The Russian Su-35 was something of a mystery for many years. Pictures from Russian firms showed different fighter jets carrying that label, even as the aircraft remained a prospective design and research project, rather an active program of record.
Revelations after 2007 began to provide answers. This article explains the sources of the widespread confusion regarding the Su-35’s layout and key characteristics, reviews what is now known about the platform, and tracks its development. Those developments are likely to have broad consequences. The aircraft now has a home customer in the Russian Air Force, and the Su-35 is being positioned to replace most Su-30MK variants as Russia’s fighter export of choice within the coming decade. Will its succession bid succeed?
As one of our readers noted, DID’s articles from 2005-2007 seem to describe 2 different SU-35s. One was a mid-life modernized SU-27 Flanker, but there’s also a much more re-engineered “SU-35” variant with canards, thrust vectoring, etc. which has been confused with (and possibly redesignated between) the SU-37. So… what do we mean by “SU-35”?
Until very recently, only KnAAPO had listed the SU-35 as a product on its site; Sukhoi now does so as well, but Irkut does not. If this seems confusing, it’s because Sukhoi subcontracts production to affiliate firms – IAIA (Irkut) and KnAAPO (Komsomolosk un Amur). Each has their own intellectual property, and their own interests. In addition, the designation “SU-35” has been used in several different contexts over the years. It has been referred to, and even photographed, in ways that referred to both mid-life Flanker upgrades, and canard-equipped next-generation aircraft. KnAAPO’s site added the confusion by showing SU-35 pictures on its type page and gallery that display the aircraft both with and without canard foreplanes.
The current “SU-35”, which has been definitively described by Sukhoi, appears to be something of a compromise between the upgrade and full redesign visions. Reader assistance, and sources from Sukhoi and various media, offer an outline of its key systems and characteristics.
SU-35 flight, 2008“…(known as Su-35BM by some sources- ie. T-10BM to the original Su-27s internal T-10S designation). Differences and features largely speak for themselves in the video, but a short summary follows as related in various other sources follows:
1 – N035 Irbis-E PESA (Passive Electronically Scanned Array) Radar, a follow-on to the Bars-M.
2 – No canards
3 – Rear-looking self-defense radar in shorter tail sting
4 – AL-37FU/ 117S thrust-vectoring turbofan engines rated at 142-147kN
5 – Extended high-lift devices with large flaperon occupying the full trailing edge of the wing
6 – L175M Khibiny-M electronic-warfare self-defense system
7 – Reduced-area empennage
8 – Larger Air Intakes
9 – New and lighter systems, including quadruple digital fly-by-wire flight-control system.
10- New man-machine interface with fully-glass cockpit with two large LCD screens and helmet mounted display.”
Sukhoi says that the fighter’s structures have been reinforced because of the increased takeoff and landing weight of the aircraft, and the front bearing has 2 wheels for the same reason. Performance is touted as 1,400 km/h (Mach 1.14) at sea-level, and 2,400 km/h (Mach 2.26) at altitude, with a ceiling up to 10 km/ 60,000 feet. Sukhoi has not touted loaded supercruise (Mach 1+, with weapons and without afterburners), which is likely to require improved engines. Thrust vectoring adds new dimensions of maneuverability, however, once pilots understand when to use it and when to avoid it.
The SU-35S will also depend on its sensors. It couples an electronically-scanned array radar with a 2-step electro-hydraulic drive unit, which creates a maximum radar beam deflection angle of 120 degrees. The NIIP Tikhomirov Irbis-E passive phased-array can reportedly detect and tracks up to 30 air targets, simultaneously engaging up to 8. It can also reportedly detect, choose and track up to 4 ground targets, and engage 2. Detection ranges of over 400 km/ 240 miles have been reported for airborne targets, which are the easiest, but resolutions are unspecified. Detecting a 747 passenger jet at 400 km is much easier than detecting a JAS-39 Gripen lightweight fighter, and information about the radar’s resolution would be needed before its real capabilities would be clear.
Full stealth jets like the F-22A Raptor, of course, create drastic reductions in radar detection range that make them a special case. In an emerging age of stealth fighters, therefore, the 80+ km detection range of the SU-35S’ IRST (infra-red search and track) system is very significant.
The SU-30 family has never been especially stealthy, and their overall airframe design limits what one can accomplish in this area. Nevertheless, Sukhoi cites an unspecified amount of “reduced reflectance” for the SU-35 in the X-band, which is a popular choice for modern radars, and in the angle range of plus or minus 60 degrees. Further improvements were made during testing by adding radar-absorbent materials, and removing or modifying protruding sensors that create radar reflection points.
The reported service life of the new aircraft is 6,000 flight hours, with a planned operational life of 30 years. The claimed service life of NPO Saturn 117S thrust-vectoring engines is 4,000 hours. Time will tell.
SU-35: Export Prospects Flanker customersThe SU27/30 Flanker family was designed and built after American had completed its “teen series” (F-14/15/16/18) fighters, and uses lessons from those designs as well as Russia’s own approaches. The result was a very extensible design that boasted impressive performance, and quickly became the global fighter reference point among global military planners. Exports followed, and Flanker variants quickly surpassed the MiG-29 as Russia’s most popular export fighter.
The SU-35 aims to build on that legacy, as a final bridge to the 5th generation PAK-FA. Three key changes to Sukhoi’s circumstances may make a similar level of export success much more difficult.
1. A globalized market.When it was first introduced, the S-27 family was the main global competitor to any western offerings, and was sold to countries whose ties and access to western technologies were weak. An array of SU-27s were gifted to breakaway Soviet satellites by virtue of being located on their territory, but India and China were its real anchor export customers. Now, SU-35 exports can expect to compete on 2 fronts. On the one hand, a less balkanized global market means that it must compete globally with western offerings that include upgraded American “teen series” fighters; and matured 4+ generation European designs that include Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen, France’s Rafale, and EADS’ Eurofighter. On the other end, it will be competing with Chinese offerings, including the J-11 that Russia correctly accuses China of copying/deriving from the SU-27, the smaller and less expensive 4+ generation J-10, and even the joint Chinese/Pakistani JF-17.
Chinese J-10China has a large inventory of SU-30MKKs, but it’s less than they contracted to produce. They’re also pressing ahead with their own J-11B, which substitutes Chinese electronics, radars, and engines in an SU-27 family airframe. Russia is very upset by this theft of its intellectual property, which has reportedly hindered sales of its carrier-capable SU-33 variant into the Chinese market.
The J-11 has run into some problems, in particular China’s inability to copy Russian engine performance. That has made exports to China thinkable again for some Russian officials, but the J-11 experience remains a barrier to further Chinese sales on both sides of the table. A preliminary agreement has reportedly been signed to negotiate a 24 plane sale, but it’s controversial. China’s questionable status among the roster of future SU-35 customers, and its certain presence as an export competitor, both create more difficult dynamics for SU-35 export success.
IAF SU-30MKIWith Eastern European countries no longer buying Russian equipment, the Flanker family’s key export markets likely closed, and key emerging markets that have decided to go in different directions, the SU-35’s export potential is likely to be much more limited than its predecessors.
India has fielded, and continues to field, the SU-30MKI, a design that includes locally-built electronics, canard foreplanes, and full thrust vectoring. Malaysia has ordered a less customized SU-30MKM variant that uses Russian and French technologies instead. Both of these designs are highly capable, and comparable to the SU-35. India in particular is unlikely to upgrade, as it continues to produce the SU-30MKI and expects to do so for several more years. That removes a major potential market, and this design is even filtering back into Russian orders, as the SU-30SM.
On a similar note, Algeria and Venezuela are inducting less advanced SU-30MK2 and MKAs, which means that future spending is likely to focus on other military areas.
Elsewhere, South Korea has opted for American F-15Ks instead of the SU-35 or European fighters for its F-X buy, and their next competition has skipped the SU-35 to invite the next-generation PAK-FA/ future SU-50. Saudi Arabia, which has become more receptive to purchases from Russia, bought Eurofighters as the future of their air force. Brazil, which could have significantly expanded Russia’s Latin American penetration, did not shortlist the SU-35 for the final round of its F-X2 future fighter competition.
The Middle East offers limited opportunities for Russian fighters these days, with some potential among long-standing clients in Libya, Syria, and possibly Iran, but competition from France’s Rafale in particular must be expected in Libya, in the wake of Gadhaffi’s ouster. Assuming that Libya buys any high-end fighters at all over the next decade. The SU-35 could be useful to other countries in the Middle East, but most are already committed to other suppliers. Success is possible, and it would be important to the platform, but any win would require a breakthrough.
The newly oil-rich countries around Africa’s Gulf of Guinea offer easier opportunities, but sales will face competition from China, as well as from the west.
Emerging South Asian markets like Indonesia and Vietnam also offer promise, and are less inclined to buy either Chinese or western fighters, but initial orders from that quarter have involved earlier-generation SU-27/30s, and future orders are likely to be limited.
Overall, the numbers add up far less favorably for the SU-35 than they did for its earlier cousins.
SU-35: Contracts and Key Events 2014-2016Opportunities: Indonesia; Why is Russia buying Su-30SMs and Su-35s? “The UFO” at Paris
January 13/16: United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) is to supply fifty more of their Su-35 fighters to the Russian Army. When delivered, this will bring the number of the jets in operation by the Russians to ninety-eight. The deal is estimated to be worth between $787-800 million. UAC subsidiary Sukhoi, who manufactures the jets, looks to have a busy 2016 ahead as the order from the defense ministry adds to a recent agreement to export twelve Su-32 bombers to Algeria.
November 30/15: The Chinese ministry of defense has confirmed the the $2 billion purchase of Su-35 fighters from Russia. China’s plan to also purchase the S-400 missile defense system is also going ahead smoothly according to Colonel Wu Qian and will generate another $3 billion in revenue for Russia. While arms sales between China and Russia are nothing new, the sale of Russia’s most developed military technologies to China represents a policy shift within the Kremlin primarily brought on by financial necessity.
Indonesia has announced that it will order 12 Su-35 fighters following the the $2 billion sale of the aircraft to China last week. The fighters will replace the 16 F-5 Tigers which have been in service since 1980. The Su-35 saw competition from the Lockheed Martin F-16 Viper. The Indonesian Air Force also operate the Su-30 in its fleet and already have an existing maintenance system that will be compatible with the new Su-35.
November 25/15: Russia is to install communications systems for China as part of the $2 billion sale of Su-35 fighters. The deal includes the delivery and installation of the NKVS-27 communications system which will begin in 2016. The delivery of the 24 fighters will follow in 2017. It has been speculated that the Chinese may attempt to reverse engineer and copy the design of the aircraft as it did Su-27SK and could include the communications system. The NKVS-27 is designed to ensure information interaction between CPs and crews of any aircraft. Interaction may be by means of conversations through voice communications radio networks as well as data exchange through data exchange radio networks.
November 20/15: China has signed a substantial contract with Russia to purchase 24 Sukhoi Su-35 fighters in a deal that is said to be worth $2 billion. The agreement comes shortly after speculation that a number of countries were interested in purchasing the advanced fighters, including Pakistan, Indonesia and UAE, during the Dubai Air Show. This comes at an important time for Russia who have been suffering economically from falling oil prices and frosty trade relations with western nations and Ukraine. Arms sales have been one constant in this rather bleak financial outlook as the Kremlin looks to find new buyers for its military technologies.
Following China and their inking of contracts for the Sukhoi Su-35 fighters, the Indonesian ambassador to Russia has announced that they too are interested in making a purchase. Ambassador Djauhari Oratmangun told news agency RIA Novosti that a delegation will be sent from Russia to Jakarta to discuss contracts for the purchase of a number of the aircraft. No further details about the deal are known but seem to be part of a plan to increase trade between the two in 2016 by $5 billion.
November 9/15: The United Arab Emirates is engaged in talks with Russia over a potential acquisition of Su-35s, according to Ria Novosti. The discussions are taking place at the Dubai Air Show, with Pakistan also thought to be considering an acquisition of the type, and China and Indonesia also possible export customers for the Su-35.
September 11/15: Pakistan and Russia are reportedly in talks over the supply of Su-35 fighters and Mi-35M helicopters, according to both Pakistani and Russian press reports Thursday. The sale of Mil Mi-35M helicopters was also reported in August, with it unclear whether current negotiations are a continuation of this previous contract or a new one entirely. The two countries signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement last November, with the fourth-generation Sukhoi Su-35 also eyeing potential export customers in China and Indonesia.
Oct 10/14: Delivery. Another batch delivery from Sukhoi, SU-35 and SU-30M2 fighters for Russia’s VVF, handed over at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur aviation plant.
Note that the SU-30M2 is the “standard” SU-30, as opposed to Irkut’s SU-30SM which is based on the canard-winged SU-30MKM. Sources: Sukhoi, “Sukhoi handed over a batch of Su-35 and Su-30M2 aircraft to the Ministry of Defense”.
Oct 7/14: Indonesia. Indonesian Military Commander General Moeldoko tells Republika Online that they’re leaning toward the Su-35 as their F-5 replacement, with the JAS-39 in 2nd place and the F-16 a distant 3rd:
“Menurut dia, jet tempur buatan negeri Paman Sam itu sudah tidak layak pakai lantaran teknologinya sudah ketinggalan zaman…. “Untuk udara, ada pengajuan penggantian F-5. Sukhoi Su-35 menjadi pilihan pertama, Saab JAS 39 Gripen pilihan kedua, dan pesawat F-16 pilihan ketiga,”…”
This isn’t the end, because negotiations, budgets and other considerations will still come into play. If that pick does stand, it would keep the Flanker family as the backbone of the TNI-AU, but the fleet would also be fragmented among 3+ types with partial commonality at best: 5 Su27SKM, 11 Su-30 (2 MKs, 9 MK2s), and 16 Su-35SK. The Su-27SKM and Su-30MK fighters will retire first, which will simplify matters, but that’s unlikely to happen before 2025 or so. Sources: ROL, “Helikopter Apache dan Sukhoi Su-35 Segera Perkuat TNI”.
Feb 21/14: No mystery. “Russia’s New Air Force Is a Mystery” wonders why Russia is buying SU-30MK2s, SU-30SMs and SU-35s, in addition to the future PAK-FA. It turns out that the answer is extremely simple: industrial priorities that bought up aircraft the Chinese stopped buying, took advantage of successful advanced SU-30MKx export developments, and aim to provide the SU-35 with a home country order base for potential exports. That sort of thing happens all the time, everywhere. The article ends up stinging itself with this quote re: the PAK-FA:
“The T-50’s schedule has stretched farther and farther to the right. Originally planned for handover to the air force’s Akhtubinsk flight test center for evaluation in 2014, recent announcements suggest this might now slip until the second half of 2016. This would derail plans to declare initial operational capability, and the start of full-scale production, at the end of 2016.
The best-case scenario would have seen 60 production T-50s delivered between 2016 and 2020, but this now seems a distant hope. As a result, the air force is badly in need of supplementary equipment.”
The 1st PAK-FA/ T-50 arrives in Akhtubinsk for testing that same day, but even if the new stealth fighters arrive on time, Russia will still need more warplanes to replace its aging force. Sources: War Is Boring, “Russia’s New Air Force Is a Mystery”.
Jan 7/14: Indonesia. Indonesia wants to replace its 11 remaining F-5E/F Tiger II light fighters with 16 modern aircraft. Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro confirmed that they “have received proposals from several jet fighter manufacturers,” and are evaluating them. Indonesian Military Commander General Moeldoko added that the TNI-AU has studied the SU-35, F-16, F-15, and JAS-39 Gripen.
Moeldoko wants the requisition plan included in Indonesia’s Strategic Plan II for the 2015 – 2020, but the air force’s choice will also depend on available funds. The F-15 is significantly more expensive than other options, and if the air force wants 16 fighters, the state of Indonesia’s economy will influence what they can buy.
There are always extraneous considerations in Indonesia. Still, if commonality matters, the F-16 is the only fighter currently in Indonesia’s inventory. The F-15 and JAS-39 are used by its neighbors, and have Asian support networks in place. Picking the SU-35 seems odd, as it would leave Indonesia vulnerable to becoming the 1st export customer, while worsening the fragmentation within an already-split Flanker fleet. Still, the existing SU-30MK fleet is a known quantity, which means the SU-35 is the only variant would require study for a full consideration of their options. Sources: Antara News, “Defense Ministry looking to replace aging F-5 tiger fighter aircraft”.
2011 – 2013Russia buys SU-30SMs; Russian plans to 2020; Final SU-35S model flies; Libya derailment; China impasse unblocks, but still no deal.
Russian SU-35
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May 20/13: Brazil. RIA Novosti quotes Rosoboronexport’s SITDEF exhibition lead Sergey Ladigin, who says they’ve offered to deliver Su-35 fighters and Pantsir S1 air defense systems to Brazil outside the framework of a tender, and says the offer is being considered.
Brazil wants the Pantsir short-range air defense gun/missile systems, but the SU-35 failed to make the shortlist in 2009. On the other hand, if you don’t ask, you’ll never get. So Russia’s is throwing in the SU-35 offer, and Ladigin said in Lima that they were “ready to transfer 100% of manufacturing technologies,” as well as some technologies from their T50 (future SU-50?) stealth fighter.
It doesn’t help. In December 2013, Brazil picks Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen. Russian Aviation.
March 26/13: China. Media reports say that a deal has been signed for 24 SU-35 fighters, and 4 advanced Amur/Lada Class submarines, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia.
Defence News claims that “During a recent visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Moscow from Friday to Sunday, no discussions took place regarding “military-technical cooperation” issues, the ITAR-TASS news agency reported Monday.” Our Russian isn’t very good, but the Google Translate version simply quotes the CCTV report of a deal, while saying that there were no problems regarding military-technical cooperation issues. Defense News also quotes outside observers within Russia; readers will have to make up their own minds. ITAR-Tass [in Russian] | CCTV [in Chinese] | South China Morning Post | Defense News | International Business Times.
March 7/13: China confirmed. China and Russia have apparently signed an intergovernmental agreement, as the 1st step toward a contract for 24 SU-35s. Reports credibly place the agreement date as January 2013, but contract negotiations could take a while.
A trickle of reports from November 2012 to February claimed that Russia and China had a preliminary agreement in place, which would let them negotiate a deal for varying numbers of SU-35s. Russia’s Interfax confirmed the existence and date of that agreement in February 2013, but didn’t specify numbers. Now, a March 8/13 article in The Hindu confirms that talks involve 24 planes, a climbdown from Russia’s initial insistence on 48.
The Russians are said to have more confidence that China can’t copy their engines, and are also said to need SU-35 orders. Russia has placed an initial contract, but a deal with Libya fell by the wayside when its regime did, Venezuela has pulled back, and even Russia’s VVS is ordering follow-on buys of SU-30SMs instead. On the other side, there’s speculation that SU-35’s improved AL-117S engine could be “of interest” for China’s J-20 stealth plane. If so, it would be a setback to India on 2 fronts: breaking an old pattern by selling China a more modern fighter than India’s SU-30MKIs, and strengthening a competitor to the Indo-Russian PAK-FA stealth fighter project. South China Morning Post | Defense News | Voice of Russia | The Hindu.
China agreement to negotiate
April 17/12: China. RIA Novosti quotes Russian state-controlled arms exporter Rosoboronexport said on Tuesday, who says that the 18+ month long negotiations to sell Su-35s to China have been put on hold. The Chinese only wanted to buy a few, and the Russians weren’t interested in selling them a few templates for Chinese copying efforts.
Rosoboronexport deputy chief Viktor Komardin characterized Russia as wanting “a large consignment to make [the deal] economically viable.” Translation: China would have to buy large numbers of SU-35s, under a contract with strict and enforceable cancellation penalties. See also Nov 16/10 entry.
March 30/12: Russia plans. Russian Air Force commander Gen. Alexander Zelin discusses their aircraft acquisition plans under Russia’s Weapons Program 2011-2020. Those plans include about 100 SU-35 and SU-30SM fighters put together, and their conflation could be a worrying sign. The VVS also expects to field 60 Sukhoi PAKFA (T-50) stealth fighters by 2020, and intends to buy 140 SU-34 long range strike fighters.
The SU-35’s future may ride on how many of the 70 remaining VVS orders before 2020 request it, instead of more SU-30SMs. AIN Online. See also March 16/10 entry.
March 23/12: Russian setback. Russia’s own VVS moves to buy 30 SU-30SM fighters, for delivery by 2015. These planes are a version of the canard-winged, thrust-vectoring SU-30MKI/M variant that was developed for India, and has since been exported to Algeria and Malaysia. Which raises the question: why didn’t Russia buy 30 more SU-35S fighters? A RIA Novosti article offers one explanation:
“Irkut has been churning out these planes for 10 years thanks to its completely streamlined production method. This means that its products are of high quality, relatively cheap… and will be supplied on time.
It is one thing if, in order to make 30 aircraft, you have to breathe life into an idling plant, to fine-tune (or develop anew) your technological method, buy additional equipment, and – still worse – hire personnel. But it’s quite another if you have been manufacturing standardized aircraft for years and years and can easily divert your workforce to produce an “improved” modification for your own country’s Air Force… This approach (buying quickly and on the cheap what can be produced immediately) has been growing in popularity in the Russian military.”
There is a contract for 48 SU-35s, but the production rate doesn’t appear to be very advanced yet. If Bogdanov’s analysis is correct, the SU-35 could have a problem. It would mean that more SU-30SMs become a very attractive near-term choice for the next few years, as Russia’s rearmament program kicks into gear. Farther down the road, the T-50 PAK-FA stealth fighter (likely to become the SU-50), will be a priority after 2016 or so. In that scenario, the SU-35 could find itself starved of budgetary oxygen at home, followed by avoidance abroad in favor of the SU-30MKx models that have already been exported to Algeria, India, and Malaysia.
Sept 19/11: Testing. Sukhoi says that its SU-35 fighters have carried out more than 300 test flights at the 929th State Flight Test Center (GLITS), and offers a number of data points regarding the aircraft.
“The maximum ground-level speed is 1,400 km/h, speed at altitude – 2400 km/h, the ceiling – 18 thousand meters. The detection range of targets in the “air-to-air” mode is over 400 km. This is significantly higher than that of the combat aircraft currently in service. The onboard OLS (optical locator station) can detect and track multiple targets at ranges exceeding 80 km… a new phased antenna array radar with a long aerial target detection range and with an increased number of simultaneously tracked and engaged targets (30 aerial targets tracked and 8 targets engaged plus the tracking of 4 and engagement of 2 ground targets)… The radar signature of the fighter has been reduced by several times as compared to that of the fourth-generation aircraft by coating the cockpit with electro-conducting compounds, applying radio absorption coats and reducing the number of protruding sensors. The service life of the aircraft is 6,000 hours flight hours… The assigned service life of vectored thrust engines is 4,000 hours.”
May 3/11: Final SU-35S model. Sukhoi begins flight tests for its final series production version SU-35S model. Among other things, it marks the program’s recovery from the April 26/09 accident. Sukhoi [in Russian] | Russia’s RIA Novosti | China’s Xinhua | DefenceWeb | Flight International.
Feb 27/11: Libya. Russia’s Interfax news agency says that a recent UN embargo on arms sales to Libya, in the wake of the regime’s military attacks on demonstrators, could cost Russia $4 billion:
“The already-signed arms deals between Moscow and Tripoli amount to $2 billion, while deals for another $1.8 billion are in the final stage of readiness. In January 2010 the two sides agreed on supply of Russia’s small arms, six operational trainers Yak-130 and some armored vehicles for total of $US 1.3 billion. Libya has been supposed to become the first country to get Su-35 fighter jets, the contract to buy 15 jets for $800 million is fully accorded and ready to be signed. Tripoli also expressed interest in buying 10 Ka-52 Alligator assault helicopters, two advanced long range S-300PMU2 Favorit air defense missile system and about 40 short range Panzir C1 air defense complexes for a total over $1 billion. The Libyan military has also discussed possible supply of modern tanks, multiple rocket launcher systems, high speed missile boats etc.”
If the civil war drags on long enough, don’t be surprised to see a number of these potential sales revived, even as other counter-insurgency related equipment steps to the fore. Russia could wind up finds ways to skirt UN sanctions and support its client, something that has been an issue before with countries like Sudan. China could do the same, and has a long history of supporting civil war factions without regard to human suffering or disposition, in exchange for medium-long term resource deals. Russia Today | AFP.
2009 – 2010Russia orders 48; KnAAPO gets financing; Crash delays program; Opportunities in China, Libya.
Ready for takeoff
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Nov 16/10: China. At Airshow China 2010 in Zhuhai, Rosoboronexport Deputy General Director Alexander Mikheyev tells RIA Novosti that Russia is ready to hold talks with China on selling SU-35 fighter aircraft to the Chinese air force. That’s a bit of a surprise, given China’s consistent record of buying, copying, and then competing with Russian technologies – see “The China Factor,” above. On the other hand, Mikheyev also told RIA Novosti that:
“We have made progress in an understanding of [illegal production of Russian arms in China]. Moreover, all the documents concerning the protection of intellectual property have been signed… China does not refuse to discuss these issues, which are primarily a concern for Russia.”
It would be darkly amusing to many in western defense organizations to have Russia fleeced in arms-related agreements, by a country that follows their own pattern of offering paper guarantees, while doing something else.
Sept 20/10: Financing for KnAAPO. Sukhoi Holding Company the Yuri Gagarin Aviation Industrial Concern (KnAAPO) in , Komsomolsk-na-Amure strikes a financing agreement with Sberbank, the Savings Bank of Russia. The agreement will allow the firm to invest in producing the Russian Air Force’s SU-35S orders. Brahmand | Frontier India.
July 23/10: Update. Aviation Week reports from Farnborough 2010. Sukhoi CEO Mikhail Pogosyan says that the Russian air force is still set to take delivery of its first Su-35S by the end of 2010, and the firm issues its own release with test results.
Preliminary testing of Su-35 has now been concluded with 270 flights and 350 flight hours, using 2 rather than 3 aircraft after a fire destroyed one of the prototypes (vid. April 26/09). The NIIP Tikhomirov Irbis passive phased-array radar was also a focus of testing, and moves were made to reduce radar signature by adding radar-absorbent materials and removing protruding sensors. They add:
“Tripoli will likely be the launch export customer [for the SU-35S]. Alexander Mikheev, deputy head of Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state-owned arms export agency, confirmed at Farnborough that the contract for delivery of undisclosed number of aircraft to Libya, one of the traditional recipients of Soviet armaments, is expected to be signed this year. The first export production slots are available from 2012.”
March 16/10: Russian plans. In “The future of the Russian Air Force: 10 years on“, RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik discusses planned buys and pending recapitalization of the Russian Air Force over the next decade:
“According to various media reports, the Ministry wants to buy at least 1,500 aircraft, including 350 new warplanes, by 2020. The fleet would include 70% new equipment at that point, said Air Force Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Alexander Zelin… The Defense Ministry has now signed contracts for the purchase of 32 Su-34 Fullback advanced fighter-bombers to be delivered by 2013, 48 Su-35 Flanker-E fighters by 2015, 12 Su-27SM Flanker-B Mod. 1 fighters by 2011, 4 Su-30M2 Flanker-C planes by 2011 and 12 Su-25UBM Frogfoot combat trainers. This year, the Defense Ministry intends to sign a contract for the delivery of 26 MiG-29K Fulcrum-D fighters by 2015. Additional contracts for the delivery of at least 80 Su-34s and 24-48 Su-35s are expected to be signed. In all, the Russian Air Force is to receive 240-260 new aircraft of these types. It is hard to say much about the specifications of another 100-110 aircraft, due to be manufactured primarily after 2015. They will probably include 25-30 MiG-35 fighters, another 12-16 Su-30 combat trainers for Su-35 squadrons and 40-60 Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA (Advanced Frontline Aviation Aircraft System) fifth-generation fighters…”
Nov 17/09: Sukhoi announces that it has begun work on Russia’s SU-35S contract.
Nov 15/09: Libya. Interfax quotes Rosoboronexport’s special missions director and Dubai Airshow delegation chief Mikhail Zavaly:
“Libya wants to buy our aircrafts, including Sukhoi fighter jets and Ilyushin Il-76 military airlifters,” Zavaly told Interfax on Sunday. The talks deal with the technical details of the planes offered to Libya, he said. After technical arrangements are approved, “the Russian side will make commercial proposals to Libya,” Zavaly said.”
Oct 19/09: Libya. Russia’s Interfax media agency reports that Libya plans to buy 12-15 Sukhoi Su-35 multirole fighters, another 4 Su-30s as an immediate interim order, and 6 Yakovlev Yak-130 trainer and light attack aircraft aircraft. Reports indicate that a contract could be signed with state arms export agency Rosoboronexport by the end of 2009, or early 2010.
Libya has also been in talks with France to buy its Rafale fighters since late 2007. A Sukhoi deal is likely to end the Rafale’s near-term chances in Libya. UPI report.
Aug 18/09: Russia orders 48. The Russian government signs the SU-35’s inaugural production contract at the Russian MAKS 2009 air show. The Russian Defense Ministry has reportedly signed a contract with Sukhoi to deliver 48 SU-35s by 2015, plus an interim buy of 12 single-seat SU-27SM and 4 dual-seat SU-30M2 multirole fighters by 2011.
RIA Novosti cites “open sources” that estimate the flyaway cost an SU-35 at about $65 million. This contract should be larger, since it’s a new type that must carry the additional costs of training spares stocks, etc. Statements place the contract’s value at “over 80 billion” roubles, where RUB 80 billion is currently about $2.51 billion. The contract follows on the heels of RUB 3.2 billion (about $100 million) in capital injected into Sukhoi, and Vnesheconombank head Vladimir Dmitriyev said the national development bank would grant Sukhoi a 3.5 billion-ruble (about $109 million) loan to start SU-35 production. ITAR-TASS | ITAR-TASS re: loans, contract value | RIA Novosti | RIA Novosti’s Russia Today | domain-b | Flight International.
April 26/09: Crash. An Su-35 burst into flames and exploded before take-off at the Komsomolosk-na-Amure Aviation Production Association (KNAAPO) Dzemgi flight test aerodrome. Yevgeniy Frolov, one Sukhoi’s most experienced pilots, managed to eject safely before the aircraft exploded. The crash may jeopardize the SU-35’s expected appearance over Russia’s May Day festivities, and will delay testing. To make matters worse, this 2nd operational aircraft was carrying a new NIIP Irbis-E radar set, which will require some effort to replace. The Weekly Standard adds:
“Su-35 programme representatives told THE WEEKLY STANDARD that the crash was the fault of one of the NPO Saturn 117S engine’s PMC units and not a failure of a fuel pump, as had been previously reported. “One of the engine’s control systems failed and the engine was working at only 93 per cent power,” said the representative.”
March 23/09: Flight #100. KNAAPO announces that the Su-35 has made its 100th flight, during which they conducted final tests of the flight control system. Flight tests began Feb 18/08, and in the second quarter of 2009 another test aircraft is expected to join the current 2-plane fleet.
The firm expects to bring the number of flights up to 150-160 on 3 fighters, allowing them to finish static tests and start the super-maneuverability mode testing with the plane’s thrust-vectoring engines. First deliveries to Russian and foreign customers are still scheduled for 2011.
2007 – 2008Maiden flight; Eliminated in Brazil.
SU-35 early concept
(click to view full)
Oct 2/08: 2nd test plane. Sukhoi says they have started flight tests of the second SU-35 production fighter. “The addition of the second aircraft to the testing program will speed up its completion and ensure the beginning of deliveries to our customers in 2011.”
Since its demonstration flight on July 7/08, the first production aircraft has made over 40 more test flights. RIA Novosti.
Oct 1/08: Brazil loss. Brazil has decided on its 3 finalists: Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Aviation’s Rafale, and Saab/BAE’s JAS-39 Gripen.
EADS Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin’s F-16BR, and Sukhoi’s SU-35 all failed to make the cut. Brazilian FAB release [Portuguese] | Reuters | Boeing release | Gripen International release.
July 9/08: A Sukhoi release says that it has presented the newest SU-35 multi-role to the “Flight Scientific Research Institute named after Gromov in Zhukovsky near Moscow,” where earlier test flights have taken place.
It adds that the SU-35 is one of the priority programs of the new United Aviation Corporation (UAC), resulting from the government’s consolidation of Russia’s aerospace industry, and notes that Russia’s 5th generation PAK-FA fighter project will not be fielded before 2015-2017. In contrast, batch production and deliveries of the SU-35 are promised between 2010-2011. Moscow News | Russian release (English version not yet on web).
March 6/08: Maiden flight. Russia test flies SU-35. The first Su-35 prototype made its maiden flight on Feb 18/08, and 2 more aircraft are being prepared for similar tests at an aircraft manufacturing plant in Russia’s Far East. The company expects the jet to enter service with Russia’s military in 2-3 years. RIA Novosti.
Sept 4/07: Clarity? A subsequent Flight International article may begin to offer clarity re: the platform. It states categorically that the SU-35-1 design, unveiled at Russia’s MAKS 2007 air show, is a single-seat aircraft without canard foreplanes, but with a lighter airframe than the SU-27, enlarged fan and engine inlets, 2 NPO Saturn/Ufa MPO Item 117S engines that reportedly offer thrust vectoring and supercruise performance in clean layout, 2t more fuel, modernized electronics at all levels, a Tikhomirov NIIP Irbis (updated N-011M Bars) passive electronically scanned array radar, 6,000 hour airframe life, and 4,000 hour engine life.
Additional ReadingsIndia’s Light Combat Aircraft program is meant to boost its aviation industry, but it must also solve a pressing military problem. The IAF’s fighter strength has been declining as the MiG-21s that form the bulk of its fleet are lost in crashes, or retired due to age and wear. Most of India’s other Cold War vintage aircraft face similar problems.
In response, some MiG-21s have been modernized to MiG-21 ‘Bison’ configuration, and other current fighter types are undergoing modernization programs of their own. The IAF’s hope is that they can maintain an adequate force until the multi-billion dollar 126+ plane MMRCA competition delivers replacements, and more SU-30MKIs arrive from HAL. Which still leaves India without an affordable fighter solution. MMRCA can replace some of India’s mid-range fighters, but what about the MiG-21s? The MiG-21 Bison program adds years of life to those airframes, but even so, they’re likely to be gone by 2020.
That’s why India’s own Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project is so important to the IAF’s future prospects. It’s also why India’s rigid domestic-only policies are gradually being relaxed, in order to field an operational and competitive aircraft. Even with that help, the program’s delays are a growing problem for the IAF. Meanwhile, the west’s near-abandonment of the global lightweight fighter market opens a global opportunity, if India can seize it with a compelling and timely product.
Within India’s force structure, the LCA is largely expected to replace its 400 or so MiG-21 aircraft with a more versatile and capable performer. The MiGs are being retired as age claims them, and even India’s 125 or so upgraded MiG-21 ‘Bisons’ are only scheduled to remain in service until 2018. The LCA’s overall performance is expected to be somewhat similar to India’s Mirage 2000s, with lower top speed but more modern electronics.
The Tejas LCA design uses a tailless compound delta plan that’s designed to be unstable, but controllable over an 8g / -3.5g flight range thanks to advanced flight software and quadruplex fly-by-wire technology. Composites are used heavily in order to to save weight, and proper placement can also lower the plane’s radar profile. Japan’s F-16-derived F-2 fighters also made heavy use of composite technologies, but Japanese issues with delamination and cracking required repairs and changes. ADA has conducted Static and fatigue strength studies on finite element models, and aeroservoelastic studies have been performed on the Tejas design; nevertheless, only full testing and actual service will reveal how it fares. So far, composites haven’t become a public problem for the aircraft.
Unfortunately, reports indicate that the lack of early pilot input has compromised several aspects of the design, while a failure to consider maintenance up front has made key components difficult to reach. Barring published comparisons from experienced pilots or evaluating countries, it’s very difficult to pin down the extent or seriousness of these issues, but Tejas has certainly spent a very long time in testing.
The following sub-sections go into more detail about the fighter’s equipment rationales, and that equipment’s specific capabilities. The above list seems straightforward, but getting there has been anything but.
ElectronicsThe plane’s avionics architecture is configured around a 3 bus, distributed MIL-STD-1553B system, using a 32-bit Mission Computer (MC) and software written in Ada. A “glass cockpit” of colour Active Matrix Liquid Crystal Displays (AMLCDs) provides the pilot with information, and is supplemented by Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display for commonality with other IAF aircraft.
The Mk.II is slated to use a more advanced glass cockpit with better computing and graphics processors behind it, full-duplex cross-Switched Ethernet (AFDX) based back up avionics, and digital maps. Elsewhere on the plane, a Universal Pylon Interface Computer (UPIC) will replace the Pylon Interface Boxes.
Radar Love: Weapons & Fire Control Radar Failure & Replacement EL/M-2032The Tejas project’s original radar, like its original engine choice, very nearly sank the project. The state-run Aeronautical Development Agency had originally intended to use Ericsson Microwave Systems’ PS-05/A radar, until they changed their mind and decided to develop their own. India’s Multi Mode Radar (MMR) program was started in June 1991, with a “Probable Date of Completion” of 6.5 years. More than 15 years later, development was still plodding away as a joint effort between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in Hyderabad, India’s Electronics and Radar Development Laboratory in Bangalore, and the Centre for Airborne Studies. Even worse, test results for the radar were poor.
By August 2007, over 16 years into the project, even India’s MoD finally had to admit that the MMR faced serious problems. Radar co-development has now been initiated with Israel’s IAI Elta, with the EL/M-2032 as the radar base and interim solution. The EL/M-2032 multi-mode radar was originally developed for Israel’s Lavi fighter, and already equips India’s Sea Harrier fleet and Jaguar IM strike aircraft, and is popular around the world. M-2032s can be found on some F-16s in Israel and elsewhere, Kfir C10s flown by some Latin American customers, Chile’s upgraded F-5s, Romania’s MiG-21 Lancer upgrades, and South Korea’s FA-50 lightweight fighter. The radar features modular hardware design, with software control and flexible avionic interfaces, and a TWT coherent transmitter with a low-sidelobe planar antenna. The M-2032 functions in several air-to-air modes, as well as the air-to-ground, air-to-sea, ground-mapping in RBS, DBM, SAR with moving target tracking, and terrain avoidance modes.
Detection and classification ranges will vary depending on the aperture size. A radar adapted to fit in an F-5’s narrow nose will have lower performance than one that fits into a larger F-16. The Tejas’ dimensions suggest that performance may be near the radar’s claimed 80 nautical mile maximums for detection of fighter-sized objects.
There have been reports that the Tejas Mk.II and operational LCA Naval will fly with IAI’s EL/M-2052 AESA radar instead. That change would roughly double performance, while drastically reducing radar maintenance costs. These reports are unconfirmed, however, and other accounts cite American pressure to prevent Israeli AESA radar exports.
Other Sensors & Defensive LITENING podRAFAEL’s LITENING advanced surveillance and targeting pod will give Tejas long-range looks at ground targets, independent laser designation capability, and (rumored) fleet commonality with India’s Jaguars, MiG-27s, Mirage 2000s, and SU-30MKIs. The Mk.II will reportedly be adapted for a more advanced variant of the LITENING pod, but that means the pods would have to be bought and given to the Tejas fleet, rather than the SU-30MKI fleet for example.
The defensive system will be designed in India. Late testing means that it won’t be fully effective in the Mk.I aircraft, which must depend on an external Israel Aerospace Elta ELL/8-2222 jamming pod. The Mk.II is supposed to have a fully effective system of warning receivers, automated decoy dispensing, etc. In advanced western aircraft, these systems can even feed geolocation data from pinpointed threats into the plane’s targeting computers. Time will tell whether the Mk.II also has those capabilities.
Weapons LCA Tejas, armedUnsurprisingly, RAFAEL’s Derby radar-guided fire-and-forget missile will serve as the Tejas’ initial medium range air-air armament. It lacks the range and datalink of Raytheon’s AMRAAM or Russia’s R-77/AA-12, but in practice, positive identification requirements have kept most aerial fights within Derby range. Derby reportedly has good seeker cone coverage, which improves performance. It has already been integrated with the EL/M-2032 on India’s own Sea Harriers, and equips the country’s new SPYDER mobile anti-aircraft missile systems. If India’s own Astra MRAAM continues to progress, it will be integrated later.
For shorter-range engagements, Derby will be complemented by TMC’s infrared-guided Vympel R-73/AA-11 “Archer,” giving Tejas partial weapon commonality with India’s large MiG fleets. The R-73 is known for its exceptional maneuverability and a “wide boresight” seeker cone, a combination that inaugurated the era of 4th generation missiles. There’s even a rear-facing version, which offers enemies a nasty surprise. The jets will also carry RAFAEL’s Python 4/5, which can face forward and still hit targets behind their fighter.
Tejas planes are expected to carry a range of ground attack weapons, from ordinary bombs and unguided Russian S-8 80mm rockets, to precision munitions. Tests for unspecified laser-guided bombs and cluster bombs are expected, though they’re expected to be Russian KAB-1500L and RBK-500 weapons, along with Russian Kh-31/35/59 anti-ship and precision strike missiles. Specifications don’t mention a MIL-STD-1760 electrical interface with carriage stores, which is very helpful when integrating GPS-guided munitions. Time will tell, but the Tejas Mk.I’s initial weapons don’t include GPS guidance.
Engines & Alternatives F414-GE-400 engineWith its radar issue solved by a foreign partnership, the fighter’s indigenous Kaveri engine (vid. Appendix B) was left as the project’s biggest unresolved issue. That was resolved with a stopgap, followed by a competition to field a working engine; even so, India’s DRDO continues to pour dollars and time into Kaveri development.
The removal of American arms trade sanctions allowed smooth incorporation of a slightly modified F404-GE-IN20 turbofan in initial Tejas Mk.I production models. Over the longer term, an international competition for the Tejas Mk.II’s engines had 2 shortlisted competitors, 1 unofficial competitor, and 1 winner in GE’s F414.
The winner: F414. GE’s F414 is that company’s more advanced alternative to the F404 family that equips the Tejas Mk.I; it currently equips Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet family. India’s F414-GE-INS6 engines will include the same single-engine FADEC modifications as the Gripen’s F414Gs, and may include some components of the F414-EPE research program for enhanced thrust. Standard F414 engines can reportedly produce up to 22,000 pounds of thrust on afterburners.
GE has been remarkably coy about its thrust in normal operation, but the figures it supplied to India were obviously good enough to beat Eurojet’s EJ200, which reportedly revised its bid too close to the deadline to change its fortunes.
Slow fade: Kaveri. This was supposed to be the fighter’s main engine, but India couldn’t develop a world-leading jet engine from a base of no experience. Kaveri was sidelined in 2008 by GE’s F404, in order to allow flight testing to go forward. DRDO finally admitted defeat in 2013 and stopped advocating Kaveri for the Tejas, after around 6 fruitless years of negotiations with French engine maker Snecma. A global re-tender for assistance was proposed, but late 2014 saw DRDO finally admit the obvious and file the paperwork to end the program.
In the Navy… Naval LCA 2011 briefingIndian officials were interested in an improved engine for 2 reasons. One is simply better performance, thanks to an improved thrust:weight ratio. Another is the need for additional thrust, in order to operate the Tejas successfully as a naval aircraft.
India will induct the 40,000t INS Vikramaditya in 2013, after extensive modifications to Russia’s former Admiral Gorshkov carrier. The navy is also proceeding with construction of 2 more 35,000t “air defence ship” Vikrant Class carriers, designed in collaboration with Fincantieri and built in India. Orders have been signed for 46 Russian MiG-29Ks, but India also wants to operate navalized LCA fighters from their decks.
These fighters are actually being designed in a trainer variant first, which will then be converted into a naval fighter. Key changes to the Naval LCA include:
The other change will be the engine. India’s military and designers believe that the naval Mk.I derivative, powered by the same F404-GE-IN20 engine in the IAF variant, can be used for training and testing. At the same time, they believe that only the a Tejas Mk.II derivative with its more powerful F414-GE-INS6 engine will be capable of loaded carrier operations from the Vikrant Class’ “ski jump” ramp, in just 200m of takeoff space.
The naval Tejas program began in 2003. Variant paper designs were produced, and an initial order placed in 2009 began turning those designs into prototypes. April 2012 saw the 1st flight of NP-1, and a 2012 decision gave the go-ahead for initial production of 8 planes. The naval variant is expected to receive a different designation than “Tejas.”
LCA Tejas: Program, Prospects, and Future The Program India’s LCA ProgramsThe Tejas Light Combat Aircraft program began in 1983, and is currently in Full-Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Phase-II, under which India’s DRDO was trying to deliver production fighters to the IAF by December 2010. Initial Operational Clearance wasn’t granted until January 2011, and then only with significant waivers. Limited Series Production aircraft in final configuration have arrived, but IOC wasn’t declared until November 2013, and even that was done under pressure from the ministry. The plane’s core self-protection systems were only installed in October 2013, most weapons haven’t been tested yet, and neither has aerial refueling. The ministry is pushing for Final Operational Clearance as a day/night, all-weather platform, and the official induction of a Tejas squadron at Sulur Air Base in Tamil Nadu near Sri Lanka, by the end of 2014. It isn’t clear that the fighter can actually achieve those performance goals in time.
So far, 40 Tejas Mk.I fighters have been ordered. Current plans call for another 100 aircraft (mostly Mk.II) for the air force, and up to 60 naval variants for the Navy.
When it was originally approved in 1983, the Tejas program’s cost was set at Rs 560 crore (5.6 billion rupees). The cost had risen to over 3,300 crore by the late 1980s, and has continued to rise since. The Times of India places the 2011 program total at 17,269 crore/ $3.77 billion for all variants. As shown above, subsequent reports show continued cost increases.
LCA Tejas Mk.II: Delhi, we have a problem… MiG-21bis: Hanging onThe first test-flight of the improved and re-engined Tejas Mark-II is currently scheduled for December 2014, with production beginning in June 2016. Unfortunately for the air force, those markers are looking less and less likely, and switching in a new engine adds design and testing changes that will complicate matters. Engineers must rebalance the aircraft’s weight, adjust fuel capacity for changed consumption rates, etc. It’s already known that the LCA will need to add 0.5m in length to fit the F414, and its air intakes offer inadequate airflow and will have to be redesigned.
One also expects that an LCA Mk.II will add newer technologies in some areas, and there are reports that India intends to upgrade from IAI’s ELM-2032 phased-array radar to the ELM-2052 AESA. India’s avionics industry also continues to advance, leading to potential component swaps and re-testing. Finally, Tejas Mk.I has placed many key components in inaccessible places. Unless significant redesigns are forthcoming in Mk.II, maintenance costs will be high, and readiness will be low.
Redesign processes usually takes several years, even in a best-case scenario. China’s shift to a Russian RD-33 engine for its J-10 fighter was the centerpiece of a redesign that took more than a decade. Sweden’s JAS-39 Gripen made a similar shift from Volvo’s F404-derived RM12 in the JAS-39 A-D models, to GE’s F414 for its new JAS-39E/F, over a few years. There was a standing offer to have Saab adopt a significant role in Mk.2 development, with strong support from DRDO, but that offer remains in limbo.
Major delays to Tejas Mk.I production mean that activity probably won’t end until 2018. The delays will buy time for Mk.II testing, at the cost of IAF readiness and force strength. If the Mk.II also runs into testing problems, the LCA program will face a hard choice: produce more than 40 Tejas Mk.Is, or buy Mk.IIs before testing is done, with the accompanying risk of expensive rework and fielding delays.
Meanwhile, India’s MiG-21 fleet continues to age out.
Industrial TeamThe Tejas industrial team is weighted toward government participation, which is one of the reasons for its long development cycle. Instead of buying finished and tested equipment from abroad, new designs had to be invented by government research agencies, then tested by themselves until they were ready, followed by integration testing with other elements. These choices were driven by India’s desire for long-term self-sufficiency in many aircraft sub-systems, in order to reduce their dependence of foreign suppliers.
There have also been a wide variety of sub-contracts to Indian firms for Tier 3 or Tier 4 participation to supply tooling, testing equipment, software development, or sub-assemblies. They are not covered in our list.
In late 2013, HAL told India’s Business Standard that it aimed to roll out the first 2 Tejas IOC fighters by March 2014, and deliver 8 more by the end of 2014. The next step after that will be to enhance to production line to 16 fighters per year, a task that might prove challenging without outside aid (q.v. Dec 9/12). That would leave 10 Tejas Mk.I IOC fighters to be built in 2015, whereupon HAL would be able to begin production of 20 Tejas Mk.I Full Operational Capability variants.
Required FOC upgrades to the IOC fleet, and initial naval production orders, will also compete for production space. An early 2013 interview with ADA director Shri PS Subramanyam saw 2018 as a realistic date for Mk.I production to end.
Tejas Prospects: Think Globally, Begin Locally Tejas: 2 viewsExports are important to fighter programs. The added buys keep production lines open at no cost to the home country, and drop prices per plane. A combination of profits and paid-for modifications would help keep the design current, allowing the plane to add new technology and remain relevant. On the industrial front, if ADA can move the plane from the current 55% Indian content to around 80% without creating more problems, it would help to insulate prices from currency exchange swings.
The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft’s exact per-plane flyaway price point isn’t known yet, but the goal is an inexpensive fighter in the $20-25 million range, with performance that compares well to early model F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Historically, the low end of the market is where the largest volume of global fighter buys have taken place. In recent years, however, pressure from home-country buyers has pushed the West into a niche of high-end platforms like the F-15, F-35, Eurofighter, and Rafale. Some mid-tier options exist, like new F-16s, the F/A-18 Super Hornet, and JAS-39 Gripens, but even those are fairly pricey for emerging economies. As regional tensions rise, it remains to be seen whether the last decade has seen a permanent shift toward mid-level and high-end platforms, or whether traditional buying patterns will reassert themselves through emerging economies.
Long-term Tejas competitors in the $20 – 40 million range include the market for second-hand F-16s, the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, and Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle family of supersonic trainers and light fighters. RAC MiG has received enough work from India and others to retain the MiG-29M family as a viable platform in this bracket; Russia’s chosen pricing approach will determine whether the thrust-vectoring MiG-35 multi-role fighter also becomes a competitor.
click for videoIndia’s growing geopolitical influence, and the ability to price toward this bracket’s low end, offers the Tejas decent prospects, even in this crowded field. HAL’s problem is that the Tejas must first achieve success in India.
Delays have taken their toll. Bangalore-based Aeronautics Development Agency (MoD ADA) chief R K Ramanathan promised a 2010 in-service date, while touting a reduction from over 30,000 components to around 7,000. Even that was a late milestone, fully 27 years after the program began, but it didn’t come close to happening. Plans to field 40-48 interim aircraft in the first 2 operational air force squadrons won’t take place until 2015 (32 years), and the final “Tejas Mk.II” version will be very hard-pressed to become operational before 2018 (35 years).
A lot can change in 35 years. Official plans still call for 100+ fighters, but the IAF has embarked on a wide set of upgrade and purchase commitments for existing MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s, the new mid-tier MMRCA fighter, and a high-end FGFA stealth fighter joint venture with Russia.
Meanwhile, the IAF is now taking something of a “wait and see” approach to a longer term commitment, until the final aircraft is delivered with working systems and the “Tejas Mark II” design has shown what it can do. One the one hand, the project’s long development period, and DRDO’s past performance on defense projects, tend to justify that wait-and-see approach. On the other hand, the project can easily run into danger without adequate military and political backing. On Feb 6/06, The Telegraph in Calcutta reported that:
“Though air headquarters has not said so in public, it is weighing whether it should commit funds because it is anticipating a resource crunch for the big ticket purchases of multi-role combat aircraft – that could cost the exchequer more than $5 billion over 10 years – and other equipment that it has projected as an immediate need.”
The rumored growth of the MRCA foreign fighter program to 170-200 aircraft, naval plans for 32 more ships in the next 10-15 years, submarine construction imperatives, and other planned capital purchases do indeed have the potential to squeeze the Tejas. The reality of limited funds and budget cuts began to hit home in 2013, and another global economic slowdown will press India into harder choices still. Confidence in the Tejas, or the lack of it, will influence India’s choices.
So will other negotiations. India’s choices mean that the MMRCA program will deliver fewer aircraft at a flyaway price tag of $100+ million each. That makes $25-35 million Tejas LCA fighters look more attractive, in order to plus up numbers. Just as long as the LCA can in fact be produced to that cost level, be delivered in time to replace the MiG-21s, and perform at an adequate level.
Unfortunately, every one of those variables is currently in question.
At present, the worst-case scenario for the Tejas program is truncated production at about 40 operational aircraft, which would doom exports. In that scenario, Tejas Mk.I is built, but other expenditures grab priority. The plane’s role is then divided among upgraded MiG-29UPGs, new naval MiG-29Ks, upgraded Mirage 2000s, and possibly even Hawk Mk.132 trainers that are armed in a backup role.
The generally accepted goal for Tejas is 5 IAF squadrons plus 2 Navy squadrons, or about 140-150 planes. Even that is a relatively short production run at full capacity, which is the rate India must use in order to field new lightweight fighters in time.
The best-case scenario would involve full production for the IAF that raises planned order totals beyond 120, a serving STOBAR (Short Take Off via ramps, But Assisted Recovery via arrester gear and wires) naval variant in service by 2020, and export successes that drive up production totals and help finance future upgrades.
Contracts and Key Events 2014-2016January 13/16: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is making final preparations for their HAL Tejas lightweight fighter debut at the Bahrain Air Show next week. With plans to impress the experts and pick up a few potential customers along the way, HAL’s display apparently “significantly surpasses any aerobatics display the fighter has presented earlier”. The company plans to have gained final operating clearance (FOC) by mid-2016, and has also annouced that it is to test fire the Rafael Derby beyond-visual-range missile (BVRAAM) in March. The Israeli made missile has been bought as a stopgap arrangement as India grapples to make BVR missile Astra, which is still in development, operational.
October 27/15: India has offered Sri Lanka the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft as an alternative to the JF-17 Thunder, co-developed by China and Pakistan. Previous reports in June by the Pakistani press indicated that the Sri Lankans had signed for an undisclosed number of JF-17s, with this subsequently denied by the Sri Lankan Air Force which stated that it was still evaluating possible fighter options. However, Sri Lankan and Pakistani officials are due to meet in November to discuss the possible acquisition of the JF-17, with India likely looking to export the problematic Tejas LCA in an attempt to undermine strategic rival Pakistan.
October 8/15: The Indian government’s recent decision to procure seven squadrons of the heavily-criticized indigenous Tejas Mk.1A was pushed on the Indian Air Force by the Modi administration, according to a report by Reuters on Wednesday. The Indian Air Force had reportedly requested 44 additional Rafale fighters on top of the 36 announced in April turned down by the government, instead the Modi government pushed the Tejas on the IAF despite concern over the aircraft’s performance.
October 1/15: India will induct seven squadrons (112 to 126 aircraft) of Tejas Mk.I-A light combat aircraft, despite the aircraft’s Final Operating Clearance delayed in July until next year. Despite improvements to the heavily-criticized original indigenous Tejas Mk.I design, the Mk.I-A still has a fair share of problems, including issues with the aircraft’s radar and weapon payload. The fighters are slated for delivery from next year and are intended to provide the Indian Air Force with a much-needed air defense capability.
July 22/15: In a characteristic set-back, India’s Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) will see its Final Operating Clearance delayed until next year. The schedule has slipped consistently for the indigenous fighter, with FOC previously pushed back to December this year. The Indian Defense Ministry has blamed the delays on late delivery of components from foreign manufacturers; however the program also came under severe criticism from the Indian government’s principal oversight body in May, with the aircraft’s performance in question after over three decades of development. The new FOC for the aircraft is now reported to be timetabled for March 2016.
May 11/15: India’s indigenously-developed Tejas Mk I light combat aircraft has come under serious criticism from the country’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), with 53 deficiencies cited in a recent report. A major concern is the lack of defensive countermeasure capability, with the jet reportedly failing to meet Indian Air Force (IAF) survivability standards. The LCA achieved initial operating clearance in December 2013, with the project severely delayed from its original scheduled induction date of 1994. The CAG report to Parliament also highlighted how the IAF will likely be forced to induct the aircraft without a trainer variant available for pilot training, with a repair and overhaul facility also yet to be established at manufacturer HAL’s facilities, a requirement previously set out by the IAF.
Nov 18/14: Kaveri. The DRDO is doing something unusual: submitting documents to cancel a major research project, after INR 21.06 billion has been spent by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) in Bangalore. The request to end the GTX-35VS Kaveri program must now be approved by the Ministry of Finance, and receive clearance from the top-level Cabinet Committee on Security. Which also helps explain why so few projects are canceled, but the biggest change required still involves the DRDO’s mentality. Director-General (Aero) Dr. K. Tamilmani indicates that elections do have consequences:
“These are part of the bold stand being taken by DRDO. Whereever we have found bottlenecks for long time, with no realistic solutions, it’s better to move on. It is an honest stand we are taking…. If you are fit to run only for 50 km, why attempt 100 km? DRDO has realized its mistakes of the past and we have no hesitation in taking some bold steps.”
It is an honest stand, and DRDO can take it without giving up on India’s strategic industrial policy to become more self-sufficient in jet engine technologies. The project delays created by Kaveri remain a total waste, but the research itself can be harvested. DRDO intends to press on with jet engine research, and it’s possible to undertake projects that are militarily useful but much less ambitious. INR 3 billion has reportedly been earmarked for such work, and DRDO wants to make progress is 12 identified technical areas. Sources: OneIndia, “OneIndia Exclusive: DRDO to abandon indigenous fighter jet engine Kaveri project”.
All Kaveri research to end
Oct 4/14: Industrial. Defense News quotes an unnamed source, who says that the Indian government has been talking to major private sector industrial players about setting up a full production line for up to 250 Tejas Mk.2s. That would certainly justify the investment.
If carried out, that move would sidestep HAL’s production difficulties (q.v. Dec 9/12) by partly or wholly removing Tejas from HAL’s purview, create a full competitor to HAL in the aerospace sector, and turn the winner into India’s 1st major private sector defense firm. It would also double planned Tejas Mk.2/naval buys, based on past reports (q.v. Jan 11/14).
Since it seems apparent that the Indian government would have to fund a new production line for HAL anyway, funding the line elsewhere and reaping the benefits of diversification and competition is a logical policy option. Especially since the resulting competitor would also be a potential source for programs like India’s light transport competition, which stalled out because the private sector can’t afford to set up a full production facility for just 40 planes.
The challenge is that setting up a production line for modern combat jets isn’t simple, and major problems could really mess with already chancy schedules for Tejas Mk.2 and the planned naval variant. One obvious way to reduce this risk would be to bring in a foreign firm like Boeing, Saab, Dassault, et. al. to help set up the plant, and assist with management for the first few years. If done in conjunction with Mk.2 design assistance (q.v. June 17/14), the Tejas program as a whole could get a substantial boost.
Tata Group, Mahindra & Mahindra and Larsen and Toubro have been mentioned, and L&T Heavy Engineering President Madhukar Vinayak Kotwal has confirmed that discussions are taking place, but that’s all he is prepared to say. Watch this space. Sources: Defense News, “India Offers To Spend $12B To Break Monopoly”.
Aug 17/14: Industrial. HAL and DRDO’s ADA are trying to encourage more small and mid-size manufacturers to make parts for the aircraft:
“They aim to raise the LCA’s indigenous content to 80 per cent in three years, up from the present 50 to 55 per cent…. HAL Chairman R.K. Tyagi told them that starting 2015–16, “we aim to roll out 16 LCAs every year, [increasing] from the initial target of eight a year”.
Currently, 168 of the 344 LCA components are made in the country.
A key defence scientist involved in the programme said HAL and ADA would help manufacturers to pick up at least 10 more simple components and offer the use of government-owned manufacturing and test facilities.”
If they can do that while maintaining quality, and pick manufacturers who are capable of further innovation, they would make future upgrades easier. More local content would also reduce cost shifts based on currency exchange rates, and create a wider base for future programs like the Su-50/FGFA. The bad news? This policy falls into the “simple, but not easy” category. Sources: The Hindu, “A few small production pushes for LCA”.
June 17/14: Saab for Mk.2? As M-MRCA negotiations to buy advanced Rafale fighters stall, and projected costs rise sharply, Saab remains in position with a different offer. Instead of touting their superior JAS-39E/F Gripen, they’ve proposed to take a 51% share of a joint venture company, then leverage their expertise to create the LCA Mk.2. DRDO chief Dr V K Saraswat was enthusiastic, and they issued an RFI in 2012 and an RFP in 2013.
It isn’t a crazy idea. The Indo-Russian BrahMos missile has been very successful using a similar structure, and a 51% share plus freedom from Indian government strictures would remove many of the program’s decision-making and organizational issues. Saab is the only aircraft major with single-engine fighter conversion experience from the F404 to the F414 engine, so tasks like stretching the fuselage 0.5m, changing the air intakes, etc. have already been thought through in another context. Their Gripen has also achieved low operating costs, in part due to maintenance-friendly design. That’s another Tejas weakness, thanks to very maintenance-unfriendly placement of key components.
Since LCA Mk.2 is also expected as a carrier fighter, success already matters to India. they need to complete development successfully. From the IAF’s perspective, replacing M-MRCA with Tejas Mk.2 would simplify their future high-medium-low mix by avoiding a 2nd fighter in the same class as the SU-30MKI, while allowing them to field more squadrons. The flip side is that their high-end capability becomes irretrievably Russian-dependent: SU-30MKIs now, and FGFA/SU-50s later. For Saab, a JV would give them a major new niche in the global marketplace, providing a low-end fighter in a class below the Gripen and its Western competitors.
The catch? Incoming DRDO chief Dr Avinash Chander is more focused on developing the Mk.2 alone, and believed that any foreign partnership would require a global tender. In India, that would take years. Re-opening the opportunity would depend on a failure of M-MRCA negotiations, and continued failure to field Tejas, pushing the new BJP government to take a second look at all of its options. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Rafale contract elusive, Eurofighter and Saab remain hopeful”.
Feb 12/14: Costs. India’s MoD releases another set of official cost figures for the program, leaving out the Kaveri engine but adding a “Phase-III” development period. LCA development costs have now risen from an original INR 71.16 billion to INR 140.33 billion (+97.2%), or INR 168.72 billion (+137.1%) if one properly counts the Kaveri engine. Expected production line investments would push those figures even higher. India’s MoD was savvy enough to compare development costs to Saab’s more advanced Gripen NG:
“Developmental cost of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas is Rs.7965.56 Crore ($1.09 Billion) including building of 15 aircraft and creation of infrastructure for production of 08 aircraft per annum. This compares with the developmental cost of JAS 39 NG Grippen is $1.80 Billion for developing 5 Proto Vehicles.”
That’s actually just the current predicted cost of the IAF’s MK.I/II development, minus the Kaveri engine, and arguably without creating infrastructure that could actually deliver 8 aircraft per year. The Gripen NG figure would need to be checked carefully, to see what it included and excluded. Even so, the simple act of making the comparison shows a greater sense of external awareness than we’re used to seeing from India’s MoD. Source: India MoD/ PIB, “Developmental Cost of LCA Project”.
Feb 10/14: A written reply from Minister of State for Defence Shri Jitendra Singh to Lok Sabha parliamentarians triggers stories about the IAF raising their planned LCA buys from 200 to 300. Unfortunately for the media reporting that story, it rests entirely on an error of logic. Here’s the exact quote, which can’t be linked anymore thanks to MoD web site changes:
“The MiG-21 and MiG-27 aircrafts of the IAF have already been upgraded and currently equip 14 combat squadrons. These aircraft, however, are planned for being phased out over the next few years and will be replaced by the LCA. Steps have been initiated for upgradation of other fighter aircrafts like MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage-2000; transport aircraft like AN-32 and Mi-17/Mi-17 IV helicopters.”
What this statement does not say is that the replacement will happen on an equal basis. It’s perfectly possible to replace existing squadrons with fewer squadrons and fewer planes, if one is so inclined. The Americans have been doing so for decades, and they’re hardly alone. So far, firm IAF commitments involve 126 LCA Tejas planes: 6 squadrons of 21 planes each, with only 96 (16 x 6) as front-line fighters. Each squadron also has 3 rotation aircraft to cover maintenance absences or loss replacement, and 2 twin-seat trainers, to make 21. Beyond those 2 Tejas Mk.I squadrons and 4 Tejas Mk.II squadrons, we’ll have to see. Sources: India MoD, “Modernisation of IAF” | India’s Business Standard, “IAF will buy 14 Tejas squadrons, lowering costs”
Jan 12/14: Budgets. India’s defense budget will drop by INR 78 billion in 2013-14, after a drop of INR 100 billion in 2012-13. A more sluggish economy, and a weakened ruling Congress Party that’s trying to shore up its electoral base, are the issues. At the same time, India is negotiating the MMRCA deal for 126 Rafales, the FGFA deal with Russia for their future high-end stealth fighter, the Project 75i submarine buy that’s becoming an emergency, and attack and heavy-lift helicopter buys with Boeing. They also want to add to their fleet of P-8i long-range maritime patrol planes, buy AWACS early warning jets as a priority, and improve their aerial tanker fleet as a priority. Among other priorities.
That explains why the MoD asked for INR 400 billion more, instead of 78 billion less. Unless this gap changes, future Tejas production will find itself caught in an environment where everything can’t be funded, but big air force commitments have already been made. Sources: Times of India, “Despite budget cut, defence ministry continues with modernization drive”.
Jan 11/14: Pricing. Sources tell India’s Business Standard that HAL has quoted the Ministry a price of INR 1.62 billion (about $26.5 million) per plane for the first 20 Tejas Mk.I fighters. The Ministry wants to know why its 40% higher than the INR 1.165 billion quoted in 2006, and HAL has a good answer. One, inflation over the past 8 years takes a toll. Two, 45% of the plane’s cost involves imported parts, and the Indian rupee is sinking. Three, Tejas is still about half the $45.8 million price of a Mirage 2000 upgrade ({EUR 1.4 billion is now INR 118.3 billion + INR 2.02 billion to HAL}/ 49 jets = INR 2.8 billion or $45.8 million per), and those upgrades are even more dependent on currency rates.
HAL sees eventual purchases of 40 Mk.Is, 84 Mk.IIs, 11 naval trainers, and 46 naval variants (TL: 181), and recent government declaration have used 200 aircraft as a possible figure. Now that Tejas is on surer ground, and the opportunity is clearer, HAL is trying to control costs using longer-term commitments of its own. Step one reportedly involves Long Time Business Agreements (LTBAs) of 3-5 years and 40-50 aircraft sets with key sub-contractors, including clauses that let it vary annual production rates to some extent, a feature also seen in many of the US military’s multi-year purchase agreements. Long lead time components have been identified, and industrial improvements are underway. Practices like having 5-axis CNC machines on hand, and using computerized drilling of 8,000 holes or so in the composite wing skin, are more or less assumed in North America. They’re a step forward for HAL, which needs that kind of long-term investment in its industrial capacity.
Will that investment, and higher production, improve costs enough? Pakistan’s JF-17, which has already delivered 50 planes, is reportedly priced around $23-24 million per plane. If the Tejas Mk.II comes in around $30 million in current dollars, pointing to composite construction and supposedly better avionics isn’t going to cut it in export competitions as a reason for the 25% price difference. An AESA radar might, depending on what Pakistan does for the coming JF-17 Block II, and how much it costs. Sources: Business Standard, “HAL pegs price of Tejas fighter at Rs 162 crore”.
2013GE F414 engine contract; No Kaveris for Tejas fleet; AESA radar?; Why the multi-year delay for self-protection EW?; IOC at last, but is the plane ready?
