Defence`s Feeds

Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace has extended its helicopter maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) collaboration with Leonardo by opening a new transmission maintenance facility in Norway, the company announced on 31 October. The new MRO capability partnership has been agreed as part of a

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) announced on 1 November that it has been awarded a contract by the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) to build the first two of four ships of a new class of multirole frigate for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Although MHI did not disclose the value

US armoured vehicle manufacturer Oshkosh Corporation released the results of its 2018 financial year on 1 November, reporting a 65% rise in net income. At USD472 million, profits were USD186 million higher than in 2017, while annual revenue rose 13% year-on-year to USD7.7 billion. Oshkosh’s

US armoured vehicle manufacturer Oshkosh Corporation released the results of its 2018 financial year on 1 November, reporting a 65% rise in net income. At USD472 million, profits were USD186 million higher than in 2017, while annual revenue rose 13% year-on-year to USD7.7 billion. Oshkosh’s

Projekt System & Management GmbH (PSM), a joint venture company between Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall, has confirmed that it will not offer the Puma infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) as a contender to supply the Australian Army (AA) with up to 450 modern IFVs as part of Project Land 400

The Romanian government has signed an agreement with the US Army and transferred funding to the US government to purchase three more Patriot air and missile defence systems, Raytheon announced in a news release on 1 November. The additional units are being procured through the Foreign Military

Russia’s National Guard (Rosgvardiya) has received Ural-VV 6×6 mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles developed by the Ural Automotive Plant (Ural AZ), a Rosgvardiya source told Jane's . “The Ural-432009 [Ural-VV] has been adopted by Rosgvardiya, and the service has

Key Points Russia’s sole aircraft carrier was damaged on 30 October when the floating dock that was carrying it sank Russia has an acute shortage of floating docks large enough to accommodate its largest warships The 30 October sinking of the floating dock PD-50 in Roslyakovo has resulted

Key Points The Philippine Marine Corps has begun training on the Korean Amphibious Assault Vehicle ahead of an anticipated delivery Vehicles will further expand on the range of operations that can be conducted by the Philippine Navy’s strategic sealift vessels The Republic of Korea Marine

Turkey has begun work on its first long-range regional air and missile defence system, named Siper (bulwark or shield), Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on 31 October. The project involves the state-owned Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Board (Tübitak) Defence

Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar said on 1 November that Turkish and US troops had begun combined patrols around the northern Syrian city of Manbij. Meanwhile, the Turkish military shelled positions of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a US-allied force, further to the east in

I have a new article examining the impact of the Trident Juncture NATO exercise currently ongoing in Norway, published by the Kennedy School’s Russia Matters project.

This week, NATO forces are engaged in the largest military exercise the alliance has organized since the end of the Cold War and the first major Western exercise in decades to take place in the Arctic region. To be held in Norway through Nov. 23, the Trident Juncture exercise is designed to improve NATO’s ability to defend member states and to strengthen the alliance’s credibility as a deterrent force against potential aggression. While the scenario does not mention any particular adversaries, the exercise is clearly aimed at bolstering NATO defenses against Russia in the Nordic region. While the political impact will be minor by comparison to any potential permanent troop deployments, the military lessons gleaned by the exercise’s participants promise to be significant.

The exercise marks NATO’s third time holding the biennial Trident Juncture and differs from the previous two iterations in both size and focus. To begin with, it involves personnel from all 29 NATO members—a first—plus close partners Finland and Sweden. This in itself is significant: While the two Nordic states have regularly participated in NATO exercises in recent years and have invited NATO forces to take part in exercises on their soil, their participation in as large and politically prominent an Article 5 exercise as Trident Juncture highlights how far both have gone since their political decisions to enhance defense cooperation with NATO. The 2018 exercise is not only much bigger than the 2014 and 2016 iterations, which also focused on preparing NATO’s rapid reaction forces to counter Russian aggression, but differs significantly in its primary focus on field exercises instead of command post exercises.

