For the Islamic State (ISIS), old habits die hard. Improvised explosive devices, suicide vests, and car bombs—techniques and tactics that were the mainstay of the group’s forefathers, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—have once again become the order of the day.
The self-proclaimed caliphate, eager to shift the narrative away from territorial loses in Syria and Iraq, is beginning to fall back on a more traditional terrorism paradigm. The bombings being carried out across the region are a harbinger of things to come, and the machinations of ISIS’ global terrorist network are bearing fruit, as the group prepares for the day after Raqqa falls.
This shift in tactics, U.S. officials believe, signals ISIS may be abandoning the blitzkrieg-style territorial expansion that once garnered the group widespread notoriety; and, in its place, are focusing on building a terrorist network capable of orchestrating the sensational attacks that strike so much fear into the hearts and minds of Western governments.
On Monday, the latest example of ISIS’ tactical shift, erupted in a series of coordinated bombings in Syria and Yemen. The tactical and strategic sophistication of this operation, a combination of suicide and car bomb attacks, demonstrates a significant commitment of assets and resources, a high degree of command and control coordination, and a robust logistical infrastructure that stretches across multiple countries.
In Syria, ISIS orchestrated seven near simultaneous suicide and car bomb attacks targeting civilians in the coastal cities of Tartus and Jebleh. This region is considered an Assad regime stronghold—well-fortified and heavily guarded—with checkpoints and outposts along major roads and highways. The northwest coast also serves as a major staging ground for a large contingent of Russian military assets—Tartus is home to a Russian naval facility, and Jableh in Latakia province is near a Russian-operated air base.
ISIS’ ability to circumvent such robust security measures is a troubling sign for the Assad regime; especially when considering that up until these attacks, ISIS was not believed to be operating in the coastal provinces of Syria. The ability to build and sustain a terrorist network capable of orchestrating such a sophisticated operation, in the heart of Assad’s stronghold, is a feat that should not be easily dismissed.
The extraordinary nature of these attacks prompted some analysts to question whether ISIS was even responsible. The Assad regime, in a shameless attempt to gain political advantage, even tried blaming the leading rebel faction Ahrar al-Sham for the incident—ISIS publicly claimed responsibility for the attack.
A similar story unfolded in Yemen, where in the port city of Aden, the group deployed twin suicide bombers, targeting a gathering of Army recruits assembling to enlist. The recruits ISIS targeted were located in the Khormaskar district of the port city, which serves as a temporary headquarters for the Saudi-backed Yemeni government that is preparing to recapture Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, from Houthi militants.
The Hadi government is grappling with a fragile security situation, and while negotiations are underway in Kuwait to end the 14-month long war with Houthi rebels linked to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have been competing for territory and influence, as each try to one up the other in an alternating series of terrorist attacks.
A written statement released on social media accounts linked to ISIS, claimed responsibility for the attacks. The account stated that the bombings targeted “the apostate Yemeni army,”: similar to Syria, ISIS appears to have chosen its targets to achieve maximum political impact. Yemen, like Syria, is also home to rival AQAP, who ISIS is competing with for access to gradually diminishing terrorist real estate.
The emergence of an ISIS terror network capable of executing these types of attacks should serve as further evidence that the group is committing time and energy into the development and pursuit of tactics more reminiscent of the Sunni insurgency during the height of the Iraq War, than the territorial expansion that solidified the Islamic State’s hold on large swaths of Syria and Iraq.
The scope and nature of these attacks indicate ISIS is attempting to capitalize on the political instability across the region, exacerbating sectarian tensions, in the hopes of igniting a broader conflict between Sunni and Shi’a. Nowhere is this insidious agenda more pronounced than in Iraq. Over the last several months, ISIS operatives have conducted massive bombings—with targets ranging from soccer games to open markets—that have killed hundreds of Iraqi Shi’a.
This shift toward a traditional terrorism paradigm benefits ISIS’s asymmetrical disadvantage. With the host of regional and international military power being brought to bear against it, ISIS’ attempt to retain control over territory that stretches across two countries will become more difficult to sustain over the long term. ISIS flourished, due in large part, to comparatively weak and disorganized local governments, as well as a haphazard international response that became mired in a geopolitical tug-of-war—too busy to recognize the security vacuum emerging from the chaos of the Syrian conflict.
It’s difficult to fathom now, but there was a time when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s cavalcade of miscreant extremist did not hold sway in Raqqa, Mosul, or Fallujah. The remnants of al-Qaeda (AQ) were scattered and it seemed, at least for a time, that the operational cadres of AQ’s terrorist network were broken beyond repair. Now, however, AQ affiliated groups are once again on the rise. Buoyed by victories and substantial gains in Yemen and Syria, groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and AQAP are enjoying a renaissance of popularity.
