Diplomacy & Crisis News

At the Security Council today, a senior United Nations official called on Member States, regional organizations and civil society for greater partnership to boost women’s participation at all levels and help ensure UN peace efforts are stronger and more sustainable.

Through sound recordings and moving images, audiovisual heritage provides priceless insight to the past while preserving unique documentation for future generations, the United Nations cultural agency said on the day set aside to raise global awareness about the importance of the fragility of this heritage.

Le Parlement et le Sénat irlandais ont décidé en novembre 2014 la création d'une commission d'enquête sur l'implosion de la bulle immobilière en 2008. Dans le cadre de leurs travaux, les parlementaires ont auditionné en mars 2015 le chercheur canadien Julien Mercille sur la responsabilité des médias. (...) / Europe, République d'Irlande, Audiovisuel, Banque, Économie, Entreprise, Finance, Information, Logement, Médias, Presse, Spéculation, Crise financière - 2015/08

Il faut désormais l'eurobéatitude congénitale d'un chroniqueur comme Bernard Guetta pour estimer que « le compromis est décidément le mode de fonctionnement européen ». Loin des studios de la maison ronde, l'illusion s'est dissipée. / Allemagne, Europe, France, Royaume-Uni, Audiovisuel, Démocratie, (...) / Allemagne, Europe, France, Royaume-Uni, Audiovisuel, Démocratie, Économie, Finance, Information, Médias, Presse, Extrême gauche, Crise économique, Crise financière - 2015/08

As the Iraqi Army, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Shia militias attack Iraqi Kurdistan, Israeli MK Akram Hasson and Israeli diplomat Mendi Safadi reiterate Israel’s support for an independent Kurdistan.

After the Iraqi Army, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Shia militias launched multiple offenses in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Khurmatu, Prde and other areas over the last week, many Kurdish civilians have been forced to flee their homes due to the indiscriminate violence, torture, gang raping, looting, and the burning of civilian homes and properties. So far, 168,372 civilians have been displaced. In the wake of such wanton violence targeting the Kurdish community, Israeli MK Akram Hasson proclaimed the State of Israel’s support for the Kurdish people at this critical juncture.

“Israel displayed a clear position for the right of the Kurdish people to an independent state within the historic borders of Kurdistan,” he declared. “We stand as one front against the Iranian threat, which declares its desire to eradicate Kurdistan and Israel. We won’t permit them to arm themselves against our allies. We stand with them against every threat and we recruit the support of the free world to prevent the fall of their dream by leading terrorists in Iran.”

At a historic meeting between Israeli MK Akram Hasson, Kurdistan’s President Masoud Barzani, Mr. Dilshad Berzani and Mendi Safadi, the head of the Safadi Center for International Diplomacy and Public Relations, Mr. Dilshad Barzani warned that if the Kurdish wall against Iran will fall, Shia terrorism will achieve its goal and he called for American support in stopping the recruitment of Iran in spreading Shia terror, which works for the eradication of the Kurdish dream and the Kurdish people in the region. Mendi Safadi added: “This is a historic meeting where I stressed cooperation for achieving an independent Kurdistan. We are working via joint efforts to establish an international lobby to support the Kurdish peoples’ struggle.”

Mendi Safadi also attended a demonstration in front of the Iranian Embassy in Berlin, where thousands of Kurds protested the Iranian attacks and Iran’s open war alongside that of the Iraqi Shia militias against the Kurdish people. Safadi stated in his speech that the Israeli people support their right to an independent state, emphasizing that both the Jewish and Kurdish people have a historic right to their homelands.

He noted that while the Arabs are fighting to erase this historic right, the Israeli people still want them to have a country. Safadi hopes that the Kurdish and Israeli flag will be flown over the skies of an independent Kurdistan for Israel’s government welcomes them and supports their just demand for independence.

