Defence`s Feeds

Zurmat district in Paktia province is almost completely under Taleban control. The parliamentary elections were held there only on a tiny island of government control. Turnout was very low on the first election day and limited to the district centre – another example of Afghanistan’s emerging rural-urban voting divide. On day two, attempts of ballot stuffing were observed, when the election commission had allowed to open polling centres that were closed or opened very late on the first election day. Guest author Pakteen Khan*, who spent both election days (20 and 21 October 2018) in Zurmat, tells us what he saw (with input from Thomas Ruttig).

The security situation in Zurmat

Zurmat district is the southwestern most district of Paktia, bordering Paktika in the south, Ghazni in the west and located direct to the southwest of the provincial capital Gardez. The district is the Taleban’s main regional stronghold and the most war-affected district of the province. Tamir, the district centre, is the only area in the district where there is still some government presence. There is a local Afghan National Army (ANA) base, some Afghan National Police (ANP) and some fighters left from a dissolved local Afghan Local Police unit. (The ALP unit was dissolved earlier this year at the request of the local community after some of its members attacked a school girl and robbed the house of a teacher, killing him in the event.) The local government officials live closely together in one particular area of town, called Khwajagan village, near the ANA base, in order to be able to defend themselves.

Zurmat’s security was reinforced in late August 2018 by a “strike unit” (quwa-ye zarbati) that, local sources say, works closely “with the Americans” (possibly the CIA-led Khost Protection Force). The new unit’s main focus is to secure the road between Gardez and Zurmat, where it has taken over the existing ANP check posts. The unit seems to operate out of Khost, and has no base in Tamir.

The areas outside Tamir are under firm Taleban control. A second ANA base in Sahak is encircled and does not carry out any operations. The road leading there from Tamir is heavily mined and unusable for civilian traffic.

For historical reasons, Zurmat is sometimes called Little Kandahar, as a number of prominent Taleban leaders came from the area. For Greater Paktia – the three provinces of Paktia, Paktika and Khost – Zurmat was as important for the insurgents, as Kandahar was for southern Afghanistan (see this background paper).

Two different networks of the Taleban are active in the area: the Haqqani network, led by Qari Shams, and the Mansur network, locally called the ‘Mansurian’ – led by Abdul Latif Mansur, a member of the Taleban leadership and relative of the network’s founder, the late Nasrullah Mansur (for more background, see this AAN paper). They are rivals and keep separate structures, sometimes clashing among themselves, at other times carrying out joint operations. Both were unanimous in their rejection of the elections. They forced local teachers, who were being mobilised all over the country as the principal elections workers, to hand over their tazkeras – both to prevent them from voting and to scare them away from working with the government. The teachers were told they would get their documents back after the elections. (Outside Tamir, the Taleban also keep track of teachers’ school attendance and fine them for absences, in an effort to take control of the local education system.) The teachers, apart from some areas closer to the Gardez-Zurmat road, could do little about it and complied. As a result, very few teachers worked in the few polling centres that did open in Zurmat.

The run-up to the election in Zurmat: Registration, campaigning and threats

Zurmat’s population is estimated at 95,000 by Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Office (see here, p18), not counting the 22,000 people in Rohani Baba district that was recently separated from Zurmat. According to the Independent Election Commission (IEC), over one third – 33,320 people – registered as voters between May and July 2018; 28,408 of them men, 4,031 women and another 881 Kuchis (who were not specified with regard to gender). The IEC claims that all 22 voter registration centres in Zurmat district – that were supposed to double as polling sites on 20 October – were open during the voter registration period. Local observers told AAN, however, this was not the case; the commission’s claims also sound implausible given the almost total Taleban control outside the district centre.

In the run-up to the elections, there were constant warnings by the insurgents not to participate in the polls. Leaflets – so called shabnama(night letters) – were posted in the schools and mosques of Tamir and other villages. Outside Tamir, the Taleban directly addressed mosque congregations and spread their message over mosque loudspeakers. Ahead of election day, no election staff or electoral material was transferred to any of the 19 polling centres outside Tamir, for security reasons. As a result, many people in Zurmat did not expect that the elections would be held in their area.

This was cause for concern, as many people were already unhappy that Zurmat did not have a representative in the previous parliament. This meant that they had no one to raise their problems with in Kabul. These problems ranged from the long-pending, still-unpaved Gardez-Zurmat road, to the provincial and district administration officials who were keeping them waiting with false promises, and, further, the prisoner issues that plague many inhabitants in the district (as a result of Zurmat’s strong insurgency, many local people have relatives who have been – rightly or wrongfully – detained; it is often very difficult to find out where they are without someone speaking for them in the county’s capital).

The election-related awareness campaign was relatively weak and late. People in Zurmat were reached mainly through the airwaves. With mobile phones and radios widely available, the Taleban was unable to control radio broadcasting and people were able to hear some election-related information. There was also some limited campaigning by candidates, including campaign posters, in the district’s centre of Tamir. Some candidates had used the June ceasefire which overlapped the voter registration campaign – long before the official start of the campaign – to gather people in the district governor’s compound and the new hospital that was inaugurated in during Ramazan in May-June. Young voters, in particular, seemed eager to register to vote at that time.

Several candidates were said to have distributed cash money, including US dollars, during the campaign, according to AAN sources with families in the area. Others “bought up” tazkeras, to be used for potential ballot stuffing or proxy voting, and/or to prevent people from promising and casting their vote for rival candidates. (In some cases, copies of tazkeras were taken or names and ID numbers were noted; in other cases, candidates kept the original tazkeras.) Village elders would often organise the “selling” of the tazkeras and send these people to certain candidates. The price was reportedly 2,000 Pakistani rupees (around 15 US dollars) per document.

Zurmat has a number of local candidates on the ballot, vying to represent the district in Kabul. The most prominent ones are Dr Usman, a medical doctor from Zurmat who lives in Kabul, and Sharifa Zurmati, a female candidate. She was a member of the first post-Taleban parliament in 2005, became an advisor to both presidents Hamed Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, and was also an IEC commissioner in the 2014 presidential election.

Election poster of local candidate Dr Usman Zurmati. Photo: AAN.

Polling in the first day of the election (20 October 2018)

Election Day in Paktia province started with some small arms fire in areas near Gardez, the provincial capital, presumably to scare off possible voters. Still, people in the city turned out in large numbers, as well as in parts of some districts. On the road to Zurmat’s district centre, Tamir, this scenery already changed just a few kilometres outside the city. The town is only some 40 minutes from Gardez by car. The road leading there is asphalted but in disrepair, due to years of insecurity. In Ibrahimkhel, for instance, a village with one polling centre that administratively still belongs to the provincial capital, there was sporadic firing all day. The polling centre in the village’s school was kept open during the day, but very few people came, mainly from nearby houses.

In Zurmat, 19 of the 22 scheduled polling centres remained closed. The only three polling centres that were open were in Tamir: two high schools directly in the bazaar, Habibullah Lycee and Bator Lycee, and a centre in Muqarabkhel, a short distance outside town on the road to Ibrahimkhel and Gardez. The Taleban had mined several other access roads to Tamir, and did not even allow the bazaar’s shopkeepers who live outside of town to enter. Taliban fighters were sitting in the poplar trees along the roads leading to Tamir, occasionally firing at the city. The Afghan army occasionally fired back. There seem to have been no casualties.

Voting in Tamir’s three open polling centres started around 9:30am, with only a few people coming out at first. People were wary of the security situation and wanted to see if others would be able to come out and vote without trouble. Meanwhile, the Taleban fired missiles at the district centre throughout the day (according to ocal election observers possibly as many as 50 or 60). They hit three shops, wounding one person, as well as several civilian houses, killing two children. There were also some gunshots fired in the air – but some local people thought this was the district police chief’s work, saying he was trying to scare away voters, so that only the supporters of the candidate he was rumoured to support would be able to cast their votes.

The rocket fire died down at around 2pm, so in the afternoon, more people dared to come out and vote, even from nearby villages. The three polling stations were kept open one hour longer than planned, till 5pm, and then counting started.

There were no observers from independent organisations present at the Zurmat polls, but a few dozen candidates’ agents, mainly representing candidates who expected a significant number of votes from that polling centre. During the day, there were scuffles between them. The district police chief also had some candidate agents thrown out of a polling station, reportedly because he opposed their candidates. Some candidate agents alleged that the Paktia IEC team was not neutral and that IEC members had told certain candidates that they did not have enough votes. Presumably, the candidate agents thought this indicated the IEC member’s readiness to accept money to manipulate the vote in their favour.

Although, there had been some problems with the biometric verification in Gardez – the IEC staff had not been well trained and only two devices had been used all day in the city’s main polling centre, the Gardezi high school – the devices were apparently used all day in Zurmat without major problems. As in other places, some voters in Zurmat could not find their names on the voter lists. Polling staff then opened provisional lists.

Overall turnout in Zurmat was low because of fighting and security threats. Based on observations, the author estimates that a total of around 500 votes were cast in the three polling centres in Zurmat. (1). The voters who came appeared to mainly be locally deployed soldiers, police and arbaki, the district’s administrative staff, and shopkeepers from the nearby bazaar as well as staff from the district hospital. No women were seen to vote in Zurmat. How could they – it was difficult even for men to vote.

At the end of the day, the ballot boxes and other electoral material were transported to Gardez. Although the Taleban fired at the returning convoy, they did not attack it directly and the boxes reached the IEC’s provincial office unharmed. However, before that happened, candidate agents told AAN they believed ballot stuffing took place in Tamir’s Habibullah high school, after the official closure at 5pm (till about 9pm). At the end of the day, around 2,000 votes were sent to the provincial capital from this centre. If this did occur, it should be easy to track, as, reportedly, biometric voter verification had been used there during the day.

Rohani Baba, a district on paper

Rohani Baba was formerly a part of Zurmat and is one of several new “temporary” (ie not yet fully functional) districts that have been established countrywide. It has a district governor – Abdul Rahman Solamal, who previously had the same position in Janikhel – but no official district administrative centre (DAC) yet. He is from Zurmat centre and resides there. The establishment of the district centre has been complicated by tribal disputes, mainly between the local Sahak and Mamozai tribes, regarding where the DAC should be located. (The contest over who might ‘win’ the DAC indicates that local tribes might welcome some more government presence in their area, which so far has been Taleban-controlled.) Property prices in the area have already gone up in anticipation of the changes, but so far little has happened. The district, for now, only exists on paper.

During the voter registration campaign, inhabitants from Rohani Baba came to Tamir in Zurmat to register – but under the name of the new temporary district, as the voter list published by the IEC shows. A total of 11,237 voters from Rohani Baba registered, 1844 of them were women. Local sources told AAN that there had been irregularities. Village elders reportedly came with hundreds of tazkeras that were registered and given stickers, even though their owners were not present.

The IEC had listed nine polling centres for Rohani Baba, but none of them opened. It was even unclear whether they ever really existed.

Election posters in Zurmat. Photo: AAN.

 Polling in the second day of the election (21 October 2018)

On 20 October 2018, the (IEC) announced that the polling centres in Zurmat and neighbouring Rohani Baba districts which had remained closed that day, would be opened the next day – as part of a countrywide extra day of voting for polling centres that had opened late or did not open at all (see AAN reporting). An IEC list, seen by AAN, of the 410 polling stations countrywide that were supposed to open on the second day of voting, contained all 19 polling centres from Zurmat that had remained closed on 20 October but only six (out of nine) in Rohani Baba. Three sites in Rohani Baba – two in a mosque and one in a madrassa – were missing. (AAN has reported earlier that the IEC figures and lists have often been inconsistent.)

Fears of ballot-stuffing on day two

People in Zurmat wondered how the security forces had suddenly became capable of securing these polling centres outside Tamir in one day, even though they had been unable to secure the vote in Ibrahimkhel, which was much closer to the provincial capital.

They were concerned that claims of polling sites opening in such remote unsecured areas might be used for electoral fraud, mainly for ballot stuffing, as during previous elections (AAN reports from Paktia’s 2010 elections here and here). Local election observerstold AAN that some local candidates had indeed persuaded the local IEC administration to – on paper – open between three and five centres in Zurmat, outside Tamir, (reports on numbers differed) and at least one in Rohani Baba, in Neknam village. According to the various observers AAN spoke to, there had been no actual voting at all at these sites but there was ballot stuffing on-going in private houses. It was not clear how the electoral material had reached there.  Observers told AAN that the IEC has quarantined the boxes from Neknam village with circa 400 votes, but it was not clear whether boxes including the additional votes from Zurmat have also been quarantined.

Conclusion: Only islands of voting

The general trend of an emerging rural-urban divide in voting turnout, which AAN reported after election day one on 20 October, has been confirmed in both Zurmat district and the neighbouring, Rohani Baba district. Zurmat – a district where the centre is under government control and was accessible for election workers and materiel as well as for observers – while the countryside is controlled by the Taleban with no access for voters is further proof that this divide exists not only on the provincial, but also on the district level.

The insular government presence in Zurmat centre allowed some voting, but the Taleban’s intimidation potential led to a very low level of turnout even there. It represents less than two per cent of the number of voters the IEC said had registered. Registration figures might have been doctored, but also many voters who might have genuinely registered in spring may not have gone out once the Taleban renewed their call for an election boycott on 8 October, after attempts to arrange a ceasefire covering the elections failed.

Difficult or impossible access to Zurmat and Rohani Baba also made attempts of ballot stuffing possible in rural polling centres that were on the IEC list but never opened in reality (very likely also not during voter registration), as observers’ reports showed. These reports also showed that some of those fake votes were detected and quarantined, but it is doubtful that all those ballots will be identified and cancelled – particularly as it seems that genuine ballots cast in polling centres in Zurmat’s district capital might have been topped up with night-time ballot stuffing. In this, the lack of independent observers in contested areas is a major downside.

* Pakteen Khan is a pseudonym, chosen for security reasons. The author frequently travels to Zurmat district.

 

(1) Official turnout figures or results for the districts have not been announced yet. AAN has only been able to obtain the tallies from two polling stations in Tamir’s largest polling centre, Habibullah Lycee, where 81 and 125 votes (all male) were cast, indicating that the author’ estimate is in a realistic range.

