Diplomacy & Crisis News

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that “our health systems are inadequate”, the UN chief told a ministerial meeting on Thursday, citing weak structures and unequal access to healthcare as “major reasons” why the coronavirus has killed one million people and infected more than 30 times that, globally.

Armed conflict has a disproportionate impact on women and girls – a key reason why women’s “full, equal and meaningful participation” in UN peacekeeping is such a priority, the Secretary-General said on Thursday. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has forever changed the way consumers shop online, the UN trade and development body, UNCTAD, said on Thursday, announcing results of a survey of some 3,700 consumers across nine countries. 

Two books by scholars of the women’s rights movement explore the history of the ratification of the U.S. Constitution’s 19th Amendment.

L'absence d'ambitions de la gauche, ou son incapacité à les réaliser, encourage l'extrême droite à la détrousser de ses idées les plus porteuses. Dans ce registre, Alain Soral est devenu une vedette du Net. / Crise des valeurs, Extrême droite, Idées, Idéologie, Internet, Jeunes, Médias, Mondialisation, (...) / Crise des valeurs, Extrême droite, Idées, Idéologie, Internet, Jeunes, Médias, Mondialisation, Nationalisme, Politique, Racisme, Travail, Marxisme, Fascisme, Néolibéralisme - 2013/10

As we speak, the world is plagued by the coronavirus, which has claimed more than one million lives worldwide.  While many commentators have noted that the pandemic has created the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression, horrific mental health problems among a great segment of the population and great social unrest, not enough people have noticed that the pandemic has also led to the strengthening of Islamist extremism across the globe.  

According to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Research, a recent poll found that if elections were held today between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, Hamas would win: “The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians views the decision of the UAE to normalize relations with Israel as a betrayal or abandonment of the Palestinian cause, one that serves only the interests of Israel. A similar majority thinks that Saudi Arabia and Egypt, by endorsing that normalization, have in effect abandoned the Palestinian leadership.   But most Palestinians also place the blame on themselves because they are divided and have normalized relations with Israel long before others.”

If Hamas were to take over the West Bank, a Palestinian source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, noted that this would be detrimental for women. The Hamas daily Falistin encourages gender apartheid in the Gaza Strip by calling for limiting women’s participation in public life for they are the “fastest transmitters of epidemics.”  From age 9 onwards, all schools are gender segregated in Gaza by law, even if the schools are privately owned, Christian or run by the UN.  Furthermore, male teachers in Gaza are forbidden from having female students. Women in Gaza are also barred from riding motorcycles, smoking in public, learning to drive in the presence of a man, using a male hairdresser and even submitting complaints of incest.  On top of that, Gazan women are forbidden from going to the beach or a restaurant unless they are accompanied by a male chaperon.  In fact, even mannequins in women’s clothing stores are required to be dressed modestly.  The Hamas Morality Police are known to frequently harass women who do not wear the hijab or conduct themselves in accordance with their ideology.  All of this occurred way before the pandemic reached the coastal strip.   

The Palestinian source added that minorities fare no better under Hamas rule as well.  The Al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades, the military wing of the Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza, warned people against celebrating Christmas a couple of years ago in a flier, claiming one should “not to go the way of the Jews and the Christians, indeed God is not for the evil people.”  According to the Hamas authorities, the flier was aimed not only at Muslims but also Christians in the coastal strip.  It is apparent that if Hamas takes over the West Bank, such radical Islamist extremism would reign supreme there too.   

Further to the West, Turkey has been inciting against Israel and India at the UN.  Recently, Erdogan stated that the “filthy hands” of Israelis are “increasing their audacity at Jerusalem’s holy sites,” a remark which has an uncanny resemblance to Mahmoud Abbas’s anti-Semitic “dirty feet” speech.  He also took a jab at India’s Kashmir policy.  Shipan Kumer Basu, who heads the World Hindu Struggle Committee, called Erdogan’s remark about Kashmir and Israel at the UN “highly reprehensible.” 

Erdogan also has been threatening the UAE and other countries who seek to reconcile with the Jewish state.  This came after they transformed the Hagia Sophia into a mosque and submerged a UNESCO world heritage site under water, both acts that showed that religious extremism is dominating Turkish politics these days.  They also have been taking advantage of the pandemic to try and deport Iranian refugees.   Not too long ago, it was reported that Turkey tried to deport Iranian women’s rights activist Maryam Shariatmadari back to the Islamic Republic.  Although she was spared in the end, the Turkish authorities have now eyed the deportation of another refugee from Iran. 

