Africa

July 11, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) leader Malik Agar welcomed the progress achieved in the South Sudanese peace process and the end of war between the two neighbouring Eritrea and Ethiopia.

In a statement extended to Sudan Tribune, the Sudanese rebel leader praised the signing of an agreement over the outstanding issues in the security arrangement chapter which paves the way for a lasting political settlement of the nearly five-year conflict in South Sudan.

Also, Agar hailed the agreement signed by Eritrea and Ethiopia on 9 July ending the 1998-2000 war over the border area of Badme, and restabilising diplomatic relations, trade and opened the border.

“We support any agreement to end the war in the Republic of South Sudan because it serves the South Sudanese citizens and ordinary people who were affected by the war,” said the statement.

“Our position on the regime of the National Congress Party (NCP) is clear. However, we seek strategic relations between the peoples of the two states of Sudan. The NCP regime will disappear but remain the interests of the two peoples. The state and people of South Sudan are the closest to our people and our country Sudan,” further stressed the statement.

The SPLM-N was part of the historic SPLM that struggled for a New Sudan but the independence of South Sudan in July 2011 forced the Movement to split in two separate structures.

Khartoum in the past accused Juba of backing the SPLM-N which rebelled again in June 2011 and continue to fight the government in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.

The SPLM-N Agar further applauded for the rapprochement initiated by the new Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed which led to a visit by An Eritrean delegation to Addis Ababa and the historical visit of Ethiopian leader to Asmara on 8-9 July.

The two visits “have made a tremendous change in the region. Also, these steps serve the peoples of the two countries and the region. Peace is a strategic goal for all peoples of the region,” said the SPLM-N Agar.

(ST)

July 11, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - Sudan's Minister of Minerals Mohamed Ahmed Ali said gold production has reached 63,3 tons during the first half of this year, reported the official news agency SUNA

A Sudanese merchant weighs gold in al-Shirik, Sudan (AFP)

During a meeting with Presidential Assistant Mohamed al-Hassan al-Mirghani on Tuesday, Ali said gold production in the first half of 2018 has exceeded targeted production by 101%.

He pointed out that gold production has contributed 6% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), saying total gold revenue in the first half of the year has reached 1,516 billion Sudanese pounds.

The Geological Research Authority of Sudan (GRAS) last year said the country produced 105 tons of gold in 2017.

Gold production is now Sudan's main source of hard currency after the secession of South Sudan where are the two third of its oil reserves before 2011.

However, restrictions on hard currency by the Central Bank represent a big challenge impeding the development of the mining industry but also encourage traditional minors to smuggle their production to neighbouring countries.

Sudan currently ranks third in gold production behind South Africa and Ghana. Officials said they hope to increase gold production to more than 140 tons and make Sudan the first gold producer in Africa in 2018.

(ST)

July 11, 2018 (JUBA) - The Sudanese mediators are still reviewing the draft agreement on the South Sudan peace revitalization forum, said the information minister Michael Makuei Lueth on Wednesday.

South Sudan's information minister Michael Makuei Lueth speaks to reporters in Bor, December 25, 2016 (ST)

Following a meeting held in Entebbe on Saturday, it was announced that the South Sudanese parties would sign in Khartoum an agreement on the outstanding issues in the power-sharing and governance and conclude the revitalization forum on Wednesdays 11 July.

However, the information minister who is also the spokesperson of the government negotiating team in Khartoum said the draft agreement was not ready and the Sudanese mediators are finalizing the text.

“Unfortunately at this moment the government of Sudan is still working on the document They are not yet ready. So, we are expected to continue for the next few days,” said Lueth who was speaking in Khartoum to the South Sudan TV.

The Sudanese mediators following a meeting in Entebbe including Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Sudan's President Omer al-Bashir, South Sudan President Salva Kiir and SPLM-IO Riek Machar announced that an agreement was reached on the governance chapter.

However, the opposition groups including the SPLM-IO, South Sudan Opposition Alliance and the Other Political Parties voiced their rejection for what is called Entebbe proposal which brought important modifications to the initial document.

The most import amendment was the establishment of the fourth position of a vice-president instead of three. In return, President Kiir accepted to reinstitute Machar in his previous position as first vice president.

The proposal which dealt only with the power-sharing issues and ignored other outstanding issues like the number of states in South Sudan provides that the SPLM-IO will be given 100 seats in the parliament and the other opposition groups 50 MPs. All will join the current 400 MPs. The same for the government the SPLM-IO will get 10 portfolios, the other opposition factions 5 ministerial posts while the government keeps its 30 ministers.

Minister Lueth said his delegation will respond to the document that would be given by the Sudanese mediators once they receive it before to final signing ceremony which will be attended by the IGAD leaders.

“So let's be patient for this important day and I'm sure we will sign it in the coming few days,” he concluded.

(ST)

By Hafiz Mohamed

Sudan is facing multiple crises, mainly due to unclear political vision to tackle them, the current chronical economic problem is the manifestation of that. The Government of Sudan (GoS) decided to apply a package of measures to address the huge gap in its finances, most important components of the package is the increase of custom duties by over 200% and that will have an impact on the prices of most of goods by that they decided to liberalized the market by allowing companies to import it at the parallel market exchange rate, plus others austerity measures, 2018 budget allocated over 70% of the spending on defense and security with less than 10% in health and education. At the same time they have devalued the official exchange rate of the Sudanese pound and now US$ 1 equal SGD18, and created a parallel rate( US$1 equal SDG30), the value of Sudanese pound in the open market now is (US$1=SDG40) and that increased the prices of most essential commodities raising inflation rate to over 60% One of the most important justifications for the removal of subsidies is that the beneficiaries of the subsidies are the well-off people at the expense of the poor people and they will provide direct assistance to the low-income families so as to overcome the price increase due to the new measure introduced .

The government economic policies during the past three decades, did not reflect a bias towards poor people in the society , as the most important measures which target the rich are the income tax and business profit tax, but Sudan apply the lowest income tax in the world as the high rate is 15%, in the two decades the government has raised the indirect taxes many time by introducing Value Added Tax (VAT) and increased it to 17% at the same time customs duties has increased by over 200% in the current budget, due to the combination of tax increase and devaluation of the Sudanese currency the prices of locally produced commodities such like meat, milk and vegetables have increased with even higher rate. The tax system works in favour of the few rich as it includes many loopholes which helping them evading paying a fair tax. While targeting the least poor segments of the society directly and very sharp by increasing the value-added tax and customs duties those are the indirect taxes and do not differentiate between the rich and the poor.

The introduction of Tamkain (Empowerment) policies during the last two decades sanctioned nepotism and corruption as it becomes the norm.

Second: The new monetary policy

To address the economic crises facing the country the government opted to use some monetary policy measures instead of addressing it holistically through political reform and macroeconomic policies, the measures they introduced have complicated the situation even further they have implemented the following policies:
1- Limiting cash withdraw from banks:
To stop the rapid deterioration of the national currency ( Sudanese Pound) they decided to limit cash withdraw from the bank they aimed to target foreign currency dealers as most of their transactions are in cash , but by doing that they stop other economic activities as 80% of the commercial transactions in the retail and wholesale sectors completed by cash as most Sudanese don't have bank accounts or they don't trust dealing with cheques, The other reason Sudan lack other forms of payment methods such as point of sale in which debit and credit cards, with the shops and other commercial outlets, and there are no debit cards or credit cards.
This policy has reduced the commercial transactions and that will have an impact on the government revenue in term of tax payment (Value Added Tax) and that will increase the hole in the government finances and it will force it to resort to deficit finance by print banknote and that will fuel inflation which already too high
2- Banning Import
They have decided to ban import from own resources (non-value) and restrict it to the finance of the banking sector as the time when bank doesn't have enough foreign currencies reserve to cover the needs of importers, and that will have serious impact as the country will soon run out of many essential commodities , and that is apparent now with the shortage of fuel which the country is facing and that will hamper the preparation for the new agriculture seasons
3- In 2018 budget the government budgeted to get the amount of 5 billion US dollars from Sudanese expatriates' remittances, but actually they are not expecting to get 50% of that amount, and that will have an impact on their balance of payments.
4- At the time when the country is facing deep recession and the economy needs stimulus measure so it can start growing they are using deflationary measures just as restrict bank borrowing and reducing cash in circulation and that will deepen the recession even further.
5- All their attempt to get short-term borrowing especially from the Gulf states has failed it is clear they have no intention to bail them out as they use to do in the past even though they sent their troops to fight a proxy war in Yemen. It is clear from the recent speech of the finance minister in the National Assembly that they run out of options

