European Union

Security guarantees, not concessions, top Ukraine allies’ agenda

The only effective deterrent is to create a credible threat that Moscow cannot beat, with much less wriggle room for would-be protectors to soften their commitment

Henrik Landerholm, who resigned in January over the scandal, left documents in an unlocked locker at a hotel in March 2023

Aux côtés de Jean-Luc Soulé, président fondateur du Festival, une équipe de bénévoles et de salariés, efficaces et passionnés, s'engage toute l'année pour porter et développer le Festival et ses activités artistiques ou solidaires. Cette mobilisation est soutenue par de fidèles mécènes et partenaires publics et privés depuis trente-cinq ans.
Le Festival du Périgord Noir tient à remercier chaleureusement tous ceux qui ont choisi de s'investir dans le quotidien du Festival et d'en soutenir (…)

- Agenda / France - Régions, Albanie

The 6-Member SEDE delegation mission to the United Kingdom organised in close co-operation with AFET and INTA, was a very timely visit following the announcement by the President of the European Commission and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to enhance strategic cooperation after their leaders’ meeting of 2 October 2024. The UK in particular has set out its ambition for an “enhanced EU-UK defence cooperation,” in light of Russia’s continuing war of aggression in Ukraine.
Location : London, United Kingdom
Press release
SEDE mission report including the programme
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Albanie, Grèce, Monténégro... Cet été, beaucoup de pays des Balkans connaissent des incendies particulièrement dévastateurs. La région est exposée aux conséquences du dérèglement climatique, tandis que les États sont démunis pour faire face à de telles catastrophes. Tour d'horizon avec nos correspondant.e.s.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, changement climatique, Albanie, Serbie, Environnement, Monténégro, Grèce

Le Premier ministre Edi Rama a fait fermer la chaîne de télévision News24 sans décision de justice. Un nouveau « caprice du prince » qui ravive toutes les inquiétudes pour la liberté de la presse et la survie de la démocratie en Albanie.

- Le fil de l'Info / Albanie, Courrier des Balkans, Médias indépendants, PS Albanie, Politique, Médias

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (tur. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) conducts an active and multidimensional foreign policy aimed at strengthening relations with all neighbouring regions. In the international sphere, the primary ambition of the authorities in Ankara is to transform Turkey into a regional power capable of influencing the political landscape in its immediate vicinity. The Western Balkans region, comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia, is a key area in the AKP’s political strategy, since Turkey has long maintained strong ties (both religious and cultural) with these countries. 

In accordance with principles of AKP foreign policy doctrine, the Turkish government seeks to promote multifaceted regional cooperation, thereby cultivating Turkey’s image as a country committed to ensuring security and stability in the Western Balkans. In addition to conventional diplomatic apparatus, an extensive public diplomacy structure is also entrusted with implementation of Turkey’s foreign policy objectives in the Western Balkans. Drawing on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, these institutions are involved in a range of initiatives at various levels (from intergovernmental to municipal), with the aim of facilitating Turkey’s soft power projection in the region. 

AKP foreign policy doctrine and the Western Balkans 

The Justice and Development Party, which originated from a moderate Islamist milieu, won an absolute majority in the 2002 parliamentary elections. Immediately after taking power, the party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continued negotiations on Turkey’s accession to the European Union, thus ensuring steady growth in public support. However, the religious foundations of the AKP political ideology soon became apparent, largely due to the influence of Ahmet Davutoğlu, the creator of the strategic depth concept. In line with his vision, adopted by the AKP as the new doctrine of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s goal was to achieve a dominant position in the international system by expanding the scope of its diplomatic activities to neighbouring regions (i.e. the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus) . 

In AKP political discourse, Turkey has been depicted as a state whose historical and geographical identity is inextricably linked with the Balkan Peninsula. Consequently, the Balkans became the region in which the Turks elected to initiate implementation of the strategic depth doctrine in the early 2000s. Several factors affected this choice, including efforts to strengthen Turkey’s image as a reliable partner of the European Union ahead of its expected accession to the EU. Another indication of Turkey’s constructive engagement in regional affairs was its endorsement of NATO expansion into the Western Balkans. Furthermore, comprehensive assistance (including financial support) provided by the Erdoğan government led to a rapid rapprochement between Turkey and most Balkan countries. However, soon it became evident that the AKP’s actions were driven by ideological motivations. For instance, a substantial proportion of Turkish funds, initially designated for infrastructure investments, was reallocated to renovation of Ottoman heritage sites. Local authorities widely viewed this as an attempt to preserve Turkey’s dominance in the Western Balkans. 

