European Union

Four interior ministry employees were arrested in in Moldova on Tuesday (4 June) in a vast operation to catch government officials sabotaging Interpol red notices.

In today’s edition of the Capitals, find out more about the Polish Left not backing von der Leyen if she allies with the ECR group, Sweden's prime minister having serious doubts about cooperation with ID, and so much more.

Romanian authorities carried out searches in several counties on Tuesday after identifying a new method of migrant trafficking that involves migrants entering Schengen countries via Romania, despite migrant trafficking being the main reason why Austria blocked Romania's access to Schengen last year.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg has found Bulgaria guilty of violating the right to freedom of expression of investigative journalist Rossen Bossev, who exposed a judge's bias.

France, Germany and Poland have become "permanent" targets for Russian disinformation attacks in the run-up to European Parliament elections this week, a senior EU official said Tuesday (4 June).

Following Peter Pellegrini's victory in the presidential elections, his resignation from the post of parliamentary speaker has put his former party, Hlas, in a difficult position, as both its coalition partners prefer to give the post to the SNS, despite the coalition agreement.

Czech populist party ANO (Renew) withdrew an election ad showing a boat full of migrants with a sign reading "Vote before it is too late", saying it could frighten some citizens. 

A Spanish judge on Tuesday summoned the wife of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/S&D), Begoña Gómez, to appear in court on 5 July as a 'person under investigation' for alleged corruption and influence peddling in the private sector, following an earlier complaint by a controversial civil servants' union linked to the far right.

The only way to make a difference for our common European future is by voting in these upcoming EU elections. Only by making our voices heard can we truly aspire for a better Union.

Members of Sweden's right-wing coalition are split over whether to cooperate with the far-right ID group after the European elections, as some have indicated serious interest in doing so, while Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson of the centre-right Moderate Party (EPP) dismissed such a move on Tuesday.

The leaders of Britain's two main political parties faced off in the first live TV debate of the general election campaign on Tuesday (4 June), a month before voters go to the polls and with predictions of a record win for the main opposition Labour party.

Poland’s co-governing Left Party (S&D) would find it hard to support a second term for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen if she decides to cooperate with conservatives in the hard-right ECR group, Left MEP Robert Biedroń told Euractiv Poland, adding that the Prime Minister Donald Tusk should also rule out such cooperation.

This paper outlines the main elements related to conditionality included in the Ukraine Plan, and compares it with the European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s approach to conditionality, in particular with respect to the group of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCS) that currently includes Ukraine.
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

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Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Mechthild Roos, you are Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Augsburg, in Germany. As an expert on the European Parliament, what are your expectations towards the forthcoming elections?

Well, the forecasts largely point to two major trends. First, a relatively high voter turnout, in comparison to previous European elections. And, second, a shift of votes and seats to the right. For me, as someone who looks at longer trends in the European Parliament’s institutional development, the perhaps most intriguing question is: will these shifts affect the Parliament’s established working routines and, maybe even more importantly, its self-understanding?

 

Can you explain in more detail?

Until now, the European Parliament has always understood itself as the voice of the people, as the main provider of democratic legitimacy in EU politics, but also as driver of ever-closer integration.

This is the main point I wonder about: will the shifting of seats and perhaps majorities to the right change this self-understanding? Will the Parliament adopt more of a member-state centred course – which, in effect, would imply a weakening of the Parliament itself, but which corresponds to the political aims declared by the bulk of the parties in the most right-wing groups? Or will these new MEPs – or at least some of them – be socialized into the institution’s raison d’être and find themselves defending a stronger European Parliament and the need for parliamentary involvement in EU politics at the EU (rather than national) level?

 

Do you think this is likely?

It is far from impossible! It is actually a typical pattern within the Parliament. Over its history, and throughout many changes of composition, the Parliament has seen MEPs entering with a rather Eurosceptic view, and then gradually coming to appreciate the Parliament’s strengthened involvement in EU politics, not least of course because that gives the MEPs themselves more political power.

In addition, those who are generally sceptical about European integration tend not to be very active in the Parliament. Those who are active, on the other hand, those who lead debates and negotiations with other EU institutions, who draft reports and carry the bulk of parliamentary work – are largely in favour of closer integration, and of a strong mandate for the Parliament.

 

And in what shape, if you look back at the last five years, do you think the European Parliament is going into its next term? Which of the numerous crises it had to handle, from Brexit to Ukraine and beyond, had the biggest impact on the institution itself?

