Europe in order to settle a long-standing dispute regarding the two country’s maritime borders.

On the surface, such a development is hardly groundbreaking, but considering Israeli law enforcement still considers Lebanon an enemy state after engaging in four bloody conflicts, these not-so-secret negotiations may set the stage for a paradigm shift for Israel, Lebanon and the region at large.

The major sticking point is how many square nautical miles belong to each country, with Israel accusing Lebanon of demanding far more territory than it is actually entitled to. In a tit for tat, Israel too, expanded its claim to its square miles beyond its shores. While the United States—who is mediating the discussions—described the three rounds of talks launched last month at the United Nations base in Naqoura as “productive,” the next meeting has yet to be scheduled.

This is unfortunate. Not just for Lebanon. Not just for Israel. But for the Middle East which has been making many encouraging strides to stability.

So, what’s to gain? On an economic level, the Lebanese are in dire straits and are suffering from the worst economy they’ve had since their civil war from 1975-1990. With the younger generation calling for change, the government has been putting pressure on Hezbollah to allow for further development along the Eastern Mediterranean. This includes many initiatives including exploring its natural gas resources along its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Twenty years ago, a country’s maritime domain was not crucial to states living by the sea, but as we witnessed from the huge boon Israel enjoyed from its own natural gas discoveries, that is rapidly starting to change. After being dependent on imports for much of its existence, Israel’s discovery of its Leviathan gas field 130 kilometers west of Haifa enabled them to export 40 percent of its gas to other countries and develop energy trade agreements with Egypt and Jordan. Now, Lebanon wants to explore and develop its potential gas fields in its EEZ and is likely to make a discovery along its Southern coast whose maritime border is shared with Israel.

Eventually, even if the talks fail, Lebanon is likely to stumble upon its own reservoir—one that very well may be in Israel’s territory. So, any delay in conducting these talks will just succeed in further kicking the can down the road.

But what are the security implications of having Hezbollah closer to Israel’s shores? One would imagine Israel would not be so keen to give one of its enemies such an advantage. However, as a retired admiral in the Israeli Navy, I can confidently say that any attack on Israel’s gas resources by Lebanon would warrant a swift response from Israel. This would cause Lebanon to think twice before acting aggressively.

In addition, these talks are backed by U.S. interests. As U.S. President Donald Trump wraps up his term, President-elect Joe Biden will be just as interested in maintaining these talks because weakening Hezbollah’s influence in the region would deal a mortal blow to the region’s “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Iran’s Shi’ite proxy as well as Syria and Iran. Dismantling their influence in the region and engaging with more moderate actors like Egypt and Saudi Arabia is part of the huge seismic change we’re now seeing in the Middle East and is one that enjoys largely bipartisan support.

Moreover, from a diplomatic standpoint, an agreement could demonstrate to Israel’s new friends in the region—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan—that it is acting in good faith by speaking with its neighbors. And improved relations with Sudan can positively influence Israel’s other maritime border along the Red Sea; roughly one-third of Israeli trade goes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait which is a hotbed for terrorist activity. Should Sudan continue to look favorably on Israel, it is likely to lead to a dialing down of tensions there which will be a boon for Israel leading to facilitating trade routes to China, India and beyond.

And what if the talks fail? Yes, there is a chance we will just continue to see more of the same. But a much more realistic scenario is that Lebanon could conduct exploratory missions in waters that Israel perceives to be part of its territory, just as Turkey has done with Greece in another part of the eastern Mediterranean. Israel will see it as a threat and the European Union’s oil and gas exploration companies behind these missions will be caught in the crosshairs of an explosive international crisis that could see implications across the region.

It is important to remember that these are not peace talks. But you have to start somewhere. After all, relations between the United States and China began with an innocuous game of table tennis.  

Once gas is found on the Lebanese side of the maritime border, the two countries will be required to coordinate with each other on activities related to dealing with cases of mishaps, accidents, marine pollution, etc. which will improve the level of trust between those involved. Furthermore, once an agreement is in place, and the Lebanese people see a marked improvement in their economy, we may see decreased tension between the two countries and maybe even—one day—some sort of peace.

As such, I implore both parties to try to find a common ground and I applaud Steinitz for conveying Israel’s willingness to compromise. I hope Lebanon will agree to do the same. We’re now witnessing the beginning of a new chapter in the Middle East, let’s not squander it.

Professor Rear Adm (ret.) Shaul Chorev is the head of the Maritime Policy & Strategy Research Center at University of Haifa and Director of the University's Ezri Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies.

Image: Reuters.

Stephen Silver

Technology, Americas

The film, which was expected to be one of the year’s biggest blockbusters, will hit both formats on Christmas Day. It will also have an international theatrical release on Dec. 16. And the release on HBO Max will only last for a month, leaving the door open to a possible theatrical re-release post-pandemic. 

Warner Media made the shocking announcement last month that it will debut Wonder Woman 1984 simultaneously in theaters and on the streaming service HBO Max. The film was scheduled for theatrical release earlier this year and was repeatedly delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic, and Warner decided that rather than wait until after the pandemic to put out a wide release, it would put a high-profile title on its streaming service instead, along with a release in whichever theaters are open.

Now, the company has announced, via a tweet by the film’s director Patty Jenkins, that it will be making the film available in high-tech presentation, including in 4K, with Dolby Vision and Dolby Atmos. All are a first since HBO Max launched earlier this year.

“Excited to announce that #WW84 will be the first film on HBO Max available in 4K Ultra HD, HDR 10, Dolby Vision AND Dolby Atmos! Can’t wait. IN THEATERS on Dec. 25th and exclusively streaming in the US on @hbomax,” the director said in the tweet. “PLEASE find the biggest and highest quality screen you can.”

Jenkins had previously said, at the time that the HBO Max release was first announced, that she preferred that fans go to see it in theaters. The film had a reported budget of $200 million, meaning that Warner is likely forgoing a large box office payday by not making the film a theatrical exclusive.

On the 4K and Dolby capabilities, “HBO Max will expand these capabilities to further films and TV series, as well as adding support for additional devices, throughout 2021,” the company said in an email announcement Tuesday.

The film, which was expected to be one of the year’s biggest blockbusters, will hit both formats on Christmas Day. It will also have an international theatrical release on Dec. 16. And the release on HBO Max will only last for a month, leaving the door open to a possible theatrical re-release post-pandemic. 

HBO Max subscribers will be able to watch the movie via the Amazon Fire platform, due to a deal reached by the parties earlier this fall. The big question is whether Warner will have made a similar deal with Roku in time for the “Wonder Woman” release, thus allowing those with 4K Roku TVs to experience the film that way. There were media rumblings prior to Thanksgiving that such a deal was imminent, but one has not been announced as of yet. 

“Wonder Woman 1984” once again stars Gal Gadot as the famous DC heroine, while “Saturday Night Live” veteran Kristen Wiig will play the villain, Cheetah. Also in the cast are Pedro Pascal, Robin Wright and Connie Nielsen, while Chris Pine will reprise his role from the first movie as Steve Trevor. 

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for the National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Kyle Mizokami

Security, Middle East

Sorry Tehran, but these weapons will more likely defend against Iran, than fight for it.

Here's What You Need to Remember: America used to support and supply Iran under the Shah, but no longer.

During the 1970s the ruler of Iran, the shah, was an ardent supporter of the United States. His coffers overflowing with petrodollars, the shah requested—and often got—the latest American weapons. Such examples included the AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter, Harpoon missile and even the F-14 Tomcat fighter. (His request for the SR-71 Blackbird was turned down.)

Now an entirely different theocratic, largely hostile regime rules Iran. The regime, armed with a hodgepodge of shah-era, homebrewed and Russian weapons, is less than optimally armed. But what if Iran had access to America’s great arsenal of democracy? What weapons would it choose to arm itself with?

1. MQ-9 Reaper

The Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle would be an extremely useful weapon for Iran. A country with land and sea borders with often hostile countries, mountainous terrain and a hand in conflicts throughout the Middle East, Iran could use Reaper drones for everything from border patrolling to maritime attack and close air support for its allied forces on the ground.

Reapers armed with Hellfire missiles would quickly become Iran’s go-to weapon, threatening shipping in the Straits of Hormuz and supporting Hezbollah forces on the ground in Syria. Unarmed and with a persistent loitering capability, Reapers could act as cheap intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms for the Iranian military.

2. AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter

Backing up Iran’s fleet of MQ-9 Reaper drones would be AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. The Apache is armed with a 30-millimeter chain gun and external hardpoints capable of carrying up to sixteen Hellfire missiles, seventy-six 2.75-inch rockets, or some combination thereof.

