Diplomacy & Crisis News

Stephen Silver

Wi-Fi 6E, Americas

Last year, the first major products rolled out with the latest generation of Wi-Fi technology, Wi-Fi 6. But not long after, the Wi-Fi Alliance moved forward with the development of an even newer version, Wi-Fi 6E.

Last year, the first major products rolled out with the latest generation of Wi-Fi technology, Wi-Fi 6. But not long after, the Wi-Fi Alliance moved forward with the development of an even newer version, Wi-Fi 6E.

The FCC voted last April to approve the use of 1,200 Megahertz of spectrum for unlicensed use, which will be filled by Wi-Fi 6E. Several other countries, including the UK, European Union, Chile, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates, have opened spectrum for similar purposes, while several other countries, including Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Taiwan, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar, and Jordan, are in the process of doing so. 

The Asus ROG Rapture GT-AXE11000, a gaming router released in December, became the first-ever router to support Wi-Fi 6E transmissions, although it’s been generally understood that more such products will be arriving on the market throughout 2021. 

Now, ahead of next week’s International CES, the Wi-Fi Alliance announced that “certification for Wi-Fi 6E is now available to deliver interoperability for devices operating in the 6 GHz spectrum.” Current devices operate using 2.4GHz and 5GHz bands. Most upgrades to Wi-Fi, however, don’t entail the opening of new swathes of spectrum.

Several companies, including Broadcom, Intel, MaxLinear, MediaTek, ON Semiconductor, and Qualcomm, are on board with Wi-Fi 6E. And per The Verge, many router devices compatible with the technology are likely to be shown at CES, and that due to the Snapdragon 888 processor, many Android phones being brought out by different manufacturers in 2021 will offer support for the new Wi-Fi standard. 

“Wi-Fi 6E will see rapid adoption in 2021 with more than 338 million devices entering the market, and nearly 20 percent of all Wi-Fi 6 device shipments supporting 6 GHz by 2022,” Phil Solis, research director at IDC. “This year, we expect to see new Wi-Fi 6E chipsets from several companies, and a variety of new Wi-Fi 6E smartphones, PCs, and laptops in the first quarter of 2021 followed by TVs and VR product announcements midyear.”

The Alliance has also released an animation showing how the new technology works, with a caption that states that “6 GHz unlicensed spectrum presents tremendous opportunity for Wi-Fi innovation, and Wi-Fi Alliance is rapidly delivering its benefits with Wi-Fi 6E.” 

“Worldwide interoperability for Wi-Fi 6E devices promotes rapid adoption and innovation in 6 GHz,” Edgar Figueroa, president and CEO of the Wi-Fi Alliance, said. “Users will soon experience unprecedented Wi-Fi that significantly improves applications and delivers new use cases that will change their connected experiences.”

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Sebastien Roblin

History, Asia

A nuclear war between those countries would have impacted the entire globe.

Key point: Thankfully a full-scale nuclear war did not erupt. But Pakistan's decision to pick a fight was incredibly dumb.

For years, there was a conceit that no two states with nuclear weapons have ever directly fought each other. That conceit has at times been thin. For example, during the Korean War, Soviet air force regiments battled U.S. jet fighters in support of North Korea. But Washington as much as Moscow refrained from pointing out that thinly-veiled fact, lest it escalate tensions.

But when thousands of Pakistani troops infiltrated across the Line of Control in 1999, separating the Indian and Pakistani-controlled territories, disguised as local insurgents, the pretense proved impossible to maintain before the prying eyes of global media.

Just a year earlier on May 28, 1998, Pakistan conducted a series of underground nuclear tests known as Chagai-I. Islamabad’s ascension as a nuclear power was met with jubilation in Pakistani streets and condemnations and sanctions across the globe. Though Pakistan’s rival India had conducted its Smiling Buddha nuclear test in 1974, Chagai came in response to a second India test held just two weeks earlier.

Still, in February 1999 both countries signed the Lahore Declaration expressing a desire to peacefully resolve the long-standing conflict over the mountainous region of Kashmir, which has a Muslim majority and Hindu minority.

However, the Pakistani military’s Joint Staff Headquarters, under General (and soon-to-be prime minister) Pervez Musharraf saw an opportunity to pick off salient Indian territory called the Siachen glacier. As the glacier lay 20,000 feet above sea level, Indian border outposts in the sector were sparsely manned or abandoned. And positions near the town of Kargil could be used to interdict National Highway 1 connecting the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar to the Ladakh provincial capital of Leh.

Thus, even as Islamabad and New Delhi celebrated their apparent peace accord, four battalions of Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry regiment (5th, 6th, 12th and 13th) and two of the Sind Regiment (24th and 27th), as well as commandos from the elite Special Services Group, were infiltrating into the abandoned outposts at the very peaks of the Himalayas, without initially being detected.

The subterfuge could not last forever. Local shepherds first reported seeing the Pakistani infiltrators on May 3. On May 15, a six-man Indian patrol under Lt. Saurabh Kalia sent to investigate the Ladakh mountains was ambushed, captured and apparently tortured before being shot dead.

Within days, the Indian Army discovered that Pakistani forces had seized control of roughly 65 square miles of territory on the Indian side of the Line of Control, with troops dispersed over 132 strongpoints.

New Delhi mobilized 200,000 troops to evict the infiltrators, but the bulk of the fighting was undertaken by the 20,000 soldiers in the 8th Mountain and 3rd Infantry Divisions, supported by nineteen (battalion-sized) artillery regiments.

They faced only 5,000 Pakistani soldiers—but these were dug into fortified hilltops between 8,000 and 18,000 feet above sea level, and armed with infantry support weapons including mortars, machine guns, bazooka-like recoilless rifles, and Stinger and Anza man-portable surface-to-air missiles. 

Because the Line of Control limited the ability of Indian troops to maneuver around Pakistani positions, many of these positions had to be assaulted head-on. Exhaustion, cold, and high-altitude sickness also posed a formidable—and often lethal—obstacle to Indian infantry. 