 

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The Taleban have confirmed to various media that Pakistan has released the most senior member of their movement in detention, Mullah Abdul Ghani, better known as Mullah Baradar (brother). He was arrested in 2010 and held ever since, apparently incommunicado and without charge or trial. Baradar was a founding member of the Taleban and a noted battlefield commander. At the time of his arrest, he was the effective number two in the movement and the de facto operational chief of the insurgency. News of Baradar’s release has been reported before, but this time is looking certain. There is talk that he has been freed in order to help in ‘the peace process’ and, even after eight years in incarceration, AAN Co-Director Kate Clark says, he may have much to offer.

What has changed since Baradar’s arrest?

Depending on how much news Mullah Baradar has had of the outside world in the last eight years, the many changes between 2010 and 2018 may or may not come as a surprise. The Pakistani state, presumably, its intelligence service, the ISI, detained him in February 2010. This was during the US ‘surge’, when President Barack Obama was increasing US troops to over 100,000 in an effort to turn the tide of the war. The surge did result in the US and its allies taking back territory from the Taleban, but those gains have long since been lost. Most of the international troops stationed in Afghanistan have since left, and, apart from an (unknown) portion of the – according to Pentagon figures – around 14,000 United States soldiers (and a few thousands from other nations) deployed in Afghanistan who still have a combat mission, most are involved in the NATO mission to train, assist and advise. (1) As ISAF became Resolute Support and Enduring Freedom Freedom’s Sentinel, the conflict was also transformed. It is now overwhelmingly fought out between Afghans – Taleban on one side and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) on the other and civilians suffering from all sides. These days, few Talebab even see foreign soldiers, let alone manage to attack them. In the White House, a (relatively) new president continues to back Kabul, despite tweeting before he came to power that the US should pull out of a country where the people ‘hate us’ (for AAN analysis, see here).

Baradar will find a country where the Taleban have steadily gained ground since 2014 and where they threaten even some provincial centres (see our reporting from June here). They also tax people and ‘run services’ such as education and health – while the government continues to pay the salaries of teachers and medical staff working in areas under their control (possibly half the country – estimates vary as do methods of working out territorial control (see estimates by the BBC, the Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR, and AAN’s). The possibility of an end to the conflict was also made more real earlier this year in June when an unprecedented ceasefire over Eid ul-Fitr meant government, Taleban and US forces stopped fighting for three days. Spontaneous and potentially revolutionary fraternisation by all sides took place as Taleban came into the cities and security personnel and government officials visited villages (AAN reporting here and here).

Instead of Hamed Karzai – a co-tribal Popalzai – in power in the Arg, there is technocrat Ashraf Ghani – also Pashtun, but an Ahmadzai. Despite that, the elites in Kabul look remarkably similar. Masum Stanekzai has gone from head of the High Peace Council Secretariat to the National Directorate of Security (NDS) boss, Karim Khalili from former Vice President to head of the High Peace Council, Wais Barmak just nominated to be Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in February 2010 (he gained the post two years later) is now at Interior, Dr Abdullah has become Chief Executive (a new post) and General Abdul Rashid Dostum Vice President.

On his own side, the movement’s founder Mullah Muhammad Omar is gone, as is Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur, his predecessor. Four key Taleban leaders who were in Guantanamo are out and living in Qatar (see AAN analysis here). The Taleban’s Political Commission was also moved to Qatar, in June 2013 – and operates as a place where diplomats and humanitarians can talk to the Taleban. The real power, however, remains with the military men of the movement.

A more unexpected development was the emergence of a rival, laying claim to be fighting the ‘real jihad’, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP). It established itself in copy-cat fashion to ISIS in Iraq and Syria; it controls little territory and has little support from Afghans, but it has proved deadly as an urban terrorist outfit, deliberately killing civilians and trying to provoke sectarian conflict by targeting Afghanistan’s Shia Muslims in mass attacks (AAN dossier here). Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami that fought its own insurgency until 2016 is also back in Kabul (AAN background here and here).

Pakistan still backs the Taleban, but it remains an uneasy relationship. Without the safe havens across the Durand Line, the insurgency would struggle to continue, but the ‘marriage’ is not without its cost, as Baradar himself knows.

One thing that will be familiar is that talk of a ‘peace process’ is again in the air. In 2010, when Baradar was detained, as we reported, the idea of talking to the Taleban was being “much-discussed… pushed to the forefront by President Karzai” with his “‘Policy for National Reconciliation and Reintegration of Armed Opposition Groups’ presented at the London conference” in January 2010 and discussed at a ‘Peace Jirga’ in April (part 1 of an AAN series about it here). The timing of Baradar’s arrest raised  questions. Not the least, as Baradar had been residing in Pakistan for most of the previous nine years. At the time, we wrote that “what has become the most common explanation was that the Pakistani ISI was unhappy with contacts he had had with the Karzai government, reportedly with Karzai’s late half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, who before his death was the most powerful man in the Afghan south (see here).”

This time, his release is reported to have been made at the request of the new US special envoy, Zalmai Khalilzad (see AFP and Reuters). Khalilzad made his first trip to the region in September.

The question now is whether the release of Baradar could have any positive repercussions.

Who is Baradar?

If this and the next section look familiar, that is because they are largely taken from a dispatch written in September 2013 after the Pakistan Foreign Ministry made an announcement that Baradar was to be freed.

Baradar was one of the most experienced Taleban commanders, at the heart of the movement since its earliest days in Kandahar through the insurgency and up until his detention in 2010. [… H]e is from Dehrawod in Uruzgan (born 1968), but grew up in Kandahar in a madrassa and fought in that province, mainly in the Panjwayi area, against the Soviet army in the 1980s. He and Omar were in the same fighting group and, according to Dutch journalist Bette Dam, were friends from these days.

Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn reported that Baradar was a founding member of the Taleban movement from 1994. (2)As the Taleban expanded through the country during the mid-1990s, Baradar took on a succession of posts, almost all military: he was head of the south-western military zone, (possibly briefly) governor of Herat (1998), head of the Central Army Corps in Kabul and Deputy Chief of Staff in 1999. He also used to occasionally deputise for Mullah Obaidullah as minister for defence. He was certainly actively involved in the war at the various fronts during those years. The Afghanistan Justice Project (AJP) reports him as having been in Kunduz, the Taleban’s early northern stronghold, in 1997 when Taleban forces attacked, captured and then lost Mazar-e Sharif and as leading a major force into Balkhab, Sar-e Pul – one of the remaining Northern Alliance enclaves – in 1999. The same report provides testimony that, as deputy chief of staff, on the ground during the Taleban offensive on the Shomali in 1999, “he personally order[ed] and over-[saw] one of the massacres, the summary execution of the eleven air base personnel at Dasht-e Chirchirik on August 3.” (3)

After the US intervention of 2001, Baradar was involved in the most significant attempt at Taleban surrender. As Michael Semple and Anand Gopal have reported, Baradar – along with Taleban defence minister, Mullah Obaidullah, aide to Mullah Omar and now head of the Qatar political office, Tayyeb Agha, Minister of Interior, Abdul Razaq, and other senior Taleban – appointed Obaidullah to deliver a letter, purportedly with Mullah Omar’s permission, to Hamed Karzai. Karzai had just been selected as Afghanistan’s new interim leader at the Bonn Conference and was travelling from Uruzgan to Kandahar. The letter, according to Gopal, acknowledged that the Islamic Emirate had no chance of surviving and stated their willingness to accept Karzai’s leadership. The Taleban’s main request was “to be given immunity from arrest in exchange for agreeing to abstain from political life.” Like other attempts at reconciliation, this one fell on stony ground, although whether it was because of Karzai or Rumsfeld has never been clear (see reporting here). Baradar went on to become one of the key commanders of the insurgency.

In the early years after the Taleban lost power, when Mullah Omar was in hiding and largely incommunicado, Mullah Obaidullah was number two in the hierarchy and Baradar number three. After Obaidullah was arrested in Pakistan in early 2007, Baradar took over his role, as the effective operational boss of the movement and head of the Leadership Shura (the Quetta Shura). (Obaidullah died in Pakistani custody in 2010, something that was confirmed by the Taleban in 2012.)

Baradar is a highly experienced military commander and keen political strategist and  played a major role in organising the insurgency in its formative years. Newsweek, in 2009, described him as able, cunning and responsible for the spike in Coalition casualties that year. Yet, as Gopal reported, his thinking went beyond the military. He was, said Gopal, behind the original drawing up of a Taleban code of conduct, the Layha, (see AAN reporting here):

He understood that [this conflict] is about hearts and minds. He’s been a major push behind a lot of the insurgency’s efforts to clean up its act. He helped institute the complaints commissions, for instance and was also instrumental in streamlining and making more efficient the military structure. 

Will Baradar be important to a peace process?

News of Baradar’s release came first from Pakistani sources, initially it seems in The News (22 October) and later in other outlets, including AP and later Taleban sources confirming the release, for example on the BBC on 24 October, and later other outlets including Tolo. The sources informing about his release have been unnamed. However, speaking to International Crisis Group’s (and former-AAN colleague) Borhan Osman, the release does look to be definite. Osman told AAN he has spoken to senior Taleban and family members of Baradar who told him Baradar was freed in Islamabad late on Wednesday morning and had joined his family in Karachi on Wednesday night “apparently unaccompanied and unmonitored by Pakistani government agents.”

The last time Baradar’s was supposed to be about to be released, in September 2013, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ made a very terse and, it turned out, premature announcement. At that time, AAN looked at what implications his release might have for a peace process. Our analysis then – three years after his detention – still stands eight years after:

“It is as yet unclear why Pakistan has decided to release Baradar now,” we wrote, “and whether he will be useful or even available for possible negotiations.” We continued:

After… years in the possibly not so gentle hands of the ISI, it is unclear who he will listen to or who he will represent and, indeed, what his position might still be within the movement. On the face of it, Pakistan has given the Afghan government what it has long asked for, but their release of Baradar could just as well be an attempt to regain control and reinsert Pakistan into the heart of any negotiations. Islamabad might see Baradar as a trump card who could be used to subvert any ‘peace process’, rather than kick start it. The unknowns about Baradar are so many – even as to whether his release is about reconciliation at all – that predictions of what might happen next are not yet possible.

Where Baradar ends up is important. It is difficult to see him enjoying any sort of independent position, needed if he was to take part in negotiations, if he was in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Actually keeping tabs on where he is may be impossible for the outside world – but not, presumably, for the ISI – as it has been for the last tranche of reportedly released Taleban; they are now said to be “reunited with their families”, although to all intents and purposes, they have disappeared.

Baradar certainly has the potential to still be highly influential. Much will depend on his health and vigour and whether he was tortured in custody or otherwise mistreated. In late 2013, at a reported meeting with a High Peace Council delegation, he was reported to have been ‘sedated’, and unable to speak. If Baradar was able and willing to play a role, there is still the question of a role in what. As yet, nothing solid in the way of US-Taleban or Kabul-Taleban talks has emerged.

More biographical details in this AAN piece and this Newsweek article.

Note: None of the photos purportedly showing Mullah Baradar are genuine, for example here, here or here.

Edited by Sari Kouvo, Thomas Ruttig and Jelena Bjelica

 

(1) The NATO mission has a deployment of 16,000. However, it is not clear when it comes to the US soldiers, how many are part of the non-combat NATO Resolute Support mission (with officially 8,745 US soldiers) and how many are in the ‘can-be-combat’ US military Freedom’s Sentinel mission. The ‘hats’ of service personnel can change, even within a day, for example, pilots flying different mission.

(2) In their book, “An Enemy We Created: TheMyth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970–2010”, Hurst, London, 2011.

(3) The Afghanistan Justice Project reported:

On August 3, 1999, a group of Taliban, acting under direct instructions from a senior commander [elsewhere named as Baradar], summarily executed a group of eleven captured personnel of the Bagram Airbase, at Bareek Ab in the Dasht Chirchirik plain. Victims had their hands tied and were under armed guard at the time of their execution. On the same day, also in the Bagram sector, Taliban troops also summarily executed two local barbers close to the airbase, and nine other prisoners, in the Dasht Chirchirik.

 

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I have an explainer article about Russian perceptions of U.S. plans to withdraw from the INF Treaty on the Washington Post Monkey Cage blog today. Here’s a sampler…

Despite Russian urgings, national security adviser John Bolton is insisting that the United States will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The treaty prohibits all short-range and intermediate-range ground-launched missiles, both nuclear and conventional, as well as systems that can be used to launch such missiles. As a result of the treaty, neither Russia nor the United States can deploy missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, or 310 to 3,420 miles. Since this is a bilateral treaty, other countries are not bound by these constraints.

Since the U.S. government announced its withdrawal plans, Russian officials and experts have weighed in on what this means for Russia and how to respond. Here are five things to know.

1. Russians see the INF treaty as giving unfair advantages to the U.S.

Russian experts and officials have long argued that the treaty that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed with President Ronald Reagan in 1987 was disadvantageous — first to the Soviet Union and then to Russia. Russia gave up its ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles without extracting any restrictions on U.S. sea- and air-launched missiles. That’s significant, because the vast majority of Russia’s nuclear weapons are land-based, whereas the U.S. bases much of its nuclear force on submarines. The Kremlin believes this has allowed the U.S. to dominate the world’s oceans with its Tomahawk cruise missiles, and has left Russia vulnerable to a U.S. sea-launched attack.

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Unsurprisingly, Belgium has announced that it has chosen the American F-35 fighter.Unsurprisingly, Belgium has announced that it has chosen the American F-35 fighter. Second betrayal of partners by Belgium, "heart of the European Union" since the 1970s. After 48 years, new proof to what extent Belgium's policy is influenced by the Americans, which was also the case in 1970. New proof to what extent European integration can be considered serious. Quo vadis European integration?

Why has Belgium once again turned its back on the European preference?

Thanks to two defining criteria that were insinuated in the specifications for the replacement of the F-16: the ability to carry a US-made nuclear bomb and stealth. Two crucial criteria for the success of the F-35. Belgium has been carrying out the nuclear mission on behalf of NATO for decades. The F-16s stationed at Kleine-Brogel (F-16A) are capable of carrying and dropping an American B-61 nuclear bomb. In any case, Brussels who wishes to keep it, had made it known.