As Israeli scholar Dr. Mordechai Kedar proclaimed, “Every group has the right to have its own state, its own homeland, its’ own government and to control itself. It is time for all the nations occupied, coerced and persecuted by other religions and nations to be liberated. If they want independence, let them have it in order to make sure they stay alive and prosperous. Why should they be forced to live under the yoke of another culture especially when the other culture is vicious and cruel?”

Meanwhile, within the Islamic Republic of Iran, already many Iranian Kurds are inspired by Iraqi Kurdistan’s Independence Referendum despite the brutal onslaught the Iraqi Kurds have faced from the Iraqi Army, Iran and the Shia militias for voicing their opinions democratically. According to Iranian Kurdish dissident Kajal Mohammadi, “The people of Iranian Kurdistan stand in solidarity with the struggle of greater Kurdistan. The language of violence and threats no longer scares them.” Noting that Iranian Kurds have demonstrated in solidarity with Iraqi Kurdistan and the violent Iranian response to these protests, she emphasized: “No occupying force can break this bond of solidarity and support for one another. The people of Kurdistan are fed up with the Iranian regime. Their threats of bloodshed and their continued militarization no longer work.”

Iranian Kurdish rebel Mohammed Alizadeh stressed that he believes Iran reacted in the way that they did to the Iraqi Kurdish Referendum and the celebrations by the Iranian Kurds of this referendum for they are afraid of its implications: “The first step was taken to reach the goal of having a Kurdish nation. The enemies of the Kurdish nation are so afraid of this. Iran sent in a large military force to prevent the freedom celebrations of the Kurdish nation but the people of Kurdistan are brave enough to resist Iran.”

However, as Kurds across the world are increasingly standing in solidarity with Iraqi Kurdistan and waving Israeli flags alongside Kurdish flags at political demonstrations, there is also a lot of criticism of how America has responded to the recent violence implemented by Iran and its allies against Iraqi Kurds. As Kurdish leader Arif Bawecani declared, “From 2014 to 2017, many of you prized the Kurds for fighting for the whole world in the war against ISIS and terrorism but today you are sending Iran and Iraq against the Kurds. What kind of friendship do you have for the Kurds? Where is your conscious?”

The post Israeli Druze diplomat: “We stand in solidarity with Kurdistan” appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Addressing lawmakers in the Central African Republic, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres on Friday stressed the international community&#39s commitment to helping tackle the myriad challenges plaguing the conflict-torn country, and strongly defended the role of the UN peacekeeping force there.

As the number of Rohingya refugees sheltering in southern Bangladesh crosses 800,000, United Nations agencies responding to the crisis are working hard to ensure access in the difficult to reach area so that much needed assistance can be delivered in a timely manner.

Freezing temperatures, storms and heavy snowfall will add to the misery afflicting hundreds of thousands of families affected by conflict across the Middle East unless assistance &#8211 including cold weather clothing and supplies &#8211 is urgently provided, the United Nations Children&#39s Fund (UNICEF) has warned.

The United Nations human rights chief on Friday called on the parties to the conflict in Syria to allow badly needed food and medical supplies to Eastern Ghouta in rural Damascus, describing the situation of at least 350,000 besieged civilians there as &#8220an outrage.&#8221

Although the debate on migration has largely focused on Europe, the global compact being negotiated must be adapted to the realities and peculiarities of each region, including Africa, where more than half of migrants moved to other countries on the continent, a senior United Nations official said Thursday.

Annual deaths from measles dropped below 100,000 last year for the first time 90,000, United Nations and other international agencies reported on Thursday, as they warned however that the world is still far from reaching goals on eliminating the disease.

Even as Iraq breathes a sigh of relief with the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da’esh), it has been hit by another crisis – one between Baghdad, the capital, and Erbil, in the Kurdistan region – the top United Nations official in the country has said.

On the third day of his visit to the Central African Republic (CAR), United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres on Thursday called on the international community to support the conflict-ravaged country’s peacebuilding and recovery strategy.

If Africa is to keep pace with an unprecedented demographic transition – African’s under-18 population will reach 750 million by 2030 – scaled-up investment in health, education and women’s protection and empowerment will be needed or the continent will face a ‘bleak’ future, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported Thursday.