LCA Naval
(click to view full)
Dec 20/13: IOC-2. the LCA program achieves Initial Operational Clearance II. This is closer to the F-35’s IOC than traditional American IOC designations: limited capabilities with some initial weapons, and more testing required, but regular air force pilots can now fly it. Sources: Economic Times of India, “Indigenous fighter aircraft LCA-Tejas gets Initial Operational Clearance”.
Dec 19/13: What’s next? Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification Director-General Dr K Tamil Mani explains what’s next for Tejas, whose remaining testing and certification needs show the IOC-2 designation’s limits. The fighter needs to pass 6 milestones in the next 15 months, on the way to G=Final Operational Clearance. They include:
Sources: Indian Express, “Tejas Needs to Cross 6 Milestones in 15 Months”.
Dec 18/13: IOC process. India’s Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) explains what IOC-2 certification involved to the Indian Express. The bureaucracy takes credit for the plane’s accident-free history, of course, and proudly notes their “concurrent participation in all development activities,” without discussing Tejas’ developmental delays.
The did have a lot to do between the incomplete Initial Operational Clearance on Dec 10/11, and IOC-2 about 2 years later. Full integration and testing of IAI’s ELM-2032 radar, testing of stores integration and release, flight envelope expansion from 17 degrees Angle of Attack to 22 degrees. Maximum flight parameters are now 6gs maneuvering, with a maximum speed of Mac 1.4 and a service ceiling to 50,000 feet. Safety-related work included safe emergency jettisoning of all stores, engine relight, wake penetration, night flying and all weather clearance. Sources: Indian Express, “Clearing Flight Test Parameters was a Challenge, Says Airworthiness Centre”.
Dec 17/13: Updates. India’s MoD summarizes the state of the LCA program. The key takeaways? As on Nov 30/13, they’ve conducted 2,415 flight tests using 15 Tejas Aircraft. A lot of reviews are riding herd on the program, which can add urgency or slow down actual work, depending on how that’s handled. Structurally, the Phased Development Approach has been changed to Concurrent Development Approach, which adds development risk but can cut time if it works, and Quick Reaction Teams have been formed to address design and production issues as they arise.
IOC-2 is still expected on Dec 20/13, but another release makes it clear that the Mk.II project continues to slip. The Probable Date of Completion for LCA Phase-II full-scale engineering design work is now December 2015: 9 months later than the previous March 2015 goal, and 7 years later than the original plan. Sources: India MoD, “LCA project” and DRDO projects“.
Dec 17/13: MiG-21 update. India’s MoD summarizes the state of the IAF’s MiG-21 fleet. The MiG-21FLs are retired now, but the answer shows that the remaining MiGs may have to serve longer than intended:
“254 MiG-21 aircraft are still in service with the Indian Air Force. During the last ten years (2003-2004 to 2012-2013) and the current year (upto 30.11.2013), a total of 38 MiG-21 aircraft have crashed.
Phasing out of aircraft and their replacement with new generation aircraft depends upon national security / strategic objectives and operational requirements of the defence forces and are reviewed by the Government from time to time. This is a continuous process.”
On Dec 12/13, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne confirmed that the LCA Tejas would replace the MiG-21 in the IAF fleet. That may appear to have been obvious, but official confirmation indicates a greater degree of confidence in the program. Sources: India MoD, “MIG-21 Aircraft” | Indian Express, “Tejas to Officially Replace MiG-21 FL”.
Dec 9/13: Defence Minister A K Antony is scheduled to give the Tejas its Initial Operational Certificate (IOC) on Dec 20/13, which would allow Tejas to be flown by regular IAF personnel outside of the test pilot community. Note that IOC doesn’t include key performance parameters like qualification with many of the fighter’s weapons, basic self-protection systems, air-to-air refueling, or finalization of the Tejas Mk.I’s design. Those will have to wait for Final Operation Clearance (FOC), and an increasingly-impatient defense minister has reportedly ordered DRDO to ensure that FOC takes place before 2014 ends.
The first Tejas squadron of 18-20 fighters will be built to IOC standard, and based at Sulur AB in Tamil Nadu, near Sri Lanka. They should be able to handle the minimal threats from that quarter, and one hopes that reported problems (q.v. April 21/13) were either untrue, or have been fixed.
On the industrial front, HAL has told India’s Business Standard that it aims to roll out the first 2 Tejas IOC fighters by March 2014, and deliver 8 more by the end of 2014. The next step after that will be to enhance to production line to 16 fighters per year, a task that might prove challenging without outside aid (q.v. Dec 9/12). That would leave 10 Tejas Mk.I IOC fighters to be built in 2015, whereupon HAL would be able to begin production of 20 Tejas Mk.I FOC variants. Required FOC upgrades to the IOC fleet, and initial naval production orders, could probably keep HAL at a minimum activity level through 2017; but an early 2013 interview with ADA director Shri PS Subramanyam saw 2018 as a more realistic date for Mk.I production to end. That might actually be helpful. If Tejas Mk.II isn’t ready to begin production by time Mk.I is done, India will have an industrial problem on its hands. Sources: Business Standard, “Tejas LCA sprints towards IAF’s frontline squadron” | AeroMag Asia, Jan-Feb 2013 issue.
Dec 7/13: Testing. The LCA’s 1st firing of an AA-11 short range air-to-air missile is successful, as the missile hits a target that was towed by a drone. The demonstration was conducted off the coast of Goa, in the Arabian Sea. Sources: The Hindu Business Line, “Light combat aircraft Tejas fires missile on target”.
Dec 7/13: MiG-21FL retires. After 50 years of service, the IAF is about to phase out its MiG-21FL variant, which is prepping to fly its last sortie on Dec 11/ 13 over Kalaikunda AFS in Bengal. Other MiG-21 variants will remain in service, and current expectations will extend the most modern MiG-21 Bison variants to at least 2018. Sources: The Calcutta Telegraph, “Supersonic jet set for last sortie”.
Aug 7/13: Costs. A Parliamentary reply to Shri S. Thangavelu in Rajya Sabha sets out the costs for each phase of the Tejas program in slightly more detail. Our chart above has been amended to reflect the current figures.
India is still in Full Scale Engineering Development Phase II, which aims to build 3 prototypes and 8 Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft, and establish infrastructure for producing 8 aircraft per year. LSP-8 made its maiden flight on March 31/13, but reports to date suggest that meeting the infrastructure goal will require a significant increase in development costs (q.v. Dec 9/12). India MoD.
BEL on EW, 2011Oct 16/13: Why no EW? The DRDO has finally fitted a Tejas fighter (PV-1) with electronic warfare/ self-protection systems, and intends to begin flight tests in November and December. Why has this key development been delayed for 5 years? Believe it or not, they thought it was more important to preserve the plane’s flight safety record:
“For almost eight years, a section of the aeronautical community has been resisting its fitment, anxious that the add-ons may cause a first crash…. They have been very keen on securing the operational clearance, initial as well as final from the Indian Air Force, even if the LCA did not have the electronic system…. no one wished to risk an add-on on the LCA that had not been tried. The idea was to defend the ‘zero crash’ record. This was made known sometimes explicitly to engineers and scientists working on the electronic systems, who, however, had been pressing for very long that the systems ought to be fitted and trials conducted to be able to fine-tune them.”
Unfortunately, PV-1 hasn’t been flying recently, so they may end up introducing risk that way. Tejas Mk.Is will have an Israeli IAI Elta jamming pod available as an external store, with the full RWJ system slated for the Mk.II. Sources: Deccan Herald, “Finally, Tejas gets electronic warfare systems”.
DRDO’s problems, in a nutshell
June 1/13: Excuses. DRDO chief V K Saraswat tries to deflect criticism of Tejas’ continuing delays, by citing the effects of sanctions that ended 13 years ago. Lack of cooperation and foreign help might explain why Tejas was slow to develop from the early 1980s to 2000. It doesn’t explain why DRDO didn’t follow professional practice by working with experienced pilots and the IAF, which created a multitude of poor design decisions that required years of delay to produce only partial fixes. Or the reason DRDO has wasted so much time with engine and radar choices that were obviously inadequate, all well after sanctions had ended. Or why, 13 years after sanctions had ended, Tejas isn’t ready for service yet, while Pakistan’s JF-17 equips 3 squadrons.
Weak excuses do not inspire future confidence. Brahmand Defence & Aerospace.
April 21/13: Tejas a lemon? The Sunday Standard reports that the Tejas is much farther away from viability than anyone is admitting, and says that DRDO’s notional stealth AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) has been put on hold until the LCA project can be made to work. A stealth FGFA/SU-50 is already in co-development with Russia, so AMCA’s value is unclear anyway. With respect to the Tejas LCA, the Sunday Standard’s unnamed sources say:
“The plane cannot fly on its own. It needs a lifeline in the form of support and monitoring of its systems from the ground by technicians…. The common man thinks the plane is doing fine, its engine sounds great and the manoeuvres are perfect. But those flying and weapons firing displays are done with ground monitoring and support. The plane is still not ready to flying on its own”…. the sources noted that LCA was grounded for three months between September and December 2012 following problems with its landing gear. “Normally, a combat plane is ready for its next sortie following a 30-minute [servicing]. In the case of LCA, after a single sortie of about an hour or so, it needs three days of servicing before it can go for its next sortie,” they said.”
These revelations come against a backdrop of pressure from India’s defense minister Antony and India’s government to buy designed-in-India items unless there’s no other choice. He’s selling changes to India’s Defence Procurement Policy as an anti-corruption effort – but what do you call spending billions of dollars on politically-allied state organizations, who don’t deliver on the critical defense projects assigned to them, and never pay any serious penalties for it? Their competitors in China and Pakistan are consistently faster and often better – while doing a better job developing their industries. See also India PIB.
March 20/13: More delays. A Parliamentary reply confirms the obvious, formally extending the scheduled end of the LCA’s Phase 2 Full Scale Engineering Development from December 2012 to March 2015.
The IAF has ordered 20 fighters in “Initial Operational Clearance” (January 2011) status, and another 20 in “Full Operational Clearance” (i.e. combat-ready) configuration. Full Operational Clearance is now expected in December 2014. PTI, via Zee News | India MoD.
Feb 6/13: AESA Radar? At Aero India 2013, Defense Update files a report that adds the short-range Python 5 air-to-air missile to the Tejas’ list of integrated weapons, alongside the Russian R-73/AA-11. It adds:
“The LCA will also carry the EL/M-2052 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar developed by IAI Elta. Originally, the EL/M-2032 was selected but the new 2052 now available with a more compact antenna is best designed to fit the nose cones of LCA and Jaguar, offering enhanced capabilities for both fighters.”
If the Defense Update report is true, it would roughly double the Mk.II fighter’s radar performance, and sharply lower its maintenance costs. DID has been unable to confirm this report, and there have been previous reports (q.v. Jan 14/11 entry) that said M-2052 sales for the Tejas Mk.II had been barred by American pressure. Indeed, the Americans managed to pressure the Israelis not to install the M-2052 in their own F-16i fighters.
Feb 5/13: On the eve of Aero India 2013, Indian defense minister AK Antony tells DRDO that:
“I am happy for your achievements of DRDO but not fully happy. Delay in delivery is a real problem… Try to speed up your process and reduce time for research, development and production. [DRDO is getting ready for a 2nd initial clearance for Tejas, but] I am impatient for the Final Operational Clearance (FOC)….. Antony also expressed his disappointment over reported lack of cohesion between the aircraft development agencies under DRDO and aircraft maker HAL.”
In India, FOC means “ready for combat operations”, which is closer to the US military’s idea of “Initial Operational Capability.” The Pioneer.
Jan 20/13: F414 deal. India Strategic quotes DRDO Director General V.K. Saraswat, who says that India’s government has finalized the terms of GE’s F414 contract, including the difficult issues surrounding Indian production. That process took over 2 years, as the engine was picked in September 2010.
The deal is reportedly a Rs 3,000 crore (about $560 million) contract for 99 of the Tejas Mk.II’s F414-GE-INS6 engines, with an option to buy another 100 at fixed terms. IANS via Silicon India | Times of India.
F414 engine deal finalized
Jan 4/13: Kaveri. India’s Business Standard reports that India’s Ministry of Defence has failed in its 6 years of sole-source negotiations with Snecma, and will try a global tender to secure cooperation in developing the Kaveri engine. The engine’s development has hit a technical dead-end, and cannot incorporate key alloys, single-crystal blades, and other manufacturing and design technologies without foreign help. The DRDO’s GTRE department has also conceded defeat with respect to the LCA, according to its chief Dr. C.P. Ramnarayanan:
“We were planning to re-engine first 40 Tejas fighters with the Kaveri. But now they will continue to fly with the F-404 engine.”
DRDO swill use Kaveri for its UCAV, and still holds out hope that a redesigned Kaveri can power a locally designed AMCA twin-engined medium fighter. To power AMCA, the engine would need to improve afterburner performance of about 15,825 pounds thrust. That means foreign help, but DRDO has made global solicitations before, and had no takers beyond Snecma.
2012Cert & program delays; Naval prototype flies; Kaveri for UCAV; Shaping up HAL – which clearly needs it.
IUSAV: News report
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Dec 26/12: Kaveri. India wants to develop a long-range, jet-powered armed drone, powered by a modified Kaveri engine (vid. March 21/12 entry). These are commonly called UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles), but India refers to their project as IUSAV (Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle). Note that most of the video and pictures in the video are of other countries’ efforts, since India is at a very early stage.
Now DRDO’s GTRE has asked the Ministry for another Rs 595 crore (about $93 million), covering a 48-month program to develop 2 prototypes of a modified Kaveri engine with no afterburner. This includes removing the base design flaws detecting during 2010-11 testing in Russia, ground testing in Bangalore, and confirmatory tests in Russia at the Gromov Flight Research Institute. The program would be capped by flight testing of the 2 no-afterburner prototypes in LCA prototype PV-1.
This idea actually makes sense. The Missile Technology Control Regime makes it problematic for countries to sell India a USAV jet engine, since a cruise missile is also an armed unmanned aircraft. On the Indian side, the Kaveri engine has the most problems adding enough thrust in afterburner, but “dry” statistics of 11,060 pounds thrust are close to the project’s goal of 11,500. Dropping the afterburner sheds engine weight, which has been an issue for Kaveri, and UCAV engines to date don’t have afterburners anyway. Other countries’ UCAV designs have all been sub-sonic drones that rely on stealth or low-threat environments to survive. Business Standard.
UCAV: a good use for Kaveri
Dec 12/12: Naval LCA. India’s Navy is upset by the fact that only 1 naval LCA has been built, and need aircraft to train with. Media reports say they’re about to issue a an Rs 1,000 crore (about $185 million) RFP to produce the first 8 Limited Series Production Tejas naval fighters, which would include both single-seat test aircraft and 2-seat trainers. This would turn the Feb 27/12 approval into a contract after negotiations with HAL, and work is expected to begin in 2013. Whether HAL’s production capacity can handle it (vid. Dec 9/12) is another question.
Business Standard reports the Indian military’s current belief that the navalized Tejas Mk.I can be used for training, and the state-owned ADA is touting a 1st representative takeoff by mid-2013 and a 1st representative landing by the end of 2013. At the same time, they believe that only the Tejas Mk.II will be capable of loaded carrier operations, using just 200m of space and a “ski-jump” ramp. The design has also turned out to be harder than expected. Commodore CD Balaji, who directs the Naval LCA project at ADA told India’s Business Standard that:
“In the paper design it looked feasible [to convert the IAF’s Tejas], similar to what Eurofighter proposed for a navalised Typhoon; or what Gripen proposed for the Sea Gripen [DID: both of which are higher end designs, with better base performance]. But when we started the detailed design and the actual build… we realised the benefits of what Dassault had done with the Rafale. They designed and built the naval variant first, the Rafale Marine. The air force Rafale is just a subset of Rafale Marine. That is the easiest path.”
Dec 9/12: Industrial fail, more $. India’s Business Standard offers a scathing portrait of incompetence at HAL, which has been unable to set up and operate a production line for the LCA, even though many of its projects involve assembling foreign designs on production lines in India. On the other hand, see the March 24/11 entry, where HAL executives point out that it doesn’t make much sense to establish a full modern production line for a program that has only featured limited production orders and an uncertain future.
As a result, Tejas fighters built to date have been custom-built limited-production and prototype aircraft. The immediate consequence is that the Ministry of Defence has to budget another Rs 1,500 crore (about $277 million) to try and set up a modern production line. Air Marshal (ret.) Pranab K Barbora:
“HAL’s assembly line expertise is outdated by at least three decades. They have done nothing to upgrade their technology. Setting up a modern assembly line for the Tejas is far beyond HAL’s capabilities.”
The paper points out that HAL’s new CEO RK Tyagi has “no experience in aeronautical development or manufacture,” and openly doubts the government ADA’s program manager, P. Subramanyam. He promises that HAL will build 20 Tejas Mk.I fighters in 2.5 – 3 years, with production of the next 20 in just over 2 more years, by 2018. That might be possible if an experienced foreign manufacturer is contracted quickly to help set up production, and the MoD is reportedly studying that idea. By itself, however, HAL hasn’t been able to build even 2 Tejas fighters per year over a prolonged reference period, and India has no operational squadrons. Meanwhile, Pakistan has already fielded almost 3 squadrons of their JF-17 Thunder fighter, which began its design cycle after Tejas.
Note that the Business Standard’s figure of INR 155.470 billion (Rs 14,047 + 1,500 crore) for the entire LCA Tejas program is almost exactly double the Indian government’s official March 2012 figures. The math indicates that they’re probably including the Kaveri engine. DID considers the 2 programs to be separate, and pegs unofficial total Tejas development costs at INR 131.015 billion (Rs 13,101.5 crore, currently about $2.15 billion), including current and forecast costs for the naval variant, and the expected Rs 1500 crore for production line help. With Kaveri included, our figures rise to INR 144.405 billion, and are probably slightly behind actual Kaveri spending. Business Standard.
HAL: Industrial fail
Dec 3/12: Kaveri. India’s state-owned Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) aims to integrate the Kaveri powerplant with a Tejas fighter operated by India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), with the aim of flying it by the end of 2013. Whether it can perform to standard won’t change DRDO’s advocacy, but it may matter to the IAF. As of May 14/12 (q.v.), India’s Minister of Defence said that it couldn’t meet India’s 90kN/ 20,200 pound thrust requirement.
A March 21/12 answer to Parliament (q.v.) pegged the Kaveri’s development cost at INR 28.39 billion ($520 million), nearly 10 times greater than the original INR 3.83 billion. Flight International.
Aug. – Nov. 2012: Testing halted. The Tejas encounters a DASH of trouble, as India discovers that the top of the pilot’s DASH-III integrated helmet display can end up above the top of the Martin-Baker ejection seat. That’s a serious problem, because it means the helmet could hit the canopy as the seat rockets out of the cockpit, killing the ejecting pilot. India had to halt testing for 3 1/2 months before the problem was fixed. Their response was to modify the seat, and to provide a backup mechanism that they calculate will blow the canopy off before the pilot’s head can hit it. They had better be right.
DRDO chief V. K. Saraswat has confirmed to India’s Business Standard that the fixes are done, adding that ADA used the down time to make other modifications as a result of flight test feedback. Even so, a string of setbacks has shifted Tejas’ Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) from a re-baselined end-2010 to mid-2013 – if nothing else goes seriously wrong. Final Operational Clearance (FOC) for combat operations was scheduled for end-2012, and now looks unlikely until 2014-2015.
To the west, Pakistan has already inducted 3 squadrons of its comparable JF-17 fighters, whose joint development with China began 16 years after Tejas. India’s Business Standard.
A DASH of trouble
Oct 18/12: Lessons Learned. Air Commodore Muthanna’s “Challenges In Design To Deployment: Critical Lessons From the D&D of LCA” [PDF] has some interesting bits in it. The Commodore believes that the fighter deserves to enter service. Unfortunately, Indian officials and firms didn’t involve aviators in the initial design process, either by teaming with the IAF or by the widespread practice of embedding aviators in the design teams. The IAF had to get involved after the 2006 contract, and a lot of the time and cost slippage from then until now has involved RFAs aimed at fixing deficiencies that should have been addressed in design. Beyond that, he cites serious issues in management, manufacturing, and training:
“A fundamental challenge has been the structure of the Indian higher defense management. Broadly speaking, there are three verticals within the Indian Ministry of Defense that steer this program…. In this totally State funded and State managed program, interdepartmental oversight has been lacking. It is necessary that a single political entity take charge….
….[Transitioning from design to manufacture,] the necessity to convert frozen design drawings into production drawings…. [is] an elaborate process…. Other shortcomings are; inability to meet manufacturing tolerances; non availability of correct jigs, fixtures and tooling to mee t DAL requirements; non availability of suitable calibrating equipment; and, lack of trained manpower.
….With the flight simulators, however, it was a strange story. While the ASR did envisage the requirement of a simulator before deployment, no such development was undertaken…. there would be no representative flight simulator available for use by the customer aircrew. The situation will be aggravated by the non availability of a trainer variant of the aircraft in the required time frame.”
Lessons learned report
May 14/12: Kaveri. Minister of Defence Shri A K Antony replies to Shri Bal Kumar Patel in Lok Sabha. No, DRDO still has no time frame to fully develop its Kaveri engine. Antony reiterates that the engine does not meet requirements for the Tejas, but will be used in UAVs and marine applications. A technology demonstrator may fly in a Tejas Mk.I fighter around 2015. The operative word here is “may”.
April 27/12: Naval LCA. NP-1, the 1st Tejas naval prototype, has its maiden flight. The plane is piloted by chief test pilot of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) national flight test centre (NFTC) Commodore TA Maolankar and co-piloted by the centre’s flight test engineer, Wing Commander Maltesh Prabhu. NP-2 will be the single-seat naval variant. Zee News.
Naval variant flies
March 21/12: Costs. Defence minister Antony answers a Parliamentary question, and provides cost and schedule slips for the LCA Tejas, LCA Naval, and Kaveri engine. Those are reproduced above along with other information. Antony also discusses what’s being done about these slips, which amounts to more oversight and monitoring. That won’t cure a system whose main problem is a lack of accountability or consequences for the state-run development agencies, and whose secondary problem is the system’s own red tape. On the other hand, the answer makes it sound like the government is doing something. Antony adds that:
“Tacit knowledge acquired by the DRDO scientists during this project will also be applied for further aerospace technology. Kaveri spin-off engine can be used as propulsion system for Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle (USAV).”
Readers may note that he is not referring to the LCA Tejas program as a destination for Kaveri, despite DRDO’s wishes in the matter. See also Indian government PIB | Flight International.
March 14/12: Goal – 6 squadrons. Indian minister of state for defence M M Pallam Raju tels the Rajya Sabha upper chamber that the IAF plans to induct 6 LCA squadrons over the next decade or so, including 4 squadrons of Tejas Mk.II fighters. Given current schedules, past performance, and the extent of the redesign and testing involved, India may be lucky to induct any Mk.II fighters by 2022. Deccan Herald.
March 11/12: Naval LCA. India’s Sunday Guardian reports that India’s Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) has refused flight certification for the Naval LCA, until the new landing gear’s weight is reduced, and its wing leading-edge vortex controls are redesigned. The US Navy and EADS are reportedly being consulted to help fix the problems.
CEMILAC’s decision will add further delays to a program that is already late, and effectively ends hopes for a March 2012 flight. The naval variant’s initial flight was initially slated to happen by the end of 2010, following a July 2010 roll-out. As of Sept 26/11, it had managed only an Engine Ground Run.
March 10/12: Testing. While Tejas continues to make test flights, and has been granted initial certification, final certification and full production continues to face delays, and will not come until late 2013 or even 2014 now.
New test aircraft LSP-7 had a maiden flight, without a chase plane, “to test many indigenously-developed instruments,” as well as the M-2032 radar and DASH helmet. It’s close enough to the final standard that it will be one of the planes offered for IAF user-evaluation trials, but the final-configuration LSP-8 won’t be ready until later in 2012. LSP-8 will be the version presented to CEMILAC for full certification and flight clearance, a necessary step before full production can begin for the two 20-plane orders. The Hindu.
Feb 29/12: HAL, shape up. India’s MoD explains that changes are coming to HAL, and cites the Tejas program as one reason behind the push:
“The Defence Minister Shri AK Antony today asked the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to realign its business processes for strategic alliances and joint ventures, as also, to step up R&D efforts to remain globally competitive… Keeping in mind the mammoth role that the HAL would assume in the coming years in the aerospace industry and the challenges that it would face, the government has set up an expert group under the chairmanship of Shri BK Chaturvedi, Member, Planning Commission to suggest measures to strengthen and restructure HAL… the Group will suggest how best the spin offs from HAL order book can be earnest to ensure better involvement of the private industry in the defence sector. It will also suggest measures to enhance the synergies between HAL, the private defence sector and the civilian industry.
“Taking part in the discussion the Members of Parliament appreciated the role played by HAL in the defence arena of the country over the years. They, however, pointed out certain shortcomings such as the delay in the induction of the Light Combat Aircraft in the Indian Air Force, delay in the development of Kaveri Engine, delay in phasing out of Mig-21 aircraft and lack of an aggressive strategy to export HAL products.”
See also March 24/11 entry, The Pioneer | Flight International | IN FOCUS: India advances air force modernisation.
Feb 27/12: Naval LCA. The Indian Ministry of Defence’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has sanctioned the building of 8 Naval LCA aircraft by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), and reportedly allocated the necessary funds for a contract. That does not mean a contract has been signed yet.
The 8 planes will be built as a mix of single-seat test fighters and twin-seat trainers, and would begin to add production fighters on top of the ordered fleet of 6 test aircraft. The first flight is announced for sometime in March, though talks last year of a maiden flight in July did not pan out. Business Standard.
2011Tejas initial clearance; RAFAEL Derby picked as MRAAM; Kaveri engine still alive but in limbo; HAL pushed to outsource.
IOC flight
(click to view video)
Dec 21/11: Kaveri. In response to Parliamentary questions, Defence Minister Antony explains the Kaveri engine’s current development status:
“So far 9 prototypes of Kaveri engines and 4 prototypes of Kabini (Core) engines have been developed. Total 2050 hours of testing have been conducted on various Kaveri and Kabini engines at ground and altitude conditions for various requirements including performance, operability, endurance, environmental, etc. Two major milestones viz. successful completion of Official Altitude Testing (OAT) and completion of first block of flights of Kaveri engine in Flying Test Bed (FTB) has demonstrated the technological capability and maturity of this indigenous effort. Kaveri engine prototype (K9) was integrated with IL-76 aircraft at Gromov Flight Research Institute (GFRI), Russia and flight tests have been successfully carried out up to 12 km maximum forward altitude and a maximum forward speed of 0.7 Mach No. Twenty seven flights for 55 hours duration have been completed on IL-76. Critical subsystems and its associated knowledge know-how and know-why has been acquired in association with Indian public & private sector industries, including certification methodologies.”
Nov 23/11: Kaveri. In response to Parliamentary questions, Defence Minister Antony says that nothing has changed with respect to the Kaveri engine’s successor. He doesn’t put it like that, but that’s the reality. India MoD.
Aug 8/11: Kaveri. In response to questions, the Indian MoD clarifies the status of the Kaveri engine project. There is no signed co-operation agreement with SNECMA, but the Air Force has reviewed the draft technical specification and approved it.
“The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has made no agreement with a French firm to develop the Kaveria aero engine to be used for the Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas. However, DRDO is negotiating with M/s Snecma, France for co-development and co-production of Kaveri aero engine for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas MK-II. The project proposal will be put up for Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approval after the completion of price negotiation… IAF has further suggested that the engine design should have minimal impact on the LCA Tejas airframe for future retrofitment.”
If it succeeds, India’s Tejas fleet would have an alternative engine option, much like the popular F-16. Several countries fly F-16s, and even F-15s, with 2 different types of engine (PW F100 or GE F101) in their fleet, as insurance that keeps their air force flying even if an engine type develops problems. First, however, an agreement must be signed. Then, the development project must succeed at a reasonable cost.
July 20/11: Naval LCA. The naval Tejas will probably get a different name. Meanwhile, an F404-IN20-powered naval variant is undergoing ground integration tests at HAL’s Bangalore facility, followed by engine runs and ground runs in the coming weeks. A 1st flight within 3 months is considered optimistic.
Meanwhile, India’s ADA has asked the US Navy to help it define carrier suitability plans, and the US Navy is assisting. Flight International.
May 23/11: Testing & Weapons. Aviation Week reports that the Tejas Mk.I is due to undergo a 2nd phase of night trials. Aircraft LSP-5 reportedly made 6 night flights in April 2011, which tested avionics, the instrument landing system, and integration involving the IAI ELTA multimode radar, Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display, and RAFAEL’s LITENING pod. The push to finish night operations clearance will also include items waived for the IAF’s initial clearance (vid. Jan 10/11 entry) – waivers that the service does not intend to grant again.
The next 16 months will see assessments of Tejas’ angle of attack, g-forces and sustained turn rate, with limited series production aircraft #6 arriving to help speed things along. It will also see a greater focus on weapons integratiopn tests – so far, only R-73/AA-11 Archer short-range air-to-air missiles and standard bombs have been tested. Still to go: Laser-guided bombs, cluster bombs, and Russian 80mm S-8 rocket pods. RAFAEL’s Derby medium-range air-to-air missile isn’t set to test until mid-2012, and the IAF also expects Russian Kh-31/35/39 anti-ship and precision strike missiles as part of the Tejas Mk.I’s intended configuration.
March 24/11: Industrial. India’s Business Standard reports that the Indian DRDO is pushing HAL to outsource some Tejas production or set up joint ventures, in order to meet required delivery schedules and keep the IAF’s fighter fleet at acceptable numbers. The current line can reportedly produce just 8 planes per year, and a high-level HAL team has reportedly toured Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Eurofighter GmbH facilities.
A request of this nature from the DRDO is nothing short of revolutionary. HAL has 2 serious problems, however, which make such a different approach thinkable for India’s bureaucrats. One is low real orders for Tejas. As one HAL executive put it: “…how much money could we have realistically invested in a production line?… So far, future Tejas orders of 100-120 more fighters are only plans.” The other problem is the load level on the state-owned firm’s Aircraft R&D Centre, which is is simultaneously trying to develop the Tejas Mark II; the Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT); the Sukhoi-HAL Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA); and the Irkut-HAL Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MRTA). The firm is also developing Dhruv helicopter variants, including a light attack helicopter. That’s a tremendous amount of competition for attention and resources, and HAL will face more strains if/when each project becomes a production demand.
Other likely candidates for partnerships wold have to include France’s Dassault Aviation, Sweden’s Saab, and Israel Aerospace Industries, as well as BAE and Northrop Grumman. The latter 3 firms have considerable experience as fighter program sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman is looking to sell its E-2D AWACS and Global Hawk UAVs to India; while IAI supplies a range of equipment to India already, and has industrial partnerships in place. So, too, does BAE, who is already working with HAL to produce its Hawk advanced trainer jets in India.
Feb 14/11: Tejas runs the Derby. Indian Aeronautical Development Agency director P.S. Subramanya says they have picked RAFAEL’s Derby as the Tejas’ initial beyond visual range air combat missile. He expects a contract by March 2011, with delivery expected in the second half of 2012, in time for the final phase of Tejas Mk.I testing.
Derby has range limitations, and was accepted on India’s Sea Harrier fleet despite not meeting the program’s original range goals. It also lacks a datalink. On the other hand, it offers a fire-and-forget weapon that’s already in India’s inventory, and integrated with Tejas’ EL/M-2032 radar, possessing what’s reported to be a wide boresight cone. It’s also true that given the need to avoid fratricide and positively identify targeted aircraft, most aerial engagements have taken place within Derby’s range, and future conflicts involving India are expected to feature that same limitation.
Long-term plans were to deploy the locally developed Astra missile as the Tejas BVRAAM, but in 2010 India decided to use a foreign missile and get Tejas into operational service. If Astra succeeds, it can always be integrated later. Meanwhile, Tejas gets ordnance commonality with India’s Sea Harriers, which also carry the EL/M-2032 radar, and with India’s SPYDER anti-aircraft systems. Defense Update | Livemint | RAFAEL on Derby | ACIG on Derby.
RAFAEL Derby BVRAAM picked
Feb 3/11: Kaveri. DRDO hasn’t given up trying to force the issue with its long-delayed Kaveri engine. After proposing it as a naval turbine, the newest gambit is to specify it for a proposed twin-engine Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (A-MCA), which would be developed by 2020 and operational by 2025. The proposal is an aircraft somewhat comparable to America’s F-35 – not an encouraging comparison, given that plane’s development costs.
Government acceptance of that plan would buy the engine project another decade, but the question is whether the A-MCA project is even realistic. India’s M-MRCA medium fighter competition hopes to field an advanced 4+ generation plane by 2015, but deliveries will take years, and real operational capability isn’t likely until 2016 or later. Meanwhile, the 2020-2025 time frame is also the expected window for India’s FGFA 5th generation collaboration with Sukhoi. Both are very big budget programs, even as India looks to field a much larger Navy to counter Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean basin, and faces a growing need for expensive ballistic and cruise missile defenses. In that environment, MCA could easily find itself fighting hard to avoid becoming yet another sidelined Indian technology demonstrator project.
DRDO also hopes to muscle the Kaveri v2 engine into the Tejas. They want the Indian government to swap the engines in when the initial 40 GE F404 equipped Tejas Mk.Is come in for their scheduled overhauls, during the 2015-2020 time period. Flight International | The Hindu | UPI.
Jan 31/11: Kaveri. Livemint reports that India’s DRDO expects to close price negotiations for a Kaveri joint venture (JV) with France’s Snecma by the end of February 2011, following over 2 decades and INR 28.8 billion spent on the project in India. DRDO declined to reveal the estimated cost of the Snecma-GTRE project, which reportedly aims to produce a viable competitor to the GE F414 that powers the F/A-18 Super Hornet family, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen NG, and will almost certainly power the Tejas Mk.II.
Reports suggest that Snecma will bring in critical technology for the hot engine core, which is key to the 38% thrust gain sought over existing Kaveri models, while DRDO’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) will work on the “cold” sections around it. GTRE would be left with complete know-how and intellectual property rights for the engine,which will also need to become lighter.
Jan 10/11: Tejas IOC. The Tejas LCA is given Initial Operational Clearance by the Indian Air Force, marking their first induction of an Indian designed and built front line fighter. It has been a long road. The Hindustan Times reports that: “The government has so far pumped Rs 14,428 crore into the LCA programme which was pegged at Rs 560 crore when conceived in 1983.” The program cost was set at over 3,300 crore by the late 1980s, and has continued to rise. At today’s exchange rates, the INR 144.28 billion figure translates into about $3.15 billion. The Times of India places the program total even higher, at 17,269 crore/ $3.77 billion for all variants.
Note that India’s IOC designation is not the same as Initial Operational Capability for America’s military, which represents a combat-ready unit. India doesn’t have that yet, and Tejas receives this designation without all of its advertised capabilities, such as air-air engagements using radar-guided missiles. Indeed, subsequent reports reveal that key criteria for even minimal operations were waived, including wake penetration tests, lightning clearances, and some basic all-weather and day/night items. What India’s IOC does, is allow regular IAF pilots to begin flying it.
Indian Air Force chief P.V. Naik says that Final Operational Clearance for induction and formation of a Tejas squadron isn’t expected until 2013 or 2014, an event that will take place at Sulur Air Base in Tamil Nadu. The first test flight of the Tejas Mark-II version is currently scheduled for December 2014, with production beginning in June 2016. Indian Government | Economic Times of India | The Hindu | Hindustan Times | IBNLive | LiveMint | New Delhi TV | Sify | Times of India | Times of India op-ed || BBC.
Tejas IOC
Jan 14/11: Radar. domain-b reports that American pressure has forced Israel to bar exports of its EL/M-2052 AESA radar to India. The radar was reportedly intended to replace the EL/M-2032 on the Tejas Mk.II aircraft, where it would sharply improve radar performance and sharply lower maintenance costs (q.v. Oct 3/08, Dec 4/09 entries).
Israel wanted to install the radar in its own F-16s and F-15s, but the Americans moved to strangle a potential competitor by telling the Israelis that installing the M-2052 would cut off all manufacturer support for its fighters. On the export front, the USA can use ITAR restrictions to block technologies developed with American assistance, and forced Israel to implement a set of military export controls that add up to unofficial American review. Israel has reportedly sold a limited number of M-2052s to 1 undisclosed customer, but use in the Tejas Mk.II would represent the radar’s 1st major sale anywhere.
2010GE’s F414 engine for Tejas Mk.2/Naval; 1st Naval LCA prototype rolled out.
EJ200s in Eurofighter
(click to view full)
Nov 21/10: Cost. The Times of India places the cost of India’s Tejas program at 17,269 crore, or over $3.7 billion. The report adds:
“Latest figures also show each of the first 40 Tejas fighters will cost around Rs 150 crore [DID: about $33 million], over and above the huge developmental cost… Tejas, incidentally, has clocked around 1,420 flights with 10 prototypes till date. Its FSED (full-scale engineering development) Phase-I till March 2004 cost Rs 2,188 crore [DID: 1 crore = 10 million rupees]. The Phase-II, to be completed by December 2012, will cost another Rs 5,778 crore. To add to that, there is fabrication of two Tejas Mark-II, with alternate engines, to be completed by Dec 2018 for Rs 2,432 crore, along with development of indigenous technologies for Rs 396 crore. Naval Tejas FSED Phase-I, in turn, is to be completed by Dec 2014 for Rs 1,715 crore, with Phase-II slated for completion by December 2018 for another Rs 1,921 crore.
Tejas will, of course, also be powered by American GE engines, with its indigenous Kaveri engine floundering despite Rs 2,839 crore being spent on its development since 1989. Towards this, India recently finalised a $822-million deal for 99 GE F-414 engines.”
These figures are later shown to fall short of government figures. India’s goal of a $20-25 million fighter at full rate production may still be achievable, but it will bear close watching. It is very normal for the first production sets of a fighter to cost far more than fighters at full-rate production, with figures of double or even triple the price common for aircraft with very long production runs.
Nov 6/10: F414. During President Obama’s visit, the White House provides further details regarding the F414 engine order, which it places at 107 engines:
“…Upon finalizing the contract, General Electric’s facility in Lynn, Massachusetts, and other sites across the United States will be positioned to export almost one billion dollars in high technology aerospace products. This transaction is tentatively valued at approximately $822 million, all of which is U.S. export content, supporting an estimated 4,440 jobs.”
This is strictly true, since any contract with GE would be 100% export content, but the deal itself may still contain provisos for technology transfer and related contracts in India. UK Financial Times Beyond BRICs blog | Hindu Business Line | Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) | NDTV | Sify | WSJ India Real Time blog.
Nov 3/10: At the end of the India-UK “Indra Dhanush 2010” exercise, Indian Air Chief Marshal P V Naik tells the media that LCA Mark-I will be inducted into operational squadrons by the middle of 2011, while the LCA Tejas Mark-II should be operational in the next 2-3 years, as “the process of selection of engine for LCA Mark-II is nearing completion.” It doesn’t happen that way.Deccan Herald.
Nov 1/10: Testing. Aviation Week reports that LSP-5, the 11th test jet and 1st final configuration Tejas Mk I aircraft, is readying for flight trials as the ADA tries to meer a Dec 27/10 deadline for release-to-service certification. Changes include internal cockpit lighting for night flying, a revised internal communication set similar to HAL’s Druhv helicopter, and National Aerospace Laboratories’ auto-pilot mode. Aviation week adds that:
“If the delivery schedules are met, then the Indian Air Force will have LSP-7 and LSP-8 for user evaluation trials by March 2011. LSP-6 will be a test vehicle for high angle of attack. The Tejas squadron is expected to be in Bengaluru by mid-2011 and the first two series production aircraft (SP-1, SP-2) also should be ready by then.”
Oct 25-28/10: Engine II. Report, and denial. After NewsX’s Vishal Thapar broadcasts a reports that a Eurojet consultant has been expelled from India for illegally obtaining information on GE’s bid, trying to substitute a new Eurojet bid by offering a monetary inducement, and then planting media reports that Eurojet was ahead on price. Thapar also claims that this is why the Indian MoD took the unusual step of announcing GE as its low-cost bidder, before a contract was signed.
The follow-on effects could be very severe if true, making it very difficult for India to pick the Eurofighter as its M-MRCA medium fighter. Eurojet’s communication agency subsequently issues the following denial. See Milplex | India Defence:
“Eurojet Turbo GmbH categorically denies unfounded allegations made in the NewsX report titled ” India expels arms dealer”, authored by Vishal Thapar and released on 23 October 2010. The report lacks any factual base and is a work of fiction.”
Oct 1/10: Engine II – F414. India’s Business Standard may want a word with its sources. GE announces that its F414 engine has been picked to power the Tejas Mk.II fighter. India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) will order 99 jet engines, with GE Aviation supplying the initial batch of F414-GE-INS6, engines and the rest manufactured in India under transfer of technology arrangements. When questioned by DID, GE sources confirmed that this is not a contract yet, merely preferred bidder status.
The selection of GE’s F414 deepens a relationship that has supplied 41 earlier model GE F404 engines so far, in order to power initial Tejas LCA Mk.I fighters and LCA Naval prototypes. GE describes the F414-GE-INS6 as “the highest-thrust F414 model,” without offering specifics, but is has been working on an F414 Enhanced Performance Engine. The INS6 will add single-engine safety features in its digital controls, something GE also installed in the F414 variant powering one M-MRCA candidate, the JAS-39 Gripen NG.
F414 engine picked for Tejas Mk.2
Sept 20/10: Engine II. India’s Business Standard reports that the European EJ200 engine may have the edge in the competition to supply the Tejas Mk.II fleet’s powerplants:
“Informed sources have told Business Standard that when the bids were opened last week, European consortium Eurojet bid $666 million for 99 EJ200 engines, against US rival General Electric, which quoted $822 million.”
Both engines have been ruled technically suitable, so the lower priced bid will win, but the bidding process isn’t 100% final yet. The paper also quotes Air Vice Marshall Kapil Kak (ret.) of the Indian Air Force’s Centre for Air Power Studies, who draws the obvious conclusion:
“It is as clear as daylight. Selecting the EJ200 for the Tejas would boost the Eurofighter’s prospects in the MMRCA contest. Its engines, which form about 15-20 per cent of the cost of a modern fighter, would be already manufactured in India for the Tejas [after the 1st 10 were built abroad]. For the same reason, rejecting the GE F-414 would diminish the chances of the two fighters [F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet and JAS-39NG/IN] that fly with that engine.”
Aug 25/10: Kaveri. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony updates progress in the Kaveri engine in a written reply to Shri N Balaganga of India’s Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament). It’s phrased in terms of what DRDO is doing as development and testing continues, and gives various reasons why the engine is so late. It does not mention that the IAF isn’t interested, except to note at the end that “LCAs are, meanwhile, as decided by user, being fitted with imported engines.” Unlike some Indian programs, the Kaveri program has managed to spend most of its yearly budgets; over the last 3 years, these expenditures have been:
2007-2008: INR 1,525.1 million
2008-2009: INR 1,535.4 million
2009-2010: INR 1,220.6 million
As of Aug 25/10, INR 100 million = $2.15 million, so INR 1.2206 billion = $26.05 million.
July 6/10: Naval LCA. NP1, the first naval Tejas prototype, is rolled out. HAL will build NP1 and NP2 for testing, which will take place at a new facility in Goa. The naval variant adds a tailhook, strengthened undercarriage, leading-edge vortex controllers to slow down landings, auto-throttles, and a fuel dump system.
Naval LCA rollout
May 5/10: Engine II. GE describes 3 of the programs underway to improve its F414 engine. The most relevant is probably the F414 EPE (Enhanced Performance Engine), which has a new fan to increase airflow, and aims to increase thrust by 20%. It’s explicitly “targeted for potential international customers,” which includes India’s Tejas Mk.2.
The US Navy wants the F414 EDE (Enhanced Durability Engine), which uses an advanced high pressure turbine and 6-stage high pressure compressor (HPC) that offers a 2-3X hot-section durability gain, and reduced fuel consumption. F414 EDE forms the base of the EPE engine, but the gains will not be the same in both engines, owing to other design differences.
Crowded India may also appreciate the retrofittable F414 noise reduction kit project, with serrated edges where each “lobe” penetrates into or out of the primary airflow and generates a secondary flow, reducing jet noise by 2-3-decibels. The USN has identified funding for a program to mature the technology and prepare it for incorporation in the USN F414 engine fleet, with work scheduled to continue through 2011. GE Aviation.
Feb 3/10: Engine II. Eurojet says it will share single-crystal engine blade technologies with India if Eurofighter wins MMRCA, or the EJ200 engine is selected for the LCA Tejas Mk2.
Eurojet’s EJ200 equips the Eurofighter Typhoon. The EJ200 weighs about 2,200 pounds and produces 13,500 pounds of thrust in normal operation, or 20,000 pounds with afterburners. There were even rumors of a thrust-vectoring version, to improve Tejas maneuverability, but the engine lost the Tejas MK.II competition, then the Eurofighter was edged out by France’s Rafale in India’s M-MRCA finals.
Feb 2/10: Indian defence minister AK Antony watches flight demonstrations by twin-seat (PV-5), and single-seat (LCP-2) Tejas test aircraft, and declares: “Serious doubts were raised about Tejas… Now I can proudly say we will fly our own fighters.” He states Cabinet Committee of Security approval to add Rs 8,000 crore (about $1.73 billion) to the 27-year program for continued air force and naval development, and development of a new engine for the Mk.2, and expresses confidence in final operational clearance for the Mk.1 version by end of 2012. Antony also agreed that the government is in talks with parties abroad for the development of that Mk.2 engine, but would not be more specific.
The Indian Air Force has already ordered 20 LCAs, and has reportedly expressed interest in ordering another 20 aircraft. Meanwhile, the Navy is building 2-seat trainer (NP1) and a single-seat fighter (NP2) prototypes, with NP1 nearing completion of equipping after the structural assembly. NP1 is scheduled to roll out by April 2010, followed by a hoped-for first flight in June 2010. The single-seat NP2 is scheduled for its first flight by June 2011. India’s Business Standard | The Hindu | Indian Express | Times of India | Agence France Presse | The Asian Age.
2009 First 6 LCA Naval ordered; Tejas Angle of Attack flight issues; US red tape trips Lockheed Martin; Engine competition to equip Tejas Mk.II.
Tejas test
(click to view full)
Dec 31/09: Kaveri. The Hindu reports that India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been given government permission to accept an offer from France’s Snecma to ‘partner’ with the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) to jointly develop a new version of the Kaveri jet engine. Senior GTRE officials tell The Hindu that talks could begin early in 2010. When that might result in a signed contract is anyone’s guess.
This article’s Dec 26/08 entry covers the verdict of a senior Indian committee, which had recommended against the DRDO-Snecma collaboration. The Hindu highlights the Matheswaran team’s criticism that using Snecma’s fully developed ‘Eco’ engine core would not create sufficient transfer or control of technology, but reports:
“Snecma, which indicated that an engine run of at least 250 is required to make their offer economically viable, agrees that an existing core would be at the heart… will take at least five years before the first production engine comes out. Snecma chairman and chief executive officer Philippe Petitcolin told The Hindu: “Yes we first stated a 15-year period to hand over the design technology, but now we have indicated that the technology can be given as fast as the Indians can assimilate it.”
Note that the article does not indicate commitment to use the “Kaveri II” engine for any particular purpose, or offer a likely timeline. Rather, the emphasis seems to be on continuing to develop India’s industrial capabilities, rather than fielding an operational engine. StrategyPage places the cost of that collaboration at $200 million, but this must be an estimate, as no firm deal has been negotiated. See also Sri Lanka Guardian. See also Aug 20/08 entry.
Dec 14/09: Kaveri. In a written Parliamentary reply, Defence Minister Shri AK Antony responds to Shri Gajanan D Babar:
“The proposal on the Kaveri-Snecma engine joint venture for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas is under consideration of the Government. Request for Proposal (RFP) for procuring 99 engines have been sent to two short-listed engine manufacturers, namely GE F414 from General Electric Aviation, USA and EJ200 from Eurojet Germany. The engine houses have responded to the RFP. Both Commercial and technical responses have been received for procurement of 99 engines along with Transfer of Technology.”
Dec 7/09: A Parliamentary response from defense minister Antony offers details regarding the initial Tejas Mk.1 contract:
“A contract for procurement of 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) configuration, along with associated role equipment, reserve engines, engine support package, engine test bed and computer based training (CBT) package from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) was signed in March 2006. The total contract cost is Rs. 2701.70 crores.” [currently about $580 million]
Dec 4/09: Radar – AESA? DRDO’s Bangalore-based Electronics & Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) reportedly invites global bids to become the development partner for a Tejas active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. This would presumably replace the IAI Elta EL/M-2032 derivative that will requip Tejas Mk.1 fighters.
The Active Array Antenna Unit (AAAU) would be supplied by the development partner. Responsibilities would include “detailed design, development and realisation” of the antenna panel (main antenna, guard antenna and sidelobe cancellation antenna), transmit/receive modules/groups, the RF distribution network (RF manifold/combiners and RF interface), antenna/beam control chain (T/R control and T/R group control), and array calibration/BITE among other areas. Livefist.
Nov 26/09: Testing. Tejas PV-5, a 2-seat trainer version, makes its maiden flight. The Deccan Herald says that commonalities between the 2-seat trainer and Tejas naval version will help that sub-program as well, but it will take hundreds of flights over a year or more before the trainer version can be qualified for use by IAF, as a key step in pilot training and induction of the single-seat fighter into IAF operational service.
Sept 28/09: US red tape. India’s Business Standard reports that Lockheed Martin was selected in June 2009 as a consultant for developing the Naval version of the Tejas. Lockheed Martin has no serving carrier-borne fighters, but they’re developing the F-35B STOVL and F-35C Lightning II for use from carriers.
Unfortunately, delays in US government approval has led DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Agency to recommend that another consultant be chosen instead; Dassault (Rafale) and EADS (no carrier-borne aircraft) were recommended as alternatives,and EADS was eventually picked. Lockheed Martin is still fighting to get through the red tape and salvage the contract, and may continue trying until V K Saraswat, India’s Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, makes a decision.
This has happened before, and recently. Boeing was the front-runner for a similar role with respect to the main (IAF) version, and would be a logical consultant for any naval version – but the Indian MoD awarded EADS that contract in early 2009, after the US government failed to grant Boeing a Technical Assistance Agreement clearance in time.
Sept 21/09: Naval LCA. India’s Business Standard reports that the Tejas Mk.II is attracting funding from India’s Navy, who believes that a modified, EJ-200/F414 equipped Tejas would have the power required to operate from its future aircraft carriers in STOBAR (Short TakeOff But Assisted Recovery) mode:
“Business Standard has learnt that the navy has okayed the placement of an order for six Naval LCAs. At an approximate cost of Rs 150 crore per aircraft, that will provide a Rs 900 crore infusion into the Naval LCA programme.”
At today’s rates, Rs 900 crore = $187.8 million. Naval LCA fighters would operate from India’s 30,000t-35000t Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC), which is being built at Cochin Shipyard with assistance from Italy’s Fincantieri, and is expected to join the fleet by 2014. That creates a potential timing issue, as the Tejas Mk.II’s engine selection and ordering process isn’t supposed to produce new engines before 2013-14. Aeronautical Development Agency director P S Subramaniam told Business Standard that they would fly the modified Naval Tejas airframe with the current GE-404 engine, to test its flight characteristics and structural strength. The new INS Hansa in Goa, with its land-based carrier deck outline and equipment, will be extremely helpful in that regard. If those tests go well, a naval Tejas variant would not operate from a carrier until the new engines were delivered and installed. See also: India Defence
India: 6 Naval LCA.
Aug 4/09: Engine II. Flight International reports that the Eurojet consortium has done tests regarding the EJ200’s fit into the Tejas’ space, and believes itself to be in a strong position for the expected 99-engine order to equip the Tejas Mk.II. The RFP response date is Oct 12/09.
Aug 3/09: Kaveri. India’s DRDO is attempting to resurrect the Kaveri engine project, but the IAF’s lack of enthusiasm is pointed. MoD release:
“Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has offered to co-develop and co-produce 90 kN thrust class of upgraded Kaveri engine with M/s Snecma, France to meet the operational requirement of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas with 48 months from the date of project inception… The proposal for co-development was considered by Indian Air Force. Indian Air Force has suggested a proven engine that is already in production and flight worthy for meeting immediate requirement. Request for Proposal (RFP) has been issued to reputed engine manufacturers.”
A separate MoD release gives December 2012 as the target date for the LCA Tejas Mk.I’s “final Operational Clearance,” adding that project oversight currently involves a high level review by the Chief of Air Staff once per quarter, and by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff once per month.
March 4/09: Testing. India Defense reports that a multi-agency team is carrying out 2-weeks of Phase 2 weapon testing for the LCA Tejas. The focus is on safe separation, aerodynamic interference data, and complex weapon release algorithms in different modes of release. Note that the tests still involve aerodynamics, rather than full weapons system integration.
Feb 25/09: Government of India:
“A contract for 20 indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) has been signed. One IAF squadron is expected to be equipped with this aircraft in 2010-11. Government is not planning to set up a hi-tech facility at Nagpur costing about Rs. 300 crores [3 billion rupees, or about $60 million] for indigenizing components of these aircrafts. Product support including spare parts will be supplied by the vendor as per the terms of the contract that will be concluded.”
Feb 17/09: Engine II. Flight International reports that the Eurojet engine consortium may be about to change the competitive field for the expected RFP to equip LCA Tejas MkII aircraft. The firm has been working on a thrust-vectoring model of its engine, and the magazine reports that it will be offered to meet India’s expected RFP for up to 150 engines.
The Eurofighter is also an MMRCA medium fighter competitor, and twin wins for Eurojet could offer India important commonality benefits, even as they justified an in-country production line. Thrust vectoring would also offer the Tejas a level of maneuverability and performance that could be a difference-maker in combat, and on the international market. The Eurofighter is considered a long shot to win the MMRCA competition, however, and timelines could become an issue. Flight tests of a thrust vectoring EJ200 engine are not expected to begin for another 2 years.
Feb 6/09: Engine II. The Press Trust of India quotes Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) Director P Subrahmanyam, who says that India’s state-run DRDO is still looking for partners to develop the indigenous Kaveri engine. That hasn’t stopped the Ministry of Defence’s ADA from preparing a competition to equip the LCA Mark II version from 2014 onward, after the initial aircraft are fielded with F404-IN-20 engines:
“We are looking to procure either the GE-414 from US or European consortium Eurojet’s EJ 200 to fly with the LCA Mk II version [after going through offers from various global manufacturers]. Request for Proposals (RFP) is just about to go out and very soon it would be floated.”
Eurojet’s EJ200 equips the Eurofighter Typhoon, while GE’s F414 equips Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet family. All 3 of these fighters are competitors in India’s MMRCA, which aims to buy at least 126 medium multi-role fighters to fill the gap between Tejas LCAs and India’s top-tier SU-30MKIs.
The article appears to indicate that India would be looking to switch production to the new engines, after low-rate initial production equips the first 2 IAF squadrons with 48 aircraft. In practice, required engineering changes and aircraft testing make such an early switch unlikely.
Jan 29/09: AoA issues. Indopia reports that India’s DRDO/ADA and HAL are proposing a $20 million collaboration with EADS to assist with flight trials, and help to increase the fighter’s flight envelope. Performance at high “angles of attack,” in which a fighter’s nose and wings are tilted at steep angles, will reportedly be the focus for EADS efforts.
At any aircraft’s critical angle of attack, the wing is no longer able to support the weight of the aircraft, causing a tail slide that generally worsens the problem and can lead to an aerodynamic stall. Different aircraft have different critical angles of attack, and design changes can lead to an expanded range for safe, sustained flight maneuvers. In some cases, such as India’s Sukhoi 30MKIs with their modern triplane configuration, the design’s flight envelope can become so large that maneuvers like the near 90 degree “Cobra” become safe and routine.
Jan 23/09: Testing. The Tejas LCA completes its 1,000th test flight since the first 18-minute flight by Technology Demonstrator-1 on 04 Jan 4/01. Frontier India | The Hindu | The Times of India.
Flight #1,000
2009 Why Kaveri was a failure, demonstrated; Kaveri for naval ships?
Inverted flypast
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Dec 26/08: Kaveri. The Hindu reports that a committee set up by the IAF in September 2008 has recommended against Snecma’s offer (see Aug 20/08 entry). The report says that the result would not be a co-designed, co-developed engine, but rather a license production arrangement. The group recommends continued development of the Kaveri engine and its core technologies instead, despite the failures to date.
These conclusions are less surprising when one examines the committee’s composition. Air Vice Marshal M. Matheswaran chaired the group, which included representatives from India’s state-run Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification, and IAF officers posted at ADA, the National Flight Test Centre and the Aircraft Systems and Testing Establishment. All are state-run groups that have been involved in the Kaveri’s ongoing development, and have strong incentives to protect that turf.
Dec 13/08: Testing. A Tejas fighter prototype lands at Leh air base in the high-altitude Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir, at an altitude of 10,600 fee. Leh is one of the highest airfields in the world, with a temperature variation ranging from 5 to -20 C/ 41 to -4F. .
That was the whole point, of course: perform cold weather testing, while making an assessment of the aircraft’s performance in high-altitude conditions, without the confounding influence and additional challenge of high temperatures. India Defence
Oct 3/08: Radar. The Hindu newspaper relays news from ADA Programme Director P.S. Subramaniam that the Israeli Elta “EL/M-2052” radar has already undergone tests on the flight test bed and ground rig in Israel, and “airworthy units” are expected to arrive early next week.
There had been some unconfirmed mentions of EL/M-2052s in connection with the Tejas, and it’s possible that ADA is beginning tests related to the Mk.II. It’s more likely that the radars are IAI Eltas M-2032, instead of Elta’s AESA option. The Elta M-2032 multi-mode radar already serves on India’s Sea Harriers and some Jaguars, and was picked as an “interim option” until India’s indigenous radar program performs to the required standard. Because the indigenous radar has failed to perform to standard, the ADA has reportedly been running weaponization tests on the Tejas using a weapon delivery pod, and has been forced to keep critical tests on hold. Past experience suggests that the Tejas’ radar will remain an import.
Aug 20/08: Kaveri & Snecma. The Wall Street Journal’s partner LiveMint.com has an article that more or less sums up the Kaveri project in a nutshell, and also the DRDO: “In aircraft engine development, you cannot set a timeline.” The article interviews T. Mohana Rao, director of India’s state-run Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE). Rao explains why the Kaveri engine is effectively dead as a fighter aircraft engine, leaving GE’s popular F404-GE-IN20 variant to power the Tejas for at least the next 4 years.
Rao quotes the Kaveri’s performance at 11,000 lbs./ 5,000 kg dry thrust at sea level, and 16,500 lbs./ 7,500 kg thrust on afterburners. That’s about 1,000 lbs./ 400 kg short of specifications. The engine is also overweight by 330 lbs./ 150 kg, and has yet to perform long-endurance tests to assess its durability.
The GTRE cannot promise any date for successful delivery, and so political approval was granted to form a partnership with a foreign engine firm on a risk-sharing basis. Russia’s NPO Saturn and France’s Snecma responded, while GE, Rolls-Royce, and Pratt and Whitney declined. After almost 2 1/2 years, the GTRE chose France’s Snecma, but there’s no contract yet. industrial issues need to be settled, and the government requires consultation with the Indian Air Force before any contract and requirements are signed.
Snecma’s proposal involves an engine core (compressor, combustor and high-pressure turbine) called Eco. Snecma would have a workshare of 45%, and GTRE’s would be 55%, with nearly 85% of the manufacturing within India. Snecma says the aircraft could be certified for fitting in the Tejas within 4 years. Assuming that project remains on time, of course. The policy question is whether this outcome was predictable from the outset. As the Live Mint article notes:
“Nearly 20 years after it promised an indigenous engine to power India’s light combat aircraft Tejas, the… country’s sole aero engine design house, is now seeking outside help…”
Aug 13/08: Kaveri KMGT. The DRDO’s GTRE in Bangalore believes it may have found a use for the Kaveri engine, in naval vessels. Using the core of the Kaveri engine, plus a low-pressure compressor and turbine, the engine would become a gas-fired 12 MW propulsion unit in warships up the he Rajput Class, or find uses as on-shore electricity generators. A Kaveri Marine Gas Turbine (KMGT) has been transported to naval dock yard at Vishakapatnam, and installed on to the marine gas turbine test bed there. Yahoo! India | RF Design.
The Rajput Class “destroyers” are modified Russian Kashin-II Class ships, though their top weight of just under 5,000 tons would mark them as large frigates in many navies.
Aug 3/08: Kaveri – And Replacements? The Wall Street Journal’s partner LiveMint.com reports that France’s Snecma will partner with India’s DRDO to develop a new engine, sidelining the Kaveri project.
“GTRE has spent nearly Rs1,900 crore of the Rs2,800 crore that was sanctioned since an engine project Kaveri, named after the river in southern India, began in 1989… Vincent Chappard, a Snecma spokesman in France, said he could not immediately confirm the development.”
While the IAF waits for Snecma’s efforts, reports also suggest that the DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Agency has invited both General Electric and Eurojet Turbo GmbH, a European engine consortium, to bid for higher-powered interim engines. GE offers the F414, and the Eurojet 2000 already has higher thrust, but the engines will have to fit the Tejas’ design – or vice-versa. These engines would be slated for Tejas aircraft produced beyond the initial 48 plane order, but before any indigenous engine is certified. WSJ partner Live Mint | domain-b
March 4/08: Radar. There are reports that Europe’s EADS has offered to co-develop an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar with India, for installation on board the Tejas fighters. Work is currently underway on an AESA radar to equip EADS’ Eurofighter, which is a long shot in India’s 126-190 aircraft MMRCA fighter competition.
The nature of AESA radars makes it possible to scale them up or down while retaining high commonality with larger versions, the main difference being changes to radar power and hence overall performance. Northrop Grumman whose AN/APG-77 AESA radar equips America’s F-22, recently introduced its AESA Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) at Singapore’s February 2007 air show. It’s designed to equip existing F-16 fighters with no modifications required, and is advertised as being scalable to other platforms.
A win for EADS in this area offers to solve a problem for India, while creating a commonality hook for the Eurofighter – or at worst, a supplier diversification option for India that adds external funding to help EADS catch up in this key technology area.
March 3/08: Indian Defence Minister Shri A K Antony responds to a Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) question by saying that the Tejas flight test program is:
“…progressing as per the schedule. So far, 829 flight tests have been completed. Efforts are being made to accelerate the flight tests… Presently, no need is felt for strategic partner. To complete the project at the earliest, a top level review is being conducted by the Chief of Air Staff once in every quarter and review by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff once in every month. So far, Rs. 4806.312 cr [DID: 48.063 billion rupees, or about $1.19 billion at current conversion] have been spent on development of various versions of Light Combat Aircraft.”
2006 – 20081st 20 production Tejas ordered; IAI to substitute for MMR radar failure; F404 engines ordered; AA-11 fired; Naval Tejas contemplated.
AA-11/R-73 Archer
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Oct 25/07: Testing. The Tejas fires a missile for the first time: Vympel’s short-range, IR guided AA-11/R-73 Archer air-to-air missile. Test aircraft PV-1 fired the missile at 7 km altitude and 0.6 Mach within the naval air range off the coast of Goa, marking the beginning of weaponization as a prelude to initial operational clearance (IOC) phase of the Tejas program.
The main objectives of test firing were to validate safe separation of the missile, the effect of missile plume on the engine’s air-intake and on composite structures, the workings of the stores-management displays and software, and quality assessment. India DoD release | Times of India.
While the beginning of weaponization is a significant event, the state of the fighter’s indigenous radar development means that the critical weaponization event for the Tejas LCA will be its first successful test-firing of a radar-guided missile.
Aug 13/07: Radar – IAI. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony states the obvious in a written reply to Shri Sugrib Singh and others in Lok Sabha, but adds new information concerning foreign cooperation:
“There has been a time and cost overrun in the said project. The project to develop two MMR systems for ground testing was sanctioned at a cost of Rs.62.27 crore. This activity was completed in 2004 at a cost of Rs.105 crore.
Yes, but see poor testing results in the April 8/06 and May 1/06 entries, below. He does not mention them, but effectively concedes the point by adding that:
A co-development activity of MMR has been initiated for Limited Series Production and Series Production with M/s ELTA Systems Ltd, Israel, which has experience in developing similar types of radars. To expedite the project, close monitoring of activity at the highest level of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) management has been put in place.”
See also India Defence follow-on | Flight International.
IAI Elta radar agreement
April 26/07: Testing. The 1st of the Limited Series Production Tejas jets (LSP-1), makes its successful maiden flight at HAL airport in Bangalore, reaching an altitude of 11 km/ 6.6 miles and a speed of Mach 1.1 during the 47 minute flight.
According to the Indian government release, LSP-1 marks the beginning of series production of Tejas for induction into the Air Force.
1st production flight
March 1/07: India’s Defence Minister Shri AK Antony offers an update re: the Tejas LCA:
“Five Tejas are currently being flight tested for Initial Operational Clearance by the Indian Air Force pilots posted at National Test Centre of Aeronautical Development Agency, Ministry of Defence. So far 629 flights accumulating 334 hours have been completed. Twenty aircraft have been ordered by the Indian Air Force as the first lot.”
Feb 7/07: F404. HAL ordered an additional 24 F404-GE-IN20 afterburning engines in a $100+ million contract, in order to power the first operational squadron of Tejas fighters for the Indian Air Force.
This buy follows a 2004 purchase of 17 F404-GE-IN20 engines, in order to power a limited series of operational production aircraft and naval prototypes.
F404 engine order #2
Jan 25/07: India tries to throw a large monkey wrench into Pakistan’s rival JF-17 project. They almost succeed.
Nov 22/06: Reuters India: “Pakistan set to get eight JF-17 fighter jets next year.” Anxieties are becoming more acute as Pakistan readies its JF-17 fighter developed in conjunction with China and Russia, and prepares to induct them into service in 2007-2008. The JF-17 is a sub-$20 million fighter designed to replace F-7P (MiG-21+) and Mirage 3/5 aircraft in Pakistan’s fleet, and is a comparable peer for the LCA Tejas.
Sept 19/06: India set to induct 28 LCA Tejas aircraft by 2007. They would have GE F404 engines rather than the Kaveri, says former project director Dr. Kota Harinarayana. As it turns out, India has 0 inducted aircraft, 5 years after that stated date.
May 2/06: India Defence reports that the Indian Navy may be interested in a Tejas LCA version of its own.
May 1/06: Radar. More bad news for the radar project. The Vijay Times also notes that that the performance of several radar modes being tested still “fell short of expectations,” and may force acquisition of American or Israeli radars (likely APG-68 or Elta’s EL/M-2032) as an interim measure.
April 8/06: Radar. The Sunday Telegraph reports that the Tejas’ radar, which was also set up as an indigenous project after foreign options like the JAS-39 Gripen’s fine PS05 radar were refused, could only perform at the most basic levels, putting tests on hold:
“According to the IAF, which proposes to buy 220 of the planes when they are ready, the radar is now “marooned in uncertainty”… While two basic radar modes have been tested, the other modes have failed, throwing up serious questions about the system’s fundamentals.
In written replies to queries sent by The Indian Express, DRDO chief M Natarajan said: “Because of the complexity of technologies involved (in the radar project) and the extent of testing to be done, help of specialists in the field may be sought to complete the task… When Natarajan was asked why there was uncertainty over the radar so long after development began, he said: “The radar is under development by HAL and not at LRDE (the DRDO’s lab).” This, even when the signal processor built by the DRDO is the very heart of the radar.
Security analyst K Subrahmanyam has earlier called the dogged refusal to entertain foreign help by the DRDO as reflective of the organisation’s bad project management.”