This skewed the competition and favored the American F-35 against its four competitors: F / A-18E / F Super Hornet, Rafale F3R, JAS-39E / F Gripen and Eurofighter Typhoon. Only the F-35 will be able to carry out the mission of nuclear attack by carrying a B-61 American gravitational bomb. It is designed as dual capacity (conventional and nuclear) and should be able to carry a bomb B-61 in a later phase (!) of its development, probably from 2022 (!).

What is not the case for other contenders to Belgian market, with the exception of the Rafale, which already carries a nuclear weapon. However, Germany has also made a formal request to the United States to integrate the B-61 under the Eurofighter. In theory, this ability could also be certified on the European fighter. Not sure if Washington shares with anyone the firing and releasing codes of the B-61s.

"Within the Alliance, Belgium has accepted, five decades ago, that its fighter jets have both conventional and nuclear capabilities, taking into account a joint analysis of the global threat. NATO is asking us to continue to maintain our combat aircraft available for any such missions, and we look forward to meeting all our obligations in this regard, " said Belgian Foreign Minister Didier Reynders.

In addition, the Belgian Air Force is close to that of the Netherlands, which without hesitation bought eight F-35s in March 2015 on a target of 37 aircraft.

Despite the fact that about 38,000 signatures were collected against the idea of ​​equipping the Belgian air force with F-35 stealth fighter jets, the finance committee of the House of Representatives refused to hear the arguments opponents of this project.

The F-35 project is the most expensive project ever seen. The aircraft had several hundred defeats (hardver + software) his "brother" the F-22 Raptor, after it was put in place with the US Army, was less effective in the fight against the Eurofighter and the former F-16 is stealth is also highly doubtful.

According to a leaked test in 2015 also the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s demonstrated performance is inferior to the current fighters it is designed to replace. Specifically, the report marked for official use only (FOUO) finds that, in a series of 17 dogfights, the F-35 was consistently outmatched by an aging F-16 :

"One of the significant new issues raised by the report was the F-35’s difficulty in sustaining energy in close-in maneuvering combat—that is, the energy needed to turn and accelerate. The test pilot found this to be “substantially inferior” to older planes like F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s. In the tests, the F-35’s maneuverability against the F-16 was so limited that it could only point quickly enough to achieve a missile shot by executing one specific maneuver. But this move consumed so much energy that if the shot failed the F-35 would “ultimately end up defensive again”—which is to say, at the mercy of any opponent.

The report also homed in on flight control problems in the 20 to 26 degrees angle of attack zone, crucial for hard maneuvering. The pilot described the F-35’s computer-controlled flying qualities as “sluggish” for evasive maneuvering and “not intuitive or favorable.” This echoes information in a recent report from the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) that described severe flying quality problems in this high angle of attack region—including uncontrollable wing drop and heavy buffeting (shaking) “that degraded the flight control system (two of three flight control channels become disabled), requiring a flight abort.”

Tag: BelgiumF-35RafaleEurofighter

Tomorrow, on 27 October 2018, Kandahar will vote in the country’s parliamentary election – a week later than the rest of the country. The delay comes after the assassination of, among others, the province’s police chief and strongman Abdul Razeq on 18 October 2018. The IEC has tried to remedy the problems that plagued the rest of the country last week, through additional training. This may not be enough to maintain the integrity of their new anti-fraud measures: voter lists and biometric verification – particularly since Kandahar has a history of mass fraud. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert, with input from Ali Adili and Ali Mohammad Sabawoon, takes a closer look at what we might be able to expect on Afghanistan’s third day of voting.

What can we expect on Afghanistan’s third election day?

Kandahar’s Provincial Electoral Officer Neamatullah Wardag told AAN that the IEC intends to open 173 polling centres on 27 October 2018, with a total of 1,113 polling stations. This is, on average, a little over six polling stations per centre but the variation in size will be wide. Some centres registered only few voters and will have one or two stations only, while other will have to have at least 15 or more. (1)

Some polling centres, particularly in Kandahar city, would be very crowded if all voters did indeed turn up (which is unlikely, even in the city). Nahiya nine in Kandahar, for instance has almost 29,000 voters registered in three polling centres, while three other urban districts have around registered 45,000 voters for six polling centres. Of course there will be many polling stations, but the crowds could still be large. Alternatively, if the centres are captured by strongmen or partisan security forces, as has happened in the past, the opportunity for fraud in these places would be significant.

So far, there have been no signs of a breakdown in the security situation or in discipline in the security forces, since Abdul Razeq’s death (AAN background here). Security in Kandahar city has been tight and there has been a steady stream of high profile visitors who have come to pay their respects, including President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah, former president Karzai and several Jamiat leaders.

It is difficult to predict the overall turnout, other than that it will be very low in the remote districts, where Taliban threats warning people not to take part in the election are expected to keep people away from the vote. In Kandahar city, Abdul Razeq’s supporters believe turnout might be buoyed by the wish to honour his memory. They emphasised that he had been killed only minutes after a meeting that focused on election security and had called on the people of Kandahar to come out and vote.

The death of Police Chief Abdul Razeq has the potential to rearrange Kandahar’s political scene. Different groups, both from Kandahar (such as the Karzai and Gul Agha families) and outside (President Ghani and others) may see new opportunities to try to get their own affiliates elected. His absence will also be felt during this vote, even though so far there seems to have been no security vacuum. But he was a looming figure in the elections, controlling security and, sometimes, the vote.

Unpacking Kandahar’s election numbers

There are a total of 112 candidates (13 are women, more by AAN here) competing for Kandahar’s eleven seats, of which three are reserved for women. Five have registered a political party affiliation; the remaining 107 have registered as independents. 99 of the candidates are men, 13 are women (full candidate list here). According to the 2018 population estimate by the Central Statistics Office (CSO), Kandahar has a total population of around 1,3 million.

According to the IEC’s voter lists Kandahar registered a total of 522,984 voters in this year’s new voter registration: 442,512 men and 67,276 women for the vote in the provincial constituency, and 13,196 Kuchis (gender not specified) for the nationwide election of kuchi representatives.(2)

The rate of registration varied greatly across the province. The district with the most registered voters was Spin Boldak, the birthplace and main power base of General Abdul Razeq. In Spin Boldak 86,082 voters registered to vote in 26 polling centres (11,801 of them were women; 2,015 were Kuchis), representing 15 per cent of the province’s total number of votes.

Four urban districts in Kandahar city (nahiya one, two, four and ten) each registered between 45,000 and 55,000 voters, representing a little less than 10 per cent of the total vote each. Three other urban districts registered a fair number of voters, (almost 29,000 in nahiya nine, and around 13,000 in nahiyas seven and eight). The five rural districts closest to the city – Zherai, Panjway, Dand, Arghandab and Daman – each registered around 20,000 to 30,000 voters in 16 or 17 polling centres each.

After that, it starts petering out: Mianeshin (909 voters), Ghorak (564 voters), Khakrez (409 voters), Shorabak (203 voters) and Reg (161 voters) all registered voters in single polling centres – with no women, except a handful in Khakrez. There was no voter registration in two rural districts – Nesh and Maruf – which also means there will be no vote. There are also four urban districts where no voter registration took place (nahiyas 11, 12, 14 and 15), which include the prosperous, largely-gated community of Aino Mina, Kandahar’s most densely-populated neighbourhood of Loya Wala are located and an insecure area bordering on Dand district. (3) Residents of Kandahar city, however, said that voters from these two areas would have easily been able to register in other neighbourhoods close by. [Update 27 October: According to the IEC there is voting in all nahiyasof Kandahar. They said the centres in question may have been listed under other areas.]

Normally, an election would most probably be won or lost in the areas where most votes are cast (in this case likely to be Spin Boldak and areas of Kandahar city). However, in an election like this, with many candidates and relatively small margins, seemingly insignificant areas can swing a vote, particularly if the votes are concentrated on a certain candidate. This is further compounded by the fact that the final results have so far been largely determined afterelection day, when the IEC had to decide which votes could be counted and which must be invalidated. For this reason, candidates and supporters are often incentivised to try to manipulate the vote wherever they can, in the hope that some of it will slip through.

What was the vote like in Kandahar in previous elections?

In the 2009 presidential election, Kandahar became famous for its “industrial scale” ballot stuffing (for an AAN report that raised the issue of mass fraud days after the election, see here). The fraud was particularly concentrated in the border provinces, where the late Abdul Razeq was then Border Police Chief at the time. Out of the around 250,000 votes that were cast that year, around 180,000 were disqualified in the ECC-led sampled audit, leaving only a little over 70,000 votes to be counted (see details here).

In the 2010 parliamentary elections, every single polling station in the province had reported open on election day, despite serious security challenges. 30 per cent of all polling stations were disqualified in full. After the IEC and ECC disqualifications, there were around 75,000 votes left (see here for more details).

The 2014 presidential election saw 270,000 votes counted in the preliminary count. In the various audits (the results of which were never made public) the province appears to have lost around 50,000 votes (see here). In the 2014 provincial council vote, which took place at the same time and was audited by the IECC rather than the IEC, Kandahar lost around 11 per cent of its votes, including all the votes of its top candidate. (4)

Will the new anti-fraud measures work?

In the past, when voters could cast their vote wherever they wanted, Kandahar provided ample opportunity for unmonitored and/or unopposed ballot stuffing that could be explained away with claims of suddenly improved security or surprise high turnouts. This was particularly the case in the province’s remote districts and in the districts that were under the firm control of local strongmen.

With the new registration system, voters have to cast their vote in the centre where they registered. The last-minute addition of biometric verification aims to weed out multiple registrations, multiple votes and the use of fake documents. If implemented properly, it has now become much more difficult to engage in multiple voting, mass proxy voting, ballot stuffing and manipulation of the count and data entry. But only if procedures are actually followed. The scope for (mass) fraud, and the difficulties the IEC will have to deal with this, will therefore depend on how messy the election becomes.

So far, the IEC in its public statements has downplayed the messiness, saying that only in a minority of the polling centres procedures were not followed and that the main problem had been teachers and other staff turning up late. The IEC also said it hope the vote in Kandahar would be an improvement, compared to last week’s two election days (see here and here and here for observation reports). Provincial IEC head, Wardag, told AAN that atechnical team, dispatched from IEC headquarters, trained the district electoral officers (DEOs) and polling centre managers, who in turn trained the polling station staff. The focus was mainly on the use of the new biometric machines.

The IEC initially made it clear it would invalidate all votes that were not cast using both the voter lists and biometric verification, but it has already been wavering. From what happened on 20 and 21 October 2018, it appears that there will be considerable leeway to get votes counted that were not without properly cast. (5)

This could provide an incentive for all forms of fraud, including the very blatant, in the hope that the results will slip through the cracks. Things to watch will thus include implausible high turnouts in both secure and insecure areas, significant numbers of voters turning up without having registered, and the mass malfunction or loss of biometric devices and voter lists.

Edited by Sari Kouvo and Thomas Ruttig

 

(1) According to the IEC’s lists voter registration earlier this year took place in 172 polling centres. Wardag could not explain why the number of polling centres had now risen from 172 to 173. He thought it might simply be a repetition on the list somewhere.

(2) The English-language summary, which can be found here has slightly different figures for Kandahar’s registration totals: 567,608 registered all together, with 557,344 registered for the vote in the provincial constituency – 483,749 men and 73,595 women (a little over 13 per cent) and – and 10,262 as part of the nationwide kuchi constituency.

The total number of registered kuchi voters nationwide is 168,015. Kandahar, according to this list, comes in fifth and is dwarfed, by far, by Kabul’s largely settled kuchi constituency (71,506 registered kuchi voters, or 43 per cent of the total). The other provinces with significant Kuchi registration have numbers comparable to Kandahar: Kapisa (13,651 or 8 per cent of the total), Nangarhar (11,535 or 7 per cent of the total), Logar (10,298 or 6 per cent of the total).

(3) Voters registered per rural and urban district, as provided by the IEC:

Kandahar’s rural districts

1. Arghestan: 12 polling centres registered 9,231 voters (9,904 male, 106 female and 31 Kuchis)
2. Arghandab: 16 polling centres registered 24,570 voters (23,097 male, 1,013 female and 460 Kuchi)
3. Panjwayi: 16 polling centres registered 25,728 voters (24,624 male, 769 female and 335 Kuchis)
4. Takhta Pul: seven polling centres registered 11,374 voters (9,336 male and 1,767 female and 271 Kuchis)
5. Khakrez: two polling centres registered 409 (377 male and 32 female) (Khakrez Kalai Clinic registered only 4 male voters)
6. Daman: 17 polling centres registered 18,992 voters (15,613 male, 2,024 female and 1,355 Kuchis)
7. Dand: ten polling centres registered 25,233 voters (21,875 male and 2,131 female and 1,227 Kuchis)
8. Reg: one (Shir Shah school) polling centre registered 161 (148 male and 13 Kuchis)
9. Zherai: 16 polling centres registered 30,491 voters (29,193 male, 380 female and 918 Kuchis)
10. Spin Boldak: 26 polling centres registered 86,082 voters (72,266 male,11,801 female and 2,015 Kuchis)
11. Shah Wali Kot: three polling centres registered 3,902 voters (3,475 male, 63 female and 364 Kuchis)
12. Shurabak: one polling centre (Da Wali Muhammad Khan Kor) registered 203 voters (199 male, zero female and four Kuchis)
13. Ghorak district: one polling centre (Pir Khadem Mosque) registered 564 voters (563 male, zero female and one Kuchi)
14. Mianeshin: One polling centre (Ghalinag Mosque) registered 909 voters (908 male, zero female and one Kuchi)
15. Maiwand: three polling centres registered 8,099 voters (7,865 male, 159 female and 75 Kuchi)

A total of 132 polling centres in rural districts registered voters. Mianeshin, Shorabak and Reg were among 32 districts that could not be accessed due to security problems at the time of the polling centre assessment in the second half of 2017. These three districts, as well as Ghorak, ended up with just one polling centre. Maruf and Nesh have no polling centres at all, even though are not mentioned in the list of 11 districts countrywide which, according to the Afghan Ministry of Interior, are fully under Taleban control.