The combination of Reaper drones and Apache helicopters would quickly make Iran and Iranian-backed forces two of the most powerful in the Middle East. Iran’s Reapers could identify the enemy and conduct a limited number of time-sensitive strikes, Apaches could then be called in to bring in the serious firepower. Apaches could wreak havoc on lightly armed enemy guerrillas, and Hellfire missile’s long range enables the helicopter to stay out of the engagement envelope of man-portable air-defense missiles such as the Chinese FN-6.

A flight of just four Apaches could seriously damage any warship operating in the Persian Gulf, and perhaps even sink smaller ones such as the American Littoral Combat Ship.

3. Littoral Combat Ship

Iran never had much of a navy, which amounted to a handful of American and European made small surface combatants. Then again, the Persian Gulf was virtually an Iranian lake and closing it was never in the cards for the shah. The Islamic Republic, on the other hand, has other ideas.

While Iran doesn’t need a large navy, it would benefit from having some of the latest, most advanced vessels designed to operate in the littorals. Littoral combat ships could patrol Iran’s sea border, intimidating enemy shipping, escorting convoys of military materials to Iranian client forces throughout the Middle East and showing the Iranian flag. They would also boost the prestige of the Iranian Navy against its archenemy the Royal Saudi Navy, matching the frigates of the Al-Riyadh class with a ship of similar size.

4. F-35B Joint Strike Fighter

In any armed conflict with the West, Iran would be at a serious disadvantage. Not only would it be outnumbered, it would be up against air and naval forces that are well trained and that have executed military campaigns in Serbia and Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, Syria and elsewhere. The targeting and destruction of Iranian air force bases would be just part of what has become a well-established ritual. While Iran’s S-300 and S-400 air defense missile systems would provide a credible defense, eventually those defenses would be worn down and the country’s air force would be completely destroyed.

The alternative is to scatter the Iranian air force to the four winds, dispersing its fighters to smaller civilian airfields, stretches of highway and perhaps even caves carved into hillsides. This would make detecting and neutralizing Iranian air power much more difficult, but still allowing Iranian air commanders to concentrate their combat forces when necessary.

Ideally, the fighter would be a multi-role beast, capable of air-to-air and air to ground missions. It would also be capable of vertical takeoff and landing. The obvious choice—the only choice at this point—would be the American F-35B.

5. Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

Iran, like other pariah states such as Iraq and North Korea, has spent decades pursuing both nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile programs. The ability to attack the United States with nuclear weapons has been a long-cherished goal, a trump card against any military action against such states.

The nuclear program was halted by international agreement in 2015. Still, there’s little doubt that Iran would like warm and fuzzy comfort of a nuclear umbrella. Given Iran’s limited access to protected or expansive waterways and the lack of strategic bombers, the ideal choice would be intercontinental ballistic missiles.

A force of LGM-30 Minuteman III ICBMs, hidden in hardened silos in the Zagros Mountains, would deter Saudi Arabia, the United States and others from armed conflict with Iran. The risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange would be enough to give Iran’s traditional enemies pause, and cause the remaining nonnuclear states to go nuclear.

Unconstrained by arms control treaties, the Minuteman IIIs would sit armed with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, each capable of attacking a different target with a 350-kiloton warhead. Such a nuclear umbrella would likely embolden the Islamic Republic to pursue an even more aggressive regional foreign policy. . . much to the detriment of its neighbors.

 Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami. This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Wikipedia.

Mark Episkopos

Security, Americas

The B-52 strategic bomber has its roots in a postwar procurement search for a heavy strategic bomber.

One of America’s most iconic bombers, the B-52 Stratofortress has managed to outlive its Cold War roots and is set to see service through the mid-twenty-first century.

The B-52 strategic bomber has its roots in a postwar procurement search for a heavy strategic bomber. Boeing, along with several competing companies, submitted dueling proposals. Boeing’s candidate, a colossal straight-wing aircraft called the Model 462, went on to win the tender in 1946. The process stalled amid a prolonged series of negotiations between Boeing and the Air Force, with the latter expressing concerns over the proposed bomber’s weight, speed, and bulky design. In the years that followed, Boeing churned out additional concept models that were lighter and faster—the initial design was eventually abandoned in favor of swept wings. It was only after six years, in 1952, that prototypes began to enter pre-production. By then, the strategic bomber was a thoroughly different plane from the early design concept introduced by Boeing in 1946.

Powered by Pratt & Whitney J57-P-1W turbojets that were later replaced by the markedly more powerful P&W TF33-P-3 turbofans, the B-52 supports a payload of up to 31,500 kilograms and boasts an operational range of just over fourteen thousand kilometers without aerial refueling. The B-52 isn’t particularly maneuverable or fast at a top speed of just over one thousand kilometers per hour, nor does it need to be; its primary purpose was to fly deterrence missions against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.

In keeping with its raison dêtre, B-52 is prodigiously armed. Beginning with its “H” revision, the B-52 bomber’s nuclear weapons capability was headlined by twelve AGM-129 advanced cruise missiles and twenty AGM-86A air-launched cruise missiles? The AGM-86A was theoretically able to overwhelm Soviet missile defenses with saturation strikes launched outside of Soviet airspace. The B-52 bomber likewise supports an exhaustive list of weapons for a wide range of conventional missions: among them, AGM-84 Harpoon missiles, joint direct-attack munitions (JDAM), AGM-142 Raptor missiles, and AGM-86C conventional air-launched cruise missiles (CALCM).

Capable of delivering huge payloads at vast distances, the B-52 bomber quickly became a U.S. Air Force staple in the Vietnam War. The strategic bombers flew hundreds of combat sorties and dropped over fifteen tons of bombs on North Vietnamese targets during Operation Linebacker II. More recently, the B-52 bomber distinguished itself during Operation Desert Storm: “B-52s struck wide-area troop concentrations, fixed installations and bunkers, and decimated the morale of Iraq’s Republican Guard,” read an Air Force statement.

The B-52 bomber’s greatest long-term strength has proven to be its flexibility, and nowhere is this more apparent than its remarkable ability to assimilate new weapons platforms. There are plans to upgrade B-52 bombers with AGM-183A hypersonic missiles as part of the U.S. military’s response to Russia’s recent strides in test-launching hypersonic cruise missiles.

In addition to new weapons, the Air Force’s fleet of seventy-six B-52s is slated to receive a raft of avionics and targeting updates to keep them relevant into the coming decades. B-52’s are currently being retrofitted with new data links and upgraded communications suites, as well as additional countermeasures and navigation features.

Combining a remarkably resilient airframe with a modular design approach, the B-52 bomber will be among America’s longest-serving aircraft when it eventually retires in the 2050s.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest. 

Image: Reuters

Michael Peck

Military History, Europe

No matter how good, no military is perfect.  

For centuries, the sun never set on the British Empire. But eclipses there were, and more than a few that stained British arms.

Like the Romans, the British fought a variety of enemies. They also had the distinction of being defeated by a variety of enemies, including Americans, Russians, French, Native Americans, Africans, Afghans, Japanese and Germans. Even in defeat, there is something glorious in losing to so many different foes.

As the saying goes, victory has many fathers, but defeat is an orphan. Yet in Britain's case, defeat has multiple sires, from overconfidence to racism. Those Americans who would sneer at the Limeys should be mindful that the same reasons have also resulted in U.S. defeats.

Here are the five greatest British military failures:

Saratoga:

Imagine an entire U.S. Army brigade surrendering to the Taliban, and now you grasp the impact of the Battle of Saratoga in 1777. A British force of 7,000 men had laid their arms before an army that European experts had dismissed as colonial rabble.

Saratoga was a battle that should never have been fought. Britain always had a small army for a major European power, and a particularly small army for subduing an area the size of eastern North America. Yet Britain did have the Royal Navy, which conferred a strategic mobility that allowed the British to concentrate or evacuate their forces with a speed that George Washington's Continentals couldn't match.

So in the best British tradition of contempt for the enemy, the British chose to mount an overland expedition deep in the North American wilderness in autumn 1777, as far from naval support as the Moon. General "Gentleman Johnny" Burgoyne would lead 7,000 men down from Canada into Upstate New York, where he would rendezvous near Albany with another force under General William Howe moving north from New York City. In theory, this would isolate that troublesome nest of revolutionaries in New England from the rest of the rebellious colonies.

Unfortunately, the British command was as divided as their forces. Instead of assisting Burgoyne, Howe chose to occupy Philadelphia. Burgoyne had managed to recapture Fort Ticonderoga, but now found himself low on supplies, with winter approaching. Instead of retreating back to Canada, he chose to press on to Albany. Meanwhile, the Americans eventually mustered a force of 15,000 militia backed by reinforcements sent by General Washington, including Daniel Morgan's riflemen and Benedict Arnold (actually a competent American commander before his defection).