There are 50,000 total participants, including 20,000 from the ground forces, 24,000 from naval and marine infantry forces, 3,000 from air forces, 1000 logistics specialists and 1300 command personnel.  The United States has provided the largest contingent, including the Harry Truman Carrier Strike Group, the Iwo Jima Marine Expeditionary Strike Group and over 18,000 troops. Preparations, including deployment of forces to the exercise area, began in August. The active phase of the field exercise began on Oct. 25 and will continue through Nov. 7, to be followed by a command post exercise in mid-November.

You can read the rest of the article here.

Americas

South Korea is equipping three of its guided missile destroyers with a new Aegis combat system. The foreign military sales contract between Lockheed Martin and South Korea is priced at $365.7 million. Lockheed Martin will provide the Republic of Korea Navy with development and integration of the weapon system in its Baseline K2 configuration. The Aegis Combat System manages all combat essential elements on Arleigh-Burke and Ticonderoga-class ships and ensures that the missile launching element, the computer programs, the radar and the displays are fully integrated to work together. The contract covers services such as combat system installation, including staging and integrated logistics support required for the installation; program management, system engineering and computer program development; ship integration and testing; technical manuals and planned maintenance system documentation. Work will be performed at multiple national and international locations, including Moorestown, New Jersey and Ulsan, South Korea. Work on all three vessels is expected to be completed by July 2026.

Boeing is being contracted to supply multiple US foreign military sales customers with anti-ship missiles. The $244.7 million not-to-exceed, firm-fixed-price contract enables the company to procure long lead material for the Harpoon full-rate production Lot 91. The Harpoon Block II is an over-the-horizon, anti-ship missile capable of performing land-strike and anti-ship missions. The missile leverages progress on several other weapons to reduce its cost. The Harpoon’s GPS/INS guidance system is taken from Boeing’s JDAM program, and its GPS antennae and software are found on Boeing’s SLAM. The missile’s 500 pound blast warhead can deliver lethal firepower against targets like coastal missile batteries and ships in port. Work will be performed at multiple locations including – but not limited to – St. Charles, Missouri, Galena, Kansas and Elkton, Maryland.

The Air Force is upgrading the refuelling system for its C-17 Globemaster III short field, heavy-lift transport jets. Bodell Construction will construct the refueling hydrants and ramp expansion at a cost of $20.3 million. A hydrant system is a loop of pipeline located under the aircraft parking ramp that delivers fuel straight from the hydrant fuel tanks to the aircraft. A mobile pantograph allows for continuous fuel delivery to aircraft within 135 feet of a hydrant pit. With the hydrant system about 420 gallons a minute can be transferred to the C-17, which reduces the overall refueling time by half, compared to the current truck refueling method. Work will be performed in Charlotte, North Carolina and is expected to be completed by December 2020.

Middle East & Africa

Israel’s defense industry can expect a major influx of Boeing investments. The aerospace giant signed a “reciprocal procurement” agreement on Tuesday, that calls for Boeing to collaborate with Israeli industry to the value of at least 35% of all government deals exceeding $1 million. As Israel is expecting to award Boeing with contracts totalling at $10 billion over the next decade, the agreement could possibly add $3.5 billion in new business to Israel’s economy. “A reciprocal purchase agreement on such a scale is a significant achievement which will lead to the growth of many companies in the domestic market, and to expand their activities and success in international markets,” said Economy Minister Eli Cohen. Boeing is currently competing for a number of Israeli defense procurement contracts, including new F-15 fighter aircraft, aerial tankers and a squadron of transport helicopters.

Europe

The German air force will soon test a new passive radar system in the country’s southern province of Bavaria. During the week-long test German electronics specialist Hensoldt will deploy three of its newly developed TwInvis systems in the Munich area and one roughly 70 miles west, near the city of Ulm. The TwInvis system uses the signal echoes of existing third-party transmitters to detect and track aircraft. According to the company the one radar unit can monitor up to 200 aircraft in 3D within a radius of 250 kilometers. Passive radars have the advantage that they cannot be located by the enemy and are very hard to jam, however to properly function the radars are dependent on a sufficiently strong commercial broadcast activity in the targeted area. The company first unveiled the TwInvis passive radar system at the Berlin Air Show in April, where it was rumored as a technology with the potential to detect stealthy aircraft like the F-35.