Kandahar’s urban districts (with a brief description of the nahiyas):

1. Nahiya one (army corps and part of Herat bazar; secure): nine polling centres registered 52,469 voters (38,655 male, 13,456 and 358 Kuchis)
2. Nahiya two (Jamai-e Umer mosque and part of of Herat Bazar; secure): six polling centres registered 48,093 voters (38,596 male, 8,241 female and 1,256 Kuchis)
3. Nahiya three (Abdul Rab Akhondzada Masjid and the southern bypass; secure): One (Shin Ghazai Baba) polling centre registered 7,431 voters (5,295 male, 1,909 female and 227 Kuchis)
4. Nahiya four (Karwan, Daikhowja and Baro Darwaza; secure): six polling centres registered 46,826 voters (40,920 male, 5,383 female and 523 Kuchis)
5. Nahiya five (Haji Aziz, Kandahar Radio television and Vehicle bargain markets; secure): one (Da Haji Nika School) polling centre registered 6,522 voters (4,834 male, 751 female and 937 Kuchis)
6. Nahiya six (Sayed Mrach Agah’s tomb, Jandarmar): Two polling centres registered 8,016 voters (6,911 male, 1,058 female and 47 Kuchis)
7. Nahiya seven (Mirbazar, Sof road, Chilzino park; to an extent secure): two polling centres registered 13,645 voters (10,403 male, 3,063 female and 179 Kuchis)
8. Nahiya eight (Bagh-e pol park, the Fruit Market up to Dand Chowk; suffers from some insecurity incidents): Two polling centres registered 13,027 voters (11,443 male, 1,123 female and 461 Kuchis)
9. Nahiya nine (Kandahar university, Tarinkot Ada, Siman bridge and Kotal Morcha, borders Arghandab and Shahwali Kot, is a little insecure): Three polling centres registered 28,776 voters (24,985 male, 3,591 female and 200 Kuchis)
10. Nahiya ten (Karta-ye Malimin and the old police headquarter; secure): Six polling centres registered 46,271 voters (36,503 male, 7,885 female and 1,883 Kuchis)
11. Nahiya thirteen (the old army corps, Mirza Mohammad Khan Kalach and from Baba Sahib’s tomb until Kotal-e Morcha; insecure): Two polling centre registered 5,960 polling centres (5,334 male, 571 female and 55 Kuchis)

A total of 40 polling centres in urban districts registered voters. The districts that are not on the list are:

11. Nahiya eleven: Aino Maina, a wealthy residential area where rich people, NGO staff and government official live, very secure
12. Nahiya twelve: Hakim Ada, Simano brige rasta, near Loya Wala, famous for criminality and Taleban influence, most populated area in Kandahar city
13. Nahiya fourteen: Khojak Baba, Majid Akhondzada and Ahmad Wali Khan Karzai Chowk, a secure area
14. Nahiya fifteen: borders Dand district, insecure

(4) In a letter to the IEC, the IECC said it decided to disqualify the candidate after an audit of over 600 polling stations in Kandahar, when they found that “all his votes had problems.” Such problems included ballots not being removed from their stubs, large numbers of ballots with similar tick marks, made with the same markers, which led them to the conclude that there had been systematic fraud.

(5) As reported here, the IEC will need to deal with three types of election results: a) votes from polling stations that used both the voter lists and the biometric verification, b) votes from polling stations that used only the voter lists, without capturing the biometric verification data, and c) votes from polling stations that used neither of the two systems and made new on-the-spot, handwritten voter lists. (see here for background).

 

Russian Pantsyr Self-Propelled Air-Defense Gun/Missile System

Official Investigation Pending. Internet Buzzing with Speculation About Cause. A U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bomber made an emergency landing on Tuesday, Oct. 23, 2018 at the Colorado Springs Airport following an unspecified inflight incident. A number of local photographers have posted photos of the aircraft sitting on the tarmac at the joint use […]

NATO response to Vostok 2018 : Trident Juncture 18, abbreviated TRJE18, is a NATO-led military exercise to be held in Norway in October and November 2018 with an Article 5 collective defence scenario.

Trident Juncture 2018 will consist of three main parts:
- A phase of deployment lasting from August to October,
- LIVEX (live field exercise) from 25 October to 7 November. The land battle will take place in the area south of Trondheim and north of Rena Camp in Hedmark County. There will also be sea activity along the Norwegian Coast, the North Sea and limited areas in The Baltic Sea and Skagerrak. There will be air activity in the airspace over Norway, Sweden and Finland.
- CPX ( command post exercise) from 13 to 24 November 2018 at NATO's Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway. This is a data simulated desk exercise to train the headquarters. This exercise is also a certification test for Allied Joint Force Command Naples.

The Norwegian Armed Forces have called the exercise the largest to be held in Norway since the 1980s, it will be NATO's largest exercise since 2002. An expected 50,000 participants from 31 nations will take part, including 10,000 vehicles, 250 aircraft and 65 vessels.

The exercise will mainly take place in central and eastern parts of Norway, and air and sea areas in Norway, Sweden and Finland. The main goals of Trident Juncture is to train the NATO Response Force and to test the alliance's defence capability. For Norway, the exercise will test the country's ability to receive and handle allied support.

Tag: Trident Juncture 2018Vostok 2018

The incident occurred during a test conducted by soldiers from the Airborne and Special Operations Test Directorate. At around 1 PM LT, a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III, belonging to the 437th airlift wing based at Joint Base Charleston dropped a Humvee over a neighborhood in Harnett County on Oct. 24, 2018. No one […]

Recently released photographs show flyable Raptors departing Tyndall to Langley AFB after Hurricane ravaged the key airbase in Florida on Oct. 10, 2018. Tyndall Air Force Base was heavily damaged earlier this month after the Category 4 storm tore through the base. As Hurricane Michael approached the base, mission capable F-22s assigned to the 325th […]

Beware, graphic footage ahead. The clip below was filmed aboard USS Enterprise off the U.S. East Coast on Nov. 8, 1998 when an EA-6B Prowler, BuNo. 163885/’AC-503′ of VAQ-130, US Navy, based at Whidbey Island, Washington, collided with an S-3B Viking, BuNo. 159733 of VS-22, US Navy. As the tragic footage shows, the Viking was […]

Item 4 - Public Hearing on Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security - The OODA Loop: WHY TIMING IS EVERYTHING - Mrs Wendy R. Anderson, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Item 4 - Public Hearing on Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security - As AI Begins to Reshape Defense, Here’s How Europe Can Keep Up - Mrs Wendy R. Anderson, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Item 4 - Public Hearing on Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security - As Budget Polemic Drives Headlines, Do Not Lose Track of NATO’s Approach to AI - Mrs Wendy R. Anderson, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Item 4 - Public Hearing on Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security - Regulating artificial intelligence in the area of defence by Dr Marcel Dickow
Item 5 - Exchange of view on Future challenges for The European Union Satellite Centre (EUSATCEN) : Presentation by Mr Pascal Legai, Director EUSATCEN
Item 6 - Exchange of view with Operation Commander Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino on the State of play of Europrean Union Naval Force - Mediterranean EUNAVFOR MED
Item 7 - Exchange of views on Mine action and the European Union's integrated approach with Mr Frank Meeussen Policy Officer, Conventional Arms - Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Arms Export Control, EEAS
Item 7 - Exchange of views on Mine action and the European Union's integrated approach with Mr Juan-Carlos Ruan, Director of the Implementation Support Unit of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

SEDE organised a public hearing on 'Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security' on Wednesday 10 October 2018, from 09.00 to 11.30, with four external experts
Further information
Draft programme
The OODA Loop: WHY TIMING IS EVERYTHING by Wendy R. Anderson, Amir Husain, and Marla Rosner
As AI Begins to Reshape Defense, Here’s How Europe Can Keep Up by Wendy R. Anderson and Jim Townshend
As Budget Polemic Drives Headlines, Do Not Lose Track of NATO’s Approach to AI Amir Husain, August Cole and Wendy R. Anderson
Regulating artificial intelligence in the area of defence by Dr Marcel Dickow
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

EDA and Thales Six GTS France SAS have signed a contract within the Agency’s EU Satcom Market project for the provision of secure network and communication services to the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the EU’s Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali. The contract contains several options which, when triggered, will extend the services also to the EU Training Missions in the Central African Republic and Somalia. The contract has a potential value of €6 million and runs until the end of 2021. 

The specific contract was awarded following a reopening of competition between contractors previously awarded the Service Framework Contracts for the Provision of 'Communication and Information System (CIS) Services for Headquarters and Deployed Forces' in the context of the EU SatCom Market Project

Thales Six GTS France SAS will provide network and communication services for both unclassified and EU Classified Information (EUCI). Services provided include a secure WAN with LANs, work stations, printers, VoIP phones, VTC and encrypted mobile phones for EUCI communication, SMART phone communication application, Cyber Defence services, technical support, training, accreditation support and transportation. 

The contract signing is the result of a close cooperation between EDA, MPCC and the missions’ CIS personnel to define the requirements and evaluate the most advantageous proposal. EDA has been in the lead of the process up to the signing of the contract and will continue to be fully responsible for its management throughout the implementation. 

MPCC, which is responsible at the strategic level for the planning and conduct of non-executive military missions under the political control and strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee, will be able to exercise its responsibilities in a secured environment. This new capacity will enhance the reactivity of MPCC by speeding up the flow of information not only between MPCC and missions, but evenly between missions. MPCC and CPCC already study the possibility to enlarge this capacity to other CSDP actors. 

The overall purpose of the EU SatCom Market project is to provide contributing Member States with an option to efficiently source cost effective commercial Satellite Communications (SatCom) as well as wider Communication and Information Systems (CIS) services. The Satcom services offered include end to end services with transmission links as well as SatCom terminals for all bands (including military). The CIS services offered cover the integration of telecommunications with radio and IT networks and include hardware as well as software. The range of services provided through the EU SatCom Market project enable users to access, store, transmit, receive and manipulate information required to meet a wide range of operational needs, both abroad and at home.
 

More information: 

• EU SatCom Market project page
• EU SatCom Market factsheet

Americas

A major component of the B61-12 nuclear bomb will now be produced at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge. The Complex is one of the nation’s most important national security assets. The 811 acre site contains the world’s largest stockpile of highly enriched uranium, enough to build 14.000 nuclear warheads. Y-12 is now qualified to manufacture the B61-12’s canned subassembly, which is the second stage of a modern thermonuclear weapon, and is also part of the nuclear explosives package. Y-12 Site Manager Bill Tindal said, “We are delivering a key contribution to global security through this program. I couldn’t be more proud of how all organizations pulled together to accomplish this difficult task.” The B-61 is currently undergoing a life extension program, which will consolidate four versions of the bomb into one. The nuke can be launched from B-2A, B-21, F-15E, F-16C/D, F-16 MLU, F-35 and PA-200 aircraft. Delivery of the first production unit is scheduled for March 2019.

Colonna’s Shipyard is being contracted to work on the Navy’s first Spearhead-class ship during the ship’s upcoming regular overhaul and dry docking phase. The firm-fixed-price contract is valued at $7.9 million and provides for a 67-calendar day shipyard availability. The contractor will be responsible to conduct structural inspection of the hull, perform a variety of repairs, support the main propulsion engine’s overhaul, replace heater exchangers and perform gear maintenance. The USNS Spearhead is an Expeditionary Fast Transport ship that was launched in 2011, it is designed for the fast, intra-theater transportation of troops, military vehicles and equipment with aviation support. Work will be performed at Colonna’s shipyard in Norfolk, Virginia. The Regular Overhaul availability is expected to be completed by January, 2019.

National Industries for the Blind is being awarded with a contract modification that extends a one-year base contract for the second year in a row. The modification is priced at $13.1 million and allows for the continued production for the advanced combat helmet (ACH) pad suspension system. The ACH is made of a new type of Kevlar to provide improved ballistic and impact protection. The helmets are also designed to allow an unobstructed field of view and increased ambient hearing capabilities for the wearer. Modular, flame-retardant, and moisture-resistant pads act as the suspension system between the wearer’s head and the helmet. This allows a soldier to fight more effectively when wearing body armor. Work will be performed at facilities in Virginia, Pennsylvania and North Carolina. This second option period is set to run through October 26, 2019.

Contitech is being tapped to provide the US Army with vehicle tracks for its M109 Paladin artillery system. The firm-fixed-price contract is valued at $20.1 million and will run through July 8, 2021. The M109 family of systems has been in service since 1962. The latest variant is the BAE produced Paladin M109A7 next-generation artillery system. The new variant incorporates upgrades to hull, turret, engine, and suspension systems that offer increased reliability, survivability and performance over its predecessor. The 155 mm cannon is mounted on the chassis structure common to the Bradley tracked fighting vehicle. Work will be performed at Contitech’s factory in Fairlawn, Ohio.

Middle East & Africa

Saudi Arabia may be blocked from future arms purchases as world leaders are calling on the government to provide more information on the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. German chancellor Angela Merkel recently said that future weapon deliveries to the Middle-Eastern nation are highly unlikely until an investigation into the journalist’s death has been carried out. The German parliament approved exports worth $416.4 million to Saudi Arabia in 2018 alone, making it Germany’s second biggest defense customer, right after Algeria. One of the largest deals in recent year included the Saudi purchase of 270 Leopard A2 Main Battle Tanks. Germany is currently calling on other countries to consider setting up bans on the sales of arms to Riyadh.

Europe

Belgian news agency, Belga reports that the country has chosen Lockheed Martin’s F-35 JSF over the Eurofighter Typhoon to replace its old fleet of F-16s. Despite the final deadline being set for October 29, government sources are confident that the US-made fighter jet will make the cut. Lockheed spokeswoman Carolyn Nelson told Reuters that “the F-35 offers transformational capability for the Belgian Air Force and, if selected, will align them with a global coalition operating the world’s most advanced aircraft.” The potential deal could also strengthen Lockheed’s position in forthcoming tenders in Switzerland, Finland and Germany. The order for jets due for delivery from 2023 is estimated to be worth $4.14 billion. European countries that currently fly the F-35 include Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy and Norway.