It wasn't only the British who suffered from divided command; Arnold quarreled with Horatio Gates, the ostensible commander of the American force. But after two small battles at Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights, Burgoyne's army found itself outnumbered, surrounded and isolated at Saratoga, far from any reinforcement or succor.

Gentleman Johnny surrendered on October 17, 1777, thus preserving the lives of his men from a hopeless battle. But the fact that the revolutionaries had destroyed a British army in the field helped convince France to ally with the fledgling American revolutionaries and declare war on Britain, later followed by Spain. The impact on world history would be immense.

Isandlwana:

Being defeated by the Americans was bad enough, yet at least the Americans were Europeans by ancestry and culture. But surely spear-waving African natives would be no match for a force of well-armed and well-trained British troops? Even today, that image is perpetuated by the 1964 movie Zulu, where a handful of British troops fight off human waves of African warriors at the Battle of Rorke's Drift.

Such a racist stereotype was shattered by the Battle of Rorke's Drift and was preceded by the defeat of Isandlwana, where the Zulus annihilated 1,700 British regulars and colonial auxiliaries at the Battle of Isandlwana on January 22, 1879. Britain had invaded Zululand, ostensibly to revenge the murder of British subjects, but in reality to create a Southern African confederation, which in turn required smashing the Zulu Empire.

As at Saratoga, the British recklessly maneuvered themselves into a deadly position. British commander Lord Chelmsford split his 15,000-strong force into three separate columns on the theory that this would enable the British to surround the Zulu army (of course they'll flee, old chap). Chelmsford commanded the main column of 5,000 men, which set up camp at Isandlwana just five miles from a Zulu army that British scouts hadn't detected. Not only didn't he entrench his position, but he also split his force again by sending most of the column chasing after what he thought was the main Zulu army, leaving just 1,700 men to guard the camp.

But the main Zulu army of 20,000 strong was actually hidden near the camp. When British scouts finally detected them, the Zulus attacked. They wielded Iron Age spears and shields in the Industrial Age of steamships and machine guns, but the Zulus proved what the highly organized, motivated and tactically mobile troops could accomplish despite technological inferiority. Their favorite tactic was the izimpondo zankomo ("horns of the buffalo"), where the older warriors of the Zulu force engaged the enemy from the front while the younger warriors circled around both flanks and attacked. Such tactics had won the Zulus a fierce reputation and an African empire. Now they would destroy the British.

Battle of the Denmark Straits:

One couldn't fault the Royal Navy for lack of aggressiveness. When news came in May 1941 that the battleship Bismarck was sailing from Germany into the North Atlantic, the British reacted quickly. A German battleship, let loose among the shipping lanes that sustained Britain with food and weapons, would be like a tiger in a chicken coop.

The Bismarck was a formidable battleship, newer and more advanced than most of its British and American counterparts in 1941. Accompanied by the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, it would have been a tough match in any battle. But as the German raiders passed through the Denmark Straits, it was the Royal Navy's misfortune that the two ships that intercepted them on May 24 were the battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse.

The Prince of Wales was fresh out the shipyard and still had dockyard workers aboard to finish the ship. The Repulse had been launched in 1918, while World War I still raged. As a battlecruiser, faster but less well armored than a battleship, it wasn't meant to slug it out with a modern battleship like the Bismarck. Even for a battlecruiser, it had weak deck armor, which left it vulnerable to plunging fire coming down on top of the ship instead of the sides.

Rather than wait for reinforcements, the British closed for battle in a fight where the odds were even at best. It was a classic clash of capital ships, with none of those pesky aircraft or aircraft carriers to ruin the proceedings. Yet the Prince of Wales had gun malfunctions that reduced its rate of fire. Yet it was the Repulse that made it a dark day for the Royal Navy. After a few German salvoes, the battlecruiser exploded with the loss of more than 1,300 sailors. The cause was probably—though not definitively—a magazine explosion caused by a German shell that penetrated its deck armor.

The Prince of Wales inflicted three hits on the Bismarck, including a bow hit that caused some flooding and deprived the Bismarck of precious fuel oil in her forward tanks. But the fact was that the Repulse—one of the proudest ships in the Royal Navy—had been sunk and the Germans had lived to sail away.

But not for long. The loss of the Repulse would be avenged. From the British Admiralty came a simple three-word order that would go down in history: "Sink the Bismarck!" Just as it was poised to reach safety in France, the Bismarck was crippled by antiquated Swordfish torpedo bombers from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, and finally sunk by the British fleet.

Singapore:

After being beaten by impudent American colonists and fierce natives, who else would the British underestimate? Never fear, by the 1940s, it was Japan's turn. Prewar British experts discounted the Japanese on racist grounds—a big mistake.

That racism bore bitter fruit in the first six months of the Pacific War, when the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy disemboweled the Western powers across Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. Nowhere this was better symbolized than the fall of the British fortress of Singapore.

Singapore had been considered an impregnable bastion of Britain's Asian empire. That was largely mythical; budgetary penny-pinching had left the island-city a Potemkin fortress far from invulnerable. Nonetheless, with a garrison of 80,000 men, Singapore was expected to hold out for a while, perhaps until help arrived.

Help wouldn't arrive. The U.S. Pacific Fleet was mostly destroyed at Pearl Harbor. The battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse were sunk by Japanese torpedo-bombers off Malaya on December 8, depriving Singapore of its naval shield.

But much of the British disaster was incomprehensible, rather than inevitable. Royal Air Force pilots, cocky from their victory over the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, found themselves outmatched by better-trained Japanese pilots and their deadly Zero fighters. The Japanese force that landed on the Malay Peninsula north of Singapore on December 8 was smaller than that of the defenders, but it outmaneuvered and outfought poorly trained and led British, Australian and Indian troops.

The Japanese were commanded by General Yamashita, victor over the Americans in the Philippines and later to be known as the "Tiger of Malaya." The British were commanded by the lethargic General Percival and his quarreling subordinates.

Yamashita's army was outnumbered almost three-to-one and had to conduct a water assault across the straits separating Singapore from the mainland. The fortress fell within a week, resulting in the surrender of 80,000 prisoners, many of whom would not survive brutal Japanese captivity. Winston Churchill described the surrender of 80,000 men as the worst disaster in British history.

Gazala:

The same lethargy that cost Britain its Singapore bastion nearly cost it the Middle East. In the summer of 1942, after Germans, Italians and British had chased each other back and forth across North Africa for nearly two years, the front had temporarily stabilized while both sides prepared for the next round.

With its wide-open, waterless spaces and vast distances between populated areas, the North African campaign was more like naval warfare than the tightly packed mass combat of the Somme or Normandy. Like fleets at sea, armies constantly maneuvered through a barren landscape where most territory had little value in and of itself, barring a few key ports and supply points like Benghazi and Tobruk.

But in mid-1942, the British chose to bring the Maginot Line to North Africa, and with similar results to 1940. The Gazala Line, built near Tobruk, stretched from the Mediterranean coast south into the desert. It consisted of a series of minefields and fortified "boxes" garrisoned by infantry brigades, backed by British armor held in reserve to the rear. Unfortunately, the emptiness of the desert meant that there was no river or mountain to anchor the British defenses, which left a dangling southern flank in the open desert.

Leaving dangling flanks before the Germans was an invitation to disaster, and Erwin Rommel wasn't going to miss this party. Though the British outnumbered Rommel's Afrika Korps and its Italian allies, Rommel characteristically chose to attack on May 27. As should have been expected, he looped his armor around the British southern flank while his Italian cannon fodder (who largely marched on foot in the desert!) diverted the British by attacking their fortified boxes. If all went well, the British boxes would be surrounded and destroyed.

But all didn't go well, and it was Rommel who was in trouble. Square in the path of the German armor was the oasis of Bir Hacheim, held by a very tough Free French brigade of Foreign Legionnaires (plus a detachment of Jewish soldiers). The German armor found itself caught between Bir Hacheim and the British minefields, with their fuel convoys unable to reach the tanks.

The British could have ended the North African campaign then and there if their armor had struck decisively against the isolated German armor. But as at Singapore, British commanders were strangely lethargic, sending their armor in small, uncoordinated packets against the concentrated German defenders. Poor tactics compounded the problem; British tanks attacked without infantry or artillery support that would have neutralized the devastating lines of German anti-tank guns.