March 2006: Order #1. India signs a contract with HAL for 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in “Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) configuration,” along with associated role equipment, reserve engines, engine support package, engine test bed and computer based training (CBT) package.
The total contract cost is INR 27.017 billion. Source.
India: 20 LCA
February 2006: Kaveri. Jane’s claims that SNECMA won the contract to assist India in developing the Kaveri.
Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (2006) More exportable KaveriThe complexities inherent in designing a new fighter from scratch are formidable, even for a lightweight fighter like the Tejas. As Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd) notes, India’s industry had significant experience deficits going into this project, which have delayed the project significantly, and raised costs. The insistence on pushing the envelope with a new fighter design, a new engine, and a new radar all at once has had consequences. In the long run, those consequences will lead to a smaller IAF, and could be set to create major force gaps if MiG-21 lifespans can’t be extended long enough.
As experts like Richard D. Fisher have noted, Chinese projects tend to quickly hand off significant components to others and confine the kinds of domestic expertise required. The J-10 has been an example, and the massive changes required when Israeli and Western cooperation ended made the project incredibly challenging. Only a Chinese decision to outsource major components like the engines to the Russians kept the project from failing completely.
As the J-10 shows, delays remain possible, even with extensive foreign cooperation. It’s also true that every new jet engine type can expect teething issues when it is first installed. This may explain why even Sweden, with their long history of indigenous fighter development, chose the less risky approach of adopting the proven GE F404 & F414 engines for the JAS-39 Gripen. They made minor modifications as required in conjunction with the manufacturer, then concentrated their design efforts elsewhere.
All the more reason, then, to bring in foreign partners for components like the engine etc., and minimize the complexities faced by India’s indigenous teams in its state-run organizations.
Sainis and Joseph’s examination of the benefits to Indian industry from the LCA program demonstrate that most industrial benefits would have been retained had India taken this route. So, too, would the project’s timelines, which have suffered instead as India’s fighter fleet dwindles.
In India’s case, these added complexities can also spill over onto the export front. If potential Tejas export customers aren’t offered a common, fully tested international engine like the GE F404, with a broad network of support and leverage across multiple aircraft types, risk calculations will get in the way of some sales. When deciding on their buy, potential customers will have to evaluate the Kaveri engine’s prospects for future spares, upgrades and support, available contractors with relevant skills in maintaining them, etc. This tends to make potential buyers more cautious, and is likely to reduce Kaveri’s odds when competing against options like the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, which uses a modified version of the engine that equips many MiG-29s around the world.
As the French have found with the Rafale, lack of exports for a limited production indigenous fighter equals rising maintenance and upgrade burdens that hit right in the home budget, and make it that much harder for the design to keep up with contemporary threats over its lifetime. Which in turn affect export prospects in a vicious circle.
Will India’s decision to proceed with the Kaveri engine offer short-term customization benefits, at the expense of long-term pain? Or can HAL maintain the Tejas airframe design, and field a lightweight fighter that offers its customers a choice of engines?
Appendix B: The Kaveri Saga – Keystone, or Killer? Kaveri prototypeThe GTRE GTX-35VS Kaveri was envisioned as a variable cycle flat-rated engine, in which the thrust drop is compensated by increased turbine entry temperature at the spool. The variable cycle flat-rated engine would be controlled by a Kaveri full authority digital control unit (KADECU/ FADEC). The goal was a powerplant with slightly more thrust than GE’s F404 engines, whose characteristics were uniquely suited to India’s hot and humid environments.
India’s frequent goal of “100% made in India content” has derailed a number of its weapon projects over the last few decades, but foreign decisions also played an important role in the Kaveri project’s genesis. In 1998, India’s nuclear tests prompted the US to place sanctions on military exports, including GE’s F404 turbofans and Lockheed Martin’s assistance in developing the Tejas’ flight control system. In response, India began its program to develop an indigenous engine. As the Rediff’s Feb 5/06 report notes:
“DRDO scientists had kept the development of the Kaveri engine under wraps, exuding confidence that India had developed the technological edge to develop its own aircraft engine, so far confined to handful of developed countries.”
The prospect of ending that dependence is a powerful lure, but some of the reasons for that small club are technical. Modern jet engines are far more complex than even Vietnam-era engines like the GE J79 that equipped the F-4 Phantom. Producing a working, reliable engine that can operate at these high pressures and thrust ratings isn’t easy, and weaking and troubleshooting a new and unproven jet engine always involves a great deal of work and expense. The Kaveri engine’s climate performance targets added even more challenges to an already-full plate. That proved difficult for the program when the program’s entire context changed.
Eventually, the USA lifted its weapons export restrictions on India. In contrast, the natural barriers to developing an advanced engine from scratch, in a country with no past experience doing so, to technical specifications more challenging than current market mainstays, were not lifted so easily. The complexities inherent in this challenge belied DRDO’s apparent confidence, forcing India to bring in turbine experts from Snecma in France and from US firms like Pratt and Whitney.
In the end, the Indian DRDO was finally forced to look for a foreign technology partner, and issue an RFP. Even then, acceptance of program realities was slow in coming. In the initial stages, DRDO secretary M Natarajan referred to it as an effort to “add value and look for a partner to stand guarantee,” and stated that any partners would have to work to India’s terms. A committee in which IAF experts would be included would evaluate the bids to decide on:
“…how much to take and from whom… But Kaveri is and would remain an Indian project… We have gone this way to shorten time for making the engine airborne, as we don’t wont to delay the LCA induction schedule.”
GE F404Those goals did not prove to be compatible.
US engine manufacturer General Electric, who supplies the F404 jet engines that power initial Tejas models, seemed unenthralled with those proposed terms. They declined to respond to the RFP for foreign assistance. Eventually, India’s state agencies were forced to concede that they could not develop an engine with the required specifications, and that seeking foreign help to improve the basic design was also unlikely to produce a design that met the required specifications.
With no engine in production as late-stage aircraft testing began, and none forthcoming in the forseeable future, India’s drive to develop an indigenous “Kaveri” jet engine had become a key roadblock for the Tejas program in India – and very possibly, beyond India as well.
In contrast to the Kaveri, F404 family engines are already proven in a number of aircraft around the world including Saab’s 4th generation JAS-39 Gripen lightweight fighter, the F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter, models A-D of the F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft in service around the world, South Korea’s T/A-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer & light attack aircraft, and Singapore’s soon to be retired A-4SU Super Skyhawk attack jets. Kaveris equipped with F404/F414 engines would present a lower risk profile to potential export customers, due to the engines’ long-proven performance, GE’s global support network, and the number on engines in operation around the world.
Kaveri would offer none of these important benefits, in exchange for one offsetting feature: foreign sales would not require US military export approval for the engines.
India has not been a major weapons exporter, so export realities didn’t carry a lot of weight. On the other hand, the technical and timeline difficulties experienced by the main Tejas program created a potential natiional defense crisis that could not be ignored. By August 2008, the Kaveri program had effectively been sidelined, in order to get the Tejas into service within an acceptable time frame and preserve India’s operational fighter strength. While political changes may resurrect the Kaveri program as a political exercise, the Tejas program’s technical procurement path has been moving in the other direction.
This kind of vague drift away from an indigenous option is common in India’s procurement history. It usually ends with off-the-shelf “interim” buys becoming permanent; and an indigenous program that’s either shelved, or bought in very low numbers alongside a much larger foreign purchase of similar equipment.
GE’s F404-IN20 will be the Tejas’ initial powerplant, to be followed by the F414-GE-INS6, which beat the Eurojet EJ200 as the Tejas Mk.II’s planned engine.
Even so, DRDO continued to fund and back its long-delayed project. By January 2013, they had abandoned negotiations with France’s Snecma to create a Kaveri 2.0 version using key Snecma engine technologies, and resolved to try yet another global tender. A Kaveri without an afterburner would power a notional UCAV strike drone, and DRDO specified a pair of Kaveri engines for a proposed “Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft” project.
These pursuits would have kept the Kaveri development project consuming defense funds for another decade. In May 2014, however, Narendra Modi’s BJP Party scored a crushing landslide victory, and vowed to shake up the way government was run. DRDO felt the change, shifted their prioritization methods, and decided in November 2014 that the Kaveri program should be abandoned entirely.
\Additional Readings & Sources Background: LCA TejasThe MQ-1 Predator UAV has become a stable of the Global War on Terror; the program is finishing up a major 5-year fleet expansion. Its successor, the larger MQ-9 Reaper UAV/UCAV (aka. ‘Predator B’), is designed to carry more ordnance while loitering over its coverage area for long periods.
Amidst all the gee-whiz, it’s worth recalling that these systems need the same things any other craft needs: maintenance, spares beyond initial buys, back-end and even in-field support, support for associated systems like sensors, etc. Hence a number of recent contracts, one of which may be related to the recently-publicized ability of Iraqi terrorists to intercept Predator signals…
Note that DID’s coverage includes contractor support of integral sub-systems like the UAVs’ surveillance and targeting turrets, but not the purchase of new drones or sub-systems. Unless otherwise indicated, all contracts are issued by the Headquarters Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.
Contracts & EventsDecember 22/15: General Atomics will conduct logistical support for Predator (MQ-1) and Reaper (MQ-9) unmanned aerial systems for the US Air Force. The one year contract is worth $338.2 million. Work to be carried out includes program management, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, contractor field service representative support, inventory control point management, flight operations support, depot repair, and depot field maintenance. The MQ-1s and MQ-9s will also see sensors contractor logistics support provided by Raytheon for the year in a contract worth $49.4 million.
September 24/15: General Atomics – manufacturer of Predator and Reaper UAVs – will open a training facility for international customers of its unmanned aircraft, according to a company press release. The new ‘RPA Training Academy’ facility on Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota will ultimately aim to train up to 60 flight crews a year, using a US government-approved training scheme.
Dec 31/09: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in Poway, CA received a $266.1 million contract for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contract engineering technical specialists, contractor inventory control point and spares management, depot repair, flight, operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, and CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection entry for the Predator/Reaper MQ-1 and MQ-9 unmanned aircraft system (UAS) program. At this time, $53.2 million has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028).
Dec 31/09: Raytheon Co in McKinney, TX received a $38.1 million contract to provide for CY 2010 contractor logistics support of the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper’s multi-spectral targeting system turrets. At this time, $12.6 million has been committed by the 703rd AESG/SYK at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH (FA8620-06-G-4041).
Sept 30/09: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. of Poway, CA received a $46 million contract for Linux operating systems, technical orders, improved display, and spares for the Predator/Reaper. At this time, the entire amount has been committed by the 703 AESG/SYK at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH (FA8620-05-GD-3028).
May 18/09: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems of Poway, CA receives a $9.8 million firm fixed price contract for Predator receiver terminals, installation, and software updates. At this time, the entire amount has been committed by the 703rd AESG/SYK at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH (FA8620-05-G-3028).
Subsequent media reports in December 2009 would reveal that standard-issue Predator UAVs were vulnerable to interception of their surveillance footage, using an inexpensive satellite receiver and low-cost SkyGrabber software. Some reports added that retrofits have been underway to fix this, beginning with deployed UAVs. See Wall St. Journal | Ars Technica | cnet | Defense Tech | John Robb’s Global Guerrillas | Flight International.
March 3/09: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems of San Diego, CA received a $168.4 million firm-fixed-price contract for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor inventory control point and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, data collection/entry and numbered periodic depot maintenance for the Predator MQ-1 and MQ-9 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program. At this time, the entire amount has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028).
Dec 30/08: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA received a $42.6 million contract for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor engineering technical specialists, contractor inventory control point and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, and CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection/entry for the Predator/ Reaper MQ-1 and MQ-9 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program. At this time, $42.6 million has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028 Delivery Order 0048).
Dec 29/08: Raytheon Co. in McKinney, TX receives $27.3 million to provide CY 2009 Contractor Logistics Support for the MQ-1 and MQ-9’s Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems. At this time, $4.1 million has been committed under this cost plus fixed fee contract by the 703rd Aeronautical Systems Group at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8620-06-G-4041, #009).
Oct 30/08: General Atomics in San Diego, Calif., received a cost plus fee term contract for $177.1 million for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor engineering technical services, contractor engineering technical specialists (formerly field support representatives), contractor inventory control point (formerly depot supply support) and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, CAMs/REMIS/CEMS data collection/entry and numbered Periodic Depot Maintenance (PDM) for the Predator/ Reaper MQ-1 and MQ-9 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) programs. At this time $163.1 million has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028 Delivery Order 003502).
MQ-1 PredatorJune 27/08: Raytheon Co. in McKinney, TX received a firm-fixed-price $11.4 million contract to provide Multi-Sensor System (Predator MTS-A and the Reaper’s Multi-Sensor System-B) support at American and overseas locations. It includes depot OEM(Original Equipment Manufacturer) spares and repairs, depot configuration management, technical manual OEM system source data and software maintenance, depot level contractor Field Services Representative (FSR) support and other functions. At this time $10 million has been committed by the 658th Aeronautical Systems Squadron at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8620-06-G-4041, DO 0007).
Dec 21/07: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA received a contract for $67 million for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor engineering technical specialists (formerly field support representatives), contractor inventory control point (formerly depot supply support) and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection/entry and numbered Periodic Depot Maintenance for the Predator/ Reaper MQ-1 and MQ-9 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) program. At this time $50.3 million has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028 Delivery order 0035).
MQ-9, armedJune 22/07: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in Poway, CA received a $69.4 million contract modification for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contract engineering technical specialists, contractor inventory control point and spares management, depot repair, flight, operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, and CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection entry for the Predator/Reaper MQ-1 and MQ-9 unmanned aircraft system (UAS) program. At this time, $53.2 million has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028 Delivery Order 001503)
Dec 29/06: General Atomics in San Diego, CA received a $42.7 million cost-plus fixed-fee term contract. This contract delivery order includes all program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor engineering technical specialists (formerly field support representatives), contractor inventory control point (formerly depot supply support) and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection/entry and numbered Periodic Depot Maintenance (PDM) for the Predator MQ-1 and MQ-9 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program.
Work will be complete December 2007. At this time $38,099,885 has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028 Delivery Order 0015).
Dec 29/06: Raytheon Company in McKinney, TX received an $11.5 million cost-plus fixed-fee contract for Contractor Logistics Support of the Predator A and B Multi-spectral Targeting Systems (MTS). This contract includes program management, repairs and services, depot configuration management, technical manual system source data and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor field service representatives support, contractor inventory control point and spares management, depot-level repair, design and engineering reliability/maintenance enhancement, Core Automated Maintenance System/Reliability and Maintainability Information System/Maintenance Management Information System data collection/entry, and obsolescence management.
Work will be complete in December 2007. To date, $8.7 million has been obligated (FA8620-06-G-4041, #0003).
UAV TCS ground control trailerMarch 15/06: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. in San Diego, CA received a $30.1 million cost-plus fixed-fee contract modification. This action will provide services necessary to perform Predator organizational maintenance of aircraft, Ground Control Stations, and Predator Primary Satellite Links. This work will be complete March 2007. The Air Combat Command Contracting Squadron at Langley Air Force Base, VA issued the contract (FA4890-05-C-0001/P00016).
March 13/06: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. in San Diego, CA received a $27.1 million cost-plus fixed-fee contract to provide total support to the for the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Predator B unmanned aircraft system programs. Specifically, this contract includes all program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, contractor inventory control point (formerly depot supply support) and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, engineering technical specialists (formerly field support representatives), reliability/ maintenance enhancements, CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection/entry, and numbered periodic depot maintenance.
Solicitations began September 2005, negotiations were complete March 2006, and work will be complete December 2006 (FA8620-05-G-3028, delivery order #0011).
Feb 10/05: General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA received an $8.3 million cost-plus fixed-fee contract to provide services necessary to perform Predator Organizational Maintenance for: aircraft, Ground Control Stations, and Predator Primary Satellite Links. The contractors also shall be responsible for Launch and Recovery Elements including contract aircrew for forward deployed operations. The contractor will be responsible for program management and providing support, following the basic requirements of AFI 21-101.
The principal place of performance is Indian Springs Air Force Auziliary Field, NV as well as various worldwide locations. Other key locations of performance are General Atomics-Aeronautical San Diego, CA, and the Indian Springs Auxiallary Airfield, NV. Total funds have been obligated. Solicitation began June 2004, negotiations were completed January 2005, and work will be complete by March 2006. The Air Combat Command Contracting Squadron at Langley Air Force Base, VA issued the contract (FA4890-05-C-0001).
SM-3 Standard missiles have been the backbone of the US Navy’s ballistic missile defense plans for many years now, and are beginning to see service in the navies of allies like Japan. Their test successes and long range against aerial threats have spawned a land-based version, which end up being even more important to the USA’s allies.
In July 2008 the US Missile Defense Agency began considering a land-based variant of the SM-3, largely due to specific requests from Israel. Israel currently fields the medium range Arrow-2 land-based ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) system, and eventually elected to pursue the Arrow-3 instead of SM-3s. Once the prospect had been raised, however, the US government decided that basing SM-3 missiles on land was a really good idea. The European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense is being built around this concept, and other regions could see similar deployments.
The European Phased Adaptive Approach aims to use a combination of naval and land-based missile defense systems, which hope to share a common architecture and missile set. The core physical component is a “deckhouse” enclosure, containing the command and control center and a BMD-enhanced SPY-1(D) radar that’s similar to those aboard US Navy destroyers and cruisers. The software will be taken from the Aegis combat system on US Navy ships, beginning with version 5.0.1 and upgrading over time. A connected vertical launching system building will contain 24 SM-3 missiles, which will become more advanced as newer variants are fielded.
The USA is building 3 Aegis Ashore sites: one test site in Barking Sands, Hawaii, USA, and sites in Deveselu Air Base, Romania and Redzikowo, Poland. The GAO estimates that building these sites and bringing them to operational status will cost the USA about $2.3 billion. Our own tracking includes R&D into land-based SM-3 options, and tracks obviously related categories in MDA’s shifting budget lines.
The European Phased Adaptive ApproachThe European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) currently envisions 4 phases:
EPAA Phase 1, 2011-2015In 2011, the US Navy expected to have naval SM-3 Block 1A missiles and ships fully in place, on more BMD-capable ships than the 2 Atlantic Fleet destroyers available in 2009, to pair with land-based AN/TPY-2 radars that are also used in the THAAD system. Another 4 destroyers are being forward-deployed to Rota, Spain in FY 2014-2015. Unfortunately, naval SM-3 Block 1 missiles cannot cover the Czech Republic at all, and can offer only limited coverage for Poland.
The Obama administration bowed to Russian pressure and picked the THAAD system’s AN/TPY-2 radar as the system’s ground accompaniment, to limit the distance they could see into Russian airspace. The Russians simply saw weakness, and kept up the pressure, but couldn’t make any more headway. Turkey agreed to host the AN/TPY-2 radar near Diyarbakir in SE Turkey, though they added conditions that the data must not be shared with Israel.
This will be the only EPAA option until 2015, which is beyond the Obama administration’s current term of office. During that interim period, THAAD continues to receive upgrades. At sea, AEGIS BMD system 4.x is being rolled out beyond USS Lake Erie [CG 70], offering some capability improvements on board ship, and laying an open architecture foundation for future upgrades.
In parallel, NATO has fielded an initial version Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) command and control architecture. They declared an “interim” BMD capability in May 2012, after a successful multinational test.
ALTBMD will also have European components to draw upon, including the national early-warning system under development by France. In August 2012, Poland announced that it was pursuing its own national BMD system, which may mirror many of France’s components. France (11 systems) and Italy (6 systems) can also contribute with their land-based SAMP/T Mamba and its Aster-30 missile, which is designed to address threats in the SRBM (<1,000 km) class.
On the naval front, the Netherlands is upgrading its 4 top-tier air defense frigates with ballistic missile tracking capability, and its ships are compatible with SM-3 missiles if they decide to purchase some. Elsewhere, Aster-30s are already found on advanced air defense destroyers: the Franco-Italian Horizon Class, and Britain's Type 45 Daring Class. The naval system hasn't been tested against ballistic missiles yet, but the systems could all be upgraded to do so.
EPAA Phase 2, 2015-2018
In Parallel:
SAMP/T launch
(click to view full)
If progress continues per plan, 2015 would see advances on 2 fronts.
One front involves improved SM-3 Block 1B missiles, which will expand the range of coverage for American ships. Serious orders for the Block 1B missile began in 2011, but technical issues have delayed full production. That delay means that US Navy ships based in Europe will be competing with other priorities in Asia and around the USA, as they seek to host the new missiles. A slower phase-in that extends to 2018 now looks most likely.
The other element was to be a land-based “Aegis Ashore” site at Deveselu Air Base, Romania, hosting SM-3 missiles instead of Boeing’s longer-range, fixed-location GMD system. Aegis Ashore designs appear to have shifted from an easily-deployable configuration, toward high-investment fixed sites that are similar to the GMD program they replaced. The Romanian deployment would use SM-3 Block 1B missiles from an emplaced Mk.41 VLS launcher, and be controlled by a SPY-1D radar and AEGIS BMD 5.0.1 combat system. An interim setup was formally commissioned in October 2014.
If successfully deployed, this is a defense against short and medium range missiles (SRBMs & MRBMs), with some capability against intermediate range missiles in the 1,850-3,500 mile class (IRBMs). On the other hand, the location of these defenses still leaves central Europe mostly unprotected.
During Phase 2, NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) command and control network will be operational at an initial level. France, Italy, and possibly Poland will have armed land-based BMD systems of their own deployed, and it’s likely that ALTBMD compatible BMD-capable ships will be fielded. The Netherlands is already preparing its vessels for missile tracking and SM-3 hosting, and the Aster-30/ PAAMS combination is fielded on British, French, and Italian ships.
EPAA Phase 3, 2018- SM-3: EPAA phasesAround 2018, America expects to deploy the longer-range, 21″ diameter SM-3 Block II missile, on ships and (if deployments have been accepted) on shore. The US MDA would add Redzikowo, Poland to its list of land-based sites, defending Northern Europe with SM-3 Block 1B & Block IIA missiles, controlled by an AEGIS BMD 5.1 combat system.
This system would be intended to kill SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM threats, with some capabilities against full intercontinental range missiles (ICBMs). Gen. Cartwright has stated that just 3 SM-3 Block II locations would be able to cover all of Europe, but that missile is an earlier-stage R&D effort, with all the expected implications for dates and certainty of capabilities.
EPAA Phase 4, 2020+Effectively cancelled.
The USA was going deploy a new Next-Generation Aegis Missile (SM-3 Block IIB) design, to improve performance and begin to field a credible anti-ICBM capability. Technical issues became a serious problem, once experts concluded that the initial sites picked for EPAA aren’t all that helpful for defending the USA. A liquid-fuel booster could be used to boost interceptor speeds, but that isn’t safe to use on ships. Even though the best place to defend the USA against an ICBM launched from Iran is from the middle of the North Sea. Now throw in a planned development schedule defined by a wild-guess political promise, rather than solid information. The whole thing was a mess, and in March 2013, it was “restructured” into into an R&D program by the Pentagon.
Aegis Ashore AN/TPY-2Making these things happen requires a number of additional steps. AN/TPY-2 radars will provide initial services during Phase 1, and will continue to play a supplemental role thereafter in both EPAA and NATO’s ALTBMD.
Beyond Phase 1, the USA has shifted to a larger and more permanent basing structure, which removes some of the benefits of switching away from GMD. The US Missile Defense Agency is building an “Aegis Ashore” test complex near Moorestown, NJ, and another at its missile defense testing center at Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. The Hawaiian complex is hosting a land-based Mark 41 launcher, a 4-story building with a SPY-1 radar, and three 125-foot tall test towers.
Poland is being considered for Aegis Ashore deployment in 2018, but the country is beginning to diversify its options. The September 2011 agreement with the USA is still in force, but Poland is determined to have its own missile defense infrastructure, and may choose to place their bets on a parallel NATO/ European system. Their other option would likely involve American PATRIOT and/or THAAD systems.
Beyond EuropeAegis Ashore may spread beyond Europe. In the Pacific, Japan is already deploying SM-3s at sea, and may find land-based counterparts useful. Its neighbor South Korea shares Japan’s worries about North Korea’s evil and semi-stable regime; the ROK intends to load shorter range SM-6 missiles on its AEGIS destroyers, is buying and deploying Patriot PAC-2 GEM+ missiles, and has contracted with Israel for “Green Pine” air and missile defense radars. Its cruiser-size KDX-III AEGIS destroyers could be modified for a ballistic missile defense role, but land-based SM-3s linked to air and naval systems offer an option that doesn’t require naval upgrades.
The other country that has been linked to land-based SM-3s had a more complicated set of choices, and possible rationales. See Appendix A’s coverage of Israeli deliberations, which ended with a decision to deploy their own Arrow technology instead.
The Missiles SM-3 seeker: target!With a maximum range of about 300 miles/ 500 km, the Standard Missile 3 Block I (SM-3) has just 1/5th to 1/6th the reported reach of GMD’s Ground Based Interceptors, but a longer reach than current mobile land options like THAAD. SM-3 has 4 stages. The booster motor and initial stage launch the missile, and take it out of the atmosphere. Once it goes “exo-atmospheric,” the 3rd stage is used to boost the missile higher, and also corrects its course by referencing GPS/ INS locations. The final stage is the LEAP kill vehicle, which uses infrared sensors to pick out the target, then guides itself in to ram it. That target is expected to be an enemy ballistic missile, but America’s shoot-down of its own ailing satellite in 2008 showed that the same technology can be used against any low earth orbit object.
The introduction of Raytheon’s SM-3 Block II variant will widen the missile’s diameter from 13.5″ to 21″, greatly extending its range and speed. That means better performance against longer range missiles that move faster, and offer different trajectories. Block II weapons will add the ability to handle longer-range, higher-flying IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, usually 3,000-5,000 km range), and even offer some hope against global-strike threats like ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) warheads. SM-3 Block IIA is currently expected to debut around 2015, but testing and other requirements mean it won’t be part of EPAA until 2018 or later.
Contracts & Key Events Europe scenarioBecause of the intertwined nature of the EPAA system, many contracts will be covered elsewhere. The AN/TPY-2 radar has its own article, as does the THAAD theater air defense system the TPY-2s were originally developed for. Standard Missile family contracts also have their own FOCUS article, as does the ubiquitous Mk.41 vertical launching system that will be part of the Aegis Ashore complex.
Unless a contract of these types specifically notes dedicated assets for EPAA/Aegis Ashore, or is directly germane to key program technologies, they will not be covered here.
FY 2015 – 2016NSF Devesulu opens.
December 22/15: Raytheon has been awarded a $2.35 billion contract to deliver 52 SM-3 Block IB missiles. The contract finalizes a preliminary one for 44 missiles valued at $541 million. The addition of 8 further missiles comes as the US military is increasing its stocks of SM-3s in the wake of increased missile threats, and orders by foreign allies of its weapons systems.
December 10/15: Raytheon has been awarded a not-to-exceed $543,337,650 undefinitized contract action modification to a previously awarded contract to manufacture, assemble, test, and deliver 17 Standard Missile-3 Block IIA missiles. The deal, initially set at $87 million, has now been extended to $543.3 million. The news comes after the US Navy and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced the second successful flight test on Tuesday. The SM-3 is the only ballistic missile killer to have the capability to be launched from both land and sea, and is being jointly funded and developed by US Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces. Future development of the program will see the interceptor be tested for the European missile defense system and hopeful deployment in Poland by 2018.
Oct 10/14: Romania. NATO formally inaugurates Naval Support Facility Devesulu, the new Aegis Ashore facility in Romania. Capt. William Garren becomes the site’s 1st commander, and construction continues on site. It’s scheduled to become fully operational in 2015. Stars and Stripes, “Navy to commission missile defense base in Romania” | Romnaia TV, “Vin americanii! SUA preia vineri baza de la Deveselu” [picture is wrong] | Iran’s PressTV, “US will commission missile base in Europe amid tensions with Russia” | Russia Today, “US commissions ‘crucial’ NATO missile shield facility in Romania”.
NSF Devesulu, RO opens
FY 2014GAO & CRS reports cite software issues, spectrum frequency conflict in Poland, question operating cost estimates and cost-sharing; Initial Turkish deployment was very ragged; 1st launch from AA facility; DDGs deploying; SM-3 Block IIA passes CDR.
NATO BMD concept
click for video
June 2/14: DDG Deployment. USS Ross [DDG-71, uses BMD 3.6.1] steams out of Norfolk to its new base in Rota, Spain, where it will join USS Donald Cook [DDG-71, uses BMD 4.0.2] as part of EPAA efforts. Sources: WVEC Norfolk, “Photos: 2nd Navy destroyer leaves Norfolk for Spain”.
May 22/14: SAMP/T. France and Italy carry out a test of their own at the French DGA’s Biscarosse test range, with SAMP/T Mamba systems from each country firing an Aster-30 missile and destroying a target drone. The larger story is the successful interconnection of their systems, within a broader test campaign that also involved French air force Crotale SHORADS batteries, French Army man-portable Mistral VSHORADS, and a French E-3F AWACS plane, all connected to the French 3D Defense Management Center (CMD3D) and control centers at Lyon and at Mont de Marsan.
France is building a national air defense and anti-missile system, which needs to inter-operate with NATO. Italy is another natural partner for missile defense, as they’re also using Aster-30 missiles on land in SAMP/T Mamba systems, and using them at sea in Franco-Italian Horizon Project frigates. Sources: French DGA, “Vidéo : reussite d’un double tir SAMP/T franco-italien” | defense-aerospace, “Surface-to-Air Campaign at Biscarosse: “Barrois” Squadron from Saint Dizier Fires First Mamba, Demos Interoperability”.
May 20/14: AA CTV-01. The 1st SM-3 launch from an Aegis Ashore facility takes place at the Pacific Missile Range Facility test site in Kauai, Hawaii. It’s a live SM-3 Block IB launch, but not a live intercept, since they’re only using a simulated target. The main goal is ensuring that all systems work when they’re transferred to land. Sources: US MDA, “Standard Missile Completes First Test Launch from Aegis Ashore Test Site” | Lockheed Martin, “Aegis Ashore Achieves Major Test Milestone for Worldwide Ballistic Missile Defense System” | Raytheon, “Aegis Ashore Launches Standard Missile-3 for First Time”.
1st Aegis Ashore launch
April 11/14: GAO Report. The Pentagon has been reluctant to develop a life-cycle cost estimate for BMD in Europe, on the dubious grounds that it isn’t a separate program. that’s why GAO-14-314 concerns itself with EPAA’s costs and implementation issues.
PATRIOT and AN/TPY-2 deployments have already shown weaknesses. The Turkish PATRIOT batteries faced roadblocks involving deployment when they arrived in December 2011. Other issues included training to different NATO engagement procedures, information-sharing uncertainties, soldiers deployed to cold mountaintops in tents that couldn’t handle the conditions, and poor local roads that could be dangerous. Build-out of longer-term infrastructure won’t even begin until mid-2014. The TPY-2 radar deployments to Turkey (2011) and CENTCOM (2013), meanwhile, still can’t share information and work together, because that hasn’t been worked out.
For Aegis Ashore, previous reports (q.v. April 26/13) have mentioned the AN/SPY-1D radar’s conflicts with local civil frequency usage. That’s largely worked out now in Romania, but not in Poland. Indeed, the Poles are about to issue commercial licenses for key radar frequencies, which would complicate things even more. It doesn’t get easier to handle all of this when US Strategic Command, European Command, MDA, and the Navy all claim roles in each deployment.
On the cost side, the US Navy will take over maintenance and operation of both European Aegis Ashore sites in 2018, but they haven’t developed a joint 25-year O&M estimate. There are also gaps concerning other BMD elements. The Army is estimating $61 million to support the Turkish TPY-2 radar, and $1.2 billion over 20 years. This assumes contractor support throughout, but different arrangements might be better and cheaper. A full analysis is expected in FY 2015. THAAD batteries have an estimated O&M cost of $6.5 billion over 20 years, but that $325 million per year involves basing in the USA. Costs for basing in Europe are expected to be higher. How much higher? We don’t know, because the US MDA and US Army can’t agree on how to do the analysis.
April 9/14: Speed up? Vice Adm. James Syring of the US Missile Defense Agency responds to speculation by saying that they could speed up the deployment of Poland’s Aegis Ashore installation in response to Russia’s invasion of Crimea, but:
“We’d need some additional funds in the budget, and we’d need to move up the development of the [SM-3 Block] IIA,”
The first part of the statement is true. Given the likely cost of the SM-3 Block 1B missiles, and known costs for the facility, it will take somewhere between $400 – 500 million to fully pay for an operational site. The second part of Syring’s statement, however, is wishful thinking. Unless development is being slow-walked and funds are the primary bottleneck, extra funds have a very limited effect in moving up a project’s development. The SM-3 Block IIA isn’t the type of project that will get much benefit. Sources: Defense News, “US May Accelerate Deployment of Missile Defense System in Poland”.
April 8/14: CRS Report. The Congressional Research Service updates their backgrounder covering the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system, which includes the EPAA. They confirm DID’s charts regarding these areas, though CRS doesn’t divide general naval BMD from the land-based European implementation.
They do have some pointed questions for Europe, however, proposing a calculation of relative American vs. European total contributions to European missile defense, and asking “Why should European countries not pay a greater share of the cost of the EPAA, since the primary purpose of the EPAA is to defend Europe against theater-range missiles?” That’s a different attitude.
Meanwhile, the FY 2015 budget cuts 132 SM-3 missiles from the FY 2014 budget’s 2015-2018 buys, and it will also change the composition and makeup of the naval BMD fleet via slower upgrades, and the mothballing of 4 BMD cruisers. Congress will want to know what effect that will have on overall capabilities, but asking the military will be pointless.
April 1/14: GAO Report. GAO-14-351 focuses on acquisition goals and reporting for missile defense in general. Most of the key findings for EPAA have already been covered recently, but the program is concerned about flight test delays and cancelations affecting Aegis Ashore, while adding that a 17 month delay in the modernized Aegis system is at a problematic point:
“Discovery of software defects continues to outpace the program’s ability to fix them; fixes may have to be implemented after software is delivered.”
March 25/14: AA Poland. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training, Moorestown, NJ receives a $93 million contract, exercising options for the core radar and equipment in Poland’s Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS), and providing multi-year procurement funding for Aegis Weapon System (AWS) MK 7 equipment sets.
All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 budgets and FY 2013 shipbuilding budgets. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (85.5%), Clearwater, FL (13.1%), and Akron, OH (1.4%), and is expected to be complete by September 2021. US NAVSEA in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-14-C-5114).
March 21/14: AA Poland. Raytheon IDS in Sudbury, MA receives a $45 million modification for 1 AN/SPY-1D(V) Transmitter Group and select Missile Fire Control System MK 99 equipment, which will become part of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System in Poland.
Work will be performed in Andover, MA (78.3%); Sudbury, MA (19.3%); Canada (1%); Moorestown, NJ (0.9%); and Norfolk, VA (0.5%), and is expected to be completed by March 2016. All funds are committed immediately, using FY14 funds. US NAVSEA in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-13-C-5115).
March 14/14: GAO report. The GAO releases GAO-14-248R, regarding the USA’s EPAA plans for defending Europe from ballistic missiles. The bottom line? There are a lot of moving parts, they’re being developed in parallel, and some of them aren’t moving as fast as others. Which means the system as a whole is going to be a bit behind. The MDA isn’t interested in acknowledging that, but the GAO makes a strong case by citing all the promised capabilities that are being removed from the beginning of each phase.
Phase 1, 2011. A TPY-2 radar is deployed in Turkey, but C2BMC systems still haven’t tested scenarios where they’re managing more than 1 TPY-2 radar, and GAO says that “Key capabilities for Phase 1 will not be fully available until 2015.”
Phase 2, 2015. The biggest issue is C2BMC S8.2 software, which has been delayed until 2017. It was supposed to improve the integration of incoming missile tracks for Phase 2, and provide a Lock-On After Launch firing capability for AEGIS BMD systems. Without it, radars like the TPY-2 will perform below their planned potential, and so will the missiles. Especially since the Romanian site’s Aegis Ashore system will only be an interim version, which will also wait until 2017 before it has all of the initially promised capabilities. On the mobile front, THAAD’s ability to distinguish incoming warheads in debris fields won’t reach desired capability until 2017, either.
Phase 3, 2018. The 2-year delay of full Phase 2 Aegis Ashore capability leads one to wonder if AEGIS BMD 5.1 will really be ready for 2018 deployment. The same might be said of the SM-3 Block 2A missile, even though MDA says it’s on track. Meanwhile, C2BMC is the biggest issue again. S8.4 is meant to let AEGIS BMD systems intercept incoming missiles without using their own radars, thanks to faster integrated tracks, more precise tracking, and resilience in more “complex” conditions. It won’t arrive until 2020 or later, forcing the MDA to deploy an S8.2.x build instead. That lateness will affect THAAD as well as Aegis Ashore, and THAAD’s own upgrades will happen in a timeframe that means any issues found in testing will delay them until after Phase 3 has begun.
Dec 27/13: Aegis multiyear. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training in Moorestown, NJ receives a multi-year $574.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for Aegis MK 7 equipment sets. All confirmed orders will be used in destroyer production and refits (DDG 117 – 123), but there’s 1 option that can be used for Poland’s Aegis Ashore complex, along with associated engineering services. Lockheed Martin confirms that the core of all sets will be Aegis Baseline 9, which includes missile defense features.
$308.4 million in FY 2013 shipbuilding funds is committed immediately, to enable advance buys in bulk. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (85.5%); Clearwater, FL (13.1%); and Akron, OH (1.4%), and is expected to be complete by September 2021. As one would expect, this is a sole source contract under 10 U.SC 2304(c)(1). US NAVSEA in Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-14-C-5114). See also Lockheed Martin, Jan 7/14 release.
Oct 31/13: SM-3-IIA. Raytheon and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries have completed the SM-3 Block IIA’s Critical Design Review (CDR), and the USA and Japan have agreed on workshare arrangements that allocate development responsibility between each country. SM-3-IIA is the key new piece in EPAA Phase 3, and the successful CDR keeps it on track for flight test in 2015.
Raytheon made the announcement at the 2013 AIAA Multinational Ballistic Missile Defense Conference in Warsaw, Poland. Sources: Raytheon, “New, Larger Standard Missile-3 Moves From Design to Testing” | Raytheon, Oct 31/13 release.
Oct 28/13: AA Romania. American, Romanian and NATO officials break ground on the Aegis Ashore facility at Devsulu AB, based on the September 2011 accord between the United States and Romania.
Romania’s SC Glacial PROD SRL has already done $3.3 million in site-activation work, including temporary offices, container housing units, a warehouse, and a vehicle inspection area. US Navy, “US, Romania begin work on Aegis Ashore missile defense complex”.
FY 2013SM-3 Block IIB canceled; European multi-system test; GAO Report; MBDA’s Aster-30 SAMP/T and USA’s GBI advance in parallel.
2013 BMD conference
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July 18/13: AA Romania. KBR announces a $134 million Aegis Ashore build-out contract from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Europe District. The 269-acre site on Romania’s Deveselu Air Base will include a 4-story radar deckhouse structure relocated from New Jersey, security fencing, plus facilities and infrastructure including roads, support buildings, communications, security and utilities.
April 26/13: GAO Report. The GAO looks at the Missile Defense Agency’s full array of programs in report #GAO-13-342, “Missile Defense: Opportunity To Refocus On Strengthening Acquisition Management.” With respect to EPAA/ Aegis Ashore, the report reiterates concerns from the GAO’s March 30/12 and April 20/12 reports (q.v.): unstable cost baselines, concurrent testing & development, and questions about the ability to use the SPY-1’s radar frequencies without creating spectrum interference problems for the host nations.
The program office sees its greatest risks as (1) integration testing in Hawaii and New Jersey, (2) potential shipping or transportation delays, and (3) construction delays for the operational and test facilities. The disconnect stems from a fundamental disagreement about the project’s level of risk. With the program citing similarity to sea-based Aegis BMD as a reason for low risk. If the GAO’s concerns re: spectrum issues come true, however, the similarity will drop quickly. An analysis for Romania is due in 2013, but Poland will present its own independent situation. Meanwhile, knowledge gained from flight tests that begin in 2014 can’t be used to guide construction. Under a new plan, even Poland’s 2018 site will be ordering advance construction components in January 2014.
The GAO estimates the cost to develop and build the Polish facility at $746 million, from R&D to operational status. As such, the MDA reported costs of all 3 Aegis Ashore facilities is $2.3 billion. The GAO wonders about the US MDA’s portfolio balance, given R&D needs for multiple missiles, plus full build out of Aegis Ashore and full production of the SM-3 Block IB, plus operation, support, and testing for the iffy GMD system. The GAO recommends Analysis of Alternatives studies as one way to help manage that portfolio.
April 18/13: Poland. US State Department official Frank Rose (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance) speaks to the Polish National Defense University in Warsaw about Aegis Ashore. Poland is looking to build a national missile defense architecture, so Rose stresses the important of interoperability with NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) command-and-control system (q.v. May 21/12). He adds that:
“The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement between the U.S. and Poland entered into force in September of 2011. This agreement places a land-based interceptor site, similar to Phase 2, in Redzikowo, and includes the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This EPAA Phase 3 site is on schedule and on budget for deployment in the 2018 timeframe. The interceptor site here in Poland will be key to the EPAA. Not only will it protect Poland itself, but when combined with the rest of the EPAA assets, Phase 3 will be able to protect all of NATO Europe against ballistic missile threats from the Middle East.”
March 15/13: Following North Korea’s 3rd nuclear test attempt, the new US Secretary of Defense announces that the USA will add 14 more ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, AK and Vandenberg AFB, CA, boosting the total number from 30 back to the 44 planned by the previous administration. At the same time, they’re re conducting Environmental Impact Studies for a potential additional GBI site in the United States.
They’re paying for this by “restructuring” the SM-3 Block 2B Next Generation Aegis Missile program, whose 2020 deployment date was never realistic (vid. April 20/12 GAO report). It’s effectively canceled.
Japan will continue to collaborate with the USA on the SM-3 Block 2A program, and they’ll get a 2nd AN/TPY-2 radar on their territory. Pentagon AFPS | Full Speech Transcript | Boeing | CS Monitor re: Russian angle.
No EPAA Phase 4
March 6/13: SAMP/T. MBDA’s SAMP/T system is operated by a joint French & Italian crew, and successfully intercepts a 300 km (short range) tactical ballistic missile target. Eurosam describes it as:
“…the first SAMP/T firing test in a NATO environment, close to what would be an operational use… [within] the alliance ALTBMD programme…. DGA sensors did provide the firing units and the command levels long-range detection data on A L16 radio network. DGA MI, in Bruz, acted as a L16 [Link-16] national C2, interfacing in L16 both with NATO BMDOC [in Ramstein, Germany], via L16 JREAP and with SAMP/T.”
The SAMP/T system is now widely deployed in France & Italy, with 15 land-based units equipped, alongside naval use of its Aster-30 missile from the countries’ Horizon Class frigates. We won’t be covering it here beyond this initial milestone, but it will be part of NATO’s missile defenses going forward. France’s DGA [in French] | Eurosam.
Feb 11/13: GAO Report. GAO-13-382R: “Standard Missile-3 Block IIB Analysis of Alternatives” throws cold water on the idea that the SM-3 Block 2B can defend the USA from bases in Poland or Romania. The geometry isn’t very good, and success may require a boost-phase intercept. Those are very tricky, and have limited range, because you have to hit the enemy missile within a very short time/ distance.
Some members of the military think it’s possible, at an initial estimated budget of $130 million extra. The problem is the tradeoffs. Liquid propellants can boost speed, but are unsafe on Navy ships due to the fire risks. On the other hand, the middle of the North Sea offers much better missile intercept geometries. Maybe Block 2B shouldn’t be land-based at all, but then why replace Block 2A in such an expensive way? MDA still needs to set the future missile’s performance requirements and limits. Where should the tradeoffs be made?
This brings us to the GAO’s point about the MDA developing the SM-3 Block IIB under a framework that dispenses with a good chunk of the usual paperwork, including an Analysis of Alternatives. On reflection, this is more than a bureaucratic point driven by “records show that programs doing the paperwork usually fare better.” One of the EPAA’s key underlying assumptions is now in question, and the proposed solution must now be in question as well. Is the best solution for land-based European missile defense still SM-3 Block IIB? What are the tradeoffs vs. using a system like the NRC’s recommended GMD-I from the USA (vid. September 2012 entry), and making Block 2B a ship-deployed missile? Does Block 2B even make sense now? Without good answers regarding capability, options, and maintainability, how does the MDA decide – or pick the right winning combination among the Block 2B competitors? A full AoA could improve those answers, and hence the odds of a smart pick.
Dec 21/12: Radar components. Raytheon IDS in Sudbury, MA receives $19.7 million for firm-fixed-price delivery order for radar components: Stabile Master Oscillator ordnance alteration kits, Radio Frequency Coherent Combiner ordnance alteration kits and associated spares, and material and installation services in support of the modernization effort on Navy ships and Aegis ashore units. This contract includes options which could bring the contract’s cumulative value to $22.9 million.
Work will be conducted in Norfolk, VA (63%); Andover, MA (27%); and Burlington, MA (10%), and is expected to be complete by June 2015. $19.7 million will be obligated at time of award. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-11-G-5116, #0020).
Dec 21/12: AA Romania. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $57.3 million contract modification for an Aegis Weapon System in support of DDG 116 and the purchase of material assemblies to support Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Host Nation #1, Romania.
Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (85%), Clearwater, FL (14%), and Akron, OH (1%), and is expected to be complete by January 2017. All contract funds in the amount of $57,336,086 are committed immediately. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5110).
Dec 20/12: Trainer SDD. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors (MS2), Moorestown, NJ receives a $20.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price contract for the Aegis Ashore Team Trainer. This trainer will be designed to meet the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS) individual watch station and watch team training, qualification and certification requirements. This contract will also fund information assurance requirements for the trainer, an information assurance training course, an instructor operator training course, and travel associated with the trainer’s development.
$4.7 million are committed immediately. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ and is expected to be complete in October 2014. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 by the US Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division in Orlando, FL (N61340-13-C-0007).
Dec 10/12: AA Romania. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors (MS2) in Moorestown, NJ receives a $45.9 million a contract modification for Aegis Ashore Engineering Agent engineering support and skid integration for “host nation” (which would be Romania) though “this is not a Foreign Military Sales [FMS] acquisition.” If the US military is buying it, it isn’t an FMS, even if they’re preparing to base it at a foreign location. This award raises the total contract’s value to date from $209.9 million to $255.8 million.
Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ through Dec 31/15, and $7.8 million FY 2013 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will get things going. The US Missile Defense Agency in Dahlgren, VA manages this contract (HQ0276-10-C-0003, PO 0044).
Nov 5/12: Networking. Boeing in Huntington Beach, CA receives a $16.7 million firm-fixed-price and time-and-material contract for gigabit ethernet data multiplex systems. They’ll be used in the DDG modernization program, new ship construction, and Aegis Ashore Systems. This contract includes options which could bring its cumulative value to $30 million.
Work will be performed in Camarillo, CA (57%), Smithfield, PA (33%), and Huntington Beach, CA (10%), and is expected to be complete by May 2015. $475,975 will expire by the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. This contract was procured on a limited competition basis via the FBO.gov and Navy Electronic Commerce Online websites, with 2 proposals solicited and 2 offers received. The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, Dahlgren, VA manages this contract (N00178-13-C-2000).
Oct 2/12: C2 Integration. ALTBMD. NATO’s NCI announces that “Ensemble Test 2” has been successful, using NATO’s Combined Federated Battle Lab Network (CFBLNet) as a test bench. Participants included 12 laboratories from 5 Nations across 2 continents, and the systems included:
Firing missiles is the easy part. Having different command and control systems work together, which is required for any sort of coordinated defense, is difficult. Ensemble Test 3 is scheduled for May-June 2013. NATO NCIA.
FY 2012NATO declares interim defensive capability; EPAA won’t really defend USA; SM-3 Block IIs may not meet EPAA schedule; Costs keep rising; Poland independent, but not out.
Operational
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Sept 25/12: AA Romania. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA a $43.6 million contract modification “for the production and integration of an Aegis Weapon System (AWS) and Missile Fire Control System in support of DDG 116, and an AWS in support of Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Host Nation #1” (HN-1, i.e. Romania). Raytheon makes the AN/SPY-1 radar transmitters and MK99 FCS illuminators.
Work will be performed in Andover, MA (80%), Sudbury, MA (15%), and Portsmouth, RI (5%), and is expected to be complete by September 2017. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5111).
Sept 14/12: AA Romania. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives an $18.5 million contract modification for the production and integration of an Aegis weapon system in support of DDG 116, and the purchase of material assemblies to support Aegis ashore missile defense system Host Nation 1 (Romania).
Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (85%); Clearwater, FL (14%); and Akron, OH (1%); and is expected to complete by January 2017. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5110).
September 2012: NRC report. The US National Research Council publishes “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives.” The report staff have deeply impressive backgrounds related to missile defense, and their main conclusion is that very fundamental reasons of geography and physics make boost-phase defense systems a waste of time.
This includes AEGIS BMD systems. The report explains very clearly that the window for stopping a warhead before it has enough energy to hit “defended” areas makes it difficult to impossible to position a ship in a place that allows even future SM-3 Block II missiles to hit their target.
It also states that EPAA Phase IV is not likely to be an effective way to defend the United States, and recommends that the USA make changes to its own GMD system and radar set. They’re not advocating the dismantling of EPAA, just saying that the USA should have a system in which EPAA is about Europe’s defense, and the USA has a system that doesn’t depend on it.
Aug 30/12: AA Kauai. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ gets an $8.3 million contract ceiling increase, to provide Aegis Ashore Engineering Agent (AAEA) long-lead-time materials for the complex being built at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in Hawaii. This brings the total contract value from $200.1 to $209.3 million.
Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ through April 30/13, and $5 million in FY 2012 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be used as initial funding. The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in Dahlgren, VA manages the contract (HQ0276-10-C-0003, PO 0038).
Aug 10/12: CRS Report. The US Congressional Research Service issues its latest update of “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress” [PDF]. Key issues highlighted or examined by Mr. O’Rourke include the cost of forward-deploying 4 destroyers to Spain, the FY 2013 budget’s proposal to slow the 2013-2020 ramp-up rate for BMD ships, the potential for European contributions to naval BMD, the inability to simulate China’s DF-21 ship-killing ballistic missile, SM-3 Block IIB risks, and concurrency and technical risk in the AEGIS BMD program generally.
With respect to the Spanish deployment (vid. Feb 16/12 entry), Rota can accommodate all of the new personnel, but infrastructure upgrades will be required. In total, the Navy estimated that it would incur approximately $166 million in up-front military construction, personnel, and maintenance costs; a small annual increase in operations and maintenance; and personnel costs of approximately $179 million – though really, you have to pay them wherever they are.
Aug 6/12: Poland fixing its “mistake”. Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski states that Poland is prepared to create its own anti-aircraft and missile defense system as part of a NATO shield, at a cost of $3-6 billion. With respect to the USA’s defensive plan, which Poland hasn’t rejected yet:
“Our mistake was that by accepting the American offer of a shield we failed to take into account the political risk associated with a change of president. We paid a high political price. We do not want to make the same mistake again.”
The missile and air defense system proposed by the Polish president would target all short and some medium range missiles, just like the initial 2 stages of the EPAA. The system would be part of NATO’s broader air defense systems, as well as the emerging NATO ALTBMD Missile Defense shield. Germany and France are specifically mentioned as potential partners, and MBDA’s naval PAAMS system and Aster-30 missiles have already been converted to a land equivalent of their own. Their SAMP/T is the logical competitor if Poland wants to buy a non-American system. Its weakness is that it wouldn’t be able to grow into a counter against IRBM or ICBM missiles, but that could make it a very good complement to an American system that did. Relations with Israel are close, but David’s Sling is a joint development with Raytheon, and past American behavior has been to use its weapon export rules against potential competitors. Read “Alone, If Necessary: The Shield of Poland” for full coverage of Poland’s WISLA and NAREW air defense competitions.
June 27/12: FTM-18 test. USS Lake Erie [CG-70] with its AEGIS BMD 4.0.1 system successfully launches an SM-3 block IB missile to hit a separating ballistic missile target. This is the same configuration that will be used for the land-based Phase 2 of the USA’s European missile defense plan, and represents an important success for the SM-3 block IB after the FTM-16 failure. This firing makes the AEGIS & SM-3 combination 23/28 in intercept tests so far (82.1%), vs. 31/40 (77.5%) for all other missile defense system intercept tests. US MDA | Lockheed Martin | Raytheon.
June 7/12: AA Romania. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors (MS2) in Moorestown, NJ gets a contract ceiling increase of $9.8 million, increasing the total contract value to $197.4 million from $187.6 million. Under this modification, they’ll provide Aegis Ashore Engineering Agent Phase 2B support for the Host Nation 1 (Romania) skids and skids accessories.
Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ, and Akron, OH through Oct 31/13. $6.9 million in FY 2012 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be used as incremental funding. The US Missile Defense Agency in Dahlgren, VA manages this contract (HQ0276-10-C-0003, PO 0032).
June 4/12: Aegis Ashore. URS Group, Inc. in San Antonio, TX wins a $129.5 million firm-fixed-price task order to build the Aegis Ashore test complexes in Moorestown, NJ and the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Barking Sands, Kauai, HI.
In Moorestown, they’ll build a radar deckhouse and support building, and do related work to test the government-furnished, government-installed MK41 missile launchers. The Pacific Missile Range facility involves full site construction of a radar deckhouse, support building, launch pad, electrical power, potable water, sewer connection, synthetic natural gas system, and communications systems, in addition to testing their success in integrating government-furnished, government-installed MK41 missile launchers. The task order also contains 1 unexercised option, which, if exercised, would increase cumulative task order value to $130 million.
Work will be performed in Kauai, HI (72%), and Moorestown, NJ (28%), and is expected to be complete by November 2013. Three proposals were received for this task order by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (N62742-09-D-1174, HC02). See also Aug 24/10 entry.
May 21/12: NATO ALTBMD. NATO leaders declared that the Alliance now has an interim ballistic missile defence capability, via a basic ALTBMD command and control system capability which has been tested and installed at Headquarters Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany.
At present, ALTBMD is just a C2 network. NATO members need to provide sensors and interceptors to connect to the system. Full Operational Capability isn’t expected until the end of the current decade, or the early 2020s. NATO.
ALTBMD interim capability
April 20/12: GAO report. The US GAO releases report #GAO-12-486, “Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency.” The implications for missile defense belie the bland title:
“To meet the presidential 2002 direction to initially rapidly field and update missile defense capabilities as well as the 2009 announcement to deploy missile defenses in Europe, MDA has undertaken and continues to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions. Concurrency is broadly defined as the overlap between technology development and product development or between product development and production. While some concurrency is understandable, committing to product development before requirements are understood and technologies mature or committing to production and fielding before development is complete is a high-risk strategy that often results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. It can also create pressure to keep producing to avoid work stoppages… During 2011, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, the Aegis Standard Missile 3 Block IB, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense experienced significant ill effects from concurrency.
…Aegis Ashore began product development and set the acquisition baseline before completing the [Preliminary Design Review]. This sequencing increased technical risks and the possibility of cost growth… The program has initiated procurement of components for the installation and plans to start fabricating two enclosures called deckhouses – one for operational use at the Romanian Aegis Ashore installation and one for testing at the Pacific Missile Range Facility – in fiscal year 2012, but does not plan to conduct the first intercept test… until fiscal year 2014. Further, the program plans to build the operational deckhouse first, meaning any design modification identified through system testing… will need to be made on an existing deckhouse and equipment. As we have previously reported, such modifications on an existing fabrication may be costly.”
March 30/12: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” for 2012. For Aegis Ashore, RDT&E costs have increased from $835.1 million in April 2010 to $1,418.6 million as of October 2011. The reconstitutable deckhouse design for the sites had not been included in its baseline, and the addition of hardware for a 3rd site in Poland also had to be paid for.
GAO sees concurrency risks from the program’s decision to begin system development before the preliminary design review, and from its plan to buy operational components before testing is done. the Navy defends their practice by saying that all of these systems are in advanced testing or deployed on Navy ships already. The program’s last milestone was a Critical Design Review in December 2011, and flight tests aren’t expected to begin before Q2 2014. The 1st “deckhouse” with radar, missiles, etc, is expected to be ready in December 2015, and the 2nd by December 2018. GAO:
“The SPY-1 radar requires modifications for its use on land and other changes may be necessary due to host nation radar frequency issues… In addition, the maturity of SM-3 Block IB may be overstated because some of its component technologies have not been flight tested or have experienced failures in testing. The multimission signal processor also faces development challenges, and the Defense Contract Management Agency has identified its schedule as high risk. We have previously reported that a significant percentage of its software still needs to be integrated.”
March 30/12: SAR. The Pentagon’s Selected Acquisitions Report ending Dec 31/11 includes elements of EPAA:
“Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) – Program costs decreased $3,596.4 million (-3.1%) from $122,362.6 million to $118,766.2 million, due primarily to a reduction in the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile production rate (-$1,247.2 million), the elimination of seven AN/TPY-2 radars (from 18 to 11) (-$1,237.2 million), and the placement of the Sea Based X-band (SBX) radar in limited test and contingency operation status (-$666.3 million). There were additional decreases for the reduction of three THAAD batteries (from 9 to 6) (-$540.8 million), reductions in Special Programs funding (-$408.2 million), a reduction of Aegis Standard Missile-3 Block IB missiles in FY 2013 (-$298.1 million), cancellation of the Airborne Infrared Program (-$239.3 million), and reductions in the Directed Energy Program (-$194.2 million). These decreases were partially offset by the application of revised escalation indices (+$684.8 million), increases to the Israeli Cooperative Program for FY 2011-2012 (+$217.8 million), increased construction estimates for Romania and Poland Aegis Ashore sites (+$213.0 million) [emphasis DID’s], and increases for Iron Dome in FY 2011 (+$205.0 million).”
Program costs
March 29/12: AA Romania. BAE U.S. Combat Systems in Minneapolis, MN receives a $23 million contract modification for MK 41 Vertical Launching System mechanical modules and related equipment and services for DDG 116 and Aegis Ashore, Host Nation One (Romania). Contract modification efforts includes requirements to procure MK41 VLS mechanical systems, production of support material, interim support parts, and equipment in support of DDG51-class new construction, and Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Systems requirements.
Work will be performed in Aberdeen, SD (43%); Farmingdale, NY (19%); Aiken, SC (15%); Fort Totten, ND (10%); York, PA (7%); Minneapolis, MN (5%); and Louisville, KY (1%). Work is expected to complete by September 2015. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-11-C-5301).
March 28/12: Beyond Europe? Hurriyet Daily News reports that EPAA could soon have other regional counterparts:
“The US seeks to expand its missile systems to Asia and the Middle East by building regional shields against ballistic missiles, similar to the NATO shield already in Europe. A senior Pentagon official says the Obama administration will hold talks with South Korea, Japan, Australia and Gulf Cooperation Council countries.”
Feb 23/12: AA Romania. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA receives a $106.5 million modification to previously awarded contract for the production of an AN/SPY-1D-V radar transmitter group for Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Host Nation 1 (Romania), as well as 2 AN/SPY-1D-Vs and a MK 99 Mod 14 targeting illuminator to equip the future DDG 116 destroyer.
Work will be performed in Andover, MA (80%); Sudbury, MA (15%); and Portsmouth, RI (5%), and is expected to be complete by September 2017. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contracts (N00024-09-C-5111).
Feb 18/12: Turkey(s). During meetings with NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu states the TPY-2 radar based at Diyarbakir (vid. Sept 3/11) must not have any of its data sets shared beyond NATO, with a specific reference to Israel. The radar is positioned in a way that makes it easy to see into Iran, for early detection of ballistic missile launches. Voice of America | UPI.
Feb 16/12: Phase 2 ships. The US Navy announces the 4 Arleigh Burke Class guided-missile destroyers which will be forward deployed to Rota, Spain in FY 2014 and 2015. See also DoD Buzz.
“The four include three from Norfolk, Va; USS Ross, USS Donald Cook, and USS Porter, and one from Mayport, Fla., USS Carney. The ships are in support of President Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach to enhance the security of the European region… Ross and Donald Cook will arrive in fiscal 2014 and Carney and Porter in fiscal 2015.”
Nov 1/11: Radars. The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) awards Raytheon IDS of Woburn, MA a maximum $307.6 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract. Under this new contract, Raytheon will maintain software required to operate “the X-band family of radars,” and perform and Ballistic Missile Defense System test planning, execution and analysis. Discussions with Raytheon personnel confirmed that the funding applies to the XBR radar on the SBX naval platform, as well as their AN/TPY-2 radars (THAAD, EPAA, deployed in Israel & Japan), and a “Ground Based Radar Prototype” that they’re working on as a technology demonstrator.
Work will be performed in Woburn, MA from Nov 1/11 through Oct 31/13, and the MDA’s FY 2012 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used to fund initial orders. The MDA at Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract (HQ0147-12-D-0005).
FY 2010 – 2011Europe grapples with BMD; Czechs out, Turkey in; Aegis Ashore shifts the plan and the costs; Progress report. (click to view full)
Sept 15/11: Progress report. The White House offers an update on progress made so far on its European missile defense plans. By Phase:
Phase 1: “In March of this year the USS Monterey [CG-61] was the first in a sustained rotation of ships to deploy to the Mediterranean Sea in support of EPAA. Phase One also calls for deploying a land-based early warning radar, which Turkey recently agreed to host as part of the NATO missile defense plan.”
Phase 2: “This week, on September 13, the United States and Romania signed the U.S.-Romanian Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. Once ratified, it will allow the United States to build, maintain, and operate the land-based BMD site [and SM-3 deployment] in Romania.”
Phase 3: “Poland agreed to host the [SM-3] interceptor site in October 2009, and today, with the Polish ratification process complete, this agreement has entered into force.”
Russia: “As an initial step, NATO and Russia completed a joint ballistic missile threat assessment and agreed that the [NATO-Russia Council] would resume theater missile defense cooperation. The United States and Russia also continue to discuss missile defense cooperation through a number of high-level working groups at the State and Defense Departments.”
Sept 9/11: Aegis Ashore. The US Missile Defense Agency in Dahlgren, VA awards a $115.5 million sole source cost-plus-award-fee/ cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification to Lockheed Martin MS2 in Moorestown, NJ, for continued Aegis Ashore Combat System adaptation efforts, site planning, transportation planning, technology initiatives and studies. This award of contract line item number (CLIN) 0001, and increase in the amounts for CLINs 0011 (material) and 0012 (travel), increases the total contract value to date from $61.2 million to $176.7 million.
Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ, through Sept 30/12. FY 2011 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used to incrementally fund this effort (HQ0276-10-C-0003, PO 0019).
Sept 2/11: Turkey in. Turkey has agreed to emplace an AN/TPY-2 early warning radar, facing Iran and linked to US Navy systems via Cooperative Engagement Capability. Turkish reports place it near Diyarbakir in SE Turkey, which also hosts Patriot missile batteries. Col. David Lapan tells Stars & Stripes that the agreement has some further required approvals to clear, but “The hope is to have it deployed by the end of this year.” Zaman Dis Haberler [in Turkish] | Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance | Stars & Stripes | Russia’s RIA Novosti.
Turkey
Aug 23/11: Phase 3. Raytheon Missile Systems Co. in Tucson, AZ receives a $9.8 million sole-source, cost-plus-award-fee contract modification. The CLIN 0008 option, “Future Upgrades and Engineering Support,” will help the Missile Defense Agency execute technical analysis for the Aegis BMD 5.1/SM-3 Block IIA combination, which is critical to PAA Phase 3. Exercising CLIN 0008 increases the total contract value from $276.7 – $286.5 million.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ through Sept 30/16, and will be incrementally funded by FY 2011 research, development, test, and evaluation funds. Though the SM-3 Block IIA is a cooperative program with Japan, this is not a foreign military sales acquisition. The US MDA in Dahlgren, VA manages the contract (HQ0276-10-C-0005, PO 0015).
July 6/11: DSB Report. In an open letter, the US Defense Science Board aims to dispel impressions that they recommended against the SM-3, which by its nature is a mid-course or terminal phase interceptor:
“The DSB concluded that the Missile Defense Agency is on the right track in developing European Phased Adapted Approach (EPAA) options, including continued evolution of the SM-3 family of missiles… The DSB also examined the potential in the EPAA context for EI [Early Intercept] in regional defense against short-range missiles before threat payloads could be deployed, and concluded that this was not a viable option because of technical constraints… The fact that this form of EI is not viable in shorter-range regional applications does not imply that either SM-3 family interceptors or the EPAA concept are flawed… MDA is on the right track in pursuing this capability for national missile defense, and examining the potential application in regional defense as a function of the range of threat missiles.”
June 23/11: CRS Report. The US Congressional Research Service releases the latest update of “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress” [PDF]. Key excerpts:
“Some observers are concerned – particularly in light of the EPAA – that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. They are also concerned that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for… BMD operations could strain the Navy’s ability to provide regional military commanders with Aegis ships for performing non-BMD missions… MDA states that SM-3 Block IAs have a unit procurement cost of about $9 million to $10 million, that SM-3 Block IBs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $12 million to $15 million, and that SM-3 Block IIAs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $20 million to $24 million.”
June 15/11: Czech Republic. The Czech Republic formally abandons its proposed role in the U.S. “Phased Adaptive Approach” to missile defense. Defense Minister Alexander Vondra told visiting Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn that his country no longer wanted to participate in the American system, but would continue working within NATO on potential European defenses. Stars & Stripes.
Czech out
April 15/11: Testing. Flight Test Standard Missile-15 (FTM-15) begins to test the European Phased Adaptive Approach architecture, firing an SM-3 Block 1A missile against an intermediate-range (officially, 1,864 – 3,418 miles) target, based on AN/TPY-2 ground-based radar data, before the USS O’Kane (DDG 77, equipped with AEGIS BMD 3.6.1) could pick the target up using its own radar. Initial indications are that all components performed as designed, and the missile recorded the 21st successful AEGIS BMD intercept in 25 tries.
The target missile was launched from the Reagan Test Site, located on Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, approximately 2,300 miles SW of Hawaii. The AN/TPY-2 radar, which is also used as part of the THAAD missile system, was located on Wake Island, and crewed by Soldiers from the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command. It detected and tracked the missile, then sent trajectory information to the 613th Air and Space Operations Center’s C2BMC(Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications) system at Hickam Air Force Base, HI. That was relayed to USS O’Kane, sailing to the west of Hawaii, which launched the SM-3-1A missile about 11 minutes after target take-off. O’Kane’s own AN/SPY-1 radar eventually picked up the incoming missile itself, and controlled the missile until impact.
As an important sidebar, the 2 demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance Satellites (STSS), launched by MDA in 2009, successfully acquired the target missile, providing stereo “birth to death” tracking of the target missile.
FTM-15 was less dramatic than the 2008 satellite kill using an SM-3, but it’s equally significant. The successful full integration of ground and naval defenses, remote launch, and supplementary satellite track confirmed that EPAA Phase I, which has already deployed, works. It did so even though launch on remote track was supposed to wait for AEGIS BMD 5.1, and IRBMs were supposed to wait for SM-3 Block II. Instead, the test also combined to extend the current system’s proven capabilities, while validating the difficult connections that make a missile defense system more than the sum of its parts, and proving out an important early warning element (STSS) in the system. US MDA | Lockheed Martin | Raytheon | Lexington Institute.