Jane’s reports that the Romanian Ministry of Defence is expected to soon make a decision on the procurement of new multirole corvettes. The planned acquisition program sees for the delivery of four corvettes at a cost if $1.85 billion. The new 2.500 ton-class vessels must come with capabilities across the ASW, anti-surface warfare, AAW, EW, SAR and naval gunfire support spectrum. Current bidders include Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding of the Netherlands, Italy’s Fincantieri, and France’s Naval Group. All bidders are currently in line with Romanian stipulations for local industry participation. The French Naval Group, has associated with local Constanta Shipyard, Dutch group Damen Shipyards, owns the Galati shipyard and is in the process of acquiring the Mangalia shipyard, Italian group Fincatieri, controls the Tulcea and Braila shipyards. The corvette program is the centrepiece of Romania’s naval modernization process that seeks to mitigate the growing Russian military threat in the Black Sea.

Asia-Pacific

India’s sole operational aircraft carrier will start sea trials by the start of next week. The INS Vikramaditya recently completed its second refitment at Cochin Shipyard, a process which cost close to $96 million. Captain Puruvir Das, the carrier’s commanding officer, told the New Indian Express “soon, we will start the sea trials, which will take place off the Kochi and Goa coasts. We are hopeful of returning to the Western Naval Command without delay.” During the refitment major work was carried out, including an extensive hull survey and repainting, as well as some large scale repair of the ship’s shaft system. “The refitment will enhance the operations of Vikramaditya. It will be ready for sea operations once the trials are completed,” added Captain Das. The Kiev-class former Russian Navy aircraft carrier has been in service since 2013 and upgrade of its infrastructure were started in September 2016.

Today’s Video

Watch: GAO: Flight Test of a B61-12 Nuclear Bomb

Austal MRV/JHSV concept
(click to view full)

When moving whole units, shipping is always the cheaper, higher-capacity option. Slow speed and port access are the big issues, but what if ship transit times could be cut sharply, and full-service ports weren’t necessary? After Australia led the way by using what amounted to fast car ferries for military operations, the US Army and Navy decided to give it a go. Both services leased Incat TSV/HSV wave-piercing catamaran ship designs, while the Marines’ charged ahead with very successful use of Austal’s Westpac Express high-speed catamaran. These Australian-designed ships all give commanders the ability to roll on a company with full gear and equipment (or roll on a full infantry battalion if used only as a troop transport), haul it intra-theater distances at 38 knots, then move their shallow draft safely into austere ports to roll them off.

Their successful use, and continued success on operations, attracted favorable comment and notice from all services. So favorable that the experiments have led to a $3+ billion program called the Joint High Speed Vessel. These designs may even have uses beyond simple ferrying and transport.

The JHSV Ships

Austal concept
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The design specifications established for the JHSV described an ocean-going vessel 450 feet in length or less, capable of carrying 600 short tons of cargo up to 1,200 nautical miles at a speed of 35 knots. It must also have seats for at least 312 passengers, and must be able to provide long-term berthing and galley facilities for at least 104 of those passengers in addition to the vessel’s 41 crew.

A single firm was ultimately selected to produce all planned JHSV ships, and Austal beat their rival Incat for the contract. Austal’s design ventured slightly beyond the program’s specifications. Length is just 103.0m/ 337.9 ft, with a Beam of 28.5m/ 93.5 ft, and a miniscule Draught of just 3.83m/ 12.57 ft.

The ship’s 4 Wartsalia WLD-1400-SR waterjets are powered by the same MTU 8000 class diesel engines used on Austal’s Independence Class Littoral Combat Ship, and the Hawaii Superferries. Specifically, JHSVs use 4 MTU 20V8000 M71Ls, rated at a maximum of 9.1 MW each. These engines and waterjets can push the ships to the required 35 knots at full cargo load, or 43 knots unloaded.

Austal’s design offers embarked troop berthing for 150 (104 permanent, 46 temporary) that can support 14 days of operations. Alternatively, airline-style seating for 354 troops, in addition to the crew of 41, allows the ship to support 96 hours of operations. Cargo capacity is up to 700 short tons/ 635 metric tons, in a usable cargo area 1863 m2/ 20,053 ft2, with a clear height of 4.75m and a turning diameter of 26.21m. The cargo area also has 6 ISO TEU (20′ ISO container) interface panels, for containers that need power. The Austere Loading Ramp Arrangement can support vehicles up to 70 ton M1A2 Abrams tanks, per requirements, and a telescoping boom crane can lift 18.2 metric tons at 10m, dropping to 12.3 metric tons at 15m.

The ship is required to be able to transport 600 short tons of troops, supplies, and equipment 1,200 nautical miles at an average speed of 35 knots, through wave height of up to 4 feet. It won’t quite manage that, in part because its 12.5 short tons overweight. Required range will also suffer a bit at 23 knots cruise speed (4,018 nmi vs. 4,700 nmi).

The JHSV’s flight deck can support all current Navy helicopters up to and including the Marines’ current med/heavy CH-53E Super Stallion, and Vertical Replenishment has been tested using a tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey. Flight operations will be handled by Kongsberg Maritime’s night-capable Helicopter Operations Surveillance System (HOSS).

HSV-2 Swift, frontal
(click to view full)

As NAVSEA noted:

“[JHSV] will be capable of transporting Army and Marine Corps company-sized units with their vehicles, or reconfigure to become a troop transport for an infantry battalion. Its 35-45 nautical miles per hour speed allows for rapid deployment and maneuver of conventional or special operations forces.

The JHSV will not be a combatant vessel. Its construction will be similar to high-speed commercial ferries used around the world, and the design will include a flight deck and an off-load ramp which can be lowered on a pier or quay wall – allowing vehicles to quickly drive off the ship.

JHSV testing

JHSV’s shallow draft will allow it access to small austere ports common in developing countries. This makes the JHSV an extremely flexible asset ideal for three types of missions: support of relief operations in small or damaged ports; as a flexible logistics support vessel for the Joint Commander; or as the key enabler for rapid transport of a Marine Light Armored Reconnaissance Company or an Army Stryker unit.”

It has taken time, but the US military is beginning to expand its thinking beyond these obvious applications, and begin thinking about ways to employ the JHSV’s vast internal space and mobility in front-line missions. The most dramatic example may involve mounting a 32MJ railgun on USNS Millinocket [JHSV 3] in 2016.

The JHSV Program

Incat JHSV concept – lost
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The Joint High Speed Vessel’s Initial Capability Document received approval from the Department of Defense Joint Requirements Oversight Council on Nov 1/05, with all 4 military services concurring. The initial goal was 5 Army vessels, and 3 Navy vessels, for a program worth about $1.6 billion, but the Navy’s interest has continued to grow. The contract signed in November 2008 called for up to 10 ships, split evenly between the Army and Navy. An initial Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) allowed the U.S. Navy to use its surface ship acquisition expertise to buy these vessels on the Army’s behalf, with Army participation – until program changes moved all of these ships to the Navy’s procurement budget and operation.

All of the JHSVs were then transferred to Maritime Sealift Command under a May 2011 agreement. The first 4 / 10 projected vessels will be crewed by civil service mariners. JHSV 5-10 are slated to be crewed by contracted civilian mariners working for a private company. Military mission personnel will embark with either set, as required by mission sponsors. The goal was for JHSV to achieve Initial Operational Capability in 2012, and JHSV 1 just made it.

All ordered JHSV ships have been named now, and ships with the USNS listing have been delivered to US Military Sealift Command:

• JHSV 1 USNS Spearhead (has deployed)
  
• JHSV 2 USNS Choctaw County (accepted)
  
• JHSV 3 USNS Millinocket
  
• JHSV 4 USNS Fall River
  
• JHSV 5 Trenton Resolute
  
• JHSV 6 Brunswick
  
• JHSV 7 Carson City Courageous
  
• JHSV 8 Yuma
  
• JHSV 9 Bismarck (North Dakota, not Otto von) Sacrifice
  
• JHSV 10 Burlington

• HSV USNS Guam (ex-Huakai)
  
• HSV USNS Puerto Rico (ex-Alakai)

The Pentagon’s April 2011 Selected Acquisition Report placed the program at 18 ships, and its total cost at about $FY08 3.5 billion. That changed as FY 2013 budget plans cut all ships beyond the 10 in the current contract, and the US Navy is negotiating over cancellation of its JHSV 10 contract due to sequestration cuts. Annual budgets to date have included:

FY 2008: $231.9 million, 1 ship funded.
Navy: $18.4M RDT&E
Army: $5M RDT&E, $208.6M production, 1 ship

FY 2009: $364.2 million, 2 ships funded.
Navy: $11.6M RDT&E, $181.3M production, 1 ship
Army: $3.0M RDT&E, $168.3M production, 1 ship

FY 2010: $391.1 million, 2 ships funded
Navy: $8.2M RDT&E, $202.5M production, 1 ship
Army: $3.0M RDT&E, $177.4M production, 1 ship

FY 2011: $390.1 million, 2 ships funded.
Navy: $3.5M RDT&E, $203.9M production, 1 ship
Army: $3.0M RDT&E, $179.7M production, 1 ship

FY 2012: $376.4 million, 2 ships funded.
Navy: $4.1M RDT&E, $372.3M production, 2 ships

FY 2013 request: $376.4 million, 1 ship funded.
Navy: $1.9M RDT&E, $189.2M production, 10th & final ship

Note that advance materials purchases for future years are included in each year’s procurement budgets. After FY 2013, JHSV budgets are very small, reflecting only minor post-shakedown work.

Supplements: From Leased to Bought

Hawaii Superferry
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At present, 1 leased vessel remains in military service, following the end of Incat’s HSV-2 Swift lease. Austal’s HSV 4676 Westpac Express catamaran continues to serve in Military Sealift Command in the Pacific around Guam and Japan, working closely with the Marine Corps as a troop and cargo transport.

HSV-2 Swift’s influence lives on in the JHSV concept of operations. The ship had supported relief operations in Indonesia post-tsunami, and in the Gulf Coast region following hurricane Katrina. In both cases, Swift’s high speed and shallow draft combined to make it an ideal platform for the delivery of relief supplies and support of other platforms operating in the area. During operations following Katrina, Swift was able to use ports that were inaccessible to other ships of the logistics force. It has also been a platform for UAV and aerostat experiments.

It’s likely that both charters will soon be replaced, thanks to a recently-purchased alternative with many similarities to the JHSV.

After its ferry service was forced into bankruptcy by environmental lawfare, the Hawaii Superferries Huakai and Alakai were pressed into service by their main creditor: the US Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD). They were called into service in the wake of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and these Austal-built ships were very successful in that role. Both ferries were ultimately bought by the US Navy in 2011, for just $35 million. Once their $35 million conversions are done, they’re likely to replace Westpac Express and Swift as USNS Guam (ex-Huakai) and USNS Puerto Rico (ex-Alakai, slightly smaller). The superferries will offer more troop-carrying berths than their similar JHSV counterparts, in exchange for less military flexibility.

USNS Guam is expected to relieve Westpac Express in the Pacific some time in FY 2015.

Contracts & Key Events FY 2014-2018

JHSV 1 passes trials & deploys; JHSV 3 passes acceptance trials; JHSV 4 launched.

JHSV 1 deploys
(click to view full)

October 24/18: EPF-1 ROH Colonna’s Shipyard is being contracted to work on the Navy’s first Spearhead-class ship during the ship’s upcoming regular overhaul and dry docking phase. The firm-fixed-price contract is valued at $7.9 million and provides for a 67-calendar day shipyard availability. The contractor will be responsible to conduct structural inspection of the hull, perform a variety of repairs, support the main propulsion engine’s overhaul, replace heater exchangers and perform gear maintenance. The USNS Spearhead is an Expeditionary Fast Transport ship that was launched in 2011, it is designed for the fast, intra-theater transportation of troops, military vehicles and equipment with aviation support. Work will be performed at Colonna’s shipyard in Norfolk, Virginia. The Regular Overhaul availability is expected to be completed by January, 2019.

October 22/18: EPF-13 Austal is being tapped to start building the Navy’s next Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) ship. The undefinitized contract action is valued at $57.8 million and allows for the procurement of long-lead-time material and production engineering services. The Spearhead-class vessels are designed for the fast, intra-theater transportation of troops, military vehicles and equipment with aviation support. Bridging the gap between low-speed sealift and high-speed airlift, EPFs transport personnel, equipment and supplies over operational distances with access to littoral offload points including austere, minor and degraded ports often found in developing countries. The vessels are able to transport 600 short tons of military equipment to a range of 1.200 nautical miles at speeds of up to 35 knots. Work will be performed at multiple locations, including – but not limited to – Novi, Michigan; Mobile, Alabama and Rhinelander, Wisconsin. The US Navy’s 13th EPF is expected to be completed by November 2021.

February 28/18: Christening Ceremony The US Navy has christened its latest Spearhead-class expeditionary fast transport, the USNS Burlington, during a ceremony in Mobile, Alabama, on Saturday. It is the tenth of 12 Expeditionary Fast Transports being built for the Navy at a cost of $1.9 billion. Overseeing the event were the ship’s primary sponsors US Senator Patrick Leahy and his wife Marcelle Pomerleau. Marcelle Leahy said naming the ship after the Vermont city of Burlington was “fitting because Vermonters have long heeded the nation’s call to service.” Built by Austal USA, the vessel is designed to transport troops and equipment at high-speeds and in shallow waters for rapid deployment. The Navy says it can “carry 600 short tons of military cargo for 1,200 nautical miles, at an average speed of 35 knots.” This equates to the Burlington being able to carry 1,200,000 pounds for 1,380 miles at an average speed of 40 mph. It also has a flight deck for helicopter operations and an off-loading ramp for disembarkment missions.

Sept 26/14: Naming. “Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced the next joint high speed vessel (JHSV) will be named USNS Trenton during a ceremony in Trenton, New Jersey, Sept. 25.” Um, OK. Trenton, which is still under construction, was publicly named by the Secretary of the Navy on April 12/13 (q.v.) Sources: US Navy, “SECNAV Names the Next Joint High Speed Vessel”.

