Diplomacy & Crisis News

Two United Nations agencies have begun providing both seeds and food to nearly 50,000 hungry farming families in some areas of the conflict-torn Central African Republic (CAR) to ensure that they don’t eat seeds meant for planting.

An independent State Department watchdog revived Hillary Clinton’s e-mail headaches with a stinging criticism Wednesday of the Democratic front-runner’s use of a personal server for work messages -- arousing an issue her campaign has tried to dismiss as overblown.

Following the disappearance of three shareholders and two staff members from a bookstore in Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, Swedish diplomacy has unwillingly been drawn into the international spotlight. One of the missing bookseller’s, Gui Minhai, was given Swedish citizenship in 1996 after studying in Sweden in the 1980s. Despite Gui having requested in a video posted by China’s official media that Sweden did not intervene in the affair, the Swedish government could not ignore the incident because of diplomatic protocol.

The Swedish Foreign Ministry has also made clear that it does not accept China’s response to the situation. A consular official from the Swedish Embassy has voiced its government’s annoyance at having a request for contact with Gui turned down. The embassy has also repeatedly asked for clarification from China over the incident.

Ironically, Sweden is perceived as being one of China’s closest allies in the West. During the Cold War, Sweden was one of only a few countries that maintained a workable relationship with China; the positive tie between the two countries was probably one reasons why Gui went to Sweden to study. Although Sweden was once a European hegemonic power, it has adopted a policy of neutrality since its influence has declined.

In 1950, diplomatic relations between Sweden and China were officially established and ambassadors were exchanged. This marked Sweden as the first Western state to establish diplomatic relations with communist China. Sweden also supported the admission of China to the UN, and bilateral trading and economic relations between the two countries were built before those with any other Western country.

Today, Sweden is China’s biggest trading partner in Northern Europe, while in turn China is the biggest export market for Sweden. Recently, Sweden has strengthened its cooperation with China in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). As IKEA has become an international paradigm in terms of its contribution to CSR, it has also become the role model for China’s “Opening-up Policy” and “One Belt One Road” initiative.

Another characteristic of Swedish diplomacy is its “human rights diplomacy*.” As a member of the European Union and the home of the Nobel Prize, Sweden uses “the protection of human rights” as part of its “soft power diplomacy.” It has proactively criticized human rights violations by other countries, for example, the US’ bombing of Vietnam and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR. Sweden has also been the main fund provider for the UN Human Rights Council, Refugee Council and others.

As a consequence, Sweden is seen as an appropriate location for NGOs involved in international human rights and civil society to establish themselves. More recently, the EU has included “human rights” as an important value in promoting its own external relations, and in doing so, mirrors Sweden’s strategy of “human rights diplomacy”.

There are precedents for Sweden jeopardizing its economic interests in order to safeguard its “human rights diplomacy”. For example, in 2015, Saudi Arabia cancelled the opening address at an Arab League meeting in Cairo which was to have been given by the Swedish minister of foreign affairs; it was irritated because the speech contained comments about women’s and human rights. The minister in question had earlier criticized Saudi Arabia’s lashing and jailing of a blogger for “insulting Islam”.

When Saudi Arabia cancelled the speech, Sweden immediately terminating its defense-related trade agreement with the country, which included a USD500-million-worth contract for weapons. In response, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador in Sweden and criticized Sweden for interfering in its internal affairs. The tension between the two countries escalated. At the same time, the relationship between Europe and Saudi Arabia also deteriorated. However, certain EU member states, including Germany and the UK, have shown an unwillingness to go so far as sacrificing their economic interests to promote values. Sweden, on the other hand, has been able to uphold its value of human rights and earn the respect of human rights advocates.

The incident with Saudi Arabia has further links with Sweden’s foreign policy. On being appointed minister of foreign affairs, Margot Wallström announced she planned to pursue a feminist and human-rights foreign policy with an emphasis on equality. As such, Sweden recognizes Palestine as a nation and supports the state-building movement in Western Sahara, which is under pressure. Recently, Morocco (which controls the area) blocked the opening of the first IKEA store in the kingdom. A number of Swedish enterprises have since jointly urged the Swedish government to maintain an equable relationship with Saudi Arabia in order not to affect their business. This pressure has not triggered significant response domestically.