In my point of view, the most influential crisis of all clearly was the COVID-19 pandemic. Because regardless of all the other crises’ broader implications, COVID-19 had by far the most profound impact on the Parliament’s own work. The combination of a dramatic urgency to act, a complete inexperience with a pandemic of this scale, and the institutional consequences of the lockdown, all of this put into question the established policy-making procedures at the EU level, and also within the European Parliament itself. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the 2019 elections had brought a significant turnover among MEPs: 58% of them were new to the job, and consequently had hardly any networks or knowledge of formal, but also informal working routines, which are particularly important in the European Parliament as an institution that has always been fighting for more power than it formally holds.

In the pandemic, Parliament managed to uphold a remarkable level of legislative activity. It has also pushed intensely for better and more democratically legitimised crisis governance mechanisms. Nevertheless, this period of extraordinary strain has left its marks on the European Parliament and its role in EU politics.

 

Do you think the pandemic has weakened the Parliament’s position?

Time will tell. We will most likely not exit this period of polycrisis anytime soon, so for me, the question is whether Parliament will manage to formalize its involvement in EU crisis governance, which we may safely expect to become something of a new normal, or whether it will have to fight continuously to keep its foot in the door.

Overall, I choose to be optimistic: if crises are indeed the new normal, then we will get normalized crisis governance routines sooner rather than later, if only for the sake of efficiency. And I hope that these new routines will include a strong dimension of parliamentary involvement and democratic oversight.

 

Thank you very much, Mechthild Roos, for sharing your expectations with us! I recall you are Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Augsburg, in Germany.

The post The Post-Pandemic Parliament appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research on euradio.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Jannik Jansen, you are Policy Fellow at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin, and together with your colleagues, you express serious doubts about the famous anti-green backlash among European voters. Tell us where this narrative comes from in the first place.

When Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took office in 2019, the European Parliament had just been elected amidst a wave of climate strikes, led by young people demanding more ambitious climate policies to secure their future. Five years and an ambitious European Green Deal later, climate policy debates are again central in the run-up to the European elections in June. However, the tone has shifted: instead of young people, it is farmers taking to the streets with their tractors to voice their frustration about environmental regulations.

Far-right parties have been quick in capitalizing on these protests, portraying climate policies as unfair and overly burdensome for citizens and farmers. Their narrative of a widespread backlash against green policies has gained traction. As a result, liberal and centre-right politicians have become increasingly hesitant to endorse Green Deal initiatives, calling for a pause or even a rollback of climate legislation.

 

But does this political U-turn truly reflect a general shift in public sentiment?

Good question. To explore this, we conducted a survey with 15,000 citizens in Germany, France, and Poland at the end of last year. Our findings challenge the notion of general climate fatigue.

Citizens in all three countries remain concerned about the negative effects of climate change on themselves and their families. For instance, 4 out of 5 respondents in France indicated that they were already negatively impacted by climate change or expect to be so in the next five to ten years.

These concerns translate into continued support for more ambitious climate action, with a majority of citizens in each country expressing this sentiment. Notably, this support spans beyond green and left-leaning party supporters, among liberal and conservative voters as well.

 

How much climate scepticism did you find in your survey?

There is a sizeable minority skeptical of more ambitious climate policies: roughly 30% of the population in Germany and Poland, slightly less in France. But despite the politicized debate, this group has not grown significantly compared to previous studies. Moreover, this group of “climate sceptics” is largely dominated by supporters of far-right parties, which increasingly treat climate debates as an ideological battleground.

Therefore, democratic parties should refrain from rushing into a “race to the bottom” in scaling back their climate ambitions. The tale of a broad anti-green backlash appears largely overstated; however, mainstream voters do have clear preferences for how the EU’s climate-policy mix should be shaped going forward.

 

What are these mainstream preferences?

Green industrial policies and public investments into infrastructure, such as electricity grids and railways, are amongst the most popular policies. Similarly, targeted regulatory measures such as green standards for the industry and the power sector enjoy broad support. In contrast, broad bans and CO2 pricing mechanisms are relatively unpopular, especially in areas such as transport and heating, where households would be directly affected by higher prices. This is particularly relevant, as the European Emissions Trading System is set to be extended to these areas in 2027.

Our findings underscore that to garner voter support for these necessary but unpopular policies, it will be essential to combine them with a more substantial redistribution of carbon-price revenues, providing some sort of compensation to all citizens while privileging those who are hit hardest. In general, it should be a key priority to reassure citizens that the costs and benefits of the green transition are equitably distributed.

