Vous êtes ici

Diplomacy & Crisis News

Amoureux de la loi et d'une trans

Le Monde Diplomatique - mer, 14/09/2022 - 18:22
Roman noir, roman de mœurs, récit picaresque, c'est tout cela ensemble, cette Double Vie de Jesús dont la trame plonge dans le Mexique contemporain comme dans un chaudron bouillonnant. Jesús Pastrana est un fonctionnaire municipal modèle. À la quarantaine, après vingt ans de bons et loyaux services, (...) / , , , , , , , , , , - 2017/08

Le magicien et les vétérans

Le Monde Diplomatique - mar, 13/09/2022 - 19:25
On n'en finit pas de redécouvrir Jerome Charyn, écrivain américain majeur pourtant plus célébré en Europe que chez lui. Connu surtout pour ses romans mettant en scène le superpolicier juif new-yorkais Isaac Sidel (Zyeux-Bleus, Marilyn la Dingue, Isaac le mystérieux…, publiés par Gallimard en « Série (...) / , , , , , , , , , , - 2017/08

Oui mais... la cuisine anglaise

Le Monde Diplomatique - mar, 13/09/2022 - 15:25
Toute la presse a donné les menus des réceptions offertes pour la reine Elizabeth. Il y aurait beaucoup à dire, et pas toujours du meilleur. On aurait voulu voir présenter à notre auguste visiteuse les plus sincères échantillons d'une cuisine qui a tout de même autre chose à présenter que des truites (...) / , , , - 1957/05

Politics Propelling Conversion of King Charles III

Foreign Policy Blogs - lun, 12/09/2022 - 18:55

With the death of Queen Elizabeth II, the United Kingdom now has its first King since George VI more than seven decades ago. Saturday September 10, 2022 is recorded in history as the day Prince Charles was proclaimed as King Charles III. Aside from the challenge of having to (ceremonially) lead a country that is undergoing political and economic turmoil with a Prime Minister—Liz Truss—who has less than  a week of experience in her top executive position, the new king comes with a mixed bag of goodwill and controversy. An international media and tabloid feeding frenzy is already underway.

In his previous role as The Prince of Wales and a monarch of wide international fame, the new King is accused of using his influences to advance UK’s weapons industry deals with his personal friends. He has held dozens of meetings with rulers of repressive regimes in the Middle East since the Arab Spring in 2011. He has “played a key role in promoting £14.5-billion worth of UK arms exports to these regimes.” According to UK Declassified, there is no question that he was a royalty-level salesman for UK arms makers during said period.

The ‘Barack Hussein’ Effect

At the heart of the controversy surrounding the new King is his stance on Islam and Muslims. His affinity with Islam and vision to improve the relationship between the Western and the Islamic world extend for decades. In his speech Islam and the West that was delivered at Oxford in 1993, he said:

“I believe wholeheartedly that the links between these two worlds matter more today than ever before, because the degree of misunderstanding between the Islamic and Western worlds remains dangerously high, and because the need for the two to live and work together in our increasingly interdependent world has never been greater.”

In his previous role, the new King has also taken positions that opposed UK foreign policy. The most notables are: His opposition to the Iraq war and the neocon foreign policy adventures; his disagreement with the notion that those cartoonists who flagrantly offended Prophet Muhammad were merely exercising the democratic value of freedom of expression. Also, his disagreement with the burqa and hijab ban in Europe.

Moreover, the new King is sympathetic to the Palestinian people’s right to an independent state. Granted, as a King, his leadership is ceremonial and his political views must be shelved in his royal bedroom closet, but that will not be enough to tame the usual suspects—Islamophobes and Zionists of all shades—who are determined to ferociously come after the new King to make him an unpopular King by accusing him of being a Muslim in disguise.

In his previous role, the new King has offended some when it became public that he learned Arabic, studies the Quran, and believes that “Christianity can learn from Islam.” Unlike most of the Western leaders, he had no problem offering a counter-narrative to Islamophobia. He refused to accept the so-called clash of civilization thesis popularized by the neocons. “I do not accept the argument that they (the Western and Islamic cultures) are on a course to clash in a new era of antagonism. I am utterly convinced that our two worlds have much to offer each other. We have much to do together. I am delighted that the dialogue has begun, both in Britain and elsewhere.”

And in a speech he delivered in Saudi Arabia 2006, he said: “We need to recover the depth, the subtlety, the generosity of imagination, the respect for wisdom that so marked Islam in its great ages …”

These sympathetic public statements at an era of glorified jingoism and ruthless Islamophobia made then Prince Charles a target. In 2003, two months before President George W. Bush appointed him to sit on the board of United states Institute for Peace, the notorious Islamophobe Daniel Pipes has published a long dossier to implicate Prince Charles as a Muslim in disguise.

