Diplomacy & Crisis News

/ Armée, Armement, Commerce des armes, Commerce international, Économie, Géopolitique, Industrie de l'armement, Relations internationales, Armes chimiques et biologiques - Armées / Armée, Armement, Commerce des armes, Commerce international, Économie, Géopolitique, Industrie de l'armement, Relations internationales, Armes chimiques et biologiques - Armées

Written by Loïc Burton

The Kurds are often hailed as the West’s most reliable partner in the fight against the Islamic State. From its victories in the border town of Kobani in Syria and in Sinjar in northern Iraq, the Kurds have taken advantage of the chaos in the region to get closer to achieving their dream of statehood.

On March 17, after the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—under the umbrella of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)—managed a streak of military victories, Kurdish leadership declared a federal region across much of northern Syria called Rojava. This in an attempt to formalize the semiautonomous zone controlled by Kurdish forces after five years of war, while falling short of complete independence from Damascus.

As a key ally in the coalition against ISIS, Syrian Kurds are in a much stronger position to bargain for their political autonomy. However this is anathema to both the Syrian and Turkish governments. The former—reinvigorated thanks to the Russian intervention—now believes that it could regain control over all of the country while the latter fears that increased Kurdish self-governance might increase tensions with its own Kurdish restive minority.

In Iraq, Masoud Barzani, president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, has announced his intentions of holding a referendum on independence by the end of the year—a first step toward achieving full-fledged statehood. However, some believe the referendum will be used to distract the population from more pressing problems such as the region’s flailing economy.

In February 2014, as a result of a dispute with Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was cut off from its share of the federal budget. In June, with the emergence of ISIS, security spending skyrocketed while an influx of 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons added pressure to its infrastructure and service delivery. The final blow occurred in mid-2014 with the global drop in oil prices hitting the region particularly hard—oil revenues account for as much as 80–90% of the KRG’s budget.

In addition to these recent developments, the KRG struggles with perennial issues. In a population of 5.2 million, 1.4 million are on the government payroll Moreover the practice of “ghost-employees”—arms of the government claim more staff than they actually have to inflate their budgets—is widespread. All these factors combined create an unsustainable economic situation and threaten to stall the momentum gained against ISIS: security services are currently only paid every four months.

Looking beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq, Turkey is the most concerned about the Kurds for the reasons aforementioned. As its fight against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party—to which the PYD has close ties—in Turkey’s southeast intensifies, Ankara has bombed Kurdish fighters in Syria and allegedly tacitly helped ISIS to prevent Syrian Kurds from forming a contiguous entity along its southern border.

Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter jet in November 2015 has put Ankara and Moscow at odds with each other. Since then, Russia has been much more inclined to support Syrian Kurds and the PYD, allowing the Rojava administration to establish its first overseas representative office in Moscow in February 2016.

Finally, the U.S. relation with the Kurds is complex: although the Kurds are reliable allies, Kurdish aspirations for autonomy complicate America’s strategic interests. Indeed, in addition to the risk of seeing the fragmentation of Iraq, American support for Syrian Kurds has increased tensions between the U.S. and Turkey—which allows the U.S. to use its military bases to conduct operations in the region.

Kurds are independent political actors whose interests are not always aligned with Washington. The coming months are essential for the future of their polity and the region as a whole.

Recommended Readings

Anne Barnard, “Syrian Kurds Hope to Establish a Federal Region in the Country’s North,” The New York Times (Mar. 16, 2016).

Zach Beauchamp, “America’s Kurdish problem: today’s allies against ISIS are tomorrow’s headache,” Vox (Apr. 8, 2016).

“Why Iraqi Kurdistan Is Struggling to Pay Its Bills,” Stratfor (Jan. 28, 2016).

The post The Future of Kurdistan: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A protester demonstrating against Taiwanese conglomerate Formosa during a rally in downtown Hanoi on May 1, 2016. (HOANG DINH NAM/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)

Last week, Rupert Colville, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR), called on the Vietnamese leadership to respect the right of freedom of assembly, after security officials stifled city-wide protests over an environmental disaster engulfing the country.