Having recognised limitations of foreign policy model based on historical sentiments,  in the mid-2010s the AKP government shifted its approach towards prioritising economic cooperation. This strategic realignment resulted in the establishment of free trade agreements with all Western Balkan countries. In order to maintain strong socio-cultural linkages between Turkey and the region, the Justice and Development Party has been increasingly relying on public diplomacy agencies tasked with promoting Turkish soft power in the Balkans. These organisations provide a wide range of services in the fields of education, administration, development and humanitarian aid, as well as renovation of historical heritage. Therefore, their activities are generally appreciated by local communities. However, the AKP’s frequent use of public diplomacy to achieve specific political goals raises legitimate concerns. 

Turkey’s public diplomacy activities in the region 

Among Turkish public diplomacy organisations currently operating in the Western Balkans, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) plays a key role. This institution has been present in the region since the late 1990s and has conducted a variety of initiatives there. In this regard, the Ottoman heritage restoration project has recently been identified as a high priority by the Turkish authorities. Each year, a substantial proportion of the agency’s total budget (approx. 30 million euro) is dedicated exclusively to the renovation of Ottoman monuments in the Western Balkans. As per published reports, from 2008 onwards TİKA undertook the restoration of more than hundred historical buildings in the region, approximately half of which were Ottoman mosques. Furthermore, numerous sites are currently undergoing reconstruction work, and some other renovation programmes are in the preparatory phase. According to official data, TİKA has completed over 4000 projects in the Western Balkans to date. In recent years, there has also been a significant increase in the organisation’s spending on improving economic relations with countries in the region, which is in line with the AKP’s updated foreign policy strategy. In addition to the pragmatic aspects of this particular engagement, trade and commercial initiatives allow Turkey to establish contacts on a larger scale with non-Muslim countries in the region (especially with Serbia). In this context, TİKA often acts as an intermediary, facilitating closer relations between Turks and their partners in the Western Balkans. 

Another Turkish governmental organisation involved in the Western Balkans is the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB). The institution was founded in 2010 and has since been directly affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In comparison to TİKA, the scope of its activities is much more narrow. The primary function of the YTB is to oversee various programmes dedicated to Turks residing abroad, as well as to representatives of so-called related communities (i.e. Turkic ethnic groups). The rationale behind establishment of the YTB was to unify all members of the Turkish diaspora around the AKP socio-political narrative. The government thus decided to create an institutional structure whose operation was to be predicated on shared historical memory and ethno-cultural affinities. The Western Balkans is one of the regions in which YTB operates most dynamically, organising cultural exchanges and educational programmes for students. According to data published by YTB, the institution’s involvement in the region has been steadily increasing year by year, especially in countries with a significant Turkish minority (Kosovo and North Macedonia). 

The Yunus Emre Institute (YEE) was created in 2009 under the auspices of the AKP government with the aim of promoting Turkish history, culture, art and language. YEE offers a comprehensive selection of activities, encompassing Turkish language courses, organisation of cultural events and art exhibitions, and provision of financial support for scientific research. Turkish cultural centres are currently located in 11 cities in all six Western Balkan countries, which demonstrates the crucial role of this region for the AKP. The activities of the Yunus Emre Institute in the Western Balkans can be categorised into two primary domains: education and culture. First of all, YEE is a leading institution for teaching Turkish as a foreign language. Serving as the main tool in promoting Turkish culture in the Western Balkans, the Yunus Emre Institute contributes to the steady growth in popularity of the Turkish language. As a result, in countries where the majority of the population is Muslim, Turkish is often chosen by students as their preferred foreign language. According to data published at the end of 2020, since the inauguration of the first cultural centre in Sarajevo in 2009, more than 20,000 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have completed Turkish language courses.  

