The U.S. Marines have a problem. They rely on their CH-53E Super Stallion medium-heavy lift helicopters to move troops, vehicles, and supplies off of their ships. But the helicopters are wearing out. Fast. The pace demanded by the Global War on Terror is relentless, and usage rates are 3 times normal. Attrition is taking its toll. Over the past few years, CH-53s have been recalled from “boneyard” storage at Davis-Monthan AFB in Tucson, AZ, in order to maintain fleet numbers in the face of recent losses and forced retirements. Now, there are no flyable spares left.
Enter the Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) program, now known as the CH-53K. It aims to offer notable performance improvements over the CH-53E, in a similar airframe. The question is whether its service entry delay to 2018-2019 will come too late to offset a serious decline in Marine aviation.
The $25.5 billion, 200-helicopter CH-53K program will define the long-term future of the US Marine Corps’ medium-heavy lift capabilities – and may be needed to save Marine aviation in the medium term.
On average, existing CH-53E aircraft are more than 15 years old, have over 3,000 flight hours under tough conditions, and are becoming more and more of a maintenance challenge with a 44:1 maintenance man-hours:flight hours ratio. Not to mention the resulting $20,000 per flight-hour cost ratio. According to Jane’s Defense Weekly, a 1999 analysis showed that the existing fleet has a service life of 6,120 flight hours, based on fatigue at the weakest point where the tail folds. The USMC expected that the existing fleet would start to reach this point in 2011, at a rate of 15 aircraft per year. The funding profile below suggests a problem for the Corps:
ExcelThe Marine Corps itself is the source of the disconnect. The HLR program initially called for 156 new-build helicopters derived from the CH-53E Super Stallion design, with initial flight tests in 2010-2011, and initial operating capability (IOC) in 2014-2015. IOC was defined as a detachment of 4 aircraft, with combat ready crews, and prepared to deploy with all required equipment and spares.
In 2010, however, the Marines grew the program plan to 200 helicopters, even as they pushed its initial flight back to FY 2013, and IOC back to FY 2018. The program wasn’t experiencing problems, and no reasons were given, beyond statements concerning the program’s aggressive schedule. Further slippage has occurred since. Here’s the full timeline:
Up, up, and…The current schedule creates a number of risks for the Marine Corps. There’s no question that pushing the CH-53K program back will leave the Marines with a dwindling heavy-lift helicopter fleet, whose size, capability, and safety are governed by mechanical realities rather than political diktat. In April 2010, the US military ran out of stored CH-53D/E airframes to refurbish and return to the front lines. In February 2011, the USMC retired its CH-53D fleet altogether.
The other risk is political. On the one hand, the CH-53K is a large program, and the farther the Marines push it away, the easier it is to cut amidst budget crises. With its heavy-lift fleet dwindling, that could be disastrous for the force. On the other hand, budgetary crises also look for programs that are late or experiencing problems, and the CH-53K is big enough to earn a lot of attention if it’s seen as screwing up. That fact that the original schedule was overly aggressive wouldn’t be remembered.
Was the move to push the CH-53K back an act of political negligence, to protect less critical programs like the V-22? Or was it an act of supreme prudence, which will lead to a strong program that survives precisely because it goes out and meets its targets? Opinions vary. Time will tell.
Current Status Some assembly requiredUS Navy PMA-261 is responsible for the CH-53K program. Sikorsky is currently working under a $3.5 – 4 billion System Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract, to include 4 SDD flight test helicopters, 1 ground test airframe, and associated program management and test support. As the development timeline stretched out, 6 System Development Test Aircraft were added to to that mix. To date, Sikorsky’s industrial partners include:
The CH-53X / CH-53K Mission exampleThe CH-53K’s maximum gross weight (MGW) will increase to 88,000 pounds with external loads, versus 73,500 pounds for the CH-53E. MGW with internal loads will be 74,000 pounds, compared to 69,750 pounds for the CH-53E. It’s being designed to carry a cargo load of 27,000 pounds (13.5 tons) 110 nautical miles, operating at an altitude of 3,000 feet and an ambient temperature of 91.5 degrees Fahrenheit. This is nearly double the capacity of the current CH-53E Super Stallions, all in a helicopter that’s roughly the same size.
Those altitude and temperature qualifications matter, too, because “hot and high” conditions lower aircraft load carrying capabilities and combat radius – especially for helicopters. This reduced performance has recently been a factor during operations in Afghanistan and relief efforts in Pakistan, for instance, and has been a factor with earlier models of the C-130 Hercules as well. Figures for the CH-53K operating entirely around sea level and in cooler temperatures would be higher, but would not be double that of existing CH-53Es.
As an example of these variables at work, Sikorsky’s CH-53K brochure states that the improved CH-53K will have a maximum external load of 16.3t/ 36,000 lbs. On the other hand, an operation that carries an externally-slung load from sea level to a point 3,000 feet above sea level, with a total range there and back of 220 nautical miles/ 407 km, and 30 minute loiter at the landing zone, would have a maximum mission load of only 12.25t/ 27,000 lbs.
MRAP: RG-31, IEDedEven at sea level, however, increased lift capacity will be important. As the Hummer’s fundamental lack of survivability began to marginalize it on the battlefield, the Marines led the charge to field “MRAP” blast-resistant vehicle designs instead. While an up-armored HMMWV weighs about 9,100 pounds empty, the lightest Category 1 MRAP patrol vehicles check in at weights ranging from 16,000 – 31,000 pounds, and even the “light” JLTVs that will replace a large segment of the HMMWV fleet are expected to weigh 14,000 – 20,000 pounds.
Those weights mean that tactical operations to airlift mobile forces ashore beyond the beach, or within the zone of operations, will have only one helicopter available that can get the job done: the CH-53.
If the Marines think their CH-53 fleet is seeing heavy use now, just wait.
New Technologies CH-53K conceptIn order to meet those requirements, the CH-53K will be depending on a number of new technologies. No one technology constitutes a big stretch, which is good news for the program. Instead, a host of technologies that have been developed since the CH-53E program will be refined, and used in inter-related areas. For the basic outlines of many low-risk CH-53X/CH-53K improvements, read “
The most important new addition to the CH-53K will be its 7,500shp class GE38 / T408 engines, which have already hit 8,300 shp in ground tests. The military is hoping for 18% better specific fuel consumption than the similarly sized T64 engine, even though the engine would produce 57% more power. To improve maintenance and reliability, the GE38 is also expected to have 63% fewer parts.
Other technologies slated for the CH-53K include a “glass” [digital] cockpit that has high commonality and interoperability with existing Army and Navy helicopters, high-efficiency rotor blades with anhedral tips that have 12% (main) and 15% (tail) more surface area, plus different construction to handle higher loads; a composite cuff attachment that attaches the main blades directly to an elastomerically-articulated titanium rotor head, without the need for specialized tools or multiple redundant fasteners; a cargo rail locking system; external cargo improvements, survivability enhancements, and enhancements designed to extend service life.
Changes will be made as the program progresses, and engineers get a better sense of which technologies are ready, and which would create risks to the program. For example, the CH-53K was going to use a “viscoelastic lag damper” for the rotors, in order to minimize vibration and stress. It was removed in order to speed up deployment, and a modified version of standard linear hydraulic dampers will be used instead. The Navy hopes to achieve 2x reliability compared to the existing CH-53Es, but gave up the potential for 4x reliability, in exchange for less development risk.
