Diplomacy & Crisis News

Kyle Mizokami

North Korea, Asia

They have evolved from a nuisance force designed to stage attacks in the enemy’s rear into something far more dangerous.

Here's What You Need to Remember: In the event of war, North Korea would likely launch dozens of separate attacks throughout South Korea, from the DMZ to the southern port of Busan. Whether or not these forces can make their way through Seoul’s considerable air and sea defenses is another question.

One of the most vital parts of North Korea’s war machine is one that relies the most on so-called “soldier power” skills. North Korea has likely the largest special-forces organization in the world, numbering two hundred thousand men—and women—trained in unconventional warfare. Pyongyang’s commandos are trained to operate throughout the Korean Peninsula, and possibly beyond, to present an asymmetric threat to its enemies.

For decades North Korea maintained an impressive all-arms force of everything from tanks to mechanized infantry, artillery, airborne forces and special forces. The country’s conventional forces, facing a long slide after the end of the Cold War, have faced equipment obsolescence and supply shortages—for example, North Korea has very few tanks based on the 1970s Soviet T-72, and most are still derivatives of the 1960s-era T-62. The rest of Pyongyang’s armored corps are in a similar predicament, making them decidedly inferior to U.S. and South Korean forces.

In response, North Korea has upped the importance of its special forces. The country maintains twenty-five special-forces and special-purpose brigades, and five special-forces battalions, designed to undertake missions from frontline DMZ assault to parachute and assassination missions. The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau, part of the Korean People’s Army, functions as a kind of analog to U.S. Special Operations Command, coordinating the special forces of the Army, Army Air Force and Korean People’s Navy.

Of North Korea’s two hundred thousand “commandos,” approximately 150,000 belong to light infantry units. Foot mobile, their frontline mission is to infiltrate or flank enemy lines to envelop or mount rear attacks on enemy forces. North Korea’s hilly terrain lends itself to such tactics, as does the network of tunnels that the country has dug that cross the DMZ in a number of places. Eleven of North Korea’s special forces brigades are light-infantry brigades, and there are smaller light-infantry units embedded within individual NK combat divisions.

A further three brigades are special-purpose airborne infantry. The Thirty-Eighth, Forty-Eighth and Fifty-Eighth Airborne Brigades operate much like the Eighty-Second Airborne Division, conducting strategic operations including airborne drops to seize critical terrain and infrastructure. NKPA airborne forces would likely target enemy airfields, South Korean government buildings, and key roads and highways to prevent their sabotage. Each brigade is organized into six airborne infantry battalions with a total strength of 3,500. Unlike the Eighty-Second, however, NKPA airborne brigades are unlikely to operate at the battalion level or higher, and due to a lack of long-range transport cannot operate beyond the Korean Peninsula.

In addition, North Korea has an estimated eight “sniper brigades,” three for the People’s Army (Seventeenth, Sixtieth and Sixty-First Brigades), three for the Army Air Force (Eleventh, Sixteenth and Twenty-First Brigades), and two for the People’s Navy (Twenty-Ninth, 291st). Each consists of approximately 3,500 men, organized into seven to ten sniper “battalions.”  These units fulfill a broad variety of roles and are roughly analogous to U.S. Army Rangers, U.S. Special Forces and Navy SEALs. Unlike their American counterparts, it appears some these units are capable of fighting as conventional airborne, air assault, or naval infantry.

Sniper brigades are trained in strategic reconnaissance and so-called “direct action” missions including assassination missions, raids against high-level targets military and economic targets, sabotage, disruption of South Korea’s reserve system, covert delivery of weapons of mass disruption (including possibly radiological weapons), and organizing antigovernment guerrilla campaigns in South Korea. They will frequently be dressed in civilian, South Korean military, or U.S. military uniforms. One platoon of thirty to forty troops per Army sniper brigade consists solely of women, trained to conduct combat operations dressed as civilians.

Finally, the Reconnaissance Bureau maintains four separate reconnaissance battalions. Highly trained and organized, these five-hundred-man battalions are trained to lead an army corps through the hazardous DMZ. They likely have intimate—and highly classified—knowledge of both friendly and enemy defenses in the demilitarized zone. A fifth battalion is reportedly organized for out-of-country operations.

Special forces are generally meant to operate behind enemy lines, and North Korea employs considerable, though often obsolete, means of getting them there. For ground forces, one obvious means of infiltrating South Korea is through the 160-mile-long and 2.5-mile-wide DMZ. Undiscovered cross-border tunnels are another means. By sea, Pyongyang has the ability to deliver an estimated five thousand troops in a single lift, using everything from commercial vessels to Nampo-class landing craft, it's fleet of 130 Kongbang-class hovercraft and Sang-O coastal submarines and Yeono midget submarines.

By air, North Korea has a notional fleet of two hundred elderly An-2 Colt short-takeoff and -landing transports. Capable of flying low and slow to avoid radar, each An-2 can carry up to twelve commandos, landing on unimproved surfaces or parachuting them on their targets. The regime also has a fleet of about 250 transport helicopters, mostly Soviet-bloc in origin (and age) but also including illicitly acquired Hughes 500MD series helicopters similar to those flown by the Republic of Korea. Pyongyang also appears bent to acquire modern, long-distance transports such as this aircraft, manufactured in New Zealand. Aircraft such as the P-750 XSTOL would allow North Korean special forces to reach as far as Japan and Okinawa, both of which would serve as forward bases for U.S. forces in wartime.

In the event of war, North Korea would likely launch dozens of separate attacks throughout South Korea, from the DMZ to the southern port of Busan. Whether or not these forces can make their way through Seoul’s considerable air and sea defenses is another question. Valleys, passes and waterways that could be used by low-flying aircraft and watercraft are already covered with everything from air-defense guns to antitank guided missiles. Given proper warning, South Korean defenders would inflict heavy losses on North Korean commandos on the way to their objectives.

North Korean special forces have evolved from a nuisance force designed to stage attacks in the enemy’s rear into something far more dangerous. Their ability to distribute nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons could, if successful, kill thousands of civilians. They have even trained to attack and destroy a replica of the Blue House, the official resident of the South Korean president. Although many would undoubtedly die en route to their destination, once on the ground their training, toughness and political indoctrination make them formidable adversaries.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This piece first appeared several years ago. It is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters. 

Hollie McKay

Afghanistan,

The Taliban is in over its head—and it is all coming at a time when the nation is on the brink of a harrowing economic collapse.

KABUL, Afghanistan – Three months ago, a band-aid was ripped for a bullet wound. President Ashraf Ghani fled the Presidential Palace on the searing Sunday afternoon of August 15, paving the way for the encroaching Taliban to storm right in without a crescendo of bullets. Two weeks later, the last U.S. evacuation aircraft rose into Kabul’s night sky from the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), dramatically drawing to a close a bitter and bloody twenty-year war.

So what has become of life under the Taliban three months into their iron-clad rule over Afghanistan?

Indeed, it marks a bizarre and brash maneuver from insurgency and into forming a government in charge of 38 million people. Much of the leadership has little experience running formal procedures, a far cry from wielding an AK-47 as a mountain militia. Those in top positions typically prefer to conduct business inside a mosque or away from the confines of an office. If they do show up, it is usually only for a few hours—with ministries and directorates effectively shutting shop after 2 pm.

The Taliban is in over its head—and it is all coming at a time when the nation is on the brink of a harrowing economic collapse.

In the streets—from Kabul to Kandahar to Khost and beyond—life on the surface has resumed; only Afghans are becoming hungrier, poorer, and more desperate and afraid by the day. In less than twelve weeks, the Afghani currency has devalued from around 73 AFG to one U.S. dollar to 92 AFG.

It is expected only to get worse.

 “We rely purely on Allah,” Ghaws-u-deen, thirty-five, who sells Afghan fried food on the street, tells me with a brave smile.

Almost every retailer I speak to on the dusty streets tells me that business has dropped from anywhere between 50 to 90 percent since the Taliban takeover. On top of it, the price of staple goods from bread to petrol to meat to cooking oil is ascending.

The latter, one street burger vendor named Amir Mohammad explains, has more than doubled in recent months from the equivalent of $9.80 a container to $22.

Some streets are stuffed with the starving and scared, selling their household items to fill their growling stomachs. At the same time, other areas that once bristled with vibrancy are boarded up skeletons—their owners having fled and left their livelihoods behind.

Sadly, the financial meltdown—driven in large part by Washington immediately freezing $9.5 billion in aid marked for Afghanistan followed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspension on funds—has meant much of the budding young generation have had to stop their studies.

Waheed Ullah Wafa, twenty-five, who was studying toward a Bachelor of Computer Science at Kardan University until the Taliban came, took a job as a travel agent two weeks ago.

“It costs too much money to keep studying,” one Afghan, Waheed—who took a job two weeks ago as a travel agent instead—tells me.

Twenty years of war created a somewhat “artificial economy,” meaning that the vast portion of Afghans' employment relied on the foreign footprint through the military, government, contractors, NGO sector, or even just as the primary customer base. Since that bubble abruptly burst, Afghans in overwhelming numbers have been rendered jobless and impoverished. The once middle class has folded into poverty.

The economic downfall has led to a humanitarian disaster of mass proportions. Levels of malnutrition are horrifying, government hospitals are overwhelmed and underpaid, and the few internationally-funded clinics that remain are hurting to keep up with the influx.

“Mothers can’t feed their children,” laments Muhibullah Ahmadzai, medical director of the Germany-sponsored Irene Salimi Children’s Hospital in Kabul. “That causes all sorts of congenital disabilities. And family violence is rising.”

Image Credit: Holly McKay.

The unspoken reality on the ground is also the drastic rise in mental illness. After decades of endless conflict and combat, along with their lives being yanked from beneath them in an instant, girls and women are hardest hit by bouts of extreme depression and anxiety.

Anzoorat Wali, a budding nineteen-year-old martial arts star who was in her final year of high school, has been unable to complete her studies since the Taliban came to power. The outfit has also prohibited the thing she loves most in the world—taekwondo. 

“There is nothing left here. Under the government of the Taliban, we cannot do anything for ourselves or our country,” she says softly. “All we can do is stay at home.”

Secondary education for girls in most provinces is still suspended, sports and music are outlawed, many have lost their jobs and fear stepping foot outside the home.

On top of it all is the growing threat of ISIS-K, colloquially termed Daesh. Barely a day goes by that the operatives don’t blow up a building or dispatch shooters to open fire. Yet the Taliban top brass, in a bid to portray a cloak of security and stability, refuse to acknowledge that the terrorist organization even exists on their soil. Instead, the Nangahar-based intelligence director, who goes by Dr. Basheer, assures me that “Daesh is a myth” and that they (the Taliban) don’t even call them by such a term. To the Taliban, they are “Baghyan,” meaning “rebels” in Pashto and grouped in with any anti-government clans.