Asia-Pacific

India’s Coast Guard (ICG) is upgrading its fleet of maritime reconnaissance aircraft (MRA). The upcoming mid-life upgrade of the 17 licence-built Dornier Do-228s is expected to cost about $129 million. The aircraft will help the ICG to monitor the country’s 3,370 mile long coastline and over 77,000+ square miles of India’s Exclusive Economic Zone. According to the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) the aircraft will be fitted with “state-of-the-art technology” and Pollution Surveillance Systems. Primary contractor will be India’s state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) which acquired the production licence of Do-228s in 1986.

KBRwyle Technology Solutions is being contracted to support the US Army’s Prepositioned Stock Four (APS-4) located in South Korea. The $14.8 million contract modification covers the provision of logistics support services until November 2019. APS-4 is located in Japan and South Korea and supports the Pacific theatre with two armored battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion. The Army maintains a strategic inventory of sustainment supplies as part of Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS). These stocks sustain forward-deployed and initial follow-on ground forces, and include major end items such as engines, repair parts, medical supplies, packaged petroleum products, barrier/construction materials, operations rations, and clothing required to sustain combat operations. The APS-4 is located at Camp Caroll near Waegwan, about 132 miles southeast of Seoul.

Today’s Video

Watch: NATO stages biggest military exercise since end of Cold War

The assassination of Kandahar’s police chief and strongman of southern Afghanistan Abdul Razeq in Kandahar on 18 October, along with the province’s NDS chief, and more members of the provincial leadership wounded soon overshadowed the killing of parliamentary candidate Abdul Jabbar Qahraman in neighbouring Helmand by a bomb one day earlier. Qahraman means “hero”, a title he had earned as a militia leader under former president Najibullah. His siding with the Watan Party government did not make him everybody’s hero in Afghanistan and former mujahedin declined to honour Qahraman alongside Razeq. President Ashraf Ghani paid a visit to Qahraman’s family on 28 October 2018. An obituary by guest author Michael Semple*.

Abdul Jabbar Qahraman was a larger than life figure who was directly involved in many of the momentous developments of the past forty turbulent years in Afghanistan.  He died in action, in the sense that he was campaigning for the election in Helmand, when an unseen assassin detonated a bomb under his sofa. Jabbar became the tenth candidate to make the ultimate sacrifice for daring to stand for parliament.

Jabbar knew the risks. Indeed, one of the first things that he noted about the Taleban, when the movement emerged in 1994, was their decapitation strategy. He reckoned that the Taleban wanted to impose their authority by eliminating all prominent figures who did not submit to them – an echo of earlier strategies employed by the regime of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), later Fatherland (Watan) Party (1978-92) and the mujahedin who fought it, who both eliminated or exiled the old elites. Jabbar was killed not because he was a candidate, but because he was a famous candidate and, as they highlighted in their statement, a “prominent communist commander.”

Jabbar was the son of a shopkeeper, a member of the Nurzai tribe from Spin Boldak. The family owned some land in the district but Jabbar considered them poor and reckoned that none of relatives had ever held a prominent position. The start of Jabbar’s career is an example of the Afghan military’s old meritocracy. He studied to ninth class in the Ghazi Abdullah Khan Lycee in Kandahar. Then in 1976, during the rule of republican president Muhammad Daud, the national military commission talent-spotted him and had him shifted to Kabul to join the military high school.

Jabbar was still a boy, in the military high school, when revolution came to Afghanistan. Some of his friends concluded that this was a struggle between Islam and the infidels and so Jabbar ended up dropping out and heading to Quetta, to join Hezb-e Islami. Some of his batch mates, such as Zabet Jalal, went on to become famous Hezb commanders. Jabbar spent a year and a half doing organisational work for Hezb-e Islami, before having a change of heart. “My brain began to work” is how be put it. Jabbar later claimed that he concluded that Hezb-e Islami, backed by Pakistan, could not be trusted to stand up for the Afghan national interest. He also ran into tribal problems. The main Hezb commander in Quetta, Mullah Samad, was an Achakzai. There was a long rivalry between the Nurzais and Achakzais of Spin Boldak. “I decided that I must do what was best for my country which meant going back”, is how he put it.