One of the newest organisations of Turkey’s public diplomacy is the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMV). According to its founding charter, the institution’s mission is to enhance regional cooperation within the domain of education. As a transnational educational entity, the Turkish Maarif Foundation is responsible for organising thematic courses (from kindergarten to university level), awarding scholarships, managing educational institutions and dormitories, publishing scientific works, and performing various other tasks in accordance with the regulations of the host countries. The Turkish Maarif Foundation was established in 2016 to counter the influence of the Gülen Movement, which the AKP perceives as a threat to national interests. As demonstrated by official figures, currently TMV manages over twenty kindergartens, schools and universities across five Western Balkan countries (with the exception of Montenegro). It is important to note that the Turkish Maarif Foundation has recently become the subject of accusations for its propagation of AKP’s political agenda, whilst concurrently interfering in the domestic affairs of host countries. Therefore, the institution’s expansion in most countries in the region has been substantially restricted. 

Although the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB or Diyanet) is not a typical public diplomacy organisation, it nevertheless plays a pivotal role in promotion of Turkey’s soft power. The institution was founded in 1924 as a governmental body to oversee religious affairs on behalf of the republican state authorities. Following the AKP’s rise to power, Diyanet has become a central institution in the process of resurgence of Islam in Turkish public life. In addition to its primary religion-related duties, the institution collaborates with Turkish public diplomacy organisations and engages in a range of social and cultural projects. In this way, the Directorate’s activities are closely aligned with government policies. Consequently, the authorities in Ankara have gained another platform through which they can shape international public opinion. In recent years, the non-religious aspect of Diyanet’s operations has become a point of contention, particularly in the Western Balkans. Excessive involvement of DİB’s employees in promoting the AKP’s political narrative has been perceived as an attempt to subordinate the region by Turkey. For instance, some Bosnian members of Riyaset, the major Muslim organisation in the Balkans, publicly condemned the Directorate’s activities outside the religious sphere and accused it of promoting politicised Islam in the region. 

Conclusion 

Further growth of Turkey’s regional role, however, is contingent upon the advancement of the Western Balkan countries’ integration with the European Union. It is acknowledged that national governments perceive their potential accession to the EU as a primary objective. Nevertheless, they are not opposed to the prospect of cooperation with other external actors, especially in the absence of a comprehensive EU enlargement strategy. Turkey’s already established presence in the Western Balkans provides the country with a vital opportunity to leverage its influence. On the other hand, it is evident that perceptions of Turkey in the Western Balkans vary significantly between countries, largely attributable to the substantial differences in the historical experiences of individual nations. Generally speaking, Turks are viewed rather favourably in the Muslim-majority countries in the region, while in predominantly Christian countries, the views on Turkey are more mixed. Consequently, it is not possible to assert that the AKP foreign policy model has been wholly effective and successful, nor that the narrative disseminated by the AKP government and its institutions has been particularly appealing to any country in the Western Balkans. On reflection, it appears that the strategy of delivering a uniform message to neighbouring regions, as adopted by the AKP in the early 2000s, has considerably hampered the expansion potential of Turkish foreign policy. In promoting Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision, politicians of the ruling party frequently disregarded the interests and expectations of their partners. Hence, the ultimate failure of the strategic depth doctrine can be attributed to difficulties with correct understanding of local specifics and inconsistent actions in the international environment. 

In the context of exploring ways to improve the Turkish foreign policy strategy towards the Western Balkans, it is recommended that representatives of public diplomacy organisations devote more attention to inform the Western Balkan public about less controversial areas of Turkey’s involvement (e.g. labour activation, technology transfer, infrastructure development, support to the health sector). It is also of paramount importance to increase the level of transparency, for example by including comprehensive financial statements in annual reports. In addition, some experts have pointed to significant shortcomings in the public diplomacy model established by the AKP. These include inadequate coordination of activities, incompatibility between the scope of several programmes and the target groups, and subordination of some initiatives to the political interests of the ruling party. In light of the above mistakes, there is a high probability that the credibility of Turkish organisations involved in public diplomacy in the Western Balkans will be irreversibly damaged, which may have a detrimental effect on Turkey’s overall image in the region.