However, the Causeway Bay Bookstore saga present a different scenario as Sweden has to deal with a rising China. Beijing has posed a serious challenge to Sweden’s “human rights diplomacy.” If China provides Sweden with some room for maneuver, it is likely the issue can be solved in a restrained manner. But if it continues its present assertiveness without providing a way out for Sweden, it risks to jeopardize the long-advocated working relationship between China and Sweden.

*Human Rights Diplomacy: This recent model in Western diplomacy bears the official aim of “promoting and safeguarding human rights.” It is often used to adjust bilateral relations and economic policy in accordance with the level of human rights in the state concerned. Some states targeted in human rights diplomacy view it as a means for other nations to interfere in their internal affairs. They believe the situation in each country is different and the concept of Western human rights may not be applicable everywhere. In general, China opposes “human rights diplomacy.”

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Social media can do a lot of good for a brand’s image. It can be a place where an audience comes together to share their love of a brand, posting pictures and stories to engage with it.

It can also rip a brand to pieces: remember #AskSeaWorld. Sea World fell under public scrutiny for their treatment of orcas, due to the success of the film Blackfish. They invited the public to ask questions online using the hashtag #AskSeaWorld. Of course, they were hoping for real questions from concerned citizens.

But they forgot that they were opening up their Q&A to the world and disaster ensued. Rather than changing the conversation—their intended goal—they highlighted it and gave people a launchpad from which to collectively criticize Sea World. In fact, though the hashtag was first introduced more than a year ago, it is still in active use on Twitter today.

Another great (cautionary) example of trying to use a hashtag to reframe a narrative comes from the NYPD. During a particularly difficult time for their “brand” due to violence in the community, they invited the internet to come together and share nice stories about the NYPD using the hashtag #MyNYPD. What happened was as intense as it was predictable.

Israel—a country whose very mention can start fights on college campuses and at family dinners—decided that this was a model worth emulating. To celebrate Israeli Independence Day, Prime Minister Netanyahu hosted a Twitter conversation inviting people to ask him questions about Israel using the hashtag #AskNetanyahu. Unsurprisingly, chaos ensued.

Netanyahu tweeted from his personal handle @netanyahu and was also backed up by the more official channel @IsraeliPM. He responded to questions with text and short videos, both in English and in Hebrew. Some of the interactions were positive:

• He was asked if the dress was blue and white or black and gold. “The colors of the dress were clearly blue and white. Like my pen. Like my suit. Like our flag.”
• When asked if he was “human,” @IsraeliPM responded “01111001 01100101 01110011.”
• When asked if he would fire the person responsible for the hashtag, he responded, “Nope. Actually, I’m going to give… her a treat. You want to see her?” He then panned the camera down to show his very sweet dog sitting quietly at his side.

But of course, for every positive questioner, there were 1000 more looking to insult, provoke and ask truly difficult policy questions, ranging from Israel’s treatment of Holocaust survivors to their conflict with the Palestinians. If you search Twitter right now for the hashtag, here are the top images you will find:

Even though the Q&A component of the hashtag started—and ended—over a week ago, people are still using the hashtag to attack Netanyahu personally and Israeli policy towards the Palestinians in general. The campaign, rather than starting a positive conversation, instead served as an online space for critics. The movement was already there, and this campaign simply provided them with a gathering place.

The most retweeted instance of the hashtag, including any tweet sent by @Netanyahu or @IsraeliPM (save for the 01111001… tweet), was actually a bit of an ambush. Netanyahu received this question:

He saw the tweet, gauged that it was a real question from a real person (a journalist in fact!) and responded accordingly:

Hasan then responded:

Hasan’s response garnered over 500 retweets. What it did not garner: a response from Netanyahu. Therein lies one of the challenges of taking questions so publicly. A “real” or “fair” question can quickly turn into something the brand, organization, business or—in this case—world leader may not be prepared to answer. To me, this single interaction was more problematic for Netanyahu than any other component of the whole mess. He started a conversation that he was not prepared to finish. This made him look weak.