The Indian Army deployed heavy Bofors FH77 155-millimeter field howitzers into mountain valleys. Designed for indirect fire support, the steep terrain allowed the heavy howitzers to level their gun barrels to deliver rapid direct fire with deadly results. 

Meanwhile, Pakistani forward observers profited from mountain tops to spy on Indian forces moving along the NH1 Highway and call down accurate artillery from batteries across the Line of Control.

Over six weeks, protracted battles raged at places like Tololing and Tiger Hill. The latter’s summit lay 16,700 feet above sea level and could only be attained by scaling up on a climbing rope.

Posturing at Sea, War in the Air

Starting May 20, the Indian Navy also began massive redeployment, with ships, amphibious forces, and reconnaissance aircraft departing on patrols pressuring the Pakistani port of Karachi. In response, the Pakistani Navy disbursed from Karachi and began escorting valuable tanker convoys. Though neither navy saw combat, it was clear they were ready for a lethal struggle—and that India might impose a suffocating blockade if tensions escalated further.

Meanwhile, New Delhi initially remained reluctant to commit offensive airpower for fear of escalation. Instead, Indian Air Force aircraft based at Srinagar flew transport, reconnaissance and electronic warfare missions. This was not without it risks, as a heat-seeking missile struck photo-recon Canberra on May 21, though the pilot managed to return to base.

On May 25, New Delhi authorized limited airstrikes. But initially, attempts to provide air support with unguided bombs dropped by dated MiG-21 fighters and Jaguar and MiG-27 attack jets struggled to land effective strikes. One MiG-27 crashed after an engine flameout; a MiG-21 was downed by a Stinger missile and its pilot apparently executed. Then a Mi-17 helicopter gunship was downed by a barrage of Stingers on May 28.

The air campaign (codenamed Safed Sager) turned a corner on May 30 when India deployed No. 1 and No. 7 squadrons equipped with fourth-generation Mirage 2000 jets into the war. These not only exhibited superior high-altitude performance but had been hastily modified to employ Paveway II laser-guided bomb imported from the United States and Lightening laser targeting pods acquired from Israel. Moreover, the Paveway IIs could be launched outside the effective range of portable anti-aircraft missiles.

These were first precision-guided munitions to be used in combat by the Indian Air Force. Throughout June and early July, Mirages knocked out nine supply depots and command bunkers in a succession of deadly precision strikes, particularly targeting Tiger Hill.

The Pakistani Air Force was never authorized to enter the conflict, but F-16 jets from No. 9 and No. 11 squadron did shadow Indian air operations from across the Line of Control in an effort to unnerve their counterparts.

Clinton’s Diplomatic Overture

Washington had condemned and sanctioned both India and Pakistan’s recent nuclear tests, and its policy was then in a state of flux. During the Cold War, India had maintained cordial relations with the Soviet Union, while the United States overtly supported Pakistan and eventually its close ally China. The end of the Cold War removed much of the rationale for these alignments. 

As early as May, Pakistan warned that it might resort to “any weapon” should the Kargil War continue to escalate. That warning assumed ominous dimensions when U.S. intelligence reported deployment of Pakistani nuclear weapons to prepare for a possible escalation of the war.

Globally, few believed Islamabad’s denials that the heavily-armed troops in Kargil were merely local insurgents. President Bill Clinton first urged Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw his forces in a phone conservation on June 15. As Pakistani positions near Kargil began to collapse, Sharif flew to Washington on July 4 and agreed to order withdrawal of Pakistani troops. This was largely accomplished, but some refused to return and continued fighting for three more weeks alongside local jihadists.

The Kargil conflict cost the lives of 527 Indian soldiers. After years of denial, Pakistan admitted its armed forces had suffered 453 dead in the border conflict. 

Clinton’s negotiations also set the stage for a dramatic turnaround in U.S.-India relations, with New Delhi becoming an increasingly important international partner of Washington in the next two decades while relations suffered with Pakistan due to its involvement in the War in Afghanistan.

Certainly, the Kargil War was far from the bloodiest ever fought—but it marked a frightening new chapter in the international system as for the first time states with nuclear weapons faced off on a (fortunately limited) battlefield. India and Pakistan could easily have escalated into a wider conflict with cross-border attacks and more air and sea power in play; a scenario in which the risk of using nuclear weapons would have increased substantially.

Twenty years later in 2019, Pakistani and Indian forces again clashed on land and air. Tensions remain acute and both states deployed dozens more nuclear weapons than they did in 1999.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared earlier and is being posted due to reader interest.
Image: Reuters

Sebastien Roblin

Security, Asia

U.S. cinema has had a major influence on what the Chinese public views as the trappings of modernity.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The script’s greatest problem, however, is its unwillingness to portray any serious flaws in its hyper-patriotic heroes. Most good military films explore the tension between the mechanistic obedience and composure under stress demanded by military organizations, versus natural human emotional responses, individualism and idealism.

Top Gun is legendary for its glamorous, rock-and-roll-fueled depiction of U.S. Navy fighter pilots. Of course, it was also a triumph in nationalistic propaganda which quintupled naval aviator recruitment the following year.

In October 2017, Chinese director Li Chen took a crack at making a Chinese Top Gun—and like the Bruckheimer original, his Sky Hunter was made in close cooperation with the military.

U.S. cinema has had a major influence on what the Chinese public views as the trappings of modernity. Thus, recent military blockbusters like Wolf Warrior 2 mark a distinct departure from low-budget TV series depicting scrappy Communist revolutionaries pitted against more heavily armed foreign invaders and Kuomintang forces.  In the new films, the People’s Liberation Army is portrayed as a technologically advanced force with global reach—just like the U.S. military.

So, Li’s patriotic jet fighter flick is a fascinating mirror to the United State’s own nationalistic impulses—despite cultural in-jokes such as the Chinese predilection for selfie-sticks.

Sky Hunter, admittedly, isn’t especially well-done military propaganda. and performed modestly at the box office in 2017. The cuts from scene to scene are often sloppy, and its driving need to highlight PLA heroism undermines pacing with ponderous patriotic pontificating.