Sept 16/14: #4 delivered. Austal delivers USNS Fall River to US Military Sealift Command. Construction update:

“Preparations are underway for the launch of Trenton (JHSV 5) later this month with construction on Brunswick (JHSV 6) progressing well. Metal cutting began for Carson City (JHSV 7) in early September.”

Sources: Austal, “Austal Delivers Fourth Joint High Speed Vessel”.

USNS Fall River

June 13/14: Aerostat zapped. From US Naval Forces Southern Command:

“During routine testing off the coast of Key West, the Aerostat tethered off the Joint High Speed Vessel USNS Spearhead (JHSV-1) was struck by lightning at 12:21 in the morning, June 12…. The lightning strike caused the Aerostat to deflate and land in the water. Response efforts were delayed as the thunderstorm moved into the area. The Aerostat was subsequently sunk so to pose no hazard to other vessels or navigation.”

Aerostats are tethered blimps, used to dramatically expand a JHSV’s field of view (q.v. April 27/13). This can be very useful for survey and interdict deployments like Operation Martillo (q.v. March 31/14). Sources: US Navy, “USNAVSO/US 4th Fleet Statement regarding AEROSTAT”.

May 20/14: JHSV 3. USNS Millinocket will become the 1st JHSV deployed to the far east, where it will operate alongside the leased ship Westpac Express [HSV-4676] and the former Hawaii Superferry USNS Guam [HST-1].

MSC’s JHSV project officer Mike Souza says that USNS Millinocket is preparing for a move to San Diego, CA. She’ll serve as a display platform for the two EM Railgun prototypes during the May 26/14 International Symposium on Electromagnetic Launch Technology in La Jolla, CA. Some final post-delivery tests and trials will follow, including some interface testing with a Mobile Landing Platform ship. Once the post shakedown availability trials and fixes are done, Millinocket head to an unspecified new homeport in the Far East. Sources: Seapower, “Millinocket Will Be the First JHSV in Westpac”.

April 7/14: Experiment: Railgun. The US Navy plans to use JHSV 3 Millinocket as a test platform for one of its newest weapons in 2016: a 32MJ rail gun that can fire projectiles about 100 miles at Mach 7 speeds. JHSV was picked as the trial platform because it has the space to carry the large system on its deck and in its cargo bay. The gun itself isn’t unusually large, but once you throw in the capacitors for power storage, any additional power needs, extensive maintenance tools and parts, and ammunition, it adds up fast. Rolling and bolting that onto a JHSV is much easier than using any warship, and the trial underscores JHSV’s usefulness as a concept testbed.

On the weapon’s side of the equation, ONR Chief Rear Admiral Matthew Klunder touts the railgun’s economic benefit, as well as its military edge in extending the bombardment range of naval guns and the number of rounds on board. It’s true that $25,000 for a defensive railgun shot against incoming missiles is orders of magnitude better than a RIM-116 RAM ($900,000) or RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile ($1.5 million), assuming the unproven assumption of equal effectiveness. One must also compute operating and maintenance costs over the railgun’s lifetime, however, which are going to be far higher than they would be for an All-Up-Round missile in its canister. The JHSV tests will offer some early data re: the gun’s robustness under trial conditions at sea, and that cost data point could end up being as valuable as any performance data. Sources: Reuters, “U.S. Navy to test futuristic, super-fast gun at sea in 2016”.

March 31/14: Operations. USNS Spearhead [JHSV 1] is preparing for a 2nd deployment, this time to the 4th Fleet’s waters around the Caribbean and South America. The US military is taking cautious steps to expand JHSV uses, and is explicitly following in the footsteps of HSV-2 Swift’s 2013 deployment. It’s well short of full innovation toward mothership roles, but still a step forward.

These extensions still have JHSV 1 operating primarily in a ferry capacity, with “adaptive force packages.” They’ll be carrying the USMC’s 4th Law Enforcement Battalion and equipment to the Dominican Republic. After the Marines are ferried back to Florida, a trip to Belize will involve a Navy Seabee explosive ordnance disposal detachment, and a riverine crew. From Belize, a a mobile diving and salvage unit and an explosive ordnance disposal team will be ferried from Guatemala to Colombia, before all of the units that were in Guatemala and Columbia end up ferried to Honduras.

In between, USNS Spearhead will “conduct detection and monitoring activities” in support of the multinational anti-drug Operation Martillo. Spearhead’s exact role isn’t made clear, but Spearhead works well with helicopters, Swift has shown that UAVs can be used from these ships, and it would be possible to have boarding teams embarked. Sources: US Navy, “Plans Finalized for USNS Spearhead’s Deployment to 4th Fleet AOR”.

March 21/14: #3 delivered. Austal delivers USNS Millinocket to US Military Sealift Command. They add that:

“Ships currently under construction are JHSV 4, which was christened in January and is being prepared for sea trials, JHSV 5, which has begun final assembly, and JHSV 6, which commenced construction in January in the module manufacturing facility. Five Independence-variant Littoral Combat Ships are also in construction at Austal’s US shipyard…”

Sources: Austal, “Austal Delivers Third Joint High Speed Vessel” | GD-AIS, “Austal Delivers USNS Millinocket (JHSV 3)”.

USNS Millinocket

March 10/14: JHSV 5. Trenton’s keel is formally laid. Sources: Austal USA, “Austal Commemorates Keel Laying for Trenton (JHSV 5)”.

Jan 28/14: DOT&E Testing Report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2013 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). JHSV will be able to carry 354 passengers for 96 hours, which is better than the required 312, but it’s overweight by 12.5 tons, and will fall short of required ranges at 23 knots (4,018 nmi vs. 4,700) and 35 knots (won’t make 1,200 nmi) transit speed. The extra weight amounts to about 4% fuel load, or 3,565 gallons.

Overall testing results have been positive. Loading tests demonstrated suitability up to M-1A2 tank loading onto a floating causeway. If the ships need replenishment at sea, both USNS Spearhead and USNS Choctaw County have successfully conducted fuel-only underway replenishments. For other supplies, vertical replenishment tests have included an MH-60S helicopter at night, and MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotos by day, and Aircraft Dynamic Interface testing has included MH-53E Minehunting helicopters. DOT&E says that “manning and facilities can accommodate handling of all required helicopters, with the exception of fuel and power.” Finally, DOR&E says that with an embarked security team and weapons, JHSV can engage a moving surface threat. The bad news, aside from ship range?

“The JHSV’s organic container load trailer is not effective for loading 20-foot long metal storage containers. During the IOT&E, the test team took five hours to connect the container load trailer with a storage container and failed to load it…”

Jan 17/14: JHSV 4. Fall River is launched at Austal’s Mobile, AL shipyard, after a side trip to BAE. Instead of moving down a slipway, launches are now float-off affairs from a BAE floating drydock. Getting to the drydock requires a transfer onto a barge, using Berard Transportation rollers. The ship was christened on Jan 11/14, and will be formally delivered to the USN later in 2014, after final fitting out. Austal adds that:

“Three JHSVs and four LCSs are currently under construction in Austal’s Mobile, Alabama shipyard. Austal will begin production of one more ship in each program before the end of January.”

Sources: Austal, “Austal Launches USNS Fall River (JHSV 4)” and “USNS Fall River (JHSV 4) Christened – One of seven Navy vessels currently under construction at Austal USA”.

Jan 16/14: JHSV 1 deploys. Operational use of the JHSV fleet begins with USNS Spearhead’s deployment from NAB Little Creek. She’ll head to “the US 6th Fleet Area of Responsibility” (Africa) until May 2014, then on to the 4th Fleet AOR (Central & South America) until December 2014. Sources: USN, “USNS Spearhead departs on Maiden Deployment”.

1st deployment

Jan 9/14: JHSV 3. USNS Millinocket successfully completes Navy Acceptance Trials in the Gulf of Mexico. Formal delivery is expected in late January. Sources: MarineLog, “JHSV 3 completes Acceptance Trials”.

Oct 8/13: JHSV 1. USNS Spearhead has successfully completed initial operational testing and evaluation with the US Navy. Sources: Austal, “JHSV 1 successfully completes US Navy operational testing”.

FY 2013

JHSV 10 bought, but Navy wants to cancel it over sequestration; JHSV 1 & 2 delivered; JHSV 3 launched; Keel-laying for JHSV 4; Aerostat experiment.

JHSV 2 Launch
(click to view full)

July 31 – Aug 6/13: Testing. USS Spearhead completes Initial Operational Test and Evaluation and Total Ship Survivability Trials, thanks to about 280 Marines from 1st Battalion/ 2nd Marine Regiment/ 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, and 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion. The Marines embarked Spearhead with their weapons, gear and vehicles and traveled from Morehead City, NC, to Mayport Naval Station, FL and back, while participating in various tests. Sources: US MSC Sealift magazine, October 2013.

June 6/13: Naming. The Secretary of the Navy names the last 3 JHSV ships under contract.

The future USNS Yuma (JHSV 8) honors the city in Arizona near the USMC’s big testing range, and will be the 4th ship to bear this name. JHSV 9 USNS Bismarck is named in honor of North Dakota’s capital city. As one might imagine, it’s a first for the US Navy. JHSV 10 USNS Burlington is also a first, named for the largest city in Vermont. US DoD.

June 6/13: JHSV 2. USNS Choctaw County is accepted into service, after completing acceptance trials in May. Delivery just 6 months after the 1st ship in the class is a very fast pace. US Navy | Austal.

USNS Choctaw County

June 5/13: JHSV 3. Millinocket is launched from the Austal USA shipyard in Mobile, AL. It’s not done, just entering the final phase of construction, test, and activation, followed by preparation for sea trials late in 2013. US NAVSEA | Austal.

May 23/13: JHSV 4. The keel is formally laid for Fall River. Austal.

May 3/13: JHSV 2. USNS Choctaw County successfully completes USN Acceptance Trials. Sources: Austal, “Joint High Speed Vessel USNS Choctaw County (JHSV 2) completes Acceptance Trials”.

April 27/13: Aerostat experiment. The Miami Herald reports that the chartered catamaran HSV 2 Swift is currently testing an interesting combination for the US Navy. An aerostat (tethered blimp) mooring system has been attached to the starboard rear at the helicopter deck, and sailors are deploying hand-launched Aerovironment Puma mini-UAVs to investigate targets cued by the aerostat’s radar and optical sensors. When fully deployed to 2,000 feet, Raven Inc’s TIF-25K gives Swift a sea surveillance radius of 50 miles at almost zero operating cost, roughly doubling a warship’s surveillance radius, and increasing Swift’s by 10x.

The JHSV ships and Hawaii Superferries (esp. USNS Puerto Rico) are natural fits for this configuration, given their similarity to HSV 2. If weight and other issues can be worked out, the USA’s Littoral Combat Ships like the trimaran Independence Class could also be an option, and so could amphibious LSD and LPD ships. Still, Swift needs to work out a coherent concept of operations in these trials, including the question of barrier vs. mobile surveillance approaches.

If all goes well with the operational tests, the US Navy will consult with drug enforcement agencies, including the Key West, FL Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF) that oversees Operation Martillo in the Caribbean. If the system is deployed, the biggest losers would probably be expensive-to-operate P-3 quad-turboprop sea control planes. US personnel have also begun promoting the concept to other nations, including Colombia, though those countries would almost certainly use their own ships.

April 20/13: JHSV 3 christened. The Millinocket is christened at Austal’s Alabama shipyard, named after 2 Maine towns. No word on negotiations concerning JHSV 10, though Austal’s release does make a point of noting 10 JHSV vessels under contract. US MSC | Austal.

April 12/13: Naming. 3 JHSV ships are among the 7 named by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, who actually stuck to class naming conventions this time instead of veering into political partisanship.

JHSV 5 will become USNS Trenton, after New Jersey’s capital city. JHSV 6 will become USNS Brunswick, after the seaport in Georgia. JHSV 7 will become USNS Carson City, after Nevada’s capital city. Pentagon, “Secretary of the Navy Names Multiple Ships”.

April 5/13: LCS Council. The CNO adds the JHSV program to the portfolio of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Council, which was set up to manage the logistics, support, training, and concept of operations involved in making LCS a useful part of the fleet. Sources: Gannett’s Navy Times, “LCS council adds new member”.

Added to LCS Council

March 15/13: JHSV 2. Choctaw County completes builder’s trials, reaching speeds of more than 41 knots. Delivery is expected this summer. Austal.

March 2/13: JHSV 10. The US Navy’s guidance regarding sequestration budget cuts involves negotiations to cancel JHSV 10’s contract. They have to hold negotiations, because the contract is already live. The question will be cancellation costs.

Dec 20/12: JHSV 10. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $166.9 million contract modification, exercising the construction option for JHSV 10. All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (48%); Pittsfield, MA (9%); Franklin, MA (3%); Philadelphia, PA (3%); Henderson, Western Australia (3%); Atlanta, GA (2%); Chicago, IL (2%); Gulfport, MS (2%); Slidell, LA (1%); Iron Mountain, MI (1%); Houston, TX (1%); Dallas, TX (1%); Chesapeake, VA (1%); Milwaukee, WI (1%); Brookfield, WI (1%), and various sites inside and outside the United States each below 1% (21% tl.), and is expected to be complete by June 2017. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-08-C-2217).

JHSV 10 bought

Dec 5/12: #1 delivered. US Military Sealift Command accepts delivery of USNS Spearhead [JHSV 1] at Austal Shipyard in Mobile, AL.

Following delivery to the Navy, Spearhead will participate in operational testing before sailing to its layberth in Little Creek, VA. The Navy says that it expects the ship to begin conducting missions in Q1 of FY 2013. Which is to say, by Dec 31/12. US MSC | US Navy | Austal.

USNS Spearhead

Oct 1/12: JHSV 2 launch. Choctaw County is launched in Mobile, AL.

FY 2011 – 2012

JHSV becomes Navy-only; JHSVs 4-9 bought; 2 Superferries bought, re-named; JHSV program to end at 10; JHSV 1 christening, trials; Corrosion controversy.

Austal JHSV concept
(click to view full)

Sept 15/12: JHSV 2 christened. USNS Choctaw County is christened during a ceremony at Austal USA in Mobile, AL. US MSC | Pentagon.