The post In the EU’s shadow: Turkish regional cooperation initiatives in the Western Balkans appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In a joint statement, lead MEPs stress that no peace in Ukraine can be negotiated without full participation of Ukraine’s democratically elected leadership and the backing of its people.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In a joint statement, lead MEPs stress that no peace in Ukraine can be negotiated without full participation of Ukraine’s democratically elected leadership and the backing of its people.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In a joint statement, lead MEPs stress that no peace in Ukraine can be negotiated without full participation of Ukraine’s democratically elected leadership and the backing of its people.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In a joint statement, lead MEPs stress that no peace in Ukraine can be negotiated without full participation of Ukraine’s democratically elected leadership and the backing of its people.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In a joint statement, lead MEPs stress that no peace in Ukraine can be negotiated without full participation of Ukraine’s democratically elected leadership and the backing of its people.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In a joint statement, lead MEPs stress that no peace in Ukraine can be negotiated without full participation of Ukraine’s democratically elected leadership and the backing of its people.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

OPINION on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan
Committee on Security and Defence
Thijs Reuten

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

New rules to better protect journalists, their sources and press freedom in the digital age apply in all EU countries as of 8 August 2025.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

New rules to better protect journalists, their sources and press freedom in the digital age apply in all EU countries as of 8 August 2025.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Les recettes collectées par la Haggadah de Sarajevo seront versées en soutien à la Palestine. Le Musée national de Bosnie-Herzégovine a provoqué une controverse : des voix s'élèvent pour fustiger une « politisation » du patrimoine juif.

- Le fil de l'Info / Destruction Juifs Balkans , Courrier des Balkans, Israël-Palestine , Bosnie-Herzégovine, Culture et éducation

By Laia Comerma (Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance)

When the European Union (EU) published its 2021 Trade Policy Review, a new buzz phrase took over policy and academia on EU trade policy: ‘open strategic autonomy’ (OSA). This was followed in 2023 by the Economic Security strategy, furthering a shift that brought Europe in line with the global trends towards the ‘geopoliticisation’ and ‘securitisation’ of trade and investment. This global trend has materialised with the spread of multiple trade defence instruments around the world, famously foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanisms. Since the Trade Policy Review, the EU has aimed to catch up and has enacted itself an array of new trade defence instruments to complement the traditional ones of anti-subsidies, anti-dumping and safeguards, that now take a key role to implement its economic security goals, as discussed in my newly published JCMS article.

The dragon in the room

These instruments – particularly the FDI screening regulation, the anti-coercion instrument, the international procurement instrument, the foreign subsidies regulation, and the 5G cybersecurity toolbox, amongst others like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism or the Trade Enforcement Regulation – have the aim of ensuring the EU’s economic security and resilience going forward, as well as its strategic autonomy, aiming to strike a new balance between security and competitiveness.

Several factors have been associated with the need for their enactment, among them the supply chain disruptions triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, and the protectionist policies adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations in the United States. Yet, in my article, I demonstrate that an analysis of the EU’s communicative strategy around those instruments, both at the political level (i.e. by EU institutions) and at the media level, indicates that these reforms are mainly associated with concerns about an assertive China. These findings are based on an software-powered text analysis of a dataset of 810 documents published between 2010 and April 2024 by the three main EU institutions – Council, Commission and Parliament –, and the five most influential outlets in Europe at least since 2020: Politico, The Economist, Financial Times, Reuters and Euractiv. The aim was to identify the main narratives used to justify the instruments and how they were linked to China.

This is not incompatible with their application being country-agnostic or horizontal. Yet, both EU institutions and the main pan-EU media outlets have employed a heterogeneous set of China-related narratives to legitimise these instruments, to shape a specific perception of China amongst the European public.

Indeed, China has been instrumentalised in both media and policy discourse, albeit in different ways by both these actors, as a means to justify the necessity and existence of these instruments. This instrumentalization of China has been more comprehensive, strategic and targeted than references to the United States or Russia, who are only mentioned in the context of great-power competition.

Overall, Chinese investment in Europe, especially in strategic sectors like 5G networks, has been framed by the three main EU institutions as a security threat, whilst trade with China in the areas of procurement and subsidies has been depicted as unfair, thereby justifying the introduction of instruments aimed at addressing these imbalances.