April 3-18/11: The Russian Question, Take 2. Russia’s NATO envoy Dmitry Rogozin describes the issue of NATO-Russian missile defense cooperation as “a complicated matter, but it is not hopeless.” Nonetheless, differences run very deep. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov roiled the waters recently when he said that:
“We insist on only one thing: that we’re an equal part of [a joint missile defense arrangement]. In practical terms, that means our office will sit, for example, in Brussels and agrees on a red-button push to start an anti-missile, regardless of whether it starts from Poland, Russia or the U.K.”
It’s not 100% clear if he meant veto power over launches, though it certainly sounds that way. In response, Sen. Mark Kirk [R-IL] sent a letter to President Obama, co-signed by 38 Republican senators. Excerpt:
“In our view, any agreement that would allow Russia to influence the defense of the United States or our allies, to say nothing of a “red button” or veto, would constitute a failure of leadership… ask for your written assurances that your Administration will not provide Russia with any access to sensitive U.S. data, including early warning, detection, tracking, targeting, and telemetry data, sensors or common operational picture data, or American hit-to-kill missile defense technology…”
They’re not likely to get those things, but it’s a warning shot that any agreement along these lines would face a Senate backlash, and become a 2012 election issue. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen also poured cold water on the concept, saying “We are thinking about two systems – one NATO’s and one Russian – that will cooperate and exchange information to make us more secure.” Bloomberg re: Lavrov | Agence France Presse | right-wing Heritage Foundation | Russia’s ITAR-TASS | Moscow Times re: NATO | The Telegraph (UK) | Voice of Russia re: Rogozin | AEI’s Weekly Standard (incl. full text of Senators’ letter).
March 24/11: GAO Report. The US GAO issues report #GAO-11-372: “Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability.” Key excerpts:
“In 2010, MDA was able to meet or exceed its delivery goals for several MDA activities, such as missile defense upgrades to Aegis ships… MDA finalized a new process in which detailed baselines were set for several missile defense systems… [but] GAO found its unit and life-cycle cost baselines had unexplained inconsistencies… DOD has not fully implemented a management process that synchronizes European missile defense acquisition activities and ensures transparency and accountability. Without key management and oversight processes, there is a limited basis for oversight, and there is a risk that key components will start production before demonstrating system performance… GAO makes 10 recommendations for MDA to strengthen its resource, schedule and test baselines, facilitate baseline reviews, and further improve transparency and accountability. GAO is also making a recommendation to improve MDA’s ability to carry out its test plan. In response, DOD fully concurred with 7 recommendations. It partially concurred with 3…”
Feb 7/11: Turkey. With Turkey seen to be demurring on proposals to host one or more American AN/TPY-2 radars, as part of a European missile defense shield, US Senators Jon Kyl [R-AZ], James Risch [R-ID], Mark Kirk [R-IL] and James Inhofe [R-OK] have sent a joint letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, asking him to consider Georgia as one of several potential alternate hosts.
Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister David Dzhalagania says the country has not formulated a concrete position, but thinks the proposal is interesting. The very thing that makes it interesting to Georgia – a major US asset that America would feel compelled to protect if hostilities begin again with Russia – is also the potential down-side to its placement in that country. On the other hand, a radar there would be very well positioned to monitor Iran. Civil Georgia | Georgia’s The Messenger | Russia’s RIA Novosti.
Dec 27/10: AA Kauai. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $65.6 million contract modification for production of the Aegis Weapon System, tooling, test equipment, and associated technical services for the Aegis Ashore test site at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kauai, Hawaii.
Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (87%), and Clearwater, FL (13%), and is expected to be complete by October 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5110).
Nov 3/10: AA Kauai. Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp. in Overland Park, KS receives a $6.5 million for firm-fixed price Task Order under an indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for architect-engineer services in support of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. They’ll prepare plans, specifications, cost estimates for design-bid-build requests for proposal contract documents, and other related services for FY 2011.
Work will be performed in Barking Sands, Hawaii, and is expected to be complete by June 2011. One proposal was received for this task order by NAVFAC Hawaii in Pearl Harbor, HI (W912GB-09-D-0062, SR02).
Aug 24/10: AA Kauai. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors (LM MS2) in Moorestown, NJ, is being awarded a sole-source, not-to-exceed $69.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee letter contract to serve as the “Aegis Ashore” Engineering Agent. In accordance with the AA Program of Record. Contract finalization is expected to be complete by Nov 19/10. The work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ, and the performance period is from August 2010 through April 2011.
This project is part of a $278 million program to increase missile testing on Kauai. LM MS2 will provide the engineering and necessary material to support the design of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex; the deployment sites; the integration of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS) into the removable deckhouse; the installation, test and checkout of the AAMDS at these sites; and initial site maintenance and logistics support during site transfer to the lead service. This unfinalized contract will allow LM MS2 to assist in the development of the Aegis Ashore Combat System (AACS) requirements, to include supporting program planning, element capability specification, and concept of operations development. LM MS2 will begin the AACS adaptation, design efforts associated with the configuration of the AAMDS in the removable structure, and designing the enclosures for transport.
LM MS2 will begin those activities associated with validation and verification of the deckhouse requirements and will facilitate system requirements review in September 2010, and system design review in January 2011. FY 2010 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be utilized to obligate $10.1 million for this effort. The Missile Defense Agency manages this contract (HQ0276-10-C-0003). See also Honolulu Star-Advertiser.
April 1/10: SAR. The Pentagon releases its April 2010 Selected Acquisitions Report, covering major program changes up to December 2009:
“Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) – Program costs decreased $10,068.9 million (-9.7%) from $102,912.4 million to $92,843.5 million, due primarily to the following: cancellation of the Kinetic Energy Interceptor and Multiple Kill Vehicle Program (-$5,304.2 million); cancellation of the Airborne Laser Program (-$2,634.7 million); elimination of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System follow-on constellation (-$1,972.0 million); transition of the sensor content to procurement (-$1,223.7 million); general infrastructure reductions (-$1,216.7 million); revised estimates for special classified programs (-$1,155.4 million); application of revised escalation indices (-$1,169.1 million); reduced Ground-Based Interceptor inventory due to the change of European site architecture (-$88.0 million); and infrastructure reductions (-$1,216.7 million). These decreases were partially offset by the change in European architecture to Aegis Ashore (+$2,493.5 million) [emphasis DID’s] and the consolidation of targets and revised Integrated Master Test Plan (+$1,646.4 million). In addition, procurement costs of $9,520.3 million, which were previously excluded from the SAR due to its pre-Milestone B Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)-only status pursuant to section 2432 of title 10, United States Code, were added as an adjustment to the program in accordance with Congressional direction. RDT&E and Military Construction (MILCON) costs of $14,340.1 million were also added as adjustments to reflect the addition of two years to this program, which is considered Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) limited and has been allowed to add two years of cost to the program with each biennial budget. These adjustments are not considered to represent cost growth.”
Program costs
Dec 7/09: Europe BMD. Aviation Week notes several undercurrents involved in discussions around Europe’s missile defense.
One is “consequences of intercept,” which are certainly less than the consequences of a missile strike, but could well fall outside the launching country. Another is the compressed time frames, which means authority will reside in the commander – who will that be, and where will that commander be based?
A 3rd question is how the proposed SM-3 phases mesh with European NATO plans, including NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program command and control hub, and proposed land-based radars. Which are going to be an issue all their own, since the system requires them, and the American TPY-2s may not be the only players. Finally, there’s the question of whether European navies will join the program, which would further blue the question of whether this is an American system with NATO ancillaries, or a NATO system with American assets.
Nov 17/09: Early intercept. Northrop Grumman announces a 3-month $4.7 million task order from the US Missile Defense Agency, under an indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity Joint National Integration Center Research and Development Contract. Under the Sept 29/09 task order, the firm will help the MDA integrate and demonstrate an early-intercept capability using existing SM-3 and GBI missiles. This kind of capability is especially relevant for forward-based SM-3s.
The Early Intercept effort aims to address renewed focus by the U.S. Department of Defense on dealing with large raids and countermeasures. Early Intercept will demonstrate an integrated architecture of early warning sensors, including space, airborne, land and sea; regional fire control and battle manager systems; and secure communications. This integrated architecture will enable current systems to engage threats earlier in the battle space to improve protection against large raids and facilitate “shoot-look-shoot” opportunities.
Northrop Grumman will begin by assessing existing sensor and battle management systems’ ability to support missile interception in the difficult boost phase, including technology developed for programs like the now-canceled Kinetic Energy Interceptor and battle management projects. The firm will plan demonstration experiments, leading toward the design and development of an experimental, plug-and-play architecture for battle management, command and control.
FY 2008 – 2009Israeli interest in land-based SM-3; EPAA plan unveiled.
SM-3 launch from CG 70
(click to view full)
Sept 17/09: Plan B – EPAA. The Obama administration announces revised plans for its European missile defense architecture. Instead of positioning Boeing’s Ground-Based Interceptors, which could intercept even the longest-range ballistic missiles, they choose an architecture based around the SM-3.
According to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright, the new plan begins with the current deployment of Patriot PAC-3 point defense systems in Europe, which may be adjusted. Those adjustments will bear watching, as early indicators of seriousness.
Cartwright and Gates also added several additional considerations that affected their decision. One was Russian concerns about having large X-band BMD radars that could peer deeply into Russia. By using shorter-range, directional TPY-2 radars deployed in the Caucasus, Iranian aggression can also be hedged without covering Russia so deeply – something that allies like Poland may not necessarily see as a plus. The other, more significant Russian concern was that the GBI missile was powerful enough to be fitted with a nuclear warhead, and become an offensive MRBM with very low warning time. American denials did little to dissuade the Russians, since one must plan on the basis of capabilities rather than intent. That concept becomes technically ridiculous with an SM-3, removing that issue from the table.
Another issue for the USA was cost and flexibility. Gen. Cartwright cited a cost-per-missile of $3.3 million for a Patriot PAC-3, about $9 million for THAAD v1, $9.5-10 million for SM-3 Block I, about $13-15 million estimated for SM-3 Block II… and $70 million for the GBI interceptors. In a global environment that was seeing rapid growth of medium-range offensive missiles, that cost disparity had implications for strategic flexibility, as well as budgets. According to Gates and Cartwright, the GBI deployment was really designed to deal with 3-5 incoming intercontinental missiles, rather than larger salvos of medium-range missiles that are now possible. GBI is also silo-based and so immobile, as opposed to mobile ships and redeployable land-based SM-3s. The question is whether the USA will actually increase its planned buys of SM-3 in response, something that Information Dissemination’s report suggests hasn’t really been thought through yet. The US Navy’s next 5-year budget plan will tell the tale.
With that cost and architecture change comes a 3rd consideration: greater capacity for allied burden-sharing. Several other nations deploy and will deploy AEGIS ships that could be upgraded to SM-3 BMD capability, including Japan (Kongo class, being upgraded), South Korea (KDX-III), Spain and Australia (F100), plus the non-AEGIS F124 frigates fielded by Germany and the Netherlands. The SM-3 missile has already been exported, and could easily be exported more widely. Gen. Cartwright cited the potential for development of a common architecture linking land and naval systems, which would be deployed in Europe, Asia, Israel, and elsewhere. The architecture is being developed to incorporate non-American systems, and Israel’s IAI/Boeing Arrow was specifically cited. Gates added that talks along these lines had begun with Arab Gulf states, who are already developing their own missile defense preparations based on regional command and control systems, Patriot missiles, and possibly THAAD and MBDA’s comparable Aster-30 SAMP/Ts.
Meanwhile, THAAD missiles are still scheduled to deploy to Europe in 2009, as part of operational testing, and the system is still planned for roll-out as the Army’s area-defense weapon. The USA is also still interested in adding 2-stage capability to its GMD/GBI interceptors in Alaska and California, in order to improve their speed and increase their range. The big winner in these changes, however, is unquestionably Raytheon’s SM-3. Pentagon: Gates/ Cartwright press conference | Pentagon: DoD/ Czech MoD press conference | Aviation Week | Aviation Week Ares | Defense Tech called it early | Information Dissemination | Lexington Institute.
Switch to EPAA
August 18/09: Onto land. In a presentation at the 2009 Space and Missile Defense Conference & Exhibition in Huntsville, AL, Raytheon announces that it is developing a land-based system SM-3 system that would work with THAAD’s Raytheon-made AN/TPY-2 long range radar, and could be ready as early as 2013.
The presentation states that this solution could provide Israel a near-term solution to counter ballistic missiles from Iran, given the deployment of TPY-2 radars in Israel by the US government. It is also reportedly under consideration for use in Europe as the missile component of planned deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.
It’s no accident that this comes just as Boeing announces a “mobile GMD” proposal for Europe by 2015, and Lockheed Martin has gone farther by submitting a modified THAAD proposal to the US Missile Defense Agency for consideration in the 2011 budget. Lockheed Martin has already invested privately funded R&D into a 21″ wide THAAD variant that would nearly double the Army interceptor missile’s range. Current SM-3s are 13.5″ in diameter, current THAADs are 14.5″, and the proposed SM-3 Block II being developed in partnership with Japan will also be 21″ in diameter. It would appear that a competition for the forward-deployed theater defense role may be brewing. Arutz Sheva | Reuters | Aviation Week re: shifts in doctrine | Aviation Week re: THAAD | Jerusalem Post re: Boeing’s “mobile GBI”.
April 27/09: Study. Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun reports that the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has started studying a new missile defense system capable of launching the Standard Missile-3 from the ground.
Aug 4/09: Study. Colin Clark of DOD Buzz publishes a short video interview with Raytheon VP of advanced missile defense and directed energy Mike Booen. The interview took place at the 2009 Paris Air Show, and the topic is the $50 million FY 2010 US military budget request to study land-based SM-3 deployment.
July 17/08: Israel. Aviation Week reports that the US Missile Defense Agency is considering a land-based variant of the SM-3 Standard missile, at Israel’s request:
“SM-3 prime contractor Raytheon is examining a range of options — including a moveable, but not highly mobile, system that could fill Israel’s needs. Very few modifications would be needed for the missile and some tweaks would be required in the command and control system. The system would employ the same vertical launch modules, in an eight-pack configuration, used in the Aegis ship-based system.”
Appendix A: EPAA – The Rationale for The Switch GBI Missile loadingWhen it was first announced in 2009, land-based deployment of SM-3 missiles was seen as a political move. That’s partly true. The proposed GBI missile is so powerful that it could be fitted with a nuclear warhead, and become a serviceable MRBM itself. This made Russia very uneasy. Then, too, a massive American investment in fixed site deployments, in countries that could cave in to pressure and ask the USA to leave later on, was both politically and financially problematic.
There’s also a valid military rationale in the European theater for replacing the longer-range Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system used in the USA itself, with the shorter-range and seemingly less-capable SM-3. The bottom line is more missiles, in semi-mobile locations. SM-3 missiles cost about 80% less than GMD’s GBI missiles, and the ground-based infrastructure of adapted Mk.41 vertical launchers and mobile radars is also less expensive than GMD’s full multi-silo complex and fixed radar. Now throw in the ability to move those assets once they’re built, and to quickly bulk up defenses using similar systems deployed at sea. That’s very useful against an enemy who is building a lot of MRBM/IRBM missiles, and could easily use a mass rush offense to overwhelm limited numbers of GBI interceptors – possibly coupled with terrorist operations against their fixed GMD launch complexes.
All of the rationales regarding mobile options vs. fixed sites evaporated when the US MDA switched to the Aegis Ashore configuration, which shares all of the same drawbacks inherent to fixed GMD deployments. The cost benefits remain intact, however, and so does the rationale for deploying more missiles in theater.
Meanwhile, the switch had political costs. Countries like Poland and the Czech Republic are out of range for naval SM-3 Block 1 coverage, and would require too many THAAD batteries on land. That had prompted the push for GBI missiles, and those governments had held firm in the face of domestic political controversy. The USA’s revised plans dealt them a political setback, and delayed meaningful local missile defenses until around 2015 or later. The shift was somewhat jarring, and the Czech Republic subsequently dropped out of US missile defense plans. In 2012, Poland followed with a declaration that it would deploy its own parallel system.
Israel’s Possible Rationales Arrow test conceptStatements from Raytheon indicated that Israel was already doing research into a land-based SM-3, despite its existing Patriot PAC-2 GEM+ and Arrow-2 architecture. In the end, however, Israel maintained of its focus on an improved “Arrow-3” interceptor, and America agreed to support that program in the FY 2010 budget. Those developments leave dim odds for land-based SM-3s in Israel.
The question is why they were interested in the first place. Several possibilities exist that might justify an Israeli desire to retain an active Arrow missile fleet, and still deploy the SM-3s.
One is the naval defense option. While Israel has apparently decided on a different direction, its proposed LCS-I frigates would have possessed the ability to fire SM-3 missiles, and their proposed MEKO derivatives might still have that if they’re equipped with strike-length Mk. 41 VLS launchers. The Arrow missile has not been integrated with the Mk.41 VLS, and the program has not described navalization plans.
The 2nd possible justification for an Israeli SM-3 buy revolves around and command-and-control developments. Like the LCS-I, any new Israeli frigates firing an SM-3 would need to link to an anti-ballistic capable radar for guidance. Israel already fields ABM-capable land radars like its “Green Pine” system, and the USA has reportedly moved manned AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars into Israel as additional insurance against a Second Holocaust perpetrated by Iran. Linkage of a naval missile’s guidance to those kinds of land platforms would involve many of the same modifications required by a fully land-launched and controlled SM-3, and statements by America’s General Cartwright say that the USA’s land-based anti-missile command and control systems that will work with land-based SM-3s, are also being developed to include the Arrow.
The 3rd possible justification is range. The SM-3 boasts a range about 5x longer than the Arrow-2, at 300 miles vs. 50-60 miles. A tripartite system of SM-3, Arrow-2, and Patriot missiles would effectively offer the 3 layered tiers required by a country of Israel’s size: national defense/ first line of defense, defense of key regions/ second shot, and defense of specific sites/ final attempt.
Fourth, deployment would coincide with a growing shift in the USA to focus on “ascent-phase intercept” of medium (MRBM) and intermediate-range (IRBM) missiles. If the launchers are deployed close enough to the firing missile, interceptions become possible sometime between the boost and mid-course phases during entry into space, right before the target missile can begin deploying decoys. The Middle East’s compressed distances are a threat, due to low warning times and the resulting hair-triggers. They might also be an opportunity.
Finally, the SM-3 is an active production item for the USA and Japan, which leverages the infrastructure created by a large-scale, full-rate production set of programs. This means that SM-3s can be produced far faster than additional Arrow missiles. If developments in Iran are leading Israel to conclude that it needs to deploy many more theater-range defensive missiles within a short period of time, the THAAD and Arrow programs are unlikely to be able to handle that request due to the stage they’re at, and the industrial framework around them. That would leave the SM-3 as Israel’s only realistic rapid plus-up option.
In the end, as noted above, Israel decided to improve its Arrow system and create the Arrow-3, with funding assistance from the USA. The country clearly considers ballistic missile defense to be a strategic technology capability, has yet to purchase ships that would make naval SM-3 deployment possible, and have already spent the money to integrate the Arrow system with Israel’s air defense architecture. The SM-3’s land-based progress will happen elsewhere.
Additional Readings Background: EPAA SystemsThe FC-1/ JF-17 Thunder is a joint Chinese-Pakistani project that aimed to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on western firms for advanced fighters, by fielding a low-cost multi-role lightweight fighter that can host modern electronics and precision-guided weapons. It isn’t a top-tier competitor, but it represents a clear step up from Pakistan’s Chinese MiG-19/21 derivatives and French Mirage III/V fighters. This positioning addresses a budget-conscious, “good enough” performance market segment that the West once dominated, but has nearly abandoned in recent decades.
Pakistan has fielded JF-17s in squadron strength, with more on order and a Block II R&D program nearing completion. India’s competing Tejas fighter is overcoming project delays by looking to foreign component sources, but Pakistan and China remain out front with their offering, even though they began their project much later than India did. Pakistan and China have even set up a joint JF-17 marketing agency to promote export sales, which hasn’t paid off as quickly as they had hoped, but it would be unwise to count them out just yet…
The JF-17/FC-1 is a $20 million class fighter designed as a co-operative venture between Pakistan and China to replace Chinese A-5C (massively modified MiG-19), F-7P (MiG-21+), and French Mirage 3/5 aircraft in Pakistan’s fleet. China also has options to produce them, but has made no firm decisions and seems unenthusiastic. It’s a comparable peer for India’s still-under-development LCA Tejas, Taiwan’s F-CK-1 Ching Kuo fighters, and South Korea’s F/A-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer & light fighter.
F-20 (1980s)The design itself is fairly conventional, resembling a somewhat boxy F-20. A drag chute can be installed at the base of the rudder, in order to make landings easier and shorter. Power will be provided by the RD-93 derivative of the MiG-29’s RD-33 engine; it’s proven and widely used, but known to leave smoke trails. Future models may see the engine replaced with China’s WS-13, an RD-93 copy with some modifications. Avionics involve a modern “glass” cockpit of digital screens, using Chinese technologies, and commercial processors. Reports indicate that aircraft software coding was done in the commercial C++ language, rather than a military language like Ada.
Farnborough arrayConflicting reports exist regarding its databuses: MIL-STD-1553, or the more advanced MIL-STD-1760. That will affect its range of usable weapons, and GPS-guided weapons in particular benefit from the -1760 databus.
China’s KLJ-7 mechanically-scanned array serves as the radar, despite past media references to a deal with Thales, or to the Selex Galileo’s Grifo. Grifo already equips Pakistan’s F-7s (Grifo-7), and some of its Mirage III/Vs (Grifo M3/M5), and Selex Galileo’s own materials [PDF] describe the Grifo S7 as “The version selected for the JF-17 aircraft.” Even so, multiple reports from November 2010 consistently point to the Chinese KLJ-7 instead. the following table compares the JF-17 with India’s indigenous Tejas fighter, which has taken far longer to develop and isn’t quite in service yet:
At present, the main questions concerning Pakistan’s JF-17s revolve around integrated sensors and weapons, rather than the aircraft itself or its performance. The Farnborough 2010 display showed Chinese air-air missiles, a LeiShi-6 guided glide bomb, China’s C802 anti-ship missile, and even a WMD-7 laser designator pod. Full status as a recognized multirole fighter, however, must wait until their ability to use precision laser guidance and/or GPS-guided ground attack weapons is confirmed.
JF-17/FC-1: The Program PAF F-16A drops Mk.82sSino Defense reminds us that the JF-17/FC-1 ‘Xiaolong’ has a long history. The site recalls that China signed a $550 million agreement with Grumman in 1986 to modernise its J-7 fighter (MiG-21 copy) under the “Super-7” upgrade project, with US and British firms competing to provide the engine and avionics. The project was canceled after the Tienanmen Square massacre, but Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation managed to continue the program with its own resources, and the project was eventually re-branded as FC-1 (Fighter China-1).
The next big step forward for FC-1 came when the USA imposed military export sanctions in response to Pakistan’s nuclear program, and to Chinese-Pakistani transfers of ballistic missile components. With spares for its top-of-the-line F-16s in question, and additional F-16s removed as an option, Pakistan sought help from its Chinese ally.
A joint development and production agreement was signed in June 1999, with China Aviation Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) and Pakistan each contributing 50% of the estimated $150 million in development costs. The design was finalized in 2001, with initial prototype flights beginning in 2003. A JF-17 did not fly with its full avionics suite until 2006, but testing and development appear to have progressed smoothly. Until political complications intervened.
Unfortunately for India, the engine export understanding that they thought they had with Russia, was reversed by Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin. JF-17 production began in 2009, complete with Russian engines.
Chinese J-7EUltimately, Pakistan intends to induct 150-250 JF-17s into its air force, replacing most of its Mirage III/Vs, F-7s (Chinese MiG-21 copies), and A-5Cs (massively modified Chinese MiG-19 derivatives). The A-5s will retire more or less immediately as JF-17s enter service, and the Mirages are next in line for replacement due to their uncertain spares situation. The number of JF-17s requested could rise, and some reports place potential Pakistani orders as high as 300 aircraft. Even at the JF-17’s bargain price, however, Pakistan’s budgets will be hard-pressed to afford that many. In the short term, even reaching the desired goal of 150 JF-17s could prove challenging without external aid.
China has remained on the fence regarding the program, with no PLAAF orders to date. Their air force appears to be more focused on their 4+ generation J-10 design, which offers more advanced capabilities and aerodynamics. The FC-1 remains a candidate to replace large numbers of PLAAF MiG-17s (J-5) and MiG-19s (J-6/ Q-5), if the PLAAF decides it needs to take steps to maintain the size of its force. If not, the FC-1’s role is likely to resemble the Northrop F-5’s. The USA sold them in large numbers to other countries, even as the USAF equipped itself with larger and more expensive designs instead.
Stuck in Sichuan: The SagaThe Pakistan Government had hoped to sign a deal to acquire 150 JF-17/FC-1 fighters in 2007, with 8 aircraft in service by year’s end. China had reportedly even bought 100 Klimov RD-93 engines from Russia for installing on JF-17s, with an option to contract for another 400 engines.
In January 2007, however, Forecast International reported that Russia had refused permission for the transfer of its RD-93 engines, derived from the RD-33 that equips the MiG-29. According to FI the decision came only a few days after a visit to India by Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, during which a number of joint defense projects were discussed and agreements were signed. January 2007, DID:
“The military world has no shortage of irony. The defense industry has its moments too, as Pakistan just discovered. An aircraft whose development was driven by military sanctions from the US and Europe is now derailed by military sanctions [regarding its engines]. This leaves the Pakistani Air Force dependent on an alternative from… America. Meanwhile, the Chinese are left with no export launch customer for a plane they may now have to reluctantly buy themselves, instead of the favoured and more capable J-10. Somewhere in Delhi, champagne is pouring – but first, a bit of background.”
Coincidence? Didn’t look like it. Replacement with another engine? Unless it’s a very close copy, that requires re-work of the entire fighter design and takes years. Just ask the Chinese J-10 project team.
As it turned out, however, that wasn’t necessary. The arms market also features no shortage of change, and Russia eventually chose not prevent re-export of the RD-93 engines, in an announcement that caught even India’s diplomats by surprise. The RD-93 comes with some disadvantages, including a tendency to leave smoke trails, but tacit re-export approval removed a huge potential roadblock, and let the program proceed more or less on schedule.
Updates and Key Events 2010 – 20151st & 2nd squadrons stand up; Fatal JF-17 crash; JF-17 Block II production begins; Myanmar interested again; Saudi Arabia’s interest a puzzle. Dubai 2013
December 22/15: Malaysia may consider purchasing Pakistan’s JF-17 aircraft as part of its current fighter replacement program. Malaysian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Dr. Hasrul Sani made the announcement citing the excellent relations both nations currently have in terms of defense cooperation. The sale would also see further increase in the bilateral trade between the two, which currently stands at over $2 billion per annum. Other options currently being considered are the Dassault Rafale, Boeing’s F/A-18 and Lockheed Martin’s F-16V. The interest in the JF-17 comes alongside the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project which will see over $40 billion invested in Pakistan’s infrastructure and economic development. Dr. Sani stated that the whole region would stand to benefit from the CPEC project.
November 24/15: Pakistan is to keep using the the Russian made RD-93 engine for its series of JF-17 fighters. The confirmation comes after hints made by Chinese officials that Pakistan would revert back to an original arrangement with China but Pakistan Air Force (PAF) officials are happy with the Russian engine. PAF officials have said that improvements to the JF-17 along with the reliability of the RD-93 engine has resulted in a number of interested parties. Russia on the other hand will be happy to see product solidarity due to economic sanctions over Ukraine closing many export markets.
October 12/15: Sri Lankan Air Force officials are due to arrive in Islamabad in November to discuss a possible acquisition of JF-17 fighters, according to Pakistani press reports. Sri Lanka played down reports in June that the country was the first export customer for the JF-17, stating that a decision has yet to be made on a possible procurement of the fighter.
June 15/14: Myanmar. The government of Myanmar has stepped back from its close Chinese alliance in recent years, but reports indicate that they may be taking a second look at the JF-17. The junta recently bought more Russian MiG-29s instead (q.v. Dec 23/09), but MiG-29s are notoriously difficult to keep in service. The problem is a combination of short part lifespans, and byzantine Russian “service” procedures.
“The Government of Myanmar is planning to acquire technologies from China and Pakistan to build JF-17 multirole combat aircraft at its own aircraft factory to boost its Air Force…. The force is plagued by serviceability issues due to lack of spare parts and trained manpower however introduction of JF-17 would mean that Myanmar Air Force will be investing in such areas to mitigate its short comings.”
Production may be a stretch, but parts production and a local servicing depot may be doable. The report offers an existing force breakdown of 32 MiG-29B/SE as the modern force, plus 25 F-7Ms (Chinese MiG-21 knockoff) and 21 Nanchang A-5C (Chinese plane based on MiG-19 but heavily modified). A mix of 16 Chinese (K-8) and Serbian (Sokol Galeb) jet trainers are used for ground attack roles, as well as pilot training. Sources: Burma Times, “Myanmar plans JF-17 production” | The Diplomat, “Burma to Purchase Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Fighter Jets” | See also DID, “More MiG-29s for Myanmar”.
June 20/14: R&D. Defense News begins a report in a very odd way, saying that “Contrary to speculation, development of the JF-17 aircraft continues apace…” We’re scratching our heads as to why anyone ever thought otherwise, given announcements re: Block II development and the jet’s clear importance to Pakistan. Indeed, Chief Project Director and Air Vice Marshal Javed Ahmed was quick to aver that the PAF’s 3rd squadron would be operational by year-end.
Ahmed adds that avionics improvements are underway, using the words “situational awareness” but not specifically corroborating rumors of a helmet-mounted display. Near-term improvements will also reportedly focus on “integrating some additional smart and indigenously developed weapons”. The Chinese NRIET KLJ-7 will remain the fighter’s main radar, however, as possible substitutions won’t be considered until the program reaches Block III. An AESA radar, and the possibility of offering drop-in western radar & avionics for export, are both under investigation.
On the other hand, former Pakistani Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail claims that the JF-17’s range is an issue, citing the frequency of flights with drop tanks and the averaged length of sorties. MiG-29s, which use a very similar engine, are known to have range issues, but the JF-17 uses only 1 engine. The Klimov RD-93 is less efficient than GE’s F404/F414, however, and public information gives the JF-17 fuel reserves and operational weight that are similar to the short range Indian Tejas LCA. Tufail may have a point. Sources: Defense News, “JF-17 Developments Indicate Aircraft Is Still On Track”.
Jan 23/14: Saudi Arabia. After Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Prince Salman Bin Sultan visits Pakistan and tours the JF-17 production complex, the World Tribune reports that:
“…officials said representatives of the ministry as well as the Royal Saudi Air Force were examining the feasibility of procuring JF-17 as part of cooperation with Islamabad. “This project could provide the kingdom with technology that could be used in future projects,” an official said.”
Saudi Arabia is an important donor to Pakistan’s government, and there are persistent rumors that the Saudis even financed Pakistan’s nuclear program. On the one hand, JF-17 cooperation could make sense industrially. The Saudis tried to set up a local Eurofighter final assembly and check-out line with BAE, but the kingdom backed off when it became clear that this wouldn’t work. The JF-17 might be an easier starting point, and it would also fit with growing Saudi interest in defense equipment that requires zero American involvement.
On the other hand, there’s no real hole in the RSAF that JF-17s need to fill. The RSAF’s F-5s are no longer frontline fighters; they and the Tornado F3 ADV interceptors have effectively been replaced by an order for 72 high-end Eurofighter Typhoons. The Typhoons already offer a potent non-American option, and the depth and breadth of the pre-existing Al-Yamamah partnership with Britain would make any cancellation a region-altering diplomatic event. Meanwhile, an in-progress order for 84 new Boeing F-15SA Strike Eagles is well underway, and contract penalties would make the order almost pointless to cancel at this point.
The Saudis are already expanding their fighter fleet with these buys. They would have to either expand it further to accommodate the JF-17 – or become industrial partners, and then use JF-17s as a form of regional aid that isn’t subject to American ITAR regulations. Most likely: they do none of those things, while making an ally feel good by being publicly impressed, and holding some initial discussions that go nowhere. Sources: World Tribune, “Saudi eyeing Pakistan’s JF-17 fighter jet, modeled from U.S. F-16”.
Dec 19/13: Block-II begins. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex in Kamra rolls out their 50th JF-17 fighter, and reportedly launches production of the Block II variant with improved avionics, air-to-air refueling capability, and additional weapons. Flight International’s World Air Forces 2013 lists total Pakistan’s JF-17 orders as 70 planes, plus 50 more pending finalization. Meanwhile:
“Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif…. mentioned the Pakistan China Economic Corridor project, which would link Gwadar to China through Khunjrab Pass and said that economic zones would be set up along the Corridor. The project would have far-reaching impact on the future of both countries, he added. Nawaz said cheap labour in Pakistan would also contribute to the smooth materialisation of projects with China.”
Block 2 production is expected to continue until at least 2016, after which some sources say manufacture of Block 3 will begin. That variant may get a new engine, either an updated RD-93 or possibly a Chinese engine if one is ready. Sources: DAWN, “Production of improved version of JF-17 aircraft launched” | Pakistan’s The Nation, “Production of JF-17 fighter jet launched” | Defense News, “Pakistan Rolls Out 50th JF-17, Block II Production To Commence” | The Diplomat, “Pakistan Begins Producing Block-II JF-17 Aircraft”.
Block II begins
Nov 19/13: Weapons. Flight International carries a report regarding a large Chinese precision strike missile. It’s hard to say how accurate such presentations are, but here’s the claim:
“A full list of specifications for the CM-400AKG missile was played on a loop inside the AVIC exhibit stand at the Dubai air show; a marketing venue for the JF-17 fighter jointly developed between China and Pakistan…. News reports have indicated the CM-400 has entered service with the Pakistan air force. The AVIC video notes vaguely that the 910kg (2,000lb) weapon “can be carried by JF-17, etc”. It is usually compared with the Indian/Russian Brahmos high-speed cruise missile.”
The CM-400AKG export variant of China’s YJ-12 missile supposedly has a reach of up to 130 nmi, in order to keep it within MTCR treaty limits. It flies at Mach 3+ and high altitude, using GPS/INS as base guidance within 50m CEP, with the ability to switch to Imaging Infrared for final targeting of moving items like ships, possibly augmented by L/S/X-band passive radar. Sources: Flight Global, “DUBAI: China details performance of ‘carrier killer’ missile for JF-17”.
Nov 14/11: A Pakistani JF-17 crashes in the mountainous Attock Distrct, killing Squadron Leader Muhammad Hussain. He had ejected successfully, but his parachute failed to open properly. Pak Tribune.
Crash
May 19/11: Shortly after American special forces killed Osama Bin Laden in a unilateral raid 40 miles from Islamabad, Pakistan announces a wide swath of major defense projects with China. The most consequential is that the deep water port of Gwadar in western Pakistan will be run by its paymasters, the Chinese government. Pakistan also wants the Chinese to build a naval base there, and no doubt expects to have its own ships use that facility alongside the Chinese PLAN.
The flashiest aspect of the announcements involve the JF-17, with reports that China will be sending Pakistan 50 improved JF-17 fighters, with upgraded electronics. To date, JF-17s have rolled off of Pakistani manufacturing/finishing lines, but these will reportedly involve more Chinese manufacturing to speed delivery, arriving within 6 months. Reports say that China is financing the deal, though they differ on the terms, and how much of the cost China is absorbing. Some reports paint the fighters as more or less a gift.
The interest in a batch of 50 more JF-17s isn’t a surprise, nor are the planned improvements (vid. Dec 22/10 entry). If deliveries do complete in that time frame, the end of 2011 will see Pakistan with over 92 serving JF-17s. India’s comparable Tejas will have over a year to go before the 1st squadron is formally inducted, and will still be waiting to conduct qualification tests of key weapons. DAWN | DAWN re: expediting | Kakuda Hafiz | Tribune || India’s NDTV | Economic Times || Wall St. Journal.
Chinese A-5/Q-5April 12/11: 2nd squadron. PAF No. 16 Squadron at PAFB Peshawar becomes the 2nd operational squadron with the CAIC-PAC JF-17 Thunder.
The ceremony also marks the retirement of the PAF’s A-5C Fantans, a heavily modified derivative of the MiG-19. The Panthers of 16 Sqn. were the 1st PAF squadron to covert to the A-5C in 1983, and the last to operate the type. AirForces Monthly.
March 1/11: Aviation Week reports that Pakistan is in negotiations with the U.S. to get more Lockheed Martin F-16s, but also quotes PAF Air Chief Marshall Rao Qamar Suleman as saying that indigenous projects will remain a priority. As part of that effort, Pakistan intends to eventually field a supplementary datalink, which would work alongside the Link 16 systems carried by the F-16s and communicate with the JF-17 fleet. With respect to the JF-17s:
“Rao says Pakistan will have the second squadron of JF-17s enter operation at the end of March while simultaneously phasing out all of its Nanchang A-5s… “As for the Chengdu F-7s and Dassault Mirages, we will phase these out as we get JF-17s,” Rao says. “Some of Pakistan’s Mirages are the oldest in the world,” he says, adding that some were built in 1967. Phasing out the older Mirages is a top priority. The Mirages are difficult and costly to maintain because no one is producing spare parts for these aircraft anymore, he says. “We are getting secondhand parts, but we don’t know the history of these spare parts we are getting. It’s a flight safety issue and a nightmare for me,” he adds.”
Jan 26/11: Iraq. JF-17s for Iraq? Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh tells a press conference that the Council of Ministers has approved the purchase of 18 F-16s, and budgeted an unspecified sum. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who is also the acting Defense Minister, would negotiate the deal’s final parameters. There has been talk of a $13 billion weapons buy, which would include the existing DSCA request for F-16IQs, but no confirmation as yet.
The USA will reportedly deliver the F-16s to Iraq within 2-3 years, but in the meantime, and even for some time thereafter, Iraq will not be able to police its own airspace effectively. Iraq Order of Battle author DJ Elliott believes that 2018 would be the earliest. The French are presenting a complementary offer of upgraded Mirage F1s, and DJ Elliott reports that the Iraqis may also be looking at a 3rd option: China & Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder. Iraq-Business News | DJ Elliott’s Montrose Toast | UPI | Saudi Arab News re: Iraqi readiness.
Dec 22/10: 1st squadron. Aviation Week reports that about half of the 42 JF-17s Pakistan has ordered (q.v. March 7/09) are now in place, and one squadron is operational. PAF officials now plan to set up a 2nd unit. The focus, as is true in all initial inductions, is on getting all staff familiar with the equipment. Fully qualifying crews for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions will be the next step.
PAF Air Commodore Junaid told the magazine that the government hopes to order a second batch of 50 fighters in 2011, with undefined “enhanced features,” though the avionics package fielded on the baseline JF-17 has reportedly been a positive surprise.
PL-12 & PL-8 on JF-17Nov 18/10: Avionics & Weapons. Reports from Pakistan indicate that the PAF’s JF-17s will be equipped with Chinese radars and SD-10A/PL-12 medium range air-to-air missiles, thanks to a recent contract with China.
The Thales/MBDA ATE consortium had been seen as front runners for a $1.2 billion contract to equip the first 50 Pakistani JF-17s with radars and missiles, and could stand to reap another EUR 15 million or so per plane thereafter. In April 2010, however, Le Monde reported that the French government had refused to clear the deal. That’s not surprising, since France has a $4+ billion contract to build submarines for India, is competing in the $10-11 billion M-MRCA fighter competition, and wants to sell equipment like frigates and missiles in future. France isn’t in the same geo-political position as the USA, which means retaliation for a defense sale of that magnitude is more likely. France’s DCNS still won India’s Scorpene submarine contract, despite building Agosta AIP submarines for Pakistan, but the French government evidently decided not to chance it this time.
PAF Chief Air Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman told The Nation in an exclusive interview that “PAF has no plans to install Western devices and weapons on the aircraft for the time being.” Pakistan’s The Nation || Agence France Presse | India’s Hindustan Times | Russia’s RIA Novosti | India’s Sify.
July 5/10: Engines & Egypt. India isn’t the only party with reservations about Russian engine exports for the JF-17. United Aircraft Corp. CEO Mikhail Pogosyan publicly opposes the sale of 100 RD-93 jet engines to China, citing the threat of FC-1/JF-17 competition against the MiG-29. He says that said the re-export of technologies should be approved by the original manufacturers to avoid unfair competition, but Rosoboronexport’s position is that re-export rights is a government decision with no manufacturer input. RIA Novosti adds that:
“A Russian aircraft industry source said the FC-1 is inferior to MiG-29 in performance, but sells for about $10 million, while the price of a MiG-29 is about $35 mln. MiG-29s are currently competing with FC-1s in an Egyptian tender on the delivery of 32 fighters. In addition, Egypt has launched negotiations with Pakistan on the licensed production of FC-1 aircraft. Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) approved the re-export of RD-93 engines to Egypt as part of the FC-1 fighter package in November 2007.”
Feb 18/10: 1st squadron. The first squadron of JF-17 Thunder aircraft is formally indicted into Pakistan’s Air Force by Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman. DAWN.
1999 – 2009From MoU through test aircraft, 8 initial planes, and an order for 42; Russia OK’s engines to allow the program to proceed; 1st locally-built JF-17 rolls out; Export loss in Myanmar.
Lift-off?
(click to view full)
Dec 23/09: Myanmar. Myanmar (ex-Burma) reportedly buys 20 MiG-29s from Russia, preferring them over Chinese options that are said to have included the JF-17/ FC-1. Read “More MiG-29s for Myanmar.”
Myanmar loss
Nov 23/09: Industrial. The first JF-17 Thunder built at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) at Kamra rolls out. The rest of the order is expected to undergo final assembly at by PAC Kamra within the next 3 years. Associated Press of Pakistan | DAWN | Pakistan’s Daily Times | Pakistan’s The Nation | Pakistan Times | SANA News || Chandigarh Tribune | Press Trust of India | China’s Xinhua.
March 7/09: +42. The Associated Press of Pakistan reports that a contract for 42 co-produced JF-17s has been signed in Islamabad by China’s CATIC and the Pakistani Air Force, financed by “seller’s credit.” Production capacity is listed at 15 aircraft in the first year, rising to 30 aircraft per year thereafter.
Pakistan has been flying 8 aircraft to work out tactics, techniques, and procedures, and expects to stand up the first JF-17 squadron before the end of 2009. The aircraft will be based at Peshawar, alongside existing Chinese-made Q-5/A-5C “Fantan” fighters that are a hugely modified Chinese derivative of the MiG-19, and their accompanying JJ-6/FT-6 MiG-19 trainers.
The article adds a quote from Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mehmood Ahmed. He reiterated that cooperation on China’s canard-winged J-10/FC-20 is also progressing, with first deliveries to Pakistan expected in 2014-15. CATIC’s President MA Zhiping reportedly added that the first FC-20 aircraft built under that agreement would fly in 2009. APP | Pakistan’s The News.
42 JF-17 Block I
Jan 1/09: Industrial. Associated Press of Pakistan quotes Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) chairman Air Marshal Khalid Chaudhry HI (M) T Bt re: the JF-17 project, and PAC’s work more generally. The report was triggered by briefings associated with a visit from Sheikh Aftab Ahmad, head of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly on Defence Production. Air Marshal Chadhry reportedly said that PAC has the capability to manufacture 75% of the JF-17’s avionics, and 58% of its air frame.
The firm is currently deepening its experience and earning revenue by overhauling about 180 aircraft engines and 60 aircraft per year, including work undertaken by PAC’s Mirage rebuild factory that helps maintain Pakistan’s aged Mirage III/V fighters, and refurbishes scrap Mirages from other countries in order to keep overall fleet numbers up. High-tech avionics machinery recently imported “from various developed countries” is extending PAC’s capacity, and so has a $15 million contract from Boeing for aircraft parts.
Nov 28/08: Exports. Pakistani Ministry of Defence Production Secretary Shahid Siddiq Tirmizi claims that as many as 8 countries have shown interest in buying the JF-17 Thunder fighter. Azerbaijan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe are 3 countries that have been linked to export interest in the past. The News International.
A Pakistan Defense article widens that potential field to include Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka.
Nov 20/08: Pakistani Chief of Air Staff ACM(Air Chief Marshal) Tanvir Mahmood Ahmad says that aid the first JF-17 squadron would be inducted into the PAF fleet in the first quarter of 2009.
His accompanying announcement that another 36 high-tech combat aircraft (FC-20, probably a version of China’s J-10) would be inducted into the PAF fleet by 2010 got even more attention, but that didn’t come to pass. Pakistan Daily | Pak Tribune.
April 11/08: Exports. Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that:
“Pakistan and China have established a joint marketing organisation to promote international sales of their JF-17 ‘Thunder’ fighter aircraft, the head of the main Pakistani arms export agency has told Jane’s. Major General Muhammad Farooq, director general of Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organisation (DEPO), described the JF-17 in early April as an ideal “choice for countries which are mindful of their finances.”
March 19/08: An article in Pakistan Defence claims that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) now has 8 JF-17 Thunder aircraft, after 6 more planes were received this March. All 8 will be used for testing and evaluation; the aircraft hasn’t been formally inducted into service yet.
Serial production has begun, and Pakistan’s Air Cheif Marshal reportedly said that about 60% of the airframe and 80% of the avionics would be manufactured in Pakistan by 2010, with production capacity rising to 25 aircraft per year by 2011. If true, it seems likely that deals with significant industrial offsets may be in the cards, as the article also claims that negotiations have begun with British, Italian, and French defense firms over potential avionics and other systems; France has reportedly offered its RC-400 radar and MBDA MICA missile.
Finally, the article claims that that:
“Thirteen countries have so far expressed interest in purchasing the JF-17 aircraft are Azerbaijan, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Algeria and Sudan.”
Jan 22/08: Industrial. According to India Defence, Pakistan’s national TV reports that it has begun in-country manufacturing of the JF-17 fighter. About half of the on-board equipment and avionics will be manufactured in Kamra, Pakistan, with the rest coming from China.
PakAF Chief of Air Staff Ahmed reportedly committed to 15 aircraft built in 2008 and 20 in 2009, with the goal of building 25-30 per year.
FC-1/ JF-17Nov 29/07: Exports. The IWPA reports that:
“Azerbaijan is currently negotiating with Pakistan for the purchase of 24 Chinese-made JF-17 Thunder combat planes, worth between 16 and 18 million dollars each.”
In February 2009, however, Azerbaijan’s APA files a report that says the parties are still in talks, rather than under contract.
Nov 13/07: Jane’s Defense Weekly quotes Pakistani Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mahmood Ahmed as saying that the Pakistan Air Force will have an operational capability with JF-17 Thunder light fighter aircraft by the end of 2008, and expects to have its first 8 aircraft under a “small batch order” within the next few months.
“Speaking to Jane’s at the Dubai Air Show on 12 November, ACM Ahmed dismissed concerns over the Russian RD-93 engine that powers the joint Sino-Pakistan aircraft as “an issue created from here and there.”
April 26/07: Engine OK. India may need to hold that champagne, in the wake of recent reports. India Defence relays a report from the Russian newspaper Kommersant, which said that Vladimir Putin himself had personally supervised and signed a “Sino-Russian Fighter Assembly Agreement” which included joint assembly of JF-17 fighter aircraft with RD-93 engines, and their supply to third countries. Kommersant added that:
“This permission will enable the supply of 150 Chinese JF-17 fighter aircrafts to Pakistan, and help implement the contract for the supply of Russian engines worth USD 238 million.”
Kommersant added that “the permission does not imply Pakistan’s inclusion in the list of countries with which Russia has direct military-technical cooperation.” The question is whether Russian military-technical cooperation would be required under the Sino-Russian agreement. Meanwhile, the Indians appear to have been blindsided. The Press Counsellor of the Indian Embassy in Moscow Ramesh Chandra told Kommersant that “the Embassy was not aware” of the permission for re-export. See India Defence | India’s domain-b.
Russia OKs engines
March 29/07: Program. Pakistan’s The News International references an interview that Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mehmood Ahmed gves to Jane’s:
“The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) aims to acquire 200-250 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1) fighter aircraft in place of the 150 originally envisaged, Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mehmood Ahmed has said… According to Jane’s Russian sources had initially said emphatically, that the RD-93 engines… could not be re-exported to Pakistan. This position was reversed in November 2006… during a joint [Klimov/ Chengdu] press briefing at the Zhuhai Air Show in China… Pakistani sources claim they have a clear understanding from Chinese authorities that there will be no Russian effort to block the supply of the RD-93 engines to Pakistan. “The Chinese have told us the Russians haven’t issued a written licence but the Russians will not block the supply of the RD-93 to Pakistan,” one senior Pakistani government official told Jane’s.”
March 2/07: Delivery. China delivers a pair of JF-17 fighters equipped with Russian-made RD-93 engines to Pakistan, prompting Indian protests that claim a violation of the end-user agreement between Russia and China. The aircraft were officially presented on March 12/07, and made their first public appearance during the Pakistan Day Parade on March 23/07. Scramble.
April 28/06: Testing. PT-04 makes its first flight with fully operational avionics. Source.
April 2004: Testing. Second prototype flies, though some sources contend that the aircraft in question was PT-03 instead. A total of 4 aircraft were manufactured for flight testing, while PT-05 was designed for static fatigue testing on the ground. APP | Wikipedia.
Aug 25/03: Testing. First prototype aircraft flies. Source.
July 1/03: First prototype completes first taxi trials. Source.
May 13/03: First prototype aircraft rolled out. Source.
1st prototype
September 2001: The FC-1/JF-17’s detailed design is finalized. Source.
1999: MoU. China and Pakistan agreed on 50-50 joint development of the FC-1/Super 7.
Development MoU
Additional Readings Background: JF-17 ThunderThe FGM-148 Javelin missile system aimed to solve 2 key problems experienced by American forces. One was a series of disastrous experiences in Vietnam, trying to use 66mm M72 LAW rockets against old Soviet tanks. A number of replacement options like the Mk 153 SMAW and the AT4/M136 spun out of that effort in the 1980s, but it wasn’t until electronics had miniaturized for several more cycles that it became possible to solve the next big problem: the need for soldiers to remain exposed to enemy fire while guiding anti-tank missiles to their targets.
Javelin solves both of those problems at once, offering a heavy fire-and-forget missile that will reliably destroy any enemy armored vehicle, and many fortifications as well. While armored threats are less pressing these days, the need to destroy fortified outposts and rooms in buildings remains. Indeed, one of the lessons from both sides of the 2006 war in Lebanon has been the infantry’s use of guided missiles as a form of precision artillery fire. Javelin isn’t an ideal candidate for that latter role, due to its high cost-per-unit; nevertheless, it has often been used this way. Its performance in Iraq has revealed a clear niche on both low and high intensity battlefields, and led to rising popularity with American and international clients.
Javelin’s development began in 1989 with a contract to develop a replacement for the M47 Dragon wire-guided anti-tank missile – a weapon that left its operator’s head and torso exposed to fire during the missile’s flight, and required a certain level of fine motor control. This was extremely dangerous for the operator, and of questionable effectiveness in genuine combat situations. The body’s survival-level fight or flight chemistry causes a lot of changes, one of which is a severe reduction in fine motor control under intense stress situations. Like, for instance, firing a missile whose flash and plume singles you out on the battlefield, then keeping your torso exposed for up to 10 loooong seconds while enemy machine gunners etc. zero in and try to cut you in two.
Unlike its predecessor, Javelin is be a fire and forget weapon. Its advertised 2.5 km/ 1.5 mile effective range is shorter than some other anti-tank systems, but remains more than double the M47 Dragon’s. Javelin’s cooled imaging infrared (IIR) guidance system can take 30 seconds or more to reach required temperatures for combat use, but once the sensor is ready, it will lock on to a heat emission ‘picture’ in order to hit vehicles, designated spots on the ground, or even helicopters. The operator can choose between top attack against an armored vehicle’s weakest protection, or direct fire, and the missile’s 8.4 kg/ 18.5 pound dual warhead design will defeat even reactive explosive armor protection. Its last key feature is called “soft launch capability,” which is milspeak for “you can launch the missile from inside a building without barbecuing yourself and your squad.”
Javelin fire teamJavelin technically consists of 2 parts. The 26-pound, 80,000+ Javelin missile comes in ready-to-fire tubes. These tubes are attached to the 14-pound, $125,000+ Command Launch Unit (CLU), which contains the weapons optics, electronics, and sensors. The CLU also contains a quiet innovation: embedded training that allows operators to train and qualify through multiple scenarios, using the same equipment they’ll use in the field, but without firing a live missile. While some live-fire is required for truly effective training, the expense of weapons like TOW and Javelin has traditionally limited training and practice to unacceptably low levels – one live firing per year for “trained” crews is not uncommon. Using an embedded virtual training option helps to alleviate this problem.
The Block 1 CLU makes 2 critical improvements: an increase in lethal range to about 3.45 km/ 2.1 miles thanks to improved sensors, and doubled battery life.
The Block 1 missile adds an improved rocket motor that shortens flight time, software enhancements, and an enhanced performance warhead.
The entire Javelin system weighs about 49 pounds, plus about 5 pounds each for spare BA5590 lithium batteries. Each battery lasts up to 4 hours, and 5-10 batteries is a normal range for mission loads.
Adding “Javelin Vehicle Launcher” (JVL) electronics can make the missile compatible with remote weapon systems, which let crews use a machine gun and advanced day/night sensors from inside the vehicle. So far, integration has taken place with Kongsberg’s Protector RWS system, which has a leading position in the international market as the US Army’s standard.
Javelin ATGM: The Program Javelin missile: fire!The JAVELIN Joint Venture was formed by 2 firms. Texas Instruments (now Raytheon Missile Systems) of Dallas, TX is responsible for the Command Launch Unit (CLU), missile guidance electronic unit, system software, and system engineering management. Lockheed Martin Electronics and Missiles (now Missiles and Fire Control), of Orlando, FL is responsible for the missile seeker, missile engineering and assembly. Other key subcontractors include ATK (missile tube), BAE systems (British version’s missile seeker), and DRS (thermal sensors).
Production began in 1994, and the missile equipped its first unit in 1996. initial reliability issues resulted in some delays and additional testing, and full rate production was authorized in May 1997.
The Javelin Block 1 missile upgrade went into production in 2006, with successful qualification tests in 2007. It includes an improved rocket motor that offers more speed for less flight time, an enhanced warhead, improvements to the command launch unit (from 9x to 12x thermal magnification), and upgraded software.
The next step was once called Block 2, and is now called Increment II. it aimed to offer a major increase in range, improve the seeker, and add a multifunction warhead that’s better at killing enemies in the open. The FGM-148F missile will be paired with CLU Block 1 as part of that process, and future efforts will try to lighten the CLU without affecting performance.
These changes brought Javelin Increment II in line with a very attractive prize: the ATGM missile requirements in the USA’s $160+ billion Future Combat Systems meta-program. Even with FCS’ demise, the missiles remain positioned for FCS’ successor, or for future vehicle upgrades. The USA has test-fired Javelin from its CROWS-II remote-control weapon system (RWS), for instance, and Norway has conducted winter tests from a similar Kongsberg RWS. Operationally, it’s the French leading the way, via Javelin integration onto their VAB wheeled APCs.
Javelin may even find itself in naval roles. In 2013, it was successfully test-fired from the very compact and innovative Centurion launcher, which is able to equip vessels as small as patrol boats with decoy countermeasures, signaling, and short-range guided weapons.
Customers & Recent Budgets ExcelJavelin received initial attention and interest from a few countries in its early years, but its successful use in Iraq from mid-2003 onward definitely gave its exports another push. Countries that have requested, bought and fielded Javelin systems now include: Australia (2002), the Czech Republic (2004), France (2010), Indonesia (2013), Ireland (2002), Jordan (2001, 2009, 2013, 2014), Lithuania (2001), New Zealand (2003, 2014), Norway (2005), Oman (2006 & 2012), Qatar (2014), Taiwan (2002 & 2008), the UAE (2008), the UK (2003), and the USA (original).
Sometimes the delay between an initial request and fielding can be surprisingly long. The UAE, for instance, ordered Javelins almost 4 years after their formal 2004 DSCA request. DSCA requests and national selections that have yet to result in publicly-announced contracts or fielding include Canada (2003 request), Bahrain (2006 request), Saudi Arabia (2010), Belgium (2012), and Estonia (2014). Georgia has also reportedly asked for Javelin systems, but there is no official announcement trail, and the outcome isn’t known.
India hasn’t filed a DSCA request, but its soldiers fired 9 Javelin missiles during their October 2009 Yudh Abhyas exercises with the U.S. Army’s visiting 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. Technology transfer issues were turning India toward Javelin’s Spike competitor, and despite American efforts to fix that, India opted for the Spike family in October 2014.
Javelin ATGM: Reports from the Front UK Javelin, Iraq(click to read article)The Javelin missile received very good reviews from the front lines during Operation Iraqi Freedom for its fire-and-forget accuracy and large explosions. Its role in the Battle of Debecka Pass in northern Iraq received particular attention. As Army Magazine notes:
“Debecka Pass basically had two Special Forces ‘A’ Teams facing a battalion-sized enemy force that had 12 tanks, 24 armored personnel carriers, three howitzers, a multiple rocket launcher, an anti-aircraft gun, 150 soldiers and probably another 18 to 20 light vehicles and trucks,” [Raytheon business development manager Roy] Adams said.
“The American force ended up destroying two tanks, eight personnel carriers and four cargo trucks. More important, they were able to hold off that enemy force until the 173rd Airborne Brigade could relieve them and assume ownership of that pass.”
He added, “One of the sergeants who was there said, ‘Without the Javelin weapon systems, 30 Americans never would have left that pass alive.’ “
See also Michael Yon’s May 7/07 article “Rattlesnake,” covering British forces near Basra, Iraq, as they plan and execute a counter-ambush trap using Javelin missiles in a prominent role. While any guided anti-armor missile down to a 1960s-era wire-guided AT-3 Sagger could have been substituted with similar results, note the C4SI (Command, Control, Communication, Computing, Surveillance & Intelligence) issues faced by British forces on the battlefield – issues any substitute weapon would also have to overcome.
Interestingly, the Javelin CLUs have also received rave reviews from the front lines. Their advanced optics and thermal imaging led to widespread and effective use as a day & night surveillance tool.
Javelin: Contracts & Key EventsUnless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued to the JAVELIN joint venture between Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, whose HQ is located in Orlando, FL. Given the proximity of Disney World’s “It’s a Small World After All” ride, Javelin employees have shown commendable restraint in their test venues.
Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are from the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL.
FY 2014 – 2016
India firing
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December 22/15: The purchase of Javelin missiles and command launch units by Lithuania has been cleared by the US State Department in a deal worth $55 million. The acquisition includes 220 anti-tank missiles, 74 launch command units, 10 fly-to-buy missiles, and aims to help modernize the capabilities of the Lithuanian Army to participate in future NATO operations. Recent Russian military action in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 has resulted in neighboring countries increasing their defensive capabilities against any future Russian aggression.
Oct 31/14: Orders. An unfinalized $15.3 million contract foreign military sales contract modification will buy 74 Javelin Block I Missiles, 318 Battery Coolant Units, 22 Outdoor Trainer Instructor Stations, 22 Javelin Weapon System-Student Stations, and 44 tripods. They will be divided among the US Army and foreign customers, including Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Lithuania, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. $11.5 million is committed immediately, using FY 2010, 2011, and 2014 budgets plus FMS money.
This is part of a contract that runs until April 30/23. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal (Missile), Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W31P4Q-13-C-0129, PO 0012).
USA, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Lithuania, Oman, Qatar, UAE
Oct 24/14: India. India’s top-level Defence Acquisition Council clears INR 900 billion in acquisitions. New submarines are the biggest, but there’s also clearance for up to INR 32 billion to buy and license-build about 300 Spike family launcher systems and 8,000 missiles.
Javelin may get a 2nd crack in future (q.v. Nov 11/13), but for now, RAFAEL’s Spike is India’s choice. See DID, “Spike Served: India’s New ATGM.”
Loss in India
Oct 7/14: Estonia. The US DSCA announces Estonia’s official export request for 120 Command Launch Units (CLU) with Integrated Day/Thermal Sight, 102 Battery Coolant Units, 350 Javelin Guided Missiles, 102 Missile Simulation Rounds (MSR), 16 Enhanced Performance Basic Skills Trainers (EPBST), spare and repair parts, rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, battery chargers and dischargers, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, and other U.S. Government and contractor support.
Estponia’s army, the Maavagi, has been using MBDA’s MILAN 2 and the wire-guided Israeli MAPATS, alongside a variety of shoulder-fired rockets. The Estonian Cabinet approved the military’s selection of Javelin in June, and a successful contract would make it their 1st fire-and-forget anti-tank missile.
The estimated cost is up to $55 million, and the principal contractors will be the Raytheon/ Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint Venture in Orlando, FL and Tucson, AZ. Sources: Us DSCA #14-54, “Estonia – Javelin Missiles” | Estonia’s Postimees, “Eesti kavatseb USA-lt osta tankitorjesusteemi”.
DSCA request: Estonia (350)
Sept 30/14: Contract. An unfinalized $84.3 million contract modification buys 534 Javelin Block 1 Missiles and 14 Javelin Command Launch Unit retrofits, divided among the US Army, USMC, and FMS customers Jordan and Qatar. $62.4 million is committed immediately, using FY 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2014 budgets on the US side.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and the overall contract will end on Sept 30/23 (W31P4Q-13-C-0129, PO 0011).
USA, Jordan, Qatar
July 14/14: Contract. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel hosts Qatar’s Minister of State for Defense Affairs Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah at the Pentagon, where they sign letters of offer and acceptance worth around $11 billion for AH-64E Apache helicopters, Patriot PAC-3 air and missile defense systems, and FGM-148 Javelin Block 1 anti-tank missiles (q.v. March 27/14).
As noted earlier, precise numbers and costs aren’t given, but Qatar’s DSCA export request (q.v. March 28/13) included up to 50 launch units and 500 missiles. Sources: Pentagon, “U.S., Qatar Sign Letters on $11 Billion in Helicopters, Defense Systems”.
Qatar order
July 3/14: Order. A $162.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification will buy 570 Block 1 tactical missiles and 284 command launch unit (CLU) retrofits:
Work will be performed at Tucson, Arizona, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14 (W31P4Q-13-C-0129, PO 0007).
USA, Jordan, New Zealand
March 27/14: Qatar. At DIMDEX 2014 in Doha, the Emirate announces $23 billion worth of military contracts, including Javelin missiles. Precise numbers and costs aren’t given, but their DSCA export request (q.v. March 28/13) included up to 50 launch units and 500 missiles. Sources: Al Defaiya, “Qatar Announces Big Defense Deals at DIMDEX 2014” | Arabian Aerospace, “Qatar in $23bn arms order including Apache and NH90 helicopters” | Reuters, “Qatar buys helicopters, missiles in $23 billion arms deals”.
March 4-11/14: Budgets. The US military slowly files its budget documents, detailing planned spending from FY 2014 – 2019. The FY15 order is a 44% cut in missiles ordered to 338, and that theme is repeated from 2015 – 2018.
Over that period, the difference between current projections and past expectations is $156.7 million, and 1,030 missiles. That cost-to-missile ratio may seem disproportionate with current buys. It is. Numbers cuts raise costs, from about $163,000 in the “Past Years” column of the Army’s detailed submission, to a listing of $229,000 per missile in FY15. This will rise to $273,000 per missile by FY19, unless foreign orders create enough scale to push costs back down again. Average cost of the foregone missiles from FY 2015 – 2018, using strict math? $152,136.
Note that the strict math approach isn’t strictly fair. Budgets have to work with actual costs, which can trigger a cycle. Other decisions or outside circumstances can raise costs, which may then force order reductions, which raises costs per unit again. We don’t have a concrete breakdown from within the program, but DoD’s FY15 guide to budgets by weapon system notes that:
“[FY15] Begins procurement of FGM-148F (F model) Javelin missiles with a new Multi-Purpose Warhead, which improves lethality against exposed personnel. Begins development of a lightweight CLU to reduce soldier burden and bulk.”
Centurion launcherDec 10/13: Javelin Naval. Raytheon announces that they’ve successfully fired a Javelin missile from Chemring’s multirole Centurion launcher, during testing at Britain’s Defence Training Estate on Salisbury Plain.
This is a big breakthrough for Javelin, which hasn’t had a naval niche. The Centurion’s extremely small cylindrical footprint, bolt-on installation, and optional stealthy enclosure make it an easy retrofit for vessels ranging from small patrol boats to aircraft carriers. With Javelins on board in a Centurion launcher, the ships would enhance their decoy options, while adding a useful options to kill small boats, or even overflying helicopters and UAVs. Guidance and tracking would need to happen through other systems on the ship, but if Raytheon can integrate one of its surveillance and targeting turrets as an option for ships without IRST/EOTS, that wouldn’t take up much space.
To date, Centurion had been tested as a launcher for mix-and-match 130mm – 170mm missile and torpedo decoys, flares, chaff, etc., but this is the first weapon firing. Raytheon intends to expand the system’s weapon options, though size considerations means that its Griffin-B missile is the only other option that really fits. With that said, there are tube-launched mini-UAVs… Sources: Chemring Centurion mini-site | Raytheon, “Raytheon, Chemring Group complete first live-fire test of CENTURION launcher”.
Nov 11/13: India. Indian defense minister AK Antony and the Defence Acquisition Council give Javelin an opening in India, by delaying any decision on INR 150 billion project to equip Indian military vehicles with 321 vehicle-mounted launchers and 8,356 of RAFAEL’s Spike missiles.
Raytheon had received the Indian Army’s 2010 RFP, but only RAFAEL responded. Europe’s MBDA, Russia’s Rosoboronexport, Raytheon, and General Dynamics reportedly balked at India’s technology-transfer requirements, and did not bid. Javelin needs the competition to be withdrawn and replaced by another RFP, in order to have a chance. At that point, Raytheon would need to choose between Javelin and TOW, and India’s own state-run firms may choose to offer a version of their problem-plagued Nag missile. There were indications that a full competition might be on offer back in March 2013, and the DAC’s non-decision leaves the situation very unclear.
Even if RAFAEL does win, however, Javelin is expected to remain a viable competitor for subsequent infantry buys. Sources: Times of India, “Antony defers decision on critical but controversial missile deals with Israel” | Defense News, “India Again Considers Buying Israeli-made ATGM” | Defense News, “India Pursues Indigenous ATGM Amid Javelin Talks” | Times of India, “Scam-wary Army calls off Israeli missile deal” (March 2013).
FY 2013Orders: USA, Jordan, Indonesia; Requests from Indonesia, Oman & Qatar; India slipping away?; Long shot.
Afghanistan
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Sept 18/13: India. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter is visiting India for talks, which included the Javelin ATGM. Javelin was in danger of falling out of contention due to technology transfer issues, but a new proposal would replicate the PJ-10 BrahMos missile development model for the portable strike missile niche. With encouragement from the Pentagon, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin would co-produce Javelin in India, and would also include India as a development partner for the next iteration of the Javelin system. The response remains to be seen:
“DEPUTY SECRETARY CARTER: Well, India needs to take time to consider that. It’s an offer. It’s in the spirit of the [Defense Trade and Technology Initiative]. And we intend to do that, to develop many ideas, make many proposals…. We don’t have the history that Russia does here and we’re trying to replicate that, or overcome the fact that our defense technology and industrial system and the Indian defence and technology industrial system were segregated for many decades. Now destiny is bringing us together and we need to work to make those two systems mesh. That’s not automatic. They’re different. They have different histories, different bureaucracies and so forth, so it takes the leaders of our two defense industrial systems to help our companies do that.”
Sources: Pentagon, “Media Roundtable with Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter in Delhi, India”.