In a press briefing note released by UNCHR on May 13, the agency said it is “concerned about the increasing levels of violence perpetrated against Vietnamese protesters expressing their anger over the mysterious mass deaths of fish along the country’s central coast.”  

In recent weeks, Vietnamese citizens have rallied in the cities of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Nha Trang, Vung Tau and Da Nang over reports that at least 100 tons of fish have died along a 200-kilometer stretch of coastland in central Vietnam since April.  Many of the protesters are angry over the slow response of the new leadership to pin the blame on a unit of Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics, which operates a $10.6 billion coastal steel plant in Ha Tinh province.

Vietnamese fishermen, whose income has been severely depleted by the pollution, led authorities to an illegal pipeline thought to be responsible for the poisoning of the fish, which was traced to the steel plant.  Formosa management claims to have safely treated the discharge, and initial government findings sought to deflect the blame from Formosa to a red tide caused by an algae bloom.  Newly-elected Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc has promised a thorough investigation, vowing “We will not shield anyone found causing the pollution.”

Yet Vietnamese citizens are losing their patience, and the urge to demonstrate has been building momentum, alarming authorities. Vietnamese security apparatus allowed the first two protests on consecutive Sundays to attract hundreds of demonstrators.

Security officials cracked down on demonstrators the second week, however, using tear gas was used to disperse the crowd, and reportedly beating around  300 people and arresting others, according to the UNCHR report.  Videos and pictures circulating on Facebook also showed punches thrown and protesters being dragged off into buses.

In response to reports of demonstrators being beaten and arrested, the UNCHR issued the following statement: “We call on the Government of Viet Nam to respect the right to freedom of assembly in line with its international human rights obligations.”  This statement drew a harsh response from the permanent Vietnamese representative to the UNCHR,  Ambassador Nguyen Trung Thanh, who called the statement “inaccurate, unobjective and unverified.”  

While Article 25 of the 2013 Vietnamese Constitution ensures freedom of assembly and speech for its citizens, stating “The citizen shall enjoy the right to freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, to access to information, to assemble, form associations and hold demonstrations,”  Ambassador Thanh noted that freedom of assembly must be exercised without detriment to public order “to ensure traffic order, security and safety for the people, especially the elderly, women and children.”

This past Sunday, Vietnam’s state television, and several other major state-run channels, warned potential demonstrators to ignore calls by “reactionary forces” who intend to disrupt public order, saying “their intention to abuse and disturb was revealed when many subjects called for using knives and petrol bombs to attack the functional forces and to overthrow the authorities.”   

Authorities were also quick to blame the demonstrations on an anti-government plot by a terrorist organization named ‘Viet Tan’ (Vietnam Reform). Viet Tan’s website claims it “engages in actions that empower the Vietnamese people”, with its mission to “overcome dictatorship, build the foundation for a sustainable democracy, and demand justice and human rights for the Vietnamese.”

While it is arguable whether the safety and security of the people were endangered by the demonstrations (or by Viet Tan), the state television broadcast, a shutdown of Facebook, and a heavy security presence in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City were enough to quell any significant gathering of protesters on the third Sunday of protest.  No more than 100 protesters gathered in Ho Chi Minh City, most of whom were quickly dispersed or detained.  

U.S. President Barack Obama was originally scheduled to arrive in Vietnam on May 22, a Sunday in which protests could flare again, and also the day in which Vietnam holds its election of the nation’s lawmaking National Assembly.  His trip has now been moved to the 23rd, and although his itinerary is still under discussion, events on the ground in recent weeks may give the issue of human rights more prominence.  