Nor did Rommel didn't waste time. He desperately cleared a path for his supply columns, refueled his tanks and scattered the remaining British armor. Glittering before him was the prize of Tobruk, a fortress whose tough Australian defenders had successfully withstood Rommel's siege in 1941. But the defenses were in disrepair, its new South African defenders were unprepared, and the fortress quickly fell with the loss of 30,000 prisoners. Bolstered by massive quantities of badly needed fuel and supplies, the Afrika Korps pressed on to Egypt and nearly to the Suez Canal, only to be stopped at El Alamein.

Coming four months after the fall of Singapore, Tobruk was the low point of British fortunes. After nearly three years of war, the British army proved it still could not take on the Germans in open battle.

And yet, Britain ultimately defeated the Zulus, and the Germans and the Japanese. As the old British saying goes, "We lose every battle but the last one."

Michael Peck is a contributing writer at Foreign Policy and a writer for War Is Boring. Follow him on Twitter:@Mipeck1. This first appeared in November 2014. Editor's Note: This piece has been updated from its original publication.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Ethen Kim Lieser

Technology, Americas

The diagnostic test, which is sold in all but a few states and was recently cleared for purchases in Europe, is intended for individuals sixty or older who have experienced cognitive problems and are being evaluated for Alzheimer’s.

St. Louis-based company C2N Diagnostics has begun selling the first blood test to help diagnose Alzheimer’s disease.

The test has not yet been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, but it is considered by experts to be a monumental leap in the medical field by making it much easier for individuals to learn whether they have dementia.

An estimated fifty million people worldwide have dementia, and there are nearly ten million new cases every year. Alzheimer’s disease is the most common form of dementia and contributes to about 60 percent to 70 percent of all cases, according to the World Health Organization. In the United States, more than five million people have been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s.

Most patients are known to have symptoms like memory loss in addition to evidence of a buildup of a protein called beta-amyloid in the brain.

Currently, the best way to measure the protein is a highly expensive PET brain scan that usually is not covered by health insurance. In many instances, those who can’t afford the scan are left to wonder if their problems are due to normal aging or some form of dementia.

That’s where C2N Diagnostics comes in. Although not intended for general screening or for people without symptoms, the company’s test is able to measure amyloid particles as well as forms of a protein indicating increased genetic risk for the disease. It then combines these data with other factors, such as the patient’s age, to determine the risk of amyloid buildup in the brain. 

The diagnostic test, which is sold in all but a few states and was recently cleared for purchases in Europe, is intended for individuals sixty or older who have experienced cognitive problems and are being evaluated for Alzheimer’s.

The company charges $1,250, and it’s not covered by insurance or Medicare—although discounts based on income are available. Only doctors can order the test, and the results are expected to be available within ten days.  

If the test places the individual in the low category, then “it’s a strong reason to look for other things” besides Alzheimer’s, Dr. Randall Bateman, of Washington University School of Medicine, who headed the research that led to the test, told the Associated Press.  

“There are a thousand things that can cause someone to be cognitively impaired,” from vitamin deficiencies to medications, C2N Diagnostics founder Dr. David Holtzman told the Associated Press. 

“I don’t think this is any different than the testing we do now” except it’s from a blood test rather than a brain scan. “And those are not 100 percent accurate either,” he added.  

The company, however, has yet to publish any data on the test’s accuracy but is still moving ahead with the process of seeking FDA approval.  

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn. 

Image: Reuters

Richard Douglas

Security, Americas

This compact weapon will get the job done and at an affordable cost too.

If you are a long-time gun owner, you probably had one of Taurus’ Millennium Pro Series as one of your first guns. They’re easy to conceal and have great firepower and accuracy for their size. Given this, it’s no surprise that the PT-111 Millennium G2, also known as the Taurus G2S, stands out as an excellent first-time pistol.

Accuracy

For its size, the G2S is quite accurate. It comes with large, three-dot sights—a fixed front sight and two-dot rear sights that offer the ability to adjust the windage and elevation using the provided safety key/screwdriver. The sights are easy to line up while aiming.

The sights were built to be small to prevent snag. However, this makes them less than ideal for aiming in low-light conditions. For those situations, I recommend getting a red dot sight or a scope to compensate for this. Also, due to the dots being painted on, they are vulnerable to the kinds of caustic substances found in cleaners, so be wary when you are cleaning the gun.

Reliability

The Taurus G2S can fire hundreds of bullets with only factory lubrication without a single hiccup. Suffice to say, its reliability is excellent. The polymer frame of the gun is as sturdy as metal, if not more so.

A unique feature of this gun is its second-strike capability. If the primer fails to ignite, the gun switches to a double-action mode, allowing you to pull the hammer again. This means that failing to detonate once will not impede the use of the weapon, making the G2S invaluable in a dire situation.

Handling

The Taurus Millennium G2 has above-average handling. There is next to no ejection or feeding issues with it, and the textured grip and smooth trigger make it much easier to handle. The trigger guard is small enough to accommodate gloved hands.

Trigger

The Taurus G2S is a gun meant to be used for self-defense, and the trigger is proof of this. There is a lot of bring-up on the trigger of this gun, but, once the trigger is brought up, you don’t have to pull it hard. The trigger press is around six pounds, allowing for the gun to fire easily and accurately. It may not be as good as something like a Walther PPQ, but it’s still a good choice.

Magazine & Reloading

The magazine capacity of the Taurus G2S is twelve, and the magazine supply is two. There is no magazine disconnect safety. The disconnect safety prevents a gun from firing if it doesn’t have the magazine inserted into the magazine well. Without this, the GS2 will fire the remaining cartridge in the chamber without the magazine even being in it.

Unlike some older guns, this gun’s factory magazines are perfectly serviceable. The gun has no ammunition requirements, and it’s easy to take down and clean, even if you are new to using guns.

Length & Weight

Though most would associate the Taurus with larger, cheaper handguns, this gun is a well-crafted, compact polymer handgun. Its barrel is 3.2 inches in length, and its overall length is 6.24 inches. Those who hear that the G2S is a double-stack gun are surprised to find that it’s one of the narrowest ones out there; it’s barely over an inch in width. The G2S weighs twenty-two ounces with an empty magazine. Though it’s too bulky to carry in a pocket, it’s the ideal pistol to carry on a belt.

Recoil Management

Part of what makes the G2S so user-friendly is its low recoil and great balance. In part, this is due to its small size and weight, but the overall design of the gun also helps. The finger-rest extension on the magazine allows for a better hold of the gun. When combined with the texturing and functional design of the grip, this results in enhanced recoil management.

Price

The Taurus G2S usually costs between $320 to $350, though its street price can be as low as $250. Considering all the features above, and comparing it to its competitors, this is a steal. Even other Taurus guns aren’t as inexpensive. You are getting a gun that can compete with any of the other 9 mm pistols on the market at a much better price. This makes the gun a good choice for your first pistol.

My Verdict?

The Taurus G2S is a handgun that’s easy to carry and is a decent weapon for self-defense. Its easy-to-use trigger, good size and weight, comfortable grip texture, and rounded edges all make it an excellent concealed carry weapon. It’s guaranteed to be a bang for your buck.

Richard Douglas is a long time shooter, outdoor enthusiast and technologist. He is the founder and editor of Scopes Field. Columnist at The National Interest, Cheaper Than Dirt, Daily Caller and other publications.

Image: Taurus.

Kris Osborn

Security, Asia

Report: China will mass produce its new J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter, H-20 stealth bomber and new Type 055 large destroyer as part of a stated goal to modernize its military in the coming years and carve a path toward global supremacy.

China will mass produce its new J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter, H-20 stealth bomber and new Type 055 large destroyer as part of a stated goal to modernize its military in the coming years and carve a path toward global supremacy. 

The communist country will also be moving quickly to build and commission its third and most advanced aircraft carrier as part of a broad modernization overhaul outlined in a news report from the Chinese government-backed Global Times newspaper. 

Specific modernization benchmarks were outlined by the Communist Party of China Central Committee, as reported in the paper by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. 

The details of each phase were not specified in the article, yet a Senior Chinese military official was quoted as saying the effort seeks to reach “phased goals in national defense and military modernization.” 

While stated as a certain kind of development or step forward, the Chinese announcement does not offer anything particularly new beyond what is already well known about the country’s massive modernization acceleration. However, plans to “mass produce” the H-20 and J-20 do appear quite significant as that does not seem to have been emphasized before. The comment suggests a measure of confidence in those platforms as well as a decided effort to enlarge the force, particularly its most advanced components. This makes sense when one considers that the U.S. plans to acquire more than 1,700 F-35 stealth fighters and likely well over 100 new stealth B-21 bombers. There is already some discussion about increasing the number to as many as 180 B-21s given the need within the fleet and the promise of the technology.