A town hall is a hard thing to manage. You never know what kind of questions you are going to get and once it starts, you are trapped. You cannot end it early because things are not going your way. Hosting a town hall on Twitter is like handing infinite microphones to an infinite crowd and then inviting them to pelt you with them as hard as they can.A quick search of keywords associated with the hashtag reveals the myriad hazards that overshadowed any potential political gain.

And yet it happened. And really, it’s still happening. While you probably won’t get an answer from him anytime soon, feel free to head over to Twitter and #AskNetanyahu any pressing questions you might have for him. You won’t be alone. Here is the current usage of #AskNetanyahu on Twitter.

Fun post script to the campaign: it even earned itself its very own parody handle! The fake @Ask_Netanyahu has over 3000 real followers. And it shares with its audience such nuggets as “I don’t believe in God, but God gave me the land,” “Had a long day reviewing records of newborns from Gaza’s Al-Shifa Hospital. I need to update my #KillList” and “I’ve initiated strategic long term planning consultations with George Zimmerman’s life coach.“

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

The post With #AskNetanyahu, Bibi Asks for Trouble appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Henri Ladyi works to demobilize children from militias in the DRC.

In 2003, Henri Ladyi turned his back on the endless fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) when he started working at a small peace group called Centre Résolution Conflits. Twelve years later he has been called “Africa’s Schindler” for his efforts towards peacebuilding in the eastern DRC.

The vast Democratic Republic of Congo has seen many decades of suffering before and after independence from Belgium in 1960. The colony was originally a private fiefdom of Belgium’s King Leopold II. But Belgium had to take it over in 1908 from the king’s International Association of the Congo (IAC) after a public outcry. This private company had, not unlike the militias that plague the east of Congo today, achieved Leopold’s quotas on exports like rubber through a regime of forced labour, mass executions, torture and mutilation.

Belgium administered the region as a colony, but did little to develop it or create a type of civic national identity of the sort which has kept the peace in multi-ethnic countries like the United States or Great Britain. When independence came the Congo’s new politicians unsurprisingly failed to build a functional central government or control the new ‘Armée Nationale Congolaise’ (ANC). General Joseph Mobutu, who had risen through the ranks of the ANC, eventually seized power. His regime became a Western-backed kleptocracy for the duration of the Cold War. Its three decade rule, and the manner of the Mobutu’s final fall in 1997, were almost as ruinous for the DRC as Leopold II.

When conflict reached his area in 1997, Henri Bora Ladyi was a young man in the Ituri area of the DRC’s north-eastern Orientale province. The invasion had started the year before, as Mobutu’s meddling in neighboring Rwanda finally caught up with him. A full-scale rebellion against his dictatorship had begun during 1996 in the eastern border provinces of North and South Kivu. In concert with the armies of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, rebel units swept westwards as Mobutu’s renamed Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) and his regime more or less dissolved.

For years the DRC’s state apparatus had been gradually ceasing to function in more and more parts of the country as the regime’s mixture of waste, incompetence and corruption undermined the formal economy. But the fall of the central government completed the country’s ruin. It set off a scramble by neighboring governments and their local allies to seize control of the DRC’s vast mineral wealth in an orgy of looting.

In the first 1996-1997 war Ituri was on the invasion path of the Ugandan army and its allies. But it also suffered from the same type of ethnic hatreds that had caused so much inter-Congolese violence, and left the fractured country prey to its neighbors. Under Mobutu, the north-eastern region had seen major outbreaks of violence between Ituri’s Lendu and Hema ethnic groups in 1972, 1985 and 1996. These earlier struggles revolved around the historically unequal land distribution between the two communities dating back to pre-Belgian times and favoring the Hema.

A politicized Mobutu-era land law passed in 1973 was also a recurring source of conflict. Under its provisions, people could purchase already-inhabited property, and then present title to the land in court two years later, by which time it became incontestable. The Lendu alleged the Hema elite used it to drive Lendus off valuable land, with the help of complicit Hema officials and forged documents. Certainly many Hema leaders thrived economically in the DRC’s chaotic economic conditions, and in the late 1990s some used their greater wealth and clout to further marginalize and exploit the Lendu.