The post UN Calls on Vietnam to Respect Freedom of Assembly appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

L'essor des monnaies numériques comme le bitcoin excite la convoitise de Wall Street. Pourtant, ces monnaies électroniques furent conçues pour court-circuiter les banques. En croisant les aspirations de ceux qui contestent le pouvoir de la finance, elles auraient pu donner une nouvelle jeunesse (...) / Banque, Capitalisme, Économie, Finance, Histoire, Idées, Internet, Monnaie, Mutation, Technologie, Crise financière - 2016/03

The Kurdish regions of Syria and Iraq are linked by a thin and fragile thread, a two-lane highway that passes camps filled with refugees from the wars ravaging these lands. The road is bisected by the Tigris, the international frontier that separates not only Syria from Iraq but also Kurds from Kurds. This was the border that first took shape one hundred years ago this week with the Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France—the first of a series of negotiations aimed at dividing the former Ottoman territories of the Levant between the two European powers. And while ISIS has made its hostility to the Anglo-French map well known, it is arguably the Kurds who have been most affected by the modern state system that has emerged from it.

(Own report) - Despite its involvement in violent activities, Berlin is intensifying its cooperation with the Crimean Tartars' Mejlis. Just recently, Mejlis Chairman Refat Chubarov visited Germany's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for political consultations. The talks were obviously not hampered by the fact that last September, Chubarov had announced a blockade of Ukrainian trade with Crimea and that in October, he had explicitly praised the blockade's grave consequences on the Crimean population - the shortages and significant price increases for staple foods. The German foreign ministry does not feel compelled to distance itself from the Mejlis, even after their activists blew up electric pylons causing extensive interruptions in the electrical supply to Crimea. German ethnicist organizations had established good relations with Chubarov and his predecessor Mustafa Jemilev, already years ago, intensifying these since 2010 to fortify anti-Russian circles following Kiev's change of government. Even though quite controversial among the Crimean Tatars, this cooperation with the Mejlis milieu is closely coordinated with the USA, Turkey under Erdoğan and other NATO member countries. The concurrency of the cooperation with the Crimean Tatars and their occasional violent protests is reminiscent of developments in Ukraine in the spring of 2013.

(Flickr)

One might have expected British Prime Minister David Cameron, the host of last week’s anti-corruption summit in London, to have been a bit more cautious when speaking of the “fantastically corrupt” countries whose leaders were his guests. Cameron’s comments about Nigeria and Afghanistan were caught on tape as he described them—to the Queen, no less—as “possibly the two most corrupt countries in the world.”

Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, was shocked and embarrassed according to media and staff reports, but declined to ask for an apology, pointedly stressing that he would rather see recovered the many tangible assets hidden away by his countrymen in the UK.

For all the diplomatic drama—since, not to be outdone, Queen Elizabeth was caught on tape insulting the Chinese too—the anti-corruption summit moved forward with representatives of some 40 nations present and with Buhari delivering the keynote address. A final twist occurred when The Economist reported there had been speculation that Cameron’s indiscretion was actually intentional, designed to stir up additional media interest in the otherwise staid summit talks.

International cooperation in the fight against corruption

By most accounts, the summit was a good first step toward international cooperation on transparency and toward cobbling together a coordinated effort to target secretive tax havens and offshore financial arrangements tied to illegal activities. Of the 40 attending nations, ten are EU members.

These European participants are now looking to shut down the anonymous shell companies used for money laundering by developing registers of the true business owners involved. While Ireland will consider it, France, the U.K. and the Netherlands have pledged to make those registries public—albeit some of the U.K.’s overseas territories, like the British Virgin Islands, will not be forced to come clean.

Additionally, five EU nations pledged to increase transparency on corporate tax compliance, while the summit further addressed corruption in negotiating and awarding EU public contracts, protections for whistleblowers, and seizure penalties.

However, the fact that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry managed to shift attention away from America’s notoriously secretive states of Delaware, Nevada or South Dakota prompted many to argue that the West is more interested in pointing fingers at developing countries than addressing its own shortfalls. Looking ahead, participants agreed to hold a forum next year on asset recovery, one that will focus on assistance for challenged nations such as the “fantastically corrupt” Nigeria.

Nigeria and the culture of corruption

For his part, Buhari’s remarks referred to corruption as a “hydra-headed monster” that cannot be reined in without a coordinated effort. He detailed how four different Nigerian agencies are pursuing corruption investigations in a bid to respect his campaign promises from 2015. Buhari also addressed human rights issues in Nigeria’s fight against corruption, as well as the problem of oil theft, estimated at 150,000 barrels a day. The extent of Nigeria’s problem is reflected by data provided in the annual Transparency International index, which ranked the nation at 136 of the 168 countries evaluated.