The Kyrgyz presidential elections are a positive sign for democracy in the Central Asian region. However, a recent quarrel between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan tarnishes the picture and threatens regional integration efforts. President-elect Zheenbekov is confronted with crucial decisions concerning the formation of a government.

The presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan held on 15 October were remarkable in many respects. In a region that is first and foremost associated with autocrats only to be toppled by revolution or natural demise, Kyrgyzstan made history this year by holding Central Asia’s first ever competitive election. Surrounded by Kazakhstan where Nursultan Nazarbayev has been reigning since 1990, Tajikistan with its lifetime “Leader of the Nation” Emomali Rahmon in power for a quarter century, and Uzbekistan, where Shavkat Mirziyoyev was elected with 89% after Islam Karimov’s decades long leadership came to an end, Kyrgyzstan witnesses the region’s first peaceful transfer of power from one elected president to another.

The outcome was no less astonishing than lead-up to the election, as Sooronbay Zheenbekov, incumbent president Almazbek Atambayev’s personal pick, unexpectedly gathered 54% of the vote; avoiding a runoff with businessman Omurbek Babanov in a second round.

Although widely perceived as free – mainly due to a modern voting system based on bio-metric registration – OSCE addressed the burdensome nomination process for candidates and reported minor violations such as vote-buying on election day.

Owing to the competitiveness of the vote, the election campaigns between the two major opponents Zheenbekov and Babanov were characterized by the dissemination of compromising material and the massive abuse of administrative resources. For instance, after a rally in the southern city of Osh on 28 September during which he addressed the Uzbek minority, Babanov was accused of inciting ethnic hatred, a sensitive issue after the2010 riots which resulted in hundreds of casualties.

Having commenced his business career in Kazakhstan, once holding a Kazakh passport, Babanov was an easy target when it came to questioning loyalty to the Kyrgyz state, especially after reports of his clandestine meeting with Kazakh and Russian oligarchs on the banks of lake Issyk-Kul in early September were leaked into the public.

However, what might have struck Babanov with the strongest blow was Nazarbayev’sinvite to Astana on 20 September, after which incumbent president Atambayev deplored the alleged Kazakh meddling into Kyrgyz internal affairs; pointing to the Kazakh government’s corruption.

Kazakh-Kyrgyz quarrels: potential threat for regional integration?

What might have been intended as a pre-election gambit to discredit Babanov has developed into a fully-fledged international dispute between two member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). After Atambayev’s remarks, Kazakhstan on 10 October reintroduced border controls and customs checks to Kyrgyzstan and partially suspended the import of dairy products, which has led to massive congestion and economic damage to Kyrgyz companies. As Kyrgyzstan reciprocated, Southern Kazakh and Northern Kyrgyz regions experienced shortcomings in a myriad of sectors. Labour migrants’ free movement on both sides of the border is restricted. Kyrgyzstan has alerted the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to Kazakhstan’s commitment violations.

After Kazakhstan’s threats to re-impose sanitary and phytosanitary controls as well as checks of Kyrgyz national residence permits, Atambayev questioned his country’s membership in the EEU Customs Union and reminded his partners that “we have other neighbours as well”. To lend weight to Atambayev’s words, the Kyrgyz government officially renounced a USD 100 million technical aid package from Kazakhstan – granted on a Supreme Council Meeting of the EEU in December 2016 –  to assist the Kyrgyz process to harmonize itself with the Custom Union’s standards after Kyrgyzstan had refused to sign the new EEU Customs Code Treaty.

Kazakhstan, being less dependent on Kyrgyzstan economically than vice versa, has nearly unlimited escalation range to put pressure on its southern neighbour. However, Bishkek announced that it could consider tapping the Kirov water reservoir located in northern Kyrgyzstan, which would deprive bordering Kazakh regions of their water supply.

One of the most remittance dependent countries in the world (30% of the GDP in 2016, estimated at 37.1% for 2017), Kyrgyzstan relies heavily on its EEU membership. However, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whose nationals also predominantly work in former Soviet neighbour countries, have shown the ability to manage fairly well in this respect outside the EEU.

Although the probability of Kyrgyzstan leaving the EEU can be assessed at a minimum, the current spat has revealed latent resentments between the member states and does not bode well for the organisation, and may daunt potential candidate states, such as Tajikistan.

Regional dynamics

Kazakhstan’s harsh reaction to Atambayev’s diatribe might be induced by the recent rapprochement between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which experienced a certain thaw under President Mirziyoyev. Kazakhstan, largest by territory and economy among the five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, sees its dominant regional role challenged by an increasingly engaged Uzbekistan. Bishkek could further reinforce its relations to Tashkent in order to lower its dependence on Kazakhstan. Russia would be well-advised to mediate in the regional developments in order not to see its economic (EEU) and security (CSTO) integration efforts jeopardised.

Domestic challenges

A Kremlin press release suggests that the election outcome suits Russia. Zheenbekov appears to be a convenient president in Moscow’s view. During his campaign, he asserted that he would continue Atambayev’s policies, although it is hard to determine what has constituted the latter’s tenure apart from delivering stability to Kyrgyzstan after the 2010 revolution.

Zheenbekov will struggle to find broad support among the population after a divisive election campaign and a comparably thin mandate having received the smallest vote for an elected president in the country’s history (at a turnout of 56%, only about three in ten Kyrgyz effectively voted for him). With his major opponent Babanov being backed by a third of the electorate, Zheenbekov is walking a tightrope.

Atambayev’s conspicuous bias has fuelled rumours he might want to stay in the government – potentially as new prime minister or faction leader of his social-democratic part – as the competencies of prime minister and parliament had been widened after a constitutional referendum last December. Other potential candidates for the post of prime minister are incumbent Sapar Isakov or Omurbek Babanov, who served in the same role in 2012. On the one hand, this latter scenario would accommodate a large part of the electorate. On the other, Babanov, whom Zheenbekov blustered to imprison after the election owing to his alleged corrupt business activities, might instead want to prepare for the next elections on the opposition bench.

Zheenbekov, who is widely perceived as Atambayev’s puppet has to form a government by 1 December,  and does not enjoy his entire party’s trust. By barring party leader Atambayev from pivotal executive positions, he would, on the one hand, refute critics who doubt his autonomy, but on the other would possibly lose even more support from the social democrats. If Atambayev strives for further curtailing of the president’s constitutional authority, Zheenbekov might see himself confronted with the decision to give in or risk the disintegration of the ruling party. This could play into the opposition’s hands for the next elections.

 

This article was originally published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Tobias Vollmer. 

The post The Kyrgyz presidential elections: domestic and regional dynamics appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n°3/2017). Rémy Hémez propose une analyse de l’ouvrage d’Alaric Searle, Armoured Warfare: A Military, Political and Global History (Bloomsbury, 2017, 288 pages).

Alaric Searle ambitionne d’écrire une histoire du combat blindé dépassant l’étude d’une campagne, d’une armée nationale ou des technologies. L’approche suivie par l’auteur est chrono­logique, chaque chapitre éclairant un moment phare de l’évolution du combat blindé.

Après une introduction qui revient notamment sur la terminologie utilisée, le livre s’ouvre logiquement sur les débuts des chars d’assaut pendant la Première Guerre mondiale. Les résultats initiaux sont décevants. Les problèmes mécaniques sont multiples et une doctrine d’emploi performante fait défaut. Les progrès sont cependant rapides et, en 1918, l’efficacité militaire des chars s’est largement améliorée. La période de l’entre-deux-guerres est ensuite paradoxale pour le combat blindé, entre progrès et stagnation selon les pays et les années. Pour les Britanniques par exemple, l’immédiat après-guerre est un moment de foisonnement, en particulier doctrinal, avec la publication de plusieurs manuels dédiés au combat blindé. Cependant, dès les années 1930, un fort retour du conservatisme au sein de l’institution militaire britannique empêche une intégration totale de la dimension blindée.

Un chapitre est ensuite consacré à la Blitzkrieg et à ses succès initiaux en 1939-1941. Searle cherche à faire la part du mythe et de la réalité autour de ce concept qui n’a jamais été formalisé par les Allemands. La Blitzkrieg ne survit pas à la campagne de Russie. Les Soviétiques reprennent le dessus, puis submergent les armées du Reich en produisant beaucoup plus de chars, mais aussi par leur capacité à mieux utiliser leurs ­unités blindées. L’auteur consacre également un chapitre au combat blindé dans les guerres de Corée (1950-1953), d’Indochine ­(1946-1954) et du Vietnam ­(1962-1972), trois théâtres d’opérations qui démontrent, selon lui, que l’emploi des chars n’est pas confiné aux plaines d’Europe centrale.

Les conflits israélo-arabes entre 1948 et 2006 font légitimement l’objet d’un long développement. Ils fournissent en effet de nombreux exemples ou contre-exemples d’emploi de grandes formations blindées. Les guerres d’Irak et du Golfe (1980-2016) ne sont pas oubliées. On soulignera ici des réflexions bienvenues sur la guerre Iran-Irak ­(1980-1988) au cours de laquelle les pertes massives de chars et de véhicules blindés, quel que soit le camp, ont démontré un manque de maîtrise de la planification, de la logistique et de la doctrine d’emploi des unités blindées.

Le dixième et dernier chapitre est sûrement celui qui suscite le plus de réflexions. Il aborde la question du « rôle politique » du char à travers les symboles qu’il représente, que ce soit celui de la victoire, comme lors des défilés, de l’oppression (Budapest 1956, Tiananmen 1989), ou de la puissance technologique d’un pays via la production d’un char de combat national. Il est dommage que la question de l’existence d’un message politique lié à l’envoi des chars sur un théâtre d’opérations ne soit pas évoquée. Peut-être cela n’est-il qu’un débat franco-français…

Au final, même si ce livre n’offre pas l’histoire globale annoncée en restant dans des sujets d’étude plutôt traditionnels (quid des Sud-Africains en Angola, par exemple ?), il donne une perspective historique intéressante sur le combat blindé et ses caractéristiques générales. L’ouvrage d’Alaric Searle est une utile introduction, tant pour l’historien que pour le praticien.

Rémy Hémez

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

Spain is on the verge of imposing direct rule over Catalonia, with potentially explosive consequences. GRI’s Marc Hernando Santacana asks: How did we get here?

The dramatic developments since the independence referendum may feel sudden, but nationalism in the Catalan region of Spain is nothing new. There was the Modernist political movement of the early 20th century – and the 1976 demonstrations demanding political amnesty, greater freedoms, and a new Statute of Autonomy.  In more recent years, a clear sequence of events has resulted in an ever-greater part of the population embracing the idea that Catalonia might be better off on its own.

The 11 September movement

In 2010, based on an appeal by the conservative Partido Popular, Spain’s Constitutional Court cut back a significant proportion of a revised Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia that had already been approved by referendum, and that then-President Rodríguez Zapatero had promised he would support. The Catalan responded with a one million-strong demonstration that cut across the political spectrum. Then the Catalan started to make demands for a more favourable taxation system, arguing that Catalonia was losing economic potential under the existing arrangements. The simmering discontent culminated on Catalonia’s National Day, 11 September, when 1.5 million people took the streets. They were asking for the “right to choose”: a referendum that would gauge public opinion on independence. This demonstration even saw the participation of Spanish national parties such as the Socialist Party, since it was not officially a pro-independence rally.

Every 11 September since then has seen civil society groups organize public demonstrations that shifted towards expressing outright demands for independence. In 2014, a first attempt to hold a referendum took place. The Constitutional Court ruled the referendum illegal even before it took place, but the result – 80% in favour of independence – nonetheless had a political impact.

Soon afterwards, regional elections were held and the parties supporting independence gained a majority of seats in the Catalan Parliament.