Thus in 1998, when a second regional war began on the heels of the first, the Ituri area was still occupied by the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF). The UPDF wished to exploit Ituri’s resources of gold, diamonds, coltan, timber, and coffee. Human Rights Watch has chronicled how it used its control of the region to illegally export resources, especially gold, to international buyers. The money gained was then used to support local Hema warlords who helped in the Ugandan operation.

Elite Hema landowners, in their efforts to drive the Lendu off land they considered theirs, also called upon members of the Ugandan army to help them. Those Lendu not run off were often forced to work in the majority Ugandan-controlled mines under threat of violence. This state of affairs inevitably produced a negative reaction in response to the actions of Hema and Ugandan forces. The Lendu quickly formed their own militant groups to fight back and violence rose sharply by 1999.

Henri described the pressure put on him at the time to choose sides in vivid terms. When the Ugandans arrived in Ituri he was running a telecoms bureau in the provincial capital of Bunia, telling the BBC in Kinshasa what was happening in this eastern part of the Congo. Members of the local community would often come and use his satellite phone or other office equipment and he had a talent for making useful connections.

But the bureau itself also made him a target for Hema militants, who suspected him of passing on information about their operations to his Lendu compatriots. Henri was tortured several times by the militiamen, once having metal batons interwoven between his fingers and having his hands crushed. Even when he managed to talk his way out, his own people treated him as a potential traitor, shooting up his office and ransacking his home as warnings.

As events deteriorated his Lendu community demanded protection from its young men. Henri remembers members of his family joined Lendu militia groups and several of his relatives were killed in the violence. Political shifts meant Bunia changed hands several times, and at one point during the struggle Henri found himself press ganged into joining the ranks of the temporarily victorious Lendu militants in order to prove his loyalties.

He talked his way into job as a technician which kept him away from the frontlines, but by the spring of 2003 the tides of war had changed again. This time it was Hema fighters who were advancing on the city and they were looking for revenge. Even Henri could not talk his way out of this kind of trouble. Instead when Hema soldiers came searching to kill him, he had to flee into the bush with his young family.

Henri fled with 5,000 other refugees through the jungle towards the safety of Beni in neighboring North Kivu province. It was a week-long two hundred kilometers trek on foot and he was in an angry mood, with plans to buy weapons in the city and run them back to his brothers in Ituri to continue the struggle. But along the way an incident happened which was to change the course of Henri’s life.

At a village called Gety, militiamen held up the refugees, paranoid about traitors hidden inside their ranks. A massacre loomed over the mass of displaced people trapped there as the militants debated their fate amongst themselves. A natural leader, Henri asked to speak to their leader, despite being threatened with a machete to keep quiet. He knew already he was persuasive; unasked he took a dangerous gamble and negotiated with the militia commander for the refugees’ lives and freedom.

“As the eldest child there is no one do things for you.” Henri says with a laugh. “You learn to be the responsible one when you are very young.”

After a night of bargaining Henri got his way; the commander agreed to let the displaced civilians go. It was the start of a new direction in his life. When he arrived in Beni, instead of continuing with his plans to become a gun-runner, Henri got to hear of a church based peace group that was working with displaced people. The Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC) organization had also had to relocate twice because of the war, but was continuing to hold peace rallies and invite its congregations out to learn how they could promote peace in the region. Henri joined it, and by 2004 he had become risen to become the CRC’s director. Eleven years later and he has never looked back.

CRC’s work has lead Henri into all sorts of situations as it has developed down the years. The group retain a reputation as effective mediators, a mixed blessing in a dangerous part of a country filled with guns. In one case they were asked to negotiate between the UN and a rebel militant group holding a village hostage. The UN was threatening to storm the settlement, while the militants believed themselves possessed by spirits that made them immune to physical harm. Eventually the CRC were able to resolve the situation by negotiating safe passage for the fighters out of the village.

In another instance Henri was contacted by militia commanders with too many mouths to feed. Wishing to barter for supplies they offered to demobilize some of the child soldiers in their ranks in return for goats. A bizarre exchange rate of goats for children had to be worked out; undeterred Henri went into the bush to negotiate and a ratio of ten animals for 40 children was agreed. With the help of UK charity Peace Direct, one of CRC’s international partners, enough goats to free 100 child soldiers were sent.