When Jabbar crossed back to Kandahar, he relied on friends in the Ministry of Interior and the intelligence, KhAD, to ensure a good reception. Eventually, he was given a command in Khad, sent to Tashkent for a three month training course, and then deployed to Spin Boldak. From there, Jabbar’s career took off. He recruited a group of twenty-five men and then got transferred to Maiwand, where he built up another group and was so successful that he soon found himself commanding a militia battalion of five hundred men, that was uniformed, within the MoD command structures and deployable outside its home province but still known as militia. Eventually, around 1984, the Ministry of Defence spotted him and had him transferred out of KhAD. They realised that Jabbar had the potential to mobilise men and build up militias of the sort they required to hold the line against the mujahedin. Although he retained his base in Maiwand, Jabbar ended up in command of an independent brigade group in 1988, reporting directly to the Chief of Army Staff and with forces deployed in Kandahar, Helmand, Paktia, and protecting the Kandahar-Kabul highway. He was on first name terms with President Najibullah, Defence Minister Muhammad Rafi and the key figures of both the Parcham and Khalq factions of the government.

Jabbar proudly claimed to have made it from lieutenant to major-general in six years. But he stressed that he relied on his wits and networking skills to maintain security, rather than brute force. He reckoned that, during the battle for control of Kandahar and the highway during the 1990’s, the key to his success was the hospitality he offered in his guest room. At night, Jabbar sat with people, cultivating allies in the tribes and commander networks. The achievement he was most proud of was the relief of a beleaguered garrison in Panjwai. Hundreds of government soldiers died trying to break the siege. Jabbar eventually extricated the garrison with the help of mujahedin collaborators, without a shot fired. Jabbar became famous as a militia commander, on a par with General Dostum and was given the epithet Qahraman, or hero. But he always claimed that he barely fired a shot in anger.

Jabbar was in the thick of things in April 1992, that pivotal time when the failure of Benon Sevan’s UN transition plan led inexorably to Najibullah’s lynching and the squandering of one of Afghanistan’s best chances for peace. In the run up to Najibullah’s anticipated departure, Jabbar deployed troops on the outskirts of Kabul in Deh Sabz. He claimed that he was part of the plan by the government security chiefs to secure the way for Benon Sevan to bring the transitional government from Peshawar. But Dostum and Massud pre-empted the plan, taking over Mazar-e Sharif and then deploying troops to Kabul airport. This was a time when everyone had to pick a new side. Jabbar talked directly with Hekmatyar and threw in his lot with Hezb-e Islami again. Jabbar helped bring Hezb forces into the capital, to counter the northern militias. The stage was set for an Afghan civil war.

Jabbar’s 1992 alliance with Hekmatyar did not last long and he withdrew his men to Helmand. In one of the forgotten episodes of the conflict, Jabbar teamed up with fellow militia commanders Khano and Allah Nur – nominally linked to Jamiat-e Islami – to maintain security in central Helmand. For over a year after the collapse of the Najibullah government, the militias maintained the status quo in Lashkargah, Gereshk, Nad Ali and Nawa. They nominally affiliated with new president Rabbani, but focused on protecting Helmand from the chaos of feuding mujahedin commanders, as witnessed in neighbouring Kandahar and the capital. Eventually Jabbar concluded that their secular enclave was unsustainable. He persuaded General Dostum to organise a nocturnal aerial evacuation to northern Afghanistan, for the Helmand militia leaders. This marked what Jabbar considered the beginning of his “life of wandering”. He divided his time between stints in Quetta under the protection of veteran nationalist politician Mahmood Khan Achakzai, Mazar under protection of Dostum and Moscow, where he started an export-import business. Jabbar offered advice but was never again a major conflict actor.

After the collapse of the Taleban government, Jabbar returned to Afghanistan. His first initiative was a tuition centre in Lashkargah. As if trying to recreate the spirit of the Helmand republic of 1992-1993, the centre boasted a tranquil flower garden, and classes in advanced mathematics, computing, language and science.