Mass producing the J-20, for example, could be seen as a deliberate effort to match the U.S. F-22 and F-35 in terms of mission scope reach or air presence, however the impact of large numbers of J-20s would, it seems, rely upon the reach and accuracy of the J-20s sensors and weapons. However, it would offer China an opportunity to greatly expand its global presence and forward-position large numbers of J-20s in strategically vital areas around the globe in areas of interest to China. While much is not known, it does not seem at all clear that a J-20 can truly rival an F-35 or an F-22, despite the Chinese claim that it is a true fifth-generation jet. 

In the same spirit, mass producing the H-20 could be seen as a deliberate effort to match or even out-perform the planned numbers of U.S. B-21s. However, again, the impact would equally rely upon the effectiveness of the H-20’s stealth, avionics, sensing and weaponry. At the same time, a large bomber presence would, in a manner similar to a sizable J-20 global footprint, enable the Chinese to conduct bomber patrols and respond quickly in multiple locations around the world at the same time. 

The other concerning aspect of this is simply that China does have a very substantial industrial production capacity and a recent history of being able to generate platforms, such as carriers, armored vehicles and fighter jets quickly. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

Security,

Technology matters. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Even a failed system can have positive repercussions on the future of warfare.

Weapons die for all kinds of different reasons. Sometimes they happen at the wrong time, either in the midst of defense austerity, or with the wrong constellation of personnel. Sometimes they fall victim to the byzantine bureaucracy of the Pentagon, or to turf fights between the services. And sometimes they die because they were a bad idea in the first place. For the same reasons, bad defense systems can often survive the most inept management if they fill a particular niche well enough.

This article concentrates on five systems that died, but that might have had transformative effects if they had survived. These transformations would only rarely have changed the course of wars (countries win and lose wars for many reasons besides technology), but rather would have had ripple effects across the entire defense industrial base, altering how our military organizations approached warfighting and procurement. Not all the changes would have been for the best; sometimes programs are canceled for sound reasons.

AH-56 Cheyenne:

In the early 1960s, the Army was just beginning to appreciate the value of helicopter aviation. The Army had used helicopters at the end of World War II, and used them extensively in Korea for reconnaissance and evacuation purposes.  As the sophistication of the machines grew, however, the Army began to see the prospect for much more advanced helicopters that could conduct a wide variety of missions.

The star of the show was supposed to be the AH-56 Cheyenne, a radical design that combined high speed with punching power. The Cheyenne could escort other helicopters in transport mission, or conduct ground support and attack ops independently. In particular, it contained a magnificent propulsion system that could offer speeds of up to 275 miles per hour.

But the Cheyenne fell victim to its own promise. The technologies that made the Cheyenne possible weren’t yet mature, and the early prototypes suffered from teething problems, leading to a fatal crash. The Air Force hated the whole idea of the Cheyenne, believing that the Army was trying to steal close air support and interdiction missions for itself.  The Air Force went so far as to propose a fixed-wing attack aircraft (which would eventually become the A-10) in its effort to kill the program.  Finally, the Vietnam War put enormous pressure on the defense budget, both in terms of making it harder to sell particular programs, and in diverting funds to directly support the war effort.

And so the Cheyenne never happened. Although, a few years later, the Army would push forward with the AH-64 Apache. In this sense, the cancelation of the Cheyenne merely delayed an advanced attack helicopter capability. But the Apache was also a much safer machine than the Cheyenne, and going with the more conventional system has undoubtedly limited the horizons of Army aviation.

B-70 Valkyrie:

The B-70 Valkyrie deserves its own operatic cycle. Envisioned as the replacement for the B-52 Stratofortress and the B-58 Hustler, the B-70 was designed to penetrate Soviet airspace at high altitude, and upwards of Mach 3. Beloved of the “Bomber Mafia,” a generation of senior officers who had cut their teeth in World War II’s Combined Bomber Offensive, the B-70 represented, to many, the future of the Air Force.

And just to show I’m not a hard-hearted guy, and it’s not all dollars and cents, the B-70 was a beautiful aircraft. Long and sleek, the Valkyrie resembles a space ship more than an aircraft. The surviving prototype remains on display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio.

But the Valkyrie was enormously expensive, and this expense made it vulnerable. First President Eisenhower, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were less than enchanted with the idea of spending enormous sums on another heavy bomber when ICBMs showed great promise in delivering nuclear weapons to the Soviet homeland. Advances in Soviet interceptor and surface-to-air missile technology were also making the B-70’s mission considerably more dangerous than first anticipated.

After constructing only two prototypes (one of which was lost during a PR stunt), the Air Force shut production down. Fifteen years later, the B-1B, with some superficially similar characteristics, would enter service.

The effect of the B-70 on the Air Force would have, on balance, been quite negative. Devoting tremendous resources to the procurement of another strategic bomber would have drawn attention away from both the tactical air force and the missile force. B-70s might (in desperation) have been committed to the bombing of Vietnam during Operations Linebacker I and II, but they would likely have performed no more effectively than the B-52s they were replacing. And both the B-52 and the B-1B have proven remarkably flexible in terms of missions and update technologies, in part because they have space for a larger crew (4 and 5, respectively) than the Valkyrie (2).  McNamara saved the Air Force from itself by preventing a long, deep procurement chasm that would have lasted thirty years.

A-12 Avenger:

What if we had a stealthy strike bomber that could take off from aircraft carriers? In the mid-1980s, the Navy needed a replacement for the beloved-but-venerable A-6 Intruder.  Building on expectations about the progress of stealth technology, McDonnell Douglas developed the A-12 Avenger, a subsonic “flying wing” bomber that visually resembled a miniature B-2 Spirit. Combining stealth with the flexibility of carrier ops, the A-12 promised an unparalleled deep strike capability.  Even the Air Force expressed interest in the A-12 as a replacement for the F-111 Aardvark.

But there were problems. Early expectations about the stealth coating proved optimistic, and the fixes substantially increased the Avenger’s weight.  Expenses soared, but the aircraft did not.  The biggest problem, however, was that the Avenger entered the design and production cycle just as the Cold War came to a close.  Facing a tight defense budget, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney decided to kill the A-12 in favor of less risky programs.

The effects of the cancelation remain with us today. Instead of acquiring an advanced stealth bomber, the Navy settled on the Super Hornet, a significant, but conventional, upgrade on the F-18s it already possessed.  Eventually, the continuing need for a stealthy, carrier-borne strike aircraft would manifest in the F-35C, a program that continues to teeter between “disaster” and “epic disaster.” Even if the F-35C somehow works out, the Navy gave up the deep strike mission when it settled on the Super Hornet. The Air Force is now concentrating on the Next Generation Bomber, a project that closely resembles the A-12 in many ways. The death of the A-12, in effect, transformed the nature of the USN carrier wing for a generation or more.

Future Combat Systems:

In the early 21st century, the body of theory known as the Revolution in Military Affairs resulted in a major Army procurement plan known as “Future Combat Systems.”  In brief, the application of RMA theory to modern operations suggested that the combination of precision-guided munitions, high processing speeds, real time communications, and all-encompassing sensor capabilities would transform the way in which armies fought.  Future Combat Systems envisioned an integrated system of weapons, vehicles, and sensors that could prove lethal and decisive across the combat spectrum.  The Army expected every element of the system to support the goal of linking sensors to shooters, enhancing killing power while reducing footprint. Army planners also intended FCS to result lighter, more deployable brigades.

But then the Bush administration dropped the Iraq War on the US Army.  Iraq created major problems for the development of the FCS program.  Intellectual energy and material devoted to developing the FCS concept to its fullest went, instead, to fighting the war.  The conflict demanded systems (such as the MRAP) that did not fit into the FCS concept.  Perhaps most important, the course of the war threw RMA theory into question, with guerrilla fighters consistently bloodying the nose of their technologically sophisticated American foes.

And so FCS died a slow death.  The vision of a coherent system-of-systems surrendered to the need to get particular capabilities into the field in piecemeal fashion, regardless of their role in the larger puzzle.  The Army fought the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars with a mix of new and legacy systems, combined with weapons that had no place in its future expectations.  While individual parts of the FCS vision survive, the ideal has yielded to budgetary and military reality.

Sea Control Ship:

What if, instead of a few very large carriers, the United States Navy had undertaken to build a large number of small carriers?  In World War II, the Royal Navy and the US Navy (USN) employed large numbers of escort carriers, small flattops that could support anti-submarine and amphibious operations.