But there is no one-size-fits-all when it comes to the Taliban, and it is impossible to paint the group with one broad brush. Many speak fluent English, come from affluent and educated backgrounds, and will look me (as a woman) in the eye when speaking. However, just as many are illiterate, took up arms for the outfit after being groomed at a madrassa as a child, and could at any moment switch to the even darker side of Daesh.

Nonetheless, despite much of the hysteria and anxiety puncturing Afghanistan, there is plenty of reason to believe that the Taliban of 2021 progressed significantly compared to its first reign a quarter of a century ago. As a female foreign journalist who has traveled by road to a vast portion of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces since August, I am generally treated with respect and considered a “guest” in the blood-spilled nation (which I understand the same politeness is not always applied to local Afghan journalists who report with extreme bravery).

Cases of individuals being targeted and retaliated against by the Taliban exist, but they are by far the exception, not the norm. There are no mass slaughters into the streets or people being dragged en masse in the dead of night, as much of the hype on social media would have you believe.

Afghans are resilient people, and life goes on—even without the buzz of music and foreign cash flow. Cafes and restaurants are still open (and many can be spotted smoking cigarettes or the popular waterpipe known as Hookah), commercial airplanes have resumed transits across the country and to some international destinations such as Islamabad and Abu Dhabi, hotels lure tourists, and cars continue to clog the narrow and ancient Kabul streets.

Yet the doom and gloom of a humanitarian catastrophe cling as the winter winds roll in and snow glazes the serrated mountains of the beautiful, bleeding country. It is a dilemma that the United States and much of the international community will be forced to painfully reconcile with—either recognize the new Taliban regime and release the funds that could stop innocent Afghans from starving to death or pariah the country and hold out for a longer game in the hopes the regime eliminates terrorism and values human rights.

Let’s not be tone-deaf here. Before 2001, there was no government as isolated as the Taliban. Nations refused to recognize them, and refused to give them money. But you know who did provide them with a couple of million to marginally stay afloat? Osama bin Laden.

Holly McKay is the author of “Only Cry for the Living: Memos from Inside the ISIS Battlefield”. McKay is a journalist and war crimes investigator currently based in Afghanistan.

Images from Holly McKay. 

Déjà morcelée entre cinq groupes armés eux-mêmes composites, la Syrie a vu le nord de son territoire envahi à la fin août par l'armée turque. Ce dépeçage a commencé il y a bien longtemps, lorsque Israël décida d'occuper le plateau du Golan, où seuls les Druzes ont pu s'accrocher. / Israël, Proche-Orient, (...) / Israël, Proche-Orient, Syrie, Conflit israélo-arabe, Identité culturelle, Islam, Minorité nationale, Droits des minorités, Religion, Colonisation, Frontières - 2016/10

Kris Osborn

ICBMs, Americas

There's rust growing on these deterrence technologies.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Weapons systems are increasingly becoming cyber reliant, which is why command and control networks and computer processing must be hardened to protect new ICBMs. After all, advanced connectivity can bring unprecedented advantages while also introducing some risks.

Some people may assume the Air Force’s new ground-based strategic deterrent (GBSD) is purely focused on a fast-tracked replacement of four hundred or more intercontinental (ICBMs) dispersed across vast regions of the United States, yet the effort is actually much more comprehensive and far-reaching.  

“GBSD is a wholesale change, all the way from the actual missile to the silos that house missiles to the launch centers that house the missile combat crews that stay on watch 24/7, Greg Manuel, Northrop Grumman’s sector vice president and general manager, told the National Interest.

Along with designing and building the missiles themselves, prototypes of which already exist, the joint Northrop Grumman-Air Force effort includes a rebuilding of the entire ICBM infrastructure to include new launch facilities and launch centers, as well as new software and Command and Control technology. Northrop Grumman is reconstructing as many as 450 launch facilities and building the first prototype components of the ICBM, which will first fire off in 2023.

“We are well into building our first components of the actual ICBM. The GBSD program is more than just the missile but a recapitalization of the entire system,” Manuel said. 

Building the entire infrastructure, which includes hardware, advanced computing and new generations of software, is critical to performance and sustainability for the weapons system for decades into the future. The Minuteman IIIs are aging. They are a 1960s technology supported by obsolete equipment. That’s why Northrop Grumman, the Air Force, and several defense industry companies have continued to work on hardening their networks and improving the reliability of their cyber systems to prevent “hacking” or “enemy intrusions” into any kind of launch protocol. The silos are important, too, as they house the weapons and would ultimately be key to propulsion. 

The advanced command and control is likely to be securely integrated with “higher authorities” to shorten the timeline or notification curve between when senior decisionmakers learn of a threat and responsive weapons systems are put on alert. To achieve this goal, space connectivity must be combined with secure and fortified ground control stations capable of quickly integrating with ICBMs during a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” attack. 

Weapons systems are increasingly becoming cyber reliant, which is why command and control networks and computer processing must be hardened to protect new ICBMs. After all, advanced connectivity can bring unprecedented advantages while also introducing some risks. This may be why the hardware and software infrastructure that supports the new ICBMs is essentially being rebuilt with upgradeable and secure technologies. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article is being reprinted for reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

Jets, Americas

Over the past decade, engineers working on the F-35 fighter jet have built a specific modernization plan into the stealth aircraft with a mind to keeping the jet cutting edge and hopefully superior well into the 2070s.

Although the number of state-of-the-art F-35 fighter jets is increasing rapidly, what impact will emerging technologies have on this one-of-a-kind stealth fighter?  

The advent of sixth-generation aircraft and explosive growth in artificial intelligence has generated a technological climate in which breakthrough systems come to fruition on a much faster timetable. Innovative advanced computer simulations, digital engineering, and cyber-related information processing are quickly reshaping the landscape.

New sensors, weapons, information processing, and even new stealth configurations are likely to arrive faster than expected. The good news is that the creators of the F-35 were well ahead of the curve, and ready to meet those threats head-on. 

The F-35s Biggest Asset: Upgradeability 

Over the past decade, engineers working on the F-35 fighter jet have built a specific modernization plan into the stealth aircraft with a mind to keeping the jet cutting edge and hopefully superior well into the 2070s. 

It is conceivable that many advances in the realm of stealth— such as thermal signature management, coating materials, or even various construction techniques—could be incorporated into an F-35’s airframe. 

The basic configuration of the airframe may not necessarily need to change much in order for the aircraft to surge into new dimensions of technological capability. 

Continuous Development 

Years ago, the Pentagon’s F-35 Joint Program Office outlined a “continuous development” roadmap for the F-35 fighter. This roadmap mapped out the integration of new technologies into the aircraft such as weapons and sensors. These technologies will be added as they become available.

This program, which was pioneered years ago, has yielded significant results, particularly in the realm of software. Former Air Force Acquisition Executive William Roper once told reporters that “software” may determine who “wins the next war.”

This pertains to information flow and management of otherwise disparate pools of accumulated sensor information. Software enhancements to the F-35 jet would allow it to fire new weapons. 

For example, a software enhancement will give the jet a breakthrough ability to fire the Stormbreaker weapon, which is an air-dropped bomb capable of tracking targets in all types of weather and attacking at ranges up to forty miles away. The Stormbreaker uses a tri-mode seeker using millimeter wave, infrared or radiofrequency and laser targeting to track and destroy targets. 

There are many weapons that benefit from a two-way data link that allows them to maneuver in flight. The Block III software drop similarly widen the weapons arsenal for the fighter jet.  

Better Software, Better Lethality 

Engineers are increasingly viewing software enhancements as something that needs to be pursued in more a continuous flow instead of separating them into small updates over the span of many years. 

For example, integrating new software allows engineers to add new weapons to an aircraft, improve its data library and allow it to use new computer processing speeds.

A continuous modernization environment would contribute to a more capable war platform twenty to forty years from now. And that makes all the sense in the world. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master’s Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.  

Image: Flickr / U.S. Air Force

Kyle Mizokami

U.S. Military, Americas

Fighting against these elite soldiers will ruin your day, to say the least. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Despite the axiom that one “cannot mass produce special forces,” the ranks of U.S. operatives have more than doubled in size since 2001 in an effort to keep pace with demand.

Special operations forces have been at the forefront of U.S. combat operations in the last two decades. They are nearly at the forefront of risky combat missions—and suffer higher casualties as they are often deployed to remote locations and exposed to greater risks. 

A companion article details the special operations units of the U.S. Army and the distinction between various tiers of special operations units.

In this second part we’ll dive into the special operations units of the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, and look at recent challenges facing the special operations community.

The Marine Raider Regiment

 The Marine Corps historically resisted the creation of elite special operations units, instead designating some reconnaissance units as ‘Special Operations Capable’ with training for airborne and seaborne insertion. 

Today, these include four Force Reconnaissance Companies, primarily assigned to support to Marine expeditionary forces, and three Divisional Reconnaissance Battalions which incorporate Deep Reconnaissance Platoon including specialized combat divers to perform beach and landing zone reconnaissance, and direct air and artillery strikes.

During World War II, however, the Marines briefly operated two unconventional Raider battalions involved in some spectacular island assaults, including an epic submarine-launched raid on a Japanese seaplane base. But the Marine brass disliked the concept and disbanded the units in 1944.

The Marines were finally compelled to form dedicated special forces battalions 2003 by Special Forces-loving Rumsfeld defense department. In 2015, Marine special forces battalions were then integrated into a new Raider Regiment based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

The Raider Regiment counts three Raider battalions consisting of four companies. Each company has four fourteen-man teams called MSOTs. There’s also a Raider Support Group with three more battalions including specialist multi-purpose canine handlers, surveillance and forward observers.

Raiders trainees undergo a three-stage screening, followed by a nine-month training program in skills ranging from demolitions, diving, foreign languages, close-quarters combat and wilderness survival. Raiders have been involved in actions ranging from brutal urban warfare against ISIS in Mosul, Iraq, and Marawi in the Philippines, to counter-terror actions in Mali.

Navy SEALs

The U.S. Navy’s Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams have their origin in underwater demolitions teams assigned to scout out beaches and clear defensive obstacles ahead of amphibious landings in World War II ranging from Omaha Beach to the fortified island of Tarawa. 

The SEALS were officially formed in 1962 and were soon engaged in spy missions and riverine combat tasks in Vietnam, and participated in Operation Phoenix, a program to assassinate village leaders sympathetic to the Viet Cong.

Later SEAL ops include securing the governor-general of Grenada in his palace, infiltrating Iraqi-occupied Kuwait City, and taking back oil tankers seized by pirates. 