The new cabinet took further steps towards a hypothetical independence process that was supposed to last two to three years. Meanwhile, tensions hardened between separatists and unionists. And there were other driving forces at play as well. These included “the economic crisis, the loss of legitimacy of Spanish political institutions and elites, the attractions of identity politics, and comparative grievances”, as LSE Spanish Studies Professor Sebastian Balfour told GRI at the time.

The perception grew that Madrid did not have Catalonia’s best interests at heart. Earlier this year, a plot under the name of “Operation Catalonia” was uncovered, causing widespread indignation in the region. According to judicial records, Spain’s former Minister of the Interior Jorge Fernández Díaz had conspired with high ranking police officials to delegitimize some Catalan political figures and, consequently, the process of independence.

In June 2017, the date of the current referendum was set for October. Spanish authorities indicated they were prepared use any means necessary in order to prevent it from happening. On 1 October, this was taken a step further when Guardia Civil troops actually used forced to stop people from voting.

Two political camps

Two distinct political groupings have formed over the years in relation to the independence issue. There is the nationalist movement, backed by political parties such as Junts pel Sí and the Candidatura d’Unió Popular and civil society organizations such as the National Assembly of Catalonia and Òmnium Cultural. This is opposed by the unionist movement, which includes the Partido Popular and Ciudadanos; the sole civic group supporting it is called Catalan Civil Society. In terms of the population, the demographics joining both causes are fairly homogeneous in terms of geographical origin and social status.

The two largest outliers within the Catalan borders are Podemos and the Socialist Party of Catalonia. They have been quoted both in favor and against the separatist movement. The real wildcard, however, might be the European Union. As a supranational organization, it might have the most leverage in terms of an agreement being reached, but thus far has largely stayed out of the fray.

Little prospect for compromise

In the initial aftermath of the referendum, there was some expectation in Catalonia that President Charles Puigdemont would unilaterally declare independence within the week. Instead, he equivocated: seeming to make the declaration, then suspending it and calling for talks with Spain. However, the Spanish side refuses to negotiate unless the referendum result is annulled. This has led to a new escalation, where Spain intends to invoke Article 155 of the Constitution, imposing direct rule on Catalonia – unless the region agrees to hold snap elections.

This way out has also been rejected by Puigdemont, who instead has gone out to join mass demonstrations, calling Madrid’s threats of direct rule “an attack” and an attempt to destroy democracy. He has nonetheless reiterated that his offers of dialogue are “genuine”.

Neither party seems willing to make compromises. Under these conditions, more forceful actions by Madrid are likely, which will further alienate the Catalan population, making a compromise even more difficult. An intervention by a greater authority – the EU – seems increasingly necessary.

 

This article was originally published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Marc Hernando Santacana. 

The post The origins of the Catalonia crisis appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Les révélations de LuxLeaks ont donné un coup de projecteur sur les pratiques de contournement de l'impôt chez Disney. Embarrassantes, ces informations sont occultées dans le parc d'attractions de Marne-la-Vallée, où prospère la vision d'une entreprise consensuelle, soudée autour de valeurs communes… / (...) / États-Unis, France, Enfance, Entreprise, Fiscalité, Idéologie, Jeunes, Loisirs, Multinationales, Syndicalisme, Travail, Commerce - 2015/08

Du 22 au 25 mai, les Européens éliront leurs députés, un scrutin qui influera sur le choix du prochain président de la Commission. Mais l'Union abandonnera-t-elle pour autant une feuille de route politique qui se caractérise par l'organisation du dumping social ? / Europe, France, Italie, Portugal, (...) / Europe, France, Italie, Portugal, Roumanie, Économie, Entreprise, Immigrés, Migrations, Protection sociale, Région, Syndicalisme, Travail - 2014/04

The latest terrorist attack in Mogadishu has brought the threat of Al-Shabaab to the forefront of world news and signalled the weakness of the Somali American-backed government.