For the time being, ISIS and AQ appear be at each other’s throats, vying for dominance and influence over the global jihadist agenda. But the idea of an alliance or merger between these two groups should not be discounted. Terrorism expert and Georgetown professor, Bruce Hoffman, recently explored just such scenario.
In a Foreign Affairs article, Hoffman writes, “Although admittedly improbable in the near term, such a rapprochement would make a lot of sense for both groups and would no doubt result in a threat that, according to a particularly knowledgeable U.S. intelligence analyst whom I queried about such a possibility, would be an absolute and unprecedented disaster for [the] USG and our allies.” Given fluidity of enemies and allies within extremist circles, the possibility that a beleaguered ISIS may find refugee with a group ideologically similar to its own is not impossible.
ISIS recognizes the writing on the wall, and while senior leadership continue to espouse fiery rhetoric, predicting great victories and the destruction its enemies, the group is now on the defensive—looking over the ramparts it can see the enemy at the gate. In Syria, The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces have begun its operation to retake ISIS’ capital, Raqqa, and preparations are well underway to retake Fallujah and Mosul in Iraq.
Of course, uprooting ISIS from its territorial stronghold will not, by any stretch of the imagination, signal the end of its ideological and operational contributions to the Salafi jihadist movement. They may soon find themselves without much territory to call its own, but the conflagration consuming the Middle East and the geopolitical ambitions of regional power brokers, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, guarantee a prolonged period of regional instability.
The Middle East is in the midst of the one of the worst periods of political strife in a century. If ISIS proves capable of adapting to the shifting sands of politics and power in the region, then its violent ambitions and apocalyptic vision will find fertile ground to take root and flourish among its adherents.
The post Amid Setbacks, ISIS Embraces Traditional Terrorism Paradigm appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Florence Fang interviewed by Chinese Communist Party media, 2015 (RedNet).
Prominent San Francisco businesswoman and former U.S. federal official Florence Fang’s activities on behalf of the Chinese government have been previously noted in this blog and elsewhere. Under her Chinese name, Fang Li Bangqin (方李邦琴), Florence Fang is the honorary president of the Northern California Association for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China, also known as Chinese for Peaceful Unification-Northern California.
Fang’s organization is just one of many overseas chapters of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification in Beijing, an “external propaganda” agency focused on asserting mainland Chinese control over Taiwan.
In comments to Chinese government media Fang has plainly expressed that her “mission” in the United States is to “put our ideas about peaceful reunification into mainstream American society” and to “prevent the spread of ‘Taiwan independence’ ideology.” At appearances with Chinese Communist Party officials Fang has called Taiwan a “fake democracy,” and in statements to Communist Party media she has expressed her undying patriotism for China despite living in the United States since 1960 and serving as a U.S. federal official under the George H.W. Bush administration.
Florence Fang with former President and First Lady Bush, from Chinese news website also noting Fang’s service on behalf of China’s “peaceful reunification,” 2015 (Sohu).
Her numerous appearances at the Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily and other Chinese government and state-run media websites include frequent meetings and photo-ops with high-level Communist Party officials, among whom she appears to be something of a celebrity. In these appearances her statements are virtually indistiguishable from those of the Chinese government. Her public profile at Chinese website Baike lists her not as a U.S. citizen, but as a citizen of China.
In addition to her “peaceful reunification” activities, Florence Fang’s efforts include educational exchange initiatives aimed at enhancing mainland Chinese influence in the United States. International educational exchange with countries including China is a worthy endeavor that should be encouraged, but Fang’s motives in doing so are highly suspect given the nature of her relationship with the Chinese government. In 2013, Fang launched the “100,000 Strong Foundation” to promote Mandarin language education in the United States and study in China for U.S. students.
Fang’s foundation was greeted enthusiastically by U.S. public figures including former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. As always, however, Fang’s statements on this initiative in Chinese media differ sharply from what has been presented to U.S. audiences (Should any of the sources cited in this article mysteriously disappear, archival web captures are available here).
In statements on her “100,000 Strong Foundation” to the Hubei Provincial Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese repeated in Chinese at her own Florence Fang Family Foundation website, Fang described “American ‘grassroots’ youth” as an impressionable “target group” of community members and voters whose ideas and opinions are not yet fully formed and would therefore potentially be open to ideological influence from their mainland Chinese peers while studying in China. Fang’s emphasis on American youth as a “target group” of voters clearly suggests a political motivation for her program.