Sept 6/13: Order. A $67.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 260 Javelin Block 1 rounds and command launch unit (CLU) retrofits for Jordan (q.v. Nov 30/09, May 22/13), Indonesia (q.v. Nov 19/12, May 22/13) and Oman (q.v. Nov 19/12).
A November 2013 release from the Javelin JV adds the US Army and USMC, and corrects this to a $176 million contract for 842 Block I Javelin missile rounds, plus 120 command launch units (CLUs) funded with US Special Defense Acquisition Funds. This exceeds even the May 22/13 and Sept 6/13 announcements put together.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with the CLUs expected for delivery to the US Army beginning in October 2014. US Army Contracting Command, Missile at Redstone Arsenal, AL acts as the buyer and FMS agent to manage the contract (W31P4Q-13-C-0129, PO 0001). Sources: Pentagon, Raytheon, Nov 18/13 release.
USA, Indonesia, Jordan, Oman
May 22/13: Order. A firm-fixed-price, maximum $53.4 million contract for Javelin Block I Tactical Missile Rounds, on behalf of the US Army, US Marine Corps, and the governments of Jordan and Indonesia.
The USA is using a combination of FY 2010 and FY 2013 Procurement funds to pay for their share. Indonesia submitted an export request for up to 180 missiles on Nov 29/12, and they’re a new customer. In contrast, this is Jordan’s 3rd purchase. The US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract, and acts as Jordan and Indonesia’s agent (W31P4Q-13-C-0129).
USA, Jordan & Indonesia
March 28/13: Qatar. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Qatar’s official request to buy 500 Javelin Guided Missiles, 50 Command Launch Units (CLU), Battery Coolant Units, tripods, Missile Simulation Rounds (MSR), the Enhanced Performance Basic Skills Trainer (EPBST), the Javelin Weapon Effects Simulator (JAVWES); plus training, spare and repair parts, rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, battery chargers and dischargers, support equipment, publications and training equipment, and U.S. Government and contractor support.
The estimated cost is up to $122 million, but actual costs will depend on contract negotiations involving the Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint Venture. Implementation of this proposed sale won’t require any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives in Qatar.
Qatar request
Feb 6/13: 4,000m+? The Javelin Joint Venture touts the missile’s ability to engage targets out to 4,750 meters in US Army tests. That’s far beyond the 2,500m specification usually associated with the missile, but as Javelin Joint Venture president Duane Gooden notes, most militaries want at least 4,000m for vehicle-mounted missiles. The clear hope is that the test will open up a larger market for vehicle-mounted Javelins, which is just beginning to emerge (vid June 11/12, Dec 7/10 entries).
Asked for further clarification, Lockheed Martin representatives said that the tests at Eglin AFB, FL used standard Javelin Block I Command Launch Units and missiles. Gooden’s quote had included a caveat about “under favorable conditions,” and the firm explained that this meant avoiding conditions that reduce the effectiveness of the CLU and missile’s Focal Plane Arrays: “dust, snow, rain,” etc. Long-wave infrared usually penetrates those fairly well, compared to visible light, but apparently, there’s still some drop-off in total performance.
Many competing vehicle-fired missiles benefit from ongoing guidance using wires or datalinks, which can allow them to take advantage of heavier and better sensors. The Lock-On Before Launch, fire-and-forget Javelin will either need a datalink, or lock-on after launch mode plus some additional system algorithms, to put it on a truly even footing. Otherwise, it may still have export potential as a “4,000m+ best case” fire-and-forget option. Candidate platforms would include vehicles already mounting a compatible RWS with low integration costs, light vehicles that need to keep moving; and vehicles expected to serve in frequent urban fights, where long range is closer to 500 meters.
Competition: SpikeNov 29/12: India. The Times of India reports that Israel’s Spike-MR missile may be about to elbow Javelin aside, because the Israelis are willing to transfer enough technology to allow production in India.
The Ministry wants to equip all 356 of its infantry battalions with an estimated 2,000 launchers and 24,000 missiles, produced by state-owned Bharat Dynamics. The Army reportedly wants to complete the induction of advanced 2.5 km range anti-tank guided missiles by the end of the 12th Plan (2017).
The US does make technology transfer offers to India, but Spike is eventually picked (q.v. Oct 24/14).
Nov 19/12: Oman. The US DSCA announces [PDF] the Government of Oman’s official request to buy up to 400 Javelin Guided Missiles, plus the Javelin Weapon Effects Simulator (JAVWES), missile containers, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, and other forms of US government and contractor support.
This is Oman’s 2nd DSCA request (q.v. July 28/06), and its estimated cost is up to $96 million. If both requests result in maximum orders, Oman would have 650 missiles and 30 CLUs.
The principal contractors will be the Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint Venture in Orlando, FL and Tucson, AZ. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Oman.
Oman request
Nov 19/12: Indonesia. The US DSCA announces [PDF] the Government of Indonesia’s request to buy up to 180 Javelin Block I Javelin Missiles, 25 Command Launch Units (CLU), Missile Simulation Rounds (MSR), Battery Coolant Units (BCU), Enhanced Basic Skills Trainer, Weapon Effects Simulator, batteries, battery chargers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, and other forms of U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $60 million.
The DSCA submits that “The acquisition of the Javelin system is part of the Indonesia Army’s overall military modernization program.” The principal contractors will be the Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint Venture in Orlando, FL and Tucson, AZ. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Indonesia.
Indonesia request
FY 2012Javelin + RWS; France’s VAB Javelin APC; UAE follow-on request; Various orders.
French VAB & US RG-31,
Afghanistan 2009
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Sept 23/12: India issues. India is absolutely interested in Javelin. Their soldiers fired some in 2009 joint exercises with American troops, and Defence Minister AK Antony said in August 2010 that a Letter of Request would be sent. So, why has no DSCA request been approved? India’s PTI explains that conditions regarding the secrecy of certain components are holding up an agreement. This isn’t the first time transfer of technology and proprietary designs have had an impact on US-Indian sales, and it won’t be the last. Raytheon will say only that:
“The Javelin JV stands ready to respond to all requests of the Indian government relating to the evaluation and procurement of the combat-proven missile while ensuring it adheres to a US and Indian governments’ agreement.”
If Javelin continues to hit roadblocks, Israel’s RAFAEL awaits with its popular Spike family of missiles, which go all the way up to the 25+ km Spike-NLOS / Tamuz.
Aug 6/12: Belgium request. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Belgium’s official request to buy 240 Block I Javelin Missiles, 60 Command Launch Units (CLU), Missile Simulation Rounds (MSR), Battery Coolant Units (BCU), support equipment, spare and repair parts, training, and U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $88 million, but exact figures will depend on a negotiated contract.
The Belgian Army would use them to replace its existing MBDA MILAN anti-tank missiles. The Javelin Joint Venture (JJV) consortium would be the prime contractor, and implementation would require 6 U.S. Government or contractor representatives to travel to Belgium for a period of 2 weeks for equipment training.
Belgium request
June 19/12: France. At the Eurosatory 2012 show, French operators give the Javelin missile high marks for performance in the field, and the Javelin JV is in talks with 2 French firms to integrate Javelin with the BAE/Nexter CT40 turret. Nexter is the first firm, of course. Javelin integration would offer France a way to use their stock of Javelin missiles after they leave Afghanistan, though there has been no shortage of demand-stoking brushfire conflicts in recent years.
The longer-term issue for Javelin is that France intends to develop a competitive MMP anti-tank missile for their troops.
At the same time, Panhard General Defense is working with Lockheed Martin UK to develop its Sphinx medium 6×6 wheeled armored vehicle concept for France’s EBRC light tank competition. Lockheed Martin UK expects to leverage its turret work for the British FRES-SV and WCSP, which means that any integration work could eventually filter back to those British programs. Sources: Army Recognition, “Lockheed Martin at Eurosatory 2012”.
June 11/12: Javelin RWS. Lockheed Martin touts winter firings of Javelin missiles in Norway, launched from a Kongsberg Protector Remote Weapon Station (RWS) with Javelin Vehicle Launcher (JVL) electronics. Norway already owns and deploys Javelin, and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence sponsored the live fire demonstration in Rena, Norway. The 2 Javelin missiles scored 2 direct hits when fired from the Protector-JVL system on a Piranha V wheeled APC, striking targets 800 and 1650 meters away.
The move positions Norway’s Kongsberg to consolidate and grow its RWS market share among Javelin’s international customer base, by offering a system that lets vehicles of all sizes add both machine gun and anti-tank capabilities that are controlled from inside the vehicle. Norway is first off the blocks, as Javelin Joint Venture president Duane Gooden says that discussions are underway to deploy the Protector/Javelin combination on their vehicles. Ultimately, the largest buys of existing Protector and Javelin systems point to their biggest opportunity: the US Army, which has already conducted tests with its Kongsberg-build CROWS-II RWS (q.v. Dec 7/10).
April 13/12: Order. A $30.1 million firm-fixed-price contract modification buys Javelin missile Block 0 rounds, plus battery coolant units, student stations, instructor stations, and tripods. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of March 31/15. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by U.S. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).
Feb 13/12: Retrofits. A $12.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification will buy cost reduction initiative retrofits for the 2001BH tactical (missile) round and 3001AM command launch unit. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and the contract will run to Dec 31/14. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).
Jan 17/12: Order. A $6.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for Command Launch Unit retrofits, and missiles. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).
Jan 4/12: Australia support. A 5-year, $1.9 million Javelin Repair and Support Services contract for Australia. FBO.gov.
Jan 3/12: UAE support. A 5-year, $749,122 Javelin Repair and Support Services contract for the United Arab Emirates. FBO.gov.
Dec 16/11: UAE request. The US DSCA announces [PDF] the United Arab Emirates’ official request for another 260 Javelin missiles, plus containers, tripods, weapon simulators, enhanced basic skills trainers, training and other training equipment, rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, battery chargers and dischargers, battery coolant units, and other support equipment including spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, and U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $60 million, but will depend on negotiations.
The UAE’s original DSCA request for Javelins was issued on Nov 17/04, and a July 2/08 contract finally began production. This DSCA request confirms that the UAE now has Javelin Anti-Tank missiles in its inventory, but numbers weren’t specified for the 2008 contract, and Raytheon would not discuss them. The DSCA request had mentioned 1,000 missiles and 100 CLUs. As before, the prime contractor would be the JAVELIN joint venture of Lockheed-Martin in Orlando, FL, partnered with Raytheon in Tucson, AZ.
UAE request
Nov 30/11: VAB Javelin. Renault Trucks touts their work integrating Javelin onto France’s 13-tonne VAB 4×4 wheeled APCs. The Javelin integration project was ordered on June 15/11 as an urgent operational requirement. Renault Trucks Defense designed, developed and tested an integration kit that allows 6 missiles, 2 firing posts and 2 tripods to be carried inside the VAB. The 10 kits were delivered Oct 14/11, and integration onto existing VAB Eryx vehicles is taking place in theater.
France has over 500 VABs in Afghanistan alone, and the vehicle is used by both regular forces and by the French Foreign Legion. MBDA’s Eryx is a shorter-range (0.6 vs. 2.5 km), wire-guided anti-armor missile that will still see widespread use by French forces, but Javelin’s range and guidance do make it a better option in an environment known for long-range infantry engagements. Each year, VAB improvements are made through a partnership between Renault, the DGA and the French Army Technical Department (STAT).
Nov 9/11: Order. A $97.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification of an existing contract “to support the Javelin Hardware Program,” i.e. buy Javelin components. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ and Orlando, FL with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).
FY 2011France orders; Saudi request; CROWS-II Javelin firing.
So easy, even a
General can use it!
(click to play video)
June 14/11: Order. A $187 million contract for 715 rounds; 386 battery coolant units; 10 C-size authorized stockage lists; and 386 command launch unit retrofits. Inquiries confirmed this as a Javelin contract.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and Orlando, FL, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).
Jan 12/11: Georgia. The Voice of Russia reports that Georgia has requested anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons from the USA, including Javelin missiles. Voice of Russia.
Georgia request
December 2010: France order confirmed. France is starting to train troops to use its Javelins, ordered earlier this year (vid. April 5/10 entry). DefenseNews reports that 1st batch of 4 simulator units were deemed in bad condition and refused by DGA.
France
Dec 7/10: CROWS-II integration. Raytheon announces:
“…the first Javelin missile firings from a Common Remote Operations Weapon Station II [DID: sensors and a machine gun mounted on vehicles, and controlled by a joystick and screen inside]. The station was mounted on a Stryker Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) in a near-tactical configuration. Three missiles impacted their targets at 500 and 1,000 meters (1,640 and 3,280 feet) downrange, confirming the successful integration of the Javelin into the CROWS II.”
Dec 3/10: Order. A $10.4 million firm-fixed-price contract, exercising contract options for Javelin hardware: command launch units, battery coolant units, retrofits and authorized stock list spares. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of June 30/13 (W3IP4Q-09-C-0376).
Nov 18/10: Saudi request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces Saudi Arabia’s official request [PDF] to buy 20 JAVELIN Command Launch Units (CLUs) with Integrated Day/Thermal Sights, 150 JAVELIN Guided Missiles, and 12 Buy-to-Fly test Missiles. The order also includes containers; missile simulation rounds; the Enhanced Producibility Basic Skills Trainer (EPBST); rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries; battery dischargers, chargers, and coolant units; support equipment; spare and repair parts; publications and technical data; and other forms of U.S. Government and contractor support.
The prime contractors will be the Javelin Joint Venture of Raytheon in Tucson, AZ, and Lockheed Martin, in Orlando FL; and the contract is estimated at up to $71 million. Saudi Arabia currently does not have Javelin Anti-tank missiles in its inventory, but the DSCA says they will have no difficulty adding them, and implementation of this sale will not require the assignment of any U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Unlike the requests made under the Saudis’ $60 billion set of requests in October 2010, this DSCA request does not mention what branch of the Saudi military this purchase is for. Defense Update says that:
“The Saudi Arabian Land Forces currently have about 1,000 obsolete Dragon anti-tank missiles which are due for replacement by the new Javelins. The new combined arms battalions fielded with the Royal Saudi National Guard could also be equipped with the new weapons.”
On the other hand, the Saudi Arabian National Guard recently bought wireless TOW-2A RF missiles. TOWs are heavier and can be fired by ground vehicles and helicopters, but the DSCA request was very large, and the TOW can also fill the same portable infantry niche that Javelin claims. Note that unlike the fire-and-forget Javelin, the BGM-71 TOW requires continuous guidance.
While most military branches would lean toward standardization, the Saudis have never been especially enamored of the concept. Javelins could supplement TOW missile in the National Guard, therefore, or they could be destined for Saudi Land Forces as a Dragon replacement. If so, this request is best seen as a precursor buy, allowing the Saudis to gain more direct experience before deciding on a larger order and full replacement. A 3rd option, especially given the low number of units, would involve a sale of these higher-end and more portable weapons to the Saudi Royal Guard.
Saudi request
Oct 13/10: Support. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL receives a $42.7 million firm-fixed-price contract, covering life cycle contractor support services for US Army and USMC Javelin hardware returned from the field for maintenance. The contract is technically issued on Sept 30/10, the last day of FY 2010.
Work is to be performed in Los Angeles, CA (40%), and Orlando, FL (60%), with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/15. One bid was solicited with one bid received. (W31P40-07-C-0154).
Oct 13/10: Order. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL receives a $48.8 million firm-fixed-price contract covering more US Army, US Marine Corps, and Foreign Military Sales under the FY 2009 Javelin hardware production requirement. The contract is technically issued on Sept 30/10, the last day of FY 2010.
Work is to be performed in Tucson, AZ (50%), and Orlando, FL (50%), with an estimated completion date of Oct 30/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received by U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, AMSAM-AC-TM-H at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-0-C-0376).
FY 2009British ship more to the front, order more; French win & request; Jordan request.
Royal Marines,
Afghanistan
(click to view full)
Aug 12/10: Order. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL receives a $309 million firm-fixed-price contract for US Army, US Marine Corps, and Foreign Military Sales under the FY 2009 Javelin hardware production requirement.
Work is to be performed in Tucson, AZ (50%), and Orlando, FL (50%), with an estimated completion date of Oct 30/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received by U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, AMSAM-AC-TM-H at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-0-C-0376).
July 19/10: US Order. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL receives a $96 million firm-fixed-price definitized letter contract to buy US Army and Marine Corps hardware requirements for the FY 2009-2011 Javelin hardware program.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (50%), and Orlando, FL (50%), with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14. The missile has just 1 manufacturer; 1 bid was solicited with 1 bid received (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).
April 5/10: France. The US DSCA announces [PDF] France’s official request to buy 260 JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, 76 Command Launch Units with Integrated Day/Thermal Sight, plus missile containers, missile simulation rounds, the Enhanced Basic Skills Trainer, JAVELIN Weapon Effects Simulator Trainers, 2-level maintenance services, batteries, battery dischargers and chargers, battery coolant units, spare and repair parts, test and tool sets, personnel training and equipment, and other forms of US government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $69 million.
The prime contractor will be the Javelin Joint Venture between Raytheon in Tucson, AZ, and Lockheed Martin in Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Note that a DSCA request is not a contract, but it does pave the way for one.
France request
Feb 25/10: Order. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL received a $21 million firm-fixed-price contract for FY 2009-2011 hardware production of Javelin systems for Taiwan.
Work is to be performed in Tucson, AZ (50%, Raytheon), and Orlando, FL (50%, LM), with an estimated completion date of Jan 17/11. One bid was solicited with one bid received by Aviation & Missile Command Contracting Command, CCAM-TM-H in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-09-C-0376). See also Oct 3/08 entry.
Feb 22/10: France picks Javelin. French defense minister Hervé Morin announces that France will buy Javelin missiles, rather than the Eurospike family or MBDA’s Milan-ER variant. The current set of Milan missiles will be kept until 2015, and the ministerial investment committee has decided on an initial buy of 260 Javelin missiles and 76 launchers, which are expected to see use in Afghanistan. The expected cost is around $70 million, but negotiations will determine the final price and numbers. Raytheon representatives confirmed to DID that no Letter of Offer and Acceptance has been signed yet. Once it is signed, this deal will have 2 interesting points worth watching.
Javelin is widely used by American and British forces in Afghanistan, and France has just signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UK, to allow joint purchases of military equipment for Urgent Operational Requirements. It will be interesting to see if France’s eventual contract becomes, in effect, a joint buy that benefits from Britain’s negotiated terms and volume discounts.
The second interesting question involves future opportunities. A larger future purchase of anti-tank missiles is expected to replace French Milan missile stocks more fully within the next few years. See also Oct 9/09 entry. Defense News.
Feb 1/10: The Pentagon releases its FY 2011 budget request, which includes $163.9 million for 715 Javelin missiles. While this continues full rate production, it is a sharp drop-off from previous years.
Dec 17/09: UK order. The Javelin Joint Venture announces a $176 million (about GBP 109 million) contract from the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense for more than 1,300 Javelin missile rounds and associated engineering support.
See the Nov 13/09 entry, which discusses a related internal transfer of Javelin rounds, and the way these missiles are being used in Afghanistan.
Britain
Nov 30/09: Jordan request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Jordan’s official request to buy 162 more Javelin Command Launch Units (CLUs) with Integrated Day/ Thermal Sights, 1,808 more Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, 18 Fly-to-Buy Missiles for testing, plus containers, missile simulation rounds, enhanced basic skills trainer (EPBST), rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, battery dischargers and chargers, and coolant units, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, and U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is $388 million.
“Jordan, which already has Javelin Anti-Tank missiles in its inventory, will have no difficulty absorbing these additional missiles.” The prime contractor will be the Javelin Joint Venture, and implementation of this proposed sale would not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Jordan.
Jordan request
Nov 13/09: UK. The UK Ministry of Defence announces that it’s sending an extra 1,300 Javelin missiles to Afghanistan to:
“…top up stocks… Troops in Afghanistan are using Javelin to blow up fortified enemy positions and mortar compounds. The system also provides an excellent 24-hour surveillance, target and acquisition capability for the troops… The missile can be fired from enclosed spaces, providing enhanced flexibility and protection for its crew.”
Sergeant Ross Jones, Royal Marines, from 42 Commando is quoted as saying that:
“If we are going to invest in these missiles it’s definitely a good idea – the amount that are being used and fired in theatre is phenomenal. They do save lives and anything that can do that is a good idea.”
That is so, but routinely using Javelins from beyond enemy engagement range, as a form of artillery, is a very expensive proposition that wastes most of the missiles’ capabilities. Much cheaper alternatives that could serve this front-line need are available on the global market – and might even be available in Britain via the RB57 NLAW, if that project is able to deliver.
Oct 9/09: France. France is reportedly considering an emergency buy of Javelin missiles for use in Afghanistan, though the Israeli-designed EuroSpike is also a reported contender. The estimated requirement is around 50-60 launchers and 300 missiles, with an estimated budget of EUR 70 million. All of these figures are subject to revision and negotiation, of course, and there are reports that the French Army evaluators preferred the cheaper Spike for its cost and faster delivery. Defense News | Liberation’s Secret Defense blog [in French].
See also Allbusiness August coverage of the wider man-potable anti-tank missile competition between MBDA’s Milan ER, the Lockheed/ Raytheon Javelin, and RAFAEL’s Spike/ EuroSpike.
Oct 6/09: Order. Raytheon and the Javelin joint venture announce a $214 million U.S. Army contract for Javelin missiles, command launch units (CLUs), and training and field support.
FY 2007 – 2008UAE & Oman order; 5-year USAR support deal; Taiwan request; Block 1 missile qualified.
Desert fire
(click to view full)
July 10/09: Support. Raytheon and the Javelin joint venture announce a new 5-year, 298.6 million contract from the US Army for life-cycle support. The Javelin Joint Venture will provide the U.S. Army with depot spares, repair support, training and data. The contract will be issued in stages over its lifetime, and the FY 2009 funded value is $34.9 million.
The Javelin JV’s support won an award in 2007 (q.v. Jan 17/07 entry), and VP Barry James proudly cites his team’s ability to coordinate shipments in and out of theater to the repair facility and back to the front line in a matter of days.
Dec 18/08: USMC upgrade. Raytheon announces a $29.9 million U.S. Marine Corps contract to upgrade 404 Javelin Block 0 command launch units to Block I. The upgrade will extend the detection, recognition and identification range of the CLUs but about 38%, while doubling the operating time. The joint venture team began the upgrade program in October 2008 and expects to have it completed by spring 2011.
Both changes will be welcome. Enemy forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are sing machine gun fire and mortars at ranges of 2.5 km/ 1.5 miles or more. Block I gives U.S. Marines the ability to employ the Javelin missile in riposte within that same effective range. Doubled operating time means fewer heavy batteries to carry, which will be equally welcome.
Oct 3/08: Taiwan. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Taiwan’s formal request to buy 182 more Javelin guided missile rounds and 20 command launch units, plus 40 missile simulation rounds, trainers, rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, support equipment, spare and repair parts, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $47 million.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require a U.S. Government Quality Assurance Team consisting of 1 contractor and 2 U.S. Government representatives in country for 5 days to accomplish the initial deployment of the missiles. Taiwan won’t need more help than that, as they were one of the Javelin “fire and forget” missile’s early customers in 2002.
Taiwan request
Sept 4/08: Order. Raytheon announces a $111.6 million Javelin supplemental contract to produce additional missiles and command launch units. The joint venture expects to deliver the missiles and CLUs to the U.S. Army in the spring of 2011.
July 2/08: UAE & Oman order. A $101.4 million firm-fixed price contract for an award of foreign military sales (FMS) for missile rounds, command launch units, the enhanced producibility version of the basic skills trainer, battery coolant units, and 1 C-size authorized stockage list spare. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and Orlando, FL, and is expected to be complete by May 15/11. One bid was solicited on July 31/07 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).
At the time, DID noted that Bahrain and Oman were the only new FMS request for the Javelin missile since 2006, adding that the announced value of their combined contracts would equal about $100 million. A July 29/08 release from Raytheon, however, said that the Javelin Joint Venture had “received a $115 million U.S. government contract to produce the Javelin anti-tank missile and command launch unit for the United Arab Emirates and Oman.”
Raytheon confirmed to DID that this is the UAE’s 1st contract for Javelin missiles, and Oman’s 2nd. The UAE’s Nov 17/04 DSCA request for Javelins (see entry) involved 1,000 missiles, 100 CLUs, etc. for an estimated value of $135 million. Oman’s July 28/06 request involved 250 missiles, 30 CLUs, etc., for an estimated value of $48 million (see entry); this is the 2nd installment of that request.
UAE & Oman
FY 2007 – 2008UAE & Oman order; 5-year USAR support order; US support wins logistics award; Taiwan request; Block 1 missile qualified.
UK Javelin, Afghanistan
(click to view full)
Aug 13/07: Australia order. A $5.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for tactical rounds (i.e. missiles) for Australia. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%), and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Oct. 31, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22, 2003 by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).
Australia
July 9/07: The Javelin JV receives a $172.2 million modification to their firm-fixed-price contract, exercising an option for Javelin FY 2007 production and remanufacture, and Command Launch Unit supplemental hardware.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%), and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb. 28, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22, 2003 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).
Jan 17/07: Javelin Joint Venture Earns Logistics Award for Supporting the Warfighter. The Javelin Joint Venture Logistics Support Team receives the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency’s 2006 Defense Logistics Award for Contractor-Military Collaboration.
Jan 10/07: Block 1. Raytheon and Lockheed report successful qualification tests for the Block 1 Javelin missile at Redstone Arsenal, in Huntsville, AL. The Block 1 missile has an improved rocket motor that will reduce the missile’s time of flight; improvements to the command launch unit (CLU); software enhancements; and an enhanced performance warhead that increases Javelin’s lethality against a wider range of target sets. Raytheon release | Lockheed Martin release | Defense Update | Jane’s.
Javelin Block I qualified
FY 2006 and earlierBahrain request; Oman request; UAE request. Looks like OIF made a local impression. Javelin
Sept 6/06: Order. A $38.9 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for Javelin missile rounds and remanufactured rounds. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%), and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb. 28, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22, 2003 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).
July 28/06: Oman request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Oman’s formal request for 250 Javelin missiles, 30 CLUs, simulators, plus required support involving trainers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, a Quality Assurance Team, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $48 million.
The prime contractor would be the Raytheon/Lockheed-Martin JAVELIN Joint Venture in Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale, and implementation will require a U.S. Government Quality Assurance Team consisting of 1 contractor and 2 U.S. Government representatives to Oman for 1 week to assist in the delivery and deployment of the missiles. Several contractor and U.S. Government representatives will travel to Oman for 2-week visits twice annually, in order to participate in training, program management, and technical review. Se also Raytheon’s Jan 6/05 release, which covers the selection decision but predates the formal request.
Oman request
July 21/06: Bahrain request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announces Bahrain’s request [PDF] for 180 Javelin anti-armor missile rounds (see MPEG video of Javelin firing) and 60 Javelin command launch units (CLUs), plus simulators, trainers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, Quality Assurance Team services, and other related elements of logistics support.
The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $42 million, and the prime contractor will be Raytheon/Lockheed-Martin JAVELIN Joint Venture. Bahrain is the base for the US 5th Fleet, and a close ally in the region.
Bahrain request
July 3/06: Order. A $17.2 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for the Javelin’s CLUs (Command Launch Units). Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%), and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb. 28, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22, 2003 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).
Sept 21/05: Order. A $42.4 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for “Javelin CLU (901)/ EPBST (101) supplemental hardware definitization,” which means it settles up the final price for the July 5/05 contract at $110.1 million.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb 28/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136). Note that EPBST = “enhanced producibility basic skills trainers.”
July 5/05: Order. a $67.7 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for “Javelin CLU (901)/ EPBST (101) Supplemental Hardware Quantities.” Work will be performed in Orlando, FL (40%), and Tucson, AZ (60%), and is expected to be complete by Sept 30/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).
May 11/05: USN Order. A $6.2 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for Javelin Weapon Systems Hardware for the US Navy. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb 28/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).
April 6/05: Order. A $128 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for Javelin Weapon System Hardware Procurement. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb 28/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).
Nov 17/04: UAE request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] the United Arab Emirates’ formal request for 100 Javelin command launch units and 1,000 missile rounds, plus simulators, trainers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, a Quality Assurance Team, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $135 million.
Implementation will require the assignment of a U.S. Government Quality Assurance Team consisting of 2 U.S. Government personnel and 1 contractor representative to UAE for one week to assist in the delivery and deployment of the missiles. DSCA adds a tactical note:
“The desert warfare missions of the infantry and light armored forces of the UAE require the protection afforded by the capabilities of the JAVELIN system. The UAE land forces are small, well-rounded forces that are multi-mission oriented. JAVELIN will provide the forces with a credible anti-armor defense that is critical to success in the open desert.”
UAE request
June 25/04: Order. A $5.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for Javelin Weapon Systems Hardware. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by May 31/06. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).
April 2/04: Support. A $6.4 million cost-plus-award-fee contract for engineering services for the Javelin weapon system. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by March 31/06. This was a sole source contract initiated on July 31/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0092).
March 5/04: Order. A $49.7 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for 450 Javelin Tactical Rounds, 90 Command Launch Units, 120 Battery Coolant Units, 3 Cutaway Missiles, Spares, Tripod Trade Study, Special Tool Kit, Technical Instruction Manuals, Missile Product Description, Missile Description, Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)/Logistics Support Analysis/Provisioning, and an ILS Reports Database.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by March 31/06. This was a sole source contract initiated on Oct 29/99 (DAAH01-00-C-0108).
Feb 2/04: Support. An $18 million firm-fixed-price, cost reimbursable, and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for life cycle contractor support for the JAVELIN weapon system. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Jan 15/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 5/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0046).
Jan 20/04: Order. A $10.5 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for 82 tactical rounds, 36 command launch units, 6 enhanced producibility basic skills trainers, 36 battery coolant units, 1 short round and spares. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by March 31/06. This was a sole source contract initiated on Oct 29/99 (DAAH01-00-C-0108).
Additional ReadingsReaders with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
DID thanks reader Trent Telenko for his assistance and tips.
In December 2005, Australia decided to upgrade its CH-47D Chinook fleet, in preparation for use on the front lines. Afghanistan’s high altitudes and sometimes-scorching temperatures reduce rotor lift. That made the Chinooks a far better choice than upgrading the ADF’s S-70 Black Hawk helicopters, whose reduced carrying capacity would limit their tactical uses. Those CH-47D Chinooks have gone on to play an important role in Afghanistan, amidst a general shortage of useful helicopters. Now, Australia seems determined to supplement its older CH-47D fleet with new and improved CH-47F models, which feature more modern electronics, uprated engines, and numerous other improvements.
The question was when the DSCA request would become an actual contract. That question has just been answered.
December 22/15: New FMS Order. The US State Department has approved the sale of three CH-47F Chinook helicopters to Australia. The $180 million foreign military sale includes six Aircraft Turbine Engines and three Common Missile Warning Systems, as well as three Infrared Signature Suppression Systems and logistical support. Australia has ordered seven of the latest CH47F model to replace the existing CH-47Ds currently in service with the Royal Australian Air Force. Delivery is expected to be completed by 2017.
September 15/15: The Australian Army has taken delivery of a seventh CH-47F Chinook helicopter ahead of schedule, with this the final Chinook ordered through a $513.5 million contract with the US Army Security Assistance Command in 2010, along with simulators and spares. The Australian government first requested the helicopters in April 2009. The Australian CH-47Fs are US-configured models, which allowed Australia to take advantage of volume pricing when the $370 million manufacturing order was placed with Boeing in January 2012. The helicopters will operate from Queensland-based 5th Aviation Regiment, 16th Aviation Brigade, with Boeing’s Australian subsidiary set to provide maintenance support for the seven aircraft. A housing facility for the new Chinooks is also under construction, with this slated for completion by mid-2017.
Nov 14/14: Infrastructure. Australia’s government announces announces an A$ 54.8 million contract with Lend Lease Pty Ltd, who will build new facilities to house and support the Army’s CH-47F Chinook Helicopters at RAAF Base Townsville. Construction is expected to begin before the end of 2014, and be complete by mid 2017. Sources: Australia DoD, “Defence awards contract for new Chinook helicopter facilities in Townsville”.
July 18/14: Infrastructure. Australia’s government announces Parliamentary approval of a $54.8 million project for facilities at RAAFB Townsville, which will support the introduction and sustainment of the incoming 7 CH-47F Chinooks, and corresponding replacement of 6 CH-47Ds there.
Construction is expected to begin in late 2014 and be complete by mid 2017, supporting about 50 full-time jobs over the life of the project. Sources: Australia DoD, “Parliamentry Secretary to the Minister for Defence – Multi-million dollar Defence investment in Townsville”.
Jan 5/12: Contract. Boeing Co. in Ridley Park, PA receives a $370 million firm-fixed-price contract to “provide for the services in support of the bridge requirement for new CH-47 F model aircraft to support foreign military sales.” The English translation, based on responses to our inquiries, is that Australia and the UAE are buying 14 CH-47Fs (7/7 RAAF, 7/16 UAE) under the US Army contract, in order to benefit from its volume pricing.
Other CH-47F customers like Britain and Canada, who ordered heavily customized versions, can’t take advantage of that. Neither can Italy, who will produce the machines in-country under an agreement between Boeing and AgustaWestland.
Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA, with an estimated completion date of June 30/16. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by the US Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL, on behalf of its Foreign Military Sale clients (W58RGZ-12-C-0010).
Australia: 7
May 20/10: Agency contract. Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) signs a contract with the US Army Security Assistance Command, at the Australian Embassy in Washington. The AUD$ 513.5 million (about $470 million) contract will buy 7 CH-47F Chinook helicopters, 2 Simulators, and associated spares. The first 2 aircraft are planned to enter service in 2014, with all 7 in service by 2017.
With respect to standardization, the helicopters will be delivered in American configuration. Greg Combet, the Minister for Defence Personnel, Materiel and Science, says that:
“Australian industry will have the opportunity to incorporate the Australian specific enhancements and to support the new helicopters as part of through-life support arrangements.”
Feb 25/10: Approved. The Australian Government gives second pass approval to “Project AIR 9000 Phase 5C” for 7 CH-47Fs, at a budget of AUD $755 million. This approves the plan’s details, but is not itself a contract. Australia expects to field the first 2 helicopters in 2014, with all 7 expected by 2017. The ministerial statement makes it clear that the 7 CH-47Fs would replace 5th Aviation Regiment, C squadron’s existing 6 CH-47Ds, would also be based in Townsville, and would be expected to serve until 2040.
Per the recommendations of past commissions like Australia’s famous Kinnaird Review, Senator Faulkner said the new aircraft will be procured and maintained in the same broad configuration as the United States Army CH-47Fs. Australia also promised to consider joining the USA’s Chinook Product Improvement Program as a way to keep those configurations aligned, “when information on this program is of second pass quality.” Having said all that, however, “The new Australian Chinooks will also receive some additional ADF-specific equipment to meet certain operational and safety requirements.”
2nd pass approval
July 1/09: Delay. Shephard Group reports that Australia may not place a contract order for the new CH-47Fs until 2012, and doesn’t expect to field them before 2016-2018. In the interim, Australia hopes to issue maintenance support tenders for its 6 existing CH-47Ds.
The original acquisition plan, approved by the Liberal Party government, would have bought 3 new-build CH-47Fs, and remanufactured existing CH-47Ds to CH-47F configuration. The new Defence Capability Plan, issued this day, revises the timeline and is silent on the balance between new and remanufactured aircraft.
April 13/09: Request. The USA’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces Australia’s official request for 7 CH-47F CHINOOK Helicopters with 14 (2 per aircraft) T55-GA-714A Turbine engines, 7 Dillon Aero M134D 7.62mm Miniguns, 16 AN/ARC-201D Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radios (SINCGARS), 7 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below Blue Force Trackers (FBCB2/BFT), 2 spare T-55-GA-714A Turbine engines, plus mission equipment, communication and navigation equipment, ground support equipment, spare and repair parts, special tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, and support. The estimated cost is $560 million, but a DSCA request is not a contract.
The prime contractors will be: Boeing Integrated Defense Systems in St. Louis, MO (helicopters); Rockwell Collins in Cedar Rapids, IA (engines); and ITT in Fort Wayne, IN (radios). Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 2 contractor representatives to Australia for approximately 3 years, with about 6 U.S. Government personnel participating in program management and/or technical reviews in-country for 1-2 week intervals annually.
DSCA request: 7 CH-47Fs
In the wake of events in Georgia and Crimea, Poland has emerged as NATO’s key eastern bastion. The Tarcza Polski (Shield of Poland) aims to give it an advanced air defense system to match.
Poland’s military rise has been slow, but steady. Smart economic policies have created growth, and a willingness to finance national defense is slowly improving their equipment. Combat deployments abroad to Iraq and Afghanistan have both sharpened training, and highlighted areas that still need fixing. Missile proliferation in the Middle East, American fecklessness, and a rearming Russia have all led Poland to the conclusion that they can no longer depend on old Soviet-era air defense equipment. They need their own advanced national air defense system, which can benefit from allied contributions without being dependent on them.
The Shield of Poland is envisaged as a 3-tier system.
Tier 1: Local Thunder POPRAD/ GROMThe lowest tier involves shoulder-fired Grom/Piorun missiles. Poland’s Grom (“Thunder”) is reportedly the product of some unauthorized “borrowing” from Russia’s SA-18, with local Polish changes and improvements. Grom/Piorun missiles can also be fielded as additions to fixed, radar-aided 23mm guns (Pilica system), or integrated on truck-mounted quad launchers (Poprad system). Both will be part of Tarcza Polski.
Grom missiles have already claimed a number of Russian aircraft, when used by Georgian armed forces during the 2008 conflict.
The Piorun is an enhanced version of Grom, with a new proximity fuze and warhead.
Tier 2: NAREW Air Defense NASAMS-IIThe next tier is known as the NAREW program. It involves up to 11 batteries of “short range” conventional air defense missiles, without anti-ballistic missile capabilities. While the top-tier systems have garnered the most attention and focus, and will be implemented first as a high-performance deterrent, NAREW’s ability to counter aircraft and cruise missiles at an affordable cost may make it Poland’s most critical purchase.
Competitors reportedly include Diehl (IRIS-T SL), MBDA-Bumar (VL-MICA), Israel’s RAFAEL (SPYDER & Iron Dome); and Raytheon (NASAMS). MBDA-Lockheed’s MEADS system was dealt out after Poland failed to shortlist it for the top-tier WISLA system, but Diehl’s IRIS-T remains.
MBDA’s VL-MICA. This variant of their medium range air-to-air missile has been picked for a few naval vessels, and a 2011 MBDA release suggests at least 1 export customer on land. That customer is believed to be Oman, and unconfirmed rumors suggest that there are more. The Platoon Command Post and 3D radar are complemented by missiles that come in infrared and radar guided versions. That mix makes the system dangerous even if its radars are shut down, and protected from enemy detection.
MEADS / IRIS-T. This consortium was led by Lockheed Martin and MEADS, creating a top-tier BMD system that can also mount Diehl’s IRIS-T. Aircraft and cruise missile missiles could be engaged with either MEADS’ PAC-3 MSE or IRIS-T, depending on distance, priority, etc. This dual role made MEADS’ bid something of an all-or-nothing affair. When Poland decided that MEADS was too risky to become a WISLA finalist, it effectively killed the system as a NAREW option, though buy-in from Germany and Italy could change its fate.
IRIS-T SL spun out as an independent bid, offering and a vertically-launched variant of the infrared-guided air-to-air missile, complete with an enhanced rocket motor, an aerodynamic hood for extended range, a data link, and an autonomous GPS/INS navigation system. That’s paired with an Australian CEAFAR AESA radar, Rheinmetall Air Defence’s Oerlikon Skymaster battle management system, and Terma’s BMD-Flex command, control and communication system.
SPYDERRAFAEL’s SPYDER. Israel’s system uses a pair of Python-5 IIR-guided and derivative Derby radar-guided missiles to the same effect as the different MICA variants, cued by a combination of radar and optical sensors. The truck-mounted system comes in SR (4 missiles) and MR (8 missiles with range-extending boosters) options. One interesting question is whether SPYDER-MR could also mount the Stunner missile from David’s Sling, creating a mobile BMD option. There’s already a base for Polish-Israeli cooperation, as Peru’s new air defenses are a combination of Poprad and SPYDER-SR systems, via a partnership between Poland’s Bumar (Poprad), RAFAEL (SPYDER system), and Northrop Grumman (long-range TPS-78 radar). It will be interesting to see if that arrangement rebounds back to Poland. SPYDER has been publicly exported to Georgia, India, Peru, and Singapore.
Raytheon’s NASAMS-II. This system seems to hold the high ground, if NAREW is considered on its own. Its flexible open-architecture command and control could place it at the center of Poland’s tactical air defenses, and Raytheon is working with WZU SA in Grudziadz to re-use Poland’s tracked Soviet-era SA-6 launchers as part of the system. Fokker would provide the launcher canisters, and Thales-Nederland the radar. Missile variety (IRIS-T, AIM-9X Sidewinder, AIM-120 AMRAAM, and longer-range RIM-162 ESSM), and commonality with existing Polish Air Force missile stocks (AIM-9X and AIM-120) help create a powerful edge. NATO and related NASAMS customers include Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain; it has also been exported elsewhere.
Tier 3: The WISLA Air/BMD Tier SAMP/T Aster-30The top tier is the WISLA program, which will have priority. In this “medium range” competition, up to 8 batteries will act as both long-range air defense, and point defense against short to medium range ballistic missiles. The only reason WISLA isn’t classed as long range is the expected 300+ km reach of land-based SM-3 Block IIA missiles, once the USA’s Aegis Ashore complex goes live at Redzikowo in 2018.
Competitors reportedly include MBDA-Lockheed (MEADS), MBDA-Thales-Bumar (SAMP/T Mamba using Aster-30), Israel’s SIBAT export agency (David’s Sling/ “Stunner”), and Raytheon (PATRIOT). All have killed ballistic missiles in live-fire tests, and all offer different advantages and disadvantages.
MEADS conceptMEADS. Advantages: European partnership, Advanced unified solution. Disadvantages: Risk. Lost its American customer due to the cost of integrating it with back-end command systems. The PAC-3 MSE missile is migrating to PATRIOT batteries, however, and MEADS’ advanced radars may do likewise eventually. Meanwhile, MEADS program partners Germany and Italy are looking at the possibility of financing the full system into production themselves, and Polish participation would really help. That’s good news in terms of industrial development opportunities, but it also adds real risks. Lockheed Martin and MBDA’s MEADS is a step up from PATRIOT in all respects, and its ability to launch Diehl’s short-range IR-guided IRIS-T SL missiles as a supplement adds to its appeal over PATRIOT.
The catch is that Poland would have to accept project risk, cost risk, and coalition risk in exchange. They chose not to, but there are reports that MEADS’ PAC-3 MSE missile could be an option as part of Raytheon’s bid.
PATRIOT explainedPATRIOT (Finalist). Advantages: No-risk choice. Disadvantages: Performance. Raytheon offers the most widely deployed and proven option, with zero development risk, a set path to integration with American and NATO back-end systems, full compatibility with American units already on Polish soil, and a massive global installed base that guarantees long-term upgrades and support. Raytheon IDS VP Sanjay Kapoor has added that that Polish systems would include the “PAC-3 MSE missile and recent technological enhancements introduced into the Patriot radar and command and control…”
On the flip side, PATRIOT currently has the least powerful radar in this group, and there is some concern that even with the PAC-3 MSE, future Russian aircraft and weapons will begin to outpace its capabilities. In response, Raytheon is offering Poland a variant of the TPQ-65 with 360-degree rotating coverage, an all-new antenna, and a new IFF system built in cooperation with Poland’s Bumar. RAFAEL’s Stunner missile is also an option, as an optional “Low Cost Interceptor”. Beyond that, Raytheon’s TPY-2 could also help even up the radar equation quickly, if it’s offered as part of the overall Wisla bid. It’s already being exported to the UAE as part of their land-based THAAD BMD system, and a TPY-2 is currently operating on NATO’s behalf in Turkey.
SAMP/T Mamba (Finalist). Advantages: European partnership, Range. Disadvantages: Cost, French diplomacy. MBDA’s SAMP/T uses an advanced Arabel radar, and an Aster-30 missile with longer proven reach than Poland’s other WISLA options. The SAMP/T system already serves with France and Italy, and France is implementing its own national BMD system within NATO’s ALTBMD. That makes it a ready model if Poland wants a European system. On the industrial front, MBDA has already secured key partnerships.
All of these considerations make SAMP/T a strong contender in Poland, if Mamba’s cost and France’s snake-eyes diplomacy don’t destroy its chances. America’s relationship with Poland had been damaged before the Ukrainian crisis, but France’s continued willingness to sell Russia amphibious assault ships after Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine is an odd case of “anything vous can do, nous can do meilleur”. Still, senior members of the Polish government have been recorded saying that American security guarantees are worthless. In that context, EuroSAM’s status as a finalist becomes less surprising.
DS intercept testStunner/ David’s Sling. Advantages: Cost. Disadvantages: Initial capabilities. This system is just completing development in Israel, where it will replace existing MIM-23 Hawk and MIM-104 PATRIOT batteries. Its Stunner missile said to be significantly less expensive than Lockheed Martin’s PATRIOT PAC-3, and the firm has even worked with Raytheon to tout a PAAC-4 system that would use Stunner on top of Raytheon’s PATRIOT Config-3 core system. Unfortunately, Stunner’s initial release won’t have key capabilities like cruise missile/ UAV interception, or the ability to hit maneuvering ballistic targets. Israel’s SIBAT tends to be closed-mouthed about its offerings, but it does have the leeway to offer Poland other advanced equipment like the Green Pine long-range radar used in Israel, South Korea, and India.
We thought that “the Israeli firm could have a tough climb here,” and pressure from the USA was the final nail. The Israeli firm was not a finalist, but the Stunner missile survives as a PAAC-4 option within Raytheon’s official bid.
Contracts & Key Events 2013 – 2015Budget plan set and WISLA finalists confirmed; Israel reportedly out – but Raytheon brings them back in; NAREW timeline & shortlist; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine speeds up plans, somewhat. Raytheon, MSPO 2013
December 21/15: PIT-RADWAR has received an order for 79 Poprad self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems from Poland. The $273 million contract will also include the upgrade of two previously delivered systems. The short-range anti-aircraft system uses the Polish-made Grom MANPADS. Poland’s new government, led by the right-wing Law & Justice Party, has sought to increase military spending as part of NATO directives, but also holds a desire to increase production of armaments domestically.
Oct 23/14: NAREW. Col. Adam Duda of Poland’s Armament Inspectorate outlines their candidates and timelines for the NAREW medium-range air defense system. The technical dialogue will begin in November 2014, for completion in Q1 2015. They believe that Poland can continue to provide all of its own command and control systems, but basic tactical and technical assumptions, and feasibility studies, will continue until the end of 2015. The winning system would be picked in 2016. Poland is only looking at complete system packages, and announced candidates include:
“Kongsberg NASAMS, MBDA Mica VL, Israeli Spyder and Iron Dome systems and the German IRIS-T. [Duda] claimed though that “other solutions” may also be taken into account during the proceedings.”
Note the addition of Iron Dome and the absence of MEADS, which was eliminated from WISLA. Germany and Italy are still deciding whether to invest in it independently, however, and the door seems open if those decisions change the landscape. Meanwhile, IRIS-T SL survived as an independent bid, offering and a vertically-launched variant of the infrared-guided air-to-air missile, complete with an enhanced rocket motor, an aerodynamic hood for extended range, a data link, and an autonomous GPS/INS navigation system. That’s paired with an Australian CEAFAR AESA radar, Rheinmetall Air Defence’s Oerlikon Skymaster battle management system, and Terma’s BMD-Flex command, control and communication system. Sources: Defence24, “Poland to Begin Short Range Air Defence System Procurement in 2016”.
Sept 2/14: MBDA. At the MSPO military exhibition in Kielce, Poland, MBDA signs 2 Letters of Intent with MESKO (Aster-30 B1 work and B1NT development) and PIT-RADWAR S.A (missile uplink receiver equipment), relating to the Polish “Wisla” medium range air and missile defence programme. MBDA adds that:
“…warhead, booster and servo actuators will be transferred to our Polish partners, as well as missile maintenance and training.”
Sources: MBDA, “MSPO: MBDA seals new perspectives for stronger cooperation with Polish industry”.
June 30/14: WISLA Finalists. Poland’s MON announces the Wisla program’s finalists: Raytheon’s ‘PATRIOT with options’ offer, and EuroSAM’s SAMP/T Mamba system that uses the Aster-30.
Poland won’t become part of the MEADS program, nor will it buy Israel’s David’s Sling. The 2-stage technical dialogue led Poland to conclude that they required an operational system that is deployed by NATO countries. Once those requirements were set, MEADS and David’s Sling failed to qualify. Sources: Poland MON, “Kolejny etap realizacji programu Wisla zakonczony” | Raytheon, “Poland invites Raytheon to participate in final phase of WISLA competition”.
Finalists
June 12/14: Raytheon. Raytheon Company and Bumar Elektronika announce a partnership to design and develop a modernized Patriot Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) antenna that can upgrade previous ground systems. Meanwhile, Raytheon has begun laying out its broader vision for WISLA.
The IFF system will be used as part of an “advanced Patriot 360 degree radar.” Raytheon says that it would be based on the current AN/APG-65 with the new Radar Digital Processor, but it would carry an all-new antenna, and rotate for full hemispheric coverage. The result would also be an attractive upgrade for customers whose emplaced PATRIOTs are currently limited to a 120 degree field of regard. It would also bring Raytheon closer to parity with Lockheed’s MEADS, which substitutes three 360-degree radars (2 X-band MFCR, 1 UHF-band VSR) in place of the PATRIOT system’s single G-band MPQ-53 (PAC-2) or MPQ-65 (PAC-3).
A new open-architecture, NATO-compatible Common Command and Control (CC2) system would be a joint Raytheon-Polish development, incorporating PATRIOT fire control software, but allowing the integration of options like NASAMS and other systems. CC2’s design, development, and testing would be done in partnership with Polish industry, with the final product produced in Poland.
Missile choice would be up to Poland. Raytheon makes PAC-2 GEM missiles, while Lockheed Martin makes PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE missiles. To flank their rival at the high end, Raytheon is offering a “new advanced Low Cost Interceptor (LCI)” option. This refers to Raytheon’s PAAC-4 offering, which can add RAFAEL’s Stunner missiles from the competing David’s Sling air defense/ ABM system. If previous reports are true (q.v. May 14/14), Raytheon has effectively recruited their Israeli competitor into their team. The final LCI missile solution would be based on Polish requirements, and it’s worth noting that Raytheon is also RAFAEL’s partner for the famous Iron Dome counter-rocket system. Sources: Direct discussions | Raytheon, “Poland’s Bumar Elektronika and Raytheon Partner to Develop New Patriot IFF Antenna”.
May 14/14: No Israel in WISLA. The USA has reportedly used export clearance to block Israel’s David’s Sling system from WISLA consideration. Israel’s silence concerning Russia’s ongoing annexation of eastern Ukraine hasn’t helped them in Poland, either. France is one-upping the Israelis with their continued willingness to sell Russia amphibious assault helicopter carriers, but they seem committed, even though a SAMP/T win in Poland would earn around 5x what Russia is paying for the Vladivostoks. Which leaves a strong likelihood that WISLA will be American-made. Reuters:
“As compensation, the manufacturer of the Israeli David’s Sling missile defense system may get a role in a future U.S.-led arms sale to Warsaw, the [Israeli] official, who has been briefed on the competition, told Reuters on condition of anonymity…. The involvement of U.S. technologies gives Washington an effective veto over export of the system, which the Israeli defense official said had been quietly wielded in this case. “There has been pressure,” he said, without elaborating. “We cannot sell everything we want to.””
At the same time, Lockheed Martin’s Marty Coyne told Reuters that the US government had “supported the MEADS bid by giving Lockheed permission to offer producing its baseline PAC-3 missiles in Poland, and to help Polish industry set up production of its own long-range missile.” If the winner is MEADS, that would mean either a PAC-3 downgrade within the more advanced MEADS system, or full local production of the PAC-3 MSE, which is the USA most advanced air defense missile. Sources: Reuters, “Exclusive: Israel’s David’s Sling will not win Polish missile tender – official”.
March 20/14: Polish Deputy Defence Minister Czeslaw Mroczek tells Reuters that Polish priorities are changing. With respect to the Shield of Poland:
“By the end of this year we want to already have chosen an offer. That is the acceleration by several months, compared to our original plans, that we are talking about…. To a certain extent, the decision on accelerating this process is the result of a review commissioned by the prime minister and the defence minister because of the situation in Ukraine.”
The full system is still slated to be ready by 2022, and could cost up to $13 billion. The WISLA medium range system is reportedly going to be Phase 1. Sources: Reuters, “Poland speeds up missile defense plan amid Ukraine crisis”.
March 17/14: MEADS. With Russia in the middle of invading Ukraine and annexing Crimea, Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute writes that:
“Both [China and Russia] field ballistic missiles and airborne weapons that would present a challenge to Patriot in its current form, and the outlook is for such weapons to become more capable…. in an unusual move, the Obama Administration late last week gave prime contractor Lockheed Martin permission to offer the Medium Extended Air Defense System to Warsaw for use in the Polish Shield. The Poles have known about MEADS for some time, because two other European NATO nations – Germany and Italy – provided 42% of the money needed to develop it. A Polish delegation showed up for November tests in which a MEADS prototype demonstrated its ability to intercept a drone and a ballistic missile approaching from opposite directions.”
Meanwhile, Warsaw Business Journal confirms just 4 finalists: SAMP/T (MBDA & Thales), MEADS (MBDA & Lockheed Martin), Raytheon (PATRIOT), and the Israeli government (David’s Sling). Sources: Forbes Magazine, “Ukraine Crisis: Poland’s Air Defenses Become A Pressing Concern For Washington” | Warsaw Business Journal, “Four in the running for medium range air defense system”.
Feb 11/14: WISLA. Poland’s Ministry of National Defense announced the start of Phase 2 of WISLA’s technical dialogue. Stage 2 aims to identify the areas of potential technical and industrial cooperation, the transfer of knowledge, technology, and production, and the intellectual property rights available.
Raytheon says that they are 1 of 5 shortlisted parties, and recently signed a Letter of Intent with Poland’s Polski Holding Obronny sp.z o.o. (PHO) to explore cooperation. Their WISLA offering is based on PATRIOT, and Raytheon and PHO are hosting a Partnering Conference on March 18-19/14 at the Hilton Hotel in Warsaw, Poland. Sources: Raytheon, “Poland invites Raytheon to participate in round two of WISLA technical dialogues”.
Nov 26/13: Defense News offers an update on Polish plans:
“Poland plans to modernize its anti-aircraft and anti-missile system by 2022 by adding short- and middle-range missiles. The program is estimated to be worth as much as 26.4 billion zloty (US $8.4 billion), according to figures obtained by local daily Gazeta Wyborcza, which makes it the country’s largest armament program.”
Poland reportedly had 14 firms interested in WISLA, including Boeing, Israel’s SIBAT export agency, MBDA (incl. a consortium led by Poland’s Bumar), and Raytheon. Some of the interested firms would have to be sub-contractors, or supply just part of a system: Turkey’s Aselsan, Northrop Grumman, Selex, Spain’s Indra and Sener, and Thales.
Lockheed Martin is notably absent, but MEADS is being offered through MBDA as a 2nd bid, alongside their SAMP/T offer through Bumar. Lockheed Martin would remain an active MEADS participant, and remaining development funds are estimated at $400 – 600 million. Germany and Italy and considering “a transition to European development work” by the end of 2014, and have invited Poland to join them. Sources: Defense News, “Building the Shield” | NTI Global Security Newswire, “Poland Eyes Up to $8.4 Billion in Air and Missile Defense Costs”.
Sept 18/13: Budgets. Poland’s government introduces a 10-year military modernization law that lays out a comprehensive modernization program. Once enacted, it will remove the problem of unspent modernization funds having to be returned each year, and prevent attempts to shift the money to other purposes. The catch? Poland’s “Law on the reform and technical modernization of Polish Armed Forces” includes a guarantee that every year, Poland will spend 1.95% of GDP on defense. The good news is that this sets a solid minimum. The bad news is that it also sets an effective maximum, so successful financing of these programs will depend on the long-term state of Poland’s economy.
“Among the priorities defined by the President Bronislaw Komorowski and Prime Minister Donald Tusk in November 2011, written in “Technical Modernization Plan for 2013-2022″ the following key operational programs are listed:
1. Air defence system – among other things the following items will be procured under this program:
– air defence medium-range missile systems WISLA;
– air defence short-range missile systems NAREW;
– self-propelled air defence missile systems POPRAD;
– mobile air defence missile system GROM/PIORUN;
– air defence short-range artillery-missile systems PILICA [DID: ZU-23-2 with 2 Grom missiles];
– mobile three-coordinates radio stations SOLA/BYSTRA.”
Sources: Polish MON, “Money for new military equipment guaranteed”.
2007 – 2012Poland burned by USA, resolves to field their own system as well.
Aegis Ashore
(click to view full)
Aug 6/12: Poland fixing its “mistake”. Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski states that Poland is prepared to create its own anti-aircraft and missile defense system as part of a NATO shield, at a cost of $3-6 billion. With respect to the USA’s defensive plan, which Poland hasn’t rejected:
“Our mistake was that by accepting the American offer of a shield we failed to take into account the political risk associated with a change of president. We paid a high political price. We do not want to make the same mistake again.”
The missile and air defense system proposed by the Polish president would target all short and some medium range missiles, just like the initial 2 stages of the EPAA. The system would be part of the emerging NATO Missile Defense shield, but beyond that, details regarding radars, weapons, etc. would have to be fleshed out in subsequent contracts. Germany and France were specifically mentioned as potential partners, and MBDA’s naval PAAMS system and Aster-30 missiles have already been converted to a land equivalent of their own. Their SAMP/T is the logical competitor if Poland wants to buy a non-American system. Its weakness is that it wouldn’t be able to grow into a counter against IRBM or ICBM missiles, but that could make it a very good complement to an American system that can. Relations with Israel are close, but David’s Sling is a joint development with Raytheon, and past American behavior has involved use its weapon export rules against potential competitors. Polskie Radio | Forbes | German Marshall Fund of the United States | Russia’s RIA Novosti | UK’s The Telegraph | UPI | WSJ Emerging Europe.
Sept 20/10: Budgets. Defense Minister Bogdan Klich announces that the 2011 military budget will grow 7.1% after 2010’s austerity measures, to PZL 27.25 billion ($8.79 billion). A national air and missile defense system will likely need its own separate approval, and:
“Anticipating the tender announcement, all likely bidders presented their offers from Sept. 6 to 9 at the International Defense Industry Exhibition MSPO in Kielce…. included a proposal based on the short-range VL Mica and medium-range Aster-30 missiles from European missile maker MBDA integrated with radars and Grom missiles from Poland’s Bumar Group; Norway’s Kongsberg and Raytheon’s joint bid comprising Patriot and NASAMS II systems; and Israeli Rafael and Raytheon with the Spider and Stunner interceptors.”
Sources: Defense News, “Poland’s Defense Budget Rises, With Emphasis on Modernization”.
December 2009: Status of Forces agreement between Poland and the USA paves the way for emplacement of US Army PATRIOT missile batteries in the country.
Sept 17/09: “Smart” Diplomacy. President Obama calls Polish Prime Minister Tusk to tell him, without any prior consultation, that the USA is changing their plans.
While the military rationale for cheaper, more proven missiles that can handle multi-missile raids is solid, calling the diplomatic handling incompetent would be kind. After announcing a “reset” in relations with Russia, the USA tells Poland that a different system will be delayed from 2011 until 2018. While trying to convince people that it isn’t a cave-in to Russian demands. As a final capper, the call from Obama comes on the anniversary of Russia’s attack on Poland at the start of WWII. Read “SM-3 BMD, in from the Sea: EPAA & Aegis Ashore” for full coverage of the revised EPAA plans.
Switch to EPAA
July 1/09: MBDA. The firm takes its existing Polish agreements (q.v. Sept 3/07) a step further, and signs a framework agreement:
“This agreement will see MBDA and BUMAR jointly involved in a project to modernise Poland’s ground based air defences. Long term co-operation will permit significant exchanges of technology between the two partners and the optimisation of investments already made. In this respect the new system will draw on elements of MBDA’s short-range VL MICA and medium-range Aster 30 missiles with other major subsystems such as the radars and the command and control systems developed by PIT (the Warsaw-based telecommunications research institute – Przemyslowy Instytut Telekomunikacji) and RADWAR (one of several companies within the BUMAR group which is Poland’s largest defence equipment manufacturer).”
Sources: MBDA, “MBDA and BUMAR sign framework agreement for the future Polish air defence system” | Microwave Journal, “MBDA and BUMAR Sign Polish Air Defense Agreement.”
Aug 20/08: BMD OK. Poland acceptes the G.W. Bush administration’s missile defense program, which promises to complete a base in Poland by 2011. The proposal had been the subject of vigorous debate, but Russia’s invasion of Georgia helps firm up Polish resolve.
BMD OKed
Sept 3/07: MBDA. The firm signs initial Polish partnership deals:
“The agreement, signed in the presence of Polish Vice-Prime Minister Przeyslaw Dosiewski and Polish Secretary of State for Defence Marek Zajakala, is aimed at future cooperation to meet the Polish Armed Forces’ long term ground based air defence requirements.
Under the agreement MBDA, along with Przemyslowy Instytut Telekomunikacji (PIT) and RADWAR (part of BUMAR, Poland’s largest defence equipment manufacturer) will have the common aim of providing the Polish Armed Forces with the range of Polish made weapon systems that will be needed to meet the country’s national anti-air defence requirements as well as its NATO and European commitments over the next 20 years.”
Sources: MBDA, “MBDA signs cooperative air defence agreement with Polish”.
Additional ReadingsReaders with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
General BackgroundEarly deployment of a system called Flight Guard aboard civilian jet liners came following a November 2002 incident in which shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS) were launched unsuccessfully at an Arkia plane in Mombasa, Kenya. That FlightGuard system is a civilian version of IAI/Elta’s popular ELM 2160, and costs about $1 million per plane for sensors and flares. The flares were the sticking point. Even though they were redesigned to be larger (to divert from larger targets), burn for a shorter time (to minimize ground hazard), and almost invisible to human eyes (to prevent panics), many locations were leery about allowing a flare-dispensing system near civilian airports.
In contrast, Elbit Subsidiary El-Op’s MUSIC (Multi-Spectral Infrared Countermeasures) system takes the DIRCM (Directed Infrared Counter-Measures) approach – a wise decision given civilian concerns, and key military trends. Now, the firm has its first large civilian order…
MUSIC is actually more like a symphony. A missile approach warning system (MAWS, using radar plus infrared or ultraviolet to reduce false positives) detects approaching missiles, then an advanced FLIR (Forward Looking Infra Red) system tracks it and guides the high-speed turret as it automatically slews and fires a human-safe laser beam at the missile. The laser’s pulses blind the missile’s sensors, either confusing the seeker away from the plane, or simply overloading its sensors and turning it into a rocket. It’s a very big sky; an unguided rocket is going to miss an aircraft, which will be taking evasive action because the pilots received their warning from the MAWS.
Older MANPADS like the common SAM-7 Strela produced under license by Iran rely on infrared detection of an aircraft’s exhaust plume. This makes their effectiveness questionable against military jets, who are almost always in a ‘tail chase’ position when lock is achieved, and can put on a burst of speed to cruise out of its range. Large civilian jets with bright exhaust plumes and slow acceleration are another matter, of course, though the Mombasa incident proved that even civilian aircraft are hardly sitting ducks. Both flares and DIRCM systems will be used instead.
The complicating factor for future threats is the fact that since the 1980s, shoulder-fired missiles have been diversifying their guidance systems, carrying dual infrared/ultraviolet detectors, and/or using advanced algorithms that help them ignore diversionary defenses like flares. As more advanced weapons proliferate via state support for terrorists or black market sales, the advantage begins to shift rather clearly away from diversionary decoys. In their place, customers will want systems that interfere with the missile more directly, and can be upgraded for additional threat types. DIRCM systems will be around for a long time, therefore, and could well be considered a strategic defense technology for nations under threat.
Which may help to explain why a system that was originally developed for helicopters has just received project approval from Israel’s Security Cabinet in order to equip Israel’s civilian aircraft. Investment in the MUSIC airliner project is expected to commence in early 2008, but the Reuters report quotes El-Op deputy director Yisrael Anschel as saying that adapting MUSIC for bigger aircraft could take another 2 years. That would mean a 2009-2010 fielding date. The reports add that IAI’s Flight Guard will remain on some Israeli passenger planes, even after the new MUSIC system is phased in.
As the Israelis have learned from hard experience, it pays to be careful.
Contracts and Key Events MUSIC IRCMDecember 18/15: Elbit Systems is to install the Commercial Multi-Spectral Infrared Countermeasures (C-MUSIC) systems to an unidentified Asia-Pacific nation. The two year contract is worth $26.5 million. The C-MUSIC system has been developed for fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, and gives advanced protection from heat-seeking shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles by using fiber-laser-directed infrared countermeasure technology. Whoever the mysterious buyer is, the purchase of the system may have been influenced by incidents such as the shooting down of a Malaysian Airlines plane on the Ukraine-Russia border in July 2014. Pro-Russian separatists fighting in east Ukraine shot down the plane using a Buk SA-11 surface-to-air missile.
June 25/09: Elbit Systems Ltd. announces a contract with the Israeli Ministry of Transportation, to supply its C-MUSIC system (commercial multi-spectral infrared countermeasure) under a $76 million contract. C-MUSIC is a larger version of the MUSIC system designed for helicopters and business aircraft. Israeli airliners will be among the word’s first passenger aircraft equipped with active defense systems.
The Elbit Systems Electro-optics El-Op Ltd. devices will be installed aboard a variety of commercial aircraft owned by Israeli commercial airlines El-Al, Arkia and Israir, and as part of the comprehensive ‘Sky Shield’ air transport defense plan. The Israeli airliner that was fired at near Mombassa, Kenya in 2002 was an Arkia 757. IEICI | Elbit Systems [PDF] | Defense Update | Flight International.
Additional Readings & SourcesThe F/A-18 Hornet is the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet‘s predecessor, with the first models introduced in the late 1970s as a spinoff of the USAF’s YF-17 lightweight fighter competitor. Hornets are currently flown by the US Marine Corps as their front-line fighter, by the US Navy as a second-tier fighter behind its larger F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, and by 7 international customers: Australia, Canada, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain, and Switzerland. The USA’s aircraft were expected to have a service life of 20 years, but that was based on 100 carrier landings per year. The US Navy and Marines have been rather busy during the Hornets’ service life, and so the planes are wearing out faster.
This is forcing the USA to take a number of steps in order to keep their Hornets airworthy: replacing center barrel sections, re-opening production lines, and more. Some of these efforts will also be offered to allied air forces, who have their own refurbishment and upgrade programs.
Some of the parts procured under Boeing’s contracts will be produced for allied military services who fly the F/A-18. The Hornet was a McDonnell-Douglas aircraft, so contracts will generally be to that Boeing subsidiary in St Louis, MO, unless otherwise noted.
Note that “center barrel sections” refer to the middle chunk of the plane where the wings joint the body. As one might guess, replacing them is a somewhat involved process, and is also very helpful in extending the airframe’s fatigue-hour limits.
Australian MROThere are some gaps in this article’s coverage. National MRO (Maintenance, Repair, & Optimization) initiatives don’t get comprehensive coverage beyond the multi-fleet central contracts announced in the USA, though some coverage and links are present. There’s also a thin line at times between upgrades required to remain survivable and hence useful in national fleets, and airframe life-extension efforts. In theory, they’re different, but in practice they’re often linked. As such, leaving all upgrades out would do readers a disservice, so they occasionally appear when there’s a connection. Again, however, lists of upgrades are not comprehensive.