But in spirit, Jabbar was still an inveterate political networker, who believed that the links he had cultivated during his time as a militia commander could help end the war. He was elected to the 2010 parliament, which sometimes looked like a reintegration programme for the commanders who faced each other across the frontlines in the 80’s and 90’s. Jabbar’s confidence, intelligence and occasional bombast guaranteed that he would get noticed in parliament. President Ghani was persuaded by Jabbar to appoint him as special representative for security in Helmand. The experience was both frustrating and educative, regarding the difference between Afghanistan of the 1990’s and Afghanistan after 2001. Jabbar found the administration in Helmand more factionalised and resistant to efforts at coordination than when, in the late 1980s, he and General Nur-ul-Haq Ulumi – then in similar role for southern Afghanistan for the PDPA/Watan regime as General Razeq until recently – had contended with Khalq-Parcham rivalries, while trying to co-opt the mujahedin and stabilise Kandahar. Even with the President’s backing, Jabbar could not stamp his authority on the different bits of the security apparatus in contemporary Helmand, and he stepped down from his position in Helmand. However, undaunted, he re-launched the defunct and officially banned Hezb-e Watan in July 2017 (AAN background here) and, when the 2018 parliamentary poll was called, was determined to stand for re-election.

Killing off famous Afghans like Jabbar Qahraman is one of the most sinister aspects of the current Taleban campaign. The assassinations hint at a broader authoritarian project of social control, which involves stripping society of its cultural and historical focal points. The Taleban keep their top leaders cloistered and often obscure the identity of their field commanders and officials. Scholars have documented the ambiguity of the relationship between the Taleban, the tribes and Afghan culture. The Taleban have their roots in the tribes and have repeatedly instrumentalised tribal networks. But the movement has also suppressed traditional tribal authority. The Taleban movement cultivates an image of anonymity and potency.

Jabbar the Hero in 2018 was not a military threat. Rather, Jabbar was someone everyone knew and who could mobilise Afghans through appeals to tribal bonds, or an heroic past or an envisioned future. He was an obstacle to the Taleban’s imposition of the hegemony of their anonymous cadres. He will not be the last Afghan to be killed for being famous. But there are many more Afghans who share his core optimism that the country will survive and emerge from this painful conflict

 

* Michael Semple is a Professor at the Senator George J Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, security and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast. He previously served as a Political Officer with the United Nations and Deputy to the European Union Special Representative in Afghanistan. Michael sought advice from Jabbar Qahraman during his work on reconciliation and interviewed him for an oral history project.

Chinese SH-11 Self-Propelled Howitzer

The standardisation of armaments has been a long-standing focus of EU efforts to enhance the Union’s military effectiveness, to improve capability development and to support the competitiveness of the European defence industry. Armaments standardisation is a process that can lead to cost savings for defence spending by injecting added-value in defence production processes and the avoidance of capability and equipment duplication. Standardisation is a method of improving interoperability within and between European armed forces and a process that can enhance the operational effectiveness of Europe’s militaries. Both the EU and NATO have taken measures over many years and decades to enhance armaments standardisation in Europe. Yet the nature of the contemporary global defence market is that many more technologies and components integrated into military systems are sourced and/or produced in the civilian sector. The line drawn between defence equipment and capabilities on the one hand, and civilian products and technologies on the other, is increasingly blurred. In this context, and in relation to recent developments on EU defence cooperation, this study analyses the standardisation approaches taken by the EU in relation to maritime information sharing and remotely piloted aircraft systems. It makes recommendations on how EU approaches to armaments standardisation can be expanded and enhanced.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

On 30 October, upon invitation by the Danish authorities, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq paid a visit to Denmark where he met with the Minister of Defence, Claus Hjort Frederiksen, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Industry, Business and Financial Affairs, Thomas Ditmer, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ulrik Vestergaars Knudsen, as well as other government officials and industry representatives.

The discussions centred on the interaction between Denmark and EDA. 

“I really appreciate Danish involvement in the Agency’s activities in areas such as Energy and Single European Sky. Though Denmark is not a member of EDA and while fully respecting its opt-out from the defence aspects of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, I strongly believe that a certain level of interaction in the Agency’s work directly related to wider EU policies and regulations, as well as activities that benefit from EU funding, can provide for mutual benefits", Mr Domecq commented.