In the early 1970s, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt pushed the idea of the Sea Control Ship (SCS), a small carrier that would defend sea-lanes against long-range Soviet strike aircraft and Soviet submarines.  Faced with the growing expense of modern supercarriers (the first Nimitz class carrier would enter service in just a few years) and the impending retirement of the venerable Essex class carriers, Zumwalt sought a low cost option for air operations that did not demand the full capabilities of a major carrier group.  Escort carriers had helped win the Battle of the Atlantic, and Sea Control Ships might make a similar contribution in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

The USN tried the concept with the helicopter carrier USS Guam for a couple of years, adding Harrier fighters to its complement of choppers.  Eventually, however, the Navy decided that the expense of the new ships, and the risk that they might cut into resources dedicated to supercarriers, were too great, and nixed the idea.

Eventually, the big amphibious ships of the Tarawa and Wasp classes would take over the sea control role. In effect, the USN acquired Sea Control Ships, although we call them amphibious assault ships and delegate to them a broader array of tasks.  We also rely on other countries to build small carriers to fulfill the missions envisioned by the SCS; many of the flattops operated by the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Japan essentially fulfill an SCS role.

Pursuit of the Sea Control Ship would obviously have led to a different naval force structure, as well as changes in the composition of naval aviation. The biggest difference, however, might have been conceptual; the Sea Control Ship might have changed the way we think about how naval aviation contributes to international security.  The ability of small carriers to contribute to a variety of different missions and needs might draw us away from the (if incorrectly applied) Mahanian conception of naval power to a more Corbettian “dispersal” concept. And at a time when even strong advocates of the modern CVN have begun to buckle under the enormous cost of the great ships, the SCS might have offered a different way of approaching the projection of naval power.

Conclusion:

Technology undoubtedly matters, but only rarely in the sense that an isolated technological achievement lends decisive advantage in tactical engagements. Rather, technological innovations and choices shape the ways in which military organizations, and the broader defense-industrial complex, approach the prospect of war.  Each of these systems involved a radical rethink of organizational roles and priorities, and the cancelation of each left huge holes in capabilities, holes that continue to be filled in novel ways.

Honorable Mentions:

USS United States class aircraft carrier, USS Montana class battleship, USS Lexington class battlecruiser, B-49, F-23 “Black Widow” and the F-20 Tigershark.

Robert Farley is a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. Follow him on Twitter:@drfarls. This first appeared in 2015 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikipedia.

Kris Osborn

Security, Asia

Beijing appears poised to sell the CR500 to partners around the globe.

China’s new CR500 Golden Eagle helicopter drone now being prepared for war. It looks like a mini-drone helicopter built to fly at high speeds with coaxial, counter rotating blades and a small, sensor-carrying body structure. The drone is likely intended to find and paint hostile targets ahead of advancing armored units.

The new ready-for-production drone has been cleared for export by Chinese authorities, raising the already large concern that dangerous drone technologies will continue to advance in sophistication and proliferate quickly around the world. Those seeking advanced drones range from large nation states looking to offer reconnaissance support to large mechanized armored units to small groups of rogue, stateless insurgents or even terrorists.

While many of the specifics of the platform, such as its speed or sensor payload, may not be fully known, a Chinese government-backed newspaper writes that the drone is ideally suited to support tanks, self-propelled artillery and other ground combat units advancing to enemy contact.

“The drone can carry a large payload, has a long endurance even when fully loaded, and a compact structure that can be easily stored and transported. It can also resist strong winds, carry different types of electro-optical pods and payloads, and act as a logistics support craft and deliver materials with pinpoint accuracy,” the drone’s maker, a Chinese state-owned firm called NORINCO stated in the Global Times newspaper. 

The paper even goes on to say that the Golden Eagle is “designed to meet the demands of the arms trade,” a scenario likely to fortify or simply add to existing U.S. concerns that China is not only engineering dangerous new technologies but also exporting them to hostile nations around the world. 

The drone is likely armed with standard EO/IR camera sensors and electronic warfare systems, and it may be that its principal advantage or attribute may simply be intended to be its speed. The exact speed may not be known at the moment, however it is clearly built with counter-rotating rotor blades, a well-known compound configuration built to maximize speed. The idea is to offset potentially destabilizing vibrations or flight-path disturbances likely to take place at high speeds. 

Also, much like a compound configuration, albeit in a massively scaled back way, the mini-helicopter drone may have some kind of thrusting or propulsion mechanism in the back. It may not be known if the Golden Eagle is faster than the larger, more rounded U.S. Navy helicopter-like Fire Scout drone, yet speed might be a key advantage when it comes to scouting ahead of attacking armored units. As a vertical take-off-and-landing drone, it would not have to rely upon a small landing strip or catapult of some kind to launch and can instead be organic or closely responsive to any ground forces it may support. 

The drone also looks like it has small side pylons or mini-fins which might be able to hold weapons for remote firing, which would allow an aerial attack should targets beyond line of sight for friendly troops be identified. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. 

Image: GlobalTimes.

Sebastien Roblin

Security, Middle East

Think assassinations. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Israel is known for doing what it thinks it needs to do to remain secure against any threat.

Approaching eight o’clock on the morning of January 12, 2010 Professor Massoud Alimohammadi walked to his car parked next to his house in North Tehran, passing a small motorbike on the side of the road. The fifty-one-year-old elementary particle physicist was a leading Iranian theorist on quantum-field states, and known to his friends as a political moderate.

As the professor’s open his car door, the person who had been observing him pressed a button on a remote control. The bike suddenly exploded with such force that all the windows on Masoud’s four-story apartment building were shattered. Massoud was killed instantly, and two nearby bystanders injured. The triggerman, ostensibly a man named Arash Kerhadkish, strolled over to a car waiting nearby and was driven away.

Initially, some speculated that Iranian hardliners sanctioned the killing of a reformist professor. However, anonymous Iranian and Western intelligence sources eventually told a different story: the professor was an important figure in a nuclear-research program run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Nine months later, on the morning of November 29, a quantum physicist named Majid Shahriari was driving through Tehran with his wife, Dr. Bejhat Ghasemi, in the passenger seat when several motorbikes road up beside him near Artesh Boulevard. While one rider hemmed in Shahriari’s car, another rider (believed to be Arash Kerhadkish), attached a package of C4 explosive to the door beside Shahriari, then drove back and triggered a detonator. The explosion killed Shahriari, injured his wife and colleague, and even knocked over one of the motorbike-mounted hitmen, wounding the hitman.

At nearly the same time, another motorbike assassin rammed the car of Sharhiari’s colleague, Professor Fereydoon Abassi, a prominent leader of Iran’s nuclear-research program as he awaited Sharhiari for an appointment at Shahid Beheshti University. He and his wife jumped out of the car just before the bike exploded, seriously injuring Abassi in the face and the hand.

Eight months later on July 23, 2011, Darioush Rezaeinejad and his wife drove to pick up their daughter Armita up from kindergarten. At 4 p.m., the thirty-five-year-old postgrad in electrical engineering deposited his wife and child on the curb and was returning to his vehicle to park the car when two bearded motorcyclists pulled up next him and opened fire with nine-millimeter pistols. Rezaeinejad was shot five times in the arm, neck and chest. His wife, Shoreh Pirani, attempted to pursue the attackers, but they shot her too. The engineer died shortly after being hospitalized at Resalat Hospital. Shoreh recovered, and later told an interviewer that her five-year-old daughter continued to draw pictures of the moment of her father’s death.

Darioush’s wife would also state in a later interview that the engineer had been a member of the Iranian nuclear program and had received anonymous threats prior to his death. Tehran blamed the United States and Israel for the killing. The United States denied the charge, while Israeli government social-media accounts suggestively expressed that it did not condemn the killings, whoever might have perpetrated them.

Six months later on January 11, 2012—nearly the anniversary of Alimohammadi’s killing—Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, an expert on uranium enrichment, was the next to fall victim while driving to work through Eastern Tehran in his Peugeot 405. Deputy director of the Natanz facility, he had been photographed with Mohamed Ahmadinejad, who was president at the time. Supposedly, he was tailed by multiple assassins, including the ubiquitous Kerhadkish. One of those assassins attached a magnetic mine to Roshan’s car, which detonated and killed him, but spared the life of his wife, who was sitting beside him.

Iranian counter-intelligence operatives in the Ministry Of Intelligence and Surveillance apparently were at work, however. In 2011, reportedly thanks to a tip from a third country, MOIS picked up a twenty-four-year old aspiring kick-boxer named Majid Jamali Fashi, who claimed to have dropped of the explosive motorbike that killed Alimohammadi. Fashi confessed on public television to receiving training and a payment of $120,000 from Mossad (Institute), the Israeli spy agency connected to dozens of assassinations over the years, including German rocket scientists, Olympic terrorist plotters, and the Canadian Gerald Bull, developer of the of the Iraqi Project Babylon “super gun.”