Buhari, however, has so far failed to deliver on his lofty campaign promises to root out Nigeria’s endemic corruption. After a remarkably slow start to his term, which saw the country running without an appointed cabinet between May and November 2015, Buhari came under fire for using international aid money earmarked for cracking down on Boko Haram to fund a witch hunt against opposition politicians.

Indeed, according to reports, the nascent anti-corruption campaign has been targeting political enemies of the regime, raising fears that Buhari, a former military dictator in the 80s, is returning to his autocratic ways.

Beyond the shining example Buhari set for the wider region showing that democratic transitions can indeed be possible in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigerians are not faring any better.

The president who once claimed he could singlehandedly stabilize world oil prices is being sapped by a period of high inflation that has driven food prices higher, while the inefficient power grid and infrastructure are dragging down the embattled Nigerian economy. Improving just the grid would boost the country’s economy by a whopping 14%, but the process is stalled because of rent seeking and graft.

What’s most troubling though is the vicious circle of corruption in Nigerian society: the elites who avail themselves of the country’s assets cause the very suffering that they are then supposed to alleviate. The poverty rate among rural households has grown to some 80 % on the back of tumbling oil prices in an economy that has failed to properly diversify.

The ongoing conflicts with Boko Haram in the northeast—itself fueling, and fueled by, Nigeria’s corruption—and the unrest from Biafrans in the south contribute to the nation’s climate of instability.

Everything considered, Nigeria is one of the most revealing examples of the pitfalls of corruption, the way it warps and drags down the entire economic potential of a nation.

When coupled with incompetent leadership, the only hope for Nigerians would be for this year’s anti-corruption summit to yield practical results. A list of individuals hiding wealth in London’s ridiculously overpriced property market and laundering corruption proceeds through the U.K.’s overseas territories would be a good start, both for Nigeria and David Cameron.

The post Cameron’s Anti-Corruption Summit: A First Step in a Long Road appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A member of the Iraqi security forces holds an Iraqi flag at a government complex in the city of Ramadi, December 28, 2015. (REUTERS/Stringer)

Written by Loïc Burton

On March 22, terror struck Brussels with a twin blast at Zaventem Airport and the Maelbeek metro station, claiming the lives of 32 people and injuring over 300. The attacks claimed by ISIS came only a few days after a suicide bombing killed five and injured 36 in Istanbul—the fourth suicide bombing in Turkey in 2016.

The latest bombings have reheated the debate within the EU about tighter border controls—possibly foreshadowing the eventual breakdown of the Schengen Agreement. In addition, the attacks have hardened Europe’s determination to combat terrorism at home, with increased monitoring of ISIS fighters returning from the Middle East and improved intelligence sharing between EU members, and abroad, whether through ramping up aircraft deployments in the coalition against the Islamic State or by supplying weapons to local actors.

Experts have argued that ISIS’s increased activity abroad is a sign of weakness rather than strength. As the so-called caliphate begins to crumble—ISIS is thought to have lost around 20% of its territory in Syria and over 40% in Iraq since its peak expansion in August 2014—the group is allocating efforts and resources toward large-scale terrorist attacks abroad in order to influence the strategic calculations of the coalition member countries at a reduced cost.

Since ISIS’s “winner’s message” of “remaining and expanding” sounds increasingly hollow, this tactical shift is one way to catch global headlines and retain its legitimacy and ability to recruit.

Although the increased operational tempo of terrorist attacks is the manifestation of the group’s faltering, the ISIS underlying ideology is not expected to wither away anytime soon. Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the Treasury Department, argues that “defeating the formal military presence of a terrorist group will not significantly mitigate the threat of lone wolf or small independent cells that are based in the West.”

In its heartland, ISIS is definitely in retreat. According to Pentagon officials, U.S. airstrikes have killed over 25,000 Islamic State fighters and deprived the group of millions of dollars in revenue. Financially debilitated, it has halved salaries of its civil servants and is releasing hostages for sums as low as $500.