Sirwan Mansouri, a Kurdish political and human rights activist, was captured and tortured several times in Iran before he was finally forced to flee to Turkey: “I was recognized as a refugee 5 years ago by UNHCR and I was interviewed for resettlement in 2016, but my case went on hold till 2019 for unknown reasons. Again in 2019 my wife and I were interviewed for resettlement in Ankara, but no result again and every time I contacted them, they told me I should be awaited.  I am a refugee rights activist and manage a refugee website named: HANARefugees.”

“I publish the latest news on websites for refugees.  I also have done a lot of talks and interviews about refugees in Kurdish, Persian and English languages,” he added.  “I wrote some articles about their terrible condition and the rights they are entitled to in Turkey. Two years ago we wrote a letter in a type of petition with more than 5400 signatures to UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland and complained about the process, but received no response. Again, this year, we wrote another letter to ECHR (European Court For Human Rights) and complained about both the UNHCR and immigration office of Turkey.”

“I am Kurdish and due to my race, bear more discrimination in comparison with other refugees. Besides all I am a journalist and work on the human rights and refugees rights field and because of my activities in social media, the Turkey government put more pressure on me directly and indirectly. In their recent act, they took my Identity card without any reason and  are trying to deport me and have wanted me to leave the Turkish territory, while I am a refugee and based on Geneva convention no one has the right to deport a refugee to his/her country of origin.  I know Turkey responsible for holding my case in the resettlement section for 5 years without any reason, while according to UNHCR staff, I am eligible to resettle in a third safe country.  Furthermore, I am sick and have some different diseases such as diabetes type 2 and have polyps in my intestines suspicious of cancer and have all medical documents.” 

And according to Mansouri, he is not the only one: “In late 2018, the UNHCR formally handed over the review of refugees’ cases to the Turkish Immigration Office. Since then, the Immigration Office has rejected most of the cases on an unprecedented scale, given many refugees expulsion notices for leaving Turkish territory, and in some cases has deported refugees. And this process is continuing. All this is happening while according to the Geneva Conventions, none of the refugees who have been accepted by the UNHCR and are under international protection should under any circumstances be returned to their countries of origin.”

This fact was confirmed by Mendi Safadi, who heads the Safadi Center for International Diplomacy, Research, Public Relations and Human Rights: “Turkey was a refuge for opponents of the Iranian regime and many Iranian opposition figures saw Turkey as a safe haven, but now Turkey has turned into a great danger for them, given that the Turkish government is cooperating with their Iranian counterparts.  Said Tamjadi and Muhammed Rajabbi were sentenced to death in Iran after they were betrayed by Turkey.  Other Iranian refugees who fled Turkey are awaiting deportation back to Iran, like Mansouri.   The Safadi Center operates in the international arena to prevent such deportations from happening, for Turkey is violating international law.”

However, the Palestinian Authority and Turkey are not the only ones that turned more Islamist since the pandemic erupted.   Basu claims that radical Islam has also only got stronger in Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan since the pandemic erupted, and that it poses a threat to the continued existence of Hindus in these three countries: “A Hindu school girl was hacked to death for refusing to marry a Muslim in Bangladesh.  In that same country, a Hindu girl was raped inside a police station.  A Hindu family in in Eidalpur village was recently assaulted.  A 14-year-old Hindu girl was forcefully converted to Islam in Pakistan.  In the same country, a Hindu doctor had his throat slit and a Hindu temple was destroyed during the coronavirus lockdown.  And these types of incidents just keep getting worse.”  

“Due to the silence of humanity, the simple-minded Hindus of Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan are gradually disappearing,” he added.  “Environmental activists always played an effective role in protecting endangered species in various countries.   But no one has stood up to help the oppressed Hindus of these three countries.  This is very tragic.  I think that humanity should wake up from its slumber or else Hindus will cease to exist in these countries.  And given their radical Islamist ideology, they will not even establish museums to preserve the vanquished Hindu culture in their nations.   I urge humanity to step up to the plate before it is too late.”