In May 2012, Fashi was hung—and Tehran announced it had captured eight male and six female Iranian nationals involved in the killings. Iranian media subsequently aired a half-hour documentary dramatizing their confessions. The nationals were reportedly drawn from sympathizers or members of the MEK (Mujahedin of Iran), a violent opposition group to the government Tehran. In this account, the agents had received forty-five days of training in Israel, and then operated in multi-cell teams that had meticulously spied on their victims to determine their routines and then executed the hits based on instructions from Israeli handlers.

Iranian security forces are infamous for using torture, sexual assault, and threats to relatives and to compel false public confessions of guilt. However, anonymous sources in Israeli intelligence and American diplomatic circles conveyed to media that Israel really was behind the assassination campaign that Fashi at least had given a generally true confession, and that Israel really was training MEK members to serve as operatives in Iran.

In 2014, a journalist revealed that Washington had pressured Israel to cease the assassinations, which had threatened to derail attempts to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Tehran. Earlier, president Bush was reportedly angered to learn that Israelis posing as CIA agents had recruit Iranian nationals in Pakistan for its sabotage and assassination campaign in Iran.

Of course, both public Iranian and anonymous Israeli accounts may be calculated and less than reliable. It seems possible, for example, that the Iranian nationals implicated in the assassination may have been working besides un-apprehended Israeli operatives from Kidon (Hebrew for “Tip of the Spear”) an elite assassination unit within Mossad. According to some accounts, the attacks may also have stopped because additional killings would have posed too great a risk, and remaining targets were too well guarded.

There are also a few ambiguous cases to consider. Earlier on January 15, 2007, Iranian scientist Ardeshir Hosseinpour died mysteriously in Isfahan due to a “gas poisoning” incident. The journals Stratfor and Haaretz claimed Hosseinpour’s death was the work of Mossad, while the Iranian government and sources in Mossad denied involvement. Years later, Hosseinpour’s sister claimed instead that the professor had been killed by the Revolutionary Guard for refusing to work with the nuclear program. In 2015, Iranian security claimed it had foiled another Mossad hit. Israeli sources don’t appear to have stepped forth to corroborate either claim.

In 2018, an article by Ronen Bergman in Politico sketched out the longer history of the Israeli assassination campaign, identifying it as the “fifth prong” of a four-part strategy devised in 2003 by Tamir Pardo, then serving as deputy head of Mossad under Meir Dagan. The concept was to pressure Iran into abandoning its nuclear program using economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, support for Iranian minorities and opposition groups, and interdiction of key nuclear technologies. Though the wider campaign involved close cooperation with the U.S., which famously collaborated to develop the Stuxnet computer virus responsible for destroying hundreds of Iranian centrifuges, Israel alone was involved in plotting assassinations, which the CIA claims it was unwilling to become involved in and preferred not to be aware of. (Bergman also gives an alternate versions of Rezaeinejad’s killing, claiming he was tailed by a lone motorcyclist, and shot while approaching the fortified Imam Ali facility.)

Bergman alleges that the campaign was effective in terrorizing Iranian scientists into avoiding or disassociating with Tehran’s nuclear program, and caused Iran to institute expensive and highly time-consuming security measures to protect its scientists and attempt to root out traitors and bugs. In his account, Dagan saw the assassinations as potentially heading off a push by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Nethanyahu to directly attack Iranian nuclear sites from the air, a course of action he saw as disastrous.

The Mossad campaign did, however, cause the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to plot a series of retaliatory terrorist attacks across the world using its Unit 400 cover operations branch. Hastily and ineptly planned, all but one of the roughly twenty Iranian plots failed, often in spectacular fashion. The campaign’s only “success” was the killing of five Israeli tourists and a local driver on July 18, 2012, in a suicide bombing executed by Hezbollah at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria.

The Mossad assassination campaign did not continue after 2012, though both U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources allege it was effective in slowing the progress of the Iranian nuclear program. While assassination was disavowed by U.S. diplomatic and intelligence officials, some politicians have voiced their support for the scientist killings. After all, the reasoning goes, such targeted assassinations kill far fewer bystanders than would missiles launched in a wider military conflict.

However, it’s hard to deny that the campaign used tactics that would be labelled “terrorism” or “murder” in the West were they waged against Israeli or American scientists engaged in weapons research. It seems assassinations are condemned or praised not according to the methods used but depending on who is performing them. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal, which can already be linked to an escalating proxy war in Syria, may also see a resumption of the shadowy covert war between Israel and Iran.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared earlier in 2018.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Security, Middle East

The battle group was there to keep an eye on things while some of America’s troops finally come home.

Less than a month after the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) departed the Persian Gulf to take part in the annual Malabar naval exercises with the Indian Navy, the carrier and its strike group returned to provide “defensive capabilities” during a drawdown of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.

“This action ensures we have sufficient capability available to respond to any threat and to deter any adversary from acting against our troops during the force reduction,” the Pentagon said in a statement. However, the U.S. Navy’s carrier strike group 11 (CSG 11) return was not triggered by any “threats” after the killing of Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, last week.

Tensions in the region have been seen as extraordinarily high following the assassination of Fakhrizadeh, which Tehran has blamed on the United States and Israel. However, Commander Rebecca Rebarich, a spokesperson for the U.S. Fifth Fleet, told the AFP news agency that the return of CSG 11, under the command of Rear Adm. James A. Kirk, was not related to a specific threat but was part of regional security.

“There were no specific threats that triggered the return of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group,” Rebarich said in a statement. “The return of Nimitz is centered on maintaining CENTCOM’s ability to remain postured and prepared to help preserve regional stability and security.”

The deployment to the Gulf came as President Donald Trump announced about 2,000 troops would be pulled from Afghanistan while another 500 would be pulled from Iraq—leaving approximately 2,500 troops in each country. CSG-11 has been deployed to provide combat support and air cover during the drawdown.

The U.S. Navy flotilla including the Nimitz took part in the joint exercises with India as well as with the navies of Australia and Japan in the Arabian Sea.

“We greatly appreciate the dedication of the crew of the Nimitz, who has been serving with distinction at sea since this summer,” the Pentagon also said via a statement.

USS Nimitz, which is one of the eleven super carriers in operation with the United States Navy, left its home port of Bremerton, Wash. in April after a month of quarantine and testing for the coronavirus with the crew on board the ship at Naval Base Kitsap. The Pentagon hasn’t announced when the ship will return to its home port. The U.S. warship had conducted a port visit in Bahrain from Nov. 4 through 8.

“The sailors and Marines of Nimitz Strike Group remain steadfast in their commitment to the free flow of commerce, freedom of navigation, and our regional maritime partnerships,” Rear Adm. Kirk said in a statement according to USNI News. “We are grateful for the support from the Kingdom of Bahrain for our port call.”

The port visit came after Nimitz had been operating in the Persian Gulf for almost two months, the longest amount of time that a U.S. aircraft carrier had spent in the waters of the Middle East since 2018. USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) had been deployed to the Persian Gulf from December 2017 until late March 2018 as part of the U.S. anti-ISIS effort Operation Inherent Resolve.

In October, the U.S. Navy announced that it was considering an extension to the service lives of the aging Nimitz-class carriers. USS Nimitz was commissioned in May 1975, and it had its refueling and overhaul completed from 1998 to 2001.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters.

James Stevenson

History, Europe

It’s hard to blame strategic bombing advocates for crediting the aerial onslaught for the surrender — and credit it they did. But the fallacy in this post hoc thinking derives from the belief that the order of events was the cause of the result without considering other factors.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The concept of "strategic bombing" is a good one - deprive an enemy of his ability to manufacture military equipment, and you deprive him of his ability to wage war. If used correctly, strategic bombing could shorten wars without costing soldiers' lives. That was the theory, anyway.

In the years after World War I, the brain trust of the U.S. Army evolved two conflicting opinions on how best to apply air power in the next war.

The Army Air Corps’ emerging bomber faction believed directly attacking the vital centers of a country, instead of bombing combat troops, was the best solution. This theory held that destroying an enemy’s war-making capabilities, its will to wage war, would lead to victory without the need to risk soldiers or even spend money on them.

These beliefs were incorporated into the phrase “strategic bombing,” pioneered by Giulio Douhet, an Italian military theorist who in the 1920s argued — horrifyingly — for the widespread use of chemical and biological weapons. Douhet later served as chief of aviation under Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini.

The second group looked to aviation as a kind of mobile artillery to support ground troops. After all, no one ever won a war without troops conquering territory — so the addition of aerial artillery would make soldiers that much more effective.

This thinking coalesced around the phrase “army cooperation” in the United Kingdom and “close air support” in the United States.

In the spring of 1943, American and British forces successfully defeated the German and Italian armies in North Africa. This experience informed U.S. Gen. Pete Quesada and others who wished to experiment in the unperfected art of “close air support” that would pay off once the invasion of France began.