Just to begin training, SEAL candidates must demonstrate extraordinary physical endurance. The over year-long training program spans topics ranging from airborne and diving operations as well as marksmanship and demolitions.

But of those that pass an initial screening, only one out of three make it through the initial physical conditioning unit, the third week of which is known as ‘Hell Week,” in which trainees perform 20 hours of intense physical activity per day.

The basic SEAL unit is sixteen-man SEAL platoon, which sub-divide into two squads. The Navy has roughly 3,000 Navy SEALS in eight SEAL teams, each consisting of six platoons and three eight-person special task support units.

Additionally, there are two sixteen-man SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams equipped with specialized Mk.VIII Mod. 1 submersibles which can carry up to six SEALs for underwater insertion, and three teams operating small boats for littoral operations.

DEVGRU

The Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU) is more popularly known by its former designation SEAL Team 6. Its operators are all experienced Navy SEALs who have undertaken an even more grueling training process with a 50 percent washout rate and occasional fatalities. 

Like the Army’s Delta Force, DEVGRU is a Tier 1 unit involved in counter-terrorism and preemptive assassination operations, famously including the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Unit members also specialize in hostage rescue and protect high-ranking individuals. 

DEVGRU is organized into four assault squadrons (Red, Gold, Blue and Silver); an over 100-strong sniper/advanced reconnaissance squadron (Black); a special boat squadron (Gray); and a training squadron (Green).

Air Force Special Operations

The Air Force has its own 15,000-person strong Special Operations Command, first formerly established in 1983. These involves a mix of aviation and commando-style units.

Special Ops air wings fly a wide range of unique aircraft which often work closely with special forces units of other branches.

Many of these fly variants of the venerable C-130 transport plane. For inserting and recovering commandos behind enemy lines there are MC-130 transport planes modified for low-altitude insertion and recovery and refueling helicopters, as well as CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft.

To provide long-endurance precision air support, there are ponderous but deadly “Spooky” gunship transports bristling with howitzers, Gatling guns and missiles. And to impede enemy communications and remotely detonated mines, there are EC-130H aircraft with powerful jammers.

To map out just where hostiles are in the first place, AFSOCOM has a fleet of small U-28, C-145 and C-146 surveillance planes stuffed to the gills with hi-tech sensors used in low-profile spy flights across Africa and Southwest Asia alongside MQ-9 Reaper drone squadrons.

Special Tactics Squadrons

But there’s also a ground-pounding side to Air Force Special Ops in the form of Special Tactics Squadrons. These include specialists that are detached to support other special operations units.

Air Force Combat Controllers help assess landing zones and airfields in remote, and perform traffic control in these austere conditions. Two-man Tactical Air Control Parties focus on directing air strikes in support of other ground forces. Pararescuemen, or PJs, assist in search-and-rescue missions behind enemy lines or difficult to access areas, as well as provide emergency medical care. 

There are even Special Operations Weathermen designed to assess weather conditions in the field that could impact the success of a mission.

Most STSs are grouped under the the 24th Special Operations Wing, including the 24th STS, a Tier 1 unit that habitually embeds personnel with Delta Force and DEVGRU.

Challenges for U.S. Special Forces

Despite official secrecy, units like DEVGRU have been celebrated in press coverage and films like American Sniper, The Green Berets and Lone Survivor.

But as special forces undertake a large share of military efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Syria, they are subject to being word down with near continuous combat deployments abroad

Furthermore, despite the axiom that one “cannot mass produce special forces,” the ranks of U.S. operatives have more than doubled in size since 2001 in an effort to keep pace with demand.

These stresses may be contributing to an institutional crisis. In the last few years, there have been several exposés of breakdowns in discipline and systemic misconduct in special forces units, ranging from the murder of a Green Beret in Mali by Navy SEALs and Marine Raiders in North Africa to reports that SEAL teams were exhibiting high rates of drug and alcohol abuse, and mishandling or even mutilating with hatchets the remains of enemy combatants.

These scandals are leading for calls within the community to acknowledge the problem and reestablish standards and norms of conduct.

Another challenge lies in the shifting priorities of the Defense Department. While SOCOM will likely remain at the forefront of future counter-terrorism/insurgency operations in Africa and West Asia, the Pentagon is reorienting itself away from such missions towards preparing for possible ‘great power’ conflict with Russia and China.

Special Operations forces may thus develop new tactics on how their unique capabilities could counter Russia’s own unconventional warfare tactics in Eastern Europe, or employed to surveil and raid militarized islets in the Pacific Ocean.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article first appeared in August 2020 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Kyle Mizokami

Japanese Navy, Pacific

Submarine nuclear propulsion would be an attainable but expensive project for Japan.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is planning to increase its submarine fleet to twenty-two operational diesel and AIP-powered submarines, plus one testing and two training submarines. The increase is likely meant to counterbalance China’s burgeoning undersea fleet of around seventy submarines, including several nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.

In June 2019, submarine manufacturer Mitsubishi Heavy Industries hosted a presentation (subsequently shared on Twitter) revealing plans for Japan’s next-generation submarine, dubbed the 29SS or “New 3,000-[metric] ton Submarine.” 

Documents reveal the 29SS will begin development in 2025–2028, and is targeted for entry into service in 2031. The lead ship is estimated to cost 76 billion yen ($710 million) and will likely serve primarily for testing and development purposes.

The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is planning to increase its submarine fleet to twenty-two operational diesel and AIP-powered submarines, plus one testing and two training submarines. The increase is likely meant to counterbalance China’s burgeoning undersea fleet of around seventy submarines, including several nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.

To enable this expansion, Japan’s 2019 defense budget includes funding to upgrade and increase the service life of seven older Oyashio-class diesel-electric submarines which entered service in the 1990s. 

Meanwhile, Kawasaki Heavy Industries is currently completing a twelfth Soryu-class submarine weighing 2,900 metric tons surfaced, with three more likely to be built by KHI and MHI. Unlike earlier Soryu boats, the final flight has swapped out its air-independent propulsion system for long-lasting lithium-ion batteries (LIBs)—a larger-scale, ruggedized adaptation of the lightweight, high-power-density batteries used in smartphones and laptops.

You can see a provisional drawing of the 29SS design by submarine analyst H.I. Sutton here. Earlier Japanese articles have also cataloged several technologies expected to be integrated in the 3,000-ton submarine.

Streamlining

The 29SS appears to be a further evolution of the LIB-powered Soryu, retaining its same essential hull form and its X-shaped rudder, which improves maneuverability and resilience. However, the Soryu’s bow has been inclined and its tall sail (conning tower) squashed downwards and blended into the hull of the 29SS. Diving planes formerly located on the sail are moved to the front of the hull. 

These modifications appear intended to improve aquadynamics, thus enhancing acoustic stealth and decreasing drag, which could result in increased speed and range. A “floating floor structure that can mitigate vibrations and shocks” may also make the 29SS quieter.

Pump-jet Propulsion

The 29SS’s shrouded propulsion system configuration suggests a heavier pump jet propulsor system instead of a conventional propeller. Pump-jets are unlikely to produce noisy cavitation, and allow quieter running at higher speeds. One source claims a “thirteen-blade” pump-jet would be 20 decibels (two orders of magnitude) quieter than the seven-bladed propeller on the Soryu.

However, pump-jets are usually only incorporated on much faster nuclear-powered submarines such as the U.S. Navy’s Virginia-class or Russia’s Borei-class SSBN. Diesel-electric submarines, however, can rarely afford to burn through battery with sustained high-speed cruising. 

Thus, the incorporation of pump jets suggests the 29SS may be designed to cruise at higher speeds for longer than is typical of a diesel-engine submarine.

Advanced New Sonars

Japan has also been developing advanced conformal sonar systems. The 29SS’s bow sonar will reportedly be optimized for discretion, long-distance detection, and also function better in shallow coastal waters. This last is particularly a concern in the rocky shallows off the Korean peninsula, in which North Korea operates dozens of small submarines that could prove difficult to detect.

The 29SS’s side-array hydrophones will reportedly use a fiber optic sonar which “senses sound not by the pressure of sound waves but by the interference effect of light.” This sensor may also be effective for detecting electromagnetic emissions.

There will also be a towed sonar array for long-distance, omnidirectional tracking, a reverse-search sonar array, and a broadband transmission array.

Returns from multiple sonars will reportedly be integrated into a synthetic sensor picture on the submarine’s new combat system, which can perform target-motion analysis and suggest firing solutions.

New Torpedoes

So far, there are no indications as to the 29SS’s precise armament configuration, though it will undoubtedly include at least a half-dozen torpedo tubes.

However, in 2012, Japan began developing a “high-speed, long-distance, long-endurance” successor to its standard Type 89 torpedo called the G-RX 6. Supposedly the new, optionally wire-guided system will use a stealthy hydrogen/oxygen combustion turbine, and it sonar will better be able to discriminate between decoys and real targets and time the detonation of the warhead for optimal effect depending on target type. The torpedo will be designed for both deep-sea and shallow-water engagements, and is due to enter service in 2030.

So far, there’s no evidence the 29SS includes vertical launch cells for missiles. While submarines can deploy missiles like the UGM-84 Harpoon out of their torpedo tubes, vertical cells allow ripple-fired salvoes that are more likely to overwhelm a target’s air defenses.

Propulsion: Lithium-Ion Batteries, New Diesel Engines and “High Power Snorkels”

The SS-29 class will be built around the extraordinary battery capacity offered by lithium ion batteries (LIB). At the blog Submarine Matters, analyst Peter Coates speculates the new design might boast up to ten days cruising submerged.

However, ditching the Stirling air-independent propulsion system used in earlier Soryu boats involves a tradeoff.

LIBs may allow a submarine captain more flexibility in aggressively using battery power—and a submarine running purely on battery with its diesels off can be quieter than a nuclear powered-submarine. 

But once a LIB-only sub exhausts its battery, it must surface or use its snorkel to suck in more air to run its diesel engines—during which time it will be much more vulnerable to attack. By contrast, AIP-equipped submarines can sustainably run for a few weeks confined to low speeds before surfacing, and nuclear-powered boats can operate underwater indefinitely even at high speeds. 

As Japanese submarines are likely to go on patrols closer to port, this tradeoff may be deemed acceptable. Still, the 29SS will incorporate technologies designed to minimize the length of “indiscretion” time at or near the surface, including a “more compact, quiet and powerful” “Snorkel Power-Generating System” which presumably will allow the submarine to snort air and generate electricity more efficiently. 

Japan has already studied optimizing the snorkel for the diesel engines on the Soryu class. Though LIBs are faster charging, given the SS-29’s huge planned battery capacity, the improved snorkel may be necessary to avoid taking longer than the claimed 100-minute charging time for the LIB-equipped Soryu.