The existence of this global pandemic is causing many people to turn to religion as a remedy for their sorrows.   However, Islamist extremists are taking advantage of this normal human reaction in order to push forward their extremist agendas that oppress women and minorities, and one day, this will once again threaten the West, after the borders open up again.   After all, an increase in the number of people adhering to extremist ideology leads to more terror attacks and rogue regimes.  Therefore, it is of utmost importance for Western policy makers to formulate a strategy for dealing with Islamist extremism, so that we will be prepared for what happens the day there is a vaccine.  

Dans le meilleur des mondes qui est le nôtre, les « dysfonctionnements » font rage. On aurait pourtant tort de s'en affliger : l'économie occidentale prouve, par ses dérapages même, qu'elle avance irréversiblement sur la voie du progrès, et cela à tous les niveaux... Votre ordinateur bogue ? « Petit (...) / Idées - 2003/06

The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) has strongly condemned an attack, on the night of 4 October, targeting a convoy carrying internally displaced persons in Burkina Faso, in which 25 people were killed.

Assistez à la conférence ouverte « Le monde post-COVID-19 : du siècle américain au siècle chinois ? », donnée lundi 12 octobre prochain, dans le cadre du cycle « Le monde sur un fil », au Centre Pompidou, à Paris.

Les répercussions géopolitiques de la crise sanitaire sont encore à évaluer, mais elle a déjà provoqué d’importantes tensions entre ces deux pays capables de bouleverser l’ordre mondial.

Partie de la Chine, l’épidémie du SARS-CoV-2 a été d’abord gardée secrète, provoquant un drame chez les habitants et ébranlé la confiance des partenaires. Arrivée aux États-Unis quelques mois plus tard, dans la dernière année du mandat de Donald Trump, le COVID-19 a été qualifié de « virus chinois » par le président sortant, dont l’agressivité tendait à masquer la gestion calamiteuse de l’épidémie sur le territoire américain, l’un de plus touchés au monde.

Le bras de fer économique, la perte de crédibilité diplomatique du gouvernement chinois et les effets de la pandémie sur la campagne présidentielle aux États-Unis semblent faire partie des conséquences inévitables d’une crise qui pourrait même renverser le rapport de force entre les deux puissances.

Cette conférence réunira :

•  Laurence Nardon, responsable du Programme Amérique du Nord de l’Ifri et auteure de l’article « Quelle politique étrangère américaine après 2020 ? » publié dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2020)
  
•  Alice Ekman, chercheuse à l’European Union Institute for Securities Studies et auteure de l’article « Les smart cities : ambitions chinoises à l’heure du COVID-19″ publié dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2020)

Ce débat sera modéré par Marc Hecker, directeur de la recherche et de la valorisation de l’Ifri et rédacteur en chef de Politique étrangère, et retransmis en direct sur www.bpi.fr.

* * *

Adresse : Petite Salle Centre Pompidou Niveau -1 Entrée rue du Renard 75004 Paris
Entrée libre, dans la limite des places disponibles.

Pour plus d’informations sur le débat : contact.communication@bpi.fr

A stillborn baby is delivered every 16 seconds, which translates into nearly two million infants over the course of a year that never took their first breath, according to a new UN report published on Thursday. 

Across the world, girls as young as 12 are being forced or tricked into marrying men who exploit them for sex and domestic work, in what the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has called an “under-reported, global form of human trafficking”. 

Given the history of intercommunal violence in Guinea, two high-level UN Officials voiced concern on Tuesday over the risk of “incitement to hostility, discrimination or violence” as the country gears up for elections on 18 October.

By delpixart on Pixabay

Recent high-level diplomatic visits to Taiwan risk rupturing permanently the U.S.’ “One China” policy. This policy is the foundation of the U.S.-China peaceful relationship. As Taiwan is the most preeminent security issue in U.S.-China relations, a miscalculation from either side, leading to a military conflict cannot be entirely ruled out.

U.S.-China relations are currently quite abysmal and tensions run the full gamut of issues, including trade, technology, human rights, security, and now health due to COVID-19. Additionally, recent U.S. bans on TikTok and WeChat have made the results of U.S.-China tensions more readily visible to more Americans.