May 30/12: Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the next JHSV will be named the USNS Millinocket. Pentagon.

May 8/12: The US Navy re-names the Hawaiian Superferries, which will becomes USNS Guam and USNS Puerto Rico.

They do not say, but it’s likely that the larger Huakai, tabbed to replace the Westpac Express and move Marines to and from Okinawa and Guam, is the future USNS Guam. The smaller Alakai was being considered for missions in Latin America and/or Africa, so it’s likely that she’ll become USNS Puerto Rico.US DoD.

April 25/12: The first of 43 modules for JHSV 3 have been successfully transported from the Module Manufacturing Facility (MMF), and erected in the final assembly bay on the waterfront, in preparation for the May 3/12 keel-laying ceremony. The 46 tonne, 20.4m x 8.3m x 9.4m module will be part of one of the catamaran akas. Austal.

April 19/12: JHSV-1 trials. The future USNS Spearhead completes builder’s trials of the ship’s propulsion plant, communication and navigational systems, ride control systems, pollution control systems; and first-of-class maneuverability and stability trials. The ship reached speeds of more than 35 knots, exceeding the program’s requirements.

Next steps include INSURV inspection, and commissioning. US Navy acceptance is scheduled by the end of 2012. USN PEO Ships | Austal.

Feb 24/12:JHSV 8-9. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $321.7 million contract modification, exercising construction options for JHSV 8 and JHSV 9.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (48%); Pittsfield, MA (9%); Franklin, MA (3%); Philadelphia, PA (3%); Atlanta, GA (2%); Chicago, IL (2%); Gulfport, MS (2%); Slidell, LA (1%); Iron Mountain, MI (1%); Houston, TX (1%); Dallas, TX (1%); Chesapeake, VA (1%); Milwaukee, WI (1%); Brookfield, WI (1%); various sites throughout the United States (5%); and various sites outside of the United States (19%). Work is expected to be complete by April 2016 (N00024-08-C-2217).

Austal’s release offers a snapshot of current progress. USNS Spearhead is scheduled for builder’s sea trials in early March 2012. JHSV 2 is taking shape in Austal’s final assembly bay. Modules for JHSV 3 are being built, and the ship’s official keel laying is scheduled for April 12/12.

JHSV 8 & 9 bought

Jan 26/12: JHSV cut. The Pentagon issues initial guidance for its FY 2013 budget, and next plans. They include lowering planned JHSV buys by 8 ships, leaving only the 10 in the current contract. Pentagon release | “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices” [PDF] | Alabama Press-Register.

Just 10

Jan 20/12: Superferry supplement bought. Inside the Navy reports that the cost for the 2 Hawaii Superferries, plus required modifications, is actually $70 million. The superferries were seen as a better option to move 880 Marines, because JHSV wasn’t designed for maximum passenger seating. Read “Hawaii Superferry’s Bankruptcy = US Navy Opportunity” for full coverage.

Dec 19/11: Superferries. The Defense Authorization Act of 2012, which will soon become law, looks set to buy both of the Austal-built Hawaii Superferries out of the firm’s bankruptcy, then send them to US MSC, alongside the future JHSV vessels. Read “Hawaii Superferry’s Bankruptcy = US Navy Opportunity” for full coverage.

Superferry supplements bought

Oct 10/11: JHSV 3 begun. Austal announces the official beginning of fabrication for JHSV 3 Fortitude. Austal USA President and COO, Joe Rella:

“The race is on… The world is about to learn just how much value Austal’s investments in modular ship fabrication offers our Navy and Military Sealift Command customers. We challenge ourselves every day to build each ship faster and more efficiently than the one before.”

Oct 7/11: JHSV 6 named. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus names JHSV 6 as USNS Choctaw County. He grew up in that Mississippi county, though there are also Choctaw counties in Alabama and Oklahoma. Ray Mabus said that “I chose to name JHSV after Choctaw County to honor those men and women who represent rural America.”

The name eventually migrates to JHSV 2. US MSC.

Sept 10/11: JHSV 1 christened. JHSV-1 Spearhead is launched at Austal USA’s yard in Mobile, AL. The formal christening ceremony is held on Sept 17/11. The ship is reported to be slightly over budget, but not badly so – a welcome departure for a USN first ship of class. US MSC | Austal | Alabama Press-Register | Maritime Executive.

June 30/11: JHSV 6-7. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $312.9 million contract modification, exercising options for JHSVs 6 and 7. Note, as usual, that this is not the full price of a ready to serve ship. On the other hand, JHSVs have much lower amounts of “government furnished equipment” beyond the base seaframe and installed gear, so the figure will be much closer than it would for a warship.

Options remain for another 3 ships under the current FY 2009-2013 contract, though the program of record tops out at 18 ships. Spearhead [JHSV 1] is scheduled for launch in August 2011, and delivery in December 2011, with other ships currently in various stages of assembly.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (48%); Pittsfield, MA (9%); Franklin, MA (3%); Philadelphia, PA (3%); Henderson, WA (3%); Atlanta, GA (2%); Chicago, IL (2%); Gulfport, MS (2%); Slidell, LA (1%); Iron Mountain, MI (1%); Houston, TX (1%); Dallas, TX (1%); Chesapeake, VA (1%); Milwaukee, WI (1%); and Brookfield, WI (1%), with other efforts performed at various sites throughout the United States (5%) and outside the United States (16%). Work is expected to be complete by June 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-08-C-2217). See also US NAVSEA | Austal.

JHSV 10 bought

June 20-22/11: Corrosion issues? After USS Independence [LCS-2] corrosion reports hit Austal’s share price, a company release addresses the issue. It notes the complete lack of such problems on all of Austal’s commercial and military ships to date, and suggests that the US Navy may have failed to follow basic procedures. Information Dissemination has a different take, and wonders if Austal’s JHSV, which may not have a cathodic protection system either, could also be at risk due to the military’s added electronics:

“In the case of LCS-2, the problem was apparently accelerated by stray currents in the hull from the electrical distribution system problems the ship has been having since it was turned over to the Navy. LCS-4 doesn’t have [a cathodic protection system] either, but apparently CPS is part of the lessons learned process and was included in the fixed-price contracts for Austal versions of the LCS beginning with LCS-6. LCS-2 will have the CPS installed at the next drydock period, while Austal has said a CPS will be added to LCS-4 before the ship is turned over to the Navy. The question everyone seems to be asking is whether the JHSV could suffer the same issue… I’d be curious to know if Westpac Express has a CPS installed, or some other form of prevention is used at all.”

MarineLog’s report says that yes, cathodic protection is used on Westpac Express. See: Austal | Alabama Press-Register | Information Dissemination | MarineLog | WIRED Danger Room.

June 17/11: Corrosion issues? The US Navy has told Congressional appropriations committees that “aggressive” corrosion was found in the propulsion areas of the Littoral Combat Ship USS Independence, which rely on Wartsila waterjets. The ship has been given temporary repairs, but permanent repairs will require dry-docking and removal of the water-jet propulsion system. The strong Australian dollar has hurt Austal’s commercial exports, so this blow to its defense business has added impetus. Bloomberg | Alabama Press-Register | Sydney Morning Herald.

Corrosion in new ships isn’t unheard of, though it’s never a good sign. Norway’s Fridtjof Nansen Class AEGIS frigates had this problem, for instance. The Independence Class runs some risks that are specific to its all-aluminum construction, however, as key subsystems with different metals create risks of galvanic corrosion.

Corrosion controversy

June 11/11: Industrial accident. A 50-ton block from JHSV Vigilant, containing the ship’s service diesel generators, breaks loose while the module is being lifted and repositioned for further work. One source reported that pad eyes tore loose from the module, causing it to fall about 3 feet and tip over.

The extent of the damage to the module, and the cost of repairs, are still being assessed. The good news is that modular construction ensures less schedule impact. Defense News.

Accident

June 9/11: Inside the Navy reports that a June 14/11 Defense Acquisition Board meeting will determine the Navy’s readiness to procure JHSV ships 6-10. Defense officials may opt to fast-track the decision as a “paper DAB,” granting approval without requiring a meeting.

June 2/11: Sub-contract. Taber Extrusions LLC announces contracts to supply extruded aluminum products for JHSV 3 Fortitude, and LCS 6 Jackson, from its facilities in Russellville, AR and Gulfport, MS. Some structural extrusions for both ships will also be manufactured by Taber and supplied to Austal through a contract with O’Neal Steel Corp.

Taber has an 8,600 ton extrusion press with a rectangular container and billet configuration. The firm says that compared with smaller presses and round containers, their tool gives superior metal flow patterns with much tighter tolerances for flatness, straightness and twist; and better assurance of critical thickness dimensions. The resulting wide multi-void extrusions are friction stir welded into panels, and tight tolerances improve productivity while reducing downstream scrap. When finished, they make up some of the ship’s decking, superstructure and bulkheads.

May 2/11: Army Out. The US Army signs a memorandum of agreement to transfer custody of all 5 of its JHSVs to US Military Sealift Command. Army watercraft personnel who had been training to operate the ships have been reassigned. Instead, JHSVs will be operated by the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command, and crewed by civil service (JHSV 1-4) or civilian contract (JHSV 5-10) sailors. The transfer was approved in principle in December 2010, during Army-Navy talks.

MSC has been slated to operate the Navy JHSVs since August 2008, and in May 2010, MSC announced that the vessels would each have a core crew of 21 mariners (vid. May 13/10 entry). That template will now apply to all ships of class, which will carry a USNS designation instead of the Navy’s USS. US DoD | US MSC | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Navy-only now

Oct 12/10: #4 & 5 bought. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $204.7 million contract modification, exercising options to build JHSV 4 and 5. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL, and is expected to be complete by December 2013. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-08-C-2217).

The $204.7 million is on top of the earlier $99.6 million long-lead materials contract, bringing the total so far to $304.3 million for the 2 ships. See also Austal.

JHSV 4 & 5 bought

FY 2009 – 2010

Program baseline set; Austal wins; JHSVs #1-3 bought; Long-lead items for #4-5; JHSV 1 keel-laying; Austal opens new manufacturing facility; Hawaii Superferries in Haiti; JHSV program to reach 23 ships?

JHSV 1 construction
(click to view full)

Sept 28/10: JHSV 2 begins. Austal announces that they’ve begun construction of JHSV 2 Vigilant for Maritime Sealift Command. A subsequent release fixes the start date at Sept 13/10.

July 22/10: JHSV 1 keel-laying. Keel-laying for the first JHSV ship, Spearhead, at Austal’s Mobile, AL facility. Austal | Press-Register advance report.

June 3/10: #4-5 lead-in. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $99.6 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-08-C-2217) for JHSV 4 and 5 long lead time materials, including main propulsion engines, aluminum, waterjets, reduction gears, generators and other components, beginning in fall 2010.

Work will be performed in Detroit, MI (38%); Chesapeake, VA (18%); Henderson, Australia (13%); Gulfport, MS (10%); Ravenswood, WVA (9%); Ft. Lauderdale, FL (4%); Mobile, AL (3%); Auburn, IN (2.6%); Winter Haven, FL (1%); Gardena, CA (1%); and Davenport, IA (0.4%), and is expected to be complete by December 2011. The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages this contract. See also Austal release.

May 26/10: Sub-contract. Kongsberg Maritime has successfully delivered the first JHSV Helicopter Operations Surveillance System (HOSS) to General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems. The sub-contract was awarded in November 2009.

The JHSV HOSS system will provide comprehensive flight deck coverage for helicopter operations, even in very low light conditions, on a MIL-S-901D shock qualified 19″ SXGA liquid crystal display (LCD) monitor in the JHSV control room. The monitor’s Night Vision Device (NVD) optical filter makes it suitable for night operations in ship compartments directly overlooking the flight deck. defpro.

March 25/10: JHSV 4 named. US Navy Secretary Ray Mabus officially names the 2nd US Navy ship under the JHSV program: USNS Fall River [JHSV 4]. US Navy | Gannett’s Navy Times.

March 16/10: Support. Reuters reports on a recent US Navy SBIR research solicitation, aimed at more quickly and cheaply diagnosing cracking in aluminum ship structures. From US Navy SBIR N10A-T041: “Fracture Evaluation and Design Tool for Welded Aluminum Ship Structures Subjected to Impulsive Dynamic Loading” :

“A new analysis tool combined with an experimental validation protocol is needed to accurately characterize the dynamic response and fracture behavior of welded aluminum ship structures subjected to extreme loading events. The goal of this effort is to develop an explicit dynamic failure prediction toolkit for fracture assessment of welded thin-walled aluminum structures. To efficiently characterize a large size ship structure, innovative modeling techniques using fractured shell elements are needed along with a mesh independent crack insertion and propagation capability. In addition to innovative crack simulation in a shell structure, advanced constitutive models have to be implemented in the toolkit to capture the rate dependence and anisotropy in strength, plastic flow and ductility. Developing and demonstrating novel damage simulation and fracture prediction methods has significant potential impact on design and operation of current and future Navy welded aluminum, ship structural systems.”

US Navy Commander Victor Chen reiterated the Navy’s confidence in the JHSV and Littoral Combat Ships; the JHSV is aluminum construction, as is the LCS-2 Independence Class, and the LCS-1 Freedom Class uses an aluminum superstructure on a steel hull. He adds that:

“We already have a level of confidence in how to work with aluminum. The Office of Naval Research is trying to expand the knowledge base and build on what we already know.”

May 13/10: Crewing plans. The US Navy and Military Sealift Command announce the crewing plan for USN JHSVs (even numbers, JHSVs 2-10). Because the ships are new and could conduct a wide variety of missions, MSC determined that the best course of action is to institute a pilot program where JHSV 2 Vigilant and JHSV 4 Fall River will be crewed by 21 civil service mariners each, in order to create a base of experience and knowledge. Delivery as USNS Vigilant is scheduled for FY 2013, but the crews arrive beforehand; while USNS Fall River’s delivery is scheduled for FY 2014. JHSVs 6, 8 and 10 will be crewed with 21 civilian contract mariners each, with specifications developed based on experience with the first 2 ships.

The Army Transportation Corps officers have apparently won their argument to crew the Army’s JHSVs as USAV ships, involving larger crews of soldiers. Within a year, however, that victory would be undone. US MSC.