But first, the Allies’ strategic bombing advocates wanted to put their theories to the test.

The occasion came during planning for the invasion of Sicily and mainland Italy. The first stop was Pantelleria, an island that been occupied in the distant past by Carthaginians, Romans, Moors and Normans, and which Mussolini had made into a penal colony.

The onslaught on this small, 32-square-mile island — 10 square miles larger than Manhattan — was known as Operation Corkscrew. It would have been a trivial footnote in history except that it appeared to offer an opportunity to provide ostensible evidence that bombing alone can win wars.

Thus, the bombing of Pantelleria became an experiment, one anticipated to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that bombing would ratify what up to then had been a matter of faith, but would soon offer proof that through bombing alone, surrender was a certainty.

“All these forces were assembled to test the assertion that if you destroy what a man has, and remove the possibility of his bringing more in, then in due course of time, it becomes impossible for him to defend himself,” Maj. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle said.

If bombing alone did not force a surrender, the Allies planned to invade the island by June 11. In an attempt to avoid the need for an invasion, the Allies generated 5,284 sorties, dropping a total of 12.4 million pounds of bombs on Pantelleria.

The Allies’ rain of bombs began on May 8, 1943. As June 11 approached, cannons from five British cruisers and seven destroyers intensified the downpour.

In some respects, the presence of warships contaminated the results of the strategic bombing test, but one could look the other way and pretend the ships’ guns were the functional equivalent of small bombs.

“I want to make the capture of Pantelleria a sort of laboratory to determine the effect of concentrated heavy bombing on a defended coastline,” Gen. Dwight Eisenhower told Gen. George Marshall.

“When the time comes we are going to concentrate everything we have to see whether damage to material, personnel and morale cannot be made so serious as to make a landing a rather simple affair.”

The person in charge of the aerial operation, Lt. Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, had been convinced of the strategic bombing theory for a long time. He believed that if you knew where to drop enough bombs, you could have a decisive result.

“Spaatz … committed to the assault the entire Strategic Air Force and part of the Tactical Air Force, an armada of four heavy-bomber groups, seven medium-bomber groups, two light-bomber groups, and eight fighter groups, a total of … [1,017] operational aircraft,” Wesley Craven and James Cate wrote in the official history Army Air Forces in World War II.

“Against this concentration the Axis had 900 operational combat planes within range of the island, most of them committed to tasks other than defending Pantelleria.”

On June 11, the Italians surrendered — 33 days after the bombing began.

It’s hard to blame strategic bombing advocates for crediting the aerial onslaught for the surrender — and credit it they did. But the fallacy in this post hoc thinking derives from the belief that the order of events was the cause of the result without considering other factors.

For one, the Allied bombers were virtually unopposed for more than a month. Allied bomber crews would face a far bloodier situation during the strategic bombing campaign in the heavily-defended skies above Germany.

The results were also unanticipated. The 11,000 defending Italian soldiers on Pantelleria dug in deeper and twice refused requests to surrender. However, when Allied troops finally began their approach to the island, the Italians gave up.

Secondly, the Italian troops — along with a handful of Germans — did not mount a robust anti-aircraft defense.

“In the opinion of a small group of captured Luftwaffe technicians, a company of German soldiers would have made a better showing than” all the Italians, a 1959 Air Force historical review stated. Had the defenders been all German, the bombers would have “been less successful.”

But the bombing itself was hardly successful. It inflicted little damage on the island’s coastal defenses and anti-aircraft batteries, and the damage which did exist could have been repaired by a determined crew.

Around 22 percent of the B-17 Flying Fortresses involved in the bombing hit their targets within a 100 yard radius. “For the medium bombers,” the review noted, “approximately 6.4 percent, … [and] for light and fighter-bombers about 2.6 percent.”

The abysmal and unopposed performance should have been a warning of how much worse bombing accuracy would become over Germany with fighter and flak opposition, particularly in the winter months, rather than a celebration of the proof that strategic bombing alone would force a surrender.

Claiming Pantelleria was a strategic bombing success is like a basketball team bragging about successfully making unopposed layups.

According to one of Eisenhower’s biographers, the bombing of Pantelleria was “one of the greatest examples of overkill of the war.”

Eisenhower’s comments to Britain’s Fleet Adm. Andrew Cunningham aboard the cruiser HMS Aurora tends to confirm the “overkill” comments. “Andrew, why don’t you and I get into a boat together and row ashore on our own,” Eisenhower said. “I think we can capture the island without any of these soldiers.”

The experience on Pantelleria also refuted one of Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold’s “truisms” scattered throughout his autobiography, Global Mission. “Normally it takes five years from the time the designer has an idea until the plane is delivered to combatants,” Arnold wrote.

Pantelleria was an exception. A group of A-36 Apaches — a ground support variant of the P-51 Mustang — took part within seven months of the plane’s first flight and less than three years after the P-51’s first flight. A-36s would make 138 sorties over the island, dropping 57.5 tons of ordnance.

Finally, Eisenhower clearly wasn’t convinced that bombers alone could win wars — because he continued to rely on massed ground forces for the invasion of France the following year.

The Allies landed in Sicily and continued to the Italian mainland, landing there on Sept. 3, 1943. Italy capitulated five days later.

The speed with which Italy surrendered, six times faster than Pantelleria, might also be an insight into a country’s “will to wage war.” Forty days prior, Mussolini had been ousted and arrested. That likely had more to do with collapsing Italy’s will to wage war than bombing from above.

This article by James Stevenson originally appeared at War is Boring in 2016 and first appeared on TNI several years ago.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Peter Suciu

Security, Asia

With more than 100,000 soldiers deployed across a border stretching nearly 550 miles (872 km) at heights well over 15,000 feet above sea level where temperatures could soon drop to minus 30 degrees Celsius, it has been described as a frontline without parallel in modern military history. After months of a build-up of forces at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Indian Army and China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) fortunately aren't fighting one another – but now as winter has set in both sides are battling an extreme cold as well as boredom and increased fatigue.

With more than 100,000 soldiers deployed across a border stretching nearly 550 miles (872 km) at heights well over 15,000 feet above sea level where temperatures could soon drop to minus 30 degrees Celsius, it has been described as a frontline without parallel in modern military history. After months of a build-up of forces at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Indian Army and China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) fortunately aren't fighting one another – but now as winter has set in both sides are battling an extreme cold as well as boredom and increased fatigue.

In addition to the extreme cold, where even touching bare metal can be hazardous, soldiers must deal with equally extreme wind chills brought on by the high-speed winds that whip down from the mountains across the Ladakh Valley. According to a report from The Indian Express, all of this is exacerbated by the rarefied atmosphere, which comes from a combination of lack of oxygen and a function of the altitude. Past deployments of Indian forces along the LAC saw an attrition rate as high as 20 percent, mostly due to medical-based non-fatal causalities.

The falling temperatures can bring on frostbite, snow-blindness, chilblain, and even peeling of skin due to the extremely dry conditions – while most soldiers will still face nausea, headaches, and disorientation. Maintaining readiness is a challenge both the Indian Army and the PLA face.

On the Indian side of the LAC, soldiers wear bulky layers of clothing to stay warm but that can impact efficacy and notably affect mobility. Keeping the soldiers fed is a problem, as it is impossible to bring in fresh fruit or vegetables, but even canned food is a problem as it is difficult to consume too much in the altitudes. Instead, soldiers rely on a very high caloric diet of fruits, dried fruits, and even chocolates.

The Chinese PLA forces may have it slightly better, as Beijing has rushed in pre-fabricated dormitories to address the extremely low morale that comes with the extremely low temperatures. To bolster the spirits of the men serving along the LAC, the PLA has provided recreation centers that include fitness facilities, heated swimming pools, hot tubs, and even libraries with computers and video game systems to help address the boredom and general malaise that have set in.

Both sides are reportedly facing a shortage of specialized cold climate clothing.

Despite the harsh conditions, neither side has shown a break in their resolve even as talks to deescalate have continued. Instead, India and China have continued to deploy more units and heavy equipment to the poorly demarcated border region. By some accounts, Indian and Chinese tanks are just 400 meters apart at some spots.

India has reportedly deployed numerous T-72 and T-80 tanks, along with BMP-2 armored personnel carriers (APCs) that can run on a special fuel mix designed specifically for the high altitudes and low temperatures. China meanwhile has deployed its specially-designed T-15 light tank and T-99 main battle tank to the region.

While neither side seems ready to escalate the standoff into a full-blown war, as neither side will back down, the biggest threat now is the extreme cold. There will likely be only losers this winter, even if neither side actually fires its guns in anger.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.