But it’s interesting for two reasons. First, you get to watch China’s best new jet fighters engage in campy dogfights and canyon runs—mostly CGI creations, but real PLA aircraft show up on occasion. Second, it documents how Chinese military aviation wants itself to be perceived by its own citizens. The screenplay was even written by Lt. Col. Zhang Yi, a PLA officer!

As it happens, subtitled copies of Sky Hunter are not difficult to find on Youtube. So in this spoiler-ridden review of the film, we’ll go spotting for aircraft—and political subtexts.

South China Sea Skirmishes

Sky Hunter opens with a fairly routine international incident: the film’s two protagonists, hotshot Wu Di (Li Chen) and sidekick Liu Haochen (Jiahang Li) fly a pair of J-11B twin-engine fighters to intercept a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion maritime patrol plane over the South China Sea.

Most of the planet defines territorial waters and airspace as extending no further than 12 nautical miles from a country’s shores. Beijing, however, insists its dominion extends to waters hundreds of miles southeast of the mainland (map here). Washington defies these claims by flying maritime patrol planes in these sectors, so the PLA ritually dispatches fighters to intercept them and sternly advise they bug out.

As occurs in the film, the Chinese fighters sometimes buzz dangerously close to the lumbering American spy planes—a practice which resulted in a collision between a Chinese jet and American spy plane in 2001.

Wu and Liu then mock dogfight a pair of Super Hornets in a scene that liberally quotes the opening of Top Gun, sometimes shot-for-shot. Though rival air forcse are occasionally known to do this in peacetime, close-range dogfighting may likely be supplanted in a real conflict by beyond-visual range engagements where stealth, sensors and long-range missiles dominate. The Shenyang J-11 fighters in this scene are indeed magnificently maneuverable aircraft reverse-engineered from Russian Su-27 Flankers.

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Afterwards, at a graduation ceremony, Wu and Liu reunite with elite helicopter pilot Zhao Yali (Fan Bing Bing, debatably the most famous contemporary Chinese actress). The PLAAF inducted its first female pilots in the 1950s, decades before the U.S. Air Force, but kept them confined to a transport unit until around the year 2000. Since then, China’s growing contingent of female combat aviators has been prominently featured in the press.

Nuclear Terorrists, Central Asia-Style

Wu and Zhao go on to join an elite Chinese military unit, while Liu becomes a flight instructor in the neighboring country of ‘Maobhu’—a thinly veiled amalgam of Kazakhstan (in terms of ethnicity and Soviet-style uniforms) and Pakistan (in terms of its military alliance with China and political instability.) Inevitably, an extremist religious cult—a thinly veiled allusion to Islamist insurgents—seizes the airbase he’s is working at, taking Liu and other Chinese nationals hostage, as well as capturing a nuclear ballistic missile silo. Ironically, it seems both China and America fear exactly such a scenario taking place in Pakistan!

The hostage-taker’s bearded leader, Colonel Rahman (Tomer Oz) actually tells Liu he admires the ‘compassionate and peaceful’ People’s Republic of China, but has it in for his own government.  He does, however, question whether the PLA, which has “fought no wars in decades” has the stuff to defeat his thuggish forces.  “Are you guys even ready?”

Of course, Li is intent on answering that question with a hail of laser-guided bombs and 23-millimeter cannon shells. Along the way, the film showcases the PLA’s new technical and organizational capabilities ranging from helicopter Combat Search & Rescue units,  satellite reconnaissance and navigation, in-flight refueling (via a converted H-6U bomber), KJ-500 radar planes, and elite special forces operators parachuting from a brand-new Y-20 ‘Chubby Girl’ cargo jet.

These are platforms and capabilities the PLAAF mostly lacked twenty years ago—though in some cases, the relevant assets remain few in number today.  For example, China has only a few dozen aerial refueling tankers compared to the U.S.’s five hundred. Significant portions of the PLA continue to operate outdated systems like the 1950’s-era Type 59 tanks and J-7 jetfighters, but the growing proportions of modernized units give the PLA options suitable for expeditionary missions.

Wu Di pilots a new J-10C Vigorous Dragon, an agile, single-engine multi-role fighter similar in concept to the light-weight F-16. Curiously, despite a fly-by of a large Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter during a training sequence, it is not actually employed when the Chinese planners look for a way to elude terrorist-operated SA-6 ‘Kub’ surface-to-air missile batteries.

Political Harmony Defeats Dramatic Tension

Beijing has long maintained that Western military intervention on humanitarian grounds is merely a cover for opportunistic imperialism. By this philosophy, as long as you are a sovereign government, then what you do to maintain internal control is beyond criticism. Thus, the military intervention in the film is carefully justified as solely to protect Chinese nationals and soil from harm, and as being authorized by the incompetent Maobu government.

The script’s greatest problem, however, is its unwillingness to portray any serious flaws in its hyper-patriotic heroes.  Most good military films explore the tension between the mechanistic obedience and composure under stress demanded by military organizations, versus natural human emotional responses, individualism and idealism. But in Sky Hunter, the heroes never enter real conflict, and their emotions never impedes the performance of their duty.

Sure, characters in the film repeatedly question whether Wu Di’s may be emotionally compromised—but he never is, never screws up, and so has little in the way of a character arc.

The film concludes somewhat ridiculously with hero and villain literally flying side by side in jet fighters exchanging jibes in stilted English (“You don’t have the power to be a pilot now!”)  Along with the abundance of action-movie clichés, there are a few amusingly improbable bits of derring-do involving sonic booms and blind landings.

There’s a sad postscript to the film evocative of the current zeitgeist in the Middle Kingdom. Though actress Fan Bing Bing reportedly performed in Sky Hunter unpaid, in 2018 a website alleged she had received secret additional payments from producers for others films she was involved with to avoid paying taxes. She has since disappeared since July 2018, and her name erased from various websites. Outlets that have reported her detainment have invariably ‘retracted’ their stories.

Hollywood celebrities too, of course, get into all kinds of mischief—but in China, movie stars are considered accountable to the state. For example, Jackie Chan was compelled to virtually disown his son after he was busted for possessing marijuana. In Bing Bing’s case, either her exposure for a reportedly widespread form of corruption—or perhaps her framing for some obscure political slight—likely led to her being ‘disappeared’, at least temporarily.