King Charles III is set to become UK’s Barack Hussein Obama, at least in being projected as an alien leader. Each, on his own, has undergone an up close and personal experience that inspired him to form his own perspective and narrative on Islam and Muslims. And their respective narratives, needless to say, flies in the face of the traditional aristocrats, the political elite, and the ideologically-driven media.

To bulwark against political demonization, the new King may have to dominate the headlines by taking the moral stance that his late mother—Queen Elizabeth II—failed to take: offer an official apology to all of the countries that suffered exploitation and oppression under the British colonial enterprise. His first step should be that which could be his legacy.

Meanwhile, in a country that virtually drifted away from its religious identity: ‘So what if he is a Muslim?’  

Why Non-Alignment Is Dead and Won’t Return

Foreign Policy - sam, 10/09/2022 - 13:00
An old ideology rears its head but offers little for the present age.

A Ukrainian Victory Would Liberate Eastern Europe

Foreign Policy - sam, 10/09/2022 - 12:00
An outright win for Kyiv now looks possible.

What in the World?

Foreign Policy - ven, 09/09/2022 - 22:40
This week in FP’s international news quiz: Britain loses a queen, gains a prime minister, and retains its feline figurehead.

On 9/11 Anniversary, End the Self-Delusion About America’s Enemies

Foreign Policy - ven, 09/09/2022 - 21:02
Al Qaeda once again has a safe haven in Afghanistan, endangering Americans.

Putin Is Trying to Turn Ukraine Into a Culture War

Foreign Policy - ven, 09/09/2022 - 20:58
A conservative message isn’t selling well on the Russian homefront.

A New Iran Deal Won’t Prevent an Iranian Bomb

Foreign Policy - ven, 09/09/2022 - 17:50
Tehran’s program is far more advanced than in 2015. Only a credible threat of force will stop the regime from crossing the threshold.

Global Election Round-Up: September 2022

Foreign Policy Blogs - ven, 09/09/2022 - 16:05

A pair of August elections in Africa produced clear winners, while also sending mixed messages about the strength of each country’s democracy. Meanwhile, two contests in Europe provide potential inroads for right-wing parties.

Kenya 

In Kenya’s August 9 election, Deputy President William Ruto defeated opposition leader Raila Odinga by approximately 233,000 votes, 51–49 percent. 65 percent of registered voters turned out, down from 80 percent in 2017 — and a 15-year low.

Ruto fashioned himself as an anti-establishment “hustler” on the campaign trail, in a populist appeal to Kenya’s disaffected young population. While Ruto is, in reality, an immensely wealthy politician, this outsider branding contrasted him against Odinga (a five-time presidential candidate, former prime minister, and son of Kenya’s first vice president) as well as Odinga’s A-list stump speaker, Uhuru Kenyatta (the outgoing president and son of Kenya’s first president).  

Political dynamics between Kenya’s ethnic groups also played a role. Odinga had hoped to leverage Kenyatta’s influence as an ethnic Kikuyu to gain the backing of Kikuyu voters, the largest bloc in the country. But Odinga is an ethnic Luo, a rival group to the Kikuyu. This derailed Odinga’s plan, as the Kikuyu vote split partially for Ruto, an ethnic Kalenjin, further expanding the deputy president’s base of support. 

This shift in sentiment was partially captured in pre-election polling. On top of the tight topline margins, surveys taken a week before the vote even showed Odinga with a slight lead.

The days following the election, though tense, were markedly less turbulent than the aftermath of other recent contests. In the wake of the 2007 campaign, violence escalated into a months-long ethnic conflict that claimed over a thousand lives. Unrest and frustration erupted again in 2017, when the initial election was annulled and a redo was ordered. But this year, when the Kenyan Supreme Court found no credible evidence of election tampering following a challenge from Odinga, the opposition leader accepted the court’s decision. 

Although there are still concerns about Ruto’s checkered past on human rights, the results of Kenya’s election are, in some ways, an encouraging step for the country. Kenyatta has already promised a smooth transition of power. What’s more, the decisiveness of the court’s ruling could also restore some faith in the functionality, transparency, and independence of Kenya’s democratic institutions.

Angola

Two weeks after Kenyans took to the polls, so too did voters in Angola, a country whose democratic norms are comparatively younger and weaker. For that reason, it can be difficult to draw direct comparisons between the two elections.

The August 24 vote saw President João Lourenço secure a second term after his party, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), defeated the main opposition, Adalberto Costa Júnior and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 51–44 percent. 

The 7-point margin makes this one of the closest elections in Angola’s history and marks a record-low showing for the MPLA, which has been in power since the country gained independence from Portugal in 1975. Notably, the party’s vote share has steadily declined in all four post-civil war elections: it received 82 percent in 2008, 72 percent in 2012, and 61 percent in 2017. 