Florence Fang meets with Chinese vice-premier Liu Yandong, 2014 (Xinhua).
Fang’s efforts on the “100,000 Strong” project have been in close consultation with Chinese vice-premier Liu Yandong, former Communist Youth League official and secretary of the Communist Party’s United Front Work Department, with whom Fang has had extensive contact through the years. Liu is a noted member of what is known as the “Youth League Clique” associated with former president Hu Jintao. Liu’s role further suggests that these organizations would be involved in how U.S. students are channeled through the program and which Chinese students they would be grouped with (in all likelihood students handpicked for them from the Communist Youth League).
The United Front Work Department is a notorious propaganda agency under the direct authority of the Communist Party Central Committee, and is charged with asserting Communist Party “leadership” over non-Party groups at home and abroad. It is also an agency that is involved in almost everything that Florence Fang does on behalf of the Chinese government.
Florence Fang meets with Hunan Provincial United Front Work Department secretary Li Weiwei, 2014 (Hunan United Front Work Department, Central United Front Work Department).
The October 2013 inauguration of a language institute at Beijing University to host U.S. students funded by Fang included prominent appearances by officials from the United Front Work Department, the People’s Liberation Army, and the Confucius Institute in addition to Fang herself. The Confucius Institute is a noted part of Beijing’s “overseas propaganda” apparatus, and its presence on Western university campuses has been described as “academic malware” and as an educational “Trojan horse” due to its overtly propagandist character.
Also in attendance at Fang’s Beijing University event were officials from the State Council Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, another agency of the Chinese government’s external propaganda system. Its main purpose is to co-opt and exploit ethnic Chinese communities abroad (which it views as “overseas Chinese” rather than as citizens of the countries in which they live) for use as instruments of mainland Chinese foreign policy. Like the United Front Front Work department, this is an agency that figures prominently in Florence Fang’s dealings with the Chinese government.
Florence Fang meets with State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office deputy director Tan Tianxing, 2013 (State Organs Work Committee of the Communist Party of China).
Comments by Fang to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office on her “100,000 Strong” project express a thinly-veiled political purpose in line with China’s “public diplomacy” goal of “bringing foreigners to understand and accept China’s core values,” which of course include its national obsession with gaining control of Taiwan regardless of the wishes of Taiwan’s own citizens (most of whom in every public opinion survey are clearly opposed to reunification with mainland China for obvious reasons).
The involvement of these agencies in Florence Fang’s “100,000 Strong Foundation” makes it as questionable as any of her other activities in relation to China. In the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party, there is no such thing as education or cultural exchange for its own sake: everything is political, everything is ideological, and everything must be made to serve the Party and the Chinese state. The “100,000 Strong Foundation” appears to be no exception.
The U.S. government might wish to choose its federal officials and educational “goodwill ambassadors” with greater care. U.S. students contemplating study in China might wish to choose a program that does not view them as a political “target group” for the Communist Youth League, the United Front Work Department, and the Confucius Institute.
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By Matthew Barbari
With Ban Ki-Moon’s term as Secretary-General (SG) ending this year, many candidates have been put forward to replace him. Due to the tradition of rotating the region from which the SG is selected, this year the spotlight has been placed on Eastern Europe. There are also calls for a woman SG—the first since the organization’s creation in 1945.
As stated by UN General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft, this election will be the most transparent to date. In the past, the election process was conducted behind closed doors and under the watchful eyes of the UN Security Council. While this election has already had public nominations as well as informal discussions between the General Assembly and each of the candidates, it is still ultimately the responsibility of the Security Council to select the SG.
Irina Bokova of Bulgaria is a popular choice to replace Ban Ki-Moon as she fills three essential requirements: she is from the region whose “turn” it is to hold the position, she has experience working in the system—going into her sixth year as the Director-General of UNESCO—and is one of the leading women in the UN. She is also the most favored candidate by Russia, who holds sway due to its veto power in the Security Council.
The prime minister of Moldova, Natalia Gherman, is also a popular candidate as she is both a woman and from Eastern Europe. However, her inexperience within the UN makes her bid less likely, despite the support she receives from Western countries such as the UK and U.S.
While Vuk Jeremic would continue the trend of having a man at the organization’s highest office, he does have years of relevant experience working as the President of the UN General Assembly and as Serbia’s minister of foreign affairs.
Many General Assembly members have voiced their dissatisfaction toward the current crop of Eastern European nominees. As a result, this has led to growing support for two candidates from outside the region, claiming that geography should not play a role in the selection process—especially if it leads to a subpar candidate.