While there have been legitimate issues involving trade and human rights in China, from the U.S. perspective, the pace at which additional issues have been added to these original ones has become quite frenetic in current U.S. China policy. From the Chinese perspective, China has finally emerged from its “Century of Humiliation”. Because of historical reasons, territorial integrity is seen as a key component of this emergence. Any Chinese administration, not just the current one, would face an extreme test of its legitimacy from its own people if, after having regained Hong Kong and Macao, it failed to eventually do the same on the Taiwan question.

The current crisis in the Taiwan Strait mirrors other crises, from The Cold War and beyond. Both The Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as The Ukraine Crisis, clearly illustrate that great powers are not keen on other great powers intruding into their own perceived sphere of influence, or “near abroad”. Fortunately, The Cuban Missile Crisis ended with no military engagement between the U.S. and The Former Soviet Union. However, despite not getting as much news coverage as before, The Russo-Ukrainian War resulting from The Ukraine Crisis is still ongoing, with no end in sight.

At the beginning of the The Cold War, China was a revisionist power bent on exporting its ideology to its region, if not the world. Today’s battlefield is also a clash of ideologies, with China’s state-run capitalist model, the so-called “Beijing Consensus” facing off against the U.S.’ own market-driven capitalist model, the “Washington Consensus”. Both models are being evaluated globally in terms of their resiliency in the face of extraordinary circumstances, like financial and health crises, internal socio economic stability, as well as their effectiveness in bringing sustained economic benefits to the bulk of their respective populations. 

It is in this soft power front, affecting both trade and economic issues, that Washington faces a truly daunting adversary in today’s China, the most significant state challenge the U.S. has ever faced. No power the U.S. has ever confronted has had the same economic heft of today’s China. Even when China and the U.S. actually engaged each other militarily, during The Korean War, China was nothing like the global power it is today. Also it bears mentioning that, at the time of The Korean War, China did not yet possess nuclear weapons.

Because of this, from China’s perspective, Taiwan is seen as being a pawn on the chessboard of the increasing U.S.-China great power competition game. Taiwan provides the U.S. a convenient model for what China could possibly be, provided it made the necessary ideological changes to its current form of government.

As important as exceptionalism and ideology are however, China chose the avenue of pragmatism in 1972 when it accepted Nixon’s overtures. The Middle Kingdom did not do this out of an abiding love for democracy and free markets, but out of self-interest and self-preservation. Even then, it was not a full-fledged U.S. ally, but only a “strategic partner”. With the U.S. as this strategic partner, China was not as vulnerable when facing hostilities from its erstwhile ideological ally, The Former Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, only in time did China’s pragmatism allow it to re-engage with the West and reap the concordant economic benefits. However, no political reform was ever promised by China through this re-engagement. Perhaps not codified, but understood implicitly by the U.S., was that this new arrangement would have China following the U.S.’ lead in Asia in perpetuity. Now, it is abundantly clear that China never saw it that way. 

Deng’s Southern Tour inspired new modes of thinking in China such as “To get rich is glorious” and “It doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches the mice”. The latter slogan was an admission that a state’s ideological orientation mattered less when it came to being able to pragmatically provide economic benefits for one’s own people. For sure, China saw the benefits of economic re-engagement with the West, which enabled it to lift more people up out of poverty than ever before in human history.

However, Deng and others also recognized that “If you leave the window up, some flies are bound to come inside”, meaning that more economic freedom always posed the risk of increased political freedom being demanded by the population, now exposed to external values. However, China was never going to change its mode of government and become a “like-minded partner” of the U.S., at least not in terms of values. By the late 1980s, China had seen the beginning of the unravelling of state power in The Former Soviet Union due to increased political freedom there and decided not to repeat this mistake. This was made abundantly clear at Tiananmen, the reaction to which Deng also spearheaded.

Though difficult, more tolerance and appreciation for different forms of government within the global system architecture will lead to overall system stability. Continued intolerance towards the full diversity of forms of government in today’s global ecosystem will only lead to further system instability. Further increasing system instability is the impact of global pandemics and irreversible environmental degradation. By working together, on the Covax initiative for example, both China and the U.S. would demonstrate to the world their commitment to keeping this system stable. COVID-19 and forest fires so huge that they are visible from space do not care about the ideology of their victims, and neither should we.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère 
(n° 3/2020). Alain Antil, directeur du Centre Afrique subsaharienne de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Une guerre perdue. La France au Sahel (JC Lattès, 2020, 200 pages).