Indeed, ISIS has not scored a significant victory since taking Palmyra in May 2015. The ancient city was recaptured by the Syrian regime, supported by Russian airstrikes, on March 27, 2016, reducing ISIS’s ability to threaten Syria’s coastal regions.

In Iraq, after retaking Tikrit in March 2015 and Ramadi in December, the government in Baghdad declared on March 24 the beginning of operations to retake Mosul. The offensive to regain Iraq’s second largest city will not be easy.

After some initial success reclaiming nearby villages, progress in the military campaign was stalled. More sober prognostics have now replaced the once optimistic talks of pushing ISIS out of Mosul by the end of the year—military analysts estimate that there is little prospect of an assault on the city before 2017.

With about 10,000 fighters and almost two years to erect a multilayered defense, a force of at least 40,000 would be needed to overcome the group, according to estimates. Indeed, the current under-strength Iraqi division supported by U.S. military advisers looks woefully inadequate for the task.

Moreover, because of ethno-religious tensions, Kurdish Peshmerga seem uninterested in helping take a city that would never be part of an independent Kurdistan while Shi‘a-dominated militias—instrumental in retaking Tikrit—will probably be kept away for fears of sectarian reprisals following the conquest of the Sunni-majority city.

An important factor in the battle for Mosul is America’s involvement. The Pentagon wants to go beyond air strikes and the current deployment of military advisers and introduce additional special forces. However, this goes against Obama’s “no boots on the ground” pledge—although an increasingly tenuous promise, it rules out the deployment on the scale necessary to retake Mosul.

After attempting to train local forces—leading to the disastrous $500 million train-and-equip program for Syrian moderates that yielded little to no results—and bombing oil production facilities under Operation Tidal Wave II, the U.S. is now focusing on a leadership decapitation campaign, using special forces on the ground. In March, American forces killed Haji Iman, ISIS’s second-in-command, as well as Abu Omar al-Shishanim, the group’s “war minister.”

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter explained current U.S. strategy: “we are systematically eliminating ISIL’s cabinet,” in order to “hamper the ability for them to conduct operations inside and outside of Iraq and Syria.” Although the leadership is capable of regenerating itself and operating on the ground, taking out leaders reduces the group’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks abroad as they require a more sophisticated network and superior coordination.

Talks of a new training program—allegedly more narrowly focused—and Obama’s decision to add 250 military personnel to the 50 already on the ground in Syria are the latest development in the U.S. effort to capitalize on the momentum in  the campaign against the Islamic State. It remains to be seen whether or not these new policies achieve the desired outcome.

Recommended Readings

Max Fisher, “The Brussels attack is Europe’s new reality,” Vox (Mar. 22, 2016).

Eric Schmitt and Alissa J. Rubin “ISIS Spreading in Europe, U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns,”
The New York Times (Apr. 25, 2016).

“The last battle,” The Economist (Apr. 16, 2016).

The post The Rise of ISIS: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

На днях стало известно, что Исламское государство (организация запрещена в РФ) казнило россиянку Эльвиру Караеву. Неподтвержденная информация о том, что ИГ осудило беременную Караеву за шпионаж в пользу России, появилась несколько месяцев назад, но, видимо, исполнение приговора было отложено до момента, пока она не родила ребенка. Женщине было 28 лет.

/ Panamá, Finance, Spéculation, Urbanisme, Ville - Amérique du Sud / Panamá, Finance, Spéculation, Urbanisme, Ville - Amérique du Sud

Cette recension est issue de Politique étrangère (1/2016). Jean-Loup Samaan propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: the History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2015, 256 pages).

En l’espace de deux ans, l’État islamique (EI) a généré une abondante littérature. Cet ouvrage propose de mettre en lumière une dimension peu ou mal comprise de l’organisation : sa rhétorique apocalyptique. McCants prend soin de souligner la particularité tant idéologique qu’opératoire de l’EI : le groupe est en effet le premier acteur depuis la chute de l’Empire ottoman à prétendre au statut de califat.