Note that Hornet fighters use different radars. Raytheon’s APG-65 is installed aboard USN and USMC F/A-18C/D Hornets (both radar types), and the USMC’s AV-8B Harrier II Plus V/STOL fighters. Abroad, it serves in AV-8Bs operated by Spain and Italy, in Spain’s “EF-18A/Bs” and Kuwait’s F/A-18C/Ds, and in German and Greek F-4 Phantom strike fighters.
Raytheon’s APG-73 serves some of the USA’s F/A-18C/D Hornet fleet, and the USN’s F/A-18E/F Block I Super Hornet (APG-73) fighters. It’s also found in Hornets flown by Australia (F/A-18AM/BM), Canada (CF-18AM/BM), Finland (F/A-18C/D), Malaysia (F/A-18D), and Switzerland (F/A-18C/D).
Tests are reportedly going well for active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars to be retrofit to the A, B, C and D F/A-18 models.
2014 – 2015
F/A-18C fires Hydras
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December 18/15: It looks like a very merry Christmas for Lockheed Martin and Boeing, as they came out as the major winners in the announced $1.15 trillion spending bill announced on Wednesday. Funding will see eleven more F-35 Lightning IIs than requested by President Obama in February. The F-35 program will see $1.33 billion additional procurement money as production of the fighters will be ramped up. The F/A-18 production line will also be extended, with seven more EA-18G Growlers and five F/A-18E/F Super Hornets planned.
July 24/15: Boeing is committing to keep its F-18 production line open in response to new and forecast orders from both the US and international customers. The company was worried that insufficient orders for new Super Hornet and Growler aircraft would fail to materialize and keep the production line economically viable. Boeing considered slowing the production rate in March, to extend the time available for more orders to come through the door. Recent orders from the US Navy and Kuwait have bolstered the company’s confidence in keeping the production line open.
Nov 4/14: Support. Boeing in Jacksonville, FL receives a $25.3 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification for depot-level F/A-18A-D service life extension and remanufacturing activities, including associated maintenance support and sustainment capabilities.
Work will be performed in Jacksonville, FL (91.7%), and St. Louis, MO (8.3%), and is expected to be completed in September 2015. Funds will be obligated on individual delivery orders as they are issued. US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-14-D-0001).
Nov 3/14: Support. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $7.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification, exercising an option for post-production program management, logistics, and engineering services in support of F/A-18 A-F aircraft operated by Switzerland ($2.3M / 31.6%); Finland ($1.7M / 22.9%); Malaysia ($1.1M / 15.8%); Kuwait ($1.0M / 13.7%); Australia ($510,103 / 7%); Canada ($356,677 / 4.9%); and Spain ($298,498 / 4.1%). All funds are committed immediately.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and is expected to be complete in December 2015. US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-14-D-0012).
Nov 3/14: USMC Plan. The USMC’s Aviation Plan to 2030 outlines a future in which Hornets will remain in the fleet until 2030, instead of 2025. The main reason? The USMC believes it would be about $1 billion cheaper to retire the AV-8B Harrier fleet 5 years earlier and extend the Hornets 5 years later, based on 2 independent cost/benefit analyses. En route to this future, all West Coast MEUs will have F-35Bs instead of AV-8Bs by the end of FY 2019.
For the Hornet fleet, the Center Barrel Replacement Plus (CBR+) program has already extended the lives of 200 aircraft. A High Flight Hour inspection process is in progress, and a SLEP program will take place in parallel to extend the lives of about 150 hand-picked F/A-18C/Ds to 10,000 flight hours. Unfortunately:
“The USMC F/A-18A-D community is enduring a sustained shortage in excess of 40 aircraft fleet wide due to “Out Of Reporting” (OOR) maintenance. The USMC currently has eleven active squadrons and one reserve squadron that deploy with a full complement of aircraft, but the community is forced to absorb the shortfall during pre-deployment training due to a degraded Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory (PMAI). HQMC AVN is resetting the force by temporarily reducing squadron Flight Line Entitlement (FLE) to 10 aircraft to preserve future combat readiness while meeting today’s current operational requirements. Scalable squadron detachment models are being developed to meet the operational requirement without deploying excess assets, and Marine Corps Aviation is adding a detachment capability to each non-TAI VMFA. Forecasted improvements in aircraft availability will enable USMC F/A-18s to achieve 12 PMAI squadrons beginning in FY 17.”
Meanwhile, a set of fleet upgrades will continue to improve the platform. 2015 will see advanced LITENING G4 surveillance and targeting pods add air-to-air IRST capability, and the addition of the longer-range AIM-120D air-to-air missile with its 2-way datalink and new seeker radar. 2017-18 will add upgraded cockpit displays, AIM-9X short-range air-to-air missiles, and the 70mm APKWS laser-guided rocket. By 2019, APKWS will be able to use the 13.7 pound M822 tri-mode penetrating/ blast/ incendiary warhead. Instead of just 1 AGM-65 Maverick per hardpoint, the Hornet fleet will have 7 anti-armor weapons that can defeat many armored personnel carriers, and all lesser vehicles. Sources: USMC, Marine Aviation Plan 2015 [PDF].
May 18/14: Switzerland. Unsurprisingly, a tepid and convictionless defense of the JAS-39E Gripen NG fighter deal results in a referendum loss, with projections showing about a 53.4% no vote. The only surprise is that the margin was this narrow, indicating a winnable vote. Compare and contrast with the September 2013 referendum, which resulted in the Swiss keeping conscription. Or the government’s success in the referendum that ratified their F/A-18 Hornet buy.
While some governments in Europe will re-run referendums until they get the result they like, the Swiss aren’t like that. The TTE fighter buy is history, but the F-5E/F fleet will still retire, placing more emphasis on their fleet of 30+ Hornets. Switzerland will need to supplement that fleet with French and Italian cooperation for basic airspace protection. Sources: Swissinfo, “Swiss Reject $3.5 Billion Gripen Purchase in Blow to Saab” | Deutsche Welle, “Swiss referendum turns down minimum wage and new fighter jets” | Reuters, “Swiss voters narrowly block deal to buy Saab fighter jets: projection”.
Feb 28/14: Australia. Australia has changed and extended its F404 engine support contract with GE International Inc., to the tune of 4 years and A$ 230 million. This is also good news for local sub-contractor TAE, creating continued employment for 90 people in Williamtown, NSW, and Ipswich, Queensland.
When Australia signed their long-term F404 support contract in 2008, the RAAF’s F/A-18AM/BM fleet was scheduled to begin drawdown in July 2015, and leave service by June 2018. Delays to the F-35 program have forced an interim RAAF buy of 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet Block IIs, and will soon add 12 related EA-18G Growlers. It’s also forcing longer service from the “Classic Hornet” fleet, which won’t leave service until 2022. The new fighters are an obvious cost of the F-35 program, but so are forced extensions like this one. Sources: Australia DoD, “Minister for Defence – Jobs remain in Australia under Hornet contract”.
Jan 31/14: Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $26.8 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for the repair of various parts in support of the F/A-18 aircraft.
All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 USN funds. Work will be performed at Lemoore, CA (55%); Cecil Field, FL (44%); and Philadelphia, PA (1%), and is expected to be complete by Dec 31/16. The contract was not competitively procured by the US Naval Supply Systems Command, Weapon Systems Support, Philadelphia, PA, per 10 U.S.C. 2304 (c)(1). The a., is the contracting activity (N00383-11-G-001H, DO 0004).
Jan 22/14: SLEP. Boeing in Jacksonville, FL receives a $17.8 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity delivery order contract to support the F/A-18 A-F Depot Level Service Life Extension Program, including both maintenance and remanufacturing work.
Around $250,000 in FY 2014 USN aircraft budgets is committed immediately. Work will be performed in Jacksonville, FL (92%) and St. Louis, MO (8%), and is expected to be complete in September 2014. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-14-D-0001).
Dec 30/13: Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $46.7 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement for integrated logistics support and sustaining engineering for F/A-18A-D, F/A-18E/F, and EA-18G aircraft for the U.S. Navy ($36.6M / 78.3%) and Australia ($7M / 15.1%); plus $501,289 / 1.1% each from Canada, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain, and Switzerland. Support will include logistics, engineering, provisioning, information systems, technical data updates, support equipment engineering, training and software integration support.
All funds are committed immediately. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (70%); El Segundo, CA (15%); Oklahoma City, OK (6%); Bethpage, NY (5%); and San Diego, CA (4%), and is expected to be complete in December 2014 (N00019-11-G-0001, 0110).
2013
USMC F/A-18C
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Dec 27/13: Raytheon Technical Services Co. in Indianapolis, IN received a maximum $40.9 million delivery order against previously issued basic ordering agreement for the repair of 40 APG-65/73 Radar Weapon Replaceable Assemblies. The contract appears to be limited to the US military.
The APG-65 is installed aboard USN and USMC F/A-18C/D Hornets (both radar types), and the USMC’s AV-8B Harrier II Plus V/STOL fighters. Abroad, it serves in AV-8Bs operated by Spain and Italy, in Spain’s “EF-18A/Bs” and Kuwait’s F/A-18C/Ds, and in German and Greek F-4 Phantom strike fighters.
The APG-73 serves some of the USA’s F/A-18C/D Hornet fleet, and the USN’s F/A-18E/F Block I Super Hornet (APG-73) fighters. It’s also found in Hornets flown by Australia (F/A-18AM/BM), Canada (CF-18AM/BM), Finland (F/A-18C/D), Malaysia (F/A-18D), and Switzerland (F/A-18C/D).
Work will be performed in Indianapolis, Ind. (57%); El Segundo, CA (24%); Forest, MS (17%); Andover, Maine (2%), and work is expected to be completed no later than December 2015. Fiscal 2014 Navy working capital funds in the amount of $20,455,642 will be obligated at the time of award, and will not expire before the end of the current fiscal year. The contract was not competitively procured and is issued on a sole-source basis in accordance with 10 U.SC 2304(c)(1). Naval Supply Systems Command, Weapon Systems Support, Philadelphia, PA manages the contract (N00383-14-G-006D, DO 7000).
Dec 12/13: Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a 5-year, maximum $872.8 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for “system upgrades…. deliverables and services based on System Configuration Set life cycle phases for the” F/A-18 A/B, C/D, E/F and EA-18G fighters. Customers include the US Navy ($802.9 million/ 92%) and the governments of Australia ($29.7 million/ 3.4%), Finland ($21.8 million/ 2.5%), Switzerland ($7 million/ 0.8%), Kuwait ($4.4 million/ 0.5%), Malaysia ($4.4 million/ 0.5%), and Canada ($2.6 million/ 0.3%). It is time for USN service life extension work to get going (q.v. Jan 6/11).
Only 100,000 is committed upon award, using FY 2014 USN RDT&E budgets. Work will be performed as required in St. Louis, MO (95%) and China Lake, CA (5%), and is expected to be complete in December 2018. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to the FAR 6.302-1; it’s managed by the US Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division in China Lake, CA (N68936-14-D-0008).
5-year support contract
2012-2015Aging in the US, Australia; Avionics.
Finnish F/A-18D
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May 7/15: Reuters reported Wednesday that Boeing is on the cusp of being awarded a more than $3 billion contract for 28 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, with the potential customer named as Kuwait. The Kuwaitis currently operate the older F/A-18 Hornet fighter. The sale, combined with a USN request for a dozen of the aircraft, should be sufficient to maintain the company’s St Louis production lines past their slated 2017 closure.
Dec 28/12: Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives an $81.75 million firm-fixed-price delivery order covering integrated logistics support and sustaining engineering services for F/A-18 A-D Hornet and F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet fighters, and EA-18G Growler tactical jamming aircraft. They’ll provide in-service engineering, information systems, automated maintenance environment, technical data updates, support equipment engineering, training, and software integration support for the US Navy ($69.5M / 85%); and the Governments of Australia ($9.0M / 10.98%); Canada ($544,992 / .67%); Finland ($544,992 / 0.67%); Kuwait ($544,992 / 0.67%); Malaysia ($544,992 / 0.67%); Spain ($544,992 / 0.67%); and Switzerland ($544,992 / 0.67%)
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (70%); El Segundo, CA (15%); Oklahoma City, OK (6%); Bethpage, NY (5%); and San Diego, CA (4%), and is expected to be complete in December 2013. This contract combines purchases under the Foreign Military Sales Program. All contract funds are committed immediately, and only $342,372 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00383-06-D-001J).
Dec 19/12: Malaysia ATFLIRs. Raytheon SAS in McKinney, TX receives a $25.7 million firm-fixed-price delivery order from Malaysia for 6 Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) pods, which will be fitted to their F/A-18 C/D fighters. See “Malaysia Wants ATFLIR Targeting Pods for its F/A-18D Hornets” for full coverage.
Dec 19/12: Engine Improvement. General Electric Aviation in Lynn, MA receives a $17.5 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order for engineering and engine system improvement services, as part of the F414 and F404 Engine Component Improvement Programs. $10.8 million are committed immediately, of which $6 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 13/13.
This contract combines purchases for the U.S. Navy ($13.3M / 75.6%) and the Governments of Sweden ($1.3M / 7.4%); Australia ($832,277 / 4.8%); Canada ($516,877 / 3.0%); Spain ($514,156 / 2.9%); Finland ($380,856 / 2.2%); Korea ($225,793 / 1.3%); Kuwait ($233,955 / 1.3%); Switzerland ($204,030 / 1.2%), and Malaysia ($48,967 / 0.3%), under the Foreign Military Sales Program. Work will be performed in Lynn, MA, and is expected to be complete in December 2013. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-09-G-0009).
Dec 19/12: Avionics. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives an $8.9 million firm-fixed-price delivery order against a previously issued Basic Ordering Agreement for 285 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) retrofit kits in support of F/A-18C and F/A-18F aircraft.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (56%); Meza, AZ (37%); and El Paso, TX (7%), and is expected to be complete in June 2015. All contract funds are committed immediately, of which $1.35 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract.
Dec 19/12: Avionics. Boeing in St Louis, MO receives a $16.5 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for CY 2013 Avionics Repair Facility (ARF) labor support to repair various F/A-18 components. This contract also includes work for Spain and Kuwait (<1%). Work will be performed at ARF Lemoore, CA (48%); ARF Cecil Field, FL (49%), and Hornet Control Center in Philadelphia, PA (3%), and will be complete by Dec 31/13. All contract funds are committed immediately. The contract was not competitively procured in accordance with FAR 6.302-1 by US NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-11-G-001H, #0003). Dec 19/12: Avionics. Boeing in St Louis, MO receives $8,366,154 firm-fixed-price delivery order for CY 2013 Avionics Repair Facility (ARF) labor support to repair various F/A-18 components.
Work will be performed at ARF Lemoore, CA (48%); ARF Cecil Field, FL (49%), and Hornet Control Center in Philadelphia, PA (3%), and will be complete by Dec 31/13. All contract funds are committed immediately. The contract was not competitively procured in accordance with FAR 6.302-1 by US NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-11-G-001H, #0002).
Dec 3/12: Engines. General Electric in Lynn MA receives a 3-year, $265 million performance based logistics contract to provide repair, replacement and program support of 35 components used in F404 engines, which equip F/A-18A-D Hornets.
Work will be performed at the Fleet Readiness Center Southeast in Jacksonville, FL and is expected to be complete by Dec 31/15. Funds will be committed as needed. This contract was competitively procured with 6 offers solicited, but just 1 offer received from the solicitation. US NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-13-D-001M).
Nov 21/12: USN Life Extension. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $9.8 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification for additional engineering analyses in support of the F/A-18A-D Service Life Extension Program.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (58%) and El Segundo, CA (42%), and is expected to be complete in September 2013. All contract funds are committed by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-12-C-2010).
Nov 19/12: Boeing in St. Louis, MO received a $23.3 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for one-time F/A-18 “Generator Converter Unit Reliability Improvement” (ECP 6421SOW) engineering services.
Work will be performed in Vandalia, OH (72%); St. Louis, MO (20%); Grand Rapids, MI (5%); Cincinnati, OH (1%); Youngwood, PA (1%); and Morrow, OH (1%), and is expected to be completed in December 2015. All contract funds will be obligated on this award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-11-G-0001).
Nov 16/12: Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems in Goleta, CA receives a $23.2 firm-fixed-price contract modification for ECM gear. The U.S. Navy is buying another 26 AN/ALR-67v3 radar warning receivers ($22.1M/ 95.5%), and Switzerland is buying 4 of the system’s countermeasure signal processor weapons replacement assemblies ($1.0M/ 4.5%).
The USN flies Super Hornets that use the ALR-67v3, but the Swiss buy can only be for their F/A-18C/D Hornet fleet.
Work will be performed in Forest, MS (32%); Goleta, CA (20%); San Diego, CA (14%); Chatsworth, CA (11%); Sydney, Australia (11%); Lansdale, PA (8%); and McKinney, TX (4%), and is expected to be complete in June 2015. All funds are obligated on this award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-09-C-0052).
Nov 15/12: USN Life Extension. The US GAO publishes GAO-13-51, “Better Cost Estimates Needed for Extending the Service Life of Selected F-16s and F/A-18s.” The lateness of the F-35, and high flight-hour usage over Iraq and Afghanistan, are making it hard to keep fighter numbers up. Current USAF plans involve $2.61 billion to upgrade at least 300 of 1,020 F-16s to fly another 2,000 hours (est. 6-8 years) each, add more advanced radars, etc. The USN would spend about $2.19 billion to keep 150 of 624 F/A-18A-D Hornet fighters flying for another 1,400 flight hours (est. 5 years) each, alongside a separate buy of 41 more F/A-18E/F Super Hornets.
The alternative is a more expensive approach that would buy new F-16s or Super Hornets. They would cost much more, but last 4x-5x as long. The problem is that the cost of new planes is known, but costs of fixing existing aircraft to cover for additional F-35 delays or add new capabilities aren’t as clear. F-16 upgrades could rise to 650 planes, and F/A-18 Hornet life extension could rise to 280 planes, with the possibility of added capability upgrades.
The US Navy’s 2011 plan for its Hornet fleet would take place over FY 2013-2017. The planes to be upgraded would be specially chosen, presumably for low wear and structural integrity. They would also be individually evaluated for capability enhancements, but those aren’t in the $2.19 billion budget. Current estimates involve another $1.76 million per Hornet for capability upgrades, and an average of $5.64 million more if the Hornets need structural life extension and obsolescence replacement. That gives us a figure of between $2.19 – $3.3 billion if 150 Hornets are upgraded ($14.6 – $22 million per plane), and the upper ends of that figure offer poorer long-term value for money than buying a new Super Hornet in the mid-$60 million range.
If costs are linear, the total for a 280 plane program would be between $4.09 – 6.16 billion, but costs are often not linear. Hence the GAO’s recommendation to do a full sensitivity analysis, so decision makers can fully understand the range of Navy costs between $2.19 – $6.16 billion.
Sept 28/12: Aging in Australia. The Australian reports that the RAAF has been ordered to scale back its usage of its modernized F/A-18AM/BM Hornets, in order to keep them viable until F-35 begin arriving in the early 2020s. Aging is taking a serious toll, and 62/71 fighters had “structure fatigue above that expected for the airframe hours.”
Meanwhile, annual maintenance costs for Australia’s Hornet fleet were A$118 million in 2001, A$ 170 million in 2012, and is expected to be A$ 214 million by 2018. The ANAO sees costs continuing to climb, and says that keeping the fleet flying beyond 2020 could require more structural modifications program and capability upgrades, as well as more frequent inspections. Maintenance for Australia’s new F/A-18F Super Hornets is a separate effort, and does not affect their conclusions.
Sept 27/12: An unfinalized $33 million contract line item number against delivery order under a previously awarded contract for various quantities of new consumable parts to support the F/A-18 aircraft. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and the contract will run until Dec 30/15.
The applicable Navy Working Capital Funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Boeing was the only company solicited for this non-competitive requirement by NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-06-D-001J, #0014).
Aug 29/12: A $27.8 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fee requirements contract modification. Boeing will provide supplies and services for In-Warranty and Out-Of-Warranty depot-level modification installations and In-Service Repairs (ISR).
Work will be performed in Jacksonville, FL and is expected to be complete in September 2013. No funding is being obligated at time of award; it will be committed as needed. US Naval Air System Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-11-D-0013).
June 19/12: Raytheon Technical Services Co. in Indianapolis, IN receives $40.3 million for unpriced deliver order 7284, covering the repair of 35 weapons repairable assemblies and shop replaceable assemblies of the APG-65/73 Radar System used on F/A-18 Hornet aircraft. The AN/APG-73 is also used on a dwindling number of F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, as those radars are replaced with AN/APG-79 AESA equipment.
Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN (56.93%); El Segundo, CA (33.79%); Forest, MS (7.25%); and Andover, MA (2.03%), and is expected to be complete by June 30/14. The contract will use FY 2012 Navy Working Capital Funds, but they won’t expire at the end of the fiscal year. This was a sole-source contract by US NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-07-G-008D).
May 30/12: Multinational. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in El Segundo, CA receives a $14 million firm-fixed-price, sole-source contract for F-18 aircraft rudders, which they’ll supply to the US Navy (using FY 2014-2015 Navy Stock funds), Finland, Spain, and Switzerland. Work will continue until Oct 30/15. The Defense Logistics Agency Aviation in Philadelphia, PA manages the contract (SPRPA1-11-G-002Z, 5036).
2011USN; Malaysia; Kuwait.
Spanish EF-18B
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Dec 29/11: Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $9.8 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for supplies and services to support the USA’s F/A-18A-D Service Life Extension Program. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (58%), and El Segundo, CA (42%), and is expected to be complete in February 2013. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6302.1. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-12-C-2010).
Nov 28/11: Malaysia. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $17.3 million firm-fixed-price order for the design, development, and installation of engineering change proposal (ECP 618) retrofit kits for the RMAF’s 8 F/A-18D Hornet fighters, under the Foreign Military Sales Program. This contract action also includes training for ECP 618 and ECP 624, and the installation of other systems that are part of the Malaysian upgrade. Conversations with Boeing explain that:
“This contract includes design, development, and installation of retrofit kits that will provide enhanced navigation and targeting capabilities, along with associated training for maintenance and air crews. The majority of work to be performed under this contract is within the scope defined in the baseline Foreign Military Sales case and not the May 2011 Defense Security Cooperation Agency announcement for the Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared [targeting pods, see DID coverage] which itself was an amendment to the existing baseline FMS case.”
That scope includes GPS improvements, a colored moving-map cockpit display, changes to IFF, and the addition of the JHMCS helmet-mounted sight. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (70%), and Butterworth, Malaysia (30%), and is expected to be complete in April 2015. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD will manage the sale on behalf of its FMS client. See also Boeing.
Nov 8/11: Kuwait. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Kuwait’s request to buy continuing Contractor Engineering & Maintenance Services, Hush House Maintenance Support services, Liaison Office Support Services, and related US government and contract support for their F/A-18C/D Hornets. The estimated cost is $100 million.
The principal contractors will be Boeing in St. Louis, MO; Kay and Associates in Buffalo Grove, IL; Industrial Acoustics Company in Winchester, UK; and General Dynamics in Fairfax, VA.
Nov 7/11: Multinational. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $7.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification, exercising options from for F/A-18 Hornet in-service support on behalf of Switzerland ($2.42 million; 30.7%); Finland ($1.8 million; 22.9%); Canada ($925,000; 11.7%); Kuwait ($919,250; 11.7%); Malaysia ($919,250; 11.7%); Australia ($490,800; 6.2%); and Spain ($404,914; 5.1%). Boeing services will include program management, logistics, engineering support, incidental materials, and technical data.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and is expected to be complete in December 2012. This is a Foreign Military Sales Program contract, managed by US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-09-D-0010).
Sept 28/11: Boeing in Jacksonville FL received a $31.5 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fee requirements contract. It covers supplies and services for in-warranty and out-of-warranty depot-level modification installations, and in-service repairs incident to modification kit installs, including associated material and services as required to support the continued safe, reliable, and improved operation of the F/A-18 series aircraft.
Work will be performed in Jacksonville, FL, and is expected to be complete in September 2012. Funding will be committed as needed, and this contact was not competitively procured by US Naval Air System Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-11-D-0013).
Aug 31/11: Canada. Canada adds up to C$ 111 million (currently around $112 million) to its CF-18 Primary Air Vehicle contract with L-3 Military Aviation Services (L-3 MAS), converting the previous arrangement to a full Optimized Weapon System Support program.
The contract breaks down as another C$ 80 million to 2017 in the base contract (now C$ 547 million), plus a set of extension options that could extend the additional work out to 2020 and raise the total by C$ 111 million, taking the overall contract to C$664 million (currently $676 million). OWSS adds new items to the previous contract’s list of maintained components (vid. Sept 1/10, see also Oct 14/10) by consolidating them under this 1 contract, but doesn’t change contract length or other particulars. Public Works Canada | L-3 MAS [PDF].
Aug 25/11: USN Life Extension. AOL Defense reports that some USMC Hornets are reaching service life limits, which have risen to 9,000 – 10,000 flight hours after the full Service Life Extension Program.
“Headquarters Marine Corps – Aviation, who oversee the service’s aviation budget, were adamant the SLEP effort would go no further than the 9,000- to 10,000-hour extension… [Marine Corps spokesman Capt. Brian] Block told AOL Defense that the highest average flight time on any service F/A-18 Hornet is just over 8,500 hours. “Moreover, not a single F/A-18 Hornet in the Department of the Navy inventory has surpassed the 9,000 hour mark,” Block said… Block said that Marine Corps crews “are conducting routine maintenance at an accelerated pace due to higher utilization”… Maj. Gen. Jon Davis, commander of the 2nd Marine Corps Air Wing [said that] “You cannot keep it up forever.”
March 30/11: A $24.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification for “supplies and services to support depot-level modification installations and in-service repairs of [USN/USMC] F/A-18 series aircraft.” Work will be performed in Jacksonville, FL, and is expected to be complete by September 2011. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00189-08-D-Z028).
March 4/11: Multinational. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., Ltd. in Middlesex, England receives an $18.3 million firm-fixed price contract modification to exercise an option for 65 Navy Aircrew Common Ejection Seats (NACES). They will equip F/A-18 A+/C+ Hornets and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler aircraft flown by the U.S. Navy ($18.2M/ 99.4%), and the air forces of Australia (F/A-18A+ and F/A-18F; $51,920/ 0.27%) and Kuwait (F/A-18C+; $61,730; 0.33%). This option also buys associated hardware, equipment, technical data, and production support services.
Work will be performed in Johnstown, PA (60%), and Middlesex, England (40%), and is expected to be complete in December 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract. See also Feb 25/11 entry.
March 3/11: Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives an $8.8 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for integrated logistics support; in-service engineering; information systems; technical data; support equipment engineering; automated maintenance environment; training/software integration support; provisioning; and A-D sustaining engineering services in support of the F/A-18 A-D Hornet, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, and EA-18G Growler aircraft.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (70%); El Segundo, CA (15%); Oklahoma City, OK (6%); Bethpage, NY (5%); and San Diego, CA (4%), and is expected to be complete in December 2011. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00383-06-D-001J).
Feb 28/11: USN Life Extension. A Gannett Navy Times article details the efforts underway to keep the US Navy’s fleet of F/A-18 A-D Hornet fighters in service, until some of them can be replaced by F-35B/C jets.
The USN’s F/A-18 program manager, Capt. Mark Darrah, is quoted as saying that the Hornet fleet is averaging about 330 flight-hours per year, which means they’re consistently about 30% above planned usage. Many have now exceeded even their extended usage figure of 8,000 flight hours. Fortunately, their accident rate remains low.
Carrier Air Wing 7 commander Capt. Roy Kelley adds that the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fleet is also burning through airframe hours, with 73 of the fleet’s 418 aircraft already over 3,000 hours – wich is about half-way through their safe design lifetimes.
The Navy hopes to extend its Hornet airframes to 10,000 safe flight hours, up from the easier target of 8,600. Each plane costs about $15 million when put through the deep inspections and refurbishment program. It’s accompanied by detailed record-keeping, and a constant juggling act among the squadrons. Darrah says that NAVAIR/NAF’s quarterly modification review “literally makes the decisions every quarter on, bureau number by bureau number, what aircraft will be assigned to what units,” based heavily on flight hour and maintenance issues. Once on the carrier, that juggling continues. Networking has made flight data files compilable and accessible across the fleet, allowing for remote analysis by expert teams, and letting squadrons pick less demanding missions for high-hours airframes, in order to even out wear and tear.
Feb 25/11: A $10.8 million order for the US Navy’s F/A-18 A-D Navy aircrew common ejection seat retrofit: 24 multipurpose display indicators; 12 horizontal situation displays; and 37 install kits (AFC-430, AFC-493, and AYC-1363).
Work will be performed in Toronto, Ontario, Canada (57%); St. Louis, MO (24%); Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada (3%); Grand Rapids, MI (2%); Sylmar, CA (1%); Tempe, AR (1%); El Paso, TX (1%); El Segundo, CA (1%); and various locations throughout the United States (10%); and is expected to be complete in February 2013. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-11-G-0001).
Jan 6/11: USN Life Extension. As part of a plan detailing $150 billion in service cuts and funding shifts over the next 5 years, Defense Secretary Robert Gates states that he is placing the Marine Corps’ F-35B on the equivalent of a 2-year probation, extends the F-35 program’s development phase again to 2016, and cuts production of all models over the 2012-2016 time period.
In response, the Navy will add 41 Super Hornets, and perform service life extension work on another 150 F/A-18 A-D Hornets. Pentagon release re: overall plan | Full Gates speech and Gates/Mullen Q&A transcript | F-35 briefing hand-out [PDF] || Aviation Week | Fort Worth Star-Telegram’s Sky Talk blog.
2010Australia; Canada; Finland; Switzerland.
Malaysian F/A-18D:
Bersama Shield 2010
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Dec 30/10: FIRST. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $69.1 million delivery order under the F/A-18 Integrated Readiness Support Team (FIRST) Program for continued support of F/A-18 A-D Hornet, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, and EA-18G Growler fleets of the U.S. Navy ($64.6M/ 93.6%); and the governments of Australia ($1.7M/ 2.5%), Canada ($513,996; 0.7%), Spain ($513,996/ 0.7%), Finland ($513,966/ 0.7%), Switzerland ($513,996; 0.7%), Kuwait ($513,996/ 0.7%), and Malaysia ($256,998/ 0.4%).
Under FIRST, which began in 2001, Boeing manages and forecasts spares and repairs, oversees spares inventories, makes supportability improvements within the budget in order to meet its availability targets, and handles obsolescence management and technology insertion. Like the British “contracting for availability” agreements, the objective is to improve fleet support and aircraft readiness while reducing costs. Boeing will be rewarded for having the aircraft meet in-service readiness targets, rather than getting paid for spare parts or hours worked.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (70%); El Segundo, CA (15%); Oklahoma City, OK (6%); Bethpage, NY (5%); and San Diego, CA (4%); and is expected to be complete in December 2011. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00383-06-D-001J).
Dec 27/10: Finland/ Switzerland. A $66.2 million firm-fixed-price delivery order under the basic ordering agreement for weapon replaceable assemblies and other complex parts used in retrofitting F/A-18C/D aircraft for the governments of Finland (62/ $44.6M/ 67%), and Switzerland (33/ $21.6M/ 33%).
Work will be performed in Cedar Rapids, IA (44.8%); St. Louis, MO (26.8%); Fort Worth, TX (14.9%); Oakland, NJ (6.4%); Grand Rapids, MI (3.3%); Butler, NJ (1.3%); Sylmar, CA (1%); Killdeer, ND (0.5%); Mesa, AZ (0.4%); El Segundo, CA (0.3%); Wallingford, CT (0.2%); and Horsham, PA (0.1%), and is expected to be complete in April 2015. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract on behalf of these Foreign Military Sale clients (N00019-11-G-0001).
Dec 23/10: Multinational. Moog, Inc. in East Aurora, NY receives a $17.3 million order for 1,626 kits required to complete engineering change proposal #1054 for F/A-18 LA-d leading edge flap mechanical drive group system for the US Navy (1,260/ $13.4M/ 77.49%) and the governments of Finland (138/ $1.5M/ 8.49%), Kuwait (94/ $998,374/ 5.78%), Switzerland (68/ $722,228/ 4.18%), Spain (50/ 531,050/ 3.08%), and Malaysia (16/ $169,936/ 0.98%).
Work will be performed in Torrance, CA, and is expected to be completed in November 2014, but $13.4 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages these contracts on behalf of all customers (SPM4A1-06-G-0002).
Dec 22/10: A $10.3 million firm-fixed-price delivery order #0010 under previously awarded contract (N00383-06-D-001J) for production of nose landing gears used on the F/A-18 aircraft. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and is expected to be complete by January 2015. This contract was not competitively awarded by the Naval Inventory Control Point in Philadelphia, PA.
Dec 22/10: Multinational. Raytheon Technical Services in Indianapolis, IN receives $33 million for a priced delivery order of APG-65/73 radar system components used in support of the F/A-18 aircraft. AN/APG-65 radars are exclusive to the F/A-18 A-D Hornet, including Spain and Kuwait’s models; while the AN/APG-73 equips older F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, as well as F/A-18 upgrades and C/D model Hornets flown by the USMC, Australia, Canada, Finland, Malaysia, and Switzerland. Many Super Hornets with APG-73 radars are having them replaced by next-generation AN/APG-79 AESA models, so Super Hornets will form a diminishing base for the older APG-73.
Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN (65%); El Segundo, CA (20%); Forest, MS (13%); and Andover, MA (2%), and is expected to be complete by January 2015. This contract was not competitively awarded by the US Naval Inventory Control Point in Philadelphia, PA, as there’s just 1 manufacturer for these radars (N00383-07-G-008D, #7152).
Dec 21/10: A $13.4 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for Avionics Repair Facility support, to repair various F/A-18 components. Work will be performed in Lemoore, CA (49%); Cecil Field, FL (49%); and Philadelphia, PA (3%), and is to be complete by December 2011.
This effort includes the governments of Spain, Malaysia, and Kuwait (all less than 1%) under the Foreign Military Sales program, and was not competitively awarded by the US Naval Inventory Control Point in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-07-G-005H, #0012).
Dec 3/10: Kuwait. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $16.9 million delivery order for supplies and services required to upgrade 39 Kuwaiti F/A-18C/D Hornet fighters. The upgrades will add a Miniature Airborne Global Positioning Receiver 2000 with selective availability anti-spoofing module (SAASM), corresponding improvements to the fighters’ moving map displays, and a cockpit pressurization warning system.
Work will be performed in Ahmed Al-Jaber Air Base, Kuwait (90%), and in St. Louis, MO (10%), and is expected to be complete in June 2014. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD will manage this contract on behalf of the Foreign Military Dale customer (N00019-05-G-0026). Kuwait is currently evaluating long-term replacement options for its Hornet fleet, with France’s Rafale billed as a leading contender.
Nov 22/10: Multinational. Boeing receives a $7.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity contract modification, exercising an option for in-service support of F/A-18 Hornet aircraft of the governments of Australia ($464,714; 6%), Canada ($872,514; 12%), Finland ($1.7M; 22%), Kuwait ($874,264; 12%), Malaysia ($864,264; 11%), Spain ($385,847; 5%), and Switzerland ($2.46M; 32%). Services to be provided include program management, logistics, engineering support, and incidental materials and technical data.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and will run to in December 2011. The US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-09-D-0010).
Oct 14/10: Canada. The Canadian government has contracted Calgary-based Harris Canada Inc. to continue avionics maintenance of its CF-18 fighter jets, until their replacements are ready to fly. The contract is worth up to C$ 273.8 million (currently at rough parity with American dollar) until 2020.
It is more focused than the larger L-3 MAS contract (q.v. Sept 1/10), which covers the entire aircraft, but it’s a similar sort of extension. Canadian Press | The Globe and Mail.
Sept 24/10: Multinational. A $21.6 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for integrated logistics support, in-service engineering, information systems, technical data, support equipment engineering, automated maintenance environment, training/software integration support, provisioning and sustaining engineering in support of F/A-18 A-D, E/F, and EA-18G aircraft. This modification combines purchases for the U.S. Navy ($18.5 million; 85.7%) and the governments of Australia ($2.5 million, 11.5%); Canada ($212,300, 1%); Spain ($147,700, 0.7%); Finland ($98,500, 0.5%); Kuwait ($61,500, 0.3%), Switzerland ($52,300, 0.2%), and Malaysia ($12,300; 0.1%), under the Foreign Military Sales program.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (70%); El Segundo, CA (15%); Oklahoma City, OK (6%); Bethpage, NY (5%); and San Diego, CA (4%); and is expected to be complete in December 2010. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00383-06-D-001J).
Sept 22/10: Northrop Grumman Corp., Integrated Systems, El Segundo, CA receives a $35.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 33 F/A-18 A-D center barrel sections, and loose and miscellaneous parts. Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA, and is expected to be complete in October 2013. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-10-C-0052).
Sept 1/10: Canada. The Canadian Prime Minister’s Office announces that the government has extended its CF-18 Systems Engineering Support Contract to L-3 Communications MAS of Mirabel, Quebec until at least 2017. This 7-year contract extension is valued at C$ 467 million, with 3 additional 1-year extension options that could add another C$ 86 million (C$ 553 million total), and stretch the contract until the end of the fleet’s estimated service life in 2020.
The contractor’s primary responsibility for the CF-18 Hornet fleet is development and maintenance work that includes mission software, structural testing, depot-level inspections and repairs, technical support teams, and other engineering services. In addition to their Canadian maintenance work, they’ve also been involved in Australia’s HUG [PDF] Hornet upgrade and life-extension program. Canadian PMO | L-3 MAS [PDF] | CBC | National Post.
June 24/10: Australia. L-3 MAS announces [PDF] the on-time delivery of the last of 10 Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18 Hornet aircraft for which it performed Centre Barrel Replacement (CBR) work, under contract to the Australian Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO). See March 6/06 entry, which covered initial prototype work, and was followed by a production and integration contract. See also Aug 22/07 entry.
Under the DMO’s Hornet Upgrade Phase 3 (HUG 3) program, the aircraft systems and wings were removed in Williamtown by BAE Systems Australia. The Hornet fuselages were airlifted to the L-3 MAS CBR-dedicated facility in Mirabel, Canada on a leased AN-124 heavy cargo aircraft, then sent back to Williamtown for final assembly and returned to flight status by BAE. See also BAE Systems Australia.BAE Systems Australia.
2009Australia; Finland; Kuwait.
Kuwaiti F/A-18C
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Dec 28/09: Kuwait. DynCorp International LLC in Fort Worth, TX received a $16.9 million modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00019-06-C-0308), exercising an option for maintenance services in support of the Kuwaiti Air Force F/A-18 Program under the Foreign Military Sales Program. Work will be performed in Kuwait (90%) and Fort Worth, TX (10%), and is expected to be complete in December 2010. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD issued the contract.
Dec 8/09: A $6.6 million not-to-exceed order against a previously issued Basic Ordering Agreement (N00019-05-G-0026) for F/A-18 A-D Service Life Extension Program Phase B+ engineering support services. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (55%), and El Segundo, CA (45%), and is expected to be completed in December 2010. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD issued the contracts.
Dec 2/09: Kuwait. A $9.5 million order against a previously issued Basic Ordering Agreement (N00019-05-G-0026) for the necessary personnel, material and support to repair or replace damaged components of Kuwait F/A-18 aircraft tail number 421 for the government of Kuwait under the Foreign Military Sales program.
Work will be performed at Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, Kuwait, and is expected to be complete in December 2012. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract.
Nov 12/09: Multinational. A $10.8 million modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract (N00019-09-D-0010, exercising an option to provide in-service support for Switzerland ($2.7 million; 25%), Australia ($1.6 million; 15%), Finland ($1.6 million; 15%), Canada ($1.6 million; 15%), Kuwait ($1.1 million; 10%), Malaysia ($1.1 million; 10%) and Spain’s ($1.1 million; 10%) F/A-18 Hornets. This effort will include, but is not limited to, program management, engineering and logistics support. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and is expected to be complete in December 2010. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract.
Nov 5/09: Finland. A $13.7 million firm-fixed-price delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-05-G-0026) for 2 F/A-18C/D Mid-Life Upgrade 2 validation-verification kits for the Finnish Air Force under the Foreign Military Sales program. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and is expected to be complete in September 2011. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract.
May 28/09: Australia. L-3 MAS and BAE Systems Australia announce a 4-year, A$ 150 million contract to provide long term maintenance and modification support to the Royal Australian Air Force’s F/A-18 Hornet aircraft, with 5 years of additional extension options through 2018. L-3 MAS.
March 18/09: Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas Corp. received a $6.6 million firm-fixed-price order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-05-G-0026). They will perform for inner wing conversion and reliability improvements required pursuant to Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) 609. This ECP will convert existing F/A-18A/B Lots 5-9 Inner Wing assemblies to be compatible with F/A-18 C/D (Lots 10, 11, 12, and up) aircraft. This ECP also defines changes required to convert existing F/A-18 C/D Lots 10 and 11 Inner Wings to be compatible with F/A-18 C/D Lots 12 and up aircraft, addresses reliability issues with 2 fuel tubes by replacing them with heat treated versions, and defining requirements to improve sealing of the inner wing, in order to prevent stress corrosion cracking of the lower spar flanges.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (74%) and Mesa, AZ (26%), and is expected to be complete in December 2012. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract.
Feb 13/09: Multinational. Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas Corp. received a $10.4 million cost plus fixed fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract. They will provide program management, logistics, and engineering services and incidental materials and technical data in support of F/A-18s flown by Australia ($927,200/ 8.9%), Canada ($1.6M/ 15.56%), Finland ($2.2M/ 21.32%), Kuwait ($1.3M/ 12.45%), Malaysia ($806,352/ 7.74%), Spain ($362,000/ 3.48%), and Switzerland ($3.2M/ 30.55%). The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00019-09-D-0010).
2008Cracks in US fleet. Australia; Finland; Switzerland.
Swiss F/A-18C
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Dec 19/08: Multinational. Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas Corp in St Louis, MO received cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with an estimated value of $905.3 million. In return, the firm will provide the support services required to enhance the F/A-18 A-D Hornet, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, and EA-18G Growler aircraft with a series of System Configuration Sets (SCS) for F/A-18 family aircraft operated by the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and the Governments of Canada, Australia, Spain, Kuwait, Switzerland, Finland and Malaysia.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (95%) and at the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA (5%), and is expected to be complete in December 2013. The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division in China Lake, CA issued the contract (N68936-09-D-0002).
Dec 17/08: Switzerland. The Swiss Standerat approves the defense program, including Hornet modernization. Armasuisse release [in German].
Dec 9/08: Australia. Australia’s government announces that the final Hornet Upgrade (HUG) Phase 2.2 aircraft has now been delivered with modifications to the radar system, avionics system, electronic warfare suite and a Hornet aircrew training system. The last of 14 RAAF Hornets to receive the interim electronic warfare upgrade has been successfully delivered under HUG Phase 2.3 with Raytheon’s ALR-67v3 radar warning system. Both upgrade sets were reportedly delivered on time and on budget. The next stage of HUG 2.3 is set to begin in May 2009, and will add a new countermeasures dispensing system, new data recorder and a further software upgrade. Australian DoD release.
Oct 23/08: Cracking up? The US Navy orders inspections across its 636 plane Hornet fleet, after cracks are found in aileron hinges on 15 aircraft. In December 2008, a crash kills 3 people and destroys several San Diego houses – but it appears to be the result of an engine failure. Read “Aging Aircraft: Cracks in USA’s F/A-18 fleet” for more.
Oct 1/08: General Electric in Lynn, MA received a 5-year, $641 million Performance Based Logistics (PBL) requirements contract for the F404 engine used on the F/A-18 A-D aircraft. PBL contracts are structured with bonuses for meeting key performance requirements like readiness, and penalties for failing to meet them.
Repair, replacement, and program support work will be performed at Lynn, MA, and is expected to be complete by December 2012. This effort combines efforts with the U.S. Navy (97%) and the Government of Switzerland (1%); Finland (1%), and Kuwait (1%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Inventory Control Point.
Sept 26/08: Multinational. A $10.2 million firm-fixed-price order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-05-G-0026) for 703 F/A-18 Cockpit Pressure Warning System kits to equip the U.S. Navy, (590, $7.9 million, 77.8%) and the Governments of Finland, (66, $994,999, 9.8%), Kuwait (39, $863,000, 8.5%) and Malaysia (8, $399,854, 3.9%).
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (85%) and Mesa, AZ (15%), and is expected to be complete in October 2012. Contract funds in the amount of $3.9 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.
Sept 26/08: A $13.6 million modification to a previously awarded firm fixed price contract (N00019-04-C-0014) for incorporation of Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) 6318 “Incorporation of upgraded Solid State Recorder (USSR)” to provide “high fidelity recording of the 14 F/A-18E, 9 F/A-18F, and 22 EA-18G 8 x 10 display that retains and expands on the current Solid state Recorder capabilities.”
Despite the references confining the upgrades to Super Hornet family aircraft, this modification/order is said to combine purchases for the U.S. Navy ($7.6 million, 56%) and the Governments of Switzerland ($3 million, 22%) and Finland ($3 million; 22%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. The latter 2 countries, of course, fly only F/A-18C/D Hornets. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and is expected to be complete in November 2010.
Sept 25/08: Switzerland. General Dynamics Information Technology announces a 5-year contract to provide program management services for the Swiss government’s F/A-18 fleet. The contract has a total potential value of $25.7 million if all options are exercised. General Dynamics will provide logistics, information technology (IT) and engineering support, along with communications management and training services.
Sept 25/08: Switzerland/ Finland. Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas Corp. received a $20.1 million modification to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract (N00019-04-D-0015) for new cockpit display suites on behalf of Switzerland and Finland. These suites will be used as lab assets for the design and development of a new cockpit display associated with both countries’ F/A-18C/D upgrade programs. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and is expected to be complete in December 2011. The US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) manages the contract.
Sept 24/08: Switzerland. The Swiss House of Representatives rejects the PA08 program, dealing a political blow to defence minister Samuel Schmid, and a program blow to F/A-18 modernization. Switzerland’s Senate will vote on it again in December 2008.
The problem is Swiss party politics. While the left-wing Greens and Social-Democrats are reliably opposed to such measures, the right-wing People’s Party (SVP) has threatened to veto and block all new arms expenditures. Samuel Schmid’s personal break with the SVP appears to be paying negative dividends; without SVP support, the centre-right Radicals and Christian Democrats lack the required votes. ISN analysis | Swiss Info story.
Sept 22/08: Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Council announces approval of the country’s SFR 917 million (about $844 million) Armaments Program 2008 (PA 08). Within that program, SFR 404 million is earmarked to maintaining and upgrading Switzerland’s 33 F/A-18C/D fighters.
“[the fleet] must be prepared for the second part of its 30-year service life… to reduce costs, their modernization will be undertaken in parallel with those of other countries. However, because of cost issues, Swiss F/A-18s will not [be] equipped for air-to-ground missions, nor for aerial reconnaissance.”
Read “Switzerland’s Hornet Upgrade 25 Program” for more.
Sept 9/08: Finland. The US DSCA announces Finland’s official request for equipment, to support the 3rd phase of its F-18 Mid-Life Upgrade Program to modernize its 63 F/A-18C and F/A-18D Hornet aircraft. The contracts could be worth up to $406 million. Read “Finland Requests 3rd Upgrade Phase for its F-18s” for full details.
Sept 4/08: Australia. Australia has initially decide to replace 49 center barrel sections in its Hornet fleet, and has already begun the process. In parallel, however, it also ran a full scale fatigue testing program for removed center barrel sections, courtesy of Australia’s DSTO, QinetiQ-Aerostructures, and Fortburn. The Hon. Warren Snowdon MP, Australia’s Minister for Defence Science and Personnel under Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon, announced that in light of this testing:
“…the actual life of the Hornet centre barrels is 10%, or 2 years, greater than originally certified… These findings are thanks to Australia’s internationally recognised world-leading expertise in testing and managing ageing aircraft, and is the result of decades of experience developing this capability.”
In response, Australia’s center barrel replacement program may drop from 49 aircraft to 10, a move that would save up to A$ 400 million (currently about $330 million) and leave more aircraft available for missions.
Aug 14/08: Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas Corp. received a $17.4 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price, cost plus fixed fee contract (N00383-06-D-001J) to incorporate post production and performance based logistics support requirements. This support is designed to ensure the continued safe and effective operations of fielded F/A-18 A-D aircraft in the US Navy and US Marine Corps ($12.6 million; 72%); and by the governments of Australia ($794,520; 5%), Canada ($1.5 million; 8%), Spain ($1 million; 6%), Finland ($677,991; 4%), Switzerland ($360,183; 2%), Kuwait ($423,744; 2%), and Malaysia ($84,749; 1%).
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (76%); El Segundo, CA (21%); Warner Robins, GA (2%); and Santa Clarita, CA (1%), and is expected to be complete in December 2008.
July 10/08: Australia. L-3 Communications MAS in Montreal, Canada announces a contract under Australia’s F/A-18 Centre Barrel Replacement (CBR) program, which is part of their Structural Refurbishment Project Phase 2 (SRP2). L-3 MAS began its SRP relationship with Australia’s DMO in 2002, and Australia’s initial CBR contract with was awarded in December 2005. The second phase of that CBR contract is worth up to USD$ 106 million, and was awarded n June 2008.
Under this new phase, L-3 MAS will deliver 4 low rate initial production (LRIP) aircraft followed by 4 full-rate production aircraft between May 2008 – June 2010, while providing ancillary services such as program management, engineering services, discrete modifications, spares and kits. The aircraft are inducted and prepared by BAE Systems Australia in Williamtown before being airlifted to the L-3 MAS F/A-18 CBR facility in Mirabel, Canada. Once re-spliced and repaired by L-3 MAS, the aircraft are returned to Williamtown for final assembly, flight testing and delivery to the DMO. The contract allows for options that could extend center-barrel replacement production to 2014.
The L-3 release briefly discusses the Mirabel facility’s use of lean manufacturing principles, and makes vague references to a recent contract with Spain involving its EA-18s. “L-3 MAS Wins Second Phase of Major F/A-18 Centre Barrel Contract with Australia and Is Awarded New Contract with Spain” was not posted the web.
July 1/08: General Electric Aviation in Lynn, MA received a $30.8 million 3-month extension of a previously awarded requirements contract (N00383-03-D-011M) for repair or replacement components and program support for the F404 engine used on the F/A-18 A-D aircraft.
This award combines an effort between the U.S. Navy (90%) and the Governments of Spain (1%); Canada (1%); Australia (1%); Kuwait (1%); and Switzerland (1%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. DID is aware that this adds up to 95%, but that’s what was in the DefenseLINK announcement.
Work will be performed in Jacksonville, FL (90%) and Lynn, MA (10%), and is expected to be complete by September 2008. The Naval Inventory Control Point manages this contract.
June 16/08: USN/ Finland. Northrup Grumman Corp Integrated Systems, in El Segundo, CA received a $48.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for 20 center barrel aircraft sections and 6 engine nacelles (5 for the U.S. Navy and 1 for the Government of Finland’s F/A-18 C/D aircraft). In addition, this contract provides for loose and miscellaneous parts.
This contract combines purchases for the United States Navy ($47.2 million; 98%), and Government of Finland ($1.1 million; 2%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA (85%); and St. Augustine, FL (15%), and is expected to be complete in November 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $2.5 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-08-C-0052).
April 30/08: Northrop Grumman Corp. in El Segundo, CA received a ceiling priced $25 million delivery order under a Basic Ordering Agreement (N00383-06-G-032D, #5115) for aircraft rudders which are spares in support of the F/A-18 aircraft. Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA and is expected to be complete by April 2011. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Inventory Control Point.
2007Australia; Canada; Kuwait; Switzerland.
Australian F/A-18A
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Dec 18/07: Switzerland. Switzerland’s makes an official request to the USA for up to $535 million in new equipment and refurbishments under its F/A-18C/D Upgrade 25 Program, in order to extend the useful life of 33 Swiss Air Force (SAF) F/A-18C/Ds. The upgrades include significant upgrades to the avionics and mission computer, 20 ATFLIR surveillance and targeting pods, and 44 sets of AN/ALR-67v3 ECM equipment, among other items, follow a successful trip to the USA to test integration of the F-18s’ new AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles. See “Switzerland’s Hornet Upgrade 25 Program” for full details.
Dec 18/07: Kuwait. DynCorp International LLC in Fort Worth, TX received a $14.1 million modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00019-06-C-0308), exercising an option for maintenance and support services for the Kuwaiti Air Force F/A-18 Program under the Foreign Military Sales Program. Work will be performed in Kuwait (90%) and Fort Worth, Texas (10%), and is expected to be complete in December 2008. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD issued the contract.
Nov 15/07: Northrop Grumman Corp. in El Segundo, CA received $8.7 million for firm-fixed-price order #5095 under a previously awarded basic ordering agreement contract (N00383-06-G-032D) for aircraft rudders which are spares in support of the F/A-18 aircraft. Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA (50%), Wichita, KS (24%), and Emmen, Switzerland (26%); and is expected to be complete by July 2011. This contract was not awarded competitively by the Naval Inventory Control Point.
Nov 9/07: Kuwait. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Kuwait’s formal request for technical/logistics support for F/A-18 aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The principal contractors are: Boeing Company of St. Louis, MO; and General Dynamics of Fairfax, VA. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $90 million.
The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of continuing logistics support, contractor maintenance, and technical services in support of the F/A-18 aircraft to include contractor engineering technical services, contractor maintenance support, avionics software, engine component improvement and spare parts, technical ground support equipment, spare and repair parts, supply support, publications and technical data, engineering change proposals, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program support. The estimated cost is $90 million.
Sept 20/07: Multinational. Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas Corp. in St. Louis, MO received a $145.1 million modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N68936-02-C-0043) for continued system configuration set support for the F/A-18 A-D Hornet, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler weapons systems for the US Navy and Marine Corps. In addition, this modification provides for unique Foreign Military Sales variants for the governments of Australia, Canada, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain, and Switzerland.
This contract also provides for studies and analysis related to avionics integration and acquisition product activities such as integration and testing. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (95%) and in China Lake, Calif. (5%), and is expected to be complete in January 2009. The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division in China Lake, Calif. issued the contract.
Aug 22/07: Australia. Australia’s DoD announces an important Hornet UpGrade program milestone with the recent completion of the first center barrel replacement for Australia’s F/A-18 A/B Hornets. The prototype aircraft was disassembled in Australia and shipped to Canada where the centre barrel was successfully replaced, with up to 25,000 replacement spare parts required. The prototype aircraft has been returned to Australia for reassembly by the Hornet Industry Coalition at RAAF Base Williamtown, near Newcastle.
The initial low rate production of nine aircraft will continue in Canada following the successful prototype. Full rate production is planned for up to 39 aircraft in Australia once the Hornet industry Coalition has developed a mature supply pipeline and industrial capacity, and has recruited and trained additional skilled workforce. Disassembly and reassembly work will continue at Williamtown, and the requirement to conduct additional aircraft work in Canada has no impact on the current Australian workforce.
Aug 20/07: Canada. Boeing and industry partner L-3 Communications MAS, Inc., deliver the first modernized Phase II CF-18 fighter to the Canadian Department of Defense. Boeing previously completed 2 prototype aircraft, while L-3 provided installation services for the program’s remaining 77 aircraft. The Phase II work is done at the L-3 facility in Mirabel (Montreal), Quebec.
Phase I, completed in August 2006, upgraded the Canadian Hornet fleet’s avionics, radio and weapons capabilities. The USD $150 million Phase II of the CF-18 modernization program adds a data link system, a helmet-mounted sight system, new color cockpit displays and a new chaff- and flare-dispensing electronic warfare system to 79 CF-18 (F/A-18 A/B) Hornets. The program is expected to be completed in March 2010.
Aug 17/07: Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems Western Region in El Segundo, CA received a $25.5 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-06-C-0080) for 15 shipsets of U.S. Navy Inlet Nacelles in support of the Service Life Extension Program for the U.S. Navy F/A-18A/B/C/D aircraft. Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA (71%) and at various locations throughout the United States (29%), and work is expected to be completed in December 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $2.9 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River MD issued the contract.
Aug 3/07: Canada. Being able to send one’s Hornets into harm’s way is an ancillary aspect of fleet readiness, but it’s worth noting. Canada formally requests ALR-67v3 radar warning receivers for its F/A-18s, then follows that up over time with orders under umbrella contracts that also involve other Hornet operators.
Read “Canada’s Hornet Upgrades: ALR-67 RWRs” to get a spotlight on one Hornet nation’s measures in this area.
April 23/07: Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas Corp. in St. Louis, MO received a $9.1 million ceiling priced delivery order (# 7020) under previously awarded basic ordering agreement contract (N00383-07-G-005H) for repair of 27 F/1-18 outer wing panels. Work will be performed in Montreal, Quebec, Canada (95%), and Mesa, AZ (5%), and is expected to be completed by April 2008. This contract was not awarded competitively. The Naval Inventory Control Point is the contracting activity.
March 7/07: Multinational. An $16.3 million modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00019-05-C-0003) for the procurement of CY(Calendar Year) 2007 In Service Support services for the F/A-18 A-D aircraft for the U.S. Navy and the Governments of Switzerland, Finland, Canada, Australia, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Spain, including program management, engineering, and logistics support.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (76%) and El Segundo, CA (24%) and is expected to be complete in Dec. 2007. Contract funds in the amount of $1.4 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This modification combines purchases for the U. S. Navy ($12.3 million; 75.5%); and the Governments of Canada ($1.2 million; 7.5%); Spain ($799,508; 4.9%); Australia ($667,848; 4.1%); Finland ($569,731; 3.5%); Kuwait ($355,950; 2.2%); Switzerland ($302,571; 1.9%); and Malaysia ($71,085; 0.4%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. The Naval Air Systems Command is the contracting activity.
Jan 18/07: USN/ Australia. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. Integrated Systems Western Region in El Segundo, CA received a $28.7 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-06-C-0080), exercising an option for 32 shipsets of Center Barrel Replacement Plus (CBR+) hardware for the U.S. Navy (23) and the Royal Australian Air Force (9) in support of the Service Life Extension Program for the F/A-18 A-D aircraft.
Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA (83%); Amityville, NY (12.11%); and Ravenswood, WVA (4.89%), and is expected to be complete in December 2009. This contract combines purchases for the U.S. Navy ($20 million; 70%) and the Government of Australia ($87 million; 30%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD is the contracting activity.
2006Restarting part production.
US F/A-18C, wings folded
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Nov 30/06: Multinational. Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas Corp. received an $11.2 million modification to previously awarded indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract #N00019-04-D-0015, exercising an option for unique F/A-18 in-service support for the Governments of Switzerland, Finland, Canada, Australia, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Spain, including program management, engineering, and logistics support. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO and is expected to be complete in December 2007.
This modification combines purchases for the Governments of Switzerland ($2,805,375; 25%); Finland ($2,244,300; 20%); Canada ($1,683,225; 15%); Australia ($1,122,150; 10%); Kuwait ($1,122,150; 10%); Malaysia ($1,122,150; 10%); and Spain ($1,122,150; 10%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. The Naval Air Systems Command issued the contract.
Sept 21/06: A $76 million award to Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas for three firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity orders (#7001, #7002, #7003) under a basic ordering agreement contract (N00383-06-D-004H-7000) for procurement of newly manufactured spares in support of the F/A-18 C/D flight surfaces system. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO and is expected to be complete by July 2011. The Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) issued the contract.
A Nov 8/06 Boeing release note that this order is part of a larger 5-year contract worth up to $391 million. It aims to provide more than 3,000 new flight control surfaces for F/A-18 A-D aircraft, and replaces a previous 5-year agreement. Flight control surfaces are the hinged or movable airfoils designed to change the aircraft’s attitude during flight, and some of the surface pieces in question are as large as a compact car.
The parts will be assembled in St. Louis, MO, with deliveries scheduled to begin this year and continuing through 2013. The total $391 million contract comes in annual increments, with the first year’s order being about $89 million and deliveries starting within 6 months.
June 30/06: Part production restart. NAVICP also issued a $59.5 million contract to Boeing for 23 spare inner wings, restarting a portion of the Hornet production line that had closed in 2000 (the Super Hornet is a larger aircraft that looks similar, but does not use the same wings). The inner wing is the largest portion of the wing system, and it is called that because does not fold up when the plane is stowed on an aircraft carrier. The wings will be built in St. Louis with first delivery scheduled for 2009 and final delivery by September 2010.
March 6/06: Australia. L-3 Communications MAS announces [PDF] a C$ 20 million ($17.6 million) contract from the Australian Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) for design and prototype work under the RAAF’s F/A-18 Centre Barrel Replacement (CBR) Program. The work related to this contract actually started on Dec 22/05 and is being performed in the L-3 MAS facilities in Mirabel, QB, Canada.
The CBR prototype efforts are an extension of the structural work being carried out by L-3 MAS under the RAAF Hornet Upgrade Phase 3 (HUGPH3) Structural Refurbishment Program. The center barrel is the aircraft’s mid-fuselage section where the wings attach, and which carries their structural load. The 1st RAAF aircraft is scheduled to arrive Mirabel in April 2006, and the prototype activities are expected to be completed by mid-2007.
Jan 6/06: Northrop Grumman Corp. Air Combat Systems in El Segundo, CA received a $24.8 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-06-C-0080) for the procurement of 37 shipsets of F/A-18 Hornet Center Barrel Replacement Plus (CBR+) hardware. It was issued to as part of the Service Life Extension Program for the Navy F/A-18 A-D Hornet aircraft.
The “center barrel” is the crucial center part of the aircraft fuselage that supports the wings and landing gear. This part is may be replaced for crash damage, or just because of the continual hard landing damage sustained by aircraft in the “controlled crashes” of carrier landings.
Dec 21/05: Northrop Grumman Corp. Air Combat Systems in El Segundo, CA received a $5.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for 37 shipsets of Center Barrel Replacement Plus (CBR+) loose parts in support of the Service Life Extension Program for the U.S. Navy F/A-18A/B/C/D aircraft. Work will be performed in El Segundo, CA and is expected to be complete in October 2008. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-06-C-0080).
Additional Readings Background: AircraftIn July 2009, The Korea Times reported that ROKAF was looking to upgrade its F-16C/D fleet’s radar and armament, as part of the 2010-2014 arms acquisition and management package submitted to President Lee Myung-bak for approval.
Under the Peace Bridge II and II deals, The ROKAF bought 140 “KF-16” Block 52 fighters, which were assembled in Korea between 1994-2004 under a $5.5 billion licensing agreement. Key upgrades to this fleet will include new radars to replace the existing APG-68v5/v7 systems, modern avionics and computers, and upgrades of the planes’ cabling and databuses to MIL-STD-1760. The centerpiece AESA radar competition has a winner now, and South Korea has picked its contractor for the overall upgrade program. Now the effort is turning that into binding contracts, and beginning the upgrade process. Other countries within the region and beyond are interested in similar high-value F-16 upgrade programs, so the ROk’s experiences will be watched carefully.
Active Electronically Scanned Array radars offer dramatic increases in fighter performance, and an equally dramatic drop in maintenance costs, thanks to their large array of independently excitable and steerable transmit/receive modules. Advantages over mechanical phased array radars like the KF-16s’ APG-68 include 2x-3x range or performance, simultaneous ground and air scans, and near-zero maintenance over the fighter’s lifetime. The fixed AESA antenna in American designs cuts out high-maintenance motors and hydraulics, and if one T/R module out of thousands burns out or breaks, it matters so little that it’s just left on. More advanced functions like high speed communications, and even focused electronic disruption of enemy radars, also become possible.
South Korea was very interested in AESA performance, but we were told by contractor sources that their calculations of the long-term maintenance savings over existing mechanically-scanned APG-68 radars helped them decide to make the investment in AESA.
F-16s have several AESA radar versions to choose from.
Northrop Grumman supplies the AN/APG-68 radars that equip most current F-16s, as well as the AN/APG-80 radar that equips the United Arab Emirates’ F-16E/F Desert Falcons. The firm has gone on to develop a more generic AESA system called SABR (Scalable Agile Beam Radar) as a drop-in AESA replacement for existing F-16 radars like the APG-68.
Raytheon has taken similar steps, developing an AESA radar called RACR (Raytheon Advanced Combat Radar) for the same purpose. Their radar won, and will equip up to 134 KF-16s.
A 3rd possible choice is IAI ELta’s EL/M-2052. It was originally developed for Israeli F-16s, and would probably have been fitted to the F-16I if the USA hadn’t threatened to cut of all manufacturer support for the fighters. This raises the specter that the US government would use the same tactics in export competitions, so perhaps it’s not surprising that the M-2052’s most promising sales prospects currently involve non-American fighters in India.
Raytheon’s Speed RACR RACRRaytheon’s resizable RACR AESA radar is aimed at a very large potential market, as a retrofit for F-16s and F/A-18 Hornets around the world, and as an option for new planes. Raytheon’s goal was to keep the existing aperture and form of existing F-16 and F/A-18 Hornet radars, and keep the same power requirement. That allows customers to just drop it into the smaller fighters without structural or power changes.
The translation of received data is mostly handled within the RACR modules already, minimizing other changes to the receiving fighter, and this same flexibility is possible for other platforms with previous-generation radars. Aperture sizes can be varied for different platforms by changing the number and arrangement of T/R modules, and power back-ends can be varied as well.
APG-79 LRM removalThe RACR radar’s core design and architecture owes a large debt to the AN/APG-79 AESA radar that equips F/A-18 family Super Hornets. The APG-79’s in-service reliability record became an important selling point for Raytheon in South Korea, and in discussions, Raytheon representatives referred to their technology maturity as an important edge.
Part of that edge involves the hardware, which has served on American & Australian Super Hornets. RACR uses the same “LRM slice” approach as the Super Hornet’s APG-79, and the modernized F-15E Strike Eagle’s APG-82. This maximizes front line maintenance by using internal diagnostics plus swap out sub-modules, instead of using larger “black box” LRUs that require more Tier 2+ depot maintenance. Many aspects of the architecture and active technologies are also similar between APG-79, APG-82, and RACR.
The other facet of RACR’s value proposition involves software. Raytheon has designed their radar families to maximize the role of software in giving them new “modes” and capabilities, even as they work to ensure a common architecture and set of technologies. Raytheon employees have told DID that it’s possible to develop a radar mode like RCDL high-bandwidth communications for a platform like the F/A-18E/F, and have it made available to RACR or APG-82 customers. For a customer like South Korea, the process would have to go through the usual export control channels as a modification to the original FMS case, but development is no longer an expense, and installation involves minimal engineering work, followed by software reprogramming and relatively quick check-out testing. The reverse would also be true, allowing innovations requested by RACR customers to find their way back to other radar fleets.
The bad news is that the APG-79’s software is known to be buggy, and is the subject of repeated and continuing reports from the Pentagon’s Department of Testing & Evaluation.
AESA After-Effects T-50, 3-viewKorea Aerospace Industries has a very broad set of cooperation agreements with Lockheed Martin, from licenses to build and maintain the ROKAF’s F-16s, to the T-50 family’s development and international marketing agreements. One of those agreements states that the T-50 family of trainers and lightweight fighters may not be equipped with radars more sophisticated than the ones carried in the ROKAF’s KF-16s.
That clause is what forced KAI to abandon SELEX’s Vixen 500E AESA radar for the FA-50, and select IAI Elta’s EL/M-2032 mechanically-scanned radar instead. Adding AESA radars to the KF-16s would remove those strictures, opening the door for similar additions. The result would be a $30-35 million AESA-equipped FA-50+ lightweight fighter for the global export market, which could be a strong competitor for existing F-16s at $40-55 million each. It could even affect broader F-35 exports (currently $120 million per), thanks to its combination of advanced capabilities and traditional lightweight fighter price.
Contracts and Key Events 2013 – 2014Korea picks Raytheon’s RACR as their KF-16 AESA radar, Taurus’ KEPD 350 as their long-range cruise missile; Is the BAE deal in trouble?
RACR retrofit
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December 18/15: South Korea has selected Lockheed Martin to carry out work on its KF-16 upgrade program. The move comes after the $1.58 billion contract had been initially awarded to BAE Systems but had been on hold over demands for a cost increase by BAE. The work will look to upgrade the radar, armament and other integrated electronic systems of 134 KF-16s currently in service in the SKAF. The new contract also sees the Koreans drop the Raytheon produced AN/APG-68 radar for the AN/APG-83 produced by Northrop Grumman.
Jul 10/15: In a counter-lawsuit, South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Agency (DAPA) has filed charges against BAE Systems and Raytheon over the companies’ alleged failure to complete a $1.7 billion KF-16 upgrade program. BAE originally filed a lawsuit in November 2014 to prevent the company from receiving a $43 million penalty over the canceled upgrade program; DAPA also demanded $18 million from Raytheon.
Nov 13/14: Legal. BAE sues in US court to block South Korea’s attempt to make BAE forfeit a $43.25 million Letter of Guarantee:
“That $43 million is a fee that was built into the F-16 contract in case BAE broke its agreement. But BAE is arguing DAPA is punishing the company for not being able to convince the US government that the extra costs created by government requirements for more testing were unnecessary. In BAE’s eyes, that simply isn’t fair.”
What’s remarkable here is the fact that the clear language of the lawsuit is saying that the US government basically destroyed the agreement between BAE and South Korea. That’s not exactly a common event, and must be seen as a major institutional and program failure. There seems to be no discussion occurring about that, in an environment where a major American company had a great deal to gain from any failure. Sources: Defense News, “BAE Sues South Korea Over F-16 Upgrade Cancellation Fees”.
Nov 5/14: Terminated. South Korea has terminated its deal with the US government over the KF-16 upgrade, which means the end of the deal with BAE. The contract was technically terminated “for convenience,” but they’re still going to have to negotiate termination fees.
Lockheed Martin can offer to step in now, and the questions are twofold. Once, will South Korea move to cut the US government out via a Direct Commercial Sale contract next time? Two, if the contract remains a Foreign Military Sale, what will the US government’s price be? An abrupt change in that price would raise a lot of questions. Sources: Defense News, “South Korea, Pentagon Kill BAE F-16 Upgrade Contract”.
Deal terminated
Oct 15/14: Deal dying? Korean media report that a proposed $753 million price hike for the KF-16 upgrade deal could result in cancellation. Lockheed Martin waits in the wings, and is reportedly extending an offer that would include more technical help with the multinational KF-X fighter program if the ROKAF switches.
The US government is reportedly demanding another WON 500 billion (about $471 million) for unspecified added “risk management,” while BAE is reportedly requesting another WON 300 million ($282 million) to cover a 1-year program delay. DAPA has been talking to the US government about these issues since August 2014, but their public statements are becoming visibly frustrated and distrustful, especially with respect to the risk fee. Words like “ludicrous” are not what you want to hear from an official negotiating partner in an Asian country. The risk for BAE is that cancellation would really hurt its push to export F-16 upgrades as a growth line of business, and Raytheon also stands to lose big by losing its cornerstone customer for the RACR AESA radar. Unfortunately, since it’s a Foreign Military Sale managed by the US military rather than a Direct Commercial Sale process managed by the purchasing government, the US government is inextricably involved in program management and in financial negotiations. That sharply limits maneuvering room for BAE, Raytheon, and South Korea’s DAPA.
Lockheed Martin’s angle is a spinoff from their recent F-35A deal, which will supply 42 aircraft to the ROKAF. Part of their industrial offsets involved help designing the proposed KF-X fighter, which is currently a collaboration between South Korea and Indonesia. They were cautious about providing too much help, but they reportedly see enough benefit in badly wounding an F-16 upgrade competitor to offer another 400 man-years of support for KF-X (total: 700) if the ROKAF switches. Sources: Chosun Ilbo, “U.S. in Massive Price Hike for Fighter Jet Upgrade” | Defense News, “F-16 Upgrade: Problems With S. Korea-BAE Deal Could Open Door to Lockheed” | Korea Times, “Korea may nix BAE’s KF-16 upgrade deal”.
June 25/14: Phase 1. BAE has received a pair of ROKAF F-16s at the company’s Alliance Airport facility in Fort Worth, TX. Phase 1 will see them used as testbeds and prototypes. They’ll be equipped with advanced mission computers, new cockpit displays, advanced radars and targeting sensors, and integrated with advanced weapons. Once the changes are proven out and accepted, Phase 2 will be ready to begin, and BAE believes that will happen before the end of 2014.
BAE says that this will be the first time that any of America’s “teen series” fighters has received a major upgrade that isn’t coming from the original manufacturer. That’s actually a debatable point. The Israelis have made wide-ranging modifications to F-16s, and the cumulative effect of the Falcon-UP and subsequent programs is arguably as extensive as BAE’s work for Korea. Unlike Israel Aerospace’s work creating the clearly superior “F-4 [Phantom II] 2000/2020,” however, it’s possible to argue that Israeli F-16 upgrades were more of an alternative configuration/ refurbishment. The Israelis might disagree. Sources: BAE, “First South Korean F-16s Arrive at BAE Systems for Upgrades”.
May 8/14: Phase 1. BAE Systems Technology Solutions & Service in Rockville, MD receives an unfinalized $140 million firm-fixed-price contract, covering initial development and long lead production of KF-16 upgrades for 134 aircraft. There’s more to come, as the full program is scheduled to be added to this contract in Summer 2014.
$68.6 million is committed immediately. Work will be performed at Ft. Worth, TX and the first upgraded KF-16 aircraft are scheduled for delivery starting 2019. USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WWMK at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH (FA8615-14-C-6023).
Phase 1 contract
Dec 22/13: Phase 1. BAE Systems announces that:
“The Republic of Korea has finalized an agreement with the U.S. government for BAE Systems to perform upgrades and systems integration for its fleet of more than 130 F-16 aircraft. The company will now begin the first phase of the work under contract through the U.S. Department of Defense’s Foreign Military Sales program.”
Jan 24/14 sees Raytheon announce a corresponding signed contract with BAE Systems, without disclosing the amount for Phase 1. Raytheon is a sub-contractor, responsible for the RACR radar, ALR-69A all-digital radar warning receiver, advanced mission computing technology, and weapon systems integration. Phase 2, as proposed, would begin in late 2014, and would involve actual production and installation of the 130 upgrade kits over several years. Sources: BAE Systems, “South Korea Finalizes Agreement For BAE Systems To Perform F-16 Upgrades” | Korea Times, “S. Korea finalizes BAE deal to upgrade F-16s” | Raytheon, “Raytheon secures first international customer for its F-16 RACR AESA radar”.
Nov 25/13: Phase 1. Plans change. Instead of a single FMS case, the US DSCA announces that South Korea’s official request to upgrade 134 KF-16C/D Block 52 fighters has been broken in 2.
Phase 1 is worth up to $200 million, and the DSCA request only covers government and contractor services to support the upgrade’s initial design and development, plus some actual work and infrastructure. On the support side, they’ll produce detailed design requirements and reports for the new system design, computers, displays, sensors and weapons, pilot-vehicle interface, Group A engineering installation design, and support and training requirements. They’ll also initiate software design and development, build an avionics systems integration facility with test stations, and secure some long lead-time materials. That seems like little tangible progress for $200 million, but the DSCA doesn’t mention that 2 ROKAF F-16s will be fully outfitted as prototypes.
Phase 2 would be the full fleet upgrade with the RACR radar, updated avionics etc. That will require a separate DSCA notification.
The Koreans picked BAE Systems Technology Solution & Services, Inc. in Arlington, VA as their contractor back in March, and that’s still true. Once a contract is negotiated, implementation will require 1 BAE representative in Korea as an intermediary. Source: DSCA 13-62.
DSCA: Phase 1 upgrade planning
April 10/13: BAE & RACR AESA. South Korea’s DAPA picks Raytheon’s RACR radar to upgrade its locally-built KF-16C/D Block 52 fighters. Actually getting to a contract will be a bit more work. The ROK is using a hybrid Foreign Military Sale (FMS) structure, which retains the USAF’s role as the contract manager, but left the ROKAF to manage the selection process and decision. The ROK has made its picks, and the procedural outcome of the current government-to-government negotiations will be a single FMS case and US DSCA export notice that covers both the lead contractor for the overall KF-16 upgrade (BAE picked, confirmed no contract yet), and the provision of the AESA radar component (Raytheon picked). Once the mandatory 30-day post-notice period has passed, contracts can be issued and work can begin.
Subject to that process, Raytheon will deliver 134 RACR systems to the ROKAF, beginning in late 2016. The ROKAF received a total of 140 F-16 Block 52s/”KF-16s” under the Peace Bridge II and III contracts, on top of the original 40 F-16C/D Block 32s in Peace Bridge I. Some losses are inevitable, from landing mishaps or on-base damage to full-on crashes into the Yellow Sea. The first KF-16s were delivered almost 20 years ago in 1994, and the radar numbers could be taken as a de facto acknowledgement that the ROKAF has about 130-134 KF-16s left in inventory.
This contract’s scope includes “AESA radar development, production of test assets for the system design and development program, and production.” Discussions with Raytheon clarified that this development and testing applies only to integration with the ROKAF’s exact KF-16 configuration, which will differ even from other F-16C/D Block 52s. RACR itself is a finished product. Raytheon release | Raytheon feature.
BAE picked, RACR AESA for KF-16s
April 4/13: Cruise missiles. The ROKAF has taken about 5 years (q.v. May 18/11, April 25/08 entries), but they appear to have picked their long-range cruise missile: Taurus’ KEPD 350, with an expected order of 200 weapons. An ROKAF officer is quoted as saying that they “urgently need more long-range air-to-surface missiles due to the mounting nuclear threat and the increasing possibility of provocations from North Korea.”
It was clear from the outset that the ROKAF was looking beyond the 40 or so Boeing AGM-84K SDLAM-ER missiles in its arsenal, with particular interest in Lockheed Martin’s AGM-158 JASSM/JASSM-ER. Unfortunately, the current administration has made it difficult for South Korea to join Australia as a JASSM export customer. Parliamentary defence committee member Kim Kwan-jin is quoted as saying that:
“U.S. missiles were one of the options we were considering, but because it is difficult for them to be sold to Korea, the only option we have is the Taurus.”
Chalk up another “own goal” for American weapons export processes and administration. The KEPD 350 is currently integrated with the Tornado and F/A-18 Hornet, is partially integrated with Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen, and is expected to be integrated with the Eurofighter by 2015 or so. The ROKAF will have to fund additional integration and testing on its own, in order to use the new missile with its F-15Ks and KF-16s.
Technically, the ROKAF could have ordered MBDA’s Storm Shadow and paid for its integration instead. The thing is, it’s more expensive to buy, thanks to an added level of stealth that isn’t really helpful against North Korea. Storm Shadow also lacks the KEPD 350’s void sensing fuze, which is especially useful against the multi-level bunkers so beloved of North Korea’s tyranny. The KEPD 350’s 500 km/ 310 mile range matches or exceeds the Storm Shadow’s, and almost doubles the SLAM-ER’s reach. Chosun Ilbo | Reuters.
Cruise missile picked: Taurus’ KEPD 350
2011 – 2012BAE picked for overall KF-16 upgrade; JDAM capability added; South Korea looking for long-range cruise missiles; AESA radar competition.
KF-16D, armed
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July 31/12: South Korea picks BAE Systems as the preferred bidder for a 1.3 trillion won (about $1.05 billion) project to upgrade the KF-16s’ mission computers, operating systems, ethernet and other wiring, Link-16/MIDS, etc. They’ll also work to incorporate an AESA radar, once DAPA makes its choice between Raytheon (RACR) and Northrop Grumman (SABR). This isn’t completely unexpected. BAE has won related F-16 work in the USA and Turkey, and already provides about 40% of the mission equipment in the global F-16 fleet.
“Baek Yoon-hyeong, spokesman for the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), said his agency will send a letter of request to the U.S. government in early August for a U.S. foreign military sale (FMS) of the BAE’s KF-16 upgrade package… “DAPA is expected to ink the deal with the U.S. government in December this year,” Baek said, adding that the multi-year project calls for upgrading some 130 KF-16 fighters…
Joe McCabe, president of BAE’s South Korea office, said the strength of his company’s offer was flexibility in terms of technology transfer. He said BAE would seek the U.S. government’s approval for the sharing of share codes of F-16 flight and weapon control operational flight programs with Korea.”
Sharing codes would be a big deal, because it would allow South Korea to integrate its own weapons onto the jets without outside assistance. If negotiations with BAE fail, F-16 manufacturer Lockheed Martin could step back into the picture, but that seems unlikely. A contract is expected by the end of 2012. If and when it’s signed, most work will be performed in Fort Walton Beach, FL; San Antonio, TX; and Warner Robins, GA, with some additional work at the company’s aviation hangers in Mojave, CA and Crestview, FL. BAE Systems, who is recruiting | Korea Times | AFP | Sky News Australia | Wall Street Journal.
BAE picked for deep upgrade
July 12/12: AESA. Flight International reports that South Korea’s F-16 upgrade RFP involved 132 F-16s, and required a full suite of AESA radar modes, including the interleaving of air-to-air tracking and air-to-ground mapping.
It reportedly left out advanced modes like electronic attack/ protection, but did require an industrial offset package worth 50% of the value of the contract. Raytheon VP of international strategy and business development Jim Hvizd says that they’ll transfer some hardware production to the ROK if they win.
March 14/12: Upgrade lead? Lockheed Martin and BAE are both pushing to perform South Korea’s KF-16 upgrades, which could run up to $1.6 billion for 134 KF-16s. It’s part of a wider competition in this area between the 2 firms. BAE’s recent wins in providing fire-control and advanced ethernet capabilities for 270 US ANG F-16s, and some Turkish planes, sends notice that Lockheed can expect competition in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.
In South Korea, DAPA has reportedly accepted bids from both firms, and is expected to pick a winner for the US government to negotiate with by summer 2012. South Korea wants access to AESA technologies, which neither BAE or Lockheed can provide, but Lockheed Martin’s pedigree in advanced avionics may trump BAE’s edge in advanced ethernet networking systems. Defense Update.
Nov 22/11: AESA RFP. Raytheon declares that it is “responding to the Republic of Korea’s official launch of the F-16 radar upgrade competition with the Raytheon Advanced Combat Radar system (RACR).”
RACR is designed as a drop-in AESA radar for F-16 fighters, and is based on the technologies in the AN/APG-79 radar that equips US Navy Super Hornets. No word yet on other competitors from Israel (vid. earlier entries) or elsewhere.
AESA upgrade RFP
Oct 27/11: New weapons? Fight International reports on the specifications process for South Korea’s proposed KF-X fighter. The part of the vision that matters to the KF-16 fleet involves a complementary set of South Korean weapons. LiG Nex1 would develop a compatible line of short and medium range air-to-air missiles, strike missiles, and precision weapons to complement the DAPA procurement agency’s 500 pound Korea GPS guided bomb (KGGB).
That weapons array may well survive as a program, even if KF-X itself crashes and burns. Which means DAPA will be thinking hard about how to include compatibility in the KF-16 upgrade program.
May 18/11: Cruise missiles. South Korea is looking for advanced cruise missiles to equip its aircraft. South Korea’s F-15K Slam Eagles are so known because they can carry the AGM-84K Standoff Land Attack Missile – Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), a Harpoon derivative with extra range and dual GPS/IIR guidance. The ROKAF has been looking to buy Lockheed Martin’s stealthy AGM-158 JASSM cruise missile for its fleet of F-15Ks, and presumably its KF-16s as well.
The missiles would give South Korea a way of striking even North Korea’s most heavily defended targets if necessary, while remaining out of range of the North’s air defenses. Indeed, it recently prosecuted an ex-ROKAF Colonel who leaked information about its JASSM plans. JASSM’s long history of technical difficulties have reportedly given South Korea’s DAPA procurement agency pause, however, and an anonymous DAPA official now says that a broader RFP will go out in June 2011.
Likely contenders include Lockheed Martin’s JASSM and JASSM-ER, Boeing’s SLAM-ER, MBDA’s Storm Shadow, the MBDA/Saab Taurus KEPD-350, and Raytheon’s JSOW-ER. Of these contenders, Boeing, Lockheed, and Raytheon have the advantage of owning platforms that have already been integrated for use on the F-16 and F-15 Strike Eagle. MBDA’s products would incur integration costs, but it’s possible that their Storm Shadow’s combat-proven high-end capabilities, or KEPD-350’s combination of reliable capability and lower cost, could still make them attractive buys. Yonhap News | Flight International.
Feb 8/11: JDAM GPS. The Chosun Ilbo quotes the South Korean ROKAF, who says it has integrated the 2,000 pound GBU-31 JDAM GPS-guided bomb with its KF-16 fighters, as well as its F-15K “Slam Eagles.” After developing the software, the ROKAF successfully carried out 3 tests, and finished pilot training at the end of January 2011.
Looks like the F-16 upgrades to allow GPS-guided weapons (vid. May 26/09 entry) have been performed. The report also mentions JDAM wing kits, which are absent from normal JDAMs – but not from the locally-developed KGGB extended range 500-pound GPS-guided bomb.
2009 – 2010Peace Bridge I F-16C/D Block 32s to be upgraded; KF-X delays make F-16C/D Block 52 upgrades more attractive.
ROKAF F-16C, CBU-97s
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June 15/10: KF-X. Indonesia and South Korea will produce a KF-X jet together, with the aim of bringing it into service beginning around 2020. South Korea has bowed to realism and greatly reduced the specifications. Instead of trying to develop an F-35 or F-22 analogue, KF-X aims to begin with its FA-50, and improve on that to produce a jet that’s roughly equivalent to an F-16C/D Block 50, or a Chinese J-10.
The KF-X partners don’t expect to even begin fielding until 2020, and they’ll only reach that date in the unlikely event that technical issues don’t delay the project. That timing makes KF-16 upgrades more attractive as an interim measure. Read “” for full coverage.
Oct 22/09: From KF-X to KF-16+? Flight International reports that the stalled KF-X indigenous fighter program, is contributing to renewed assessments of KF-16 upgrades, in order to keep the existing fighters in service for another decade. KF-X has been hampered by the economic crisis, and by a mismatch between an ambitious wish list and realistic costs. If the ROKAF’s focus shifts to KF-16 upgrades as a substitute, upgraded radars and avionics are said to be the priorities.
The report adds that the Raytheon Advanced Combat Radar (RACR) is the only AESA option that the US government has declared to be available for export, and is specifically designed as a drop-in upgrade for the F-16. Note that Northrop Grumman also has its scalable agile beam radar (SABR) drop-in AESA option. Flight International does not cover South Korea’s partnerships with IAI Elta, and the possibility of extending the EL/M-2032 partnership around EL/M-2052 AESA technology.
The other question involves engines. Seoul has opted for a mix the latest GE’s F110 and Pratt & Whitney F100 engines in its Boeing F-15K fighters, and upgrading KF-16 engines to a variant that matches its F-15s would offer longer engine life, and fleet commonality.
July 23/09: EL/M-2032 radar deal. The Korea Times reports that South Korea’s LIG Nex1 will sign a deal with Israel’s IAI Elta Systems on Sept 3/09. That deal will involve the first phase of development for an indigenous radar based on the EL/M-2032 mechanically scanned phased array radar, to equip T/A-50 and F/A-50 aircraft.
An official from the ROK’s DAPA procurement agency told the Times that the radar is expected to be built by the end of 2010, and enter service in 2011. In the mid- to long-term, sources told The Kora Times that the domestically-built radar is likely to be installed on upgraded KF-16 fighters. The Times adds that the effort may even lead to Korean development of an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar under future agreements with IAI Elta, who has also developed the EL/M-2052 AESA. That positions the EL/M-2032 as a potential Plan B for the KF-16s, and could even make IAI Plan A if AESA cooperation picks up.
F-16: AMRAAM launchMay 26/09: The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces the South Korea government’s official request for equipment and services to support the upgrade of 35 F-16 Block 32 Aircraft. The estimated cost is $250 Million.
The announcement is as significant for what it does not contain, as it is for the few details it does mention. There is no mention of radars, which would require notification. Instead, the announcement simply mentions a request:
“…to support the upgrade of 35 F-16 Block 32 aircraft to allow employment of Joint Direct Attack Munitions, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles [DID: AIM-120 AMRAAM], Improved Data Modem, and Secure Voice capabilities…”
The contract is likely to involve wiring, avionics and computing module upgrades, including the installation of MIL-STD-1760 databuses to accommodate GPS-guided weapons like JDAM, or the WMD variant of the CBU-97 cluster bomb. Test and support equipment, spare and repair parts, and other forms of support are also part of this request. The prime contractor will be F-16 manufacturer Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company in Fort Worth, TX, and a follow-on contract would require temporary travel for U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the Republic of Korea for in-country support.
The lack of any radar request has 3 possible meanings: 1. Speculation that Korean-Israeli defense ties are about to take another step forward, via a contract for IAI Elta’s EL/M-2032 radars; 2. An AESA radar comeptition to follow; or 3. The low-end, non KF-16 part of the fleet will be brought this high and no higher.
Weapon upgrade request
May 1/09: The Korea Times reports that the ROKAF is looking to upgrade its F-16s, but is having problems obtaining the advanced AESA radars it wants. Israel’s EL/M-2032 radar is mentioned as a likely upgrade instead.
Appendix A: The Long Road to AESA EL/M-2032In 2013, South Korea picked their AESA radar. The challenge has been getting to this point.
A 2009 Korea Times report said that US weapons export restrictions were a problem, and when an official 2009 request to the USA didn’t include radars, it lent weight to quotes like this:
“The Air Force actually wanted the more advanced U.S. active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar but modified the plan due to the U.S. law forbidding the export of state-of-the-art and sensitive weapons systems, [the military source] said.”
In the wake of those reports, other reports focused on a non-AESA alternative. IAI’s EL/M-2032 radar has been exported to several countries for use on several different aircraft types, and equips some F-16s. It will equip the ROKAF’s future FA-50 lightweight fighters, and was said to be the basis for a jointly-developed upgrade to ROKAF KF-16s as well.
IAI’s M-2032 radar is still slated to equip the FA-50, in partnership with Korea’s LIG Nex1. By 2011, however, South Korea’s radar options for its F-16 fleet were growing. Development and fielding of AESA radars was underway in several countries, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman had finished private development of drop-in AESA upgrades for F-16s, and the USA had re-thought its position on exporting that equipment to South Korea. A 2011 RFP focused on American AESA radars, therefore, with provisions for a full suite of air and ground radar modes, and industrial offset provisions that were designed to help South Korea gain some expertise manufacturing AESA components.
Northrop Grumman’s SABR and Raytheon’s RACR were the principal competitors in Korea, as they are in Singapore, Taiwan, and in the US Air National Guard’s proposed upgrade. The US State Department has yet to issue a formal export request for the ROK, but after the September 2011 DSCA announcement of an AESA upgrade for Taiwan’s F-16s, export approval for South Korea is expected to be a mere formality.
Additional ReadingsThe AH-64 Apache will remain the US Army’s primary armed helicopter for several more decades, thanks to the collapse of the RAH-66 Comanche program, and the retirement sans replacement of the US Army’s Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH). Apaches also serve with a number of American allies, some of whom have already expressed interest in upgrading or expanding their fleets.
The AH-64E Guardian Block III (AB3) is the helicopter’s next big step forward. It incorporates 26 key new-technology insertions that cover flight performance, maintenance costs, sensors & electronics, and even the ability to control UAVs as part of manned-unmanned teaming (MUT). In July 2006, Boeing and U.S. Army officials signed the initial development contract for Block III upgrades to the current and future Apache fleet, via a virtual signing ceremony. By November 2011, the 1st production helicopter had been delivered. So… how many helicopters will be modified under the AH-64 Block III program, what do these modifications include, how is the program structured, and what has been happening since that 2006 award? The short answer is: a lot, including export interest and sales.
The AH-64E/ Block III has gone from its 2006 development contract to full production, with no major deficiencies noted in testing. By the end of 2014, all Apache helicopters rolling out of Mesa will be AH-64Es. Features like full UAV control are keeping this 1980s airframe at the leading edge of technology, and interest has been brisk.
The AH-64A/D Apache has become a dominant attack helicopter around the globe, in service abroad with Britain, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the UAE. All are strong candidates for AH-64E upgrades at some point, and some have already placed formal export requests.
Work at the Mesa, AZ manufacturing facility has been running steadily since the AH-64 program’s inception in the early 1980s, but a large share has involved less expensive refurbishment and upgrades. The Block III program continues that tradition, and most AH-64Es will be remanufactured. Countries who buy the AH-64 for the first time, or expand their fleets, will receive new-build helicopters.
There is a market for that. In recent decades, Boeing’s AH-64 Apache has eclipsed Bell Helicopters’ AH-1 in the market Bell founded, and has dealt likewise with new competitors like Eurocopter’s Tiger, AgustaWestland’s A/T129, and Russia’s Mi-28/ Ka-52. Russia’s Mi-24/25 family, which also dates back to the 1980s, is the only platform with similar customer reach, but their customer pools don’t overlap much.
The AH-64E/ Block III has been ordered by the USA (701 planned), Indonesia (8) South Korea (36), Saudi Arabia (up to 70), and Taiwan (30).
Formal DSCA export requests without any confirmed orders yet include India (22 new), Qatar (24), and the UAE (60), with more expected to follow.
AB3 Program ExcelThe US Army aims to perform Block III/ AH-64E upgrades to all of the current Block I and II Apaches, their 68 wartime loss replacements, and recently-built AH-64 Extended Block II/+ helicopters. War replacement helicopters bought after FY 2012 will be new-build AH-64Es.
According to Boeing, Low-Rate Initial production involved 2 lots, and totaled 51 helicopters. LRIP Lot 1 was for 8 helicopters. LRIP Lot 2 was divided up into 3 tranches of 16, 19, and 8 helicopters. The Lot 3 contract was delayed so long that Lots 3-4 began Full Rate Production in 2014.
The original plan involved the AH-64’s 2nd re-manufacture program at around $16 million per helicopter. That isn’t cheap, but it’s much cheaper than a new-build AH-64E’s price tag of $40 million or so. The Army still needed new-build production of 56 helicopters, however, in order to reach the program goal of 690.
International AH-64E sales are expected to be a combination of re-manufacture and new-build orders, depending on whether the countries in question already field AH-64s, and how large they want their fleet to be. To date export customers include Taiwan (30 new-build) and South Korea (36 new-build), and Saudi Arabia has begin placing orders. Formal DSCA requests have been made for up to 183 more by India (22 new), Indonesia (8 new), Qatar (24 new), Saudi Arabia (70, most new) and the UAE (60, incl. 30 new).
The AH-64E Apache Guardian (click for video)The AH-64E Apache Guardian incorporates 26 new technologies designed to enhance the aircraft’s capabilities.
Flight performance: One set of advances are tied to helicopter’s flight performance. They include enhanced -701D engines with improved digital electronic control (DEC); upgraded drive systems including a split-torque face gear transmission, which increases power throughput by more than 20% (to 3,400 shp) without taking up more room; and a new composite rotor blade. The new composite rotor blades, which successfully completed flight testing in May 2004, work with the improved engines to increase the Apache’s cruise speed, climb rate and payload.
Overall, the front-line payoff is a higher hover ceiling altitude, at greater gross weight, on a 95F-degree day. That’s very useful in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. The new avionics will also help, by allowing the new Block III helicopters to fly in clouds and inclement weather that would have grounded earlier models. Pilots in pre-training noticed the additional power very quickly, and pilots on the front lines found that they could now keep up with CH-47F Chinook heavy transport helicopters on escort missions.
Sensor performance: Block III upgrades are designed to extend the Apache’s sensor range in all domains, and may eventually be paired with new extended range weapons like the planned JAGM Block 1.
The mast-mounted radome that defines the current Apache AH-64D Longbow houses the AN/APG-78 Longbow fire control radar. Its millimeter-wave sensing improves performance under poor visibility conditions, and is less sensitive to ground clutter. The short wavelength also allows a very narrow beam-width, which is more resistant to countermeasures as it’s trying to guide the helicopter’s missiles to their targets. Block III will extend that radar’s range, or give commanders the option of trading it for an Unmanned Aerial Systems Tactical Common Data Link Assembly (UTA) that’s mounted in the same place on the mast.
UAV Synergy: The UTA will provide advanced “Level IV MUM” control of UAVs’ flight, payloads, and even laser designators from inside the helicopter, while streaming their sensor feeds back to the Apache’s displays. That level of control is causing a rewrite of existing tactics, techniques and procedures. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command capability manager Col. John Lynch offers one example of what can be done when UAV sensor and flight control is added:
“For example, with the Block III Apache you might have a UAS that’s overhead looking down into urban canyons; with Manned-Unmanned Teaming you have the ability to designate targets and you can see what is in the area where you are going to operate.”
That would have been very relevant to operations in Iraq, before the USA’s destruction of Iranian intelligence networks in that country neutralized the shoulder-fired missile threat.
Electronics & displays: Behind those sensors, AH-64D Block IIIs will add open systems architecture electronics to create more standardization and “switchability,” embedded diagnostic sensors to improve maintenance, extended range sensing, wideband network communications for high-bandwidth networking, Link 16 for shared awareness, and high capacity data fusion computers to merge off- and on-board sensor imagery into a single shared picture of the battlefield.
Other electronic systems will be added over time, and will take advantage of the new electronics architecture. A new and improved IHADSS helmet display is one example. The prototype Ground Fire Acquisition System, (GFAS) is another, and will soon undergo a “user evaluation” in theater. GFAS cameras and infrared sensors detect the muzzle flash from ground fire, classify the firing weapon, and move the information through an Aircraft Gateway Processor into the cockpit. Pilots immediately see the enemy icon on their display screen, integrated with Blue Force Tracking maps. GFAS is expected to find its way into the entire US Apache fleet, but the Block III’s open architecture electronics and convenient rebuild status will make it an attractive destination for early installs.
Upgraded versions of the AN/ARC-231 Skyfire system will form the core of its initial radio capability. SATCOM (Satellite Communications) and Link-16 will supplement those capabilities, improving the helicopter’s ability to receive or share data. New AMF JTRS radios won’t become part of the AH-64E’s communications system until the SALT terminal is added; a full production decision is expected in 2016.
Changes in Production Lots 4-6 will include better embedded diagnostics, APG-78 Longbow radar improvements to add range and over-water capability; and STT Link-16 to share the same view of enemy and friendly units with participating fighters, ships, air defense systems, etc. A Cognitive Decision Aiding System (CDAS) is a cumbersome name for a usegful system, designed “to help the pilot and the crew with some of those tasks that tend to get a little cumbersome at times.”
Contracts and Key EventsUnless otherwise noted, the Army Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL manages these contracts. Note that Longbow LLC is a joint venture between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.
FY 2016Taiwan’s Apache fleet Rusting; First AH-64E destined for South Korea.
AH-64E & Mi-35P
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December 18/15: Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $215.7 billion foreign military sale contract to provide Modernized Target Acquisition Designation/Pilot Night Vision Systems (M-TAG/PNVS) for Apache helicopters to India. Work is to be completed by December 31, 2021. The contract follows the September purchase of fifteen Chinook and twenty-two Apache choppers by India, in a deal worth $2.5 billion. The Apache will be India’s first pure attack helicopter in service. The Russian made Mi 35, which has been in operation for years and is soon to be retired, was an assault chopper designed to carry troops into heavily defended areas.
December 15/15: Prosecutors in Greece have brought fresh corruption charges against a businessman and a former high-ranking Greek Defense Ministry official over the purchase of 12 Ah-64 attack helicopters in 2003. Both men are being charged with breach of faith over the contract which amounted to $650 million. Several other former ministry officials are also under investigation. The charges come amid Greece’s attempts to cut down on state corruption and clientism which many blame for the cause of the severity of its economic crash in 2008.
November 11/15: Boeing is reportedly eyeing an Egyptian order for additional AH-64 Apache attack helicopters next year, with other potential deals also covering support services to the country’s existing Apache fleet. Egypt received ten AH-64D Apaches in December 2014, following the lifting of a delivery freeze imposed by the US after the country’s military seized power in July 2013. In May 2009 the Egyptian government requested twelve of the helicopters.
November 4/15: Boeing has rolled-out the first AH-64E Apache attack helicopter destined for service with South Korea. Deliveries to the country are scheduled for the first half of 2016, with the helicopters first undergoing testing with the US Army. The South Korean Defense Acquisition Procurement Administration (DAPA) signed a $1.6 billion Foreign Military Sales contract with the US in April 2013 for 36 of the helicopters. Taiwan recently saw problems with the country’s AH-64Es rusting in the tropical climate.
October 29/15: Taiwan’s AH-64E Apache fleet is reportedly rusting in the country’s tropical climate. The helicopters are now mostly grounded, with manufacturer Boeing investigating oxidation in the rear gearbox responsible for taking out nine of the 29 Apaches in service. A lack of spare parts has also grounded a further twelve, with the country’s Ministry of National Defense notifying the US of the issue in March.
FY 2015Iraq lets its option lapse; UAV testing goes well; M-LRFD modules being upgraded.
September 30/15: India.Following Cabinet Committee of Security approval earlier this month, India’s Defence Ministry has signed a $3.1 billion contract with Boeing for Apache and Chinook helicopters. The 22 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and 15 CH-47F Chinook transport helicopters are slated for delivery between 2018 and 2019, with Boeing agreeing to a 30% offset clause in a contract split into a Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) for the airframes and a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract for weapons, training and sensors. The deal’s signature comes two days before the expiration of a price agreed in 2013, with Boeing granting an extension to this price in July.
September 8/15: Lockheed is upgrading laser targeting on the AH-64E Apaches, upgrading the M-LRFD modules. The work will cost $21.7 million.
May 1/15: Boeing has been handed a $247.1 million support contract by the Army for Apache and Chinook airframe and weapons system overhaul, repair and recapitalization. The work is expected to run to 2019.
March 18/15: Dutch shove Apache peg into ISTAR hole.
The Netherlands has been experimenting. The Royal Netherland Air Forces has been using “modifications and operational techniques” to convert their fleet of AH-64 Apache helicopters from their traditional ground-attack and CAS roles to a more ISTAR-oriented platform. Details of exactly what these special changes are remain to be seen.
Feb 23/15: Governors gripe about plan to take Apaches from Reserve units. As was predicted, the governors, through their collective lobby group, are
complaining about the Army plan to move National Guard Apaches over to active service Army units. The argument focuses on the fact that Apaches have been used for domestic emergency management (lightly). Governors’ influence on congressional delegations should not be underestimated.
Feb 13/15: More support.Lockheed wins an $82 million contract for AH-64 Apache sustainment; the third and last possible exercising of one-year optional extensions of the original $111 million contract.
Oct 31/14: Support. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives an unfinalized $121.2 million firm fixed-price, contract, covering performance based logistics for AH-64D/E components services and supplies. $90.9 million is committed immediately, using FY 2014 Army budgets.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Oct 31/15. Bids were solicited via the Internet, with 1 offer received (W58RGZ-15-C-0017).
Oct 19/14: Taiwan. Taiwan receives the last 6 helicopters, completing delivery of the 30 it ordered under the TWD 59.31 billion ($1.95 billion) contract. It now has 29 available for service, after an April 2014 crash-landing on a residential roof. For full coverage, see DID, “Taiwan’s Force Modernization: The American Side”.
Taiwan deliveries done
Oct 14/14: Maritime upgrade. Apache program manager Col. Jeff Hager says that the Army intends to upgrade the AH-64E’s Longbow radar, “to pick up things in a littoral (shallow water) environment and detect small ships in the water.” The changes would be part of Lot 6 enhancements, and testing of this feature is planned for 2017.
Some use of Apaches is already underway (q.v. July 19/14) in the USA’s own semi-shift to the Pacific theater, and there’s also ample precedent in Britain’s use of AH-64Ds from helicopter carriers during Libyan operations. Not to mention likely demand from new customers like Indonesia and Qatar, whose land-based responsibilities have an intrinsic maritime component.
Meanwhile, American forces are going to run into a difficult problem: the USMC is short of amphibious ships to train its own AH-1 Super Cobra attack helicopters, let alone Army AH-64Es. Sources: AIN, “Maritime Mode Radar Planned for Army’s AH-64E Apache” | DoD Buzz, “Army Configures Apaches for Sea Duty” | Flightglobal, “US Army details combat experience with AH-64E” | IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “AUSA 2014: US Army preps Apaches for sea-basing”.
Oct 14/14: Qatar. Lockheed Martin announces a $90.6 million foreign military sale contract to provide M-TADS/PNVS surveillance and targeting turrets to the Qatar Emiri Air Force. Qatar will be one of the first international customers to receive M-TADS/PNVS systems equipped with the new Modernized Laser Range Finder Designator, which is reportedly 2x as reliable and can be replaced on the flight line.
Qatar marks the M-TADS/PNVS system’s 14th international customer, as the QEAF prepare to receive their AH-64Es (q.v. July 14/14, March 27/14). This sensor sale is structured as an option under the U.S. Army’s Production Lot 9 contract, awarded in May 2014. It extends production in Orlando and Ocala, FL, through 2017. To date, Lockheed Martin has delivered more than 1,250 M-TADS/PNVS systems and spares to the U.S. Army and international customers since 2005. Sources: LMCO, “Lockheed Martin Receives $90 Million Contract for Qatar Apache Targeting and Pilotage Systems”.
Oct 13/14: AH-64 Next? The ATEC, LLC (Advanced Turbine Engine Company), LLC joint venture between Honeywell International, Inc. and Pratt & Whitney has successfully completed testing as part of the Advanced Affordable Turbine Engine (AATE) Science and Technology program (q.v. Oct 21/13).
ATEC intends to offer the HPW3000 as a replacement engine for UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache helicopters. They’re still touting the target $1 billion in fleet savings over the new engines’ life cycle, along with performance improvements. Their competition is GE’s GE3000, and the question is AATE’s Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) successor will become a real program. If not, at least research into the state-of-the-art has been advanced. Sources: Pratt & whitney, “ATEC Completes Second Test, Achieves Key Milestone on New Helicopter Engine”.
Oct 12/14: Iraq. Iraq may have declined its opportunity to buy AH-64s (q.v. Oct 1/14), but they’re playing a key role anyway:
“The top U.S. military officer [Gen. Martin Dempsey] says the U.S. called in Apache helicopters to prevent Iraqi forces from being overrun by Islamic State militants in a recent fight near Baghdad’s airport.”
AH-64E Apache Guardians are conducting operations with the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush [CVN 77]. Sources: Defense News, “Dempsey: U.S. used Apache helos near Baghdad”.
Oct 1/14: Testing. Redstone Arsenal offers an update into AH-64E UAV tests, which have included full control over both RQ-7B Shadow and MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAVs.
PEO Aviation’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Project Office interoperability lead, Doug Wolfe, adds that the same kinds of technology are leading to a One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) that can control UAV payloads to point where soldiers on the ground want to look, instead of just receiving data. Sources: Redstone Rocket, “Unmanned aircraft soar with new capabilities for Apache”.
Oct 1/14: Iraq. The US Army confirms that Iraq has let its opportunity to buy AH-64D/E helicopters lapse, but the US Department of State says that nothing has been formally canceled. Who is right? The Army is right that there is a time limit to DSCA request’s, and Iraq’s (q.v. Jan 27/14) has expired. The State Department could still end up being correct, if Iraq renews its interest before the pricing changes for the items it’s interested in. If prices do change, the whole process needs to start over with another DSCA export request. Meanwhile:
“The collapse of the proposed sale was confirmed to IHS Jane’s by the US Army on 24 September. A statement by the army said: “The request from Iraq for 24 Apaches was approved by Congress. The Iraqis never accepted the offer and it expired in August…. it appears that Iraq’s latest attempt to secure an Apache sale may have been superseded by the order and start of delivery of attack helicopters from Russia…. as well as already fielding the two Russian types (more of which may now be acquired to compensate for the loss of the Apaches), the Iraqi Army also has 24 armed Bell 407 JetRanger, 20 Airbus EC635, and six Aerospatiale Gazelle helicopters in its inventory for light attack and reconnaissance duties.”
The article adds that once Egypt receives its 10 held-up AH-46Ds, all further Apache builds will be AH-64E Guardians. Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Iraq passes on Apache buy” | Defense News, “Apache Sale to Iraq Thrown Into Doubt Because of Iraqi Inaction” | RIA Novosti, “Iraq Gets Third Batch of Russian Mi-35M Helicopters: Arms Think Tank”.
FY 2014Orders: USA, Qatar; DSCA requests: Iraq; Competitions: India, Poland; SAR shows program cost increase; IOC reached; USN qualification; Crash in Taiwan; US shift to National Guard triggers controversy; Request for AH-64s as OH-58D combat loss replacements blocked; AH-64E deploys to Afghanistan; AATE program to research better engines; US Army retires OH-58D armed scouts, will use AH-64Es in scout and attack roles now. To Afghanistan
Sept 29/14: Army/NG debate. The Adjutant-General of the Arizona National Guard, Maj. Gen. Michael T. McGuire, pens an article about the proposed shift of all 192 National Guard AH-64 Apaches into the active-duty Army (q.v. Jan 14/14). Needless to say, he isn’t happy.
For one, he sees the removal of war-fighting capability as a slippery slope. The Guard is meant to fight, he says, and they need the tools to fight alongside regular Army formations. On a cost basis, it’s also true that the same equipment in Army National Guard units does cost less to run and maintain.
The second issue is Constitutional, and has to do with the balance envisioned between the federal government and the states. Even assuming the argument that the US Constitution still exists in meaningful form, arguments about the role of the colonial militia will need more depth than this article provides. Sources: National Guard Association of the US, “Apache helicopter debate fraught with veiled consequences”.
Sept 29/14: Weapons. ATK in Plymouth, MN receives a $36.8 million firm-fixed-price, requirements contract for M230 30mm chain guns and 32 types of spare parts, for use with the Apache helicopter. Work location and funding will be determined with each order, and the contract period extends to Sept 28/17. Army Contracting Command – Tank and Automotive, Warren, MI manages the contract (W56HZV-14-D-0148).
Sept 26/14: HMDs. Elbit USA in Fort Worth, TX receives a $12.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising Option #1 for 300 Apache Aviator Integrated Helmets, which are the key part of the IHADSS-21 system.
Work will be performed over a 2-year period and will be conducted at Elbit Systems’ facility in Fort Worth, TX. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract (W58RGZ-12-C-0164, PO 0010). See also Elbit systems, “Elbit Systems of America Awarded $12.7 Million Modification Contract, to Provide Additional Apache Aviator Integrated Helmets to the US Army”.
Sept 23/14: Politics. The House Defense Appropriations subcommittee rejects the Pentagon’s request to shift as much as $1.5 billion in “Overseas Contingency Operations” budgets to buy 8 new F-35A/B fighters and 21 AH-64Es. These kinds of shifts require the approval of 4 (!) Congressional committees to go through, so that’s that.
The shifts aimed to replace lost AV-8B Harrier and F-15 fighters, and OH-58D Kiowa Warrior armed scout helicopters, but the subcommittee chair Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen [R-NJ] pushed back against OCO being used to “backfill budgetary shortfalls in acquisition programs that have only tenuous links to the fight in Afghanistan and other current operations…” The Kiowa losses in particular were known to Army planners when they made their January 2014 decisions to retire that fleet wholesale (q.v. Jan 14/14). Sources: Stars and Stripes, “Lawmakers reject Pentagon using war funds on F-35s, Apaches”.
Sept 15/14: +7. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $130 million fixed-price incentive, full rate production contract modification to build 7 new AH-64E helicopters and add appropriate government-furnished equipment. This unfinalized total raises the total contract from $1.1564 billion to $1.2864 billion, and it could rise higher once the contract is finalized. $19.2 million in FY 2013 and FY 2014 funds are committed immediately.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of March 31/17 (W58RGZ-12-C-0055, PO 0013).
7 AH-64Es
Aug 29/14: India. The new BJP government’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) makes a number of key moves, beginning with cancellation of the 197-helicopter Light Utility Helicopter competition. At the same time, however, DAC effectively cleared the purchase of 15 CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift and 22 AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters, by approving Boeing’s industrial offset proposals. Contracts will follow at some point, as India needs both platforms. Sources: Defense News, “India Cancels $1 Billion Light Helicopter Tender” | Financial Express, “Make in India kicks off with defence deals” | Indian Express, “Centre scraps light utility helicopter tender, opens it to Indian players” | NDTV, “Modi Government Drops Rs 6000-Crore Foreign Chopper Plan, Wants ‘Made in India'”.
Aug 20/14: Indonesia. The Indonesian Ministry of Defence says that they’re prepping a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to cover the handling and security of data and communications received by their new AH-64Es (q.v. Sep 21/12, Aug 26/13, Jan 24/14), which are scheduled to begin arriving by 2015. Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Industry, “Indonesia and US to sign Apache MoU”.
July 19/14: Naval quals. AH-64E Apache Guardians from the 25th Infantry Division’s 25th Combat Aviation Brigade conduct deck landing qualifications aboard USS Peleliu [LHA 5] off the coast of Hawaii during RIMPAC 2014. This is the 1st deck qualification for the AH-64E model, though the AH-64D has done so. The ability to deploy from ship sharply changes deployment possibilities in the Pacific, providing lilly-pad options as an alternative to partial disassembly and carriage inside of large aircraft like the C-5 and C-17.
“Four of the [8] Apaches are scheduled to push further into the Pacific for the Pacific Pathways exercise. The other four aircraft are scheduled to conduct training at the Pohakuloa Training Area in Hawaii prior to returning to Fort Carson [Colorado] in mid August.”
Sources: Pentagon DVIDS, “Apache Guardians perform first deck landing qualifications”.
July 14/14: Qatar. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel hosts Qatar’s Minister of State for Defense Affairs Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah at the Pentagon, where they sign formal letters of offer and acceptance worth around $11 billion for AH-64E Apache helicopters (q.v. March 27/14 – $2.4 billion for 24), Patriot PAC-3 air and missile defense systems, and FGM-148 Javelin Block 1 anti-tank missiles. Sources: Pentagon, “U.S., Qatar Sign Letters on $11 Billion in Helicopters, Defense Systems”.
July 9/14: Poland. Poland has launched a EUR 1.4 billion tender to upgrade its attack helicopter fleet, which currently consists of 29 Russian Mi-24D/Ws. Submissions for the research phase of market analysis and technical requirements are welcome until Aug 1/14. Read: “Quote the Raven: Poland’s Attack Helicopter Competition” for full coverage.
July 2/14: Iraq. The US State Department is reportedly pushing to sell 4,000 more Hellfire missiles to Iraq. That volume doesn’t make sense for a tiny fleet of AC-208B prop planes carrying 2 missiles each, and a few IA-407 armed scout helicopters; it effectively assumes an AH-64E sale (q.v. Jan 27/14), which doesn’t have a contract yet. The sale would be in addition to the 500 Hellfires from that DSCA request, creating a very large reserve stockpile. One so large that unless deliveries were staggered, it could buffer the effect of any US sanctions if the Iraqi government misused its firepower against broad civilian populations.
It does eventually become a DSCA export request – read “Iraq Wants Hellfires – Lots and Lots of Them“.
June 25/14: Upgrades. Apache PEO Col. Hager discusses pending Lot 4 enhancements:
“…includes the fitting of external crash-worthy fuel tanks and software improvements to the aircraft’s missions systems…. “The Link 16 enables the Apache to receive information from the command-and-control platforms, such as the [Airborne Early Warning and Control System] AWACS and [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] JSTARS, and enables it to share this data with all the other services, making it more efficient at locating and prosecuting targets…”
E-3 AWACS and E-8 JSTARS are good intermediaries for sharing data with UAVs outside the Apache’s own radius of UTA control. Link-16 would also let AH-64Es receive information from fighter jets performing close support duties, or send it to those in the vicinity. That’s a big and significant change. With respect to changes already visible in the AH-64E:
“While previously medical evacuation Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters had had to fly slower than they were capable of so as not to outpace their Apache escorts, the AH-64E is able to match the Chinook for speed and altitude in Afghanistan. In addition, the AH-64E’s improved sustainability means that it is being flown at a higher rate of operations that AH-64Ds in theatre.”
Sources: IHS Jane’s International Defence Review , “US Army to begin operational trials of AH-64E Lot 4 enhancements”.
April 27/14: Iraq. Reports arise that Iraq has begun to use AH-64Ds (q.v. Jan 27/14), striking 8 tanker trucks in Wadi Suwab, Syria. Iraqi Interior Ministry spokesman Brig. Gen. Saad Maan said that the strike killed at least 8 people, adding that there was no coordination with the Syrian regime. On the other hand, there’s reasons to believe the reports were bogus:
“Maan did not identify the Iraqi helicopters, but photographs of the attacks suggested that they included the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. In early 2014, the United States said it was sending five Apaches to Baghdad.”
We’ve seen airstrike videos where a fast-moving object could look like an AH-64, but they were Mi-35s when the video was stopped and examined with an informed eye. Iraq has had Russian Mi-35M “Hind” attack helicopters since December 2013, and too many journalists would be hard-pressed to know the difference. Sources: World Tribune, “Iraqi helicopters strike Al Qaida ISIL convoy in Syrian territory”.
April 25/14: Crash. During a training exercise, a Taiwanese AH-64E crash-lands on the roof of a low-rise residential building in Taoyuan county. The Helicopter is a complete wreck, but the pilots suffer only minor injuries, and no residents are hurt. Guys, that’s not what we were supposed to be training today. Subsequent investigations determine that:
“The investigation report shows that the primary causes of the accident were the combination factors of human errors and environment,” Maj. Gen. Huang Kuo-ming told reporters.
The environment refers to fast descending clouds, which disoriented the pilots while they were flying at a low altitude. Still, they should have checked the instruments to maintain adequate height. Taiwan has received 18 of their 30 helicopters, though they only have 17 now. Sources: The Daily Mail, “How did they get out alive? Lucky escape for pilots of Apache attack helicopter after it crashes into a housing block in Taiwan” | South China Morning Post, “Two Taiwan pilots injured as Apache chopper crashes into building” | Defense News follow-on, “Pilots Blamed for Taiwan Apache Crash”.
Taiwan crash
April 24/14: FY15. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $103.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for AH-64E Production Lot 5 long-lead items. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 budgets.
The estimated completion date is Dec 31/14. Bids were solicited via the Internet, with one received. Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ. US Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-14-C-0018).
April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report. It includes:
AH-64E Apache Remanufacture – Program costs increased $1,321.2 million (+9.5%) from $13,760.2 million to $15,081.4 million, due primarily to higher labor and material costs for embedded diagnostics, Link 16, and full provisions for an external fuel system (+$1,870.0 million). These increases were partially offset by lower support costs for transportability kits, helmets, radar frequency interferometer, more efficient engine procurement, and reduced crashworthy external fuel tanks (-$865.5 million).
In then-year dollars that include inflation etc., the current SAR pegs the entire program at $17.72 billion: $15.081 billion for 639 remanufactured AH-64Es, and $2.639 billion for 63 new-build AH-64Es – up from the previous 55. Note that in the past 3 years since the program split in two, then-year cost for the remanufacture program has increased 26.8%. The retirement of the entire OH-58D Kiowa Warrior armed scout fleet without replacement (q.v. Jan 14/14) makes it more plausible that the AH-64E program will actually achieve its production goals, but the US government’s deeply shaky fiscal situation makes nothing certain.
AB3A costs rise
April 8/14: to Afghanistan. The AH-64E Model Apache Guardian makes its debut at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. The 16th Combat Aviation Brigade reassembled its flight, electronic and weapons systems on site. Sources: YouTube, “AH 64E Apache Guardian Arrives in Afghanistan”.
March 31/14: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2013, plus time to compile and publish. The AH-64E isn’t mentioned directly, but its communications will eventually receive an upgrade under the AMF JTRS program. That was actually supposed to happen years ago, but the equipment just wasn’t ready.
As an interim solution, AH-64Es will fly with a Small Tactical Terminal (STT) that runs Link 16, for shared awareness with allied planes and defensive systems (q.v. Aug 28/13). The next step will be the Small Airborne Link 16 Terminal (SALT):
“…SALT is designed to be a 2-channel radio capable of running the Link 16 waveform and the Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW). The program plans to introduce production hardware into the Apache AH-64E assembly line in fiscal year 2016…. The Army plans to release the SALT request for proposals in the second quarter of fiscal year 2014 and a full rate production decision is scheduled for fiscal year 2016.”
March 27/14: Qatar. The Gulf Emirate orders 24 AH-64Es, at a reported purchase price of around $2.4 billion. It’s just one part of a $23 billion weapon shopping spree announced at DIMDEX 2014 in Doha, Qatar. No word yet re: their delivery schedule. The formal contract is signed on July 14/14.
Other buys include 22 NH90 medium utility (12) and naval (10) helicopters, air defense and anti-tank missiles, fast attack boats, 2 A330 aerial refueling planes, and 3 E-737 AWACS aircraft. Sources: Al Defaiya, “Qatar Announces Big Defense Deals at DIMDEX 2014” | Arabian Aerospace, “Qatar in $23bn arms order including Apache and NH90 helicopters” | Gulf Times, “Qatar, US sign defence deals worth $11.2bn” | Reuters, “Qatar buys helicopters, missiles in $23 billion arms deals”.
Qatar: 24
March 4-11/14: FY15 Budget. The US military slowly files its budget documents, detailing planned spending from FY 2014 – 2019. The planned removal of the OH-58D Kiowa Warriors from the Army’s fleet has resulted in a big speedup of AH-64 purchases, though the FY 2015 order looks like a cut until the wartime supplemental request is known; based on Apache PMO approval, it will be another 10 (TL 35), a drop of 13 helicopters vs. previous plans. Changes are reflected in the programs and budget graphs, above.
The Apache Remanufacturing Program is all that’s left, and most budget figures through 2019 assume savings associated with a 2017 – 2021 Multi-Year contract, with production assumed to last through FY 2025. They do add that:
“The FY16 AP does not support a Multi-Year contract; however, the Army will adjust FY16 AP [Aircraft Procured] in future budget submissions. The quantities of remanufacture aircraft the Apache PMO approves are FY13, 37; FY14, 35; (based upon 16 Feb 2014 contract negotiation); and FY17, 74. The corresponding AP for all years would need to be adjusted in future budget submissions.”
March 4/14: FY13 – FY14. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $1.156 billion contract modification covering Full Rate Production of 72 remanufactured AH-64Es, 10 new AH-64Es, updates to 5 crew trainers, and full refurbishment of 1 more crew trainer; plus integrated logistics support, peculiar ground support equipment, initial spares, over and above work, and engineering studies.
There have been some advance buys (q.v. Oct 2/12, Jan 3/13, Sept 24/13), but it has taken a while to negotiate these Lot 3 and Lot 4 contracts.
$874.4 million is committed immediately, using a combination of FY 2013 ($380 million) and FY 2014 ($494.3 million) budgets. Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, and the estimated completion date is June 30/16. US Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL, is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-12-C-0055, PO 0007).
82 AH-64Es
Jan 27/14: Iraq. The US DSCA announces Iraq’s formal export request to buy 24 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and associated items, in a 3-part request with an estimated cost of up to $6.25 billion. Iraq is facing a regrown insurgency in Sunni areas, which has been strengthened by additional battlefield experience gained in Syria. Even so, this announcement immediately attracts opposition in Congress, where Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s divisive and Shi’ite sectarian approach has left him short of support. A number of senators, most prominently Sen. Menendez [D-NJ], are opposed to releasing the helicopters for sale, believing that they would be used against Iraqi civilian populations.
#1: AH-64E Longbow Guardian sale.
If a contract is approved and negotiated, Iraq will need 3 US government and 2 contractor representatives in Iraq to support delivery and initial familiarization. That would be followed by a 12-person Technical Assistance Team (1 military, 11 contractors) for about 3 years. Prime contractors will be:
The estimated cost is up to $4.8 billion. That’s very expensive, but note the implicit inclusion of base construction in the request, and the long-term Technical Assistance team whose ongoing security and provisioning also has to be paid for by the Iraqi government these days.
#2: AH-64D Rental. The 2nd component involves support for a more temporary lease of 6 American AH-64Ds as an interim measure, plus associated items and extensive support. That effort could cost up to $1.37 billion, and includes:
Key contractors for this effort include Boeing Company in Mesa, AZ; Lockheed Martin Corporation in Orlando, FL; GE in Cincinnati, OH; and Robertson Fuel Systems, LLC in Tempe, AZ.
More Hellfire Missiles. The 3rd component involves up to $82 million for 500 of Lockheed Martin’s AGM-114K/R Hellfire Missiles, Hellfire Missile conversion, blast fragmentation sleeves and installation kits, containers, transportation, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, and additional US government and contractor support. Iraq already operates Hellfire missiles on its fixed-wing AC-208B Combat Caravans, but it will need more to equip an attack helicopter fleet.
When all Hellfire requests made this day are put together, they total 152 AGM-114 K-As, and up to 980 of the newest AGM-114Rs. Sources: DSCA #13-18, “Iraq – AH-64E APACHE LONGBOW Attack Helicopters” | DSCA #13-29, “Iraq – Support for APACHE Lease” | DSCA #13-78, “Iraq – AGM -114K/R Hellfire Missiles”.
DSCA: Iraq (24 AH-64Es + 6 rental AH-64Ds + Hellfires)
Jan 24/14: Indonesia. Army Chief of Staff General Budiman says that AH-64Es will arrive in Indonesia between 2015 – 2017, and they will be piloted by the Army. While the Aug 26/13 reports focused on $500 million for the deal, Budiman places it at $600 million when pilot and maintenance training is included. Bases are being prepared, but the main base will be in Berau, the northernmost district of East Kalimantan.
Sadly, the article is provably wrong about other things. The AH-64 can’t carry any anti-radar missiles, for instance, or AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles either. Sources: Antara News, “Indonesian military to have Apache combat helicopters”.
OH-58D over Tal AfarJan 14/14: No ARH. The OH-58 fleet will be retired, without a successor. Instead of 15 Combat Aviation Brigades, the Army is likely to drop to 10-13. On the other hand, the odds of actually fielding the full AH-64E program just rose sharply.
US Army Aviation Center of Excellence commander Maj. Gen. Kevin W. Mangum finally discusses the Army’s 2010 ARH Analysis of Alternatives, which recommended a mix of AH-64Es and UAVs to take on the Army’s scout helicopter role. So, why did the Army keep pushing for a new Armed Aerial Scout? Magnum says they didn’t have enough money to buy enough AH-64s. What changed? A smaller Army doesn’t need as many. The current leadership has decided that 698 AH-64Es, who will be able to control the planned fleets of unarmed RQ-7B Shadow and armed MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAVs from the air, will provide an “80% solution.”
The AH-64D to AH-64E upgrades will be funded by avoiding Kiowa modernization or replacement, and the Army also axed 15 military specialties that were unique to the OH-58D. Some rebalancing will need to move more UH-60s to the National Guard, where they can offer useful capabilities during natural disasters etc., while shifting AH-64s to the active-duty force. Gen. Magnum adds that investment of all kinds is going to be slim:
“I tell youngsters who are in the Basic Officer Leader Course that when some of you retire from the Army in 20, we still will not have finished fielding the UH-60M and AH-64E. That’s how far we’ve pushed these programs.”
Especially with AH-64s and UH-60s costing a good deal more to fuel and maintain than Kiowas. The question is whether the sequester’s recent rollback will create pushback on Capitol Hill, if National Guard drawdowns affect local bases. If so, will that pushback be enough? The Army does seem determined to do this. Sources: US Army, “Army aviation flying smarter into fiscal squeeze” | Alabama.com, “Army planning to scrap OH-58 Kiowa Warriors helicopter fleet: Reports” | Jackson Sun, “National Guard: Tennessee could lose 30 OH-58D helicopters, including at Jackson flight facility, under proposed Army plan” | The Motley Fool, “The U.S. Army Is About to Make a Huge Mistake”.
Apaches only: End of the OH-58D scout helicopters
Nov 21/13: IOC. The AH-64E reaches Initial Operational Capability on schedule, spearheaded by the 1-229th Attack Reconnaissance Battalion at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA. The 1-229th flew more than 670 hours over the last month, with an average operational tempo of 27 hours per airframe per month. Sources: US Army, “Army Achieves Initial Operating Capability with the AH-64E Apache”.
AH-64E IOC
Nov 4/13: Taiwan. Taiwan’s first 6 AH-64E attack helicopters have been re-assembled in Taiwan’s Kaohsiung Harbor, after arriving by ship. The US reportedly asked Taiwan’s military authorities not to reveal the AH-64E’s cockpit layout or configuration in its Nov 7/13 public display. Unfortunately, that request comes about a week after revelations that Taiwanese officers sold key information about Taiwan’s brand-new E-2 Hawkeye 2000 AEW&C planes to the Chinese.
The AH-64Es will become operational in April 2014, with Guiren Air Force Base in Tainan serving as a training and basing focal point. More than 60 Taiwanese pilots and maintenance personnel returned to Taiwan in August 2013, after completed 20 months of training in the USA that will let them act as instructors. Still, there were limits, which echoed circumstances surrounding the delivery of Taiwan’s AH-1W Cobras over a decade ago:
“While Taiwanese pilots and maintenance personnel managed to get a full understanding of the aircraft software and hardware, the pilots were unable to obtain training in certain special flight skills. The Taiwanese trainees were asked to leave the classroom or training site whenever the American instructors were giving lectures on certain critical courses or special flight maneuvers, the officials said.”
They’ll have to figure those out on their own. A 2nd batch of Apache helicopters is scheduled for delivery to Taiwan in late December 2013, and 3 more batches of 6 will complete deliveries by the end of 2014. Sources: Focus Taiwan, “Taiwan takes delivery of first Apache choppers” | Focus Taiwan, “Talk of the Day — AH-64E Apache choppers debut in Taiwan” | Flight International, “Taiwan receives first batch of AH-64E Apaches” | Focus Taiwan, “Apache choppers to bolster Taiwan’s combat capability: expert”.
Taiwan: AH-64Es arrive
HPW3000 promoOct 21/13: AH-64 Next? The US government’s Advanced Affordable Turbine Engine program (AATE) program begins to show public results, with PW/Honeywell’s ATEC joint venture touting its HPW3000’s performance in early tests. Their competitor is GE’s GE3000.
Within the Army, the application of these technologies will fall under AATE’s follow-on Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP). Its goal is a 3,000 shp turboshaft that also delivers AATE’s desired 25% better fuel efficiency, 20% longer engine life, and 35% maintenance cost improvements. All in a package that could act as a drop-in replacement for the AH-64E’s current T700-GE-701D, which delivers 2,000 shp. Assuming they can deliver, AH-64 on-station time could rise by an hour or so, or see range extensions and better altitude limits. As an alternative, the helicopter could carry about 3,300 more pounds of payload under better conditions. If the companies could deliver on the reliability goals as well, the combined value of those maintenance and longevity improvements for the UH-60 and AH-64 fleets could add up to $1 billion over the engines’ life cycle. Sources: Pratt & Whitney release, Oct 21/13 | Aviation Week, “Teams Test More Powerful Engines For U.S. Army Helicopters” | ATEC JV site | ATEC HPW3000 infographic [PDF] | GE3000 page.
FY 2013Orders: USA, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan; AH-64E “Guardian”; SAR shows program cost increase; US new-build program effectively terminated; Link 16 purchases begin; AH-64E vulnerable to hackers.
Refurb, Step 1
(click to view full)
Sept 24/13: Lot 3-4. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $52.4 million firm-fixed-price contract to procure an estimated 48 AH-64Es under Lot 3 remanufacture, Lot 3 new build, and Lot 4 remanufacture. Obviously, this is just an initial payment.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with funding from FY 2013 “other authority” funds. This contract was a competitive acquisition via the web, but with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0055).
Sept 9/13: South Korea. The Longbow LLC joint venture in Orlando, FL receives a $51.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for 6 Longbow fire control radars, plus associated parts, spares and support. It’s part of Korea’s 36-helicopter buy, which has already seen orders for 36 helicopters, their engines, MTADS-PNVS surveillance and targeting turrets, and now a limited number of Longbow radars. Total announced so far: $1.236 billion, out of a $1.6 billion budget.
The Republic of Korea is the Longbow radar’s 10th international customer, and production under their order is scheduled through 2016. Work will be performed in Orlando, FL; Ocala, FL; and Baltimore, MD. US Army Contracting Command, Aviation at Redstone Arsenal, AL acts as South Korea’s agent (W58RGZ-13-C-0105). Sources: Pentagon | NGC & Lockheed releases, Sept 12/13.
Sept 9/13: Training. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $14.4 million firm-fixed-price, contract for 4 Longbow crew trainers.
Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, using FY 2011 “other authorization” funds. This contract was done as a competitive acquisition via the web, but just 1 bid was received (W58RGZ-13-C-0086).
Aug 30/13: RDT&E. Boeing receives a $22.7 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification for continued AH-64E development and demonstration. Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ (W58RGZ-05-C-0001, PO 0059).
Aug 28/13: Link 16/STT. Following successful AH-64E flight tests, the Army has decided to pursue a sole source contract with ViaSat for their Small Tactical Terminal (STT). The 16-pound KOR-24A STT provides simultaneous communication, voice or data, using Link 16 and the Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW).
Link 16 securely shares locations of identified friendly and enemy forces, so that all equipped units see what any one unit can see, and vice-versa. Knowing that there’s an enemy anti-aircraft unit in place before you fly over the next hill is a big plus. Sources: ViaSat, Aug 28/13 release | ViaSat STT.
Aug 26/13: Indonesia. US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, in a meeting with his Indonesian counterpart Purnomo Yusgiantoro, confirms that the US agrees to Indonesia’s request for 8 Apache helos (q.v. Sep 21/12 entry). The deal is valued at about $500 million, far lower than the $1.4 billion cost in last year’s DSCA request, suggesting it does not cover armament. Different contracts are subsequently announced to provide AGM-114 Hellfire missiles to customers that include Indonesia.
Some human rights groups fear the helicopters will be used to crack down on separatists, and are concerned by the sale of such machines to a military with a recent past of human rights abuses. US DoD | Jakarta Globe, “US to Sell Indonesia 8 Apache Helicopters” | Asia Times, “US sparks Indonesia arms sales concern” | Australia’s ASPI, “Why does Indonesia need Apache gunships?”
Indonesia: 8
Aug 23/13: South Korea. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a firm-fixed price, option eligible, multi-year contract from South Korea, with a cumulative maximum value of $904.4 million for 36 new AH-64E Apache Helicopters. This contract includes initial support, spares and 1 Longbow crew trainer.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with the US Army Contracting Command, Aviation in Redstone Arsenal, AL managing the contract as South Korea’s FMS agent (W58RGZ-13-C-0106). Total so far: $1.185 billion, out of a $1.6 billion budget.
South Korea: 36
Aug 21/13: South Korea. General Electric Aviation in Lynn, MA receives a firm-fixed price, no option contract with a cumulative maximum value of $57.5 million for 72 production T700-GE-701D engines, extended warranties, and four spares and support packages. They’ll be used on South Korea’s 36 new AH-64Es, and represent the 2nd purchase of long-lead items by that country.
Work will be performed in Lynn, MA, and will be managed by the US Army Contracting Command – Aviation in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract on behalf of their ROK client (SPRTA1-12-G-0006). This is the 2nd Pentagon release that refers to a sole-source item as a “competitive acquisition with 3 bids solicited and 3 received”. We can only conclude that they mean the South Korea’s attack helicopter competition generally.
Aug 8/13: Taiwan. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $92.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, as part of Taiwan’s AH-64E buy and associated support. The Pentagon says that this brings the cumulative total face value of this contract to $716.7 million. The original DSCA request, including 30 helicopters, weapons and 6 years of support, had a maximum of $2.532 billion (q.v. Oct 3/08)
FY 2009 procurement funds are being used, which was the year Taiwan placed the order. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL acts as Taiwan’s agent (W58RGZ-09-C-0147, PO 0025).
Aug 1/13: Longbow LLC, Orlando, FL receives a $6.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for services to support Low Rate Initial Production of the Radar Electronics Unit and UAS Tactical Common Data Link Assembly, bringing the cumulative total face value of this contract to $182.3 million. FY 2012 Procurement funds were used by US Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-10-C-0005, PO 0035).
Aug 1/13: South Korea. Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control in Orlando, FL receives a maximum $223.3 million contract to buy M-TADS/PNVS systems for South Korea (q.v. April 17/13). Lockheed Martin later confirms that this is the 1st announced contract in their 36-machine AH-64E order, covering 36 Arrowhead systems and spares, with production and delivery extending through 2018. Electronics assembly will take place at the Ocala, FL facility, with final assembly performed in Orlando, FL.
South Korea becomes the system’s 12th international customer. Oddly, the Pentagon release says that 3 bids were solicited, with 3 bids received. The system only has 1 manufacturer, and it would be very expensive to integrate a different system on the AH-64. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL acts as South Korea’s agent (W58RGZ-13-C-0104). Lockheed Martin.
June 7/13: Saudi. Longbow LLC in Orlando, FL receives a $39 million firm-fixed-price, foreign-military-sales (FMS) contract modification from Saudi Arabia, buying an undeclared number of AH-64 mast mounted assemblies; the fire control radars that go inside them; and related support equipment.
The Pentagon says that the cumulative total face value of this contract is $333.3 million, but it’s a FY 2006 contract that far predates Saudi AH-64E buys. Based on DID’s tracking of announced contracts, the Saudis have now committed $339 million to their AH-64E buy so far, using several contracts. US Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL acts as Saudi Arabia’s agent for this FMS sale (W58RGZ-06-C-0134, PO 0042).
May 24/12: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/12 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF]. The AH-64E programs feature prominently, with overall program costs rising by more than $2 billion, vs. the previous figures as reported by the GAO in March:
“AH-64E Apache Remanufacture – Program costs increased $1,791.9 million (+15.0%) from $11,968.3 million to $13,760.2 million, due primarily to reflect a revised Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) by CAPE [DID: Pentagon Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation team] in support of Full Rate Production (FRP) approval in September 2012 (+$1,339.5M). There were additional increases for other support (+$347.8 million) and initial spares (+$151.0 million) to reflect the approved CAPE FRP ICE.”
See April 10/13 entry to explain our lack of faith that future US Army new-build orders will ever materialize. Officially, however:
“AH-64E Apache New Build – Program costs increased $328.7 million (+15.3%) from $2,155.8 million to $2,484.5 million, due primarily to a stretch-out of the procurement buy profile (+$260.0 million). Since Milestone C in September 2010, 46 of the 56 AH-64E New Build aircraft have been shifted outside the Future Year Defense Program to higher priority programs. There were additional increases for other support (+$78.5 million) and initial spares (+$26.6 million) to reflect a revised Independent Cost Estimate by Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) in support of full rate production approval in March 2013. These increases were partially offset by a quantity decrease of 2 Overseas Contingency Operations-funded aircraft [DID: lost helo replacements] from 58 to 56 aircraft (- $111.2 million) and associated schedule and estimating allocations ($+46.3 million).”
SAR – program costs rise
May 22/13: Saudi. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $69.2 million firm-fixed-price, foreign-military-sales contract modification for Saudi Arabia’s Apache Block III aircraft and associated parts and services. The US Army reports the total cumulative value of this contract so far as $259.4 million; when other known Saudi contracts are added, contract value to date is somewhere between $296-300 million. Given Saudi AH-64E export requests for up to 60 helicopters, and known helicopter prices, this is just a drop in the bucket.
US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract on behalf of its Saudi client (W58RGZ-12-C-0089, PO 0008).
May 22/13: Saudi. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $14.3 million firm-fixed-price, foreign-military-sales contract modification for Saudi Arabia’s Apache Block III aircraft and associated parts and services. The US Army reports the total cumulative value of this contract so far as $35.2 million. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract on behalf of its Saudi client (W58RGZ-12-C-0113, PO 0003).
April 17/13: South Korea picks AH-64E. South Korea announces that the AH-64E Guardian has beaten the AH-1Z Viper and T-129 ATAK helicopters for a 1.8 trillion won ($1.6 billion), 36-machine order to replace their existing fleet of AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters. The ROK hopes to have the helicopters between 2016 and 2018. The Apaches are useful for countering heavy armor formations, and might have an important role against artillery in Korea, but the Korea Herald offers another interesting possibility: a duel between fast moving aerial and land opponents:
“In Goampo, Hwanghae Province, the North has built a unit to house some 60 hovercrafts whose infiltrations operations could be countered by the attack helicopters. The communist state is known to have some 130 hovercrafts that can travel through mudflats into the border islands at a speed of 100 kilometers per hour.”
The attack helicopter decision had been due in October 2012, but was put on hold until after the elections. The AH-1Z would have represented continuity with the existing fleet, and was the subject of a September 2012 DSCA export request. The Italo-Turkish T-129 would have been a reciprocal deal with a major arms export customer. A DAPA official is quoted as saying that the AH-64E’s superior target acquisition capability, power, and weapons load gave it the edge, and so South Korea will begin the acquisition process. The weapons load issue is debatable, but the Apache is certainly much more heavily armored than its counterparts, and its combination of modernized optics and MMW radar or UAV control does give it an edge in target acquisition.
The ROK is a bit behind on approvals and other concrete arrangements for the AH-64E, but KAI’s existing position as a major AH-64E subcontractor will help a bit. US Army | Korea Herald | Reuters.
South Korea picks AH-64E
April 12/13: Rotors. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $36.6 firm-fixed-price contract modification, buying composite main rotor blades and associated support equipment for the Block III configuration. The performance enhancing composite blades are part of the AH-64E’s efficiency changes. The award uses FY 2012 procurement contract funds (W58RGZ-10-G-0006, 0013).
April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.
The AH-64E submission marks a big shift. Previous 2014 procurement plans involved 48 machines: 10 new-build helicopters ($475.2 million) and 38 remanufactured ($618.8 million) machines, for a total of $1.094 billion. The new plan involves 42 remanufactured helicopter and no new machines, for a total of just $759.4 million and an overall drop of 30.59%. The Pentagon didn’t even deliver its war supplemental budget, so those numbers could rise. The program as a whole has dropped from the still-official 634 helicopters to 628, but there are still a limited number of airframes to work with. Adding AB3-R Apaches now means subtracting them later, which may be attractive if the Army sees even more problems in future years.
This is a long term shift, because the AB3B new-build program has essentially been terminated. Foreign buyers can still get them, and the US Army’s official fiction is that the remaining 45 new-build helicopters of their 55-helicopter goal will be bought after 2018, creating 683 AH-64Es for $15.33 billion. Anyone who believes that plan is asked to email us, in order to receive the attractive terms of our toll bridge investment opportunity near Brooklyn.
The reality? AH-64E is now a 638 helicopter program, worth $12.53 billion.
Major program shift: de facto termination for AB3 New-build
March 15/13: Support. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $7.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for AH-64E contractor logistics support. Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/14. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0161).
March 5/13: SDD. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $41.1 million cost-plus-fixed-fee modification that adds to the AH-64 Apache Block III’s SDD contract.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14. The original bid was solicited through the Internet, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-05-C-0001).
Jan 9/13: Guardian. The US Army shares that the designation for the AH-64E Apache is “Guardian,” written/ referenced as “AH-64E Apache Guardian.”
The AH-64D was known as the AH-64D Apache Longbow, due to its radar mast that provides fire and forget operation when using AGM-114L Hellfire Longbow missiles with millimeter-wave guidance. US Army.
“Guardian”
Jan 17/13: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The AH-64E is included, and the news is almost all good. It’s operationally effective, and better than its predecessors. It’s also operationally suitable, surpassing reliability thresholds with statistical confidence and meeting all current maintainability requirements. Survivability is at least as good as the AH-64D, and increased power margins also do their bit to improve flight safety.
Now, the lone piece of bad news: The AH-64E is vulnerable to computer network attack. An Army threat computer network operations team conducted limited penetration testing against the Blue Force Tracker, the Aviation Mission Planning System, and aircraft maintenance ports. Threat team activities were limited to computer network scanning (passive and active) while the AB3 aircraft were on the ground, but they were successful in gaining access to AB3 systems.
Jan 9/13: Lot 4-6 Enhancements. US Army Apache program manager Col. Jeff Hager talks to Flight International about the AH-64E.
Boeing has delivered 28 of 51 low-rate initial production AH-64Es so far, and will start full-rate production in 2013. Changes in Production Lots 4-6 will include better embedded diagnostics, APG-78 Longbow radar improvements to add range and over-water capability; and Link-16 to share the same view of enemy and friendly units with participating fighters, ships, air defense systems, etc. A Cognitive Decision Aiding System (CDAS), is a cumbersome name, for a system designed “to help the pilot and the crew with some of those tasks that tend to get a little cumbersome at times.” Flight International.
Jan 3/13: Taiwan? Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $71 million firm-fixed-price contract modification “to procure Apache AH-64D helicopters in support of Foreign Military Sales.” We asked for further details to clarify which customer, but neither Boeing nor the US military will provide those any longer, except through Freedom of Information Act requests. The contract number does match Taiwan’s 30-helicopter order, and the USA seems to be using a different contract number for them, but that conclusion isn’t 100% certain.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of Oct 31/17. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0147).
Jan 3/13: Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $39.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification. Boeing tells us that this is additional advance procurement funding for the US Army.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/13. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0055).
Jan 3/13: FMS. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives an $18.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification “to procure Apache Block III Aircraft in support of Foreign Military Sales.” We asked for further details to clarify which customer, but neither Boeing nor the US military will provide those any longer, except through Freedom of Information Act requests.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of April 30/13. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0089).
Nov 1/12: Taiwan? Boeing receives a $66.1 million firm-fixed-price contract modification “to procure Apache Block III aircraft and related support.” We asked about this contract, which turns out to be a Foreign Military Sale order, even though it wasn’t announced as such. Neither Boeing nor the US military will provide those any longer, except through Freedom of Information Act requests. The contract number does match Taiwan’s 30-helicopter order, and the USA seems to be using a different contract number for them, but that conclusion isn’t 100% certain.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of Oct 31/17. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0147).
Oct 24/12: AH-64E. The US Army formally renames the AH-64D Block III the “AH-64E,” in accordance with a USAF memo received in September. It also formally announces the program’s full-rate production decision, which the Defense Acquisition Board granted in August 2012.
As part of that decision, the AH-64E becomes an ACAT C program with oversight from the Army (Heidi Shyu), instead of an ACAT D program with oversight from the US Department of Defense.AOL Defense.
AH-64E, FRP
Oct 2/12: ? Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $69.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for “Apache Block III aircraft.” Boeing could not provide additional details by the time of publication.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of Feb 28/13. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0055).
FY 2012RDT&E funding; Taiwan orders; Indonesia & Qatar requests; UTA mast controls MQ-1C UAV; Alone in India.
KAI’s new fuselage
(click to view full)
Sept 21/12: Indonesia. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Indonesia’s official request for AH-64D Block III Apache helicopters, ancillary equipment, and weapons. The DSCA says that: “Indonesia will use these APACHE helicopters to defend its borders, conduct counterterrorism and counter-piracy operations, and control the free flow of shipping through the Strait of Malacca.”
The proposed cost is very, very high – up to $1.42 billion for 8 new-build helicopters plus initial support, or about $177.5 million for each operational, fully-equipped helicopter. By comparison, India’s similar DSCA request involved up to $1.4 billion for 22 machines and equipment. The request is somewhat controversial in Indonesia, where the chairman of the House of Representatives Commission overseeing defense and foreign affairs has said that heavy-lift CH-47 Chinook helicopters would be far more helpful. He isn’t against the Apaches per se, just believes that Chinooks would make a bigger difference to one of the military’s main roles, which is distributing relief supplies after natural disasters. He’s right, but that isn’t what they asked for; instead, it’s:
Many of the items above are produced by sub-contractors like ATK, BAE, Northrop Grumman, et. al., but the prime contractors will be:
Implementation of this proposed sale may require 5 U.S. contractor representatives and 3 U.S. Government representatives in country, full-time, for equipment checkout, fielding, and technical support.
DSCA: Indonesia request (8)
Sept 6/12: Support. Longbow LLC in Orlando, FL receives a $39 million firm-fixed-price contract to support the helicopter’s Radar Electronic Unit and Unmanned Aerial System Tactical Common Data Link Assembly.
Work will be performed in Orlando, FL until Aug 31/13. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by US Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-12-C-0049).
Aug 28/12: Support. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $17.7 million firm-fixed-price contract “for the procurement of Apache Block III aircraft and related support.”
Work will be performed in Mesa, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/15. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0113).
Aug 21/12: India. The Times of India quotes a Ministry of defence official, who says that:
“It’s just a matter of time before the contract is inked for the Apaches after final commercial negotiations. Most of the hurdles have been cleared.”
It’s hard to tell whether that means anything. In India, “just a matter of time” can easily be measured in years. Meanwhile, Boeing and Russia will be competing for another Indian contract, pitting Boeing’s CH-47F heavy-lift helicopter against the even larger Mi-26.
July 13/12: Support. An $84.6 million firm-fixed-price contract covers production and support services for the Apache Block III aircraft. Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of Jan 31/13. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0055).
July 12/12: Sub-contractors. Boeing announces that they’ve received the first 10 new Block III fuselages from long-time supplier Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). This milestone paves the way for delivery of the 1st new-build Apache Block III in 2013.
Boeing is a huge customer for KAI, who supplies parts for commercial jets, F-15s, A-10 wings, etc. KAI have been delivering AH-64 fuselages for over a decade from their facility in Sacheon, South Korea, and the Republic of Korea has expressed some interest in buying new AH-64D Block III helicopters of their own (vid. Sept 24/08 entry).
July 12/12: Qatar wants 24. The US DSCA announces Qatar’s official request to buy 24 AH-64D Block III helicopters, plus associated equipment, support, and weapons, including Hellfire anti-tank and Stinger air-to-air missiles. The total estimated cost, if a contract is signed, is up to $3.13 billion for all requests. The main request includes 24 Block III attack helicopters, which would more than replace its existing 14 SA342 Gazelle light armed scouts.
Read “Qatar: The Emir’s New Helicopters” for full coverage.
DSCA: Qatar request (24)
May 29/12: Taiwan. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $97.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification “of an existing contract to procure Block III Apache AH-64D attack helicopters in support of Foreign Military Sales.” Which means Taiwan. Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/17. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by the U.S. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-09-C-0147).
The contract number does match Taiwan’s 30-helicopter order, and the USA seems to be using a different contract number for them, but that conclusion isn’t 100% certain. If it is Taiwan, it brings total ROC Apache Block III contracts to $624.5 million so far, of the maximum $2.532 billion noted in the October 2008 DSCA request. If air-launched Stinger missiles are included, on the grounds that they were part of Taiwan’s request, the total so far rises to $683.8 million.
May 6/12: LRIP-2B. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $486.4 million firm-fixed-price contract for “AH-64D Apache Block III low rate initial production and related support.” This appears to be the FY 2012 base order, per plans to buy 19 more Block IIIs as the 2nd tranche of LRIP Lot 2.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/14. The original bid was solicited through the Internet, with 1 bid received by US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-09-C-0161).
LRIP Lot 2B
May 6/12: Taiwan. A $171.8 million firm-fixed-price contract “for the procurement of Apache Block III aircraft and related services in support of Foreign Military Sales.” The Pentagon does not mention which country, but conversations with industry sources indicate that this is almost certainly for Taiwan’s 30-helicopter order.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/14. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL acts as Taiwan’s agent (W58RGZ-12-C-0089).
April 3/12: IOT&E. The AH-64 Apache Block III is finishing up its Initial Operational Test and Evaluation at Fort Irwin, CA, and has performed “extremely well.” Col. Shane Openshaw, US Army project manager, Apache Attack Helicopters, is confident that the new variant will be ready to deploy in 2013, even as new technologies like UTA and GFAS begin their own journey into the fleet.
The Army has taken delivery of 10 Block IIIs so far. US Army.
IOT&E done
March 16/12: RDT&E. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $187 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, to fund Apache Block III development, integration and testing. Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of July 31/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-05-C-0001).
Jan 17/12: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2011 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). Most performance levels looked good as of Sept 30/11, after 1,587 developmental flight test hours, and the new helicopter got good marks for supportability, but formal IOT&E is scheduled for April 2012.
The helicopter meets all thresholds, except for 99% performance in Hover Out of Ground Effect. The new radar met or exceeded 37/44 specification thresholds, and even for the other 7, performance was at or above the existing AH-64D radar. Remaining improvements are mostly focused on 3 key sensors: the IHADSS helmet-mounted display, the MTADS “Arrowhead” sensor turret, and UAV interoperability:
“…the program redesigned the IHADSS helmet to improve its fit and functionality, and has made software corrections to make it easier to adjust radio squelch, provide feedback to the pilot while changing radio frequencies, simplify UAS linkup procedures, and achieve compliance with interoperability standard… M-TADS video vibrates excessively during certain flight regimes. Subsequent testing revealed that the cause of the vibration was the natural frequency of the TADS Electronics Display and Control overlays with the main rotor frequency. The Army is exploring options to correct the problem.”
January 2012: India. India Strategic quotes Raytheon’s Business Development Manager for missile systems Brad Barnard, who says that Raytheon’s FIM-92F Block 1 Stinger ATAS helicopter-mounter anti-aircraft missiles could also be made available for other Indian helicopters, beyond the requested AH-64D Block III buy (vid. Oct 25/11, Dec 27/10).
Missile candidates would include India’s HAL Dhruv helicopters, and HAL’s LCH scout and light attack helicopter.
UTA: UAV mast-erDec 30/11: Mast sensors for Taiwan & US. Longbow Limited Liability Corp. in Orlando, FL receives an announced $64.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, but Longbow LLC pegs its actual value at $181 million, with options to extend performance past 2015, to 2017.
It’s said to include 15 Longbow Block III mast-mounted Fire Control Radar assemblies for Taiwan’s AH-64Ds, marking the Block III version’s 1st export order.
For the US Army, the order includes 14 Block III Radar Electronics Units, which are smaller than their predecessors, and offer lower weight, maintenance and power requirements. The Army is also buying 14 Unmanned Aerial System Tactical Common Data Link Assembly (UTA) systems and spares, which provide a 2-way, high-bandwidth data link that lets the helicopter crew control nearby UAV flight paths, sensors and lasers at long ranges, while receiving high-quality imagery from the UAVs on the helicopters’ own displays.
Work will be performed in Orlando, FL, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/15. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract, including its work as Taiwan’s FMS agent (W58RGZ-10-C-0005). Lockheed Martin | Northrop Grumman.
Dec 30/11: Training. The US Army discusses AH-64D Block III improvements, as the 1st Attack Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Aviation Regiment, Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Infantry Division prepares to be the 1st unit in the Army to field a force with only AH-64D Block III machines.
The differences are extensive enough that existing 1-1 pilots are getting a 3-week course at Boeing’s Mesa, AZ facility, including 28 hours of academics, 24 hours in the new simulator, and 8.5 hours flying in the Block III helicopter. Maintenance test pilots get an additional 22 hours of academics and 3 additional hours in the aircraft.
Dec 7/11: Taiwan contract. Boeing in Mesa, AZ received a $141.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for “services in support of 30 Apache AH-64D attack helicopters for Taiwan.” This appears to confirm the report in the June 10/11 entry.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/17. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by the U.S. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL, who is acting as Taiwan’s agent (W58RGZ-09-C-0147).
Taiwan’s 30 begin
Dec 7/11: Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $7.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for “logistics support services for the AH-64D Apache low rate initial production.” DID is checking, but believes that only Block III is back at the LRIP phase.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Feb 28/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0161).
Nov 9/11: UAV Mast-a. An AH-64D Apache Block III helicopter fitted with the Unmanned Aerial Systems Tactical Common Data Link Assembly (UTA) atop its mast has controlled the payload and flight of an MQ-1C Grey Eagle UAV while both are in flight. This marks the 1st time an unmanned vehicle has been controlled from the cockpit of an Apache helicopter.
Lockheed Martin says that the test program proved the UTA’s design, adding that: “All goals of this phase of UTA testing were completed with 100 percent success.”
UAV level IV control
Nov 2/11: 1st handover. Boeing hands the 1st of 51 Low-Rate Initial Production AH-64D Apache Block IIIs over to the U.S. Army at a ceremony in Mesa, AZ. Boeing.
1st delivery
Oct 25/11: Alone in India. Reports surface that Russia’s Mi-28N Night Hunter has lost the competition for India’s proposed buy of 22 attack helicopters (vid. Dec 27/10 entry). Unnamed sources say that it fell short in 20 technical areas, and that the AH-64D displayed better maneuverability, multi-role capability, and capacity to accept upgrades.
That will be bad news for MBDA & Diehl, as well; their new PARS 3/TRIGAT LR anti-tank missile was reportedly going to be the Mi-28N’s counterpart to Lockheed Martin’s AGM-114 Hellfire missile family on the Apache. The question now is whether the Indian military’s recommendation will be accepted and approved, then turned into a contract. That often takes a long time in India. Economic Times of India | Russia’s Pravda | RIA Novosti | Monsters & Critics | The Hindu re: PARS 3.
FY 2011Program split into remanufactured & new; Low Rate Initial Production approved; LRIP-1 & 2 orders; Taiwan deal; Requests from India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
AH-64Ds, Afghanistan
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Aug 30/11: LRIP-1. A $16 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to buy support for AH-64D Apache Block III Low Rate Initial Production, Lot 1A and 1B. Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Feb 28/14. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0161).
July 25/11: LRIP-2. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $189.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification of an existing contract to provide “16 AH-64D Apache aircraft and related support.” Discussions with Boeing explain the award in detail as unfinalized contracts for Block III Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 2A production and spares/ ground support/ logistics support; increased Advanced Procurement Funding for LRIP Lot 2B production and spares/ ground support/ logistics support/ training devices, and LRIP Lot 2C production and spares.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Feb 28/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0161).
LRIP Lot 2 base
June 10/11: Taiwan deal? Reports surface that Taiwan has signed a contract for 30 AH-64D Apache Longbow Block III attack helicopters under its Sky Eagle program, making it the type’s 1st export customer. US Army AH-64 project manager Col. Shane Openshaw is quoted as the source for the news, and says that Taiwan’s first new-build helicopter will enter the production line in October 2011 as the very 1st new-build Block III, with deliveries expected in 2012-2013. The signing is consistent with April 2011 reports, but no branch of the US government, or Boeing, has made any public announcement yet; and there have been no media reports in Taiwan. On the other hand, subsequent entries strongly suggest a contract.
Per earlier contracts & requests, Taiwanese AH-64s will include Hellfire Longbow fire-and-forget light strike missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles among its weapon options. In exercises, helicopters have proven to be very challenging opponents for fixed-wing aircraft, and the growing aerial imbalance over the China Strait makes some form of aerial engagement capability a necessity for any Taiwanese attack helicopter. The Dec 3/08 DSCA entry set a maximum estimated price of $2.532 billion for 30 helicopters, all associated equipment and initial support, and requested stocks of Stinger and Hellfire Longbow missiles.
Boeing’ VP attack helicopter programs, David Koopersmith, told Shephard’s Rotorhub that the first 3 remanufactured Block IIIs were on the line, and they still expect to deliver the 1st production remanufactured Block III helicopter to the US Army in October 2011. Once the remaining AH-64D Block II line converts over, Koopersmith believes that Boeing could deliver 7-8 Block III helicopters per month on the 2 lines at Mesa, AZ. The Rotorhub report expects the US Army to eventually request 786 AH-64D Block IIIs, 96 above the current program plan of 690. Flight International | Rotorhub | Asian Skies blog.
April 15/11: SAR split. The Pentagon’s Selected Acquisitions Report ending Dec 30/10 includes a small change, for reporting purposes:
“The AB3 (Apache Block III) program was divided into two separate programs (AB3A Remanufacture and AB3B New Build).”
Looking at the accompanying tables [PDF], that brings the program from its 2010 figure of $9.371 billion for 658 helicopters (602 rebuild, 56 new), to $FY10 12.582 billion for 690 helicopters (639 rebuild, 57 new). The AB3 Remanufacture program cost has increased 43.9%, a jump of 28.3% per helicopter to about FY10$ 11.74 – 16.36 million each for PAUC (Program Acquisition Unit Cost, includes amortized R&D). On the other hand, the AB3 New-Build line has actually seen costs drop 8.3%, from $FY10 41.2 – 37.84 million PAUC, despite adding 1 helicopter.
SAR – the program splits
April 12/11: Taiwan. Defense News reports that representatives from the U.S. government and Boeing will arrive in Taipei in May 2011, to wrap up the AH-64 Block III Foreign Military Sale deal. Author Wendell Minnick.
March 16/11: UTA. Longbow, LLC in Orlando, FL received a $10 million firm-fixed-price contract for radar electronics units and unmanned aerial system tactical common data link assembly units, in support of the Apache Block III helicopter fire control radar. This equipment set helps the helicopter work with unmanned drones. The Block III’s desired “Level IV” control means the Apache pilots see what the UAV sees, and can control a UAV to do anything except launch itself, or land itself. Boeing has equipped the Block IIIs with basic systems for UAV control in anticipation of the day when the battlefield procedures and software, are deemed ready.
Work will be performed in Orlando, Fla., with an estimated completion date of Sept. 30, 2015. One bid was solicited with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-10-C-0005).
Dec 27/10: India. India’s attack helicopter competition. The US DSCA announces [PDF] India’s formal request to approve Boeing’s AH-64D Block III attack helicopter for sale, as part of that country’s multinational attack helicopter competition, to supplement and eventually replace India’s existing fleet of 32 Mi-24/35 helicopters. If the Boeing-U.S. Army proposal wins, the Government of India will request a possible sale of 22 AH-64D Block III attack helicopters under Direct Commercial Sale terms, plus up to:
The estimated cost of these items, excluding the helicopters, is up to $1.4 billion. The prime contractors will be GE in Cincinnati Ohio (engines); Lockheed Martin Corporation in Orlando, FL and Mission Systems and Sensors in Owego, NY (APR-48, Arrowhead, Hellfire missiles); Longbow Limited Liability Corporation joint venture in Orlando, FL (Radar); and Raytheon Company in Tucson, AZ (Stinger missiles). Implementation of this proposed sale would require the assignment of 1 U.S. Government and 7 contractor representatives to India for one week to conduct a detailed discussion of the various aspects of the hybrid program with Government of India representatives.
India’s competition has also attracted interest from AgustaWestland (A-129i/T-129 Mongoose), EADS Eurocopter (EC665 Tiger) and Russia (Mi-28 NE Havoc). A previous attempt to buy the 22 attack helicopters also featured interest from Bell Helicopter (AH-1Z Viper), before both Bell and Boeing quit that competition. The 2 American companies had quit because India was insisting on Direct Commercial Sale type procedures, but their offerings required at least some Foreign Military Sale procedures under US law. India ended up canceling the initial competition in 2009, when only Eurocopter was left bidding at the end, but they issued another RFP in early 2010. As is true for other Indian buys of this scale, industrial offsets worth at least 30% of the contract’s value will be required.
DSCA: India request (22)
Nov 8/10: UAE request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] a formal request for 60 AH-64D Block III Apache Longbow attack helicopters. Of the 60, 30 will be re-manufactured AH-64D Block IIs, while the other 30 will be new-build helicopters. The total contract set could run as high as $5 billion, and could include:
The prime contractors will be The Boeing Company in Mesa, AZ and Lockheed Martin Corporation in Orlando, FL. Implementation of this proposed sale may require the assignment of additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the UAE, but that isn’t defined yet. U.S. Government and contractor representatives will also participate in program management and technical reviews for one-week intervals, twice semi-annually. Finally, this note from the DSCA was interesting. The UAE does have troops in Afghanistan, where AH-64s are always in demand:
“The UAE is currently deployed in support of U.S. regional operations, and plans to provide future deployment support.”
DSCA: UAE request (60)
Oct 25/10: LRIP-1 order. Boeing announces a $247 million contract to begin Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) for the U.S. Army’s AH-64D Apache Block III helicopter. The Oct 22/10 LRIP Lot 1 contract covers production of 8 AH-64D Block IIIs. The helicopters will be assembled, flight tested and delivered from the Boeing Global Strike facility in Mesa, AZ, and first delivery is scheduled for October 2011. Boeing | Seattle Post-Intelligencer.
LRIP Lot 1
Oct 20/10: Saudi request. Saudi Arabia submits official weapons export requests for up to 70 AH-64D Block III helicopters: 10 for the Royal Guard, 24 for the Army, and 36 for the National Guard. Some of these helicopters would have the Longbow mast mounted sights, and mounted weapons will include laser-guided rockets as well as AGM-114R Hellfire II missiles.
DSCA: Saudi request (70)
Oct 7/10: LRIP clearance. A Pentagon Milestone C Acquisition Decision Memorandum authorizes the AH-64D Block III program to enter the LRIP phase to produce 51 aircraft, and the current Army acquisition objective is for 690 helicopters across LRIP and Full Rate Production. Source.
Milestone C
FY 2008 – 2010Taiwan request; South Korean interest; 1st prototype flight; 1st test aircraft flight; Limited User Test done; Howard Hughes Award.
Block-III testing
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Jan 13/10: Sub-contractors. Boeing announces that Science Engineering Services Inc. (SES) is joining its Block II industry team. SES will receive U.S. Army Apache helicopters at the SES West Aviation and Integration Facility near Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL. They will be disassembled, inspected and repaired as necessary, then components and airframes will be shipped to Boeing in Mesa, AZ, for integration into the AH-64D Apache Block III.
The program will create approximately 70 new positions for aviation and avionics mechanics, structural installers, and aviation quality inspectors within SES.
Nov 23/09: Testing Boeing completes the 1st flight of its AH-64D Apache Block III program structures test aircraft in Mesa, AZ. The tests demonstrate flight characteristics and handling maneuvers, and test technologies including the composite main rotor blade, composite horizontal stabilator, and -701D engines with enhanced digital electronic control. The aircraft also features a split-torque face gear transmission that increases power throughput by more than 20%, without taking up more room.
The Army and Boeing continue to work toward an anticipated US Department of Defense Milestone C decision in April 2010, which would begin production. Boeing release.
November 2009: Block III LUT. Boeing’s AH-64D Apache Block III program avionics test aircraft completes the Army’s Limited User Test according to schedule. Source.
LUT
June 2008: Testing. Boeing completes the first flight of the AH-64D Apache Block III program’s avionics test helicopter ahead of schedule, at the Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. Source.
Dec 3/08: Sub-contractors. Presagis, a Canadian firm which specializes in providing commercial-off-the shelf (COTS) modeling, simulation and embedded display graphics software, announced that Boeing has selected their Lyra image generator to support the development of the next-generation Apache helicopter simulator. Boeing will use Lyra in its new Block III Apache Engineering Development Simulator (EDS), the virtual simulation of the Apache weapon system. Ottawa Citizen – Defence Watch.
Oct 2/08: Taiwan request. Taiwan’s official request [PDF] is placed for 30 AH-64D Apache Longbow Block III attack helicopters and associated equipment. The estimated purchase price is $2.532 billion. Taiwan currently fields AH-1W Cobras in this role, and the AH-64D beat Bell’s AH-1Z Viper on the grounds that it was battle proven, while the AH-1Z remains developmental.
The helicopters will be ordered with 30 Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensor (MTADS/PNVS “Arrowhead“), 17 AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars and AN/APR-48 Radar Frequency Interferometer (FCR/RFI), 69 T700-GE-701D Turbine Engines. Composite horizontal stabilators, crew and maintenance trainers, depot maintenance, all necessary support equipment, tools and test equipment, integration and checkout, spares and repair parts, training and training equipment, and other forms of support.
The request also includes applicable weapons: 173 FIM-92F Stinger Block I Air-to-Air Missiles, 35 Stinger air-air missile Captive Flight Trainers with live guidance systems but no rocket motors, 1,000 AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire anti-tank missiles that can use the APG-78 and their own radar’s millimeter-wave guidance for “fire and forget” capability, and 66 M299 Hellfire missile launchers.
Taiwan has requested industrial offsets, which will be defined in direct negotiations with the contractor(s). Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 2 U.S. Government personnel for a period of 6 years to provide intensive coordination, monitoring, and technical assistance. In addition, 6 contractor representatives will be in country serving as Contractor Field Service Representatives for a period of 5 years, with the possibility of a 5-year extension. The principal contractors will be:
DSCA: Taiwan request (30)
Sept 14/08: South Korea. South Korea’s Yonhap News reports that the USA has offered to sell 36 used Apache attack helicopters to South Korea at less than 60% of the out-of-factory price, with upgrades to Block III status plus include a new frame and engines, resetting their life span to 10,000 flight hours.
The deal, if signed, is expected to be worth around $811 million. Its size is causing hesitation in Korea, which needs to replace its aging fleet of 500MD Defender helicopters and has backed off of its previous plans for an indigenous attack helicopter program. Politics is an uncertain game, and dates are rarely dependable. A government decision was expected by the end of 2008, but remained unmade as 2012 began. Seoul Times article | DID coverage: “US Army Apaches for Auction?”
July 11/08: 1st flight. The Boeing Company and assembled guests celebrate the first flight of the AH-64D Apache Block III helicopter in Mesa, AZ. The aircraft was flown by two Apache-rated aviators: U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Richard Cody, and Army experimental test pilot (Chief Warrant Officer 5) Rucie Moore.
Actually the demonstration flight on this day was the second flight. As one might expect given the passenger involved, a U.S. Army soldier and a Boeing teammate initially flew this Block III prototype aircraft over the Arizona desert on June 27/08 in preparation for this day’s ceremony. Boeing’s release states that it plans to begin Low Rate Initial Production in April 2010, and to deliver the first production AH-64D Apache Block III in June 2011.
A follow-on Lockheed Martin release notes the debut of its Arrowhead surveillance and targeting sensors, and Longbow Unmanned Aerial Systems Tactical Common Data Link Assembly (UTA) on the new helicopters. The Longbow UTA can control up to 4 UAVs.
1st flight
April 30/08: Award. A team comprised of The Boeing Company [NYSE: BA], the U.S. Army’s Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, AMRDEC Aviation Systems Integration Facility, Harris Corp. and Rockwell Collins receive the American Helicopter Society’s (AHS) 2008 Howard Hughes Award during the AHS International Annual Forum in Montreal, Canada. The AH-64D Block III’s progress figures prominently in that award.
One hopes that the award’s annual winners will have better luck with aircraft development than Howard Hughes. Boeing release.
Jan 17/08: Longbow LLC in Orlando FL received a $15.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for Apache Block III radar electronics unit and an unmanned aerial vehicle tactical common data link assembly. The latter item would allow the helicopter’s pilots to share data with UAVs, and could allow full control depending on the technologies used.
Work will be performed in Baltimore, MD and Orlando, FL and is expected to be complete by June 30/09. One bid was solicited on Jan 20/06, and 1 bid was received (W58RGZ-05-C-0239).
FY 2007 and EarlierInitial development contract; Advance electronics contracts.
AH-64D Longbow
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July 14/06: Development. Boeing and U.S. Army officials sign a $619.3 million development contract for Block III upgrades to the current and future Apache fleet, via a virtual signing ceremony in Washington, DC; Huntsville, AL; and Mesa, AZ.
Those upgrades are described earlier in the article.Boeing release
Block III SDD contract
Jan 25/06: Longbow LLC in Orlando, FL received a $76 million increment as part of a $100 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for Apache Block III Radar Electronics Units.
Work will be performed in Baltimore, MD (50%), and Orlando, FL (50%), and is expected to be complete by Dec 30/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on Jan 11/06 (W58RGZ-05-C-0239).
July 13/05: Longbow LLC in Orlando, FL receives a $15 million increment as part of a $17.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the Apache Fire Control Radar Electronics Unit.
Work will be performed in Baltimore, MD (50%), and Orlando, FL (50%), and is expected to be complete by Dec 15/05. This was a sole source contract initiated on July 22/04 (W58RGZ-05-C-0239).
Appendix A: Apache’s (Re) Production History No sunset yet.Of the 937 AH-64As ever built, 821 were built for US Army. Over 500 of those were remanufactured to AH-64D status over a 10-year period, under 2 multi-year contracts that ran for 5 years each. Subsequent contracts drew in more AH-64As, and as of April 2012, only 8 AH-64As remained in the US Army.
Observant readers will note that adding up all of the above cohorts makes 779 AH-64Ds produced (284 + 217 + 278) – but that counts the 66 war replacement helicopters twice, so the real total is 713. 713 – 690 = 23 unconverted AH-64Ds for whatever reason, be it unreplaced losses, budgets, or a safety margin to account for future losses and accidents. The Block III program was also supposed to manufacture 56 new-build helicopters as a separate program, but the FY 2014 budget throws the “AB3B” program into doubt. Unless Congress changes the Pentagon’s plans, the new-build program will end at just 8-10 helicopters.
Additional ReadingsReaders with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
Background: AH-64 ApacheBackground: Ancillary Equipment
Competitors
News & Views
Sonobuoys are used to detect and identify moving underwater objects by either listening for the sounds produced by propellers and machinery (passive detection), or by bouncing a sonar “ping” off the surface of a submarine (active detection). They usually float, or have at least some part of them that does. Specialized sonobuoys can also detect electric fields, magnetic anomalies, and bioluminescence (light emitted by microscopic organisms disturbed by a passing submarine); as well as measuring environmental parameters like water temperature versus depth, air temperature, barometric pressure, and wave height.
Sonobuoys are generally dropped from aircraft or helicopters that are equipped with a means to launch them, and electronic equipment to receive and process data sent by the sonobuoy. They can also be launched from ships. This entry will discuss some of the new sonobuoys in use, and cover related contracts.
Sonobuoys are classified by size (A, B, C, etc.), type, and model. Most U.S.-manufactured sonobuoys are A-size (about 4 7/8″ x 36″). Some countries have moved to half-size, or A/2, as a preferred configuration.
In the broadest sense, sonobuoys fall into 2 type categories. Active sonobuoys emit pings or otherwise create an effect that will bounce off of underwater objects like submarines. Passive sonobuoys simply sit and listen to sound emissions, or sense other telltale signs they’ve been programmed to monitor. Models include:
AN/SSQ-36B: A passive bathythermograph sonobuoy, which is a fancy way of saying “ocean thermometer”. Water tends to distribute itself in coherent layers with different temperature ranges, and that in turn affects sonar and acoustic ranging. Knowing the local “temperature geography” is an excellent idea before launching any other sonobuoys. This buoy survives for about 12 minutes, taking readings down to about 2,625 ft/ 800 m at a descent rate of about 5 feet per second, with an accuracy to about a degree Fahrenheit. The data is transmitted to the launch aircraft by an RF transmitter at 1/4 watt, over 1 of 99 selectable channels, for processing and display. The AN/SSQ-36B Bathythermograph can be air launched at air speeds up to 370 knots, and at altitudes up to 30,000 ft. Air descent is controlled and stabilized by a parachute.
AN/SSQ-53F DIFAR (“Pointer”): The latest generation passive sonobuoy for the US Navy and several allies, replacing both the AN/SSQ-57 and the AN/SSQ-53. Combines the functionality of a calibrated omni sensor with that of the AN/SSQ-53E DIFAR (Directed Frequency Analysis and Ranging), and adds on board embedded Digital Sound Processors. The DSPs improve acoustic detection performance, and permit all AN/SSQ-53F sonobuoys to be calibrated to a common sensitivity levels. Additional flexibility is achieved through the use of Command Function Select (CFS), which allows various operating parameters to be modified after the sonobuoy has been dropped.
AN/SSQ-62E (“Cadillac”): The current generation of the DICASS (Directional Command-Activated Sonobuoy System) family of active sonobuoys. This is an active sonobuoy.
The AN/SSQ-62 is composed of 2 main sections. The surface unit receives commands from the controlling aircraft via a UHF receiver, and sends target information to the aircraft, via a VHF transmitter. The subsurface unit transmits sonar pulses in the ocean upon command from the aircraft, and receives sonar target echoes for transmission to the aircraft. The sonobuoy will accept command signals only after a decoder identifies the correct address code; commands can include mid-depth or deep depth selection, sonar ping, and scuttle (naval term for self-destruction).
The key advantage of the AN/SSQ-62E is that it permits each sonobuoy to transmit on any of 4 acoustic channels and their respective RF channels. Optional thermal battery technology allows DICASS sonobuoys to be shipped and stored in a relatively unrestricted manner with an extended shelf life, as this battery does not degrade significantly with time. AN/SSQ62E is in large scale production, and has been bought by customers that include the USA, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain.
AN/SSQ-101 IEER: Part of the Improved Extended Echo Ranging (IEER) system. IEER was developed in for large-area search capability against small submarines operating in littoral waters, and uses explosive charges to generate noise. The system combines a new sensor, the AN/SSQ-101 Air Deployed Active Receiver (ADAR) sonobuoy, with improved software in the P-3C Orion Anti-surface Warfare Improvement aircraft. The ADAR sonobuoy employs a multi-element planar hydrophone array to improve detection in shallow littoral waters. When coupled with the P-3C’s powerful USQ-78A acoustic post-processor, it improves the US military’s ability to perform the difficult task of finding quiet submarines amidst the clutter and confusing echoes of shallow littoral waters.
AN/SSQ-125: MAC. Also part of the Improved Extended Echo Ranging (IEER) system, but with a different mode of operation. It will also be part of the P-8’s new Multi-static Active Coherent approach. This NATO “A” size sonobuoy is capable of generating a variety of waveforms upon command, including low-frequency coherent tones which can propagate for long distances. Echoes can be detected by multiple receiver sonobuoys, which nullifies a submarine’s standard profile-minimizing head-on maneuver, and the tone’s coherence allows doppler shift equations to calculate the contact’s speed and heading. GPS receivers in source and receiver sonobuoys can sharpen targeting further, which is very useful in conjunction with high-altitude, GPS-guided torpedo kits like HAASW.
Before it’s deployed, the AN/SSQ-125’s RF channel can be programmed to any of the standard sonobuoy operating channels. At any time after deployment, it can be commanded via CFS to change its operating parameters or depth (deeper only), generate a ping, or scuttle itself. It’s designed to work with the AN/SSQ-53F, AN/SSQ-77C and AN/SSQ-101 (ADAR) sonobuoys.
Note that this chart of orders from 2009 ends in July 2014, when the US government switched to a multi-year block-buy and no longer detailed sonobuoy orders:
Competing Payloads? Turais launch conceptOne interesting ancillary trend involves the concept of launching other things from sonobuoy tubes – such as UAVs or UUVs.
Piasecki Aircraft has been demonstrating its WBBL “Turais” UAV, under a Phase II US Navy SBIR contract. Turais deploys with a drag parachute just like a sonobuoy, but then pops out tail fins, rotates its wings into position, and fires up a turbojet engine. It has a 200 pound payload capacity, an expected 6 hour endurance, and was successful in its initial flight demonstration on Jan 5/10.
Projects of that sort will not be covered in this article, but we include it to remind our readers that rising surveillance needs of all kinds are leading to some non-standard, category-crossing solutions.
Contracts & Key EventsERAPSCO is joint venture between Florida’s Sparton Corporation and Indiana’s Ultra Electronics. Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the US Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division in Crane, IN.
Note that the sonobuoys described here are also sold to foreign governments. This article does not cover those sales, unless they are explicitly intertwined with a US Navy sale.
FY 2016Multi-year buy; Sentinel USV begins an important new category.
Sentinel USVs
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December 17/15: The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) laboratories and the Anti-submarine Warfare Systems program office (PMA-264) rapidly developed a new sonobuoy launching system over the summer and fall which was delivered this November. The new system was developed as the existing system, the S-3, was being retired. A bit of brainstorming resulted in putting two SH-60B launchers on a pallet to roll on and off from a KC-130 tanker operated by the VX-30 Air Test and Evaluation Squadron.
October 28/15: The service also awarded a $178.6 million contract modification for hundreds of thousands of sonobuoys. These include 6,000 passive athythermograph AN/SSQ-36s; 95,000 passive AN/SSQ-53s; 15,500 active AN/SSQ-62s; 10,000 Improved Extended Echo Ranging (IEER) AN/SSQ-101s; and 10,000 Multi-static Active Coherent (MAC) AN/SSQ-125s. The contractor – ERAPSCO – is a Sparton Corp. and Ultra Electronics joint venture.
FY 2014 – 2015Multi-year buy; Sentinel USV begins an important new category.
Nov 7/14: FY 15-16. ERAPSCO in Columbia City, IN receives a $195.2 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification, exercising an option under the current multi-year contract (q.v. July 16/14) for up to 141,500 AN/SSQ series sonobuoys, and 10,000 MK-84 signal underwater sound devices. Funds will be committed on individual delivery orders as they are issued.
Work will be performed in De Leon Springs, FL (51.7%), and Columbia City, IN (48.3%), and is expected to be complete in September 2016. US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00421-14-D-0025).
July 16/14: Multi-year buy. ERAPSCO in Columbia City, IN receives a 5+ year, firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract, worth up to $810 million. The $166 million base-year deal covers up to 141,263 AN/SSQ Series sonobuoys, and 5,000 MK-84 Signal Underwater Sound devices. All base-year funds are technically committed immediately, using FY 2014 US Navy budgets. ERAPSCO will subcontract $90.5 million of that base order to Sparton in DeLeon Springs, FL, and $75.5 million to Ultra Electronics USSI.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL (51.7%), and Columbia City, IN (48.3%), and the contract will run until October 2019. This contract was competitively procured via an electronic request for proposals, and 1 offer was received by US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00421-14-D-0025). See also Sparton, “Sparton Corporation and Ultra Electronics USSI Joint Venture (ERAPSCO) Awarded $166 Million for U.S. Navy Sonobuoy Contract”
Multi-year buy
April 8/14: New option – Sentinel. Instead of sonobuoys, Ultra Electronics and Liquid Robotics are developing a persistent Sentinel robot that combines some of USSI’s sonobuoy technologies with the principles behind Liquid Robotics wave-powered, ultra long endurance Wave Glider robots.
“The sensor/software suite is designed to acoustically detect, track and form contact reports on waterborne targets that are transmitted to a command and control node on shore, ship or aircraft platform. Contact reports will contain spatial information that allows for data fusion with other sensor sources to achieve an affordable common operational picture that will provide the user maximum situational awareness. Applications for this product are vast and include area surveillance, perimeter trip wire notification, marine mammal monitoring and data collection, environmental data collection and defense and military mission capability sets.”
This isn’t an exact sonobuoy competitor, because the network of Sentinels will move very slowly. If you’re trying to scan ahead in uncovered waters, or pinpoint a fleeting contact, sonobuoys will still be the way. On the other hand, good planning may remove some of the need for sonobuoys at key waypoints or chokepoints. It’s also the thin edge of a trend that will require new kinds of compatibility from sonobuoys and naval mission systems alike. Sources: USSI, “Ultra Electronics USSI And Liquid Robotics Announce The Development Of Long Duration, Maritime Security Solution”.
FY 2012 – 2013Sonobuoy orders of various types; Torpedo compatibility.
Loading a P-3C
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Aug 5/13: SSQ-53. ERAPSCO in Columbia City, IN receives a $7.2 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract, exercising an option to buy 9,400 AN/SSQ-53F Sonobuoys for the US Navy. All funds are committed immediately.
Work will be performed in Columbia City, IN (50%) and DeLeon Springs, FL (50%), and is expected to be complete in April 2015. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Md., manages the contract (N00421-11-C-0030).
Feb 8/13: HAASW. ERAPSCO Inc. in Columbia City, IN receives a $7.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification for engineering and manufacturing development services in support of the High Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare system. This is actually an Increment 2 upgrade to the new P-8A sea control aircraft. It makes drops more accurate by using a GPS-based algorithm; receives, processes, and stores in-buoy GPS data received from AN/SSQ-53, AN/SSQ-62, and AN/SSQ-101B sonobuoys; and will remotely send commands, and receive and process data from the AN/SSQ-101B’s digital datalink.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL (52%) and Columbia City, IN (48%), and is expected to be complete in May 2014. $890,000 in FY 2013 Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation, Navy contract funds are committed immediately. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00421-11-D-0029). See also Military Aerospace.
Dec 11/12: SSQ-125. ERAPSCO in Columbia City, IN receives a $17.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for the procurement of 2,999 AN/SSQ-125 MAC active IEER sonobuoys.
Work will be performed in De Leon Springs, FL (55%) and Columbia City, IN (45%) and is expected to be completed in March 2015. All contract funds are committed, and will be managed by the US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD (N00421-12-C-0049).
Dec 4/12: 53F/ 62E. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN receives a $71.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for 76,000 AN/SSQ-53F passive and 7,500 AN/SSQ-62E active US Navy sonobouys.
Work will be performed in Columbia City, IN (59%) and DeLeon Springs, FL (41%), and is expected to be completed in January 2015. All contract funds are committed. The US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00421-11-C-0030).
Nov 15/12: SSQ-101A. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN receives a $9.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for 1,800 AN/SSQ-101A ADAR IEER sonobuoys.
Work will be performed in Columbia City, IN (53%) and DeLeon Springs, FL (47%), and is expected to be complete in November 2014. All contract funds are committed, but $414,645 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. The US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00421-12-C-0047).
June 11/12: SSQ-125. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN receives a sole-source $25.4 million firm-fixed-price contract for 4,628 AN/SSQ-125 MAC IEER sonobuoys.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL (53%), and Columbia City, IN (47%), and is expected to be complete in June 2014. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to the FAR 6.302-1 (N00421-12-C-0049).
April 26/12: SSQ-101A. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN receives a sole-source $10.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for 2,006 AN/SSQ-101A sonobuoys.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, Fla. (53%), and Columbia City, Ind. (47%), and is expected to be completed in April 2014. Contract funds in the amount of $257,421 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00421-12-C-0047).
Mar 29/12: 36B/53F/62B. Sparton Corporation announces ERAPSCO subcontracts worth $24.9 Million: $18.1 million for SSQ-53F passive, $4.7 million for SSQ-62E active, and $2.1 million for SSQ-36B bathythermograph sonobuoys. Production is expected to be completed by January 2014.
March 13/12: SSQ-53F. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN receives a $13 million modification firm-fixed-price, performance-based contract modification, exercising a US Navy option for 17,000 AN/SSQ-53F passive sonobuoys. This brings total US Navy expenditures on all sonobuoys since the beginning of 2006 to around $510 million.
Work will be performed in Columbia City, IN (53%), and DeLeon Springs, FL (47%), and is expected to be complete in January 2014. $811,296 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00421-11-C-0030).
Jan 27/12: SSQ-53F. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN receives a $38.4 million firm-fixed-price, performance based contract modification, exercising options for 50,430 AN/SSQ-53F DIFAR passive sonobuoys for the US Navy (49,990/ $38.1M/ 99.1%) and Taiwan (440/ $335,283/ 0.9$%).
Work will be performed in Columbia City, IN (53%), and DeLeon Springs, FL (47%), and is expected to be complete in January 2014 (N00421-11-C-0030).
Nov 7/11: 36B/62F. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN receives a $15.6 million firm-fixed-price, performance-based contract modification, exercising options for 3,544 AN/SSQ-36B bathythermograph sonobuoys and 8,588 AN/SSQ-62E DICASS active sonobuoys. The U.S. Navy is ordering 3,500 AN/SSQ-36s and 8,500 AN/SSQ-62s ($15.5 million/ 98.9%), while Taiwan is ordering 44 AN/SSQ-36s and 88 AN/SSQ-62s for training support ($164,745; 1.1%).
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL (53%), and Columbia City, IN (47%), and is expected to be complete in April 2014. $57,219 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00421-11-C-0030).
FY 2009 – 2011Various sonobuoy orders; Market review;
On SH-60F helicopter
(click to view full)
April 8/11: 36B/53F/62B. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN received a $55.5 million firm-fixed-price, performance-based contract for 65,230 items: 3,211 AN/SSQ-36B bathythermograph sonobuoys; 51,733 AN/SSQ-53F DIFAR passive sonobuoys; and 10,286 AN/SSQ-62E DICASS active sonobuoys.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL (53%), and Columbia City, IN (47%), and is expected to be complete in April 2014. $546,096 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 This contract was competitively procured via electronic request for proposals, with 3 firms solicited and 1 offer received by the US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD (N00421-11-C-0030).
Nov 29/10: R&D. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN received a $33.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract to provide ongoing sonobuoy R&D and engineering services for the next 5 years.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL (51%), and Columbia City, IN (49%), and is expected to be complete in November 2015. $244,419 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11. This contract was not competitively procured (N00421-11-D-0029).
Nov 2/10: SSQ-101A. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN received a $26.8 million option for 4,999 AN/SSQ-101A sonobuoys, under a firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL (61%), and Columbia City, IN (39%), and is expected to be complete in November 2012. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00421-10-D-0010). See also Sparton release.
Sept 28/10: R&D. Sparton Electronics Florida, Inc. in DeLeon Springs, FL receives an $11.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for research and development, and production engineering services in support of sonobuoy technology upgrades.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL, and is expected to be complete in September 2015. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to FAR 6.302-1. The US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00421-10-D-0024). See also Sparton release [PDF].
Sept 27/10: SSQ-125. ERAPSCO in Columbia City, IN receives a $5.8 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification for up to 1,000 AN/SSQ-125 production representative sonobuoys.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL (52%); and Columbia City, IN (48%) and is expected to be complete in August 2012. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00421-09-C-0073). See also Sparton press release [PDF].
May 6/10: Sparton Corporation in Schaumburg, IL announces a $28 million subcontract from ERAPSCO, to manufacture 33,604 total AN/SSQ-53F, AN/SSQ-62E, and AN/SSQ-36B sonobuoys or the US Navy.
These sonobuoys will be manufactured at Sparton’s DeLeon Springs, FL, facility and production is expected to be complete by September 2011.
March 31/10: Sparton Corp. in Schaumburg, IL announces a $14.5 million subcontract from ERAPSCO to make sub-components for the AN/SSQ-101A (Q-101A) Air Deployable Active Receiver (ADAR) sonobuoys. Production will be finished by the end of 2011.
March 25/10: 36B/53F/62B. ERAPSCO, Inc. in Columbia City, IN receives a $60 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for up to 70,294 sonobuoys.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL (52%), and Columbia City, IN (48%), and is expected to be complete in March 2012. $192,293 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured by a limited source Lowest Price Technically Acceptable competition, with 3 firms solicited and 1 offer received by the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD (N00421-10-D-0011). Production will include:
March 3/10: SSQ-101A. ERAPSCO in Columbia City, IN received a $34 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for 7,500 AN/SSQ-101A sonobuoys.
Work will be performed in De Leon Springs, FL (61%), and Columbia City, IN (39%), and is expected to be complete in March 2012. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to the FAR 6.302-1. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD issued this contract (N00421-10-D-0010).
Oct 2/09: Market. According to Forecast International’s annual review of the market for airborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sensors, the next 10 years will see production of more than 199,000 systems valued at $6.1 billion. Sonobuoys are benefiting from faster processors that improve filtering, and low-cost datalinks that make information sharing easier. They will have a large share of this segment – by volume, anyway:
“Sonobuoys still represent 99.4 percent of the airborne ASW market, with the sale of 198,046 units projected over the next 10 years. Yet, in terms of value of production, these units represent only $212.35 million, or 3.50 percent of the market. The average cost of the units in this category is about $1,000, stressing the very low-cost/high-volume aspect of this segment.”
Sales of radar sets optimized for periscope and snort detection, and electronic support measures (ESM) equipment designed to localize radar and communications transmissions from submarines and dipping sonars, are expected to make up the lion’s share of this segment by value. Raytheon ($1.9 billion, 31.5%), Telephonics ($559 million, 9.22%) and L3 ($300 million, 4.95%) are expected to lead the sales race, but the field as a whole has just 8 major participants.
June 22/09: Sparton. Sparton Electronics announces a $19.3 million subcontract to help manufacture sonobuoys for the United States Navy, as part of the ERAPSCO joint venture. Sparton will produce subassemblies for more than 7,320 AN/SSQ-101A sonobuoys, with on-board digital signal processing and a Sparton Digital Compass for bearing determination.
Production and testing will be performed at Sparton’s DeLeon Springs, FL facility and is expected to be complete in May 2011. Sparton release.
Recent months have not been smooth for Sparton. In March 2009, declining fortunes set in motion the closure of plants in London, Ontario, Canada and in Jackson, MI, while significant changes were made within the executive team. April 2009 even saw a threatened NYSE de-listing, because the firm’s market capitalization had fallen below a $75 million average over a 30-day trading period. June 2009 developments allowed Sparton to continue trading, but only because the NYSE dropped its limit to $50 million. June 2009 also saw an extension of Sparton’s credit facility from National City Bank.
Feb 9/09: 36B/53F/62B. Two contracts worth a total of $68.8 million are issued, with purchases split between the vendors in amounts related to their offer prices, covering sonobuoys for the US Navy (4,150 AN/SSQ-36B; 61,697 AN/SSQ-53F; and 17,880 AN/SSQ-62E) and Pakistan (45 AN/SSQ-36B, 350 AN/SSQ-53F, 50 AN/SSQ-62E).
They are detailed below.
Feb 9/09: 36B/53F/62B. Undersea Sensor Systems, Inc., in Columbia City, IN receive a $34.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for 3 types of sonobuoys. They will deliver 4,195 AN/SSQ-36B sonobuoys, split between the U.S. Navy (4,150) and the Government of Pakistan (45); along with another 30,454 AN/SSQ-53F sonobuoys split between the U.S. Navy (30,104), and the Government of Pakistan (350). A 3rd set of 8,302 AN/SSQ-62E sonobuoys will be purchased exclusively for the U.S. Navy. Overall, this contract combines purchases for the U.S. Navy ($34.5 million, 99.25%) and for the Government of Pakistan ($259,880, 0.75%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program.
Work will be performed in Columbia City, IN (90%) and Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada (10%) and is expected to be complete in February 2011. This contract was competitively procured by electronic request for proposals, and 2 offers were received. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00421-09-C-0040).
Feb 9/09: 53F/62E.Sparton Electronics in DeLeon Springs, FL received a $34.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for 2 types of sonobuoys. They will deliver 31,593 AN/SSQ-53F sonobuoys to the U.S. Navy, and another 9,578 AN/SSQ-62E sonobuoys will be split between the U.S. Navy (9,528) and the Government of Pakistan (50). Overall, this contract combines purchases for the U.S. Navy ($34 million, 99.74%), and for the Government of Pakistan ($86,555, 0.26%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL, and is expected to be completed in February 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $251,010 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured by electronic request for proposals, and two offers were received by the Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00421-09-C-0039).
FY 2006 – 2008Various sonobuoy orders; Sonobuoy R&D.
Aug 18/08: SSQ-101. ERAPSCO in Columbia City, IN received an $11.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for AN/SSQ-101 sonobuoys and associated data. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $17.2 million. Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL (66%) and Columbia City, IN (34%), and is expected to be complete by August 2010. This contract was not competitively procured by The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division in Crane, IN (N00164-08-C-GP03).
June 5/08: Sonotube-launched UAVs. Small business qualifier Lite Machines Corp. in West Lafayette, IN won a not-to-exceed $10.5 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for a Phase III Small Business Technology Transfer Program contract under Topic N04-T004, entitled “Sonobuoy Tube Launched UAV.” Phase III SBIR projects are the last stage before commercialization.
Lite Machines will provide services and materials for engineering tasks, including research and development, and prototype and testing of their rotary wing UAV. Work will be performed in West Lafayette, IN and is expected to be complete in June 2013. Contract funds in the amount of $796,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured using the STTR Program Solicitation under Topic N042-T004, and 41 offers were received by the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ (N68335-08-D-0010).
Feb 8/08: SSQ-125. The Us Navy issues FBO solicitation #N00421-08-R-0044: Develop and Procure the AN/SSQ-125 Sonobuoy:
“AN/SSQ-125 sonobuoys as the coherent source sonobuoy for the Air Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) multi-static acoustic program – Advanced Extended Echo Ranging (AEER). AEER is an airborne ASW detection system being developed to provide large-area, subsurface search and detection capability. AEER will be employed in the U.S. Navy P-3C aircraft. The sonobuoy shall be capable of being deployed from all platforms capable of launching “A” sized sonobuoys. This effort will include design, development, fabrication, and testing of an “A” sized air-launched, disposable (expendable) sonobuoy. The development will include testing, certification, and qualifications to meet the technical and safety operational requirements. A quantity of sonobuoys will be manufactured for lot testing to meet the sonobuoy reliability requirements.
ERAPSCO is the only known responsible source that can provide the required products and services which includes a required delivery of 100 EDM units 3 to 5 months after contract award. The estimated award date is February 2009.”
Feb 7/08: SSQ-62E. Undersea Sensor Systems Inc. in Columbia City, IN won a $9.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for the procurement of AN/SSQ-62E sonobuoys. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $18.9 million.
Work will be performed in Columbia City, IN and is expected to be complete by February 2010. This contract was competitively procured through Government-wide Points of Entry, Navy Electronic Commerce On-line, and Federal Business Opportunities websites, with 2 contractors solicited and 2 offers received by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division in Crane, IN (N00164-08-C-GP02).
Jan 24/08: SSQ-53F. Undersea Sensor Systems Incorporated in Columbia City, IN won a $13.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for AN/SSQ-53F Sonobuoys from the United States Navy. This contract includes options which could bring its cumulative value to $20.5 million.
Work will be performed in Columbia City, Ind., and is expected to be completed by Feb. 2010. This contract was sort of competitively procured, with 1 proposal solicited and 2 offers received via Government-wide Points of Entry, Navy Electronic Commerce On-line, and Federal Business Opportunities websites (N00164-08-C-GP08).
Aug 31/07: R&D. Undersea Sensor Systems Inc. in Columbia City, IN won a maximum $6.1 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for up to 51,340 hours of research and development technical services. They will help resolve technical and engineering issues associated with the design, construction, and use of sonobuoys, and their results will provide data for Government engineers and program management personnel to use in evaluating the technical and economic benefits of potential improvements to various sonobuoy types.
Work will be performed in Columbia City, IN and is expected to be complete by May 2011. The contract was competitively procured and advertised via the Internet, with 2 firms solicited and 2 offers received by The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division in Crane IN (N00164-07-D-6781)
April 13/07: SSQ-101. ERAPSCO in Columbia City, IN received an $11.7 million firm-fixed-price contract for AN/SSQ-101 sonobuoys and associated data. Work will be performed in Columbia City, IN. (50%) and DeLeon Springs, FL (50%), and is expected to be complete by April 2009. The contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division in Crane IN (N00164-07-C-6788).
Jan 23/07: SSQ-53F. Undersea Sensor Systems Inc. in Columbia City, IN received a $19 million firm-fixed-price contract for passive AN/SSQ-53F sonobuoys and associated data. This contract includes options, which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $30.3 million.
Work will be performed in Columbia City, IN, and is expected to be completed by February 2009. This contract was competitively procured with 2 proposals solicited and 2 offers received by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, Crane, IN (N00164-07-C-6785).
Jan 23/07: SSQ-53F. Sparton Electronics in DeLeon Springs, FlL received a $13.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for AN/SSQ-53F sonobuoys and associated data. This contract includes options, which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $19.6 million.
Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL and is expected to be completed by February 2009. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured with 2 proposals solicited and 2 offers received by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, Crane, IN (N00164-07-C-6793).
Feb 6/06: SSQ-53F. Sparton Electronics in DeLeon Springs, FL received a $20 million firm-fixed-price modification to previously awarded contract (N00164-05-C-6760) for procurement of passive AN/SSQ-53F DIFAR sonobuoys [PDF format] and associated data. Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, FL and is expected to be complete by February 2008.
Feb 6/06: SSQ-53F. Undersea Sensor Systems Inc. in Columbia City, IN received a $14.2 million firm-fixed-price modification to previously awarded contract (N00164-05-C-6769) for procurement of passive AN/SSQ-53F DIFAR sonobuoys and associated data.
That firm, which is a subsidiary of Ultra Electronics Holdings PLC, was also awarded an $8 million firm-fixed-price modification to previously awarded contract (N00164-05-C-6770) for procurement of active AN/SSQ-62E sonobuoys [PDF format] and associated data. Work on both contract modifications will be performed in Columbia City, IN and is expected to be completed by February 2008.
Additional ReadingsCarried on SSBN-726 Ohio Class submarines, The Trident II D-5 is the US Navy’s submarine launched nuclear missile, with exceptional range for a sea-launched weapon and accuracy figures that rival or even exceed land-based ICBMs. These missiles are arguably the most important and effective component of the US nuclear deterrent, and they constitute Britain’s entire nuclear deterrent as well. They were first deployed in 1990, and are planned for continuous deployment to 2042.
The US Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs in Washington, DC and Lockheed Martin recently issued over $100 million in contracts related to the Trident II D-5 SLBMs, in order to maintain their propulsion and guidance systems.
Alliant Techsystems received a $76 million contract from Lockheed Martin to produce solid propulsion systems for all three stages of the U.S. Navy’s Trident II (D-5) missile. Under the terms of the contract, ATK will continue to supply Trident solid propulsion systems to Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company in Sunnyvale, CA through 2010. LMSS is the Trident II (D-5) Missile System’s Prime Contractor,
ATK has a 50-year history of producing solid propulsion systems for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, beginning with the original Polaris missile. The company’s solid rocket portfolio ranges from 3-inch diameter spin motors to the Space Shuttle’s Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRM).
Meanwhile, the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in Cambridge, MA received a $26.9 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract to provide repair and recertification of MK-6 guidance systems, including pendulous integrating gyroscopic accelerometers, inertial measurement units, electronic assemblies, inertial measurement units electronics, repair parts, test equipment maintenance, and related hardware. Work will be performed in Cambridge, MA and is expected to be complete September 2006. The contract was not competitively procured by the US Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs in Arlington, VA (N000-30-06-C-0002).
DID has covered work on the aging MK-6 guidance systems before, including key subcontracters to Draper’s efforts. We have also noted the efforts underway to develop a modernized Mk6 LE guidance system that dispenses with obsolete 1980s era electronics, and how that fits into overall Trident II modernization activities.
Contracts & EventsDecember 17/15: Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training and Charles Stark Draper Laboratories have each been awarded contracts to carry out support and engineering services for the US and UK Navies’ Trident systems. Lockheed was awarded $72.47 million to provide Trident (D-5) II navigation sub-system engineering support services and that contract may contain add ons that amount to a total of $147.3 million if options are exercised. CSD Labs will provide specialized tactical engineering services, logistics services, fleet support services, and guidance SSP alteration services to test, repair and maintain guidance subsystems, test equipment, and related support equipment of existing Trident (D-5) weapon systems. The contract with CSD Labs is for $54.3 million, but with options could total $392.9 million.