Technically, LIBs could be combined with the AIP system, and indeed Japan reportedly studied possibly developing a Fuel-cell AIP, which is quieter and enables longer endurance than the Stirling AIP on the Soryu. However, the Japanese defense ministry decided this would be excessively expensive and time-consuming to develop.

It’s also estimated the 29SS will use two new larger-stroke Kawasaki 12V25/31S diesel engines producing 25 percent more electrical output.

Coates is skeptical that even advanced LIB-equipped submarines will fare well facing Chinese and Russian nuclear-powered submarines.

“…even with LIBs, Japanese and Australian subs will need to loudly snort with supercharged diesel engines every 10 days, thus blowing their residual discretion out of the water.”

Submarine nuclear propulsion would be an attainable but expensive project for Japan. South Korea appears to be considering developing submarine nuclear propulsion despite legal obstacles, but the technology might be even more politically sensitive in Japan.

For now, Japan is committed to deploying much less expensive yet still highly capable conventional submarines. The JMSDF’s submariners will need to leverage superior stealth and situational awareness when contending with the increasingly formidable naval forces of potential adversaries in the western Pacific.

Kyle Mizokami is a writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he co-founded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch.

This first appeared in July 2019 and is being reprinted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters.

Kris Osborn

Stealth Jets, World

In counterinsurgency, fourth generation aircraft can be just as effective for instance.

Here's What You Need to Remember: These aircraft are not quite advanced, stealthy and effective enough to truly rival enemy fifth-generation jets and successfully counter next-generation enemy air defenses. And yet, they may be far too advanced for counterinsurgency or counterterrorism missions wherein the United States already has air superiority.

The Navy and the Air Force appear to be making a push to supplement the Defense Department’s growing fifth-generation fleet of F-35 stealth fighter jets with advanced, enhanced fourth-generation aircraft. The Air Force’s Boeing F-15EX Eagle II and the Navy’s Block III F/A-18 Super Hornet jets could be described as 4.5-generation aircraft. These jets are helpful on the modern-day battlefield but their existence raises interesting questions. Just how sensible is it to build and deliver advanced fourth-generation fighters that might be incapable of countering fifth-generation jets flown by America’s adversaries, such as China’s Chengdu J-20 and Russia’s Sukhoi Su-57. 

The basic airframe structure and design of the Super Hornet, many of which have been preserved, upgraded and sustained through the Navy’s Service Life Extension Plan, is still viable. But some military strategists may question the rationale for continuing to build enhanced fourth-generation aircraft such as the Eagle II and Super Hornet. These aircraft are not quite advanced, stealthy and effective enough to truly rival enemy fifth-generation jets and successfully counter next-generation enemy air defenses. And yet, they may be far too advanced for counterinsurgency or counterterrorism missions wherein the United States already has air superiority. So just what kinds of missions are these enhanced fourth-generation aircraft best suited to perform?

It does not seem feasible that a Super Hornet or Eagle II could ever truly be “stealthy” but it might be able to make itself less detectable to some extent. Would it be less detectable against fifth-generation Chinese and Russian aircraft? Or advanced S-400 Russian air defenses? Or would upgraded Super Hornets primarily be useful against lower to mid-level threat environments? That seems to be a fundamental question to answer when trying to decide whether a Super Hornet or Eagle II might truly be used as a deterrent or combat asset. In counterinsurgency environments or areas where the Air Force maintains air superiority, a wide range of less expensive or light-air-attack aircraft might be just as effective. 

For example, the Super Hornet proved to be useful in Iraq. It was able to conduct more than just attack or “bomb-dropping” missions. It conducted overhead surveillance, targeting and information connectivity. Perhaps advanced sensors, AESA radars and longer-range sensors might indeed prove extremely useful in high-end combat? It seems logical for the Eagle II to supplement, support or offer additional capabilities to an advanced fleet of F-35 fighter jets. Yet, given concerns about cost and sustainment costs, decisionmakers would likely question the cost-value equation of enhancing and delivering a newly built generation of fourth-generation aircraft.

Nonetheless, these aircraft are far from “useless.” The Super Hornet and Eagle II are engineered with an advanced suite of next-generation combat capabilities. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master’s Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article is being reprinted for reader interest.

Image: Flickr 

Caleb Larson

Missiles, Americas

A video posted to social media shows several recovered AGM-114 R9X Hellfire missiles.

Here's What You Need to Know: Instead of an explosive charge, the missile uses several pop-out blades to chop up targets and prevent civilian casualties.

The Hellfire missile was originally developed in the 1980s as an anti-tank missile, though its role has been expanded for a variety of missions thanks to the missile’s high precision. It is currently in service with a number of countries including the United States, and is most often used with the Predator or Reaper drones for operations in crowded urban environments.

The missile is particularly well suited to urban operations. Though the missile’s overall weight is around 100 pounds, or about 45 kilograms, its warhead makes up only a fifth of the missile’s weight. Smaller, more controlled explosions are absolutely crucial in these environments where civilian casualties can seriously undermine long-term mission success. But one of the Hellfire variants doesn’t have an explosive warhead—and is just as deadly.

AGM-114 R9X Hellfire

In a video posted to social media, several recovered AGM-114 R9X Hellfire missiles were seen after they had been fired. In the video, the spent missile parts can be seen along with markings on them, including the R9X designation. Though fragmentary, the missile pieces appear to be parts of missile bodies, as well as a centrally located hub where the missile’s long, deadly blades attach to. Red spheres can also be seen inside the missile body that are likely responsible for acceleration. Another photo on Twitter gives a better look at the missile’s blade hub and part of a twisted blade.

Geçtiğimiz günlerde İdlip'te bir araca yönelik saldırıda kullanılan AGM-114 Hellfire Füzesine (Ninja Füzesi) ait parçaların görüntüleri. @orko_8 @Acemal71 @hkilichsword2 https://t.co/3lJOIWgxcO pic.twitter.com/6EoYjAWlK1

— Turkey In The World (@TRintheworld) June 17, 2020

This fragment is reported to have been found at the site of what may have been an RX9 (Hellfire with frikken swords) strike.

If you looks closely, you can see what appear to be hinges, as well as being and twisted projections from those hinges.

H/T @obretix, who found this. pic.twitter.com/db7ZOE6S1x

— Nick Waters (@N_Waters89) December 4, 2019

These missiles are seldom used. They lack an explosive warhead, and instead of blowing up, they use several pop-out blades to take out targets kinetically—hence the ninja nickname. The missile is designed to reduce civilian casualties, especially in dense urban environments. Thus far the missile seems to have been favored against individuals in cars, and is said to have the ability to target individual seats preventing other passengers from being killed.

Other photos and video posted to Twitter appear to show a car hit by at least one R9X missiles. Unlike usual missile strikes, this car is not burned, but looks like it’s been on a giant chopping block. The front windshield, roof, and seats are sliced through and what appears to be one of the missile’s blades can be seen on the ground next to the vehicle.

The secretive missile, likely carried by a drone, is reported to be used exclusively by the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States’ Joint Special Operations Command.

Postscript

Despite the dearth of concrete knowledge publicly available on the R9X missile, its aftermath is unmistakable. Use of the R9X is increasing—and keeping it a secret in the future will be next to impossible. Stay tuned for more info on this so-called ninja missile.

Caleb Larson is a defense writer with the National Interest. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture.

This article first appeared in June 2020.

Image: REUTERS/Josh Smith

James Holmes

China Missile, East Asia, China, United States

NATO could serve as guidance.

Here's What You Need to Remember:  A Golden Rule governs alliances and ententes of all types: the ally who furnishes the gold makes the rules.

Last week the University of Sydney’s United States Studies Center (USSC) set policy circles aflutter when it issued a novella-length report that questions the staying power of U.S. military strategy in the Indo-Pacific theater while urging inhabitants of the region to take up their share of the defense burden vis-à-vis a domineering China. Read the whole thing.

In one sense the report presents little new information or insight. That the U.S. military has retooled itself for counterinsurgency warfare and must now reinvent itself again for great power strategic competition is old news. So is the notion that Washington suffers from strategic ADHD, taking on new commitments around the world willy-nilly while shedding few old ones to conserve finite resources and policy energy. Over the past decade-plus, it’s become plain that Communist China is a serious, strategically-minded maritime contender and has equipped itself with formidable shore-based weaponry to assail U.S. and allied bases in the region and supply firepower support to its increasingly impressive battle fleet. Beijing can now hope to fend off U.S. reinforcements from coming to the aid of regional allies, to slow them down, or to make the effort so expensive in terms of lives and hardware that no U.S. president would order the attempt. If it does any of these things it could spring a fait accompli on the region, accomplishing limited goals before powerful outsiders could intercede.

This is old—if still potent—wine in a new bottle.

And yet. The report is clearly written and forceful, no small virtues. It adds a welcome new voice to the chorus—and that voice booms out from the region rather than from such precincts as Washington, DC or Newport, RI. One hopes the leadership in Canberra listens up, and other Indo-Pacific governments wary of Chinese Communist Party pretensions should bend an ear as well. The USSC coauthors’ central message—that the United States can no longer provide for common security alone and must have help—is precisely correct. They stop short of espousing an Asian NATO by name, but they invoke the basic concept underlying the Atlantic Alliance, namely “collective defense.” Allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific must shoulder their part of the defense burden, just as Europeans helped stave off the Soviet menace.

For its part, Washington must stop trying to do it all alone—and afford allies and friends the deference their interests and contributions warrant. All parties to the common defense must readjust not just strategy, resources, and hardware but also their way of thinking about these matters. They must nurture a culture of collective defense.

Three points the report puts forward are worth exploring: culture, strategy and operations, and alliance building and maintenance. First, culture. Note the coauthors: “In an era of constrained budgets and multiplying geopolitical flashpoints, prioritizing great power competition with China means America’s armed forces must scale back other global responsibilities.” But culture is a stubborn thing—and the strategic culture in Washington lags behind disconcerting new realities. The report maintains that “political leaders and much of the foreign policy establishment remain wedded to a superpower mindset that regards America’s role in the world as defending an expansive liberal order.” Acting as the lone custodian of the world order, including freedom of the sea, sets the United States up for strategic overreach and failure. Something will give.

The classics of strategy instruct statesmen and military commanders to wind down commitments or theaters that have outlived their usefulness, that no longer command the same importance they once did, or that have come to consume resources needed for more pressing priorities. That’s easy to say. It’s a simple matter of toting up costs and benefits, estimating the opportunity costs of one commitment against another, applying resources to the most important priorities, and downgrading or jettisoning the rest. But breaking up is hard to do, even with an Afghanistan where eighteen years of combat and diplomacy have yet to yield a durable sovereign government. Why such obtuse stick-to-it-iveness? Because every foreign commitment attracts a constituency within the establishment, the think-tank sector, or academia. That constituency sees its chosen commitment as the top priority for Washington, bar none, and clamors tirelessly for policy attention and resources.