As the CRC has persuaded fighters to demobilize, or let children and teenagers leave the bush to return home, its operations have had to change to cope. The CRC has faced the task of reintegrating these fighters into communities filled with their former victims and often it is no longer a just a case of overcoming interethnic hatreds. Over time many militia groups degenerated into fronts for banditry or just formed to terrorize their own areas into handing over food and other supplies.

Many ex-fighters, adults, children and youths, are psychologically scarred by the terrible things they have seen and done, and afraid of communal rejection as well as revenge attacks. Faced by a lack of support and economic alternatives in one of the world’s poorest countries, they can easily be seduced back into armed groups.

Still based in North Kivu, Henri and the CRC have piloted a number of projects designed to mitigate these problems as much as they can. As well as disarming ex-combatants and returning them home, they try to give each a skill that can make them employable. Special efforts are made to prepare communities for the return of ex-fighters, so they are not rejected out of hand. Child soldiers are returned to their families or placed with special trained foster parents and then returned to school or given a livelihood.

Similarly for women who have suffered rape or sexual assault at the hands of the various combatants, they provide trauma counseling and micro-finance to set up small businesses. The organization also run community radio stations in more than 70 places, supporting interactive clubs which broadcast discussions by the community members about local issues, including the dangers of joining militia groups.

It has been twelve years since the end of the formal end of the war that set Henri on this path and he recently celebrated another anniversary with CRC. Although his work may never quite end, the legacy as a peace-builder he leaves behind him will be a proud one.

This article first appeared in H Edition magazine and is re-published here with kind permission.

The post A New Direction: Henri’s Story appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension est issue de Politique étrangère (1/2016). Rémy Hémez propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de David Revault d’Allonnes, Les guerres du président (Paris, Seuil, 2015, 256 pages).

David Revault d’Allonnes, grand reporter au service politique du Monde, nous propose dans cet ouvrage une plongée au cœur des relations entre le président de la République et les forces armées. L’auteur analyse bien les ressorts de ce « président aux deux visages » : réticent à la confrontation avec ses partenaires et ses adversaires politiques, mais n’hésitant pas à faire la guerre.

François Hollande n’a pas de penchant naturel pour la chose militaire. Il a fait son service national par nécessité politique et a toujours montré peu d’intérêt pour les sujets de défense. De plus, au cours de sa campagne et au début de son mandat, il a exprimé des réticences quant à l’emploi de la force armée. Il était alors focalisé sur le retrait d’Afghanistan. L’auteur introduit d’ailleurs son propos en évoquant un entretien avec François Hollande au cours duquel ce dernier affirme ne pas vouloir céder à « la tentation de l’aventure extérieure », selon lui une échappatoire commode aux difficultés de la politique intérieure.

Pourtant, quelques semaines après cet échange, l’opération française au Mali – qui marque « l’entrée en guerre » de François Hollande – était lancée. En effet, la dégradation de la situation dans la boucle de Niger bouscule le calendrier diplomatique. Le 11 janvier 2013, jour de la décision de l’intervention au Mali, est ainsi une date pivot pour le président François Hollande : il prouve qu’il peut trancher. La communication gouvernementale saura mettre cet état d’esprit en valeur. Le président devient « chef de guerre ». En août 2013, François Hollande est proche de déclencher une nouvelle intervention militaire, cette fois en Syrie. Cette dernière ne sera pas lancée mais le président a une fois de plus fait preuve de détermination.

Tout au long de son ouvrage, David Revault d’Allonnes cherche à expliquer le changement d’attitude présidentiel vis-à-vis de l’action armée. En fait, François Hollande y trouve des satisfactions personnelles et politiques. Les « résultats immédiats » qui sont obtenus tranchent avec les délais nécessaires pour obtenir des effets en politique intérieure et l’administration de la défense est aux ordres. Mais ce volontarisme dans les affaires internationales et militaires est aussi le reflet des institutions de la Ve République : tous les présidents avant lui y ont trouvé un terrain de liberté.

David Revault d’Allonnes dresse aussi le portrait de l’entourage du président dans le domaine de la défense, de ceux qu’il nomme « les faucons du président » : Jean-Yves Le Drian, le général Puga et Cédric Lewandowski. L’auteur décrit très bien l’équilibre délicat entre ces fortes personnalités ainsi que leurs relations avec les Armées et le ministère des Affaires étrangères.