Third: The Government Reshuffle
The recent government reshuffle within the National Congress Party(NCP) ministers and state governors has nothing to do with addressing the economic crisis its mainly to consolidate the power of president Bashir in preparation for his re-election in 2020, that shows the rift within the NCP and that will continue and weaken their grip on especially ally if the current economic crises continue. The reshuffle is just recycling old faces without injecting any new visions or ideas, the problem can be addressed by changing the whole system and the way the government is run.
What the country needs to move forwards a change of the system and dismantling the centre of powers, so corruption can be rooted out and establishing a system of transparency and accountability, their attempt to fight corruption will not work because its selective and use to punish political rivalries. Sudan is now ruled by one person (the president) surrounded by incircle and has the power to override any decision by ministers or within the party (NCP), many senior members within the NCP and the Islamic movement strongly believe that is hindering any genuine political reform.

Fourth: Combating Corruption
Recent the NCP government took some steps to fight corruption by arresting some businessmen most to them very close to the ruling party, they promise to take legal action against them, but they are selective and targeting certain people not all of them as that mainly driven by the power struggle within the NCP. Without radical political reform, which dismantles centres of power they will not be able to root out corruption

Fifth: Political Reform
1- To pave the way for any economic recovery Sudan, need radical political reform, first to start with a genuine and comprehensive peace process to achieve a sustainable peace in all conflict zones, and that will save a huge amount of money through cutting security and defence budget.
2- Genuine and inclusive political dialogue to set the constitutional principles and terms of an interim period which will lead to a free and fair election after creating the conducive environment for it.

Sixth: Diagnosis of the economic crisis in Sudan
The problem facing Sudan economy is in structural imbalances because of poor infrastructure of the economy and the inability to absorb any shocks due to internal or external factors.
1 -The huge budget deficit.
2 - The balance of trade/payment deficit that led to a sharp deterioration of the national currency value
3 - External debt crisis, the debt for Paris club members is over 50 billion US dollar most if its interest and fines due to default in paying debts instalments, but there are other debts which are undeclared from Arabs financial institution and Chinese Banks.
4 - Sharp rise in the rate of inflation, particularly food prices the official inflation rate now over, 63% without any rise in the average salary.
5 - High unemployment rate among the youth specifically universities graduates.
6 - Shrinking economy due to the deep recession and that led to the sharp decline in the gross domestic product (GDP) and led to decrease of the government budget from $ 10.5 billion in 2010 to 3.5 billion in 2012, the forecast of 2018 budget has increased it to around 8 billion us $ but that is unrealistic, that was mainly due to the loss of oil revenue but at the same time non-oil products have also declined.
7 – Sharp rise in the poverty level due to, many factors such as displacement and low income for families in Sudan.

Seventh: Economic Reform Needed
1- For ensuring the success of any economic policy radical review for the government accounts and financial systems to ensure all the loopholes are closed and to strengthening the monitoring and audit systems and ensure there are robust and rigorous measures to compact corruption.
2- Sudan needs to undertake the needed reforms to meet the criteria for debt relief under the UN high indebted countries initiatives, include a clear strategy for poverty eradication.
3- Reform the rule and regulation covering the banking systems and restructure Sudanese bank as most of them don't meet the international criteria (Basel Accord) for capital adequacy and liquidity ratios

The Way Out
The only way by which Sudan can address its economic crises is by taking a serious political reform by starting a holistic and comprehensive process which address the issues of governance, end the wars and agree on a roadmap for transition to democracy by establishing transitional institutions to lead that process.
First: Political Reform: -
The political reforms must start with an agreement which stop the ongoing wars as that consume more than 75% of the total budget, used for mass killing and destruction those extravagant resources can then be spent on investments in health services and education reform, infrastructure of the main economic activity which is agriculture and processing manufacturing of agricultural products and that will create jobs and boost the economy..
The political reform must include genuine democratic reforms leading to free and fair elections and establish a state based on citizenship rights, rule law recognition of Sudan multi-ethnicity multicultural, freedom of belief with the participation of all Sudanese and that begins with:
1 - negotiation with the armed movements to reach a just and lasting peace agreements which addresses the underlying causes that led to the military struggle to achieve political rights and mitigate the impact of those wars on areas of conflicts and working to return displaced persons and refugees, to their villages.
2 – To Establish transitional government which include representatives of all political parties, armed movement and all the states where everyone is treated equally so that no one has a veto by which he/she can block the implementation of the transitional programme.
3- Reforming all government institution to make them more transparent and accountable, institutions such as the army and all law enforcement and security organs. Respect for human rights according to the international norms and standards.
4 - To agree on a roadmap in a transitional period so as to lead to a final settlement by establishing a state based on citizenship, equal rights and rule of law.
5- Addressing the issue of transitional justice, reparation for victims and their families.
6 - Pave the way for free and fair elections.

Unlocking the Gate to Economic Recovery and Regeneration
The only way to unlock the gate and to pave the way for serious economic reforms to attract investment and regenerate the economy by carrying out serious political reforms. And that will pave the way for:
1 – removing Sudan from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism and according to that lifting the remaining U.S.A. sanctions against Sudan and that will open new Investment opportunities with the inflow of foreign capital and import of modern technology.
2 - Paving the way for debt relief and that will improve Sudan's creditworthiness, so it can borrow from leading international financial institutions to invest in development projects, which will lead to job creation so as to employ millions of the unemployed and it helps in the reverse migration of large numbers of Sudanese professionals, forced to leave Sudan due to the economic situation and the NCP policies.
3 - Sudan now isn't qualified for debt relief programs, grants and subsidies for poverty alleviation in the least developed countries and those programs include the following: -
A - Debt Relief under the Heavily Indebted countries.
B - This program is based on the state's plan to fight poverty through debt relief and its plan to lift the most destitute and poor within the country.
C - Clear and genuine political and democratic reform and fighting corruption.
The government's attempt to impose harsh austerity policies in the country of most of its people live below the poverty level will lead to social results difficult to treat.

If the NCP government is serious in addressing the consequences of its policies in the last two decades, it must address the underline causes of those crises, the problem in Sudan is not lack of resources, but mismanagement of those resources, taking short-term measures do not resolve them. They must introduce policies which target those who benefited from its policies in the last three decades, at the expense of millions who have been impoverished such measures include the followings : -
A – Increase Income tax band for high- income earners by as much as 40% at the same time Increase business profits tax rate to 40%.
B - Reform rates and property taxes.
C - Re-evaluate the public institutions that have been sold less than half their real values and the impose windfall taxes on the owners of those institutions for a period of up to 5 years. The windfall-Tax then can be invested in retraining graduates who have spent years without a job, so they can find their way in the job market.

Other Possible Scenarios
There are many changes in the regional and international politics, the recent development in Ethiopia is a clear sign of the maturity of it political leaders by putting the interest of the country and its people over their narrow personal interest, the recent Khartoum agreement by South Sudan political leaders also goes on that direction and their seriousness will be tested in the coming few months. But the ruling elites in Khartoum still haven't learned the lessons insisting on putting their narrow personal interest over the interest of the country and its people the current status quo is not an option as no one can predict what will happen within one week as the GoS adopting hand to mouth and buying time tactics, waiting for miracle to bail them out.

The author is a former banker and civil society activist. He can be reached at hafiz2502@hotmail.com

By Roger Alfred Yoron Modi

Over the weekend, the media widely reported that South Sudan's warring parties agreed to a power-sharing deal reinstating the leader of the armed opposition (SPLM/A-IO) Dr Riek Machar as First Vice President, quoting Sudan's foreign minister Al-Dierdiry Ahmed.