Sky Hunter isn’t good enough to be a hit, and it wasn’t.  But it is a product revealing of the aspirations and rhetoric of China’s modernizing armed forces—and an excuse to watch cool jet fighters dueling over the Himalayas.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This article first appeared three years ago and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Sebastien Roblin

Security, Europe

These are not hypothetical capabilities; they have been demonstrated in the war in Ukraine.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Western militaries depend on extensive command-and-control infrastructure and near real-time tracking of troop positions as force multipliers. However, Russian electronic-warfare batteries wield a multitude of systems to jam or spy upon frontline communication systems — including radio, cellular, satellite and even GPS.

The U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group was formed in 2006 to identify gaps in U.S. military doctrine, equipment and field tactics, and to study how potential adversaries are developing tactics to exploit them. In 2017 the group released the 61-page Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook, based on observation of Russian tactics in Ukraine and to a lesser extent Syria, as well as published doctrine and public statements.

The handbook paints an intimidating picture of a military ready to combine old strengths in artillery and anti-aircraft systems with new technologies and tactics, leveraging drones, electronic warfare, information warfare and massed sniper fire.

To be clear, the document doesn’t set out to paint the Russian military as an indomitable juggernaut.

In fact, its so-called “New-Generation” or “Fourth-Generation” warfare is founded on a recognition that old Soviet-era “Deep Battle” tactics emphasizing huge armored formations deploying to battle in echelon were no longer viable given Russia’s more limited resources compared to the Soviet Red Army, as well as its persistent qualitative inferiority.

Despite progress in professionalizing, the Russian military remains largely made up of conscripts who, after four months of basic training, only serve for another eight before a new group of fresh recruits is rotated in. The armed forces retain a centralized command-and-control structure, which accords enlisted personnel and NCOs little ability to act on their own initiative.

Of course, the AWG’s handbook is in attempt to understand an adversary’s warfare from the outside, rather than reflecting how the Russian military perceives its own tactics. Such an effort will inevitably be colored by analysts’ cultural biases and worldviews, as well as a degree of paranoia intrinsic to the military profession.

For a reverse example, Russia’s concept of “hybrid warfare,” or the so-called Gerasimov doctrine — a term used to describe a blend of conventional and irregular warfare as well as political and cyber warfare — was actually coined to describe what the Russian military perceived as Western military tactics.

Without further ado, let’s look are some of the major takeaways from the report.

Modern Russian units are evolving into smaller, more flexible formations:

The new basic Russian military unit is the Battalion Tactical Group, which can be tailored for specific missions by the addition of anti-aircraft, electronic-warfare and artillery units.

At the operational level, Russia has moved away from a force organized around large divisions to smaller but still well-rounded brigades — though the divisional echelon may soon be reemphasized to ease administrative burdens.

Moscow prefers to rely on local proxies to do the brunt of the fighting: 

Moscow has made increasing use of allied irregular forces and private mercenary companies to lead operations in Ukraine and Syria, bolstered by Russian advisors, military equipment and training. This approach has been inspired in part by Western engagement with allied proxies in conflicts ranging from Vietnam to Libya and Afghanistan.

As the AWG puts it, the proxies create several useful effects for successful Russian military operations: “confusion, deniability and additional manpower.”

Local proxies free up conventional Russian military units and assets to intervene in the sectors they are most needed. They also help paint a veneer of political legitimacy to Russian military operations. Indeed, Moscow is placing renewed emphasis on “information warfare” to mold the human terrain of a conflict zone in its favor.

Finally, Russia uses the proxies to deny the involvement of their own forces, confusing the reactions of its adversaries. This was especially evident in the conflict in Ukraine, when the government’s reaction was initially paralyzed by uncertainty as to whether it faced a Russian invasion or a purely local uprising.

Meanwhile in Syria, there is often uncertainty as to whether any given attack directed against civilian targets was perpetrated by Syrian or Russian forces.

Moscow uses cyberwarfare and information operations for offensive ends: 

Moscow has invested to an unparalleled degree in an information-warfare apparatus designed to manipulate foreign public opinion and break into adversary computer systems for both political and military ends.

These hacking and disinformation campaigns have high possible rewards, and are done at limited risk to Russia because Western adversaries’ open political systems constrain their ability to retaliate. By contrasts, Russia’s authoritarian structure silences political opposition and independent media outlets that could undermine information campaigns, and projects a philosophy of universal cynicism to instill doubt in counterpropaganda.

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Moscow employs hundreds of professional hackers and internet trolls, and is also comfortable employing experienced criminal groups for such operations. While the propaganda generated by low-level sources may be contradictory, it still plays up the same general themes (“Western society is on the verge of collapse,” “there are no Russian forces in Ukraine” and so on), helping mold international opinion to Moscow’s preferred narratives.

Russian military relies on artillery to destroy enemy formations: 

Russia’s fondness for the “god of war” dates back several centuries, and according to the guide, Russian tactics still emphasize artillery as a decisive instrument for destroying enemy formations, while maneuver units handle mopping up the survivors.

While self-propelled artillery vehicles can accompany troops on offensive maneuvers, in general the Russian military now seeks to keep the enemy at arm’s length from its frontline positions so that the artillery can blast enemy troops without hitting friendly forces.

Moscow has long been wielding more and bigger guns as a means to compensate for its forces’ qualitatively inferior training. Whereas Western militaries increasingly use artillery to launch precision strikes against enemy positions, the Russian army still values large-scale area bombardments with overwhelming volumes of firepower, especially from deadly multiple rocket-launcher systems such as the BM-30 Smerch.

In Ukraine, the wide-scale adoption of drones has reportedly been a “game changer” in the effectiveness of artillery. Russian-supported forces using drone spotters have delivered deadly artillery fires against Ukrainian formations on the move that inflicted over a hundred casualties in one attack.

However, a weakness of Russian artillery is its centralized command-and-control structure, which makes it difficult for frontline troops to request fire missions.