Helen Clark, the current Administrator for the United Nations Development Programme and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, is a name that has been floated around. She has strong connections to the U.S. and UK, as well as China. In addition, she has years of experience at the UN, with many seeing her as a more qualified leader than other candidates.
Another “outside candidate” is Antonio Guterres who served as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and is a former Prime Minister of Portugal. Guterres has an impressive resume, and is the most well equipped candidate to face the current refugee crises, which are a main concern for Europe and the Middle East.
The major roadblock to him or Clark is the UN tradition of selecting an SG from a certain region, as well as a possible veto from Russia, which wants to see an SG that is amenable to its interests. While Moscow has publically stated that it would not veto a candidate selection solely on the geographical criteria, this strategy was previously employed by Beijing, helping Ban Ki-Moon back in 2007, when China threatened to veto any candidate who was not from Asia. The Security Council is expected to select its nominee in July with the election in the General Assembly happening in September.
Recommended Readings
Somini Sengupta, “At U.N., Ambassadors Hold Auditions for Next Secretary General,” The New York Times (Apr. 15, 2016).
Reid Standish, “Will the Next U.N. Secretary-General Be From Eastern Europe?” Foreign Policy (Apr. 29, 2016).
“Selecting a new UN Secretary-General: a job interview in front of the whole world,” UN News Centre (Apr. 8, 2016).
The post The UN Post-2015: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
President Obama holding a town-hall-style meeting in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, on Wednesday. (Credit Doug Mills/The New York Times)
The recent U.S. decision to fully lift its arms embargo against Vietnam is a victory for both countries as they seek to balance China in the region. However, the U.S. must also realize that the decision will be measured against already-strong Russian-Vietnamese strategic and defense ties. Therefore, the embargo decision is a maneuver to not only counter Chinese influence in the area, but Russian power as well.
Embargo Lift Strengthens Re-Balance
As the U.S. continues its “re-balancing” efforts to counter China in Asia, it has strengthened military ties with allies in the region, most notably Japan and the Philippines. However, the U.S. has also realized that in order to maximize its impact, it needs to reach beyond formal treaty allies. Even though some of these states may not have had the best relations with the U.S. in the past, they now realize that increased U.S. ties are in their own long-term self-interest if they desire to balance China as well.
India is currently being wooed by the U.S.—Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s recently visited the country to shore up defense ties. Vietnam also falls in the camp of non-allied states currently being courted by the U.S. Unlike with India, the legacy of the Vietnam War still runs deep in many quarters within Washington. However, despite past and current concerns with respect to Vietnam’s human rights policies, it would seem that realism based on mutual interests eventually prevailed and resulted in the decision to lift the embargo.
Even more crucially, the U.S. must realize that it is not the only one of several regional powers vying for Vietnam’s affections. Japan and India have both increased their own outreach efforts to Vietnam in order to balance Chinese influence. They have done this both from a military perspective as well as an economic one, as Vietnam has several blocks of offshore oil in need of investment and development. The U.S., at this point, finds no fault in these efforts as they complement its own “re-balance”.
Russian Rivalry and Economic Factors
Russia, however, may prove to be a formidable obstacle to the U.S.’ charm offensive. Because of the Soviet Union’s support of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, Russian-Vietnamese strategic ties are still quite abundant. Vietnam also plays a role in Russia’s “Asian pivot” as it seeks to both reduce its dependence on Western economic ties post-Ukraine and to simultaneously balance China itself, its erstwhile strategic partner, in Asia. Strong ties to Vietnam serve to actually put teeth behind Russian rhetoric of diversifying its Asian strategic portfolio beyond China.
Even though these strong ties have led to many past Vietnamese purchases of Russian armaments such as ships and aircraft, all parties must realize that Vietnam is not going to be exclusively in any one’s camp, save its own, for the foreseeable future. Vietnam, similar to India, realizes that the best way to maintain strategic autonomy is to pursue a truly multi-vectored foreign policy strategy.
If strengthened ties with the U.S. improves its own position based on its own interests, those ties will indeed be pursued. The same is true with respect to Russia, India, and Japan. Simply put, all of these powers must realize that they will always be only suitors and any feelings of actually consummating something more substantial will remain exactly that, a feeling.
The real front on which both the U.S. and Russia must compete for Vietnamese attention, however, is the economic one. This stems from the realization that it is China’s economic power, symbolized by its leading trading partner status with most southeast Asian states, which serves as the foundation for its growing military and diplomatic power. Chinese South China Sea maneuvers and the formation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) symbolize these, respectively. This realization was also behind the recent ASEAN leaders’ summit held in Sunnylands, California, the first ever hosted by the U.S.