"It has been agreed that there will be four vice presidents: the current two vice presidents, plus Riek Machar (who) will assume the position of first vice president, and then the fourth position will be allocated to a woman from the opposition," AFP quoted Ahmed as saying after last Saturday's meeting between South Sudan's government delegation headed by President Kiir and the SPLM/A-IO led by Machar, among others. The Talks which is a continuation of IGAD process aimed at ending the civil war in South Sudan was hosted in Entebbe by Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni and attended by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.

The Sudanese foreign minister "said the new proposal was "accepted by the government" and that Machar's opposition had accepted the deal "in principle" but would "consider it and come up with the final position" following further negotiations, to begin in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, on Sunday."

Other salient features of the Entebbe proposal include the addition of 15 ministers to the South Sudan central cabinet which currently has 30 ministers. It is reported that the SPLM-IO led by Machar will be allocated 10 ministerial positions while the other five will go to the other opposition groups. According to the Proposal, 150 members will be added to the current 400-member parliament to represent the opposition groups with Machar's SPLM/IO to take 100 seats while the rest 50 seats.

Opposition Reject Entebbe Proposal

So far, the SPLM/SPLA-IO and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance SSOA, a coalition comprising nine parties, movements and entities have issued statements rejecting the Entebbe Proposal.

The SPLM/SPLA-IO said the Proposal "only focuses on accommodation of politicians and ignores the radical reforms needed in order to effect fundamental" in South Sudan.

"We are following the IGAD peace process and the Movement shall not accept any shortcuts to peace by vested interests, whether locally, within the region, or beyond…The Movement is confident in the peace process and is confident that the only way to end the conflict in our country is through a negotiated settlement. We are also fully committed to the IGAD peace process and we shall continue negotiating in good faith to achieve a just and honourable peace for our people," partly read the statement bearing the name of the SPLM/SPLA-IO Chairman for Information and Public Relations Committee, Mabior Garang de Mabior.

"However, in light of the regime's malicious propaganda, intransigence throughout the peace process, their constant violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreements (CoH) and constant aggressive posturing the SPLM/SPLA (IO) reserves our natural right of self-defence," added the statement.

On their part, SSOA decried lack of their inclusion in most part of the Entebbe meeting, calling the event "a bilateral agreement between two of the warring parties, namely; the Juba regime and SPLM/A-IO."

"It is to be noted that the leadership of SSOA and Other Political Parties (OPP) were officially invited to Entebbe for the July 7th meeting but kept out of the 8-hour proceedings between the government and the SPLM/A-IO; only to be invited into the meeting to be briefed about what had been agreed upon by the two parties," SSOA statement bearing the name of Kwaje Lasu partly read.

"It is crystal clear that the Entebbe meeting was focusing on power-sharing instead of addressing the fundamental issues of governance. For that reason, we absolutely reject these proposals as they do not serve the interests of the suffering people of South Sudan."

SSOA argued, amongst others, that the Proposal "does not address the root causes of the crisis in South Sudan," and "says nothing about the adoption of federalism which all Parties have recognized to be the will of the people of South Sudan."

A group of women participating in the ongoing Talks calling themselves "non-partisan South Sudanese Women representatives" have also issued a statement saying they will not accept "a peace agreement without the full consent of all parties to this process."

"We recognize the tireless efforts of mediators to attain peace for South Sudan. However, we urge the mediators to refrain from subjecting the parties to sign an agreement under duress. We want to categorically state that the people of South Sudan do not deserve an agreement that cannot be implemented," the Women said in their joint statement, adding that they are hopeful and have confidence that the process could yield peace "if interests of ordinary South Sudanese are placed above those of individuals and parties."

On their part, The African Union Peace and Security Council during its 783rd meeting just concluded in Nouakchott, Mauritania, welcomed the commitment by the South Sudanese parties to make progress on the IGAD-released Revised Bridging Proposal, and urged them to “conclude this process very urgently to address issues of power sharing and security arrangements.”

Also, The UN Secretary-General António Guterres welcomed the signing of the Khartoum Declaration and urged all parties to demonstrate “political leadership at a critical juncture of the peace process.”

The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Bintou Keita later, in an address to the UN Security Council, praised the IGAD efforts but stressed that peace would not be achieved or sustained “merely on the basis of a bilateral deal between President Kiir and Mr. Machar.”

“While the outcome of regional and international efforts to deliver a political settlement is yet unclear, I must reiterate that peace will only be sustained if the revitalized agreement is inclusive, fair, that addresses the root causes of the conflict and engages all stakeholders, including women and youth,” Keita said.

“While that declaration dealt broadly with all the contentious issues, further discussions would be needed to ensure that the agreement would be implemented through an effective mechanism.”

The South Sudanese parties to the conflict, the Civil Society and other stakeholders are currently in Khartoum, reportedly expecting to receive a final draft proposal on governance "soon."

Real Challenges facing the Peace Process

It first starts with the nature of the Talks. The ongoing South Sudan peace Talks is not a new peace process per se. It is called High-Level Revitalization Forum HLRF of the 2015 IGAD-mediated Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan ARCSS which remains largely unimplemented mainly due to the resumption of armed conflict in July 2016 and repeated attempts to frustrate the implementation of reforms provided for in the ARCSS.

It was therefore in its response to the new armed conflict and circumstances that emerged in South Sudan that the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government in a Communiqué on 12, June 2017 mandated the IGAD Council of Ministers "to urgently convene a High Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) of the parties to the ARCSS including estranged groups to discuss concrete measures, to restore permanent ceasefire, to full implementation of the Peace Agreement and to develop a revised and realistic timeline and implementation schedule towards democratic election at the end of the Transition Period."

However, several of the parties and stakeholders have on many accounts interpreted that mandate for the HLRF differently. This factor has been among the major striking challenges facing the progress of the peace being pursued through HLRF.

This has been well observed in several forums and discussion regarding the process. For instance, citing Dr Jacob D Chol of the University of Juba, in a December 2017 Policy Brief, Meressa K. Dessu of the Institute for Security Studies ISS wrote: "… [Chol] told the ISS that] the different parties involved in the conflict conceptualise the IGAD initiative differently. He notes that the SPLM/A-IG [President Kiir's side] says the revitalisation is the same as what the government is trying to implement; SPLM/A-IO's Taban Deng in the TGoNU argues that the revitalisation is pushing for the implementation of the ARCSS; and the SPLM/A-IO – led by Machar – disputes the process as rebooting and renegotiating a new peace deal that incorporates all the newly emerged rebel outfits."

"From IGAD's perspective, the revitalisation is about restarting the ARCSS – with some amendments to accommodate the interests of estranged groups, and a revision of the schedule for a realistic implementation process," Dessu continued.

On the other hand, in addition to the different interpretations and possible attempts to manipulate the HLRF process by some parties, it is evident that circumstances have changed a lot. We are currently in July 2018; the IGAD communique mandating that the HLRF be “urgently convene[d]” was issued in June 2017 which is over a year ago but so far the process which was meant to be urgent in the first place is still no concluded.

Moreover, the term of transitional government established is soon expiring together with the ARCSS, regrettably, without conducting most of the legal and institutional reforms envisaged in the ARCSS. There is no peace also. Elections are out of question due to the nationwide insecurity created by armed conflict and other factors. The economy is in dire straits. Already the US has warned against the extension of the term through the legislature, as opposed to a peace agreement. It is expected that the HLRF succeeds in revitalizing the ARCSS so as to give legitimacy to the next transitional government to be formed thereunder.

But it is has been acknowledged that so far the process has made a breakthrough between the parties such as the signing of the agreements on outstanding issues of security arrangements last week and the permanent ceasefire about two weeks ago, though there is a growing caution over the texts of the former.

Those are fruits of the "Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between Parties of the Conflict of South Sudan" which was signed as part of the HLRF and the last month resolution of IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government which mandated the ongoing process.