Dans la dernière partie du livre, l’auteur revient sur la lutte contre le terrorisme. Les trois jours sanglants de janvier 2015 marquent, selon lui, la fin d’un processus de « présidentialisation » de François Hollande qui avait débuté avec la guerre au Mali. S’ensuit, une nouvelle fois, l’emploi de la force armée avec le déploiement de 10 000 militaires sur le territoire national.

Très agréable à lire, fruit d’un excellent travail de journalisme, cet ouvrage est une véritable plongée dans les arcanes du pouvoir et nous éclaire quant aux mécanismes politiques régissant l’emploi de la force armée. On peut seulement regretter que les ressorts de l’intervention en Centrafrique ne soient pas plus décryptés et que la voix des militaires ne soit pas plus présente.

Rémy Hémez

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

Expressing concern about possible imminent executions in Gaza, the United Nations human rights office today urged the authorities in Gaza to uphold their obligations to respect the rights to life and to a fair trial and not carry out death penalty.

The United Nations human rights office today urged the Government of Iraq to immediately conduct an independent, transparent and effective investigation into the use of force by security forces against protestors outside the Green Zone in Baghdad this past week.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the holding of municipal elections in Lebanon, which are expected to conclude on 29 May, urging all Lebanese leaders to act responsibly to elect the country’s President, a post vacant for two years, without a further delay, his spokesperson said today in a statement.

The Security Council today stressed the importance of strengthening the existing cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union (AU), a regional organization described by a senior UN official as “the most important peacekeeping partner.”

The United Nations Independent Investigation in Burundi, which was set up to investigate human rights violations in the country since April 2015, said today it has completed the deployment of a team of human rights monitors on the ground.

The United Nations human rights expert on racism today urged the Government of Argentina to take urgent measures to sustainably address the invisibility, marginalization and systematic exclusion of indigenous peoples in the country.

Caían casi las 6 de la tarde cuando llegamos a la casa de una importante lideresa local en un lugar remoto del departamento de Guaviare. Nos sentamos a hablar de la paz, el posconflicto y lo que es para ella la realidad de estos asuntos; ella fue muy clara. “Aquí estamos en contra del proceso de paz. Se va la guerrilla y llegan (otros) a robar y matar”. Sigue, “Es que hemos sido muy maltratados por el Estado”. En otra parte, en Putumayo, algunos líderes han expresado lo mismo, que sin la guerrilla no solo habrá problemas de robo y violencia, sino que llegarán el Estado y las Fuerzas Militares, lo cual les da miedo. Aunque estas opiniones son de una minoría – pues hay otros que sí quieren ver la salida del FARC, - es una minoría que puede tener mayores efectos en la paz territorial.

About two months before the NATO Summit in Warsaw, many wonder what the new strategy of the alliance in relation to Russia will look like.

Speaking at GLOBSEC 2016, a security conference in Bratislava held in mid-April, Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski emphasized that Poland expected “presence, presence, presence” of NATO troops and bases on the Eastern flank. Other Allies, including the United States and Germany, do not deem it necessary to build new NATO infrastructure. As Jim Townsend, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy, put it, “we support an enhanced presence, but we can do it without bases, bases, bases.” The current debate thus centers on the question how heavy the new NATO footprint on the Eastern flank should be.

Yet, while arguing about the differences between a persistent or permanent presence or what German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen called a “permanent rotational presence,” the Allies risk losing sight of the bigger strategic picture. The best outcome of the Warsaw Summit would be a clearly articulated common position of the Alliance that is well understood both by Russia and at home.

NATO can build on its previous efforts here. After all, reports on the disagreements among the Allies obscure the fact that NATO has been remarkably united in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s continued interference in Ukraine.

On the one hand, the Alliance has embarked on the “biggest strengthening of our collective defense in decades”, as Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg underlined at the Munich Security Conference in 2016. In addition to the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and an increase in exercises as decided at the Wales Summit in 2014, the Allies have agreed to strengthen NATO’s forward presence on the eastern flank. Even member states such as Germany, often criticized as overly reluctant, have demonstrated their clear commitment to a renewed emphasis on collective defense.