Dans cet essai, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, spécialiste des conflits, du Nigeria, de Boko Haram, tente de dresser le bilan de l’action de la France au Sahel, en particulier de sa lutte contre le terrorisme depuis l’intervention de l’opération Serval. Comme on l’aura deviné avec le titre, la tonalité est résolument pessimiste. L’auteur pense en effet que les effets négatifs de l’action antiterroriste française au Sahel dépassent ses conséquences positives.

Une approche par trop sécuritaire, une méconnaissance, ou tout du moins une sous-évaluation des problèmes politiques des États comme des enjeux de pouvoirs locaux, une coopération qui parfois contribue involontairement, comme c’est le cas au Tchad, à maintenir un régime kleptocratique en place : le diagnostic est sévère. Le livre s’attache d’abord au Mali, puis élargit sa réflexion au Sahel, appuyant sa démonstration de multiples pas-de-côté historiques ou géographiques (débat sur le djihadisme, Kenya, Soudan, Nigeria…).

La partie centrale du livre – « Les erreurs de diagnostic » – est la plus stimulante. Consacrée à l’analyse des causes profondes de la conflictualité au Sahel, elle parle évidemment de la France et, au-delà, de l’ensemble de la communauté internationale. Parmi les biais d’analyse, l’auteur pointe la « labellisation terroriste » des conflits, qui a « favorisé des mécanismes qui ont contribué à entretenir et exacerber les conflits » – à travers la militarisation outrancière de la réponse ; des partenaires techniques et financiers qui ferment les yeux sur les dérives multiples des régimes politiques, au motif que ceux-ci combattent un « péril global » ; la survalorisation du djihad globalisé dans l’analyse des conflits ; la pauvreté invoquée comme facteur direct des conflits, alors que la relation pauvreté-conflit est à resituer dans des configurations plus complexes et labiles, et est toujours médiée par d’autres facteurs ; la survalorisation du facteur religieux au détriment des dynamiques sociales et politiques ; les limites des approches de « déradicalisation »…

Au total, cet essai vaut mieux que son titre, et que certaines de ses pages, inutilement polémiques. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos pointe avec justesse à la fois les erreurs d’analyse et de réponses politiques aux phénomènes combattus. Si une approche par trop militarisée peut apporter quelques améliorations ponctuelles et des répits politiques, les interventions internationales risquent de contribuer in fine à allonger les durées des conflits, ce qui ternit, et ternira, l’image de la communauté internationale.

L’ouvrage ouvre enfin un débat plus vaste, sur les politiques de la communauté internationale qui contribuent à maintenir, sinon des régimes, du moins des ordres politiques contestés par des segments de plus en plus larges des opinions publiques sahéliennes. Les violences, et les conflits que l’on labellise « terroristes » ne sont qu’un des aspects des transformations de ces ordres politiques qui sont en train de maturer, avec probablement de nouveaux types de dirigeants et surtout de nouvelles sources de légitimité. Ces questionnements rejoignent d’anciens travaux de l’auteur, où il montrait que les interventions extérieures avaient plutôt tendance à allonger les cycles de conflits en bridant les processus historiques à l’œuvre.

Alain Antil

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Depuis 1993, les réformes des retraites, qui toutes ont conduit à une baisse globale du niveau des pensions, entraînent des conséquences plus négatives encore pour les salariées. La nouvelle ne semble guère s'en démarquer. / France, Économie, Femmes, Inégalités, Protection sociale, Travail, Droits des (...) / France, Économie, Femmes, Inégalités, Protection sociale, Travail, Droits des femmes, Retraites - 2013/09

L'octroi de prêts et la mise à disposition de produits d'épargne ou d'assurance permettraient aux plus démunis d'entreprendre afin de s'extraire de la pauvreté. Il n'en est rien. / Aide au développement, Banque, Capitalisme, Dette, Économie, Finance, Inégalités, Pauvreté, Spéculation, Crise financière (...) / Aide au développement, Banque, Capitalisme, Dette, Économie, Finance, Inégalités, Pauvreté, Spéculation, Crise financière - 2013/09

Dans le numéro 3/2020 de Politique étrangère, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos a proposé une analyse croisée de plusieurs ouvrages consacrés à l’insécurité en Afrique subsaharienne. L’auteur d’un de ces livres, Jacob Zenn, professeur associé à l’université Georgetown et chercheur à la Jamestown Foundation, a demandé à bénéficier d’un droit de réponse.

In Politique étrangère (n°3/2020), Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos reviewed my book, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2020), but with much misrepresentation. This article addresses those misrepresentations by quoting Montclos’ review and the book itself.

Montclos claimed Unmasking “utilized no French academic literature on the Sahel.” However, Unmasking cited two French-language Olivier Meunier book chapters. One chapter demonstrated 1990s Nigerian and Nigerien Salafi scholars’ close contacts and the other revealed an “Algerian merchant” constructed Niger-based Islamic school, Moufidah (p. 33). The relevance in Unmasking related to Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) member, Hacene Allane, being a Niger-based Algerian merchant in 1993 before becoming the GIA’s first Nigeria-based operative in 1994 (p. 30). Furthermore, the Salafi preacher hosting Allane in Nigeria ran an Islamic school that supported Moufidah. Although I suspected Allane constructed Moufidah, I withheld making that claim in the book.

French scholar Emmanuel Grégoire’s book chapter was also citedfor noting Niger’s Salafis were called “new jihadists” in 1993 (p. 33). Although Niger’s Salafis rebuffed GIA recruitment attempts, Nigerian intelligence officials observed Allane’s recruiting Nigerians to the GIA and inviting diaspora Nigerian al-Qaeda members back to Nigeria (p. 39). Unmasking contends this represented the Nigerian jihadist movement’s beginnings.

Another French scholar cited was Christian Seignobos, whose research demonstrated when Ansaru faction members reintegrated into Boko Haram in 2013 they would have encountered Cameroon-based zarquina road-robbers (p. 213). Further, Mauritanians Lemine Salem and Zekeria Salem’s French-language works were cited regarding Abu Muhammed al-Yemeni and Muhammad al-Hassan Dedew. Al-Yemeni was Usama Bin Laden’s Nigeria envoy and was hosted by Allane (p. 48); Dedew frequented a Mauritania-based Islamic camp where “Nigerian Taliban” youths studied in 2003 (p. 96).

Lastly, a Montclos French-language report was cited because it argued Boko Haram lacked “diaspora links” and Sahelian jihadist ties. However, Unmasking argues Saudi Arabia-based diaspora Nigerians contributed to Boko Haram’s founding (p. 37) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) trained, financed, supplied weapons, and advised Boko Haram before it launched jihad in 2010 (p. 152). Given Unmasking’s citing French scholars, including also Gilles Kepel (p. 21), and French-language publications, including Tunisia-based Jeune Afrique, Cameroon-based L’Oeil du Sahel, and Senegal-based Dakaractu, it is remarkable Unmasking was criticized for not citing French scholarship.

Montclos further asserted Unmasking focused only on “international connections” and “a few individuals who tried extending sect networks towards the Sahel.” However, Unmasking’s introduction argues for “understanding how international, national, regional, and local forces produced the Boko Haram phenomenon (p. 9).” Moreover, Chapter 4 examines Nigeria’s domestic Islamic milieu, including oil magnate Muhammad Indimi, who befriended George Bush’s family and selected Salafi Jaafar Mahmud Adam over Sufis to preach at his Maiduguri mosque (p. 81). This mosque is where Adam’s disciple, future Boko Haram leader Muhammed Yusuf, eventually preached.

Chapter 4 also mentions the 1982 Borno government report recommending banning the Salafi Izala movement for promoting takfir against Sufis (p. 67). Further, political calculations compelling Izala’s “godfather” Abubakar Gumi to ally with Sufis to counter northern Nigerian Christian political influence is analyzed (p. 76). Tensions between Gumi, anti-government Salafi radical Ibrahim Datti Ahmed, and Shia revolutionary Ibrahim al-Zakzaky are also assessed (p. 71). However, Gumi’s, Datti Ahmed’s, and al-Zakzaky’s receiving Saudi, Libyan, and Iranian support, respectively, demonstrates Nigeria’s religious marketplace was inseparable from international influences.