Sikorsky on CH-53KGiven the CH-53E’s large maintenance ratio, reliability will matter. As former HLR program manager Col. Paul Croisetiere put it in a NAVAIR release:
“Given the CH-53E’s operational costs and maintenance demands, heavy lift has built its reputation for excellence on the backs of our maintainers… We are going to take our maintainers somewhere they’ve rarely been before. Home for dinner.”
Several decades of weapon program history suggest that the odds of meeting this goal are low. Instead, the trend is that these promises are made, but more advanced and complex weapons wind up having more points of failure, and require even more maintenance. If the CH-53K program can break that cycle, it would represent a landmark success in Pentagon weapons acquisition.
Contracts & Key EventsUnless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD.
FY 2014 – 2016March 17/16: The second prototype of the CH-53K helicopter made its maiden flight in January according to Lockheed company Sikorsky. In addition, the first aircraft into the test program has achieved flight envelope expansion to 120 knots for the USMC’s CH-53K King Stallion heavy lift helicopter program. The two are the most heavily instrumented of the Engineering Development Models (EDM) and will focus on structural flight loads and envelope expansion. Two more will join the flight line later this year and will focus on performance, propulsion, and avionics flight qualification.
January 5/16: The USMC seems to have given the seal of approval to the latest CH-53 after the first marine pilot to test the helicopter commended its abilities. Lt. Col. Jonathan Morel tested the CH-53K King Stallion which is set to become the largest and heaviest helicopter in the US military. Two hundred of the rotorcraft will be procured by the USMC in a deal worth $25.5 billion.
October 29/15: The Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter has flown for the first time, eleven months behind schedule. The new helicopter is intended to replace the Marine Corps’ fleet of CH-53E Super Stallion heavy lift helicopters, with the new design boasting three times the lift capability of the older model. The first CH-53K, known as Engineering Development Model-1 (EMD-1) will be joined by an additional three aircraft to undergo 2,000 flight hours of testing.
July 31/14: Engines. General Electric in Lynn, A receives a $68.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 16 GE38-1B engines, closure kits, tooling, and associated systems engineering and program management in support of the CH-53K helicopter program’s Operational Evaluation phase. This is on top of the July 17/13 contract for “time critical parts”, and the $84.3 million total represents the first engine buy beyond the 20 covered by the System Development & Demonstration contract. $22.5 million in FY 2013 – 2014 US Navy RDT&E budgets are committed immediately.
Note that each CH-53K is equipped with 3 engines. Work will be performed in Lynn, MA, and is expected to be complete in January 2017 (N00019-13-C-0132). See also GE, “U.S. Navy Awards GE38 Engine Production Contract”.
June 9/14: Leadership. PMA-261 Program Manager U.S. Marine Corps Col. Robert Pridgen turns over command to Col. Henry Vanderborght, a long-time CH-53E pilot, former John Glenn Test Pilot of the Year, and former Light/Attack Helicopters (PMA-276) platform team lead for UH-1Y production and the UH-1N’s sundown. Vanderbought wasn’t actually a full Colonel until he was promoted on the morning of the change-of-command ceremony.
Pridgen will become the program manager for the Presidential Helicopters Program (PMA-274) in July 2014. Sources: US NAVAIR, “Heavy-lift helicopters program welcomes new program manager”.
May 5/14: Naming. Sikorsky officially unveils their CH-53K flight test helicopter EDM-2, and the USMC officially names the type “King Stallion”.
One can see the natural extension from the CH53A/D Sea Stallion and CH-53E Super Stallion, but there comes a point where one can push the boundaries in unintended directions. Maybe they were thinking of the 1942 movie with Chief Thundercloud. In the modern era, people are more likely to think that somewhere, an adult entertainer wants his name back. Sources, Sikorsky, “Sikorsky Unveils CH-53K Helicopter; U.S. Marine Corps Reveals Aircraft Name” | South Florida Sun-Sentinel, “Sikorsky introduces new ‘King Stallion’ helicopter” | Stamford Advocate, “Sikorsky unveils its new King Stallion heavy lift helicopter”.
“King Stallion”
May 1/14: Testing. Sikorsky announces that full testing is finally moving ahead with the non-flying GTV, including powered “light-off” with all 7 main rotor blades and 4 tail rotor blades spinning, and powered by its three 7,500 horsepower class GE engines. This begins a rigorous 2-year test program of the rotor blades, transmission, engines, and all subsystems using the GTV. Sources: Sikorsky, “Sikorsky Begins Powered Ground Tests of CH-53K Helicopter with Rotor Blades”.
March 31/14: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2013, plus time to compile and publish. With respect to the CH-53K, their top concern is that the USMC is scheduled to begin ordering helicopters before testing is done. Beyond that concurrency worry:
Nearly 9 years later the program’s two critical technologies – the main rotor blade and main gearbox – are approaching maturity. The program expects these technologies to be demonstrated in a realistic environment by its planned February 2016 production decision, a delay in 6 months over last year’s schedule. Program officials reported that they conducted a three-blade whirl test that produced results that exceeded required outcomes. Flight testing is expected to begin in late 2014.
March 4-11/14: FY15 Budget. The US military slowly files its budget documents, detailing planned spending from FY 2014 – 2019. The current Navy plan will begin buying production CH-53Ks with an order for 2 in FY 2017, followed by 4 in FY 2018 and 7 in FY 2019. That means production has been pushed back by about a year, because:
“Late delivery of components into qualification, and subsequent qualification challenges, have delayed Ground Test Vehicle (GTV) delivery, Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR – GTV & 1st Flight), Engineering Development Models (EDM) delivery and CH-53K 1st Flight, and have moved Milestone C (MSC) and other associated events to 3Q 2016. Budgetary constraints delayed start of the Aircraft Procurement (APN) program by one year. As such, Advanced Acquisition Contracts (AAC) and LRIP awards have been adjusted accordingly. In order to procure aircraft that effectively demonstrate manufacturing processes are both mature and under control, two (2) additional RDT&E,N-funded System Demonstration Test Articles (SDTAs) in FY15 with delivery in 4Q 2018 and 1Q 2019 were added to the program.”
Sources: USN, PB15 Press Briefing [PDF] and detailed budget documents.
Oct 31/13: Rotors. Sikorsky has completed initial tests of the CH-53Ks new rotor blades, including fatigue tests and whirl-tower balance tests. Additional blade qualification testing will continue for several years, in order to validate aspects like aerodynamic stability, tip deflection, and rotational twist. The next steps involve installation and testing on the stationary CH-53K GTV.
There’s a lot to test, because the rotors are new technology. The 35 foot span, 7-bladed main rotor has blade of almost 3 foot chord width, with new airfoil designs, twist, and taper to handle the engines’ 71% power increase. The new blade tips are designed to improve hover performance, and a composite cuff attachment allows attachment of each blade to the elastomerically-articulated titanium rotor head, without tools or redundant fasteners. The rotor hub itself is almost 9 feet in diameter, and the blade radius will be 39.5 feet when assembled, with 12% more total surface area than the CH-35E.