 

What are your recommendations to the political parties?

It is clear that ideology and partisanship have a significant impact on people’s climate policy positions. If parties compete over the best recipes on how to fight climate change, explain trade-offs, and try to convince voters of necessary but unpopular steps, voters will take notice. However, if parties outbid each other over who scales back climate ambitions the most, they would not only misread where most voters stand on the issue but could inadvertently create the very climate fatigue they aim to address.

 

Thank you very much, Jannik Jansen, Policy Fellow at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin, for sharing your research on the perception of green policies by European voters.

The post Is there an anti-green backlash? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Citizens in the EU Member States will elect their representatives to the European Parliament during the European elections of 6 to 9 June. The newly elected Members, representing EU citizens until 2029, will meet in July to elect their President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors. They will decide on the composition of Parliament's standing and sub committees - thereby launching the new legislative term. The committees will then hold their first meetings to elect their respective Chairs and Vice-Chairs.
European Elections 2024 website
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by Dr Moritz Rehm, Prof. Dr. Martin Schröder, and Prof. Dr. Georg Wenzelburger (Saarland University)

The enduring romanticized notion that border regions serve as the quintessential embodiment of European identity has long captured our collective imagination. However, recent scholarly inquiry challenges this assumption, suggesting that the emotional attachment to Europe among individuals residing in border regions is not significantly different from those living inland.

Led by Professor Georg Wenzelburger, Martin Schröder, and post-doctoral researcher Moritz Rehm, our study recently published in JCMS delves into the prevalent belief that proximity to borders inherently fosters a stronger sense of European belonging. Contrary to popular belief and political claims, our findings, drawn from comprehensive data collected from over 25,000 individuals via Germany’s Socio-Economic Panel, reveal a surprising lack of disparity in attachment to Europe between residents of border and inland regions.

In scrutinizing potential explanations for this unexpected revelation, we explored various factors including education, income, duration of residency in border regions, and actual cross-border experiences such as commuting. While our study confirms the commonly held view that individuals with higher education, income levels, and international experience tend to exhibit greater attachment to Europe, it also shows that neither the educated nor the affluent, nor those with cross-border experiences, display heightened European attachment simply by residing in border regions compared to their counterparts in inland areas.

Rather than perpetuating an overly optimistic portrayal of border regions as natural hubs of European identity, our study urges a reevaluation of prevailing assumptions. While we do not outright dismiss the potential influence of border regions on European attachment, we propose a nuanced understanding. Border regions may indeed serve as focal points for European integration, intensifying the “experience of Europe” compared to inland regions. However, they may also be arenas of heightened conflict where national differences manifest more acutely, potentially leading to detachment from Europe among residents who directly witness the challenges of cross-national connections. Thus, border regions may simultaneously foster cooperation and conflict across borders, resulting in a net neutral effect on European attachment overall.

As policymakers continue to invest substantial resources in promoting cross-border cooperation, our study underscores the importance of adopting evidence-based approaches. Our data unequivocally indicates that border regions are not inherently foster greater European attachment. This insight is crucial for shaping informed policies that accurately reflect the dynamics of European identity formation.

Dr. Moritz Rehm is a postdoc at the Department of European Social Research at Saarland University. His research is focused on the political economy of European integration as well as on financial assistance in the European Union. He studied at the College of Europe in Bruges and holds a doctorate in political science from the University of Luxembourg.

 

Prof. Dr. Martin Schröder is professor of sociology at Saarland University, Germany. He did his doctorate at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne and studied at Sciences Po Paris. He was a postdoc at Harvard University and a Visiting Professor at Sciences Po Paris. He is currently in what explains a European identity.

 

Stt

Georg Wenzelburger is a political scientist and holds the Chair of Comparative European Politics at Saarland University. His research is centred on the comparative study of public policies with a focus on Western Europe. Recent work has focussed on the politics of law and order, welfare state reforms, digital politics and insecurity and has been published in academic journals such as the British Journal of Political Science, the European Journal of Political Research, the Journal of European Public Policy or West European Politics.

The post Debunking the Myth: Exploring the Role of Border Regions in European Identity Formation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This media advisory outlines the briefings and practical assistance available to journalists covering the 6-9 June European elections.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This media advisory outlines the briefings and practical assistance available to journalists covering the 6-9 June European elections.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP