Kris Osborn
Chinese Military, China
Unlike some other countries, China is not known for exaggerating its military strength, so U.S. and Western defense planners are taking what is said seriously.Editor's Note: The 2020 Zhuhai Air Show, initially scheduled for November, was postponed in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Here's What You Need To Remember: China appears to be preparing to unveil its new H-20 stealth bomber, an emerging platform expected to massively extend China’s attack range and present a rival platform to the U.S. B-2 and emerging B-21.
Quoting “military sources,” a report from The New Zealand Herald said the new and still somewhat mysterious H-20 bomber could make its first public appearance at this year’s Zhuhai Airshow in November—depending upon how things progress with the Coronavirus Pandemic.
The H-20 could, of course depending upon its technological configuration, bring a new level of threat to the United States, for a number of reasons.
For instance, the New Zealand report says the new supersonic stealth bomber could “double” China’s strike range. Interestingly, although much is still not known about the platform, its existence was cited in the Pentagon’s 2018 and 2019 annual “China Military Power Report.” The 2019 report specifies that the new H-20 will likely have a range of “at least 8,500km” and “employ both conventional and nuclear weaponry.”
The report cites 2016 public comments from People’s Liberation Army Air Force Commander General Ma Xiaotian announcing the development of the H-20, and saying the weapon could emerge some time in the next decades. Well, sure enough, the next decade is here and early renderings appear to parallel some of Xiaotian’s comments about Chinese intentions for the bomber. According to the Pentagon’s China report, he said the H-20 will “employ 5th generation technologies.”
An ability to engineer and deliver fifth-generation systems into the bomber may remain to be seen to some extent, as much is still unknown, yet the Chinese have already engineered several potentially fifth-generation aircraft with the J-20 and J-31. At the very least, the exterior does appear to be stealthy; it looks like it has an embedded engine, blended wing body, absence of vertical structures and engine air ducts woven into the frame underneath the fuselage. The B-2, by contrast, has air ducts emerging from the top of the fuselage, however many design features unequivocally seem to resemble a B-2. The Pentagon report observes that “a possible H-20 prototype depicted a flying wing airframe akin to the B-2 bomber and X-47B stealth unmanned combat aerial vehicle.”
A reported range of 8,500 kilometers appears slightly less than a B-2 bomber’s range of more than 6,700 miles, Pentagon reports have raised concerns that the Chinese “may also be developing a refuelable bomber that could “reach initial operating capability before the long-range bomber.”
Perhaps of even greater concern, according to the Pentagon assessment, is that such a refueler could “expand long-range offensive bomber capability beyond the second island chain.” A refueler could also substantially change the equation and enable it to rival the mission scope of a B-2 which, as many know, successfully completed forty-four-hour missions from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to Diego Garcia, a small island off the Indian coast during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
As for its ability to compete with a B-2 or B-21, there may simply be too many unknowns. However, a few things do come to mind. The B-21 airframe, for instance, appears to have little or almost no external exhaust pipes, raising the question as to whether it incorporates new thermal management or heat dispersion technologies. A key goal, when it comes to designing stealth bomber airframes, is to work toward having it mirror or align with the surrounding temperature of the atmosphere so as to be less detectable to thermal sensors. Also, while much of the B-21’s details remain “black” for understandable reasons, senior Air Force leaders have said the platform contains a new generation of stealth technologies and can “hold any target at risk in the world at any time.”
This indicates that there may be a high measure of confidence that the new B-21 will be able to succeed against the most advanced current and anticipated future air defense systems. An ability to elude both surveillance and engagement radar in a modern technical environment would be quite an accomplishment, as advanced Russian air defenses such as the S-400 and S-500 contain a new generation of technologies. Not only do they use digital networking to connect radar nodes, rely upon faster computer processing and track aircraft on a wider sphere of frequencies, but they also claim to be able to detect “stealth” to a large degree. This may remain as of yet unproven, as it is something touted by the Russian media, yet it has inspired U.S. weapons developers so seek newer paradigms for stealth technology. Also, the sophistication of these advanced air defenses may be one reason why, at least when it comes to stealth fighters, senior Air Force weapons developers describe stealth as merely “one arrow in a quiver” of methods to evade and destroy enemy air defenses. Nonetheless, there is no available evidence to suggest a new B-21 would have any difficulty against the most advanced air defenses; debates along these lines are likely to persist for years, at least until much more is known about the B-21. Air Force officials say the B-21 will be virtually “undetectable,” something which may very well be true.
Finally, it may not even be clear that China’s new H-20 bomber could even fully rival the U.S, B-2. While the B-2 may be thought of as a somewhat antiquated 1980s built platform, years of Air Force upgrades have vastly changed the performance parameters of the airplane. The B-2 is now being engineered with a so-called Defensive Management System sensor designed to find locations of enemy air defenses—and thus fly around them. The B-2 is also being outfitted with a new one-thousand-fold faster computer processor and being configured to integrate new weapons platforms such as the modern, upgraded B-61 Mod12 nuclear bomb. Finally much like what is reported about the H-20, both the B-2 and B-21 are engineered to carry and fire long-range nuclear and conventional cruise missiles, such as the Air Force’s emerging Long-Range Standoff Weapon.
Overall, the current B-2, which is now being engineered to fly alongside the B-21 until sufficient numbers of B-21s are available, is nothing like the aircraft which initially emerged in the late 80s. Along these lines, both the B-21 and B-2 are built with the often discussed “open architecture” strategy intended to lay down the technical apparatus sufficient to sustain perpetual upgradeability.
Ultimately, while there is much still to be known about the H-20, there are many reasons why U.S. weapons developers are likely to take it very seriously. For instance, if the H-20 can extend beyond the first island chain, as the New Zealand report maintains, then it can not only hold the Philippines, Japan and areas of the South China Sea at risk, but also threaten Hawaii, Australia and even parts of the continental United States.
Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
The piece first appeared last year and is being republished due to reader interest.
Image: Weibo.
Kris Osborn
Taiwan, East Asia
The comments may have to do with Washington's increasing arms sales to Taipei.Here's What You Need to Remember: A prominent Chinese researcher and military expert's comment raises an interesting question in the sense that it may not be clear what exactly he means by the “U.S. edging closer to Taiwan.” Perhaps this relates to increased U.S. weapons sales to the island, or could simply be seen as a kind of empty threat.
A prominent Chinese researcher and military expert connected to the People’s Liberation Army is saying that a potential war with the United States over Taiwan independence essentially relies upon Washington or U.S. actions.
Zhou Bo, an honorary fellow at the Centre for China-America Defence Relations at the Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, is quoted in a news story in the South China Morning Post back late last year called “U.S.-China relations” as saying “The development of cross-strait relations is not solely decided by the Chinese mainland. It is, on the contrary, a result of the interaction between Taipei, Washington and Beijing.”
The essay goes on to say China is “reluctant to use force against Taiwan because it sees the people as their compatriots.”
These two comments, as cited in the paper, seem to resonate as a bit of an overt contradiction, meaning they seem to both communicate warnings and threat while also encouraging restraint. Which is it? Chinese-military affiliated experts, analysts and researchers have of course a long history of making provocative statements, and this simply seems no different.
After all, it seems clear that the United States would have no actual reason to risk war except in the unforseen or unanticipated event that China actually launches an invasion to reunify with Taiwan.
Nonetheless, much of what could be called confusion or overt contractions coming from Chinese officials does seem to pertain to the arrival of a new Taiwanese president.
“Now the US is increasingly edging closer to Taiwan, and [President] Tsai Ing-wen holds a totally different stance to developing ties with Beijing when compared to her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou,” Zhou says in the South China Morning Report, referring to Ma’s mainland-friendly approach.
Zhou’s comment raises an interesting question in the sense that it may not be clear what exactly he means by the “U.S. edging closer to Taiwan.” Perhaps this relates to increased U.S. weapons sales to the island, or could simply be seen as a kind of empty threat.
The United States is already close to Taiwan and has a long history of providing military and diplomatic support to the island. As part of this, Taiwan has long been a Foreign Military Sales customer of the United States, acquiring Black Hawk and Kiowa helicopters, hellfire missiles, Stingers, torpedos, and even C-130 aircraft, along with much more.
Most recently, the United States is now amid a deal with Taiwan to offer as many as 108 Abrams main battle tanks. This is quite significant, as the presence of main battle tanks on the Taiwanese mainland certainly strengthens a credible deterrent against a Chinese invasion, by at very least ensuring that a ground invasion could be costly and lengthy for China should it embark upon such a venture.
Also, Taiwan received some Patriot (PAC-3) air defense missiles during the George W. Bush administration, yet Taiwan has overwhelmingly purchased maritime defenses. They have also received air-to-ground and air-to-air weapons, torpedos, and ship-fired SM-2 missiles.
Kris Osborn is the Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
This article is being republished due to reader interest.
Image: Reuters.
Trevor Filseth
Stimulus Help,
If you own a home or are in the process of paying off your mortgage, you can access an additional $10 billion program set aside for homeowners who fell behind on bills during the pandemic.The three stimulus checks paid out so far – one in March 2020, one in December 2020, and one in March 2021 – have so far amounted to $3200 in direct cash relief to all American adults within certain income brackets.
However, the stimulus checks are far from the only financial relief that Americans can avail themselves of during the pandemic. The Biden administration has passed a raft of financial measures in the American Rescue Plan Act, the March legislation that provided for the third (and so far last) stimulus check. Many of these measures have been described elsewhere in detail, including the IRS’s “plus-up” payments and increases to the Child Income Tax Credit.
One of these measures concerns homeownership. If you own a home or are in the process of paying off your mortgage, you can access an additional $10 billion program set aside for homeowners who fell behind on bills during the pandemic.
According to the financial website MoneyWise, slightly under $10 billion has been set aside for the Homeowners Assistance Fund, a fund that provides assistance to homeowners in paying their mortgages, taxes, and other homeowner-related expenses.
This money has mostly been sent out to individual states to distribute through their statewide housing agencies, based on the number of late mortgage payments and foreclosures in each state, in addition to other considerations such as the unemployment rate. Per the Treasury Department, each state received at least $50 million from the fund; however, the states which received the most were California ($1 billion), Florida ($676 million) and Texas ($842 million).
There are some conditions attached to the aid requests. To qualify, you must own your home and have a mortgage with a balance of less than $550,000. You must also have an annual income that is lower than either your area’s median income or the national median income. Furthermore, 60% of the aid is earmarked for mortgages, and the funds from the program must be used before the end of September 2025.
The Biden administration (and the Trump administration before it) provided other means of assistance to homeowners and renters. Perhaps the single largest and most important measure has been the nationwide moratorium on evictions, blocking landlords from evicting tenants who are behind on their rent until after the pandemic. The eviction moratorium has repeatedly been extended for additional periods; it is currently set to expire at the end of June.
Trevor Filseth is a news reporter and writer for the National Interest.
Peter Suciu
military, Americas
The service plans to employ a number of KC-46 tanker aircraft equipped with a pod filled with communications equipment that could translate between the two waveforms.Soon the United States Air Force’s Boeing KC-46 aerial refueling tankers will be outfitted with new equipment that will enable it to serve as a node in the service’s new Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). The system is the Department of the Air Force’s contribution to the Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2), a Department of Defense effort to digitally connect all elements of the United States military across all five warfighting domains including air, land, sea, space and cyberspace.
ABMS has become a top modernization priority for the Department of the Air Force with a budget of $3.3 billion over five years. Once fully deployed it will be the backbone of a network-centric approach in partnership with all the services across the DoD. When fully realized, the CJADC2 could allow U.S. forces from all services—as well as allies—to receive, fuse and act upon a vast array of data and information in "all domains at the speed of relevance."
The Air Force announced that a communications pod installed in a KC-46 Pegasus will soon allow the F-35 Lightning II and F-22 Raptor to connect and instantly receive and transmit the most up-to-date information to ensure the warfighters maintain decision superiority. This concept, which is known as Capability Release #1 under the ABMS framework, will also allow data to pass between the stealth fighters—despite the fact that each of the Lockheed Martin-built aircraft utilizes different data links.
The F-35 jet employs the Multifunctional Advanced Data Link, whereas the F-22 jet uses the Intra-Flight Data Link. According to DefenseNews those two links are incompatible and do not allow the fighters to share information while retaining stealth capability. The Air Force will soon employ a number of KC-46 tanker aircraft equipped with a pod filled with communications equipment that could translate between the two waveforms.
The Air Force had conducted tests of the command and control during the ABMS onramp 3 last November, but the platform is much more than just a translation tool for the stealth aircraft. ABMS has become akin to an “Internet of Military Things,” which could connect everything from sensors to shooters across the joint force via cloud-based networks. It could revolutionize how the services operate together.
“Nearly two years of rigorous development and experimentation have shown beyond doubt the promise of ABMS,” said Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr.
“We’ve demonstrated that our ABMS efforts can collect vast amounts of data from air, land, sea, space and cyber domains, process that information and share it in a way that allows for faster and better decisions,” added Gen. Brown. “This ability gives us a clear advantage, and it’s time to move ABMS forward so we can realize and ultimately use the power and capability it will provide.”
Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.
Image: Reuters
After being a resident living in the UK and EU, learning the legal foundations and delicate intricacies of British and European Commercial Law and Intellectual Property rights, it still amazes me how these two powerful entities could still place the weakest and most needy in society at peril over the political aspirations of a few wealthy, elite politicians and their political movements. This being done to the clear detriment of everyone’s parents. The birthplace of Parliamentary Democracy and Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite chose to squabble during a deadly pandemic over vaccines, a possible cure to the Covid crisis, in the middle of a third horrendous wave because there are two camps with well dug in positions over the issue of the UK leaving the EU.
When a community votes for an issue that affects them directly, a democracy should work to respect their decision even if it is not wholly correct in the eyes of professional democrats who run democracies. That is the foundation of society in Western Europe. A weakness of the EU system is that direct democracy is often lacking, and large Supranational bodies often apply policy without the constraints of grassroots communities in the process. This was a key failure in the process that lead many in the UK to push away from the EU. If the British people and those of the now streamlined European Union chose a path for their society, it will be taken by vote, but the decision should not result in a political punishment of those voters.
Citizens on both sides need vaccines, and if the parents who need it the most who lived in the European Economic Community need help, they should be helped in concert with other European nations. The European Economic Community was after all mostly a trade agreement before the legal and cultural ties of the modern EU took shape, and it functioned fairly well for citizens of both communities. A shared trade agreement between many of the current EU members and the UK needed and needs to get everyone vaccinated, whatever their politics might be in 2021, to help those who lived well under the EEC in the 70s. A people first approach should be sacrosanct when everyone’s family is at risk, whatever their political opinion on borders are currently.
While the EU as a quasi-Federal political entity did fracture, other Federated states have taken to charging at their political opposition in different regions of their country. While regional health initiatives produced more effective local results in combatting Covid, the challenging of states against other states seems to have more to do with shifting blame to political opponents instead of sharing useful health policy in an environment where honest science produces life saving healthcare strategies. On top of elites challenging elites to the detriment of the greater community, there have even been cases of petty politicians using their petty politics to belittle and even dehumanise their political opponents who are clearly members of the 1% crowd, concerned more about their job than the people they believe they govern. Such individuals need to be ejected from polite society, still landing on a cushion of power, with great rewards depending on how corrupt the system they gave birth to has become. This will not save any lives but their own it seems.
Welcome to 2021…or for most of us still waiting for vaccines under lockdowns, 2020 plus 5.
The Source
To many Americans, foreign policy discourse comes in broad themes punctuated by very specific issues. China policy may well form the largest of those themes, and reasonably so. China could pose a threat to displace America’s international system, arguably the only one. News and commentary focus heavily on China’s actions and their rulers’ intent: whether they aim to displace us in our influence or merely want to insulate themselves from us; whether they want to supplant democracy with their system; and how far they will go to disrupt our society. Our China experts, and others, report every fact and parse every analysis of China. They yield deep insight on China’s nature and intentions, possibly deeper than George Kennan’s 1947 study of the Soviet Union.
Relatively few raise the question of what the U.S. seeks in our China policy. AEI’s Giselle Donnelly calls for a true strategic approach, and Ali Wyne of Eurasia Group has queried what we compete over in “great power competition.” We should recall the old adage about friendships and interests, and add that enmities as well as friendships defer to interests. Kennan established the Soviet Union as an existential danger, so opposing that country became a proxy for our interests. But today we lack consensus on America’s core interest. Having been immersed in what China might do, our discourse should turn its focus, to coin a phrase, to the sources of American conduct. The same holds for our foreign policy in general.
U.S. policy toward China will variously cite a rules based global order, democracy, human rights, trade, common interests in curbing climate change, U.S. competitiveness, and jobs. Policies shift between these various concerns, but rhyme and reason to any given shift is hard to see, while the common denominator is that we oppose China. And we offer no coherent and durable narrative to say why. We do not confront the Chinese leadership with a durable counter to their self-serving but coherent interpretations.