The 4-blade tail rotors are also new, with 10 foot blades and 15% more surface area compared to the CH-53E. Sikorsky says that the CH-53K tail rotor produce as much thrust as the main rotor blades on Sikorsky’s 5.5 ton S-76 medium helicopter, which is used in the offshore oil industry. Source: Sikorsky via PR Newswire, “Sikorsky Completes Initial Tests of First Rotor Blades for CH-53K Helicopter”.
Oct 11/13: EVM penalty. Bloomberg News:
“Sikorsky was notified Sept. 6 of three deficiencies on a contract for the Navy’s CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter related to guidelines for the recording of direct costs and material accounting, Navy Commander William Urban, a Pentagon spokesman, said in an e-mailed statement. A corrective action plan is expected from the company by Oct. 21, he said.”
While Bloomberg doesn’t say so, the issue in question relates to a quantitative approach to project tracking called Earned Value Management. Until they’re satisfied, the Pentagon is withholding the maximum 5% on payments. Sikorsky responds that 2 of the 3 issues are already resolved, and they don’t expect this to affect the program. Sources: For Dummies.com, “Earned Value Management Terms and Formulas for Project Managers” | Bloomberg, “Pentagon Withholds Sikorsky Payments for Business System Flaws”.
Oct 1/13: Sub-contractors. Kratos Defense & Security announces that an $8.5 million contract from Sikorsky to design and develop CH-53K maintenance trainers. The full-fidelity Maintenance Training Device Suite (MTDS) is meant to provide a true-to-life environment for maintenance training; as well as remove-and-replace training for avionics systems, electrical systems, hydraulic systems and many other mechanical subsystems.
The Helicopter Emulation Maintenance Trainer (HEMT) uses a 3D virtual environment to support maintenance training scenarios: functional tests, fault isolation, troubleshooting, and remove and installation for 27 subsystems. Sources: Kratos Oct 1/13 release.
FY 2013SAR shows program cost increases; Ground Test Vehicle delivered; Flight test helicopters ordered.
CH-53K GTV
(click to view full)
Sept 27/13: Sensors etc. Raytheon in El Segundo, CA receives a $20 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for:
CH-53K, using FY 2013 USN RDT&E budget…
USAF HH-60 search & rescue helicopters, using FY 2011 procurement budget…
All funds are committed immediately, and $16.2 million expires on Sept 30/13. Work will be performed in McKinney, TX (92%) and El Segundo, CA, (8%), and is expected to be complete in September 2015. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-10-G-0018).
Sept 23/13: IG OK. The Pentagon’s Inspector General submits a non-public report concerning the CH-53K program. Their public statement: the program has been managed appropriately, but it may not meet its February 2016 Milestone C decision date, or its revised costs.
The Acquisition Program Baseline was updated on April 24/13, to address cost growth and schedule delays. Contractor manufacturing delays and component testing failures, hence the risk of not being ready in time for the low-rate production decision, and not meeting even its revised costs. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is aware of these issues. Sources: OIG, “CH-53K Program Management Is Satisfactory, but Risks Remain (Project No. D2013-D000CD-0095.000)”.
July 17/13: Engines. General Electric Co. in Lynn, MA receives a $15.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to buy “time critical parts” for incorporation into the CH-53K’s T408-GE-400 gas turbine engine. All funds are committed immediately by the US Navy.
Work will be performed in Lynn, MA, and is expected to be complete in December 2016. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-2-1(a)(1) by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-13-C-0132).
June 27/13: Sub-contractors. Boeing spinoff Spirit Aerosystems announces a $60 million sub-contract, as a result of the #435 million order for 4 System Demonstration Test Article helicopters (q.v. May 30/13). Spirit makes the base cockpit and cabin, essentially the body of the helicopter.
Spirit will begin work during 2013 at its Wichita, KS facility, with deliveries to Sikorsky’s CH-53K prototype assembly line in West Palm Beach, FL to begin in 2014. When the helicopters are finished, they’ll enter Operational Evaluation in 2017, to verify that their performance meets projections. The contract follows over $150 million in work on 7 structures, for the first 5 prototype test helicopters and the 2 ground test frames.
Spirit recently announced work with Spintech Ventures, of Xenia, OH on a set of trademarked products called Inflexion/ Smart Tooling. The technology uses re-formable, reusable mandrels that can change states through the layup and cure phases. That helps form complex, highly integrated composite structures into large and/or unusual shapes and configurations – like full integration of skins, stringers, and frames or ribs in one step. Spirit | Wichita Eagle | Spirit re: Inflexion.
May 31/13: Hostile IG Report. The Pentagon’s Inspector General issues a report under Audit Project No. D2012-D000CD-0037.000, telling the USMC that the CH-53K’s program increase to 200 helicopters isn’t justified. The Marines politely tell the IG to stick it where Chesty can’t find it.
The Inspector General’s statement that “the Marine Corps risks spending $22.2 billion in procurement and operating and support funding for 44 additional aircraft” is a blatant error – that’s the entire 2011 program cost for 200, plus R&D. Beyond that, they complain that the USMC:
In response, the USMC Deputy Commandant says the existing analyses do justify it, and JROC approved the 200. Then the Milestone Decision Authority approves the Marine Corps’ request to rebaseline the program with a 54% procurement cost increase over the 2005 baseline (a jump from Dec 2011 figures, if true) and formally push the Milestone C decision from December 2012 to February 2016 (later than the current August 2015). The IG wants additional comments re: the re-baselining. Which is fine, as far as it goes, but the whole process seems like an ad for the Lexington Institute’s Daniel Goure, who argues that the Pentagon’s procurement processes are an out of control overhead burden. It’s all about paper, rather than the soundness of the conclusion. And you can’t use what you learn in war games to change procurement decisions? What idiot thinks that’s a good idea? Pentagon IG Report.
May 30/13: Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT receives a $435.3 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification, to buy 4 CH-53K System Demonstration Test Article helicopters. The April 5/06 System Development & Demonstration contract already included 4 test helicopters, and US NAVAIR and Sikorsky subsequently confirm that these 4 SDTA helicopters are a different set that the Marines will test during operational evaluation. The buy is structured as an additional line item under the 2006 contract, and initial funding will use $48.1 million in FY 2013 RDT&E budgets.
Sikorsky CH-53K Program VP Dr. Michael Torok says the SDTA helos will be based on the configuration of the 4th and final flight test aircraft from the 2006 contract, which is currently being assembled on the prototype production line. To date, Sikorsky has delivered 2 non-flying SDD CH-53Ks: the Ground Test Vehicle and the Static Test Article. That leaves the 4 flight test prototypes, 1 stationary Fatigue Test CH-53K, and now the 4 SDTA helicopters. First flight of a CH-53K prototype is now expected in “late 2014” instead of Spring 2014, and this contract requires 1st SDTA delivery by September 2016. Final delivery is scheduled by the time OpEval begins in March 2017, with incentives for early delivery.
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT (17%); West Palm Beach, FL (17%); Wichita, KS (15%); Salt Lake City, UT (10%); St. Louis, MO (4%); Bridgeport, WVA (3%); Windsor Locks, CT (3%); Ft. Walton Beach, FL (2%); Redmond, WA (2%); Forest, OH (2%); Jackson, MS (2%); Cudahy, WI (2%); Irvine, CA (2%); Kent, WA (1.2%); Bristol, United Kingdom (1%); Phoenix, AZ (1%); Chesterfield, MO (1%); Los Angeles, CA (1%); Rochester, United Kingdom (1%); Buckinhamshire, United Kingdom (1%); Longueil, Quebec, Canada (1%); Cedar Rapids, IA (0.8%); Twinsburg, OH (0.8%); St. Clair, PA (0.5%), and various other locations (8.7%) (N00019-06-C-0081). See also US NAVAIR | Sikorsky
4 flight test helos
May 24/12: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/12 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF].
“CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement Helicopter – Program costs increased $1,897.6 million (+7.1%) from $26,626.8 million to $28,524.4 million, due primarily to changing the cost estimating methodology from analogy-based to supplier bottom-up (+$1,796.6 million), use of commercial indices for materiel escalation costs (+$948.9 million), revised escalation indices (+$539.4 million), an increase in the production line shutdown estimate (+$120.7 million), and an increase in support equipment, repair of repairables, and spares costs (+$64.9 million). These increases were partially offset by decreases in other support costs (-$664.0 million), initial spares requirements (-$589.0 million), and the application of new inflation indices (-$385.3 million).”
To put the estimating into English, the program had estimated costs based on similar programs, but now they’ve gone through the chosen suppliers and built an estimate using actual costs for components and materials, plus commercial figures for raw materials etc. The result adds almost $2.85 billion to the program, and other cost jumps bring the total increase to $3.47 billion. The downward revisions to spares and support, and to inflation, prevent costs from rising over 13%.
Are the changes reasonable? We won’t know until flight testing is well underway and time has revealed real inflation costs, but there’s reason to be skeptical. It could be a case of “paper cuts now, then cost increases once production is underway and jobs in Congressional districts are committed.” We’ll have to talk to the program to even begin to judge.
SAR: program cost increases – questionable cuts?
May 17/13: General Electric in Lynn, MA receives a $7.6 million firm-fixed-price delivery order to buy critical hard tooling required to support the manufacture of the CH-53K’s GE38-1B engines. The current order involves GE38s for the CH-53K System Demonstration Test Article (SDTA) helicopters, and they’re the engine’s inaugural platform.
Work will be performed in Lynn, MA (20%); Morristown, TN (20%); Groton, CT (20%); Hooksett, NH (10%); Fort Wayne, IN (10%); North Clarendon, VT (10%); and Albany, OR (10%); and is expected to be complete in November 2014. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2013 RDT&E budgets (N00019-10-G-0007).
March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. Overall, expected costs have risen (q.v. March 30/12 entry), though the added cost per helicopter is only 5.6% above the baseline. The “ground test vehicle” non-flying model has been delivered, but issues with a test stand are delaying progress.
GAO points out that the design is released, but not necessarily finished. The big break in the program remains the April 2011 shift from a cost-plus award fee to cost-plus incentive fee contract, tied to specific cost and schedule goals, and associated with a much-delayed schedule. The next big event will be the beginning of system-level prototype testing in 2013.
Dec 4/12: Testing. Sikorsky delivers the 1st CH-53K Ground Test Vehicle (GTV) prototype. It won’t fly, just help test the performance of the rotor blades, transmission, and engines. The 4 follow-on flight test helicopters aren’t expected to fly until 2014-2015. Sikorsky.
GTV delivered
FY 2012GAO report says development will need more $; Last CH-53D retired. CH-53E lifts M113 APC
May 6/12: Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT receives a $7.8 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to incorporate CH-53K live fire test and evaluation. This is exactly what it sounds like – the Navy will shoot lots of holes in test platforms, and assess damage resistance.
Work will be performed at Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA (80%), and Stratford, CT (20%). Work is expected to be complete in December 2018 (N00019-06-C-0081).
April 12/12: Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT receives a $25.7 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification, to provide detailed maintenance plans in support of the CH-53K helicopter program. Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, and is expected to be complete in December 2015 (N00019-06-C-0081).
March 30/12: GAO report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” for 2012. With respect to the CH-53K:
“Program officials reported that in July 2011, the contract’s estimated cost was increased by $724 million to $3.4 billion. According to Defense Contract Management Agency officials, the estimated contract costs increased because of several factors including the need for additional flight test hours and spare parts, increased material costs, and design complexity. The contract was also changed from cost-plus award fee to cost-plus incentive fee for the remaining period of performance. The incentive fees are tied to specific cost and schedule goals… According to Marine Corps officials, a force structure review has been conducted to assess the required quantity of aircraft and that review determined that the requirement for 200 aircraft is still valid despite the proposed manpower reduction.”
Feb 28/12: Avionics. Northrop Grumman announces a $5.6 million Phase II contract from US NAVAIR to modify existing software for the CH-53K’s LN-251 embedded GPS/fiber-optic inertial navigation system (INS). Northrop Grumman’s Navigation Systems Division will provide updated software and engineering support for platform integration and flight tests, to both NAVAIR and Sikorsky Aircraft.
Feb 24/12: Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT receives a $15.5 million cost-plus-incentive-fee CH-53K contract modification. The program needs a condition-based maintenance plus software toolset (almost certainly ISS – vid. Oct 26/11), to integrate the helicopter’s onboard prognostics and the Navy’s fleet common operating environment maintenance computers. The contract includes installation, operation, and recurring data analysis.
Funds and work will be assigned if and as needed, and work will be performed in Lexington Park, MD (90%), and Stratford, CT (10%). The contract is expected to run until February 2018. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-06-C-0081).
Feb 10/12: USMC retires CH-53D. The USMC holds a “sundown ceremony” to retire its CH-53D Sea Stallion fleet, leaving only CH-53E Super Stallions. See also Aug 16/10 entry. US NAVAIR explains that the retirement isn’t immediate, but it is imminent:
“The Sea Stallion’s last mission is currently underway with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 supporting Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The helicopter will be flown from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay to its final destination at the Pacific Aviation Museum, where it will be displayed.”
CH-53D retired
Dec 19/11: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman announces a follow-on contract from US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD to define system requirements for the integration of its LN-251 embedded global positioning system (GPS)/fiber-optic inertial navigation system (INS) on the new CH-53K.
The firm touts the LN-251 system as “the world’s smallest, lightest navigation-grade embedded GPS/INS unit in its class… [whose] modular, open architecture supports additional applications and evolving requirements.”
Oct 26/11: Recognition. The CH-53K Helicopter Systems Engineering Team wins a Department of Defense Systems Engineering Top 5 Programs Award, at the annual NDIA Systems Engineering Conference Award Luncheon in San Diego, CA. US NAVAIR.
Oct 26/11: ISS Patent. Sikorsky Aerospace Services’ Integrated Support System (ISS) aftermarket software suite has received a patent. ISS integrates onboard diagnostics (vid. Sept 26/08 HUMS entry) and usage data with ground-based troubleshooting and service information. This technology is part of Sikorsky’s efforts to move toward proactive diagnostics, and ISS platforms for the Sikorsky CH-53K and S70i are under development. Future plans include expansion to other aircraft types. Sikorsky.
Oct 11/11: Sub-contractors. Thermoplastic composites firm Fiberforge announces the addition of Njord A. Rota as its CH-53K Program Manager. They explain that the Lockheed Martin veteran will lead all management aspects of Fiberforge’s work for DRS Technologies Inc. Their work includes the design, development and production of the carbon fiber composite components within the CH-53K’s Internal Cargo Handling System. Helihub.
FY 2011GE delivers 1st engine, sees GE38 civil and military market potential as $4+ billion; Sikorsky unveils virtual reality center, FAFO experimental assembly line.
August 2011: Re-baselined. The CH-53K program undergoes a major time shift. Delivery dates for engineering development models are moved, 1st flight is pushed back to 2014, and Initial Operational Capability is moved from 2015 to 2018 (later 2019). Source: GAO.
Contract rebaselined
GE38 engineAug 4/11: Engine. GE has delivered the 1st GE38 engine, for use on the Sikorsky CH-53K Ground Test Vehicle. After 2 years of testing, GE touts 57% more power and 18% lower specific fuel consumption than the CH-53E’s similarly-sized GE T64, while using 63% fewer parts.
In addition to the CH-53K SDD program’s 20 flight engines, the GE38 testing program includes 5 factory-test engines that will accumulate more than 5,000 engine test hours by 2013. GE is pushing ahead on its engine despite CH-53K delays, and expects it to have applications in the fixed wing and naval markets, alongside its helicopter potential. They see a total civil and military market potential of $4+ billion. GE.
June 21/11: Industrial. Sikorsky announces that they’ve begun assembly of the CH-53K Ground Test Vehicle (GTV), which is currently in position 4 on the line. It’s the 1st of 5 prototype CH-53Ks to be assembled at the Sikorsky Florida Assembly and Flight Operations (FAFO) facility in West Palm Beach, FL, which opened in March 2011.
Another 2 GTVs will be assembled at Sikorsky’s main manufacturing plant in Stratford, CT, making 3 ground test and 4 flight test helicopters. CH-53K ground testing is scheduled to begin in early 2012, and flight testing during FY 2014. To give one a sense of the CH-53K, its rotor hub and transmission alone weigh 15,000 pounds – about the empty weight of a UH-60 Black Hawk.
April 2011: Restructuring. The CH-53K program undergoes a major shift. The SDD contract is changed from a cost-plus award fee structure to cost-plus incentive fee contract, which is tied to specific cost and schedule goals. Source: GAO.
Contract restructured
March 22/11: Industrial. Sikorsky officially opens its new 60,000 square foot Florida Assembly and Flight Operations (FAFO) campus, establishing experimental assembly line operations for the new CH-53K heavy lift helicopter. The FAFO line introduces a set of new manufacturing technologies. It’s equipped with wireless data connections to all operator plasma data screens, uses digital operation sheets, and is outfitted with overhead power and air dropdowns, new aircraft work stands, and overhead cranes. Sikorsky, incl. video.
Feb 16/11: Sub-contractors. Donaldson provides an update regarding its Engine Air Particle Protection System, which is a critical piece of equipment in desert or dusty environments. They received the contract in September 2007:
“We built the first full-scale EAPPS in just three months following the CDR, [DID: which was August 2010]” said Sheila Peyraud, General Manager, Aerospace and Defense at Donaldson. “Developmental testing began in November 2010 to support testing of the helicopter’s GE38-1B engine in 2011. We are pleased that initial results in this phase of the program are exceeding expectations originally set during the conceptual design phase. Qualification testing will begin in May 2011.”
Jan 14/11: Industrial. Sikorsky unveils a state-of-the-art virtual reality center for the CH-53K heavy lift helicopter program, attempting to help identify production and maintenance issues before the initial build takes place by using a 3-dimensional digital environment.
Located within the engineering labs at Sikorsky’s main manufacturing facility in Stratford, CT, the virtual reality center uses sophisticated software, along with 12 cameras, a head-mounted display headset, gloves, and a gripping tool. All devices are linked to 3 computers, which comprise the “command center” for operating the system.
Nov 19/10: Sub-contractors. ITT Corporation (formerly EDO) announces that after nearly 3 years of advanced design, development, testing and manufacturing, they’ve delivered the first pair of CH-53K sponsons to Sikorsky. Each sponson is 25 feet long by 4 feet wide and 5 feet high, and fits on the helicopter’s side to house landing gear, fuel, and other mechanical and electrical assemblies.
ITT used composite materials instead of traditional sheet metal for the sponsons, and hopes they’ll provide benefits in weight, corrosion resistance, and in-flight stress tolerance. To make that work, ITT has to use advanced manufacturing technologies like electronic model control, laser-ply projection, 5-axis computer numerically controlled machining, automated trimming and drilling, and laser and ultrasonic inspection of all subassemblies. The CH-53K parts will be built at ITT’s Electronic Systems facility in Salt Lake City, UT.
FY 2010Why was the CH-53K program pushed back 2 years?; SAR raises plans to 200; Critical Design Review passed; AAQ-29 surveillance turrets for CH-53K; No more “boneyard” CH-53D/Es left.
CH-53Ds in Hawaii
(click for video)
Sept 6/10: Sub-contractors. GKN Aerospace delivers the first major CH-53K structural assembly to Sikorsky – an aft transition fuselage section that measures approximately 20′ x 9′ x 9′, built of an advanced hybrid composite, aluminum and titanium structure covered with external composite skins.
GKN Aerospace was accorded full design authority and manufacturing responsibility for the CH-53K helicopter aft transition fuselage section, cargo ramp, and overhead door structural assemblies in 2007. Structural design is carried out by the GKN Aerospace Engineering Development Center in Nashville, TN, and manufacturing of over 1,000 separate components takes place at the Company’s plant in St. Louis, MO. GKN Aerospace is employing manufacturing technologies including automated fibre placement (AFP), automated trim and drill, and digital inspection. GKN Aerospace.
Aug 16/10: CH-35D plans. DoD Buzz looks at the shifting plans to replace the USMC’s 30 CH-53D Sea Stallions. The original plan was to replace them with MV-22s. At some point in 2007/08, the Marine Corps formally decided replace their aging CH-53Ds with CH-53Ks. But now USMC Lt. General Trautman is saying that he wants an east coast and a west coast MV-22 squadron to replace the CH-53Ds in Afghanistan, and “When I can do that, that’ll be the start of getting CH-53 Delta out of the way.”
Exactly what “out of the way” means is ambiguous. If it means out of service, DoD Buzz correctly notes that this raises questions about the USMC’s support for the CH-53K, and would seem to be better news for the MV-22. If it means “shifted back to Hawaii while MV-22s serve in Afghanistan,” that would be something else. The exact meaning isn’t 100% clear in the article.
Aug 3/10: CDR. Sikorsky announces a successful Critical Design Review for its CH-53K, following a week-long meeting in late July that included representatives from the military, Sikorsky, and 21 industrial partners. At the review, the CH-53K team had to demonstrate that their design meets NAVAIR’s system requirements. System-level performance projections indicate that all 7 Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) will be achieved with adequate risk mitigation margin built-in. Over 93% of the design has been released for manufacturing, and the final design definition concludes, the next step involves initial prototypes and testing.
The overall program CDR follows previous efforts including a System Requirements Review (SRR), System Functional Review (SFR), System Preliminary Design Review (PDR), 77 supplier-level CDRs, 64 supplier and internal software reviews, and 16 sub-system CDRs. Sikorsky VP and CH-53K Chief Engineer Mike Torok offers an update of other preparations:
“Parts are being made throughout the supply base and at our new Precision Component Technology Center; test facilities are being fabricated and prepped for installation in our recently opened ground test facility; the integrated simulation facility is marching toward a late 2010 opening, already having received the first increment of software for the aircraft; and the final assembly facility in West Palm Beach is being prepared to start building the ground and flight vehicles early next year. It’s time now to prove out our design and show that this helicopter system will indeed meet the war fighting requirements of the USMC…”
CDR
June 28/10: Sub-contractors. Raytheon Co. in El Segundo, CA received a $26.5 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for 50 forward looking infrared devices that will be fitted to CH-53E (42) and CH-53K (8) helicopters. Discussions with corporate representatives confirm that these will be AN/AAQ-29 turrets, using a 480 x 640 element, 3-5 micron wavelength indium antimonite infrared detector, and a 2 field of view telescope on a 12-inch diameter turret.
This is a follow-on to a previous order. Work under this basic ordering agreement will be performed in El Segundo, CA, and is expected to be complete in June 2012. $530,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/10 (N00019-10-G-0018).
June 4/10: No more CH-53D/Es. US NAVAIR announces that it has delivered the last available CH-53s from storage at AMARG in Tucson, AZ. The last H-53E to come out of desert retirement was delivered to Marine Helicopter Training Squadron 302 on May 7/10, while the last CH-53D was delivered April 16/10.
Since the start of the program in August 2005, FRC East H-53 artisans have inducted and completed 10 of the heavy-lift helicopters. The team delivered 8 CH-53Es and 2 CH-53Ds, some of which had been idle for as many as 11 years, ahead of schedule and under budget. Each helicopter still took about 25,000 total work hours for all testing, modifications, and maintenance. Sikorsky ended CH-53 production in 1999, so AMARG was the last remaining source of airframes.
Boneyard out of CH-53s
May 10/10: Engine. Flight International reports that even though the CH-53E is delayed, GE remains committed to delivering the 7,500 shp class GE38-1 engine on schedule. The firm sees re-engining opportunities and related sales beyond the CH-53K, so they’ve begun delivering GE38s for ground tests years before airframes become available for flight test.
As of Feb 15/10, GE had recorded 176 engine starts and 177 operating hours, with sustained power of 7,760 shp and peak power of 8,300 shp. April 2010 saw delivery of a 2nd engine for ground tests.
The article is less positive about the CH-53K’s odds of winning the German/French heavy-lift helicopter program. Apparently, Germany wants a helicopter that will fit key vehicles internally, not underslung. Ultimately, the question will be whether Germany can afford to develop what it wants, can find it elsewhere, or is forced to remove some requirements.
April 29/10: Why the delay? DefenseTech reports that the USMC has pushed back the initial flight date of the CH-53K by 2 years to FY 2013, and Initial Operational Capability by 3 years to FY 2018, “with little concrete justification beyond an ‘overly aggressive initial program schedule’ “, and while stressing that the program has not run into technical problems. Craig Hooper writes:
“The CH-53K was an unsung showpiece for those preaching the virtues of incremental development, and, as a result, appetite for the platform has grown by about 30 percent, with the program of record expected to increase from 156 aircraft to 200. But, in the process, the CH-53K has become something of a MV-22-killer. Is this the problem?… In late 2009, the Marine Corps decided to go with the CH-53Ks to replace their 40-year old CH-53D fleet (MV-22 Ospreys were originally slated to replace the CH-53D). At about the same time, Israel decided to forego the Osprey for the CH-53K, killing the Osprey’s best hope of snaring an international buyer. And with the Osprey 65% availability and the MV-22s high operating costs of about $11,000 dollars an hour… worse, studies from the Pentagon demonstrated that a CH-53K-equipped big-deck amphib provided a lot more logistical support for embarked Marines than the MV-22… Slowing CH-53K development will… prevent real-data comparisons between platforms… [until] a second multi-year MV-22 contract gets signed in FY 2013. Even worse, slowing the CH-53K schedule raised the program price by at least $1.1 billion dollars, raising the per-unit price… Why slow a program that stands to be a high-demand showpiece with potential markets in Israel, Germany, France, Turkey, Singapore and Taiwan?”
Asked for a response, US MARCORSYSCOM said that US NAVAIR was the only agency that could respond; NAVAIR did not respond to DID’s simultaneous inquiry.
April 1/10: SAR – Program grows. The Pentagon releases its April 2010 Selected Acquisitions Report, covering major program changes up to December 2009. The CH-53K is included, because the Marines want more of them – but there’s a self-imposed catch:
“CH-53K – Program costs increased $6,817.8 million (+36.4%) from $18,708.3 million to $25,526.1 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 44 aircraft from 156 to 200 aircraft (+$3,108.9 million), and increases in other support costs (+$749.7 million) and initial spares (+$456.2 million) associated with the quantity increase. Costs also increased due to a three-year delay in the procurement profile shifting initial purchases from fiscal 2013 to fiscal 2016 (+$1,148.4 million), schedule growth attributable to funding constraints (+$669.6 million), and an increase in the cost estimate for the development contract (+$611.2 million).”
Feb 22/10: Sub-contractors. Cobham announces [PDF] a sub-contract from Sikorsky to manufacture all leading and trailing edge details and precisely locate and bond the details onto the CH-53K’s main rotor blade spar.
The work will be done by its Antenna Systems unit, which has consolidated all composites-related operations within the company. Depending on how many CH-53K helicopters are eventually built by Sikorsky for the US Marine Corps, the contract could be worth up to $25 million.
Jan 22/10: Industrial. Sikorsky formally opens its new $20 million Precision Components Technology Center, as part of United Technologies Corp.’s $130 million investment the CH-53K program.
The center currently employs 8 people, and was designed to allow the development of new product lines with “zero setup time” and quick changeover from one component to another. The center will produce major dynamic components of the CH-53K helicopter such as rotating and stationary swashplates, main and tail rotor hubs, and main rotor sleeves. The equipment in the center has the capability to produce any precision rotor and drive system dynamic component, including earlier-model configurations, and forgings machined there can be up to double the size of previous on-site limits. Sikorsky release.
Jan 7/10: IDR. Sikorsky announces the wrap-up of its Integration Design Review for the CH-53K, in preparation for the Critical Design Review coming in 2010. The event included industrial team members , and personnel from US NAVAIR and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Risk reduction initiatives on the critical split torque main gear box and the advanced main rotor blade are done, and 2010 will also hold a Technology Readiness Assessment. Initial Operational Capability is currently slated for early 2016.
Established features of the CH-53K helicopter currently include a joint-interoperable glass (digital screens) cockpit; fly-by-wire flight controls; 4th generation rotor blades with anhedral tips; a low-maintenance elastomeric rotor head; upgraded engines; a locking cargo rail system; external cargo handling improvements; survivability enhancements; and design for reduced operation and support costs. Sikorsky release.
FY 2009CH-53s flying at 3x planned usage; 1st GE38 engine test; VELD removed from the design; Sub-contractors picked.
CH-53E, Cobra Gold 2002
(click to view full)
July 28/09: Engine. The GE38 team holds a ceremony at General Electric in Lynn, MA, celebrating the completion of the first full GE38 engine test. This first engine test, which began June 24/09, focused on basic engine checkout and risk reduction. All engine test parameters were within predicted values.
SDD phase testing will include 5 ground-test engines that will accumulate more than 5,000 engine test hours, plus production of 20 flight-test engines for the CH-53K development helicopters (each helicopter carries 3 engines). NAVAIR release.
May 7/09: Sub-contractors. Curtiss-Wright Corporation announces a contract from Sikorsky to develop and supply data concentrator units for the CH-53K. Curtiss-Wright’s system consists of 2 data concentrator units (DCUs) that will receive and provide various avionic and air vehicle discrete, digital and analog inputs for monitoring, processing data and controlling various CH-53K subsystem components.
Curtiss-Wright’s Motion Control segment will develop and manufacture the DCU systems at its newly-opened City of Industry, CA, facility. The initial contract runs through 2011 with the production phase starting in 2013. The contract has a total potential value of $22 million when development and all aircraft production options and phases are completed.
April 21/09: Sub-contractors. Curtiss-Wright Controls Inc., announces a contract from United Technologies subsidiary Claverham Ltd. (a Hamilton Sundstrand Flight Systems business unit) to provide multi-channel linear variable displacement transducers (LVDTs) for the fly-by-wire (FBW) systems controlling the main rotor and tail rotor on the Sikorsky UH-60M Upgrade and CH-53K helicopters.
The LVDTs are special pressure sealed linear displacement transducers that are embedded in Claverham’s Primary Flight Control Actuators. The transducers provide electrical signals that are proportional to the position of the hydraulic actuator rod, and the actuators change pitch angles on the main and tail rotors in response to the pilot’s commands.
These two programs have a potential contract value in excess of $20 million over a 15-year period, with shipments expected to begin in 2009. The company will supply these products from its Christchurch, UK operation.
March 30/09: GAO. The US GAO audit office delivers its 7th annual “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs report, which looks at 47 programs including the CH-53K HLR. The CH-53K stands out, as one of the few programs to show lower R&D projections (from $4.23 billion to $4.17 billion) and estimated delivery time (2 months early) since its 2005 baseline. The truth is, the Marines have little choice. The time crunch has already begun:
“According to program officials, all available decommissioned CH-53E helicopters have been reclaimed… Currently deployed CH-53E aircraft are flying at three times the planned utilization rate… The program intends to manufacture up to 29 of the 156 total [CH-53K] helicopters (19 percent) during low-rate initial production at the same time that it is conducting initial operational testing. While concurrent testing and production may help to field the systems sooner, it could also result in greater retrofit cost…”
That’s likely, since a number of requirements and systems have been shelved, in order to deliver the helicopter on time:
“Both of the CH-53K’s current critical technologies, the main rotor blade and the main gearbox, are immature and are expected to be fully mature following the low-rate initial production decision in 2013. The program replaced a third technology, the viscoelastic lag damper, with a modified version of an existing [linear hydraulic damper] technology. During preparations for the preliminary design review, it was discovered that maturing system engineering tasks would potentially require additional cost and time. As a result, the program eliminated noncritical requirements to contain costs and delayed the preliminary and critical design reviews and low-rate initial production decision.”
Feb 8/09: Sub-contractors. BAE Systems announces contracts from Sikorsky Aircraft for development and initial deliveries of CH-53K Cockpit Seats and Cabin Armor Systems, and for integration of the CH-53K’s fly-by-wire flight controls. BAE Systems efforts will include design, development, testing, qualification, and delivery of initial systems to support the flight test and ground test aircraft. Follow-on contracts would be placed for production orders and spares.
The seats will be based on BAE Security & Survivability Systems S7000 armored, crashworthy seats, and first deliveries of both seats and cabin armor are scheduled for 2010. The total value of the programs is estimated at approximately $90 million through 2022, if 156 CH-53K aircraft are built.
FY 2008PDR successful; Sub-contractors picked.
Iraq: CH-53E lifts UH-60
(click to view full)
September 2008: PDR. The CH-53K program conducts a successful Preliminary Design Review. Source.
PDR
Sept 26/08: Sub-contractors – HUMS. Goodrich announces that it has been picked to supply its IVHMS Health Usage and Monitoring Systems (HUMS) for the CH-53K. HUMS are embedded sensors within the aircraft’s key components, like engines. They monitor these systems, and can often tell if things are beginning to wrong inside before something actually breaks.
Avoiding breakdowns, and helping to pinpoint problems faster if something does break, saves money. Further savings can be had by using HUMS in conjunction with advanced maintenance and fleet management software. Once a baseline of good data is available, it becomes possible to switch from “do it just in case” maintenance and overhaul checklists, to “condition-based maintenance” that’s performed only when necessary, based on a combination of HUMS readings and predictive software.
Goodrich has carved out a strong market position in this area, supplying HUMS systems of varying complexity for a number of US military helicopters. IVHMS will supposedly build on earlier IMDS systems implanted in the CH-53E, but will be broader in nature, monitoring “the CH-53K helicopter’s entire mechanical drive train from the engines to the rotor system, and hundreds of aircraft systems.”
Sept 2/08: Sub-contractors. Breeze-Eastern Corporation announces that Sikorsky has picked them to provide the CH-53K’s Internal Cargo Winch System. The initial contract requires the delivery of 5 units for the System Design and Development phase.
Breeze-Eastern has worked with Sikorsky in this area to supply the S-92, and to retrofit USMC CH-53Ds. Bloomberg.
May 30/08: Camber Corp. in Huntsville, AL received an $8.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for program management, acquisition management, and engineering and technical services in support of the CH-53D, CH-53E, MH-53E, and CH-53K.
Work will be performed in Patuxent River, MD and is expected to be complete in November 2008. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, MD (N000421-08-C-0044).
Feb 18/08: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman Corporation announces that U.S. Naval Aviation Systems Command has picked their APR-39BvX radar warning receiver (RWR) integration program for the Navy’s CH-53K helicopter fleet. The APR-39 BvX upgrade, scheduled for completion and flight testing in late 2009 or early 2010, builds on the recently completed AvX program and includes new, faster processors and “massive” memory expansion.
Under the terms of the $17 million phase Phase 2 contract, Northrop Grumman will incorporate all electronic warfare (EW) integration capabilities of the APR-39Av2 and APR-39Bv2 versions, which are variants of the same system tailored to the kind of aircraft computer and cockpit interfaces in Navy/USMC aircraft. The APR-39BvX program will create one interoperable version for the forthcoming CH-53K fleet. This phase 2 program will include electronic warfare controller and integration interfaces to multiple missile and laser warning sensors, and also tie the APR-39 into Northrop Grumman’s Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) systems onboard each of the helicopters. The intended result is a system providing warning and protection against electro-optical, infrared, and radar guided missiles, and electronic warfare threats. NGC release.
Nov 6/07: Sub-contractors. Sikorsky has selected fellow United Technologies Corporation subsidiary Eaton Corporation to design, develop and supply the CH-53K’s integrated fuel system. This is in addition to the contract for the helicopter’s hydraulic power generation system and fluid conveyance package awarded to Eaton in July 2007.
During the development phase of the program, which runs through 2014, Eaton will provide the integrated fuel system support hardware for 5 helicopter shipsets in addition to a number of system development test sets. “Based on expected production of more than 156 helicopters for the U.S. Marine Corps, the contract value is approximately $96 million and, when combined with anticipated foreign military sales, is expected to exceed $160 million over the approximate 12-year life of the program.” Eaton release.