Il en ressort plusieurs clés de compréhension de l’EI. Tout d’abord, si l’EI est bien un descendant d’Al-Qaïda en Irak, sa stratégie s’en est dès le début distanciée. Ainsi, rappelle l’auteur, Ben Laden et Zawahiri ne proclamèrent jamais un califat qui devait, à leurs yeux, n’advenir qu’une fois les musulmans rassemblés contre l’impérialisme occidental. De plus, les attaques visant directement des musulmans en Irak et Syrie étaient jugées contre-productives par les leaders d’Al-Qaïda. L’EI, pour sa part, n’hésite pas à conquérir ses territoires par une campagne de terreur, et non de séduction, des populations.

Cela nous conduit à un phénomène particulièrement intéressant vers 2013-2014. L’émergence de l’EI et son ralliement par de nombreux djihadistes d’Al-Qaïda ont été entourés de débats internes et de controverses relayés par les réseaux sociaux, comme jamais cela n’avait été le cas dans l’histoire du terrorisme islamiste. Alors qu’Al-Qaïda prenait soin de contrôler les dissensions internes, les allégeances à Daech et les critiques à l’égard des autres mouvements (Jabhat Al-Nusra notamment) furent largement diffusées et discutées sur la toile. Il s’agit là aussi d’une dimension fondamentale de l’EI : son attention méticuleuse apportée à la propagande de masse.

Pour autant, le succès médiatique de cette campagne de l’EI et le flux sans précédent de combattants à ses côtés ne peuvent se comprendre sans la rhétorique apocalyptique qui l’entoure. McCants détaille celle-ci, en montrant comme la proclamation du califat, les références à « Rome », ou encore la mention de la ville syrienne de « Dabiq », sont autant d’éléments s’appuyant sur une croyance en la fin des temps annoncée dans les textes sacrés. L’auteur souligne comment cette eschatologie de l’EI émerge à la suite des révolutions arabes, qui ont elles-mêmes engendré de nombreuses théories populaires sur la fin des temps.

Dans le même temps, McCants souligne bien aussi la lecture cursive des textes sacrés par les idéologues de l’EI. Les crimes infligés et leur mise en scène sont ainsi justifiés par des références contestables à des hadiths tandis que toute contradiction possible est écartée – notamment sur l’interdiction de fumer qui ne trouve tout simplement aucun fondement dans le corpus religieux. Parce que ce messianisme s’ancre dans une lecture biaisée de l’islam, le discours de l’EI attire des masses de jeunes enclins à se sacrifier pour des idées, ou autrement fascinés par la symbolique apocalyptique.

Au-delà, la grande question qui subsiste à la fin de l’ouvrage est celle de la rationalité de l’EI : comment concilier la foi en une fin des temps islamique et la rationalité que suppose l’exercice du pouvoir sur des territoires ? La question est un défi tant pour l’organisation elle-même – qui cherche à préserver ses conquêtes – que pour la France et ses alliés – qui cherchent à détruire le groupe.

Jean-Loup Samaan

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

Al entrar en la segunda década del siglo XXI, el Ártico emerge como una región de inmenso potencial, creciente compromiso por parte de los Estados costeros y mayor atención desde todas partes del globo, incluyendo desde China e India. Esta transformación ha sido impulsada por el cambio climático, con el deshielo como la evidencia más palmaria del calentamiento global. Las nuevas rutas de transporte se han abierto, conectando el Atlántico y el Pacífico y allanando el camino para la exploración de recursos, desde la pesca hasta los minerales. Mientras tanto, Rusia ha emergido como poder regional después de la tormenta política del período post-soviético. Esta combinación podría estimular tensiones, rivalidades e incluso conflictos. Pero no es inevitable.