America in fact has a fundamental bottom line. The nation was conceived on a short, abstract creed, of unalienable rights and government that exists to secure those rights, under the consent of the governed. This definition of national identity underpins American national legitimacy, the deepest interest a nation can have. Yes, we have more tangible interests, of fair trade in principle and of trade advantages of our industries, of democracy in Taiwan and of peace, of human rights in Xinjiang and of climate policy. But we need to organize our priorities around the deep interest, our commitment to the creed of the Declaration of Independence.
Today, U.S. foreign policy serves as a tool of bipolar politics. Two partisan camps occasionally voice the same incontestable common points, but they are more concerned to do better than the other side. Everyone knows China is a one party dictatorship, so no one is overly friendly. Everyone knows we share interests from financial market stability to climate issues. But Republicans act to hobble China’s tech firms, while Democrats seek collaboration on climate policy. What degree of support either side would muster for other goals is a matter of political convenience. Both sides found reasons to ditch the Trans Pacific Partnership trade pact. Will either find it useful to defend Taiwan?
Walter Russell Mead points out that all potential policy stances toward China carry risks. He further asserts that a flourishing Asia is the answer to the U.S.’s China problem. If flourishing includes growth in personal freedom, as it has in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, then that approach also fits America’s founding ethos. A world that not only protects, but promotes, people’s right to the pursuit of happiness best serves everyone, and fulfills our creed. A flourishing world goes very far toward securing America’s deepest interest, for all of our foreign policy. If U.S. foreign policy organizes itself to express that aspiration, then to the American public, and to billions of others, that’s what matters most.
On se souvient d’abord d’une confusion extrême. La démission de Michèle Alliot-Marie en février 2011, à la suite de ses propos sur la situation tunisienne, trois mois après sa nomination au quai d’Orsay. La disparition de plusieurs interlocuteurs arabes encombrants mais familiers. Un processus décisionnel qui semble flotter malgré les efforts d’Alain Juppé, appelé pour redresser la machine diplomatique. La campagne libyenne de Bernard-Henri Lévy. Puis les regrets acerbes de Barack Obama pour avoir suivi la France en Libye.
2On se remémore ensuite un sentiment d’impuissance en réalité plus profond, plus ancien. L’attentat contre le Drakkar, quartier général des forces françaises à Beyrouth, en 1983, et le départ de cette France, dont les dirigeants assuraient qu’elle « n’avait pas d’ennemis ». Une Europe absente du processus israélo-palestinien supervisé par les États-Unis après 1991, et qui arrive trop tard, à Barcelone en 1995, pour accompagner une paix qui n’existe déjà plus. Les efforts français pour rester dans le jeu proche-oriental après les bombardements israéliens de Cana en 1996. Les navettes quasi mensuelles, mais vaines de Bernard Kouchner en 2007 pour tenter de trouver une issue à la crise institutionnelle libanaise, laquelle sera finalement dénouée à Doha.
3Bien sûr, il y eut des images fortes. Jacques Chirac dans la vieille ville de Jérusalem en 1996, houspillant la sécurité israélienne au plus grand bonheur des télévisions arabes. Jacques Chirac encore, quelques mois plus tôt à l’Université du Caire, appelant à une nouvelle politique arabe de la France. Jacques Chirac, toujours, recevant un accueil triomphal fin 2001 à Bab El-Oued. Jacques Chirac, surtout, s’opposant à la guerre états-unienne en Irak en 2003. Ces images ne sont pas négligeables et restent dans les mémoires. Elles rappellent que la France est là. On cherchera d’ailleurs à en créer de nouvelles : Emmanuel Macron à Beyrouth, prenant une femme libanaise dans ses bras au lendemain de l’explosion du 4 août 2020, après des mois de protestations contre un système moribond.
4Mais ces images ne changent pas la réalité profonde. La France subit une séquence difficile en Méditerranée depuis les « printemps arabes ». La région va de Charybde en Scylla. Et les temps qui s’annoncent risquent de réduire encore la marge de manœuvre.
Une séquence difficile5Le « petit roi » Hussein de Jordanie entretenait des relations de confiance avec la France. Lors du voyage de François Mitterrand au royaume hachémite en novembre 1992, l’arrivée du Concorde présidentiel avait été filmée de longues minutes en direct, sur une télévision jordanienne fascinée par le faste majestueux de ce drôle d’oiseau français. C’est ensuite à l’hôtel Old Cataract d’Assouan, en 1995, que François Mitterrand choisit de passer son dernier Noël, sous la fidèle bienveillance d’Hosni Moubarak. Le « Docteur Chirac », lui, était régulièrement l’un des premiers acteurs informés par Yasser Arafat, au retour de ses voyages et discussions diplomatiques. Il félicitait le président tunisien Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali de ses scores improbables aux élections présidentielles : 99,45 % en 1999, 94,49 % en 2004. Il était l’ami de Rafic Hariri, dont il écoutait les conseils sur la politique moyen-orientale. Hassan II du Maroc, dont il était un intime, fut, avec la Garde royale marocaine, son invité d’honneur aux cérémonies du 14 juillet 1999.