Russian-supported forces deploy lots of snipers: 

Back in World War II, the Russian military famously made extensive use of snipers to degrade enemy morale and eliminate key unit leaders. In the last decades, Moscow has reinvested in elite sniper units by acquiring modern sniper rifles, suppressors, ammunition and sights from Western sources, as well as producing its own deadly T-5000 sniper rifle.

In Ukraine, Russian forces have even deployed platoon-sized sniper units in depth on narrow fronts, with the most elite sharpshooters deployed over a mile to the rear while local proxies man the front line.

These sniper fronts can pin down larger enemy formations with accurate fire — then call down artillery strikes on the immobilized enemy to inflict even greater casualties. The guide suggests only two tactical responses — either disengage immediately, even at the likely cost of some casualties, to avoid getting hit by an artillery strike, or to reply with accurate sniper or heavy-weapons fire.

Anti-access/area-denial weapons may target Western forces’ air and logistical support: 

Western militaries have come to expect on-call air support and medical evacuation. By contrast, Russian forces are not accustomed to assuming air superiority — this was true even during victorious campaigns late in World War II — and thus have invested heavily in a diverse array of anti-aircraft systems, from short-range man-portable surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft vehicles at the battalion level to “strategic” S-300 or S-400 missiles that can threaten aircraft hundreds of miles away.

While each system individually has its limitation, they are designed to overlap into an integrated network that can only be dismantled with great care.

In Ukraine, Russian-supported forces deployed a variety of anti-aircraft systems that shot down Frogfoot attack jets, helicopter transports and gunships and even a fully loaded cargo plane, eventually forcing the Ukrainian air force to stop providing tactical air support. While Russian air-defense networks are not invincible, a Western adversary would likely only be able to count on sporadic air support, at least initially, due to the density of the anti-air threat.

Russia has also placed more emphasis on accurate tactical ballistic missiles such as the Iskander to deliver strikes that a Western military might employ aircraft to undertake. This means rear-area command and logistical units would be subject to deadly strikes, even if air superiority is secured.

Electronic warfare threatens dependence on communications and sensors

Western militaries depend on extensive command-and-control infrastructure and near real-time tracking of troop positions as force multipliers. However, Russian electronic-warfare batteries wield a multitude of systems to jam or spy upon frontline communication systems — including radio, cellular, satellite and even GPS.

Russian EW units may transmit misleading data to lure enemy forces into a trap, and signal-intercept devices and electromagnetic sensors can also detect the position of opposing communication and sensor nodes and subsequently direct precise artillery fires to destroy them.

These are not hypothetical capabilities; they have been demonstrated in the war in Ukraine. Russian electronic-warfare units shut down communications to frontline Ukrainian positions and directed deadly attacks on their headquarter units.

Western reliance on lavish C3 capabilities could be fatal in such an environment. Field commanders used to wielding precise control over their troops will instead need to learn to communicate in short transmissions, erect smaller and more dispersed Tactical Operation Centers, and give adaptable mission orders that delegate authority to low-level unit leaders to adapt to varying contingencies.

However, a major limitation to both Russia’s electronic-warfare and area-denial systems is that Moscow simply can’t afford enough of them, and is forced to shuffle these assets from one critical zone to another.

Because their deployment may be necessary for local units to achieve their mission, this can slow down the pace of operations and makes the location of the next local offensive more predictable. Disabling such system is thus more likely to cripple a military operation than simply inflicting personnel losses, which can be more easily replaced due to the conscription system.

It’s just as important not to overestimate an opponent’s strength as to underestimate them; likewise, while caution and situational awareness may be warranted, paranoia is not. The AWG’s handbook does its best to contextualize how New Generation warfare just as much an attempt to compensate for Russian weaknesses as to exploit gaps in adversary capabilities.

It adds up to a timely reminder that awareness of an adversary’s methods may be key to prevailing in a military conflict — or, more desirably, avoiding one in the first place.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This article first appeared two years ago and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Sebastien Roblin

Security, Middle East

A shallow waterway is perfect for small subs.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Though the new Iranian boats may remain far from the cutting edge of submarine design, they could still prove dangerous adversaries in the confined and shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. More importantly, the ongoing effort to domestically produce larger and more capable submarines and submarine-deployed weapons provides more evidence that Tehran is investing long-term efforts into becoming a self-sufficient military power.

The Iranian military has long planned for a defensive naval war in the Persian Gulf, in which it would leverage its large fleet of fast attack boats toting antiship missiles to launch swarming hit-and-run attacks on adversaries in along Persian Gulf, with the ultimate goal of shutting down passage through the Straits of Hormuz.

Supporting this naval guerilla-warfare strategy are twenty-one indigenously produced Ghadir-class mini submarines, derived from the North Korean Yono class. The 120-ton vessels can poke around at eleven knots (thirteen miles per hour) and each carry two 533-millimeter torpedoes. All in all, shallow littoral waters are very favorable for mini-submarine operations, with interference from rocky shallows and loud surf reducing sonar detection ranges and giving mini submarines abundant opportunities to hide and wait in ambush. On the high end of the capability spectrum, Iran operates three much larger and more capable Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines purchased from Russia in the 1990s. These can comfortably hunt in the waters of the Indian Ocean.

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Four years ago, Iran also launched its own domestically built Fateh-class submarine. The homemade vessel may lack modern features such as antiship missiles or quiet Air Independent Propulsion system, but it does seem to be the genuine article—not something one should take for granted with reports of new Iranian weapons.

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Why would Iran invest considerable sums in building its own submarines instead of shelling out for off-the-shelf hardware in Russia or China?

The reason is doubtlessly related to Tehran’s jarring education in how shifting international alliances can throw defense planning askew. Prior to the Iranian Revolution, the government of the shah was lavished with large quantities of top-shelf U.S. weapons, which became rather difficult to maintain after that one little incident in the 1979 involving the American embassy. When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Tehran found itself on the outs with both America and the Soviet Union, and turned to the Chinese for arms—as well as backdoor dealings with Reagan administration officials.

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This tumultuous history has created a tremendous impetus for military self-sufficiency in Iran, even if the results in the short term are nothing special compared to extant foreign weapon systems.