For bureaucratic institutions, the easiest path is to try to please everyone and do everything. Yet setting and enforcing priorities is what strategy is at its most fundamental. Political leaders must harden their hearts when deciding on policy and strategy. If the Indo-Pacific is now the most critical geopolitical theater, other worthwhile commitments may have to give way.

Second, strategy and operations. The Australian coauthors do not counsel despair. They deny that “America is becoming a paper tiger.” It still fields “the world’s largest and most sophisticated armed forces, and is likely to continue to supply the central elements of any military counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific.” Still, “the United States’ longstanding ability to uphold a favorable regional balance of power by itself faces mounting and ultimately insurmountable challenges.” Just so. But let’s not sell ourselves short, either as the U.S. armed forces or as part of alliances that have endured for seven decades. It may be the case that Fortress China now boasts the capacity to reach out and smite allied military bases, or even forces in the field. But let’s refuse to succumb to a reverse form of the fallacy of “scriptwriting.” We have options.

Scriptwriting in strategy reduces a living, thinking, impassioned foe to an inert, docile mass on which we work our will. Scriptwriters in Los Angeles or New York develop storylines that instruct the characters in a drama or sitcom what to do, and the actors do it. But in strategic competition or warfare, some of the “actors” in our script are under no obligation to play the part we set out for them. In fact, they have every incentive to go off-script and wreck our production so that they can fulfill goals diametrically opposed to our own. Now flip that logic around. Sure, Communist China may be able to pound our legacy infrastructure or forces. But the United States and its allies aren’t lifeless masses. We too have ingenuity and the desire to prevail. Let’s refuse to follow Beijing’s script—and figure out how to ruin its production.

How do multinational and joint forces go off China’s script? The U.S. Studies Center insists that girding for strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific “will not be easy or cheap. On the contrary, it will require major changes to the U.S. military’s force structure, regional posture and concepts of operations, only some of which are currently in train.” But dodging the brunt of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy while giving PLA commanders strategic headaches may be less burdensome than all that. Read the Commandant’s Planning Guidance issued by the new U.S. Marine Corps leadership last month. Geography favors the allies. They can deploy low-cost measures along the first island chain, throwing up a barricade to Chinese maritime movement between the China seas, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. Small bodies of ground troops could fan out along the island chain, using volleys of anti-ship missiles to halt surface traffic. Sea mines, diesel submarines, and surface patrol craft could lend their firepower to the mix. Etc.

There’s no free lunch in strategy, but such measures could levy some serious military, economic, and diplomatic pain at manageable cost to the allies. One leading strategy professor in China pronounces challenging such a strategy a “suicide mission” for the PLA. If that reflects how Chinese Communist magnates reckon matters, then the prospects for deterrence—and thus for peacetime strategic success—may be brighter and more affordable than the Australian team lets on. Offbeat approaches to force design, operations, and strategy merit debating in allied circles.

And third, alliance building and maintenance. There are unmistakable signs that what the strategic canon calls a “community of interest” is gelling around the idea of counterbalancing Chinese overreach. What the U.S. Studies Center depicts as a brave new world in the Indo-Pacific is in many ways a return to geopolitical business as usual. During the Cold War, few deluded themselves that the United States could deter or defeat the Soviet empire all by itself. Allies chipped in niche capabilities without which the U.S. armed forces would have found it hard to execute their strategy. For instance, I was grateful to NATO navies for supplying minesweepers in the Persian Gulf back in 1991. Approaching the Kuwaiti coast would have been perilous in the extreme without Europeans running interference for us. Mine warfare is a traditional zone of neglect for the U.S. Navy—not so for the allies. Same goes for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, whose diesel submarines prowled along the first island chain throughout the Cold War to cramp communist maritime movement. Another niche but invaluable capability.

Such examples are legion. It’s good to see allies take ownership of their own security, and of freedom of the sea. The French and British governments have bruited about a return to Asia, possibly including naval bases in the South China Sea where aircraft-carrier groups can tarry. Here’s how a grand bargain could work should the USSC team get its way. A Golden Rule governs alliances and ententes of all types: the ally who furnishes the gold makes the rules. If Washington could provide for the common defense all by itself, it would have little reason to consult with allies or heed their advice. It would remain the sole agenda-setter. But if others contribute significant resources of their own, Washington must consult with them and consider—and perhaps embrace—their advice. U.S. leaders often deferred to allies during the Cold War, allowing them a say in policy and strategy. Consensus prevailed for the most part, even when decisions ran afoul of American preferences. And U.S. alliances proved resilient for the most part.

So America needs to rediscover the habit of strategic humility after being top dog for a generation. Here’s what Indo-Pacific allies need to do: help us help you. Even if island-chain defense works out, U.S. reinforcements must gain access to the Western Pacific to prevail in wartime. PLA commanders have predicated their access-denial strategy on disheartening their U.S. counterparts or convincing the U.S. administration the military effort cannot succeed at a cost the country is prepared to pay. Allies and partners should devise strategies and operations that hold down the price of access for U.S. forces—and thus make it thinkable if not easy for an American president to order them into combat.

Let’s march jointly in the Indo-Pacific.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific. The views voiced here are his alone. 

This piece was originally featured in 2019 and is being republished due to reader's interest.

Image: Reuters

Access to a new COVID-19 drug will be expanded in low- and middle-income countries following a voluntary licensing agreement between the pharmaceutical company Pfizer and a UN-backed global health initiative, announced in Geneva on Tuesday.

Kris Osborn

U.S. Submarines, Americas

Northrop Grumman isn't only good for stealth bombers.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Part of the challenge is finding ways to minimize Navy submarine vulnerability to enemy detection and attack by simply remaining at safer depths, yet in order to achieve a high-degree of high-speed connectivity, submarines need to break the ocean surface by coming to “periscope depth,” which is closer to the surface.

Sub-hunting spy planes armed with torpedoes, maritime drones armed with missiles, high-resolution, surface scanning cameras, and fast-moving surface ships dragging sonar sensors while conducting surface reconnaissance are all fast-growing threats to U.S. Navy submarines.

Part of the challenge is finding ways to minimize Navy submarine vulnerability to enemy detection and attack by simply remaining at safer depths, yet in order to achieve a high-degree of high-speed connectivity, submarines need to break the ocean surface by coming to “periscope depth,” which is closer to the surface.

The U.S. Navy is working with a number of industry partners such as Northrop Grumman to identify, evolve and refine new kinds of undersea communications technology.

“Today, the submarine comes to periscope depth and conducts the majority of its transmissions at this depth. Capabilities we’re developing at Northrop Grumman will allow the submarine to never have to come up to the surface, because it is at its most vulnerable when at periscope depth,” Alan Lytle, vice president of Strategy & Mission Solutions, Maritime/Land Systems & Sensors division, Northrop Grumman, told The National Interest in an interview.

Interestingly, while most people might immediately associate Northrop Grumman with high-profile programs such as its B-2 and B-21 stealth bombers, the company’s history with undersea warfare goes back nearly 100 years, including substantial World War II efforts. Years ago, Northrop Grumman was involved in adapting radio frequency (RF) technologies to undersea acoustic systems and developed the first electric torpedoes for Navy submarines.

“We have been working in the undersea domain for well over 50-years, and our support for the Navy stretches back even further,” said Jenny Roberts, director of strategy, investments & integration, Maritime/Land Systems & Sensors division, Northrop Grumman.

Roberts, who formerly worked as a director for undersea influence at the Navy’s Undersea Warfare Division, says Northrop Grumman innovators seek to align closely with the sense of mission and purpose now driving the U.S. Navy’s push to stay in front of undersea warfare technology.

“We bring together the power of the corporation’s continuous innovation to provide capabilities our Navy customers need for mission success,” Roberts explained to The National Interest. As part of the ongoing effort to synchronize efforts with the Navy, Northrop Grumman developers are placing a special premium on innovation in the areas of undersea warfare and cross-domain networking.

For instance, perhaps a surface drone, submarine, ship, or fighter jet can identify and share time-sensitive targeting data across domains in near real-time, integrating crucial threat information exponentially faster than ever before. The ultimate goal of this is to massively truncate sensor-to-shooter timelines. Perhaps an undersea drone could identify an enemy subsea target, pass the data back to an undersea-warfare commander who in turn instantly sends coordinates to a helicopter armed with Very Light Weight Torpedoes. This innovative kill-chain concept was demonstrated by Northrop Grumman in a Navy exercise.

“To deter future conflict or to ensure we win if future conflict arises, we need to provide capabilities which expand the influence of the undersea force, including connectivity across all domains,” Lytle added.

In light of this, Northrop Grumman developers discuss their efforts to link undersea and space domains in the context of the Pentagon’s fast-evolving Joint All Domain Command and Control initiative. JADC2, as it is called, seeks to engender a kind of multi-node connectivity between otherwise disparate pools of information across multiple domains.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master’s Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Flickr. 

Kris Osborn

China Drones, Asia

It's leaning like no, but it doesn't mean the Pentagon should discard the threat altogether.

Here's What You Need to Remember: While it is certainly possible that Chinese robots are more capable in terms of autonomy than what may have appeared in the newspaper report, however advanced degrees of autonomy or man-machine networking were not mentioned as potential mission options presented by the robots. This leads to the question as to whether China can in fact truly compete with current U.S. Army unmanned systems technology. 

The visible Chinese effort to fast-track new carriers, fighter jets, destroyers and armored artillery vehicles shows no sign of slowing down. Now, a lesser-known but equally impactful commensurate initiative can be seen in China’s apparent attempt to match or exceed the U.S. explosion in the production and development of surface, air and undersea drones. 

China also appears to be accelerating the development of land and undersea robots to conduct forward surveillance, deliver supplies, search for targets and even launch attacks. A Chinese newspaper report says the People’s Liberation Army “Pathbreaker” robot is a small, 1.2-ton unmanned vehicle able to hit speeds of thirty kilometers. It is a tracked vehicle, meaning it is configured for rugged terrain and off-road missions and intended for what the Chinese paper calls “armed reconnaissance, fire assault, patrol, search and destroy operations, as well as strike guidance in complicated terrain at high mobility.”

The technical description of the robot indicates it can be teleoperated or programmed to “automatically follow combat personnel and independently avoid obstacles.”  This seems quite interesting, given that the U.S. Army has been teleoperating or remotely controlling robots for more than fifteen years as well as operating with what’s called “leader follower” algorithms wherein an unmanned system mirrors or follows a manned vehicle leading the way. The U.S. Army refined this technology, along with obstacle avoidance, nearly two decades ago and is now operating robots with extremely advanced levels of autonomous navigation.

While it is certainly possible that Chinese robots are more capable in terms of autonomy than what may have appeared in the newspaper report, however advanced degrees of autonomy or man-machine networking were not mentioned as potential mission options presented by the robots. This leads to the question as to whether China can in fact truly compete with current U.S. Army unmanned systems technology. 

At 1.2 tons, the new Chinese “Pathbreaker” robot may or may not be similar in size or form factor to the U.S. Army’s emerging Light Robotic Combat Vehicle, a now-in-development program to introduce a new fleet of highly-capable unmanned systems able to independently operate forward, network with air drones and manned vehicles and, for instance, test an enemy perimeter, move to contact or conduct an actual “breach.” The robots are closely aligned with the networking capacity and measure of computer-enabled autonomy, according to U.S. Army developers.

It may simply be that Chinese weapons developers are behind the United States when it comes to advancing levels of robotic autonomy, as it is something the U.S. Army has been working on for many years. Autonomous navigation on the ground is particularly challenging and seen as something more complex and challenging than aerial autonomy, simply due to the number of obstacles, variables and fast-changing conditions. An air drone often has few actual “impediments” to its flight path and, absent some kind of fast emerging enemy aircraft or incoming missile, can align autonomous navigation with little difficulty.

Ground autonomy, however, must operate with extremely advanced algorithms able to make nearly instantaneous decisions in response to dynamic changes in the environment. Perhaps new terrain challenges pop up, or a column of enemy vehicles approaches its path? An autonomous ground vehicle would not only have to “course correct” but make instant determinations regarding any particular obstacle it may encounter. 

This is something which, based on the engineering and scientific progress now being cataloged with the Army’s robotic combat vehicle program in terms of artificial-intelligence-enabled autonomy, drone-to-drone networking and unmanned operations in general, the Chinese simply may not be able to match. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

Integrated Deterrence, World

Whether or not it will be effective is yet to be decided.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The concept is to look collectively to a degree, meaning it might make more sense to envision a coordinated, multinational military operation benefitting from both the unique attributes of a given countries’ weapons system and an ability to cross-train, collaborate and secure information sharing in real-time in war. 

Massive investment in innovation and new technology greatly strengthened cooperation with European and Pacific allies, and a new dispersed, yet highly networked force are all fundamental elements of the Pentagon’s new “Integrated Deterrence” approach. 

The concept was introduced by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin during public remarks at the Global Emerging Technology Summit of The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. He explained that new levels of deterrence could be reached through the combined strength of the United States and its many allies, a vigorous commitment to research and development funding, and sustained technological superiority. 

“Integrated deterrence is about using the right mix of technology, operational concepts, and capabilities—all woven together in a networked way that is so credible, and flexible, and formidable that it will give any adversary pause,” Austin said according to a Pentagon transcript. 

Instead of relying upon pure numbers or force size to achieve military overmatch against potential adversaries, Austin’s “Integrated Deterrence” strategy points to the wide-spanning impact of innovation, dispersed, yet secure networking, and technological superiority.

The integration focus of the strategy is clearly invested in the need for multi-domain operations and joint U.S.-allied war preparation exercises. If the U.S. military truly strengthens its clear margin of technological superiority and of course solidifies its connection to allies, then it could lead to a potentially effective deterrence strategy. 

A more dispersed, multi-domain force able to successfully network with allies can exponentially increase the size and speed of its striking power. Longer ranges can also help cultivate new tactical and strategic approaches to align with how weapons might be used differently in a modern or future warfare environment. Much of the success of this would, it seems, depend upon the measure of secure networking and connectivity made possible through hardened data links, artificial-intelligence-enabled computing and high-speed data processing. The concept is to look collectively to a degree, meaning it might make more sense to envision a coordinated, multinational military operation benefitting from both the unique attributes of a given countries’ weapons system and an ability to cross-train, collaborate and secure information sharing in real-time in war. 

Integrated Deterrence “means investing in cutting-edge capabilities for the future, in all domains of potential conflict,” Austin said.

“America’s integrated deterrence relies on both innovation and investment,” he added. “And we understand that those are interwoven. Innovation requires the resources to develop new ideas and scale them appropriately.”

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

James Holmes

Future Warfare, Asia, China, United States

StarTrek and Battlestar Galactica may have some interesting insights.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Chinese commanders would doubtless deploy deceptive measures to make the campaign even more wearisome.

How would you punk the U.S. Navy if the lords of naval warfare handed you the keys to, say, China’s navy? Well, you might do the obvious thing: read or watch some science fiction!

In the latest Star Trek flick, for instance, a new foe harnesses swarm tactics to eviscerate the starship Enterprise. A coordinated stream of small craft overpowers the starship’s defenses through the simple expedient of presenting more targets than the Enterprise crew can shoot down. Its overseer then concentrates fire at vital nodes to dismember the ship’s structure.

Such tactics are an otherworldly counterpart to saturation missile barrages meant to overwhelm U.S. surface combatants’ Aegis combat systems. Rather than try to evade Aegis defenses, attackers simply aim more rounds at this combination radar, fire-control and surface-to-air missile system than it can handle. Some get through—and sow havoc. Life imitates sci-fi.

And then there’s Battlestar Galactica, a TV show with a similar ripped-from-the-headlines feel. The conceit behind the show: rather than risk a slugfest against the human colonies’ fleet of capital ships and their Viper fighter squadrons, the archenemy Cylons insinuate a computer virus into the fleet. The virus spreads through the ubiquitous computer networks whereby commanders coordinate their endeavors. It disables heavy ships and fighter spacecraft alike, leaving the fleet easy prey.

Sound strategy, that. Why duel a stronger antagonist and risk losing when cyberwarfare can nullify combat power before shots are fired? Galactica, an aged man-of-war, rides out the onslaught because her old-school commander, William Adama, refuses to permit the computers on board to be networked. When modern Vipers—the F-35s of this faraway universe—shut down, the battlestar’s deck crew salvages obsolescent fighters. Old tech proves too low-tech for viruses to infect—yet still lethal enough for skilled aviators to repulse attack.

“Network-centric warfare” remains U.S. forces’ warfighting method of choice, even though the phrase has fallen out of fashion. It comes with grave perils. Live by the computer network, die by the computer network.

But Battlestar Galactica also hints at subtler ways to outfight a stronger opponent. The weak need not vanquish the strong outright. They can harry the strong—enfeebling them until their margin of supremacy vanishes.

Wise combatants, then, study their foes, discern their strengths and frailties, and design operations to tame the former while exploiting the latter. A prospective enemy like China would try to divine the American “center of gravity” or, as Carl von Clausewitz describes it somewhat mystically, the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” Should a fight erupt, Chinese forces would then aim “blow after blow” at that center of gravity—pounding away until U.S. forces capitulated or, more likely, lost heart and went away.

There’s a curious thing about centers of gravity, though. They can be innocuous. Petroleum refineries turned out to be a center of gravity for Hitler’s war machine, humble freighters and tankers for Tojo’s. By pummeling industry and merchantmen from sky and sea, the Allies starved Axis forces of irreplaceable war materiel.

A related idea from Prussia’s master of strategy: Clausewitz advises strategists that, in the folksy terms I like to employ in Newport, the enemy is not a potted plant. In strategy, in other words, one antagonist doesn’t work its will on a lifeless mass that’s unable to strike a counterblow. Rather, warfare involves an intensely interactive “collision of two living forces”—both imbued with ingenuity and with zeal for their causes. It’s the Golden Rule of combat: the foe does unto you even as you do unto him.

But here’s the thing. It may be possible, through dexterous strategy and operations, to transform a foe into a potted plant—dulling his reactions and material capacity until he’s little more than an inert mass with little prospect of protecting himself or thwarting your will. Better yet, such operations could yield an opponent prone to self-defeating mistakes. Inert pugilists make easy pickings.

By the Golden Rule, moreover, he may do things to reduce you to a potted plant, hampering your ability to adapt to change to the tactical surroundings—change he himself may have wrought. If he renders you inert, you can no longer compete effectively or efficiently. He imposes his will on you—and wins.

Which brings us back to the sci-fi universe. In the very second episode of Battlestar Galactica, titled “33,” the Cylons hit upon an ingenious stratagem: weary Galactica’s and the colonial fleet’s defenders through small-scale but frequent assaults, then strike a fatal blow against a foe too tired, addle-brained and mistake-prone to fight back effectively.

Clausewitz would instantly recognize the approach. He notes that the components of combat strength are force—material capability—and resolve. Quite so. The Cylon onslaught targets both the hardware and human dimensions, enervating the colonial fleet over time. The Cylons smuggle a homing device onto a transport to track its movements, then repeatedly “jump” in faster-than-light strike forces to menace the fleet. Cylon fighters appear every thirty-three minutes. It becomes plain to Galactica’s leadership that the attacks’ purpose is less to inflict damage than to compel the fleet to keep jumping. Relentless assault prevents repairs and upkeep to fighting ships while keeping crews awake.

The campaign takes its toll on hardware and bodies, debilitating the fleet’s fighting power. Think about scrambling an air wing for action every half-hour: you assemble pilots for a preflight briefing, launch, do battle, and recover through “combat landings” that require pilots to slam fuselages on the ship’s flight deck to get the squadron aboard fast. Little maintenance gets done under such circumstances. Machinery needs downtime, and it dislikes transients. Repeatedly starting and stopping it is stressful—even leaving aside the rigors of deep-space combat.

Nor do the equipment’s operators fare much better. “We’re getting slower,” observes Commander Adama grimly after fatigue cascades into computer problems that in turn delay a faster-than-light jump out of harm’s way. The mistake almost subjects not just the battlestar but its consorts—mostly unarmed transports—to Cylon missile fire. Laments the weapons scientist and turncoat Gaius Baltar, “there are limits” beyond which human physiology can’t be pushed. It’s just a matter of time, observes Baltar, before the fleet’s defenders commit a fatal blunder.

And that’s the impact of wearisome tactics on a ship of war that appears amply stocked with manpower. Throughout most of its history, the U.S. Navy manned its ships under a similar philosophy, reasoning that it takes a surplus of manpower to fight a ship in combat. Combat means losses. Now imagine Cylon pinprick attacks’ impact on Galactica and her coterie were it “minimally manned”—that is, if every crewman were assigned multiple jobs, and if the vessels lacked any manpower reserve when (not if) battle damage and casualties occur.

In all likelihood, colonial commanders would have committed a final mistake sooner rather than later, as demands on crews mounted to unbearable proportions. Humanity’s end would have come with it.

This foray into sci-fi represents a roundabout way of proposing that personnel policy may constitute a U.S. Navy center of gravity. Late-model surface vessels—ranging from diminutive littoral combat ships to hulking Zumwalt-class destroyersand Ford-class aircraft carriers—are indeed minimally manned. The logic behind this approach is simple: U.S. defense budgets are stagnant, sailors are expensive. Ergo, substitute technology for people to save taxpayer dollars. The navy doesn’t have to pay, say, an automated firefighting or ammunition-loading system a salary or pension, or fund its health care. The leaner the crew, the greater the savings.

Now, minimal manning may make sense for routine peacetime steaming. Transiting from point A to point B on the nautical chart represents a steady-state environment, entailing predictable demands and few extra stresses to wear down crews. It’s worth noting, though, that every crewman shoulders lots of different duties for different situations—even during everyday operations. That’s true even of ships manned under the traditional, more generous personnel policy. The same sailor might help launch or recover aircraft, take on fuel or supplies from a logistics vessel, fight fires or flooding, and on and on, depending on what the ship’s doing at the time.

Capping the number of crewmen caps the supply of labor. That means automation must reduce the demand for labor enough to keep supply in sync with demand. Can it? Color me skeptical. It’s an open question whether enough shipboard tasks can be automated, wholly or partially, to sustain that balance. I served in a warship operated by half the manpower that operated it in its first life, during World War II. You can indeed reduce manpower by replacing sailors with gee-whiz technology—to a point. It worked for us, but there were times when the makers of Galactica could have cast our crew as characters in “33.” We were the walking dead.

But if minimal manning may suffice for peacetime operations, when no enemy is trying to turn American shortcomings to advantage, what about combat—an environment without a manageable, predictable rhythm? War unfolds not by peacetime cost-benefit logic but by its own paradoxical logic, the logic of unforeseen reversals of fortune. It’s a helter-skelter realm that comes complete with antagonists bent on enfeebling and defeating warriors and materiel.

“Redundancy” is the traditional antidote for battle damage and other emergencies. It imparts resiliency to a combat unit. In hardware terms, redundancy means furnishing a spare of everything you can—shipwrights installing duplicate machinery so that a vessel has an extra generator, pump, piping system, whatever. Lose one widget, and you put a duplicate in service. Excess capacity thus lets crews reroute around damage. It lets a unit sustain its fighting strength despite absorbing a pounding. Spare manpower serves the same purpose. It provides skippers replacements for those who fall in action. Individuals may be incapacitated; the ship as a whole fights on.

If you’re China and confront an antagonist that opts to do without redundancy, you can deploy a troublemaking strategy. You whittle away at the center of gravity manifest in minimal manning. The object of such a strategy? Tire and bewilder crews that may already be overworked. Fling a variety of challenges at them, along as many axes as you can, as simultaneously as you can. Give each crewman more to do than he can, on the Cylon-esque reasoning that imposing numerous, repeated contingencies compounds the demands on people and hardware. Such tactics constitute the precursor to a crushing blow—or to an American withdrawal under duress.

China’s navy, in short, could ape the Cylons’ strategy. In purely martial terms, posing missile, gun, and torpedo threats from many points of the compass from as many domains as possible—from the surface, the depths, and aloft—would compel a ship’s beleaguered defenders to cope with more challenges, perhaps, than they could manage. Flooding an embattled zone with China Coast Guard vessels, fishing craft, and purportedly civilian sea and air traffic—interspersing combat units among nonmilitary ships and planes—would further complicate U.S. commanders’ picture of the surroundings. It would be hard to act for fear of hitting the wrong target—and having pictures of an errant shot splashed across TV and computer screens around the world.

That’s a fate few captains relish. And Chinese commanders would doubtless deploy deceptive measures to make the campaign even more wearisome. To glimpse the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) mindset toward deception, dust off that old copy of Sun Tzu’s Art of War. Among other things, Book I of the Chinese masterwork instructs generals to “feign disorder,” “feign incapacity,” sow confusion among the enemy leadership, divide an enemy host and fall on the weaker fractions, and generally deploy “normal” and “extraordinary” forces in mercurial combinations to confound and weaken opponents. Such ideas find their way into contemporary works on PLA strategy.

Do all that, and a weaker but resolute China stands some chance of overcoming its brawnier foe. It could land a heavy hit or, failing that, simply outlast the foe. How to respond? First and foremost, the U.S. Navy should acknowledge—should grok, as sci-fi master Robert Heinlein might say—that a manpower deficit represents a grave weakness in a hot war. Taking the problem seriously constitutes the first step toward a solution.

Second, it should conscript some imaginative tacticians to play the “red team,” projecting how PLA forces might harness troublemaking strategies. Realistic wargames illuminate the contours of problems while hinting at workarounds.

Third, there may be no substitute for stationing sailors aboard American surface combatants in greater numbers. The service leadership already expanded the crew of littoral combat ships by 25 percent. That’s a welcome boost in percentage terms, but a 25 percent boost equates to just ten more seafarers. Exercises will show how many more mariners are needed, and what skills they should boast to bolster these vessels’ resiliency.

And lastly, the nation is poised to undergo a change of presidential administrations that will usher in a president inclinedto bulk up the U.S. Navy, along with a secretary of the navy reportedly inclined to agree. The next few months, then, represent the ideal time for the navy leadership to put the case for new policies—including less minimal manning—before a political leadership favorably disposed toward such policies.

Let’s hand them a sci-fi tract while we’re at it. Therein lies wisdom.

James Holmes is professor of strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific (second edition forthcoming 2018). The views voiced here are his alone. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

This article is being republished due to readers' interests.

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

X-32 Fighter, United States

Despite their significantly different designs, the X-32’s performance was roughly in line with rival Lockheed’s Martin’s X-35 concept demonstrator.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The X-32 used the same, massive delta wing as the foundation for all of the three fighter variants mandated by the JSF program. The result was, by wide consensus, an exceedingly ugly-looking aircraft.

Over a decade after its introduction, the F-35 stealth fighter jet is among the most recognizable symbols of American airpower. And yet, the emergence of the F-35 as a technological standard bearer for the U.S. Air Force was anything but inevitable.

Here is the F-32 that could have been.

In 1993, the U.S. government launched the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter project (CALF) to phase out a slew of older fighters— including the F-15 and F-16— and provide a cost-effective development platform for the next generation of U.S. fighter aircraft. CALF was rolled into the Joint Strike Fighter Program (JSF) in the following year, and the bidding phase ensued. Emerging as the front runners from the first selection round, Boeing and Lockheed Martin were both offered contracts to produce two concept demonstrator fighters.

With little flexibility on the Pentagon’s highly detailed checklist of features and specifications, Boeing sought to distinguish itself based on cost. To this end, the X-32 used the same, massive delta wing as the foundation for all of the three fighter variants mandated by the JSF program. The result was, by wide consensus, an exceedingly ugly-looking aircraft. There is some indication that Boeing planned big design changes for future models, including a sleeker delta wing and redesigned nose, but nevertheless: the X-32 demonstrator model’s bizarre aesthetic hardly did Boeing any favors.

Employing a direct-lift thrust vectoring system, the X-32 reached top speeds of just under Mach 1.6 . The X-32’s internal bay loadout supported six AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, or a combination of up to two air-to-air missiles and two bombs. Despite their significantly different designs, the X-32’s performance was roughly in line with rival Lockheed’s Martin’s X-35 concept demonstrator.

So, why didn’t the X-32 make the cut? For one, its direct lift system was prone to pop stalls, or severe malfunction caused by hot air being ingested into the engine. The government also expressed concerns as to whether the X-32’s engine was powerful enough to support its reported maximum take-off weight of 50,000 pounds.

Worse still, eight months into the competition, the JSF’s aerodynamic requirements were revised at the behest of the Navy. Boeing engineers managed to make some slight changes to the tail, but it was too late to meaningfully redesign the delta wing to fully comport with the new JSF guidelines.

Despite its cost-cutting strategy, Boeing wound up building two prototypes, each demonstrating different aspects of the JSF’s specifications guidelines: a conventional-flight model demonstrating supersonic performance, and an X-32B short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant. Boeing insisted that these features will be unified with the serial F-32, but its rival X-35 demonstrator model was already capable of doing both. Vertical take-off/landing capability was a core pillar of the JSF guidelines, and the Pentagon simply did not buy into Boeing’s vision for STOVL integration.

The Lockheed Martin X-35 was formally declared the winner over Boeing’s X-32 in 2001. In hindsight, it’s difficult to gauge whether or not the DoD made the right decision. From rampant budget concerns to the implicit technical challenges of implementing cutting-edge technologies like sensor fusion, it’s highly likely that Boeing would have encountered broadly similar problems as to those that have plagued the F-35 program for the past decade.

Boeing, for its part, has taken the loss in stride, describing the X-32’s R&D process as a “strategic investment” that paid off during subsequent work done on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter and X-45A drone.

Mark Episkopos is the new national security reporter for the National Interest. This article first appeared earlier in 2021 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Caleb Larson

M1, Americas

An estimated 6 million plus units were built before the carbine was retired—a pretty good service record for a somewhat underpowered plinker.

Here's What You Need to Know: As a carbine, the M1 was much more compact than the full-sized M1 Garand.

During the Second World War, the shortcoming to most countries’ standard-issue rifles became apparent. Most European and American military rifles were chambered for cartridges that were quite high-powered and not practical for the closer range that firefights normally occurred at. The United States’ service rifle during World War II was the venerable American M1 Garand, and was chambered in the powerful .30-06 round. In the hands of a skilled shooter, accurate shooting was possible past 500 yards.

However, most firefights, especially in the Pacific Theatre, took place at 300 yards or less. The M1 was both too long and too heavy, and a common troop complaint was a lack of maneuverability when using the weapon. While the Soviet Union issued the lower-powered SKS rifle, and Germany the StG44 assault rifle to give troops more firepower at these ranges, the United States also issued troops a more compact, less powerful weapon: the M1 Carbine.

.30 Carbine

The M1 Carbine was built around the .30 Carbine round. The cartridge was essentially a copy of a much older cartridge designed by Winchester around the turn of the century, though the .30 Carbine had superior performance thanks to the use of updated propellant.

Though sometimes criticized as under-powered, the .30 Carbine cartridge fell roughly in between the M1 Garand’s .30-06 cartridge and the .45 ACP cartridge used in the familiar Thompson submachine gun. Still, the .30 Carbine is easily outperformed by both the Russian AK-47 and the German StG44 assault rifles.

M1 Carbine

As a carbine, the M1 was much more compact than the full-sized M1 Garand. Initially it was issued with a folding wire stock to paratroopers, and with a fully wooden stock to artillery troops, mortarmen, drivers, other support troops, and infantry riflemen, though it was not originally intended to fill this front-line role in the same way that the M1 Garand or Thompson submachine gun did.

The carbine’s geometry was praised. It was much more maneuverable in tight urban spaces and could be more easily handled in claustrophobic jungle environments than the M1. The carbine’s small size and low weight was favored especially by soldiers or Marines that handled crew-served weapons and had to carry tripods, machine gun ammunition, or mortar parts in addition to their rifle.

One of the carbine’s main drawbacks was its relatively modest stopping power compared to the full-sized M1 Garand which easily outclassed the smallish .30 Carbine round. A number of both Army and Marine Corps post-action combat reports document instances of enemy soldiers sustaining multiple hits with the M1 Carbine before being stopped.

In response to the Germany issuing the StG44 assault rifle in ever-increasing numbers, the M1 was modified to shoot fully automatically in addition to semi-automatic, augmenting the individual rifleman’s firepower.

Postscript

Post-war, the United States exported the M1 Carbine broadly to allies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In America’s own military, the M1 would serve in some capacity until replaced in the mid-1960s by the M16 rifle. An estimated 6 million plus units were built before the carbine was retired—a pretty good service record for a somewhat underpowered plinker.

Caleb Larson is a defense writer with the National Interest. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture.

This article first appeared in June 2020.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Mark Episkopos

F-15C, United States

The iconic F-15 variant has an important mission, but is seeing rising costs and becoming more difficult to maintain.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The F-15C is an improved variant of the iconic McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle air superiority fighter, introduced in 1979. By 1985, around 480 F-15C units were built.

Almost fifty years since its introduction, the F-15 platform has set yet another record.

An F-15C Eagle executed the longest known air-to-air missile shot in March 2021, according to a press statement issued earlier this week by the 53rd Wing of the U.S. Air Force (USAF). “An F-15C Eagle fired an AIM-120 AMRAAM at a BQM-167 subscale drone, resulting in a “kill” of the aerial target from the furthest distance ever recorded,” the statement read. 

“This test effort supported requests from the CAF for ‘long range kill chain’ capabilities,” said Maj. Aaron Osborne, 28th TES. “Key partnerships within the 53rd Wing enabled the expansion of capabilities on a currently fielded weapons system, resulting in warfighters gaining enhanced weapons employment envelopes.” The statement added that the test in question was conducted “at a relatively low cost, showcasing innovation and directly supporting the 2018 [National Defense Strategy’s] calls for increased lethality and affordability.”

The press release does not specify what the new record is. The F-15 platform previously broke as many as eight world-time-to-climb records. The fighter is likewise among the world’s most successful air-to-air combat platforms, achieving an impressive 104 recorded kills while reportedly never having been shot down over the course of air-to-air combat. 

The F-15C is an improved variant of the iconic McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle air superiority fighter, introduced in 1979; by 1985, around 480 F-15C units were built. The F-15C upgrade package initially added expanded internal fuel, an improved central computer, and more robust weapons compatibility. The F-15C supports air-to-air missiles from the AIM-7, AIM-9 Sidewinder, and AIM-120 AMRAAM series spread across nine hardpoints with a total payload capacity of up to 7,300 kilograms. As with its F-14 Tomcat counterpart, The F-15C also carries the M61 Vulcan 20-millimeter Gatling gun.

Although the F-22 Raptor is considered by many to be the best air superiority technology available, there simply aren’t enough F-22 jets to fulfill USAF’s robust rotation commitments across Pacific, European, and Middle-Eastern theaters. This is why USAF’s fleet of around two hundred F-15C/D’s remains a core component of American air superiority capabilities—these fighters continue to be upgraded in order to maintain their battlefield relevance to the present day. Later F-15C models came with an improved engine and, more recently, the AN/APG-63(V)3 AESA radar. It was likewise reported that a certain number of F-15C jets are being fitted with infrared search and track systems. 

Still, the USAF is aware that the aging F-15 Eagle platform is getting increasingly more cost-ineffective to maintain and operate. The pace of upgrades has slowed significantly in recent years, with the service ordering a 47 percent cut to the number of F-15C fighter aircraft eligible for modernization.

The Air Force is reviewing plans to retire the F-15C/D fleet around the mid-2020s, though a final decision has yet to be made. The proposal’s supporters argue that the F-16 Fighting Falcon can reproduce much of the capabilities of an F-15C jet at a lower cost. 

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for The National Interest. This article first appeared earlier in 2021 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Mark Episkopos

Glock 22 Gen5, United States

The Gen5 Glock 22 is available in two variants: the baseline model, and the Modular Optic System (MOS) variant that adds compatibility with popular aftermarket optics solutions

Here's What You Need To Remember: Gen5’s slew of small-but-thoughtful changes quickly add up to produce a more formidable Glock 22 that’s not only more accurate but offers better handling and improved durability.

One of America’s most popular service handguns, the Glock 22 got even better in 2020 with the vaunted Gen5 upgrade.  

First introduced in 1990, the Glock 22 is a .40 S&W version of the iconic Glock 17. The .40 Smith & Wesson round was designed specifically for law enforcement in 1990, following the infamous 1986 Miami Shootout in which eight FBI agents were outgunned by just two robbers. The Glock 22 became one of the first mass-produced .40 S&W guns, widely adopted by police departments across the United States. Their visual similarities notwithstanding, the Glock 22 employs a slightly different frame from the Glock 17 to account for its heavier .40 S&W rounds. It also carries two less rounds, for a total of fifteen as opposed to the Glock 17’s seventeen. The baseline Glock 22 is only slightly heavier than the Glock 17 but boasts an identical barrel length and trigger pull.  

In the decades that followed, Glock released a steady stream of revisions—dubbed “generations”—to keep pace with competitors. The informal second generation brought minor frame revisions and caliber options for certain models; Gen3 was a more comprehensive upgrade package, offering numerous ergonomics updates in addition to a universal accessory rail for mounting such tools as lights or lasers. Introduced in 2010, the Gen4 revision featured a new backstrap system and Rough Textured Frame (RTF) surface for additional grip support, among other quality of life improvements.

The Glock 22, along with its smaller Glock 23 counterpart, was recently upgraded to the Gen4 standard. But in 2020, the Glock 22 made the leap to Gen5—Glock’s latest handgun platform. Gen5 brings nDLC  (diamond-like carbon) coating for added protection against scratches and corrosion, the new  GLOCK Marksman Barrel (GMB) with superior rifling, flared magwell for more streamlined reloads, ambidextrous slide stop, smoother and more ergonomic trigger design, and the removal of finger grooves to better accommodate all possible hand sizes.

The Gen5 Glock 22 is available in two variants: the baseline model, and the Modular Optic System (MOS) variant that adds compatibility with popular aftermarket optics solutions. The Gen5 iteration of the Glock 22 has little interchangeability with prior models.  

Not terribly impactful by themselves, Gen5’s slew of small-but-thoughtful changes quickly add up to produce a more formidable Glock 22 that’s not only more accurate but offers better handling and improved durability. Nevertheless, the .40 S&W caliber’s popularity has declined precipitously in recent years; even the FBI, which originally commissioned the round, has stopped using it, returning instead to higher-capacity, softer-shooting, and more compact 9mm guns. Although too unwieldy for law enforcement, the 10-millimeter caliber has recently resurfaced as an increasingly popular option for consumers (especially some hunters) who want the stopping power and don’t mind the recoil.

The Gen5 upgrade breathes much-needed new life into Glock’s .40 S&W range, but it likely won’t be enough to reverse the .40 S&W ongoing downwards spiral in the consumer and law enforcement markets. 

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.

This piece first appeared earlier in 2021 and is being reprinted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Mark Episkopos

Russian Arctic Fleet, arctic

Moscow has expressed concerns that the United States is seeking to ramp up its military presence along the Northern Sea Route with airpower and submarines.

Here's What You Need to Know: A new Russian fleet, exclusively dedicated to guaranteeing the integrity of the Northern Sea Route, could help to streamline the duties of Russia’s other fleets, making for more effective and resource-efficient deployment rotations across the Navy.

Russia’s military is reviewing plans to create a new fleet, according to sources within the Navy.  

“The Russian Arctic Fleet, a new structure, is under consideration,” a Navy source told Russia’s TASS state news outlet. “It will be a separate formation within the Navy, and its responsibility will be to ensure the safety of the Northern Sea Route and the Arctic coast in the area of responsibility of the Northern and Pacific fleets.”

The source added that the Arctic Fleet is intended to complement, not replace, the existing Northern Fleet. “The plan is that the infrastructure of the new association will be separate from the Northern and Pacific fleets,” the source told Tass. “In the future, it will have ships and special equipment suitable for the Arctic. The Northern Sea Route is a shipping route spanning Russia’s Arctic coast, stretching from the Kara Sea to the Bering Strait.  

This news remains uncorroborated and unconfirmed by the Russian government as of the time of writing. Nevertheless, TASS has distinguished itself in prior years as a generally reliable source of information on Russia’s military and defense industry.  

Russia’s Navy currently consists of the Baltic, Pacific, and Black Sea fleets, as well as the Caspian Flotilla. A new fleet, exclusively dedicated to guaranteeing the integrity of the Northern Sea Route, could help to streamline the duties of Russia’s other fleets, making for more effective and resource-efficient deployment rotations across the Navy. It is unclear to what extent the Arctic Fleet will be constituted through hardware transfers from other fleets, as opposed to brand new equipment. It also remains to be seen how big this prospective fleet will be, given its relatively modest role.

Moscow has expressed concerns that the United States, which is reportedly planning to build six new icebreaker ships through 2029, seeks to ramp up its military presence along the Northern Sea Route with airpower and submarines. Russian observers reacted with alarm to the recent flight of three U.S. B-2 stealth bombers from the Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to the Keflavik Air Base in Iceland, the first such deployment since 2006. “The Americans are forcing Russia to increase its military spending and spend more resources on ensuring the military security of the Northern Sea Route,” said retired Lt. Col. Vladimir Ovchinnikov. “However, I think that these expenses will be justified. The traffic of goods through Russia's Arctic ports has grown this year.” Discussions around a prospective Arctic Fleet signal the Kremlin’s renewed resolve to secure its maritime interests against the perceived threat of NATO encroachment.  

Russia has steadily built up its Arctic military posture in recent years with bases, weapons installations, and other military infrastructure along the country’s northern coastline and adjacent territories. “Russia is refurbishing Soviet-era airfields and radar installations, constructing new ports and search-and-rescue centers, and building up its fleet of nuclear- and conventionally-powered icebreakers,” Lt. Col. Thomas Campbell told CNN. Russia’s military also has taken steps to integrate large swathes of the Arctic into its sprawling air/missile defense network, installing S-400 “Triumf” and S-300P missile systems on the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago to Russia’s north.  

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.

This article first appeared earlier in 2021 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.