Not to be outdone, Russia recently hosted its own ASEAN summit, held in Sochi. This summit, similar to Sunnylands, promoted increased economic and technological ties with southeast Asian states as the foundation for further strengthened political ties. The case may be made that the Russian economic presence in ASEAN, apart from Vietnam, is scant. In the past, this has been due to the relatively low importance assigned to southeast Asia within Russian foreign policy objectives due to the region’s remoteness, as well as previous ASEAN skepticism with respect to Russia’s minimal economic footprint within the region.
On the economic front, the U.S. would appear to be in the lead in the race against Russia, given Vietnam’s accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). However, it can ill-afford to rest on its laurels as one of the Russian proposals highlighted at Sochi was to gradually integrate ASEAN economically with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Because of all these factors, the U.S. must always keep in mind that its Vietnamese courtship will inevitably go against Russian strategic machinations in Vietnam, as well as both Russian and Chinese economic endeavors in the region as a whole.
The post U.S. Must Still Compete with Russia for Vietnam’s Affections appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Iraqi Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi’s convoy tours the front line in the Samarra desert, Iraq, earlier this month. (Associated Press)
Written by Miles Kopley
Since it was wrestled away from Iraqi forces in a startling June 2014 offensive, the ancient city of Mosul has been crucial for the Islamic State. It remains the largest city held by the group in Iraq, even as other cities such as Tikrit and Ramadi have been liberated by the Iraqi Army, backed by coalition forces. In recent months, Mosul has become increasingly vital to the military presence and economic viability of the group in the region. A lone defensive bastion in the Nineveh Governorate amidst a series of ISIS military losses, Mosul suffers from meager supply lines and the city’s crumbling infrastructure.
Although it’s a tall order, one that has already proven to be a challenge for an anti-ISIS coalition skeptical of itself, the retaking of Mosul would spell the beginning of the end for the Islamic State presence in Iraq. The defensive and economic benefits of capturing Mosul have been apparent since the Islamic State first began operations against Iraqi troops in 2014.
Shortly after taking the city, ISIS looted approximately $480 million in banknotes from financial institutions, providing an important funding boost to the expanding organization. It established extensive convoy routes spanning from the city to its self-proclaimed capital of Raqqa in Syria, providing economic and military relief to the insurgents and remaining civilians. It maintain Mosul’s local oil industry, pumping it from nearby wells and shipping it to destinations all over the region. The roughly half-million citizens who remained within the city faced increased taxes on agricultural land and additional duties on imports.
The defensive capabilities Mosul offers to the surrounding territory compounds the economic assets the city grants the Islamic State. Indeed, the Islamic State has extensive forward positions nestled in villages, valleys, and open fields surrounding the city, a system of fortifications that gives it added strength in holding the city.
In the past few months, however, the accomplishments of the Islamic State in Mosul have been largely dashed by coalition efforts. Oil revenue across the Islamic State has been halved by airstrikes targeting critical infrastructure. Mosul’s main supply route to Raqqa was severed last November, putting increased pressure on the city’s residents and forcing them to face frequent fuel shortages and electricity blackouts. Banks were extensively bombed in January, resulting in monetary losses ranging into the millions. The group has already lost approximately 45 percent of its territory in Iraq since the height of its power, and Mosul seems to be the next target in line for coalition efforts.
The Iraqi Army captures Mahana village just 60 kilometers from ISIS-held Mosul.
Yet, while coalition airstrikes have made significant headway, forces on the ground have had mixed results. Currently, the United States only has two hundred Special Forces troops dedicated to the ground offensive in Mosul, leaving most of the large-scale operations to the Iraqi Army.
Skirmishes between Peshmerga and Iraqi Sh’ia forces threaten the alliance they have built against the Islamic State, and complicated their plans to advance on the city. Splintering of troops along ethnic and communal lines has also led to miscommunication and mistrust among individual units, further damaging relationships. The Iraqi Army has also stated that it would need a force five to six times their current size in order to mount an effective attack on the Islamic State.
If the Iraqi Army and coalition forces are capable of freeing the city, however, a drastic chain of events could follow. Virtually all of Iraq’s oil fields are located in the Nineveh Governorate, where Mosul lies. If lost, the few convoy routes the group has would be severed, impacting the oil trade within the group’s territory and on the black market, and permanently reducing their financing capabilities. Losing the city would also mean the loss of the largest defendable position in the region, as well as any military support it could offer to combatants on other front lines.
With so much at stake for the Islamic State in Mosul, there has never been a better time—or chance—for coalition forces wrestle it back. Taking back Mosul would mean the recovery of one of the country’s largest economic centers: a key victory for Iraq and coalition forces and a disastrous defeat for the Islamic State.
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