In the Khartoum Declaration also, the South Sudanese parties have agreed to reach a deal on the IGAD-peace "Revised Bridging Proposal" "as soon as possible and before closing the current Khartoum Round of Talks." This limitation could be positive or negative, depending largely on the manner of the Talks and the progress thereof.

Also, as announced by Sudan's foreign minister, the Khartoum round of talks between the South Sudanese shall continue until 12 July (tomorrow.)

But the gap between the proposals and the talks by those calling for a comprehensive peace agreement through the HLRF that addresses the root causes of the conflict remain too big as of recent it is mostly about power-sharing in the next transitional period.

Parties must drop narrow interpretation of HLRF mandate

It is indeed very important to have a fair power-sharing agreement between the South Sudan parties to the conflict and stakeholders/entities participating in the HLRF. This will greatly assist in creating a balance in decision-making and genuine implementation of peace and the institutional and legal reforms enshrined in the revitalized ARCSS.

But a mere distribution of power (percentages) are not enough. The revitalized ARCSS must contain substantive provisions on the fundamental issues facing South Sudan and as well as incorporate corrections to the lessons from its past failures. That is how the HLRF could lead to ARCSS full implementation and end to the conflict.

As I have argued in my recent articles making substantive observations and recommendations on the nature of the peace process and power-sharing proposals, despite the (limited?) mandate of the HLRF, the South Sudanese parties, could still discuss and agree on a comprehensive peace agreement that is implementable, that addresses the root causes of the conflict and incorporates the needed radical reforms for fundamental change in the Country.

They, all the South Sudanese parties, very well know the problems and solutions to the issues of governance failure and the cycle of violent conflicts in the young country. All required from them now is honesty and constructive engagements to come up with a final agreement that will bring a lasting peace. They also have a chance to rectify the (unintended) mistakes made in the ARCSS that directly or indirectly led to its failure.

Moreover, a narrow interpretation of the wordings of the IGAD 2017 communique that mandated the HLRF, whether by the government or the opposition, is not only unhelpful by unreliable as well.

It is worth recalling that 32nd Extra-Ordinary Summit of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government that mandated President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan to facilitate the Khartoum Talks to: “a. discuss and resolve the outstanding issues on governance and security arrangements including measures proposed in the revised Bridging Proposal of the IGAD Council of Ministers; and b. discuss measures to be taken to rehabilitate the South Sudanese economy through bilateral cooperation between the Republic of South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan” also decided that President Al-Bashir shall inform President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya of the outcome of the discussion between the parties.

The Summit further decided that President Kenyatta will facilitate the third round of face-to-face discussion between President Kiir and Dr Machar in Nairobi “to facilitate the revitalization process and report the outcome and way forward to the upcoming Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government.”

The Summit also instructed the IGAD Council of Ministers “to give guidance to Special Envoy for South Sudan on the remaining tasks to finalize the IGAD bridging proposal at the sideline of the 33rd African Union Summit….in Nouakchott, Mauritania” which just was ended early July, apparently without finalizing the IGAD bridging proposal due to the recent unforeseen changes, one of which is Article 3 of the Khartoum Declaration between the South Sudanese Parties which says “An Agreement on the ‘Revised Bridging Proposal' shall be concluded as soon as possible and before closing the current Khartoum Round of Talks.”

Indeed, the different South Sudanese parties have different interests and different allies in the region and beyond, but if they are serious about peace and ending the suffering of the people, they should be particularly concerned about making a comprehensive peace through the HLRF, not capitalizing on issues of whether or not the recent agreements prevail over past communique of the regional body on related matters. They should as well be concerned about their direct and indirect actions that could possibly lead to lack of support required from the region and beyond for smooth implementation (success) of the very Agreement they say should bring reforms in the Country.

Recommendations for fundamental reforms

Therefore, given the justifications above, in addition to my earlier suggestions to the success of the peace process, I hereby recommend the following:

1- On excessive powers of the National Security Service

The South Sudanese Parties should reach an agreement and set a timeframe and parameters for reforming the existing National Security Act. Provisions of the National Security Act giving the National Security service broad powers of arrest, search and seize property without a judicial warrant, and expansive surveillance powers with no independent oversight or due process should be repealed.

In fact, those powers given to the National Security Service NSS contradict Article 159 of South Sudan Constitution TCRSS which limits the NSS to information gathering, analysis and advice to the relevant authorities (e.g. the Police).

Actually, many of our current leaders were the ones who struggled for the professionalization of National Security Service during the times of the liberation war and peace negotiations.

Renowned academician and Former Minister in the Office of President Kiir Dr. Luka Biong Deng captured that history very well in his 2014 article after he was reportedly arrested, detained, deported from Yei with his properties sought and seized by the Military Intelligence of the SPLA.

“The genesis of this constitutional provision of the mandate of the National Security Service goes back to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) insisted to discuss and to clearly define the mandate of National Security Service in the CPA. Specifically, the Power Sharing Protocol that was signed on 26th May 2004 stated in section 2.7.2.4 that National Security Service shall be “professional and its mandate shall be advisory and focused on information gathering and analysis”. The same provision about the mandate of National Security Service was included with the same wording in the Sudan Interim National Constitution, 2005. It is clear that the National Security Service is not constitutionally mandated to arrest, detain, search and seize,” wrote Dr Biong.

In fact, the Constitutionality of the provisions of the Act would have been contested before the Courts in South Sudan but since they lack independence, pursuing such avenue in the hope of getting justice may be, simply, a wishful thinking.

Also, this could not have been an issue for the HLRF if ARCSS provisions were explicit on the parameters and nature of reforms to be carried out on the National Security Act. But ARCSS is not explicit on the matter.

So, the best option is to agree on and stipulate a comprehensive approach for the reforms of the National Security Service (Act) in the final Agreement (revitalized ARCSS) currently being negotiated through the HLRF.

2- On Media Laws

The South Sudanese Parties should reach an agreement and set a timeframe and parameters for reforming The Media Authority Act, the Right of Access to Information Act and The Broadcasting Corporation Act.

For instance, though has not been implemented, Chapter 1 Article 14 of ARCSS provides for reforms and reconstitution of The Broadcasting Corporation SSBC “…paying particular attention to the mandate and appointments, to ensure their [the Corporation's] independence and accountability.”

Well, this may be well intended however, there are two problems with that provision namely: A) Instead of providing for those reforms and reconstitution to be done by parliament by amending the SSBC Act, the ARCSS stipulates that they be shall be done the executive.

B) Whether intentionally or not, major media laws like the Right of Access to Information Act and The Media Authority Act have not been included in ARCSS as among the institutions and legislation requiring reforms to ensure their independence and accountability.

The presidential appointees heading those bodies have no security of tenure as the president, instead of the legislature, holds the powers to remove them. The provisions of those Three Media Acts requiring reforms include, but not limited to, repealing the provision criminalizing defamation (see section 5 of The Media Authority Act); the procedure for appointments and removal of officials under the Acts, to ensure adherence with democratic principles, human rights law and international best practices as at the moment the bodies established by those laws are not living up to expectations.

Some of the negative actions of the Media Authority include coming up with “registration” of media houses and warning “the public and donors not to engage with media houses, it says are unregistered and operating illegally.”

The Media Authority, as of April 24 2018, publicized media houses and entities that are “legally” registered. The Media Authority “authorized” nine newspapers and magazines to operate. This is a violation of Section 13 (i) of the Media Authority Act which provides that “…there shall be no licensing or registration of newspapers, news agencies, magazines and periodicals or other printed media, or of websites or sources of content on the Internet, other than that required by law for any business seeking to engage in a commercial or non-profit activity…”

The Media Authority has no powers to register newspapers, news agencies, magazines. The registration required “by law for any business seeking to engage in a commercial or non-profit activity” is not the competence of the Media Authority as that falls under the Ministry of Justice at the moment and such registrations are purely for those mentioned purposes and nothing to do with professionalism/media ethics per se.

Last year, The Media Authority “banned” about twenty foreign journalists from entering or operating within South Sudan for reporting what it termed “unsubstantiated and unrealistic stories.” The Media Authority cited no law and no transparent, verifiable, justified procedure in reaching those decisions.

As for the SSBC which controls the Public Broadcasters (TVs, Radios, etc) the opposition, especially the SPLM-IO, The Democratic Change DC, the other political parties and the civil society know very well the bureaucracy in there as many a times they complained about their events not being covered or broadcasted by the SSBC (former SSTV/SS Radio). The Act SSBC Act provides for transformation of the State-owned media (SSBC) into public broadcasters, independent from the political or economic control of the government. But that is far from the reality on the ground as the SSBC suffers lack of independence from the executive, apparently due to undue influence over budget and the fact that Section 32 of SSBC Act provides that the Media Authority shall monitor the SSBC while the Media Authority itself lacks the independence it ought to have from the executive.

Member of Parliament and then Leader of Minority Onyoti Adigo Nyikwec once told me in an interview published in September 2016 on The Nation Mirror newspaper that his party was not being accorded fair opportunity by the SSBC.

“If you see me there… it is something which has been organized by other people, not by us [opposition].

“The TV is still being controlled by the government, even the radio and especially by the minister of information. So it has become the property of some people, not the South Sudanese people,” Adigo said at the time. So far the situation may have only changed for those currently to the government.

This February, the Human Rights Division (HRD) of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in a joint report on The Right To Freedom of Opinion and Expression in South Sudan since the July 2016 crisis, wrote:

“As the present report shows, the restrictive domestic legal framework, which criminalizes defamation and does not clearly define the clauses limiting the exercise of freedom of expression, leaves a wide margin of interpretation which might lead to arbitrary implementation. As media outlets and civil society play a key role in promoting good governance and accountability, journalists and outspoken civil society actors have been especially targeted with censorship, harassment, threats and violence. As a result, citizens fear criminal prosecution for expressing their views or are concerned about their safety, and tend to practise self-censorship,” the UNMISS-OHCHR report continued.

“Despite positive developments, such as the establishment of the Media Authority, the key regulatory institution aimed at promoting freedom of the media, effective civic participation remains a challenge. Main concerns include a restrictive legal framework and the imposition of undue restrictions by State institutions, at the national and local levels, including by security forces, to the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression of media workers and other individuals. Restrictions, such as censorship of newspaper articles that are critical, have been misused to muzzle individuals and media critical of the Government or perceived as such – in some cases with the pretext of prohibiting hate speech.”

Last year, the deputy chair of the ARCSS Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, Amb Gen. Augostino Njoroge called for the protection of fundamental principles of press freedom and an end of the crackdown on journalists in South Sudan.

“The media, in South Sudan, like it is globally can offer a platform for various voices that seek to promote tolerance, dialogue, cohesion and compromise. This will ensure an all-inclusive national healing and dialogue and also shape the development agenda of the country,” Gen. Njoroge said.

He is right. Also, as correctly observed by the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, “A silenced journalist mutes the voices of the people and curbs their right to know. The result is a society where fearful citizens resort to self-censorship and where it is not possible to make informed decisions.”

Therefore, taking into account the abovementioned facts and arguments, the author hereby submits that providing for reforms in the South Sudan media laws and environment are extremely necessary for peace and ensuring full implementation of the revitalized ARCSS.

Given the failure to implement the reforms provided for under ARCSS, the revitalized ARCSS, the next TGoNU and all should ensure freedom of expression and the media in South Sudan so that the same mistakes do not occur. Make explicit provisions for reforms of the media laws in the final Agreement now!

3- On the Peace Monitors and their Mandate

Chapter Seven, Article 3 of ARCSS provides that JMEC “shall be responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Agreement and the mandate and tasks of the TGoNU, including the adherence of the Parties to the agreed timelines and implementation schedule. In case of non-implementation of the mandate and tasks of the TGoNU, or other serious deficiencies, the JMEC shall recommend appropriate corrective action to the TGoNU.”

This provision implies that JMEC has powers to, for example, recommend appropriate corrective actions to the TGoNU regarding the validity or lack thereof in the appointment to a post or removal of a position holder under the Agreement (when there is a dispute.) Otherwise, why have a monitoring body when it shall not follow such significant processes to ensure that they occur in line with the letter and spirit of the very Agreement establishing them for the purposes of overseeing the Agreement's implementation and recommending appropriate corrective action in case of non-implementation or other serious deficiencies?

This was the test JMEC faced when in July 2016 debates arose on the question of Machar's replacement by members of the SPLM-IO in Juba following the resumption of violence.

On 24, July 2016, JMEC issued a statement saying: "The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission [JMEC] would like to clarify its stance on the SPLM/iO leadership debate. As stated yesterday, a change to the leadership depends on the Opposition itself and we are not here to speculate on such changes. We do not see any value in speculating when the people and friends of South Sudan are working hard to ensure a return to the implementation of the Peace Agreement."

This was unnecessary, since according to ARCSS, in my view, JMEC role is never to "speculate" on leadership changes anywhere, be it in the opposition or any other party to the agreement. Thus, legally, in relation to Dr. Machar's replacement, in my view, JMEC was supposed to ensure that, it was in line with the recommendations of the “Top Leadership” of the SPLM-IO as required by Chapter One, Article 6(4) and Chapter 1 Article 5 (2) (4) of the ARCSS. That ought to be a democratic exercise and ARCSS seeks to transform South Sudan into a Democracy.

So, it was a simple matter that only would require JMEC to monitor and verify that there was the quorum required for the meeting or voting of “the Top Leadership” of the SPLM-IO and that the replacement was in line with ARCSS. This is what they should be doing with all other related provisions of the ARCSS and then recommend appropriate corrective action in case of non-implementation or other serious deficiencies.

On this, in relation to the HLRF, I have recommended in one of my recent articles that let each party or entity develop, adopt and deposit their internal Constitution or rules and regulations with JMEC and IGAD. Such internal Constitution or rules and regulations should define the mode of decision making within each party on matters related to the revitalized ARCSS, including their procedure for membership and lose thereof, the procedure for nomination of their representatives to the next TGoNU, TNLA, etc. The internal Constitutions or rules and regulations should be separate documents that IGAD or JMEC or HLRF should, on the technical aspect, assist the parties to develop as soon as possible for the purposes of protecting the revitalized ARCSS from violations. The documents should be valid for the purposes of the revitalized ARCSS, regardless of possible change such as the expected reunification of the SPLM. This is very significant as it will ensure accountability, adherence to the revitalized ARCSS. It would also avoid a return to armed conflict or any controversy and possible pulling out by some parties/entities from the revitalized ARCSS over related issues, thereby negatively affecting its implementations.

Back on the stand JMEC took since July 2016 crisis, it is somehow understandable, given the nature of the violence that erupted and required politics and diplomacy as JMEC leadership itself was notably lacking enough backing from the region and apparently the wider international community.

However, to avoid the occurrence of similar crises during the period of the revitalized (next) TGoNU (ARCSS), strengthening of JMEC mandate and gathering support for their role is absolutely necessary if the revitalized ARCSS currently under negotiations through the HLRF is intended to be implemented.

This was also called for by Aly Verjee, the JMEC former deputy and subsequently acting chief of staff Testimony in his last year's testimony before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy.

“In the event the Forum produces a meaningful result, reform to the peace agreement's supreme oversight body, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), where I served as deputy and subsequently acting chief of staff until my expulsion by the Government of South Sudan in April 2016, must be contemplated,” Verjee told Senates Subcommittee.

“While the principal responsibility for continued conflict and systematic misgovernance rests on the South Sudanese political elites, JMEC has failed to live up to expectations. It has not moved quickly enough to take corrective action at moments of acute crisis, and not held the parties to account when they dishonoured their obligations. There has been insufficient backing for JMEC from the IGAD member states and the African Union when the South Sudanese failed to comply with the terms of the agreement. When JMEC itself came under attack, with its key personnel expelled from the country, JMEC's regional and international backers did not protest.”

Another issue is, Chapter 7, Article 2 (6) of ARCSS provides that the terms of reference of JMEC shall be endorsed by the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

There is no such terms of reference available in the public arena to the best of my knowledge. This further makes it difficult for the public to hold JMEC to account. JMEC may also be reluctant to live up to expectations as a result of that.

The JMEC Chairman has no security of tenure. ARCSS in Chapter Seven, Article 2 (5) only provides that “JMEC shall be chaired by a prominent African personality appointed by the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government in consultation with IGAD-PLUS Partners, and form Committees to facilitate its activities as deemed necessary. JMEC may select deputy Chairs in accordance with the number of the said Committees.”

Lack of provisions in the Agreement guaranteeing the security of tenure and a clear procedure for their removal could be a big source of undue influence and underperformance. This should be rectified in the current process and JMEC needs to involve more members of the academia in decision-making positions than politicians. Involving respected, competent South Sudanese academics in top positions in JMEC would also strengthen the influence of the body within the Country and counter the arguments that South Sudan's sovereignty under threat because of the powers given to the peace monitors.

Conclusions

In case the South Sudanese Parties and Stakeholders continue to differ over their interpretations of the IGAD communique establishing the HLRF to the extent that they fail to discuss and agree on a comprehensive peace agreement that is implementable and equally important, addresses the root causes of the conflict and the major issues for fundamental change in the Country, IGAD should issue urgent resolutions with explicit provisions detailing/expanding the mandate to the HLRF.

The resolutions should set clear parameters for the peace talks through the HLRF to include, inter alia, the fundamental issues facing the Country as raised herein and the articles attached. The IGAD resolutions should as well incorporate rectifications to the lessons learned from ARCSS failures, without altering the relevant provisions of ARCSS, the “Revised Bridging Proposal” and positive achievements made by the HLRF. Then IGAD should speed up the HLRF with clear areas for discussions and agreements needed from the parties and stakeholders including the civil society.

On their part, parties who were signatories to the ARCSS such as the SPLM/AIO led by Machar, the Former Detainees, and others, should not view an expansion of the HLRF mandate or even a new peace process as being against their interests. It may be wrong for them to assume that under an expanded mandate of the HLRF, they would lose their current level of influence in that process and its outcome.

In fact, they should know better, that, reaching any final agreement that fails to address the fundamental issues facing South Sudan will be too costly for the Country and most of them the opposition in particular. Anyway, they know more about this, including the fact that the government has not withdrawn labelling them as plotters of a failed coup attempt. The opposition leaders know very well the costs for surrendering themselves without a genuine agreement providing for fundamental reforms in the Country.

On the other hand, the various leaders in the government (delegation) to the HLRF should work for a comprehensive peace agreement as well. They should remember that several leaders who were part of the government when the conflict erupted, like the Former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Paul Malong, have now become victims of the same system they worked to maintain. They, like others, have apparently learnt their lessons and they will probably be different and become pro-reforms if they find themselves again in power.

The various government leaders should as well convince President Kiir to accept radical reforms to the problems facing South Sudan. It is well-known that the governance crisis facing South Sudan today is not the making of President Kiir alone. Many of the current opposition leaders were directly involved in establishing the weak and corrupt system in the Country.

But Kiir being the President, together with all the parties, including Dr Machar, now have a chance to correct the mistakes and move the Country forward based on the ideals which inspired our decades of struggle for freedom, independence, democracy and good governance.

Our people have suffered for far too long. Do not squander this opportunity. Make a comprehensive peace agreement now and make our people pick up their lives once again.

Finally, if IGAD is too reluctant to come up with a new peace process or help expand the mandate of the HLRF given the justifications above, and in case the South Sudanese Parties and Stakeholders continue to differ over their interpretations of the IGAD communique establishing the HLRF to the extent that they fail to discuss and agree on a comprehensive peace agreement that is implementable and equally important, addresses the root causes of the conflict and the major issues for fundamental change in the Country, then it means the African Union and the United Nations should step in more actively than before and roll-out a new peace initiative to rescue the people of South Sudan and help transform the young nation into a democracy. This will as well need cooperation from South Sudan neighbours and IGAD, albeit to a different degree.

Roger Alfred Yoron Modi, a South Sudanese journalist, is the former Managing Editor of Juba Monitor Newspaper and former Chief Editor of Bakhita Radio. He can be reached via his email: rogeryoron@gmail.com

A Ugandan mother says a children's home tricked her into giving her son up for a zero-contact adoption.

July 10, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - The European Union condemned two east African countries, Djibouti and Uganda, for refusing to arrest Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir, the only sitting head of state wanted by the International criminal court.

President al-Bashir was in Djibouti on 5 July to attend the inauguration of a regional trade zone. Also, he was in Entebbe on Saturday for meeting on peace in South Sudan with Presidents Yoweri Museveni and Salva Kiir and SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar.

“The European Union and its Member States regret that Djibouti and Uganda, both States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), did not comply with their obligations under international law and as State Parties to the ICC and did not surrender President Al-Bashir to the Court,” said the statement.

The statement, which is issued by the EEAS Spokesperson, further called on all Member States of the United Nations to abide by and implement the UN Security Council resolutions related to the referral of Darfur crimes to the war crimes court.

“The European Union remains a strong supporter of the ICC and is committed to enforcing international criminal law and to ending impunity”.

Sudanese foreign ministry didn't react to the statement but the Sudanese embassy in Cairo distributed a statement by the Arab Parliament Speaker Mishaal bin Fahm Al-Salami denouncing the provocative EU statement against an Arab leader.

(ST)

July 10, 2018 (JUBA) - As discussions over the governance chapter are stalled in Khartoum, the main armed opposition SPLM-IO Tuesday accused the South Sudanese government army of attacking its positions in Yei River State.

“This morning the 10/07/2018, over 200 regime's soldiers went out of Morobo Town and attacked the SPLA IO base at Isebi in Lujulo Payam of Morobo County, Yei River State,” said SPLM-IO military spokesperson Lam Paul Gabriel.

In a second statement, Gabriel further said Yei River Governor Emmanuel Adil is preparing to launch an attack SPLA IO bases in Kajo Keji county.

The warring parties committed themselves in an agreement signed on 27 June to implement a permanent ceasefire in the country starting from the 1 July.

However, they had accused each other of breaching the deal twice in the Northern Upper Nile and Yei River State.

The SPLA IO spokesperson called on the ceasefire monitoring mechanism, CTSAMM, and UNMISS peacekeepers to investigate into these attacks and to hold Governor Adil responsible for the alleged violations.

Gabriel further went to say that the South Sudanese army Chief of staff Gen. Jok Riek, recently travelled to China to acquiring new weapons to continue with their military campaign despite the ongoing peace process.

“This is a blatant violation of the signed permanent ceasefire,” he added.

(ST)

July 10, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - An Indian company on Tuesday has won a tender to build electricity interconnection project between Sudan and Egypt, said Egypt's Minister of Electricity and Renewable Energy Mohamed Shaker

The Egyptian minister didn't disclose the name of the Indian company saying the concerned parties are making preparations to sign the final contract soon.

He pointed out that the first phase of the project would be executed within four months at a cost of $60 million.

According to the minister, the first phase of the project, which covers 95 kilometres within the Egyptian territory, would enable Egypt to supply Sudan with 300 megawatts.

He expected the supply to rise to 3000 megawatts at the end of the project.

Shaker added the linking of Sudan and Egypt power grids would allow for the optimal use of both grids and supports development projects.

He stressed the two countries are ready to work jointly to implement this project, saying there are no natural obstacles that hinder the implementation of the project as scheduled.

In a meeting held in Khartoum last April, Shaker and his Sudanese counterpart Muataz Musa agreed to establish an electricity linkage between the two countries.

The tumultuous relations between Sudan and Egypt experienced last December a new crisis over media attacks against al-Bashir after a visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Sudan. Also, Sudan accused Egypt and Eritrea of supporting rebel groups to attack Kassala State on the eastern border.

However, the two countries recently developed joint security cooperation against the opposition groups from both sides.

The main differences between the two neighbours remain the dispute over the border triangle area of Halayeb and the construction of Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam that Sudan backs.

(ST)

July 10, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - Sudan's State Foreign Minister Osama Faisal has met China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bejing on the sidelines of the eighth ministerial meeting of China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF).

Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) shakes hands with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during a signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, September 1, 2015. (Photo Reuters/Parker Song)

The CASCF, initiated in 2004, is a high-level platform for dialogue and cooperation between China and the Arab World.

The two ministers discussed ways to promote bilateral relations and develop economic cooperation within the framework of the Belt and Road initiative.

The Chinese minister expressed pleasure that President Omer al-Bashir has confirmed his participation in the meeting of the Africa-China Cooperation Forum which would be held in September in Beijing.

For his part, Faisal thanked China for its continued support to Sudan's stances at the various international forums.

China has been Sudan's largest foreign investor, particularly in oil and telecommunications after western firms shunned the East African nation due to conflicts and sanctions.

It has invested more than $20 billion in Sudan mostly in the oil sector during the past two decades. Beijing provides low-interest loans and weapons transfers in return for oil.

Sudan hopes to attract new Chinese investments after Beijing had refrained from implementing a number of projects agreed upon with Khartoum following the latter's failure to settle its debts.

Sudan's total debt to China is estimated at $ 10 billion, accounting for about one-fifth of Sudan's estimated $53 billion foreign debt.

(ST)

July 10, 2018 (JUAB) - The SPLM Leaders (FPD) chairperson Tuesday said the Khartoum round of talks for peace in South Sudan is missing transparency and inclusivity and called for more African union involvement in the IGAD-led process.

SPLM Leaders (FPD) leader and former SPLM secretary general Pagan Amum (AFP/Getty)

The call comes after a statement by the SPLM-IO clarifying its position from the outcome of a meeting held between its leader and South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda presidents last Saturday, saying that its chairman Riek Machar rejected Entebbe proposal which was verbal and not official.

“The SPLM/SPLA (IO) rejected the proposal as it only focuses on accommodation of politicians and ignores the radical reforms needed in order to effect fundamental change in our country. The SPLM/SPLA (IO) is not waging a struggle for the position of First Vice President, we are waging a protracted struggle for the future of our country,” said Mabior Garang de Mabior the head of SPLM-IO information committee.

In a statement on the occasion of the 7th anniversary of the Independence of South Sudan extended to Sudan Tribune Tuesday, Pagan Amum said the peace process is facing serious challenges as the regional bock now has delegated the mediation to members states that have competing interests and come with “divergent and contradicting proposals”.

“We appreciate the current efforts of Sudan and Uganda to bring peace to South Sudan. Nevertheless, we regret that the process of negotiations and consultations in this session is marred by lack of transparency and are not inclusive,” he said.

On Sunday, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance and the Other Opposition Parties (OPP) issued a statement saying they had been excluded from the discussions between the three heads of states and Machar in Uganda.

On Tuesday the Sudanese mediator filled a draft agreement on the power-sharing and governance issues including all the propositions discussed in Entebbe last Saturday.

The most important point in Entebbe proposal was Kiir would accept Machar as the first vice president and in return, the latter accepts the addition of a fourth vice-president during the transitional period. Initially, Kiir strongly rejected Machar's participation in the 30-month cabinet tasked with political and institutional and economic reforms.

The draft agreement, also gives Machar 100 seats in the transitional parliament, against 50 for the other opposition groups while the running SPLM group keeps its 400 MPs. The same for the ministerial portfolios Kiir's has 30 ministers, Machar 10 posts and others will receive 5 posts.

Amum said time has come for action from the African Union and the international community after repeated statements calling for a lasting and inclusive peace and threatening of sanctions on peace spoilers.

“Therefore, we welcome resolution of the African Union Peace and Security Council urging “the Ad Hoc Committee” to continue pursuing and further intensifying its engagement and support to the IGAD-led mediation process;” We further urge the AU, UNSC, the Troika and EU to act now by engaging actively in support of the mediation process,” said Amum.

Following Entebbe meeting, Khartoum announced the extension of Khartoum round of peace talks until 12 July.

Initially, the discussions had to move to Nairobi on 9 July.

(ST)

Instead of regaining its footing once sanctions were lifted, inflation is soaring in Sudan and people are struggling to get by.

The Ghanaian warrior queen who went to war to protect the Golden Stool of the Ashanti Kingdom.

The United Nations Security Council on Tuesday described the Joint Declaration, signed by the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia, as “a historic and significant” move with “far-reaching consequences” for the whole Horn of Africa region and beyond.

Multiple killings and a campaign of sexual violence that may amount to war crimes have been documented by United Nations rights monitors in South Sudan’s Unity state, prompting a call for government and opposition forces to be held to account.

Women across Africa’s Sahel region can be agents for a “new paradigm” for peacebuilding and development that benefits all people there, the United Nations Security Council heard on Tuesday.

Africa is projected to have the highest demand for moving people to safety next year, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has the greatest needs of all, according to the United Nations refugee agency’s Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2019 report.

The Challenges of Forging a Vision for a Peaceful and Prosperous South Sudan

By John A. Akec*

The importance of a vision in the life of a nation is as ancient as our planet earth. Visions have underpinned the rise and fall of great civilizations throughout the recorded history of the world. Its mention goes back as far as the Bible time, wherein the book of Proverb we read: “where there is no vision, people perish.” Other versions of the holy book put it more starkly: “when there is no vision, people cast off restraint.” What does this mean exactly?

One the hand, and in the biblical context, lawlessness and sin reign supreme in societies and nations where divine guidance and the moral anchors, which Christianity and all other forms of organised religion strive to provide, are no longer central to what people do or not do. Sodom and Gomorrah were examples of visionless societies that abandoned all restraint, and have been recorded to serve as a warning on the terrible end that awaits similar societies.

On the hand, and in the political and secular context, governments, societies, and political parties of every stripe need “a vision of the end, and without a vision, there is aimlessness and vast chaos” as once noted by the great American educational philosopher, Robert Maynard Hutchins.

And without any shred of doubt, any possibility of agreeing on a comprehensive peace deal in South Sudan is a welcome news. After all, “a bad peace is better than a good war,” as the Yiddish wisdom puts it. But we also need to be reminded that this famous Yiddish wisdom is not without critics who counter that “a bad peace is worse than war.”In our context, one can argue that any peace deal that has no vision of the ‘end result', is bad peace. Specifically, for South Sudan at this moment in time, the end result should be a united, prosperous, and resilient nation.

Hence, while we applaud the current momentum towards an inclusive peace deal that has been jump-started by the signing of Khartoum Framework Agreement, the absence of clear pointers to state-building goals should be a cause for concern, lest the emerging peace deal eventually unravels like its predecessors. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the parties to the regionally backed peace talks to try their hardest in order negotiate a peace settlement whose primary goal does not merely stop at the distribution of power, but that which must be based on a farsighted vision capable of propelling the country out of the vicious cycle of violence and socio-economic stagnation into spheres of sustainable peace, unity, security, and prosperity. In short, we need a peace deal that “will end all wars” in our country. And here are some, not necessarily all, of the elements of such a vision.

First, the agreement should resolve that South Sudan must be governed by its constitution. Our Interim Constitution is a good document that must guide and inspire all that we do or not do. And if there are clauses in the constitution that hinder our progress towards building a prosperous and united country, then we should speedily amend it. And until the amended constitution is passed, our current constitution should be our reference point and the anchor on which all government, business, and civil society actions are based.

Second, we must recognise that stagnation and the lack of socio-economic development could be a cause of current and future wars. Citizens must be given stakes that will raise the opportunity costs of war and consolidate peace. In the last 4 years, our country experienced negative economic growth as indicated by an ever contracting GDP. Oil production has dropped from over 350,000 bpd in 2011 to under 120,000 bpd in 2018. We remain amongst the most oil-dependent countries in the world. The contribution of tax to government budgets is insignificant We fought three disastrous wars since 2011. Our ability to provide services such as health and education has been affected negatively. Foreigners want to take over the security of our citizens.

And as the late architect, Constance Adams, who worked in American space programmes once noted: “no nation in the history of the earth has failed to conduct great projects and remained significant.” The Great Wall of China, Pyramids of Egypt, Burj Khalifa in Dubai, and Ivor Tower in Paris, are all expressions of what peoples of those great nations are capable of dreaming up and achieving. Until now, we as a nation are yet to complete a single ambitious project that we can be proud of.

What is holding us back? One may ask. It is my view that we can only reverse our fortunes if we can look inward to identify the weaknesses in our systems, and then devise strategies for overcoming them. Let me briefly outline some of these internal systemic weaknesses and possible strategic options for future success.

To begin with, by failing to raise enough taxes from our citizens to fund government's budgets, our country is missing out of the benefits that come with dependence on tax revenues. Research shows that the benefits of depending on taxes for government revenues include strengthening of the institutions of fiscal governance, improved government transparency and accountability, and strengthening of the nation's bureaucratic capability.

Furthermore, as a country, we must recognise that we have been drinking from a poisoned well. That is, our oil-dependent economy hinders our progress on many fronts. Economists have long found strong links between dependency on primary commodity for export earning and likelihood of civil wars. They argued that rents from extractive industries (oil and gas, diamonds, and timber) increase greed and attract the wrong kinds of people into politics. Researchers made their conclusions after studying the underlying causes of 47 civil wars in resource-rich countries around the globe. Commenting on these stark findings, Tina Rosenberg of the New York Times wrote: “Every nation wants to strike oil, and after it happens, nearly every nation is worse off for it.”Weaning ourselves from too much dependence on oil revenue could be the beginning of progress. The sooner, the better.

The question is how? Help is around the corner in terms of availability of models to emulates in order to escape the resource curse. The same research that unearthed these dark findings also points to possible remedies and experiences of others such as Norway (locking oil revenue out of economy), Alaska (distribution of rents to all citizens and future investment accounts), Botswana (establishing cluster of institutions for protection of private property) , and Rwanda (developmental state) are just few examples of countries that have succeeded to break loose of resource paradox by following certain strategic options. One radical strategic choice recommended by Mick Moore at the Institute of Development Studies at University of Sussex in England (and coauthor of an upcoming textbook: Taxing Africa: Coercion, Reforms, and Development), is for the resource-rich countries to distribute all revenues from primary commodity export to its citizens and then ask the citizens to pay percentages of that back in tax. He believes this can create a sense of commitment amongst citizens and strengthen accountability.

Moreover, our country needs to build its bureaucratic capability not only to be able to collect sufficient taxes but also to be able to manage external shocks more effectively as well as being able to turn our societal aspirations into actionable policies and projects. This can be achieved by reforming civil service so that only, and only the most capable and ethical amongst our citizens can be admitted into the public service, irrespective of the ethnic background or religious belief.

Finally, any future peace agreement should aim at reducing the transitional period to no more than 12 months. Why? Elections by in themselves are part of democratic development in the life of a nation. Regular elections do much to exercise tolerance of citizens and the politicians to celebrate victory in humility and accept electoral defeat in grace. Elections also provide the needed once-in-a-while opportunity for citizens to hold their government accountable and chose those who will rule the country on their behalf, and hence impart legitimacy and give the strong mandate to elected government nationally and internationally.

Depending on how the above nation-building blocks are captured by the peace deal being negotiated, we will be wrestling at heaven's gate. And wrestling for that goal we should.

*The author is the vice chancellor of the University of Juba in South Sudan. He blogs at www.JohnAkecSouthSudan.blogspot.com

James Gatdet Dak sits inside the dock in the High Court in Juba, South Sudan February 12, 2018. (Photo Reuters-Samir Bol)

July 10, 2018 (JUBA) - James Gatdet Dak's family, the imprisoned-spokesperson SPLM-IO's leader denied his release and called on President Salva Kiir to free him in line with the recent security arrangement reached in Khartoum.

"The family of James Gatdet Dak do hereby informing the public to disregard the 'fake news' being circulated on social medias about "James being released," said Paul Tesloach Dak, James's younger brother in statements extended to Sudan Tribune.

We as a family together with you wished this day to arrived but not this one being circulated on media. Shall that day comes we all will know it!

In November 2016, the Kenyan government in collaboration deported James Dak to Juba, after statements welcoming Secretary-GeneralSecretary General, Ban Ki-Moon to replace UNMISS force Commander Lt. Gen. Johnson Mogoa Kimani who himself is a Kenyan national.

The removal of the Kenyan general was decided after an UN investigation revealing that UNMISS has failed due to poor command to protect civilians and foreign aid workers in Juba and Malakal cities.

Paul who is based in Canada further called on President Kiir to honour his commitment taken in Khartoum Declaration of Agreement of 27 June and the Security Agreements agreement signed on 6 July and free his brother and the other political detainees.

“We absolutely wished the president Kiir to bless the peace accord signed in Khartoum by not only releasing James Gatdet Dak but all political detainees as a good gesture of Hope for all South Sudanese to believe this is a meaningful document," said Paul.

In February 2018 James Dak was sentenced to death by hanging. The South Sudanese court on charges of treason and incitement against the government.

President Salva Kiir in a meeting held on Saturday with Presidents Yoweri Museveni and Omer al-Bashir agreed to appoint Riek Machar as Frist Vice President during the transitional period, a measure that he had been refusing since the bloody clashes of Jul 2016 in Juba.

(ST)

July 9, 2018 (KHARTOUM/JUBA) - South Sudan opposition groups Monday distanced themselves from Entebbe Proposal saying it ignored the core issues and was just a bargaining between warring parties over the allocation of cabinet and parliament seats.

South Sudanese government and opposition groups including the SPLM-IO, South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) and Other Political Parties (OPP) were in Kampala for a meeting with Presidents Omer al-Bashir, Salva Kiir, and Yoweri Museveni.

The meeting agreed to reinstitute Machar as the First Vice-President and amended the Revised Bridging Proposal by creating a fourth vice-president. The compromise was seen as a major breakthrough in the process as Kiir vetoed the participation of his former FVP threatening to collapse the whole peace talks.

Also, the cabinet ministers have been increased to 55 ministers: 30 for the government, 10 for the SPLM-IO and 5 for the remaining opposition forces. The same for the parliament which will be composed of 550 members: the government 400 MPs, SPLM-IO 100 MPs and 50 seats for the other opposition factions.

The opposition SSOA and OPP groups were reportedly involved in the discussions, but the spokesperson of the opposition alliance said, in fact, the discussions were between the three presidents and the SPLM-IO leader.

“The leadership of SSOA and Other Political Parties (OPP) were officially invited to Entebbe for the July 7th meeting but kept out of the 8-hour proceedings,” said Kwaje Lasu SSOA spokesperson in a statement he issued on Sunday and confirmed to Sudan Tribune on Monday evening.

“The Entebbe meeting of 7/712018 turned out to be a bilateral agreement between two of the warring parties, namely; the Juba regime and SPLM/A-IO,” he added.

Asked if things have changed since the return of the delegations to Khartoum Lasu stressed that things remain the same and even they have not been officially notified the extension of talks to next Thursday 12 July.

However “ We have had submitted our counter-proposal on governance but we've yet to be engaged on. It's the same tactics used in Addis,” he said.

In Khartoum, Sudanese foreign minister El-Dirdery Ahmed met with the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires to Khartoum Steven Koutsis and U.S. Ambassador to Juba Thomas Hushek and briefed them about the Entebbe compromise and ongoing efforts to settle the outstanding issues.

Lasu recalled the need to be committed to inclusivity principles as the only way for a lasting peace in South Sudan.

“ln our informed view, any bilateral agreement to the exclusion of other parties will not bring about sustainable peace in South Sudan,” he stressed.

The Sudanese mediators said the extension of the talks aims to draft the points agreed in Entebbe and to sign it on Wednesday.

Nonetheless, it is not clear if a compromise will be reached on Tuesday paving the way for the signing ceremony on the governance chapter or the discussions will be extended until the next week.

The parties have travel for the third round of talks in Nairobi after agreeing on the outstanding issues in the governance and the security arrangements.

(ST)