On the other hand, NATO members have recently tried to reinvigorate the NATO-Russia Council and underlined that they are open to dialogue with Moscow. All members, including those long accused of blocking engagement with Russia, have finally supported this decision. NATO member states should strengthen both aspects of this renewed dual-track policy—responding to the security needs of its most exposed members, while at the same time advocating dialogue and heightened transparency to diffuse tension in their relations with Russia.

The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, only a more visible presence will make a renewed emphasis on dialogue meaningful, signaling to Russia that NATO will not be intimidated by Moscow. And only a clear commitment to dialogue will allow all Allies to back a stronger defensive posture.

First, demonstrating that attacking one of NATO’s frontline states means an assault on all of NATO requires a multinational presence that goes significantly beyond the decisions taken at the Wales Summit. The Russian government needs to understand that it will not reach its goals by threatening its neighbors and testing NATO’s resolve. Although U.S. efforts to support the Eastern flank are crucial, it would be advisable to integrate it as much as possible under a NATO umbrella. This would not only signal the united stance of NATO, but would also be seen as less threatening by Moscow.

Moreover, the respective host countries should be supported in strengthening their own armed forces. While it makes sense that other Allies police the Baltic air space, they can expect the member states that feel particularly threatened to invest more in their own defensive capabilities, including necessary infrastructure such as airfields that multinational reinforcements would require. Among the Allies on the Eastern flank, only Estonia and Poland fulfill the NATO commitment to spend two percent of their GDP on defense.

Second, a more visible NATO presence necessitates new diplomatic efforts. Although the Alliance sees its moves as entirely defensive, Moscow will still read them as offensive and use them as a pretext for its own “counter measures” that in reality have often been long in the making. NATO should continue to propose new transparency mechanisms. It should also avoid being seen as the party rejecting dialogue, thus serving as an easy target for Russian propaganda. Even if it will not bring immediate results the reinvigoration of the NATO-Russia Council was thus an important message in itself.

NATO must also get better at getting its message across. Above all, this means that national leaders have to be more vocal and stress the differences between Russian and NATO policies. All information fact-sheets published by the NATO bureaucracy will not suffice if national politicians do not actively make the case for the new posture. In some member states, governments try to avoid a public debate on the revamped efforts, portraying them as minor adaptations.

This allows for misinformation and misinterpretations. Media reports sometimes claim that the NATO-Russia Founding Act generally rules out the stationing of troops in NATO’s “new” member states although the wording tells a different story. Few even mention that NATO publishes all its exercises on its website and invites Russian observers.

Russia, in contrast, regularly surprises NATO with snap exercises and ignores proposals to heighten transparency although numerous close encounters between the Russian military and Western military units or even civilian airliners have highlighted the danger of escalation. And while NATO members discuss the deployment of a few battalions, Russia has already announced that three new divisions will be created in its Western military district. For every NATO soldier on the Eastern flank, there will be roughly five to ten new Russian troops. This is hardly an escalation by NATO.

By avoiding public debate to explain and defend NATO’s new posture, national leaders endanger the long-term stability of the Alliance. Some opinion polls already show that the public support for the collective defense commitment is fragile. This is dangerous because deterrence only works if it is credible. But domestic support for deterrence will only be secured if the Alliance convincingly demonstrates that it is not interested in confrontation. It thus needs to offer dialogue, propose additional arms control steps, and think about a long-term perspective for NATO-Russia relations.

In the end, the question of what exactly the enhanced presence of NATO on the Eastern flank will look like is of secondary importance. What will matter most is whether the outcome will send a signal of unity and resolve, supported across the Alliance. In order to achieve this NATO needs both deterrence and dialogue. Both pillars of the renewed dual-track approach should be strengthened in Warsaw.

Tobias Bunde is Head of Policy and Analysis at the Munich Security Conference and Research Associate with the Center for International Security Policy at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.