Interestingly, my JCMS article illustrates that the framing of China with respect to each of the instruments is targeted to adapt to the heterogeneity of the instruments and their purpose. Media, in particular, have promoted two distinct narratives regarding China: one portraying it as a threat in the context of investment, and another framing it as a source of unfairness in trade. This dual portrayal reinforces the perception of China as a competitor and political rival rather than an economic partner, fostering a vision of China as a ‘threatening other.’ This aligns with the broader trend towards the ‘securitisation’ of Chinese investment in Europe.

Moreover, since 2023, the analysis of the communicative discourse around these instruments by EU institutions shows that the TDIs have become increasingly integrated into broader strategic frameworks, moving beyond their original focus on ‘strategic autonomy’, and towards achieving broader geopolitical and economic security aims. This is coherent with the integration of those strategies with the EU’s trade policy across the board.

What might this mean going forward?

Is the Commission actually targeting China with those instruments? The short answer is that we don’t know yet. While these instruments have arguably been designed to be country-agnostic and thus apply to any country equally who violates the trade rules and standards that each of the instrument deals with, the truth is that China has been overly targeted and framed in the communicative discourse around the justification for the legitimacy and necessity of these instruments. We will need to pay attention, as the first investigations and screenings unfold, to the impact that this has on inward Chinese investment to the EU, even though much of this data is often confidential and the instruments will probably have a deterrence effect that can hardly be quantified.

Additionally, these findings raise the question of how these instruments, and the broader ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’ and Economic Security strategies will impact the EU’s identity as ‘Normative Power Europe’. This means how far the EU can continue employing selectively protectionist measures before its normative identity as a liberal, normative power is fundamentally challenged. While several scholars have argued that the EU continues to advocate for economic openness and positions itself as a defender of multilateralism, the use of unilateral trade instruments signals a significant shift towards a more assertive and less open trade policy.

Moving towards this new paradigm of selective openness and increased assertiveness to protect Europe’s interests, in this new world increasingly marked by tit-for-tat strategies and divide-and-rule tactics, the EU has, in effect, adopted more protectionist measures to prevent coercion and exploitation. This raises important questions about the EU’s evolving identity: Is the emergence of a ‘Geopolitical’ or ‘Geoeconomic Power Europe’ replacing ‘Normative Power Europe’? Or can the two coexist and potentially reinforce one another, rather than being in conflict?

Last but not least, a concern that became ever more relevant since the last European elections in June 2024, where Europe saw a sharp increase in extremist and populist forces in the European Parliament, the EU needs to acknowledge that there are concerns that the OSA instruments could be co-opted for purely protectionist purposes, or at the very least, that they might dangerously shift the EU’s focus from trade openness towards trade defence. This could lead to an increasingly bifurcated trade regime, with continued openness towards allies but heightened assertiveness and greater reliance on autonomous tools against perceived rivals.

In short, even though the current focus of the OSA instruments is to defend multilateralism and the Liberal International Order, they have broader systemic and normative implications that the European Commission still needs to wrap its head around. When it comes to China, it is clear that those instruments were aimed to address the multifaceted concerns that the EU has related to China’s international role and domestic economic policy. But as we move towards their implementation, we will see what the actual impact on an EU-China trade and investment relationship will be, as the last High Level Summit that took place in Beijing on the 24th of July demonstrated, is already fraught with misunderstanding and tensions.

 

Laia Comerma is a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance (BSoG-VUB) under the ERC project ‘Europe in US-China rivalry’ (SINATRA). She completed her PhD at the Pompeu Fabra University (UPF) and the Barcelona Institute for International Studies (IBEI). Her doctoral dissertation, “The politics of EU-China economic relations: Normative and regulatory disputes in the reconfiguration of global economic governance”, analyses the norms, rules and institutions structuring the foreign policy relation between China and the EU, and how they are being reformed due to their interaction in the fields of investment, trade, and development infrastructure. Her research fields of interest are foreign policy analysis, Chinese and EU foreign policy, and EU–China relations. She holds a MSc in International relations from the London School of Economics (LSE) and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from UPF-UAM-UC3M. 

 

The post China as a Catalyst of the European Union’s Trade Defence Instruments appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Next AFET committee meeting will be held on:

• Thursday 4 September, room SPAAK (1A2), Brussels

Meetings are webstreamed with the exception of agenda items held "in camera".

AFET - DROI calendar of meetings 2025
Meeting documents
Webstreaming
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP