REUTERS/Stephane Mahe
L’agriculture fait partie de l’ADN de l’Europe : la politique agricole commune (PAC) a été la contrepartie négociée, en 1957, par une France encore très agricole à l’ouverture des frontières douanières entre les six pays signataires du traité de Rome qui s’apprête à fêter ses soixante ans. Sur le papier, c’est un succès : grâce à la modernisation qu’elle a organisée, elle a non seulement permis à l’Europe d’atteindre l’autosuffisance alimentaire, mais de devenir la première exportatrice agricole au monde, juste devant les États-Unis (129 milliards d’euros en 2015 et un excédent de 16 milliards). Pourtant, la PAC est de plus en plus décriée : la très grande majorité des paysans n’en profitant pas, ils sont devenus anti-européens, les citoyens se demandent de plus en plus pourquoi elle absorbe 38 % du budget communautaire alors que les agriculteurs ne représentent qu’une infime partie de la population active (3,6 % en France), certains, comme le Front national, l’accusent d’être « ultralibérale », un comble pour une politique publique dirigiste et bureaucratique. Bref, la PAC de 2017 souffre des mêmes maux que l’Union : incomprise, accusée de tous les vices, rejetée. « Le système ne fonctionne plus », reconnaît Michel Dantin, député européen LR (PPE). « La PAC a fait l’Europe, elle peut la défaire », met en garde son collègue socialiste, Eric Andrieu. L’Irlandais Phil Hogan, le commissaire à l’agriculture, en a conscience : il a lancé, le 2 février, une consultation publique (1) afin de proposer d’ici à la fin de l’année une nouvelle réforme. Décryptage.
· Pourquoi les réformes de la PAC se succèdent-elles ?
La PAC est, en réalité, en chantier permanent depuis son « achèvement » en 1968. Car, très rapidement, elle a atteint son but grâce aux prix garantis, c’est-à-dire détachés du marché local et mondial, et à la protection totale des frontières européennes, l’autosuffisance alimentaire. Mais, dès le départ, le vert était dans le fruit : la PAC première manière a entrainé un productivisme sans limites, une baisse de qualité des produits agricoles, une concentration des exploitations et une explosion des dépenses agricoles. À la fin des années 80, des montagnes de beurre et de viande et des lacs de lait étaient stockés dans les frigos communautaires avant d’être exportés à bas prix cassé vers les pays tiers au détriment de leur agriculture. 1971, 1984, 1988, les réformes s’enchainent, en vain, jusqu’à 1992, lorsque Jacques Delors, soucieux aussi de mettre en conformité la PAC avec ce qui allait devenir l’Organisation mondiale du commerce, parvient à convaincre les États de rompre avec le système des prix garantis pour les remplacer par des aides fixes aux revenus. Mais la rupture avec le passé se fait lentement, la France ayant bataillé pour que ses céréaliers ne soient pas pénalisés : les prix baissent en douceur et les aides tiennent compte des rendements historiques, ce qui favorise les gros aux dépens des petits. En 1999, nouvelle réforme, destinée à financer le développement rural (deuxième pilier) et surtout à préparer l’élargissement à l’Est. En 2003 puis en 2008, rebelote : cette fois, les aides au revenu peuvent être découplés des références historiques et remplacés par un paiement à l’hectare, ce qui la aussi, favorise les grandes exploitations. La France, comme la plupart des pays du sud, reste fidèle aux références historiques, tout comme elle refuse les possibilités de plafonner partiellement les aides supérieures à 150 000 euros par an et par exploitation… La dernière grande réforme remonte à 2013 (mise en place en 2015) qui a notamment introduit un « verdissement » de la PAC afin d’inciter les paysans à développer une agriculture durable et à entrer dans une logique d’aménagement du territoire : ainsi, 30 % des aides directes sont réservées aux terres respectant une série de critères environnementaux. Depuis 1992, donc, la ligne est la même : rompre avec le productivisme à tout prix, développer une agriculture de qualité (développement des AOC et des IGP) respectueuse de l’environnement et assurer un revenu minimum aux agriculteurs pour les protéger des fluctuations des prix du marché auxquelles ils sont désormais exposés de plein fouet.
· Les réformes de la PAC ont-elles été des succès ?
Le problème de cet empilement de réformes extrêmement rapides a abouti à une complexité bureaucratique sans précédent, les exigences nationales s’ajoutant à celles de l’Union pour pouvoir bénéficier de la moindre aide. « On a construit des usines à gaz », dénonce Michel Dantin. « La PAC est devenue beaucoup trop complexe, trop lourde surtout pour les petits paysans qui n’ont pas les moyens et pas envie de faire face à cette bureaucratie », reconnaît Phil Hogan qui cite les « 300 mesures législatives diverses » réglementant la PAC qui forment un maquis impénétrable et surtout oblige les agriculteurs à multiplier les investissements coûteux pour satisfaire à toutes les demandes. La détresse paysanne face à ce « doux monstre » est réelle comme le montre le taux de suicide en France. Mais, surtout, en dépit de toutes ses réformes, « 80 % des aides directes sont toujours versées à 20 % des agriculteurs », se désole Hogan, les États ayant refusé tout plafonnement des aides et toute dégressivité en fonction de la taille de l’exploitation. Certes, ces 20 % produisent 80 % des produits agricoles, mais est-il normal que « des fermes de 1000 vaches reçoivent près de 20 fois plus d’aides publiques que des exploitations familiales de taille moyenne (50 vaches) mises en péril par les bas prix du lait », s’interroge la Fondation Robert Schuman (2) ? Sans compter que les aides à l’hectare poussent à l’agrandissement des exploitations, comme le souligne Eric Andrieu : « plus on a d’hectares, plus on reçoit d’aide, et ce au détriment de la production et de l’emploi. C’est une logique de rente ». Pour donner un exemple, une exploitation de 300 hectares de céréales recevra chaque année entre 100 et 120 000 euros de subventions européennes. Surtout, le système d’aide directe, qui est fixe, n’a absolument pas servi de filet de sécurité comme l’a montré l’effondrement des prix du marché en 2015-2016 : « un tiers des agriculteurs touche moins de 375 €. Dans l’Ain, la moitié n’a eu aucun revenu en 2016 », s’indigne Michel Dantin. Enfin, la PAC, à force de favoriser la concentration dans un but productiviste, a abouti à un effondrement de la population rurale : en France, en 50 ans, le nombre d’agriculteurs est passé de 4 millions à 900 000, la surface agricole a diminué de 20 % et l’agriculture ne représente plus que 1,5 % du PIB contre 3,6 % en 1980. À terme, c’est une catastrophe qui s’annonce : « il y a un problème de renouvellement des générations : dans l’Union, il y a moins de 6 % des agriculteurs qui ont moins de 35 ans -9 % en France. À long terme, cela pose un problème de sécurité alimentaire », s’alarme-t-on à la Commission. Seule bonne nouvelle : l’agriculture bio se développe rapidement (20 % par an en surface).
· Comment améliorer la PAC ?
D’abord la simplifier et ne plus laisser les paysans seuls face à des fonctionnaires nationaux qui multiplient les obstacles à plaisir : « en Pologne, le texte sur les aides à l’agriculture de montagne fait 4 lignes. En France, 3 pages », dénonce Michel Dantin. Il faut aussi maintenir des services dans les zones rurales : « qui a envie de vivre seul avec son plus proche voisin à 4 km et l’épicerie la plus proche à 10 km ? », demande un eurocrate qui pointe l’incurie des États à assurer l’aménagement de leur territoire. Mais surtout, il faut revoir le système des aides directes. Revenir aux prix garantis et à ses dérives budgétaires et environnementales passées, tout le monde l’exclut, surtout à l’heure de la mondialisation des échanges : « budgétairement, pour maintenir les prix, cela serait monstrueux ». Hogan veut donc développer des instruments de « gestion de crise » afin que les paysans puissent faire face à la volatilité des prix, par exemple en développant un système d’assurance. Mais, comme le soulignent Michel Dantin et Eric Andrieu, il faudrait aller plus loin et mettre aussi en place un système à l’américaine, celui des « deficiency payments ». En clair, lorsque les prix mondiaux sont bons, les aides directes sont, en tout ou en partie, mises de côté et ne sont versées que lorsque les cours s’effondrent et en fonction des situations individuelles. Ainsi, les aides aux revenus joueraient un rôle contra-cyclique au lieu de permettre aux grands céréaliers de s’offrir une troisième Mercedes… « Il faudrait que ces fonds soient gérés par secteur, au plus près du terrain pour tenir compte de la diversité des territoires et des types d’agriculture », souligne Michel Dantin. Enfin, la Commission est fermement décidée à s’attaquer à la chaine alimentaire, en clair, aux intermédiaires comme l’industrie agro-alimentaire et surtout la grande distribution. « C’est un problème de concurrence plus que de PAC », précise-t-on à la Commission, mais « nous sommes déterminés à nous assurer, y compris par la loi, que le secteur primaire, c’est-à-dire les agriculteurs, ne soit plus mis en coupe réglée par la distribution ». La baisse des prix alimentaires (38 % du revenu des Français consacré à l’alimentation en 1960, 14 % aujourd’hui) a atteint un minima : il y a un prix à payer si l’on veut qu’il y ait encore à l’avenir une agriculture et une agriculture de qualité.
(2) « Question d’Europe » du 20 février 2017 par Bernard Bourget.
N.B.: version longue de mon article paru dans Libération du 25 février pour l’ouverture du salon de l’agriculture.
Conformément à la Résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, adoptée le 30 novembre 2016, aujourd’hui le Conseil européen a adopté des actes juridiques qui imposent de nouvelles mesures restrictives à l’encontre de la République populaire démocratique de Corée (RPDC).
Les mesures restrictives de l’UE contre la Corée du Nord ont été introduites le 22 décembre 2006. Les mesures existantes mettent en œuvre toutes les résolutions du CSNU qui ont été adoptées à la suite des essais nucléaires et des tirs de missiles balistiques effectués par la RPDC, et comprennent des mesures supplémentaires qui ont été prises de manière autonome par l’UE.
Le 19 mai 2016, le Conseil avait déjà ajouté dix-huit personnes et une entité à la liste des personnes et entités faisant l’objet de mesures restrictives de l’UE à l’encontre de la RPDC. Ces mesures supplémentaires de l’UE complètent le régime de sanctions imposées en vertu de plusieurs résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies.
De plus, le 12 février 2017, la RPDC avait lancé un missile balistique, ce qui constituait une nouvelle violation de nombreuses résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, dont la résolution 2321, adoptée en novembre 2016. Ce jour-là l’EEAS avait communiqué que la haute représentante/vice-présidente Federica Mogherini avait l’intention de s’adresser aux ministres des affaires étrangères des partenaires internationaux afin d’examiner de manière plus approfondie la réponse internationale.
Les mesures voulues par l’UE comprennent des restrictions sur les opérations liées au charbon, le fer et le minerai de fer de la RPDC et une interdiction sur les importations de cuivre, de nickel, d’argent et de zinc ainsi que des statues de la RPDC. Les mesures comprennent aussi une interdiction des exportations de nouveaux hélicoptères et des navires de la RPDC, le resserrement des restrictions existantes dans le secteur des transports et dans le secteur financier, comme l’interdiction des représentations diplomatiques et aux diplomates de la RPDC d’avoir plus d’un compte bancaire dans l’UE et les restrictions sur l’utilisation de biens immobiliers par la RPDC dans l’UE.
Les actes juridiques prévoient également que les États membres adoptent de nouvelles mesures afin d’empêcher aux citoyennes de la RPDC une formation dans des disciplines qui favoriseraient les programmes liés aux missiles nucléaires et balistiques, afin aussi de suspendre la coopération scientifique et la coopération technique avec des personnes ou des groupes parrainés par la RPDC à titre officiel ou pour le compte de la RPDC.
Maria Elena Argano
En savoir plus:
Site de la Libre : http://www.lalibre.be/dernieres-depeches/afp/coree-du-nord-l-ue-renforce-ses-sanctions-contre-pyongyang-58b421bccd70ce397f2e4a10
Many thanks to 1989 Generation Initiative for organizing this discussion in EU-Logos office.
Purpose: How can local authorities play a crucial role in combating radicalization, and how can the national level and the EU support these initiatives ?
Belgium is an important area when it comes to people leaving and fighting for the Caliphate, and to potential returns of radicalized adults and children. As a multicultural city, Mechelen includes around 20% of Muslims, mainly from Morocco.
The Mayor of this town, Bart Somers, seeks to prevent radicalization and departures of a part of the Muslim population, but also of the other inhabitants. Despite the analysis explaining that a large part of departures for Middle-East relates to Muslims, radicalization affects people independently of their religion or their origins. Mr. Somers explained that the size of a city and its suburbs does not directly affect the process of radicalization. In fact, taking Mechelen as an example, a town as small as Vilvoorde, it is possible to notice that the first has fewer Islamic fighters than the second. This is related to the approach taken to fight against radicalization from the bottom. According to him, the most relevant way to avoid this process is to prevent it at a local level.
Bart Somers explained that the radicalization process in the EU is influenced by another model spread by criminals and drug dealers in rough neighborhoods, which is opposed to the Western society based on school and a so-called meritocratic process. This opposition is a fertile ground instrumentalized by Daesh: Bart Somers explained in his intervention how, as a Mayor, he is handling this issue through social policies. Mr. Somers insisted on two notions, which are, according to him, inherent basis of the Western society, and therefore opposite of Daesh discourses: « Freedom and diversity are two sides of the same coin ».
Diversity in identity
Diversity is a notion that Mr. Somers emphasizes in his speech. He also insisted on the phenomena of ghettoization. The main policy to promote rough neighborhoods and support their development is to invest in good quality infrastructures and equipment, which make streets comfortable and clean. It is, according to Mr. Somers, the best way to encourage respect for politicians and their actions, and to stimulate diversity through increased social mobility. This mix will endorse a virtuous and inclusive circle: new inhabitants will choose their own neighbourhood, and this will trigger a greater involvement in local life. Hence, Mr. Somers insisted on the notion of social-mix in schools, which required a deal with the parents to support this very important criteria. As a practical example, Mr. Somers develops sports initiatives taken through schools and individual decisions. This process needs time and unbroken efforts.
Mr. Somers then put in light a part of Daesh’s strategy to deeply divide the society between who is with the truth and who is wrong according of their own interpretation. Daesh plays with this issue and creates a unique identity: us the true Muslims, and the others who do not believe in the same way. Starting from this process, plurality of identity is denied, each person is black or white, good or bad. Daesh created a deeply simple Manichean ideology, like totalitarian regimes such as Communism or Nazism did in the last century. They are destroying plural identities, which severs links between individuals. Islam is distorted to be a force of exclusion. According to Mr. Somers, Daesh’s ideology has nothing in common with Islam as a religion, and they use Islamic dogmas to manipulate isolated and/or looking for new members.
According to the mayor, Daesh’s approach is not based on a religious issue, but rather on an elaborated political process. The practical example is related to the fact that not all Muslims have embraced the doctrine imposed by the Caliphate. The war carried on by the ISIL does not aim to destroy a particular religion. They fight against democracy, open societies, and humanity in general. This is politics, not religion. Moreover, like every totalitarian ideology, the others, people who do not share the same opinion, are not seen as humans anymore. Using violence is legitimatized.
Liberty: a vector of adaptation and cultural wealth
Thus, Daesh is acting like a totalitarian regime and denies liberties and identities. Therefore, terrorist attacks serve this totalitarian ideology and create break- ups across populations, especially on Islam as a peaceful religion. This fear of the other drives to a legitimization of violence, which hurts both camps The link between ideology and propaganda in this case is very narrow. The propagandist approach adopted by ISIS touches all levels of society : poor people, middle classes and even highly- educated people. The target of Daesh is the individual with strong integration problems: the misfit. Through its propaganda, ISIL hits victims of the Western society, and makes them believe that embracing their doctrine will give them an opportunity to become heroes. Their propaganda especially involves a lack of responsibility: the cause of all failures is the other (in this case the Western society).
Mr. Somers brought up a scheme to free from fear of change and differences. As a true liberal, he claimed that « Liberalism is not a way of life, it is tolerating other ways of life » and makes a parallel with women emancipation and gay rights movements. Society needs to adapt and to change, and it should not decide on the liberty of others, as long as their rights do not impede ours. Claiming that freely veiled women are not free and deserve to be freed is also a totalitarian reasoning, and it means that we do not believe any more in values of our Western society. Change and acceptation of change are deep oppositions of Daesh ideology. In their eyes, nothing has to change since the Prophet walked on the Earth, and each proof of evolution is a treason. That is why the respect of freedom and differences is a basis of deradicalization and of the fight against Daesh.
Countering radicalization: several levels of action
Deradicalization is a hard, costly, and time consuming process with no guaranteed results. Despite these difficulties, acting at the local level to prevent or to stop the process is, according to Mr. Somers, one of the key of the issue. Knowing personally involved individuals increase the strength of the intervention. Initial trust is a large part of the success. Second, understanding how this phenomenon gained ground, seeing the cause and being able to treat her and not only the symptoms, remains crucial to help a radicalized person.
Moreover, local level is the most relevant because the main variable used by Daesh is the isolation of people. They create a feeling of inclusion, of belonging of a group. He compared this strategy to a sect indoctrination, which works like « a drug ». That is why deradicalization is so complicated and unpredictable. An isolated person, who is suddenly assimilated to a hero, will not return to an everyday life he loathes. Deradicalization has to be a part of broader social policies. Safety policies should not be the first response to fight and prevent this process. The first policy should be to pay attention to the local environment, including the respect of local investments and municipality-built infrastructures. It should then ensure of avoiding ghettoization of schools and neighborhoods. Meanwhile, national and the European authorities should put this issue on their respective agenda.
The national government needs to create a real citizenship. Mr. Somers argued that national politicians are only focused on the Right-Left line and safety issues. But putting more cameras and policemen in the streets is to deal with symptoms, not roots. They will not enable an effective prevention or response to radicalization. Social context is key and should be focused on. Our society needs to adapt to these new inputs to include better all the populations, and make them feel as true and whole citizens who belong to a plural community. Mr. Somers repeated that security is not the only issue which should be treated through national and EU level. He insisted on the key-role the Members States could have in sharing data between their intelligence services. Additionally, creating a global European organization in charge of deradicalization policies across the member states which could inspire them more effective policies. The strength of the EU is potential to gather around, and its ability to fight against polarization of the society.
“The EU has to act on three levels higher”, Somers says. The first is based on the concept of security as a top-down practice in order to create a program able to reach and touch the civil society. Security must not lead to an isolation process. After creating a security program, multi-level cooperation between states has to be improved, especially in intelligence, information sharing, collaboration, and police and judicial cooperation. Finally, after establishing a common security program and cooperation among the 28 countries, good practices can be developed. Thanks to the latter, civil society will be able to become a key actor to counter radicalization, and able to accommodate official rules to the feedback from the ground.
Moreover, the EU, along with other Western countries, should pay more attention to the considerable spread of the Wahhabite ideology and propaganda. Mr. Somers indicated that 95% of the online Muslim literature is Wahhabite. In his view, the interpretation of sacred texts has a considerable importance. Every sacred text is full of metaphorical and allegorical contents, and must be read and interpreted at a theoretical level by qualified people. In the case of the Qur’an, one must not read every verse as if we were still living in the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Such a reading of sacred texts could only lead to erroneous interpretations and nefarious life prescriptions. Jihadists and foreign fighters are stuck in this literal interpretation. Until now, financial interests have limited initiatives and efforts in deradicalization. Wahhabite vision plays a crucial role in radicalization.
The EU urgently needs to admit that Islam is a part of its history, and European institutions need to accept and support this feature as a part of their multi-cultural identity.
Emmanuelle Gris
Maria Elena Argano
Classé dans:Lutte contre la criminalité organisée, Lutte contre le terrorisme et la radicalisation, Uncategorized Tagged: bart somers, ideologie, Radicalisation, religion, Terrorisme
Troubling news continue to come from the Balkans. Two rounds of talks in the framework of the High Level Dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina were hosted by High Representative Federica Mogherini respectively on 24 January and on February first. Tensions escalated before the meeting when Serbia attempted to send a passenger train emblazoned with the slogan “Kosovo is Serbia” in several languages to the Serb enclave of northern Kosovo and started to build up a wall in Mitrovica to divide Kosovo Serbs from Albanians. Thus, both parties were invited to participate at the EU-backed High Level Dialogue in order to minimise, if not erase, any risk to blow up what already have been achieved as far as the normalisation of the relations between Belgrade and Pristina concerns.
Continuous incidents feed tensions between parties
On Saturday, 14 January a Serbian train decorated and painted down the side nationalist slogans and images departed from Belgrade and headed for northern Kosovo, but it was stopped before crossing the border and a dramatic escalation of tensions between the former wartime foes began. The train was seen as provocative by Pristina as it was decorated with Serbian flags, religious Christian Orthodox scenes and the words “Kosovo is Serbia” were painted in 20 languages. Officials in Kosovo had protested that the train’s planned route into Kosovo was a violation of their country’s sovereignty and promised not to let it in. On the other side Serbia’s Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić ordered the train stopped in Raska, before crossing the border, claiming that ethnic Albanians in Kosovo had tried to mine the railway. A word war begun as accusations and counteraccusations came from both sides. Different opinions and analysis were provided by citizens, politicians and medias.
The “provocative” train isn’t the first incident registered between Belgrade and Pristina during last past months. On the first weekend of December 2016 local Serbs authorities started building a wall on the Serb north side of the Ibar river in Mitrovica which is just next to the bridge that ethnically divides the town’s Serb-dominated north and largely Albanian-populated south. Albanian officials saw its construction as unconstitutional act that risks further divisions between two ethnic groups in Mitrovica while the mayor of the north Mitrovica stated that the wall will not be demolished. A revitalisations of tensions between Belgrade and Pristina was feared. Beside the general political discourse what seems important to understand is not the wall or a train itself but the general tense political climate that generates likely incidents.
Historical background
Kosovo with its contested statehood has been and still is potentially the most explosive issue of contemporary Europe. After the former Yugoslavia broke-up in the 1990s, Serbia responded to separatist pressure from Kosovo by launching a brutal crackdown on the territory’s Albanian population, which was only brought to an end by Nato military intervention in 1999.
Almost two decades have passed since the 1998/’99 war and the NATO bombardment against Serbia but tensions are still visible between the two parties, particularly in the city of Mitrovica. UN resolution 1244, adopted in 1999, after NATO intervention against Serbia, authorised an international civil and military presence in Kosovo and established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK). In June 1999 NATO-led Kosovo force (KFOR) and UNMIK represented the presence of international community on the ground leading one of the most costly peace-building operations ever. Five years after starting peace-building operations a failure of international community in achieving progress and changing the situation became clear with the riots carried out in March 2004 in Kosovo.
Since 2005, under the leadership of former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, international community made further efforts to resolve the question of Kosovo’s status. Those efforts unfortunately didn’t bring the hoped-for comprehensive solution. As talks on its final status came to a dead point, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 2008, after years of strained relations between its Serb and mainly Albanian inhabitants. It has been recognised by the United States and major European Union countries (with the exception of Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) but Serbia, backed by its powerful ally Russia.
Reconciliation between the majority Albanians, most of whom support independence, and the Serb minority remains elusive. Since Kosovo turned independent, Serbia has been resisting the integration of Kosovo into regional and international institutions. Belgrade also continues to support “parallel structures” in northern Kosovo— where the Serbs are in the majority—that keep this area out of the control of the authorities in Pristina. In the summer and fall of 2011, tensions in the North area rose, threatening a wider crisis. Serbia has been trying to keep its policy on Kosovo separate from its ambitions to join the European Union. However, the EU has made clear that Serbia’s progress toward accession depends on Belgrade improving its relations with Kosovo.
What has EU done so far?
On regard to Kosovo European Union has played a leading role in the international effort to build a new future for it since 1999. Kosovo has a clear European perspective as part of the wider Western Balkans region. The EU is active in Kosovo through its Special Representative (EUSR), and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission in the rule of law area (EULEX). The EU is also present through member countries’ Embassies and Liaison offices. The European Union Office in Kosovo plays a crucial role in implementing the EU agenda in the territory, especially the promotion of European norms. The Office ensures permanent political and technical dialogue between Kosovo and the EU institutions. The EUSR offers advice and support to the Government of Kosovo, coordinates the EU presence, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.
EULEX
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the European Security and Defence Policy. The aim of the mission is to assist the Kosovar authorities in the area of rule of law, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs. EULEX is a technical mission that mentors, monitors and advises, while retaining a number of limited executive powers. Besides, the relatively smooth deployment of the mission throughout Kosovo since December 2008 and the reasonably positive record of its first semester of operational activity go to the credit of the overall professionalism and commitment of the mission staff. The launch of such a large and ambitious mission in a turbulent political context invites, however, to reflect on a few key questions.
There is a mismatch between foreign policy and ESDP. Incapable to reach a common position of the question of the status of Kosovo, nevertheless EU member countries have agreed to establish an ESDP mission that had been originally conceived to underpin the ‘supervised’ independence of Kosovo itself. It is understood that all EU Member States support the building of accountable and effective rule-of-law institutions in Kosovo and that, more broadly, all agree that the future of Kosovo and other Western Balkan countries lies in EU membership. However, launching EULEX as a quick technical mission in a country characterised by an unresolved political problem could only create tensions at both the political and operational level. A very substantial degree of political ambiguity and diplomatic skill within the EU and the UN has, in this case, averted this danger and enabled EULEX to enter its operational phase. In future, more thinking will have to be devoted by EU Member States to the intersection between foreign policy and ESDP, if the two are to be mutually reinforcing.
The second issue regards EULEX itself and its ability to move on from initial achievements to structurally tackling the reform of rule-of-law institutions as well as the root causes of their fragility, namely corruption and organised crime. This challenge is closely linked to another issue facing the mission, namely striking the right balance between the direct exercise of executive functions and the transfer of ownership and responsibility to Kosovo authorities – the stated aim of the mission. Most of the political class remains more committed in words than in deeds, while the lines between political, economic and criminal networks are difficult to clear cut. Short of much stronger local commitment and capacity to address crime and corruption and uphold the rule of law, the impact of EULEX will not be decisive. From this standpoint, the specific efforts of EULEX to engage and support local civil society organisations are very important and should be pursued further.
A third question relates to civilian ESDP as such, and to the potentially growing gap between the supply and the demand of resources. This is relevant both for EULEX, which has not yet reached full strength and perhaps never will, and for future ESDP missions. As noted above, running an operation like EULEX marks a change of gear in ESDP. It is legitimate to wonder whether such change of gear will prove sustainable, whether in terms of procurement and mission support, personnel requirements or planning and conduct structures.
Economic relations
The European Union plays an important role in the reconstruction and development of Kosovo not only through its institutions but through its member states as well. Thus, the EU is by far the single largest donor providing assistance to Kosovo and the Western Balkan region, and is at the forefront of the reconstruction effort.
Since the end of the war Kosovo has received more than €2.3 billion in EU assistance and close to €1 billion in support to international presence. This support was initially focused most on emergency actions and reconstruction but later on shifted to the promotion of Kosovo’s institutions and on its European future perspective. Eighteen EU countries maintain representative offices in Kosovo, and many non-governmental organisations from EU countries are active there. In the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process that is seeking to bring Kosovo into line with European norms, Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Programme and Stabilisation and Association Agreements, in terms of agreements and treaties, need to be mentioned.
Serbia’s path to European Union
What about Serbia? The EU is about to open two more chapters in the negotiations with Serbia which should be able to join the EU around 2020, but only if it has developed by that time essentially normal relations with its southern neighbour. Through the strong use of incentives and conditionality, the EU recently helped to solve some of the acute problems in the North Kosovo and to open the door to its participation in regional cooperation. The overall situation, however, remains unsatisfactory and potentially unstable. There are two key issues addressed by the accession talks with Belgrade: first Belgrade will need to remain fully committed to the normalisation of relations with Pristina and continue to deliver on implementation of all dialogue agreements (Chapter 35 – Other issues); and second reforms in the area of rule of law, covered by Chapters 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) need to be finalised.
The EU considers that Serbia and Kosovo’s EU accession processes and the normalisation of their relations ‘should run parallel’, until a ‘legally binding agreement’ is reached, allowing both sides to fully exercise their rights and fulfil their responsibilities. In 2008, the Council of the EU declared that each Member State would decide alone on its relations with Kosovo. As five Member States have not recognised Kosovo’s independence, the EU has not been able to adopt a common position. Instead, it adopted a so-called ‘status neutrality’ approach and tied both sides’ EU accession to ‘a visible and sustainable improvement’ in their relations, rather than to the formal recognition of Kosovo.
The biggest step reached regarding the normalisation of the relations between the two neighbours is the so-called Brussels Agreement signed by the parties in April 2013 with the mediation of then High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ashton. It was thought to mark a historical breakthrough as the parties reached a vey important 15-point agreement. It was historic indeed as the EU succeeded in making the parties to sign an agreement although it’s real success depends on implementation. Serbia succeeded in giving a strong signal of willingness to proceed in its path toward the EU although without recognising Kosovo’s independence and Kosovo could keep its hope that Belgrade would not obstruct its recognition by international bodies like UN alive, as parties agreed on a very crucial point – not to hinder the other’s efforts to gain EU membership.
EU as a mediator still lacks of leverage in turning the Balkans European
Trying to connect the dots and reflecting on the EU role as a mediator in the framework of normalising Belgrade – Pristina relations a few questions come to mind: How credible can be a non homogenous entity in addressing such a big issue? Nine years after declaring independence Kosovo still has not much to celebrate about. EU couldn’t reach a common position on regard to Kosovo status as 5 out of 28 still don’t recognise its independence. Remaining stick in “neutrality status” trap don’t help in solving out such a complicate situation.
What about the EU impartiality? This brings us back to the question of homogeneity above mentioned. Considering separately the EU itself and member states rises doubts on impartiality. On one hand Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain don’t recognise Kosovo’s independence and on the other hand member states like France, Germany and United Kingdom directly participated in the bombing campaign against Serbia. Can impartial parts make up a whole (EU) characterised by impartiality?
Why should EU member states agree in importing more territorial conflicts and disputes within European Union? It can be said that this issue is of a core importance for EU because just a peaceful Balkans region can be a desirable neighbour for the Union itself. It is obvious that the process of fully normalising relations between Belgrade and Pristina is challenging for all concerned. However, their strong interest in progressing toward the EU should give Brussels some leverage to move this process forward. Finally, the EU has the responsibility to drive this “train” but first it needs to have clear in mind the destination it wants to reach.
Zana Çanaku
To find out more:
European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies, Policy department. « EULEX Kosovo: lessons learned and future challenges », Brussels, September 2009.
Leon Malazogu and Florian Bieber. « The Future of Interaction between Prishtina and Belgrade. » Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 05-06 (2012): 26-43.
Papadimitriu, Dimitri, Petrov, Petar (2012). « Whose Rule, Whose Contested Statehood, External Leverage and the European Union’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo ». Journal Of Common Market Studies. Vol. 50, no. 5, pp. 746-763.
Weller, Marc. “Negotiating the final status of Kosovo”, Chaillot Paper no. 114, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2008.
CONFERENCE ON ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION – SERBIA
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/AD-12-2015-INIT/en/pdf
Serbia and Kosovo: Normalisation of relations
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/579079/EPRS_ATA(2016)579079_EN.pdf
Serbia and Kosovo sign historic agreement – The guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/serbia-kosovo-historic-agreement-brussels