April 2/10: SAR baseline. The Pentagon adds [PDF] the JHSV program to its Selected Acquisition Reports. The program’s baseline is $3.9355 billion, and subsequent SARs set the number of ships at 18. The program is listed under the US Navy.

Baseline

Feb 11/10: Superferries. The former Hawaii superferries Huakai and Alakai are pressed into service by the USA’s Maritime Administration (MARAD), in the wake of the disaster in Haiti. The ships are managed by Hornblower Marine Services (HMS), and the deployment is seen as an earl concept test of the similar JHSV design’s operations. Haiti’s lack of port infrastructure has not, to date, been a major problem for these ships.

Maritime Executive magazine has the full report, and see also July 30/08 entry.

Feb 3/10: JHSV Boost? Defense News reports that the JHSV program may be about to get a very big boost. Navy Undersecretary Bob Work:

“There was a big debate within the [Navy] department on patrol craft, PCs… People said these are very good for irregular warfare. But when we looked at it we said we wanted to have self-deployable platforms that have a lot of payload space that you can take to the fight whatever you need – SEALs, Marines, riverine squadrons. So we decided to increase the Joint High Speed Vessel program.” Work said the Navy now envisions buying up to 23 of the ships for its own use, in addition to five being built for the Army. “We like their self-deployability aspects,” Work said. “They can be a sea base, they can be an Africa Partnership Station, they’re extremely flexible.”

Jan 28/10: JHSV 2 & 3. Austal USA in Mobile AL receives a $204.2 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-08-C-2217), exercising options for JHSV ships 2 and 3. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL, and is expected to be complete by July 2012. The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC issued the contract. See also the June 19/09 entry for related advance materials purchases.

The accompanying Austal release, adds that the similar (ex-)Hawaii Superferry ships, “Alakai” and “Huakai,” have been mobilized by the US Maritime Administration, and are currently supporting the ongoing relief operation in Haiti.

JHSV 2 & 3 bought

Dec 18/09: Industrial. Austal announces success in the US Navy’s Production Readiness Review (PRR), which allows their Mobile, AL facility to immediately begin construction of Fortitude [JHSV 1]. US Navy Program Manager George Sutton referred in part to Austal’s recently-competed Module Manufacturing Facility (MMF) when he said that:

“Considerable investments in the Austal shipyard coupled with the implementation of proven commercial technology gives me high levels of confidence in the shipyard’s ability to execute the program.”

Nov 10/09: Industrial. Austal officially opens its new $88 million state-of-the-art Modular Manufacturing Facility (MMF) in Mobile, AL, equipping its US shipyard with the ability to build up to three 100 metre-plus vessels each year. Phase 1 facility boasts 35,000 m2 of manufacturing space under one roof, including a 7,900 m2 warehouse, as well as paved parking for more than 2,000 vehicles.

The MMF will increase Austal USA’s capacity to assemble and outfit unit modules before consolidating them into the full vessel, automating component manufacture, including pipe runs, from a 3D model. This approach is widely used in advanced European and Asian shipyards, but is less common in the USA. Austal’s MMF is equipped with routers for the precise cutting of aluminum plate, as well as automated pipe and plate benders. Test constructions are currently underway at the new facility, with work on the first 103 meter JHSV scheduled to commence before the end of 2009. The facility will also build LCS-2 Independence class trimarans for the Littoral Combat Ship program. Austal release.

July 17/09: Ship names 1-3. The Pentagon announces names for the first 3 JHSV ships. The Army will field Fortitude [JHSV 1] and Spearhead [JHSV 3], while the Navy’s first JHSV will be named Vigilant [JHSV 2]. The names for JHSV 2 and 3 eventually change.

Spearhead would later become the name for JHSV 1 instead. US Navy Team Ships | MarineLog.

June 19/09: #2-3 lead in. Austal USA in Mobile AL receives a $99.6 million modification to their JHSV contract (N00024-08-C-2217), covering long lead time materials needed for JHSV 2 and JHSV 3. These materials include items like aluminum for the hulls, main propulsion engines, waterjets, reduction gears, generators, and other components that need to be on hand before construction begins in June 2010.

Work will be performed in Detroit, MI (38%); Chesapeake, VA (18%); Henderson, Australia, (13%); Gulfport, MS (10%); Ravenswood, WVA (9%); and Ft. Lauderdale, FL (4%); Mobile, AL (3%); Auburn, IN (2.6%); Winter Haven, FL (1%); Gardena, CA (1%); and Davenport, IA (0.4%), and is expected to be complete by July 2013. US Naval Sea Systems Command manages the contract

Once construction contracts are awarded for the 2 ships later in FY 2009, these materials will be moved with their associated costs into their respective ship construction line items.

April 6/09: US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates takes the unusual but approved step of making his FY 2010 defense budget recommendations public. They include another 2 high speed ship charters from 2009-2011, until JHSV ships begin arriving.

Nov 13/08: Austal wins. Austal USA in Mobile AL received a $185.4 million Phase II modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-08-C-2217) for 1 (one) JHSV, and for associated shore-based spares. The firm also has options for up to 9 additional ships by 2013, which could raise the contract’s total value to about $1.6 billion. The Naval Sea Systems Command, in Washington Navy Yard, DC manages this contract, which eliminates fellow Phase I winners Bollinger/Incat and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works. The 103m JHSV design appears to be based on Austal’s Westpac Express catamaran, which is currently under long term charter to the US Marines.

Work on this initial contract will be performed at the firm’s American facility in Mobile, AL and is expected to be complete by November 2010. Austal is teamed with General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, who will design, integrate, and test the JHSV’s electronic systems, including an Open Architecture Computing Infrastructure, internal and external communications, electronic navigation, aviation, and armament systems.

Austal already produces ships in Mobile, AL, which has about 1,000 employees and will now grow to about 1,500 employees. Ships produced at this location include some similar civilian designs like the Hawaii Superferry, as well as the Independence Class trimaran Littoral Combat Ship produced in partnership with General Dynamics Bath Iron Works. Austal USA is growing the Alabama facility, and phase one of what will ultimately be a $170 million expansion should be complete by summer 2009. The assembly-line style manufacturing building will allow construction of 3 LCS/ JHSV/ Hawaii superferry scale vessels per year, rising to a capacity of 6 ships per year at full build out. Austal | General Dynamics | Marinelog | Alabama Press-Register | Biloxi-Gulfport Sun-Herald | Western Australia Today | Maine’s Brunswick Times-Record re: union lobbying in Congress to scrutinize the deal.

Austal Wins! JHSV 1 bought

FY 2005 – 2008

From initial requirements draft, to 3-team preliminary design contracts, to final RFP submissions.

Westpac express,
loading in Australia
(click to view full)

July 30/08: Austal announces its final Phase II JHSV submission to the US Navy, following an extensive detailed design and review process. The firm expects that a single Phase II contract for up to 10 JHSV ships will be awarded in late 2008.

Austal’s release adds the interesting tidbit that the firm was recently awarded a new contract to provide additional features and equipment on Hawaii Superferry’s second commercial 107 meter catamaran, in order to allow its use by the military if required.

Jan 31/08: Preliminary design. The US Department of Defense awards a trio of $3 million Phase I preliminary design contracts for the JHSV. Winners include:

Team Austal: Austal USA, Austal Ships (Australia), and General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (GDAIS). This is sort of the same Austal/GD core team building the trimaran LCS 2 Independence design for the USA’s Littoral Combat Ship competition – but note competitor #3…

Team Incat: Louisiana-based Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., Incat of Australia, and its design arm Revolution Design, Nichols Brothers Boat Builders and Kvichak Marine in Washington State, and Gladding-Hearn (Duclos Corp) in Massachusetts. Their design will be based on Incat’s 112 meter wave-piercing catamaran, currently in commercial service. Consortium source.

General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works. No information.

See: US NAVSEA release [PDF] | Incat Australia release | Austal release | UPI re: Bath Iron Works | Springbored’s blog commentary re: Austal-GD dynamics.

Preliminary design contracts

April 23-27/07: Representatives of the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps and the shipbuilding industry meet at at Quantico Marine Corps Base, VA, to discuss the JHSV’s current status of the Joint High Speed Vessel and update prospective contractors on the vessel’s design requirements. US Army release.

November 2005: Initial Draft. The JHSV program office’s Initial Capability Document received approval from the Department of Defense Joint Requirements Oversight Council in early November. All four military services concurred with the decision. The Analysis of Alternatives for this program is scheduled to report out before the end of the 2005 calendar year, and procurement of the lead ship is planned for FY 2008. NAVSEA release

Appendix A: The US Military’s HSV/TSV Experience

Westpac Express
(click to view full)

Instead of arising from a drawing board or a notional requirements sheet, the JHSV’s requirements were based on 7 years of experience operating similar leased vessels, from 2001-2008. The core concept is based on an Australian innovation: fast catamaran ferries from Austal and Incat that are in widespread civilian use. Each ship has a carrying capacity equal to about 20 C-17 heavy airlifters, and their waterjets can power these aluminum catamarans through the water at a consistent 35-40 knots in calm seas. Robert Kaplan, in “Hog Pilot and Blue Water Grunts“:

“Who thought up the idea of using car ferries to get Marines to a combat zone and then link up with pre-positioning ships?” I asked a Marine chief warrant officer. “No-one at the Pentagon. Just a bunch of guys brainstorming here,” the chief replied.”

It was more than just brainstorming. Incat’s HMAS Jervis Bay had been used very effectively by Australia during East Timor’s 1999 independence referendum and subsequent operations, and its demonstrated capabilities attracted American interest.

The chartered vessels quickly lived up to their billing. Normal transit for a Marine battalion from Okinawa, Japan to South Korea aboard ferry or amphibious shipping is about 2-3 days, and moving it by air would take 14-17 “lifts” from C-17 aircraft, a process that might require several trips unless that many planes were available. The same deployment could be carried out by Austal’s chartered WestPac Express catamaran in 24-30 hours; which is to say, at about half the time of conventional naval options, and at about 25% of airlift’s costs. One ship can carry a complete battalion of up to 970 Marines, along with 663 tons of vehicles and equipment. If the Marines must deploy from Guam, where many are being moved from Okinawa, the added distance makes JHSV an even more timely and cost efficient option.

“I Serve With HSV-2!”
(click to view full)

Austal’s ships weren’t the only high speed vessels in operation. The Army operated Incat’s HSVX-1 Joint Venture in conjunction with the Navy, and TSV-1X Spearhead was under sole Army control until its 2005 return to commercial service. Both ships saw extensive Army use in operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, as well as supporting operations in the Pacific, Atlantic, Mediterranean, Horn of Africa, Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia.

In one operation, TSV-1X Spearhead moved the 101st Airborne Division’s military police and their equipment from Djibouti, Africa to Kuwait in the Persian Gulf. The fast catamaran made the 2,000 mile trip in just 2.5 days. Its naval LSV predecessor would have needed 10 days to make the voyage, and would only have carried the equipment, forcing the troops to fly separately.

HSVX-1 Joint Venture was even used by Special Operations Command as a proof-of-concept platform for a special operations force afloat in the western Pacific. Its modifications included a helicopter landing deck and hangar, along with a small military command, control and communications suite. Modifications to its complement also included ScanEagle UAVs, letting US Navy experiment with UAVs, blimps and related vehicles in a persistent surveillance role. The combination of high speed transport, persistent surveillance, and advanced communications may prove to be very complementary.

A 3rd Incat ship, the 112m HSV-2 Swift, was contracted to serve as an interim Mine Warfare Command and Support Ship (MCS), supporting R&D into new mine warfare modular payloads. From 2004 onward, its scope of use became far broader, and Swift’s geographic range expanded to include Africa, Asia, and recovery efforts in the USA after Hurricane Katrina. It remains in American service as of 2013, and continues to trial new approaches like aerostats and UAVs.

If HSVX-1 and HSV-2’s experiences sound a lot like the USA’s forthcoming Littoral Combat Ships, the similarity is no accident. Experience with these high-speed catamarans has played an important role in developing the LCS concept of operations, though the US Navy may not have taken the experiments to their logical conclusion. Given the emergence of naval unmanned vehicles, some observers believe that JHSV’s size and lower cost make it a better choice than the smaller LCS as a “robotic swarm mothership”.

Additional Readings & Sources

Thanks to DID reader and long-serving US MSC vet Lee Wahler for his assistance with this article.

JHSV and its Relatives

• US Navy Fact File – Joint High-Speed Vessel – JHSV

• US Navy PEO Ships PMS-325 – Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV). 2007 snapshot.

• US Navy NWDC – Naval Concept Development – High Speed Vessel. 2007 snapshot.

• JHSV Program – Joint High Speed Vessel Program Overview: SNAME SD-5 & IHS. Sept 28/06 presentation.

• DID – Hawaii Superferry’s Bankruptcy = US Navy Opportunity. Became USNS Guam and USNS Puerto Rico, based on vessels similar to the JHSV.

• DID – U.S. Marines Extend Westpac Express TSV Ship Charter.

• US Military Sealift Command – WESTPAC EXPRESS, MV.

• US Military Sealift Command – HSV SWIFT. December 2013 snapshot. No longer leased.

Ancillary Equipment

• DID – Ruin on Rails: The US Navy’s Railgun Project. JHSV 3 will serve as a testbed.

• DID – From Dolphins to Destroyers: The ScanEagle UAV. USNS Swift was a testbed, and JHSVs can be expected to operate this and Insitu’s follow-on RQ-21 Blackjack UAV in future.

News & Views

• Soldiers Magazine, via The Free Library (August 2007) – Launching the JHSV.

• US Army (April 30/07) – Services Chart Course for New Vessel.

• Inside the Navy via Military.com (July 13/06) – Joint High-Speed Vessel Taking Shape.

• Seapower Magazine (May 2006) – In the Shallows: The Joint High-Speed Vessel will bring a new dimension to U.S. forces.

• National Defense Magazine (November 2005) – Navy’s High-Speed Vessel Aids Relief Effort.

• US Armed Forces Press Service (Oct 21/02) – “Joint Venture” Craft Cruises to the Future .