The “semi-heavy” Fateh (“Conqueror”) measures between forty and forty-eight meters long, and is claimed to displace about six hundred tons submerged—putting it in a similar weight class as the small German Type 205 and 206 coastal defense submarines launched in the 1960s and ’70s. It appears to be an elongated version of the Iranian-built Nahang, an unarmed prototype that may currently be serving as a special-operations submarine. Fateh has four bow torpedo tubes with likely access to six to eight reloads, with a circular sonar array situated under the tubes.

Fateh can operate up to two hundred meters below the surface—more than adequate for the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. Sources variously place its maximum speed while submerged at between fourteen and twenty-three knots (sixteen to twenty-six miles per hour), with the lower estimate seeming more likely. The Fars news agency claims that Fateh can also operate up to five weeks at sea at a range of up to 3,100 miles, giving it the endurance to venture further afield into the Arabian Sea. However, it’s less clear how long the diesel-electric submarine can sustainably swim underwater without surfacing or snorkeling to recharge batteries.

You can see some media footage of Fateh in the clip below, including what appear to be deck plans at the two-second mark and the interior of the vessel at thirteen seconds. The website Covert Shores also offers a detailed analysis of the imagery here.

Despite being launched from the Bostanu shipyards in 2013, Fateh still appears to be undergoing sea trials and has yet to be declared fully operational. Jane’s claimed a second Fateh-class submarine was spotted in satellite photos under construction at the Bandar Anzali naval base on the Caspian Sea, but its current status is unknown.

Also nebulous are Tehran’s plans to produce two sixty-meter-long Besat- or Qaem-class submarines displacing 1,200 to 1,300 tons, armed with six torpedo tubes. Other claimed specifications include a three-hundred-meter diving depth and a maximum speed of twenty-three miles per hour.

This new design was announced in 2008, and was to enter service in 2015. A distinct lack of follow-up reports or imagery since that announcement give the impression the project has either been abandoned or is beset by major delays.

However, an Office of Naval Intelligence report published in March 2017 treats the Besat class seriously, and claims it will enter service with the Iranian Navy with the capability of firing submarine-launched cruise missiles in the next five years. Theoretically, such weapons would significantly increase the striking range of Tehran’s submarine fleet. However, such technology might prove difficult for Iran to develop independently.

A weapon that may be closer to entering service is the Hoot (“Whale”) supercavitating torpedo, which reportedly can attain speeds of over two hundred miles per hour—around four times faster than a typical modern torpedo. This is achieved by using rocket exhaust heat to vaporize water in the path of the torpedo, allowing it travel in a gas bubble with minimal drag resistance. The first Hoot tests were broadcast on Iranian TV back in 2006, and the weapon reportedly underwent new trials in 2015 and May 2017, though the outcome of those tests is unknown. Defense analysts believe the Hoot to be reverse engineered from the Russian Shkval torpedo.

Past experience demonstrates that Tehran routinely exaggerates and obfuscates the scale of its defense projects, and the timeline in which they will be completed. Nonetheless, the submarine Fateh is tangibly real and looks like it could usefully expand the medium-range capabilities of the Iranian submarine fleet. While the status of the Besat class is more difficult to assess, if it is ever deployed it would mark another capability improvement.

Though the new Iranian boats may remain far from the cutting edge of submarine design, they could still prove dangerous adversaries in the confined and shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. More importantly, the ongoing effort to domestically produce larger and more capable submarines and submarine-deployed weapons provides more evidence that Tehran is investing long-term efforts into becoming a self-sufficient military power.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. (This first appeared in October 2017.)

Image: Reuters.

Thomas Klassen

Politics, The Americas

By egging his supporters to storm Capitol Hill, Donald Trump unleashed forces that could terminate his presidency before Jan. 20, see him charged with crimes after leaving office and further tarnish the legacy he has sought so hard to create.

Among the central pillars of American politics is that presidents accept electoral loss with dignity and generosity. At the same time, those defeated have not been hounded and jailed for their actions while in power.

This differs markedly from democracies like Brazil and South Korea, where defeated presidents have been regularly jailed when their opponents seize power.

By egging his supporters to storm Capitol Hill, Donald Trump unleashed forces that could terminate his presidency before Jan. 20, see him charged with crimes after leaving office and further tarnish the legacy he has sought so hard to create.

Trump finally committed to a “smooth, orderly and seamless transition of power” in a video message released more than 24 hours after the mayhem at the Capitol left at least five people dead.

But a question on the minds of many is why did he continue for so long to battle against the November election results?

A different man might have graciously accepted defeat in November when it was obvious Joe Biden had won. Freed from the need to pander to his ideological base, he could have used the last two months to lead the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic, heal wounds, burnish the Republican Party and show generosity to opponents.

The difference between politics and business

It may be that the first president in American history without prior political experience does not fully appreciate the differences between politics and business. In politics, winners and losers don’t crush each other or harm political traditions and institutions.

Long-time politicians of all parties know they will need each other in the future, and that ultimately they need to co-operate to govern a nation.

Having blazed an unprecedented post-election path, Trump now faces the possibility that the 25th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution will be invoked. Democratic leaders and even some Republicans are calling for it.

The 25th Amendment permits a president to be removed from office by the vice-president, plus a majority of the cabinet, or by the vice-president and a body established by Congress, if they determine the commander-in-chief is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.

 

Taking the steps required by the constitutional amendment — especially the need for Vice-President Mike Pence, a Trump loyalist for more than four years, to invoke it — likely makes it a non-starter. Any formal effort to remove Trump less than two weeks before Biden’s inauguration could also cause even more ideological division in a country already on tenterhooks.

In all of American history, no former president has been charged with criminal behaviour after a term in office. This is due to an unwritten understanding by the political elite that the office of the presidency and American politics could be diminished by such an action. Charging one former president with criminal wrongdoing may raise the likelihood of the next former president being charged as well for partisan reasons, creating a vicious circle.

At the moment, in keeping with American tradition, Trump has not been charged or indicted with any offence. However, once leaving office, there is at least one criminal investigation that will proceed in New York into one of his companies. Other possible investigations also could start.

Ford and Nixon

No president has pardoned himself while in power, and no president has sought a pre-emptive self-pardon for charges that have not yet been laid, as Trump is reportedly contemplating.