More than 300 people died on 14 October in Mogadishu after two bomb trucks exploded in the crowded district of Hodan. While no group officially claimed the attack, experts agree that it was almost certainly directed by Al-Qaeda affiliated militant group Al-Shabaab. The deadliest terror attack in Somalia since 2007 highlights the persistent threat of Islamist militant groups and their ability to carry out sophisticated assaults on soft targets. The threat of Al-Shabaab has increased in southern and central Somalia as well as outside the country’s borders. In 2016, Al-Shabaab became the deadliest terror group on the African continent, followed by Boko Haram. While Al-Shabaab has suffered setbacks in recent years, the latest attack in Mogadishu shows that the organisation is resurgent and has the capabilities to carry out acute attacks. The incident also undermines the credibility of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmaajo)’s government, less than a year after his election.

Al-Shabaab’s enduring presence in Somalia and beyond

Al-Shabaab continues to wage a violent insurgency against the government and US-backed forces in Somalia. Since 2010, the group has suffered territorial losses at the hands of the US coalition and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) but its ability to carry out deadly attacks has not diminished. In September the group attacked a military base outside the capital, killing eight soldiers. The choice of targets (busy public areas, security forces) reflects Al-Shabaab’s attempts to destabilise the government and inflict maximum damage to shock public opinion. While small-scale targeted attacks by Al-Shabaab are common in Somalia, the scale of 14 October bombings is unprecedented. It signals the growing sophistication of Al-Shabaab’s tactics and the failure of the Somali government to address the threat. Al-Shabaab still controls many parts of southern and central Somalia as well as several strategic supply routes.

Al-Shabaab has also extended its influence outside the country and poses a transnational threat in East Africa. The group launched several attacks outside Somalia’s border, notably in Kenya, where it has assaulted security forces and beheaded civilians. Al-Shabaab militants are believed to be present in several other countries in the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda. The organisation regularly targets AMISON troops, recently killing 24 soldiers in an ambush attack. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab has limited the expansion of Islamic State and imposed itself as the primary security threat for the population.

Flaws in Somalia’s security strategy

The Somali president has vowed to respond to the threat of Al-Shabaab following the recent attacks. His election in February raised hopes for the security of the country and the stability of the region. The reshuffle of security services and the nomination of new heads of police, military and intelligence signaled the government’s ambition to tackle terrorism. Extra resources were invested in securing Mogadishu. Between February and September, the number of attacks in Somalia decreased.

The latest attack has nonetheless dealt a blow to Farmaajo’s record. Since February, the new government has faced several controversies. The extradition of a commander of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (a separatist group fighting advocating self-determination for Somalis living in Ethiopia) to Ethiopian authorities has sparked accusations of breaches of national and international law and has weakened the president’s ambitions to unify the country. Divisions within Farmaajo’s government over security have also come to light. Two days before the 14 October attack, the Defence Minister and the chief of the armed forces resigned over disagreements on how to combat Al-Shabaab. In late August, the death of 10 civilians in a joint US-Somali security raid against the terror group brought to light the weaknesses of the government’s tactics. Factional violence, as evidenced by recent clashes between rival governmental units, represents an additional challenge for security forces.

The impact of the attack on the Somali government

While the attack could unite Somalis behind President Farmaajo in a show of solidarity, it is also likely to raise further questions about the government’s counterterrorism strategy and embolden the president’s opponents. Divisions between federal states and central government could deepen and Farmaajo’s political opponents could exploit the situation to hold a no-confidence vote.

The government will also face the task of maintaining its international allies’ support. In a statement released after the attack, the US State Department reaffirmed its commitment ‘to stand with the Somali government’. The US administration’s ambivalent stance towards Somalia nonetheless casts doubt over the US’ intentions to increase its support. AMISOM has vowed to assist Somalia after the attacks but continued support will depend on the Somali government’s ability to project credibility and convince its allies that it can address the threat of Al-Shabaab effectively.

This article was originally published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Cecile Guerin.

The post What the terrorist attack in Mogadishu tells us about the resurgence of Al-Shabaab appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.