В последние месяцы ИГИЛ (организация, запрещенная в РФ) теряет доходы, людей и территории, однако по-прежнему остается самой мощной террористической организацией на планете. По данным, которые приводит «Нью-Йорк таймс», доходы ИГ от нефти упали с 80 млн долларов в месяц в середине прошлого года до 56 млн долларов в марте 2016 года. Территория под его контролем сократилась на 22% по сравнению с серединой 2014 года, а население — с 9 до 6 миллионов. В 2016 году иракские правительственные войска при военной поддержке США освободили Эр-Рамади и сейчас нацелены отвоевать Мосул, а сирийские правительственные войска при поддержке России освободили Пальмиру. Еще ряд городов и населенных пунктов отбиты курдами и другими воюющими группировками. ИГИЛ потеснен, но войну не проиграл: продолжает удерживать стратегически важные для его существования города и сохраняет мощную армию иностранных боевиков, по оценкам экспертов, насчитывающую около 27 тысяч человек.

(Own report) - The Mejlis, a Crimean Tatar organization - banned in Russia but supported by Berlin - has announced its plans to open official representative offices in Brussels and Washington this autumn, emphasizing particularly the importance of a seat in Brussels. The Mejlis, presented in the West as the only legitimate representative body of the Crimean Tatars, is actually only representing the pro-western tendency among them, while another tendency, with pro-Russian leanings, has for years explicitly rejected its policy. This split among Crimean Tatars hails back to the final years of the Cold War, when the long-time western ally - and subsequently Mejlis Chairman - Mustafa Jemilev supported radical demands for autonomy, while pursuing a tough anti-Russian course. When, in the 1960s, Jemilev began his campaign for Crimean Tatar autonomy in the Soviet-Union, he was given western support aimed at weakening the Soviet adversary from within. At the same time, Crimean Tatars, exiled in the Federal Republic of Germany, were pursuing the same objective - "Russia's national decomposition" - as it was referred to at the time. A Crimean Tatar, who had served as a main liaison to the Nazis, subsequently continuing his collaborationist activities in the Federal Republic of Germany, assisted them and, began in the 1950s, to also work for CIA-financed organizations in Munich.

Seules instances où les juges ont une expérience de l'entreprise, les conseils de prud'hommes sont menacés. M. François Hollande veut désormais plafonner le montant des amendes pour les délits patronaux, réduire les recours, faire payer les plaignants et remplacer les juges par des magistrats (...) / Droit, État, Inégalités, Justice, Travail, Néolibéralisme, Société civile - 2016/03

Après n’avoir, pendant longtemps, proposé aucune solution de rechange à l’approche « gestionnaire » du conflit israélo-palestinien privilégiée par le premier ministre Benyamin Nétanyahou, la laissant apparaître comme la seule option possible, le Parti travailliste relance le débat au niveau national en présentant un plan de séparation.

Nigeria has scored important successes against Boko Haram. The military campaign that President Muhammadu Buhari launched after his election last year is stronger and better coordinated. The insurgency is now less of a military threat, after seven years of conflict that have killed tens of thousands of people, uprooted millions, damaged local economies and cross-border trade, and spread to the Lake Chad basin states of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. However, as regional states and their international partners gather in Abuja on Saturday to discuss their strategy, Boko Haram remains a major security challenge requiring a coordinated response.

(Own report) - One of Berlin's government advisors is calling for Russia's expulsion from the Council of Europe. The Russian government's actions against the Crimean Tatars and its banning their Mejlis - a political organization - along with other measures, make it "no longer possible to justify continuing Russian membership in the Council of Europe," according to a current position statement published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). This demand is made at a time when the Crimean Tatars have been drawn into the spotlight throughout Europe, by the openly politicized Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). Whereas public perception of Crimean Tatars has been predominated by their 1944 deportation, their collaboration with the Nazis, which had preceded their deportation, has been obscured. As historians have ascertained, in 1942, "every tenth Tatar on the Crimean Peninsula was in the military" - on the side of Nazi Germany. Crimean Tatars fought on the side of the German Wehrmacht against the Soviet Union, excelling in the notorious "efforts to crush the partisan movement" and turned their Jewish neighbors over to the Nazis' henchmen. Already in the 1920s, leading Tatar functionaries had complained of a "Jewification" of their communities, in their protests against Moscow's resettlement measures of Jewish families. Later, exiled Crimean Tatars volunteered their services for the West's cold war efforts to destabilize Moscow. The Mejlis, which today is quite controversial among the Crimean Tatars, stands in this tradition.