Changement d’époque6Mais déjà, une page d’histoire se tournait. D’abord avec la disparition physique ou politique de ceux qui l’avaient écrite.
Lire la suite dans Revue internationale et stratégique 2021/1 (N° 121), pages 151 à 160
Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps 2021 de Politique étrangère (n° 1/2021). Julien Nocetti propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Joëlle Toledano, GAFA : reprenons le pouvoir ! (Odile Jacob, 2020, 192 pages).
L’essai de Joëlle Toledano questionne le rôle des GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook et Amazon) dans la sphère politique et économique mondiale, et propose des pistes de réflexion pour se libérer de leur emprise sur nos économies. Voici vingt ans, Google et Amazon étaient des start-ups, Facebook n’existait pas et Apple entamait avec le retour de Steve Jobs sa deuxième vie. Deux décennies plus tard, les GAFA font partie des entreprises les plus puissantes du monde, et la crise du coronavirus les a encore renforcées. La pandémie a en effet constitué une incontestable aubaine pour les grandes plateformes numériques, au point qu’elles figurent désormais au cœur des rapports de puissance.
Contrairement aux autres plateformes numériques, chacun de ces « empires » a réussi à sa façon à étendre ses activités pour créer de puissants écosystèmes, devenus des places fortes. Les pratiques abusives de chacun des quatre GAFA sont largement connues et documentées, sans même parler de leur savoir-faire en matière d’optimisation fiscale, de l’impact d’Amazon sur le commerce traditionnel et les emplois, ou encore des défis démocratiques significatifs posés par les contenus haineux et les manipulations informationnelles que véhiculent les réseaux sociaux.
L’ouvrage dresse surtout un constat d’échec de la régulation, qui n’agit qu’a posteriori, une fois les dérives identifiées. L’auteur suggère très justement de s’attaquer à l’opacité – terme qui revient tout au long de l’ouvrage – du fonctionnement de ces acteurs, en déconstruisant la « boîte noire » des algorithmes, en inspectant la complexité des relations économiques à l’intérieur des écosystèmes, et en comprenant les mécanismes de création de valeur par la publicité (ciblée).
Que nous disent le modèle économique des GAFA et ses conséquences sur la régulation ? Pour l’auteur, ce modèle ne s’appuie que sur des rendements infiniment croissants. Passé le nombre de clients qui permet de rentabiliser l’investissement, tous les autres génèrent du profit pur, avec une croissance exponentielle due à l’effet de réseau. S’enclenche alors une mécanique qui voit son efficacité progresser avec le nombre de données recueillies par le moteur de recherche de Google, les discussions sur Facebook, les abonnements chez Amazon, ou le magasin d’applications d’Apple. Les concurrents sont évincés ou rachetés.
Joëlle Toledano propose in fine une régulation individuelle plutôt qu’un appel au démantèlement, comme le préconisait un récent rapport de la commission antitrust de la Chambre des représentants américaine. Prendre des mesures marché par marché constituerait ainsi la solution la plus réaliste à court et moyen termes. Dans ce tableau où l’économie est omniprésente, Joëlle Toledano n’occulte pas les implications de puissance. Si le Congrès – désormais à majorité démocrate – pourrait prendre des mesures afin d’encadrer les GAFA et mieux protéger les consommateurs, « pronostiquer un accord politique de plus grande ampleur paraît peu vraisemblable ». Référence indirecte est ici faite au contexte de compétition technologique entre États-Unis et Chine, et à la réticence des décideurs américains à entraver leurs entreprises qui investissent et innovent le plus. Vis-à-vis de l’Europe, cette approche se traduit par un soutien sans faille des autorités fédérales aux GAFA quand Bruxelles ou les capitales européennes entreprennent des actions de régulation.
Julien Nocetti
Accédez à l’article de Alejandro Fleming ici.
Retrouvez le sommaire du numéro 1/2021 de Politique étrangère ici.