This article was originally published by EastWest Institute Policy Innovation Blog

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The impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff will become a precedent setting case in the historic and legal tradition of Brazil’s democracy. Whatever side Brazilians are on regarding president Rousseff’s six month suspension and possible permanent impeachment, a response was to the crisis was necessary. After so much popular demand for change and a severe corruption scandal facing Rousseff’s party—the Worker’s Party or PT—some action had to be taken.

As of now, it is unclear whether or not Rousseff will survive the Senate trial. The accusations against her that lead to the suspension are not directly tied to the corruption scandal plaguing the PT. President Rousseff has been accused of boosting her own economic policy record by using funds from state banks to cover budget shortfalls, which may have violated fiscal responsibility laws in Brazil. Although extremely worrisome, these practices are not linked to the corruption scandal which lead to the revelations that PT party members were taking bribes from large Brazilian companies.

Indeed, the end result of her trial may result in the reversal of her impeachment as the focus of the corruption scandal was not on her personal actions, but that of PT party members. Nevertheless, the scandals have left a indelible stain on her party’s image that will remain after the Senate trial.

There are strong precedents to it. In the British parliamentary democracy system, it is a customary tradition that a minister in charge of a department affected by a scandal should step down from his or her position, even if the minister was not aware of or linked to the scandal personally. There are two reasons for this custom: to maintain accountability of a department by the top decision makers so that the public ultimately benefits, and to ensure the legitimacy of the government and their party in the future application of policy making and governing.

President Rousseff may survive the impeachment trial as the case against her is not as solid as many of the accusations rallied against her fellow party members. But the governing party will no longer be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the Brazilian public. Rousseff’s possible success in the Senate trial will only prolong the inevitable: a loss in the next presidential elections and the implosion of the PT.

Claims that the constitutional process leading to her impeachment is tantamount to a coup, or that horrific results will come from an opposition government, or that the interim president will perpetuate Brazil’s dysfunctional political system abound . All parties should accept that if a government is not seen as legitimate by Brazilians, an immediate election should be called in. It is what a healthy democracy should demand and a positive end result of their constitutional process.

The post Challenging Brazil’s Democratic System May Make It Stronger appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

An opposition supporter holds up a giant hundred Bolivares note with the word, “Hungry” written on it during a gathering to protest against the government of President Maduro, and economic insecurity and shortages, in Caracas. (REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins)

By Matthew Barbari

Problems for Venezuela and its president Nicolas Maduro continue to mount as the country heads inexorably towards its collapse. An economic system centered around oil exports revenues, a government that can no longer provide public services such as electricity or medical care, and growing civil unrest and violence have led Venezuelans to look for an alternative to Chavismo.

Under Hugo Chavez—Maduro’s predecessor—the Venezuelan economy boomed due to the high price of oil, with barrels selling for well over $100. With crude oil accounting for 96% of the country’s exports, Chavez’s political movement relied on heavy spending on social welfare programs.

However, the government failed to improve the oil production process, leading to a lower than average export price. With the price of a barrel produced in Venezuela dropping to around $20 in February, the entire economy dropped with it. This collapse in oil prices has compounded with an incredibly high inflation rate causing supply shortages in most basic necessities.

The economic troubles have permeated through all aspects of life of Venezuelans. Massive food shortages, lack of proper medical care and constant power shortages are pushing the country close to a humanitarian crisis and are enraging even the most loyal of government supporters.

While Hugo Chavez was sufficiently charismatic to maintain public support during previous economic struggles, President Maduro is not. Increasingly fearing popular outbursts against the government and in a desperate attempt to control the crisis, he has recently declared a nationwide state of emergency.

The growing unrest has been building for some time and has led opposition parties to gain more seats in the National Assembly. There is also growing support for a recall election and a referendum to impeach President Maduro. However, the opposition is not organized in a cohesive unit against the Maduro government.

The situation has now deteriorated to the point where there is concern regarding “plausible scenarios” where Maduro’s own party or a military coup would force him out of office—triggering further civilian uprising and possibly the outbreak of a civil war.

Even though there have been gradual increases in oil prices over the past months, Venezuela has had to slow down production due to rampant power outages, failing to take full advantage of the market’s improvement. No matter the outcome of the referendum, Venezuela is heading towards bankruptcy and chaos. Hugo Chavez’s dream is turning into a nightmare for the Venezuelan people.

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