Other Nigerian Salafi preachers mentioned in Chapter 4 for post-9/11 pro-al-Qaeda preaching include Aminu Daurawa, Abubakar Gero Argungu, Yahya Farouk Chedi, and Isa Ali Pantami, who collectively impacted Muhammad Yusuf’s followers (p. 86). Nigerian Scholars Muzzamil Hanga, Abdullah Saleh “Pakistan”, and Bashir Aliyu Umar, whose experiences with Pakistani, Iranian, Sudanese, and Saudi scholars shaped their religious worldviews, were also analyzed because they eventually renounced radicalism (pp. 73-76). Furthermore, Chapter 8 described Kogi-based Salafis who joined Boko Haram and Ansaru (p. 201), while Chapter 9 discussed Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)’s financing around Lake Chad (p. 246). One can imagine my wonderment about allegations that Unmasking focused only on “international connections” and “a few” Boko Haram members with Sahelian ties.

Another Montclos claim is Unmasking “says nothing about Nigerian army failures” or abuses. This is patently false, and is rebutted by Chapter 9, whichstates “revenge for arrested, abused, or slain cofighters must have motivated Boko Haram members” (p. 246). The chapter also mentions Nigerian soldiers’ castrating Boko Haram members and asserts Nigeria’s “military alienated traders when their goods were taxed by ISWAP but then seized and destroyed by the army” (p. 290). Additionally, Nigerian security forces’ extrajudicial killing of Muhammed Yusuf, which inspired Boko Haram’s fighting “under the banner of the global jihad movement” like al-Shabaab, is analyzed in Chapter 6 (p. 142).

Montclos also faults Unmasking for showing “little interest” in Nigeria’s 1999 return to civilian rule, 2001 sharia implementation, and post-2001 Islamist disillusionment, which inspired Islamists’ turn to jihadism. However, Chapter 5 argues influential Saudi-trained Nigerian Salafis easily observed Saudi Salafi scholars’ pre-1999 voting prohibitions because Nigeria had few democratic elections. However, after Nigeria democratized in 1999, Nigerian Salafis gradually softened their sharia demands and promoted voting for Muslim leaders. Therefore, Boko Haram preachers claimed Nigerian Salafis liberalized by embracing democracy to the point of infidelity whereas only Boko Haram retained “pure” Salafism (pp. 82, 100, 115). Montclos clearly overlooked this analysis.

Finally, Montclos finds both my omission of Abubakar Lawan and Muhammed Yusuf’s alleged birthyear of 1970 as “troubling.” However, Lawan is deliberately omitted in Unmasking to avoid speculating on individuals when sources are uncorroborated. The original source regarding Lawan is civil society activist-turned-politician Shehu Sani’s 2011 Vanguard article asserting Lawan was a 1990s-era Boko Haram founder. However, no Boko Haram members’ interviews, primary source documents, or scholarly fieldwork proves Lawan even existed. Contrarily, ample evidence revealed in Unmasking indicates al-Qaeda operative Muhammed Ali cofounded Boko Haram alongside Muhammed Yusuf (p. 87). Likewise, no evidence substantiates Yusuf’s 1970 birthyear. Contrarily, Boko Haram’s Yusuf biography states Yusuf’s birthyear as 1388 hijri, or 1967 (p. 65). Thus, these are hardly “troubling” claims and Montclos’ nitpicking digresses from more important discussions.

A lesson learned from Montclos’ book review is reviewers must perform a close reading or risk being exposed for misinterpretations, inaccuracies, and outright falsehoods.

Jacob Zenn

Raphaële Chappe and Mark Blyth respond to Sebastian Mallaby's article "The Age of Magic Money."

En France, des journaux vendent des prestations événementielles aux collectivités locales pour tenter d'équilibrer leurs comptes. / France, Économie, Médias, Personnalités, Politique, Presse, Publicité, Région - 2013/09 / France, Économie, Médias, Personnalités, Politique, Presse, Publicité, Région - 2013/09

Le lien entre philosophie et anarchisme a longtemps paru défait, si ce n'est infondé. L'anarchisme, expliquait-on, aurait disparu de la scène sociale et politique dans le désastre de la guerre civile espagnole. En outre, à l'inverse du marxisme, la pensée libertaire n'aurait jamais constitué une (...) / Histoire, Idées, Syndicalisme, Socialisme libertaire, Anarchisme - 2009/01