The closest situation occurred in 1974 when President Gerald Ford pardoned his predecessor, Richard Nixon, on charges of obstruction of justice.

Any effort by Trump to invoke a self-pardon would run into the problem that he himself noted in mid-2018: “Why would I do that when I have done nothing wrong?” A self-pardon, even if ultimately deemed constitutional, would tarnish the legacy of the president who sought it.

The increasing hyper-polarization of American politics and Trump’s outrageous behaviour may have tipped the scales on the protection granted by the political establishment to former presidents.

Biden and his supporters could conclude that Trump does need to be charged once his term is finished as a reprimand and warning for future office-holders.

Trump’s name would join Nixon’s

Conversely, if Trump investigations result in charges, the Biden administration could then issue a pardon in keeping with the precedent set by the Ford-Nixon arrangement.

This would preserve some of the dignity of the office of the president, while simultaneously serving to rebuke Trump by adding his name alongside the notorious Nixon’s as the only presidents pardoned. Ironically, Trump’s eventual fate and legacy might be in hands of the opponent he has so mercilessly dismissed.

The consequences of Trump’s disruptions of one of the hallmarks of American politics — the peaceful and dignified transfer of power after an election — will have consequences for years to come. Future presidents will hopefully see the end of Trump’s single term as a lesson of what not to do.

Thomas Klassen, Professor, School of Public Policy and Administration, York University, Canada

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Navjotpal Kaur, Sumeet Sekhon

Agriculture, South Asia

These widespread farmers’ protests have entered their second month to rage against new contentious farm laws passed by the Indian government in September.

As temperatures plummet, hundreds of thousands of men, women and children continue to spend bone-chilling days and nights in makeshift shelters across multiple protest sites encircling New Delhi.

These widespread farmers’ protests have entered their second month to rage against new contentious farm laws passed by the Indian government in September.

Farmers are demanding the Indian government retract the laws, introduced during COVID-19 lockdowns without consulting stakeholders. According to experts the laws, aimed at “liberalizing” Indian agriculture, will gradually drive out small and marginal farmers by creating private monopolies in the market.

Given that 86 per cent of farmers in India are small landholders (owning less than two hectares), strong opposition to the laws is hardly surprising at all.

The protest has garnered huge community support from India and abroad. It has also managed to include and mobilize women. In this way, the farmers’ protests show how modern protest sites can be spaces of resistance and power but also of gender equity and empowerment.

Democratic alienation

Democratic alienation and an increasing distance between citizens and decision makers seems to be the hallmark of the Modi-led Indian government. An example of this was seen during the Shaheen Bagh protest to the Citizenship Amendment Act.

 

Shaheen Bagh and the ongoing farmers’ protest are among the biggest protests to rock India in recent times. A noteworthy feature of both these protests is that they have challenged the stereotypes of Indian women that have been dominated by their supposed passivity in the face of victimhood.

The farmers’ protest, however, is distinct from the Shaheen Bagh protest in the sense that it has garnered unprecedented community support. Mostly led by Sikh farmers from Punjab, the protest space reflects the Sikh ethos of langar (free meals), sewa (service), and charhdi kala (high spirits).

The seismic waves of the protest are not only being felt in India but in different countries across the world where the Indian, and particularly Punjabi, diaspora are holding massive rallies against the farm laws.

Women lead protests

Punjab and Haryana, the two states leading the farmers’ protest, are characterized by deeply entrenched feudal, patriarchal structures that place significant, deliberate and inadvertent constraints on women. Furthermore, both Punjab and Haryana continue to be counted among the country’s worst-performing states in terms of female-to-male sex ratios.

Usually, in typical agrarian patriarchal societies, women and men do not have equal access to household resources. This inequality is worsened during times of economic hardships as intra-household bargaining for meagre resources intensifies. In other words, decisions are more likely to be skewed in favour of men’s interests when household resources are inadequate to meet the needs of all members.

A decrease in farming incomes is likely to have a disproportionately adverse impact on the lives of women. Furthermore, a decrease in farm incomes is likely to lead to more people going into debt — one of the primary causes of farmer suicides in India. Women belonging to suicide-affected families are particularly vulnerable to poverty. They are left to fend for themselves due to deep-rooted ideas of patrilineal inheritance, which preclude women from owning land.

Against this backdrop, it is remarkable that thousands of women are exercising their agency, braving the biting cold and not only participating in but leading the protests.

When asked about their motivation to participate in the protests, women told journalists about their active involvement in the farming process. Indeed, women of rural India contribute directly towards agricultural production in the form of labour on family-owned farms, as well as indirectly through cooking, cleaning and caring for children and the elderly within the household.

The long working hours and gruelling daily lives of women in rural India are well documented. Monumental contributions to farming notwithstanding, women are yet to be acknowledged as farmers by society. The women at the protest sites, however, are comfortable with their farmer identity. Perhaps the protest is an opportunity for them to publicly claim this identity.

In addition to protesting, women have taken on the entire responsibility of managing their farms and households back in Punjab. These women are also ensuring there is a continuous supply of rations, blankets and other essentials needed at the protest sites. Without this logistical support from the women in their families, and the knowledge that their farms are being tended to, the men could not have camped on the borders of Delhi for more than a month.

Moreover, in the absence of men, women are managing about 100 protest sites in Punjab to keep up the momentum in the home state.

The dedicated participation of women in these protests shows that women’s activism and protest has become an empowering space in and of itself.

Navjotpal Kaur, Ph.D. Candidate, Sociology, Memorial University of Newfoundland and Sumeet Sekhon, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Development and Gender Studies, University of British Columbia

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters

Jaigris Hodson

Media,

Social media platforms are designed to increase our engagement and as such, they actually nudge us towards sharing without thinking too hard about what we’re spreading.

As we begin a new year and head back (at least virtually) to work and school, we might be thinking about personal things we would like to improve. Some people resolve to exercise more, stick to a budget or cut out sugar from their diet. Others resolve to write that book, use social media less or volunteer in their communities. These are all great ideas, and I’d like to add another one.

Though we all made our New Year’s resolutions on Jan. 1, I respectfully suggest a January resolution that would, if we each committed to it, produce a large positive impact on society. This year, I resolve — and would like to encourage others to resolve — to stop the spread of misinformation at the individual level.

In 2020, misinformation was revealed to be a major issue impacting elections, world politics and our health during COVID-19. And with the arrival of a new calendar year, the problem has not gone away. In fact, with the COVID-19 vaccine rollout now picking up steam, we need to fight misinformation harder than ever before.

Misinformation and propaganda

Misinformation is not new, and propaganda has been part of political communication since the dawn of politics. While misinformation can be spread by government and corporate public relations officials, celebrities and international bad actors, it is enabled through our own social networks as we like and share information with others.

In other words, we can put a wrench in the works of those who are trying to sow deception and division by stopping a key flow of bad information.

But how can we stop the spread? To ensure we are not inadvertently sharing misinformation, we must first understand what drives us to share misinformation, so that we can identify our own triggers and resist them. None of us share information we think is false: we share information that seems true to us, and unwittingly spread misinformation in the process.

But wait, you say, I would never spread misinformation. I only spread true information. Unfortunately, the fact is that we all share information without checking it at least some of the time, which is why false information spreads online so much faster than the truth. Social media platforms are designed to increase our engagement and as such, they actually nudge us towards sharing without thinking too hard about what we’re spreading.

 

Sharing information is a social act

People have a wide variety of motivations for sharing information online. My team’s research on COVID-19 social media engagement shows that people will share information they think will help keep themselves and their loved ones safe. This is supported by law professor Tim Caulfield, who writes that our perception of risk is likely to drive engagement with misinformation.

Misinformation is more likely to spread when it’s novel or uniquely interesting. My own team’s ongoing research shows that people are more likely to trust information that they feel to be right, particularly if it’s delivered by people they perceive as experts.

What does this tell us about the individual’s role in sharing misinformation? Put simply, it shows that what causes us to share misinformation is a combination of factors: strong negative emotions like anxiety and perceived risk, social bonds between families, friends and loved ones across online and offline social networks, and feelings of correctness.

People share information they feel to be true because they’re worried and trying to keep loved ones safe. They share information delivered by people they trust — and sometimes those people aren’t actually experts in the field they are opining on.

How to halt misinformation

Understanding our own tendencies for sharing information and misinformation can help us stop the spread.

So how can knowing what motivates us to share content help us? You can short-circuit your automatic sharing tendencies and push back against the nudges from social media platforms to prevent the spread of misinformation to your own networks. It’s the same as making any change in your life: identify the triggers and change your behaviour.

This means that when the content makes you feel emotional — particularly if it makes you anxious — stop and think before you click.

If the content is particularly new, novel or strange, stop and think before you click.

If the content is something you want to share right away, because it has the perception of urgency about it (ACT NOW! WARNING!), stop and think before you click.

If the content would be particularly appealing to your social networks, stop and think before you click.

If the content is shared by a celebrity, or someone who is not actually an expert in the subject of the content, stop and think before you click.

And most importantly, if you are sharing content because deep in your heart and soul, you know it to be true; if you are sharing content that “just feels right” — I cannot stress this enough — stop and think before you click.

Moving beyond emotion

I know when I feel really emotional, I don’t always think clearly, and I know when I want to share information that appeals to my family and friends, I’m not always thinking about accuracy, so I try to be extra careful in those moments.

I recommend following the SIFT framework developed at Washington State University that tells people to stop, investigate the source, find trusted coverage and trace the claims back to the source. This means thinking like a detective (or an investigative journalist) and gathering evidence for the information you are sharing with others.

Besides following the SIFT framework, when I stop and think before I click, I like to ask critical questions of the content I’m about to share. I ask: “Why do I think this is true?” and “How emotional do I feel about this topic?” I also ask: “Where can I find more information?”, “Who does this information benefit?” and “What might be an alternative viewpoint I haven’t considered?”

I’m not perfect, and I’ll probably still share inaccurate information at times. That’s why for 2021, I resolve to double down on my efforts to stop the spread of misinformation.

Jaigris Hodson, Associate Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies, Royal Roads University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters

A plan to use satellite imaging to build up a global picture of coral reefs, to better understand how to protect them from warming seas brought on by climate change, is being supported by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).

Two billion doses of “safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines” have been secured by the international equitable vaccine alliance COVAX, and they will be ready for distribution as soon they are delivered, the UN health agency chief said on Friday. 

Amidst post-election violence in the Central African Republic (CAR), more than 200,000 people have fled for their own safety, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) said on Friday.    

The UN human rights office, OHCHR, is urging authorities in Uganda to ensure elections next week are free and peaceful, noting that the arrest of opposition candidates and their supporters are among several “worrying” developments ahead of the vote. 

The UN human rights office (OHCHR), on Friday, voiced concerns over the use of “vaguely defined laws” in Viet Nam, to arbitrarily detain an increasing number of journalists, bloggers, commentators and rights defenders, amidst what appears to be part of an “increasing clampdown” on the freedom of expression in the country.  

People worldwide have overwhelmingly highlighted their faith in multilateralism to address global challenges, the results of a year-long survey by the United Nations have shown. 

The World Health Organization (WHO) has warned of a “tipping point” in the fight against COVID-19, amid surging cases in Europe and the fresh challenge of a mutating virus. 

Saudi Arabia’s action in lifting sanctions against Qatar is a “positive first step” towards normalized relations in the Gulf region, a UN independent human rights expert said on Thursday, urging the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt to follow suit. 

Despite increased insecurity and limited funding, the UN food relief agency is continuing to supply food for hundreds of thousands of people affected by conflict in northern Mozambique.

Urgent measures are needed to protect civilian aircraft flying over conflict zones or other areas where military tensions are high, a UN independent human rights expert said on Thursday. 

The armed, pro-Trump mob that stormed Congress Wednesday made the world’s greatest democracy look like a banana republic in the grips of mob rule.

The United Nations Secretary-General has expressed shock at the massacre of civilians in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and called on the authorities to bring the perpetrators to justice.