Most recently, the MPLA’s popularity has waned due to economic concerns and dissatisfaction with Lourenço’s handling of corruption. Indeed, pre-election polling painted a tight race, as young voters in particular seemed to move toward UNITA. Surveys taken throughout the summer varied widely, suggesting everything from a 29-point MPLA win to a 26-point UNITA win, often with large shares of respondents not selecting either party.

Overall, the MPLA’s majority in the 220-seat National Assembly fell by 26 seats to 124. UNITA picked up 39 seats, bringing its total to 90. Three other parties — the Social Renewal Party (PRS), the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), and the Humanist Party of Angola (PHA) — each won two seats. Voter turnout was recorded at 45 percent, down from 76 percent in 2017.

The final results were contested by UNITA, who alleged irregularities in the vote count, but their challenge was swiftly struck down by Angola’s constitutional court. Four of the 16 members of the Angolan National Electoral Commission also refused to sign off on the returns.

Challenges to election results — and concerns over vote tampering — are neither unwarranted nor uncommon in Angola. The ruthless rule of former President José Eduardo dos Santos, Lourenço’s predecessor and Angola’s autocratic leader of 38 years, was defined by the suppression of basic freedoms and the violation of human rights. 

Although dos Santos left office in 2017 and died in July, Angola today remains far from free. The MPLA still has a large amount of control over the electoral process and state media. When it comes to political and civil liberties, Freedom House gives the country a rating of 30 out of 100; Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index scores it one point lower at 29. 

Sweden and Italy

Looking ahead, there are two major European elections in September.

Sweden voted on September 11.

The Social Democrats, led by Magdalena Andersson after the resignation of Prime Minister Stefan Löfven last summer, were looking to maintain control in the Riksdag. Entering the home stretch, pre-election polls showed the Social Democrats ahead by an average of 9 points in a close contest with the conservative Moderate Party, led by Ulf Kristersson, as well as the far-right Sweden Democrats, led by Jimmie Åkesson. In the 2018 election, the Social Democrats outperformed polling expectations by 4 points to win with a 28 percent plurality — the party’s worst electoral showing in over a century.

The election is still too close to call, as of September 12.  With approximately 95 percent of votes counted, the Social Democrats led with 31 percent, the Sweden Democrats earned 21 percent, and the Moderates had 19 percent. This means that no bloc currently possesses an obvious governing majority of 175 seats: the parties supporting the Moderates won a total of 175 seats, while the parties supporting the Social Democrats won 174 seats.

Italy votes on September 25.

Following a falling-out with the left-populist Five Star Movement, Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s unity government collapsed last month, prompting September’s snap elections. The current polling leader is Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing Brothers of Italy, which appears to have enough support from other parties to govern if victorious. Enrico Letta’s center-left Democratic Party is polling in second. Letta would likely continue the current government’s policies, but a right-wing coalition would almost surely ditch Draghi’s direction.

A full summary of both contests will appear in October’s election round-up.

How Chile’s Constitution Revolution Missed the Mark

Foreign Policy - ven, 09/09/2022 - 14:00
It’s back to the drawing board for the country—and President Gabriel Boric.

What Does Biden’s Confrontational Speech Mean for U.S. Foreign Policy?

Foreign Policy - ven, 09/09/2022 - 13:46
Framing geopolitics in terms of democracy and autocracy won’t necessarily help bring peace.

The World Reacts to Queen Elizabeth II’s Death

Foreign Policy - ven, 09/09/2022 - 11:19
News of her death sparked an outpouring of grief from world leaders.

‘They Are Pushing Everywhere’: Kyiv Goes on the Offensive

Foreign Policy - ven, 09/09/2022 - 02:02
Ukraine may have achieved its biggest breakthrough of the war.

Pakistan’s Flood Crisis Could Become a Food Crisis

Foreign Policy - jeu, 08/09/2022 - 23:43
International aid is pouring in, but the local food insecurity would have global consequences.

Taiwan’s New Status Quo

Foreign Policy - jeu, 08/09/2022 - 23:20
A top lawmaker says China’s game plan is to blockade the island and stop allies from helping out.

Putin’s War Drives Refugees From Occupied Kherson

Foreign Policy - jeu, 08/09/2022 - 22:02
Fighting in Ukraine’s south has caused an exodus.

Scholz and Macron Have a Perilous Ambition for Europe

Foreign Policy - jeu, 08/09/2022 - 21:47
The idea of “European strategic autonomy” just won’t go away.

Taiwan Needs Weapons for Day 1 of a Chinese Invasion

Foreign Policy - jeu, 08/09/2022 - 21:15
Unlike Ukraine, the island will be very hard to arm during a conflict.

Pages