FY 2007Sub-contractors picked; Sikorsky opens CH-53K development center.
CH-53E Super Stallions:
2 HMMWVs, to shore
(click to view full)
Sept 25/07: Sub-contractors. Donaldson Company announces that Sikorsky has picked them to provide the CH-53K’s engine air particle protection system (EAPPS), which helps keep blown sand and other contaminants from gumming up the helicopter’s engines.
Sept 17/07: Sub-contractors. Fellow United Technologies’ subsidiary Hamilton Sundstrand announces that they’ve been selected to supply integrated secondary power systems for the CH-53K, consisting of the environmental control system, auxiliary power unit and main engine start system. The environmental control system (flight deck and avionics air conditioning, cabin ventilation and heating, engine bleed system, and supply air for the onboard inert gas generation system) and main engine start system will be built at Hamilton Sundstrand’s Windsor Locks, CT facility. The Auxiliary Power Unit will be built at the company’s San Diego, CA facility.
The contract includes design, development and production work; design and development will begin immediately with first hardware deliveries scheduled for 2009. Hamilton Sundstrand says that this agreement has a potential value of more than $400 million. The firm already holds contracts to supply the CH-53K’s fly-by-wire flight control computers, and primary main and tail rotor actuators. Hamilton Sundstrand release.
Sept 4/07: Sub-contractors. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation has selected Goodrich Corporation to act as integrator for the CH-53K’s input and tail drive shaft system, as well as supplying the electrical power generation and distribution system (q.v. June 17/07).
July 12/07: Sub-contractors. Sikorsky Selects fellow UTC subsidiary Eaton to supply the CH-53K’s Hydraulic Power Generation System and Fluid Conveyance Package. During the development phase of the program, which runs through 2014, Eaton will provide support hardware for 10 aircraft shipsets. Based on expected production of more than 156 aircraft for the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as anticipated foreign military sales, the potential value of the contract over the life of the program is expected to exceed $200 million. Eaton release.
June 20/07: European HTL. France & Germany confirm their heavy-lift helicopter program, known as HTL in France and FHT in Germany. A full set of specifications have not been created yet, and the countries involved are still trying to decide whether to pay the price of a full R&D program to get exactly what they want, or base their helicopter on an existing design. Possible contenders include the CH-53K, Boeing’s CH-47F, and Rosvertol’s super-giant Mi-26T helicopter.
June 18/07: Sub-contractors. Canadian aerospace manufacturer Heroux-Devtek Inc.’s Landing Gear Division received a contract from Sikorsky to design, develop, fabricate, assemble, test and deliver the CH-53K’s landing gears and tail bumper during the SDD phase, which includes the production of landing gears and tail bumper assemblies for 8 systems. Total revenue for the SDD and the Production Phase, which will be awarded in a separate contract, is expected to exceed C$ 95 million (about $89 million). Rotor News.
June 17/07: Sub-contractors. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation has selected Fortune 500 firm Goodrich Corporation to supply the electrical power generation and distribution system for the CH-53K program. Goodrich’s Pitstone Green, UK and Twinsburg, OH facilities will be involved in the development and delivery of a complete electrical power system for the aircraft, consisting of generators and controls; primary power distribution; AC/DC converters; battery; and external power controls.
Goodrich currently supplies power generation for the Sikorsky S-92/H-92 Superhawk, and has recently been selected to supply the DC power generation for the Sikorsky’s upgraded S-76D civil helicopter. Rotor News | Goodrich press kit release incl. pictures
May 9/07: Sub-contractors. Sikorsky Aircraft announces its selection of 4 subcontractors to design and fabricate the CH-53K’s major fuselage sections, “following an extensive solicitation and evaluation of multiple bids over a 12-month competition”: They include Aurora Flight Sciences in Manassas, VA; Bridgeport, WVA; and Columbus, MS; R&D in Cambridge, MA (main rotor pylon). EDO Corp. composites in Salt Lake City, UT; select resin transfer molding parts from Walpole, MA; and final assembly in North Amityville, NY (tail rotor pylon & side sponsons). GKN Aerospace in Nashville, TN & St. Louis, MO (aft transition). Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita, KS (cockpit and cabin).
Design will be conducted in a collaborative environment between supplier sites and Sikorsky’s Heavy Lift Development Center using model management systems linked to Sikorsky IT and data systems. Composite and titanium materials are being employed extensively to provide superior fatigue and corrosion durability at minimum weight, and state-of-the-art manufacturing processes such as co-curing, automated part fabrication, super high speed machining, and determinant assembly are being pressed into service to keep costs down. Sikorsky release.
Assemblies will initially be built for 7 test and certification aircraft (4 Engineering Development Models, 1 Ground Test Vehicle, 1 Static Test Article and 1 Fatigue Test Article.) The CH-53K SDD program schedule runs through the end of September 2015.
ADDENDA: GKN Aerospace’s release says that they’re contracted to deliver their 7 development ship sets to Sikorsky between 2009 – 2012, and estimates that this deal could be worth up to $70 million to them. Aurora Flight Sciences’ release clarifies that the Main Rotor Pylon (MRP) is one of 6 major fuselage sections; it is mostly made of composite materials, and houses the CH-53K’s Main Rotor Head, the No. 2 engine and other aircraft subsystems. EDO Release [PDF]
Feb 12/07: Manufacturing. Sikorsky Opens the CH-53K Development Center. The CH-53K program’s new Heavy Lift Development Center is a 106,000-square-foot office building in Stratford, CT, about 5 miles from Sikorsky’s main facility. It houses the CH-53K Program and Engineering staff, co-locating 500 team members consisting of Sikorsky, Naval Air Systems Command, Defense Contracting Management Agency personnel and subcontractors. These members work in Integrated Product Teams to design, develop, test and manufacture major systems and subsystems within the CH-53K.
Dec 22/06: Engine picked. Sikorsky Aircraft has selected General Electric Aviation to provide the new CH-53K heavy lift helicopter’s main engines. The GE38-1B engine planned for the CH-53K is a derivative of the CFE738 commercial turbofan engine used in the Falcon 200 business jet; the CFE738 was in turn derived from the T407 turboprop intended to power the US Navy’s updated P-7 Orion (that program was canceled and a competition restarted that left the 737-derived P-8A MMA as the winner). See also GE’s Feb 7/07 release.
According to this Flight International article, GE’s engine beat out Pratt & Whitney’s PW150 and a derivative of Rolls Royce’s AE1107 that powers the V-22 Osprey.
Oct 30/06: Rotor. Sikorsky Aircraft has submitted test results for its 4th Generation(TM) rotor blade, which builds on the work done for the Growth Rotor Blade(TM) (GRB) currently used on their new UH-60M and S/H-92 helicopters, using anhedral tips. The CH-53K model wind tunnel testing performed late in the summer of 2006 has reportedly shown a significant improvement in forward flight efficiency over the GRB. Earlier in the year, similar model rotor hover testing indicated large gains in hover efficiency. Read Sikorsky’s release.
FY 2004 – 2006Program OK and $3 billion development contract; European HTL opportunity?
CH-53D at work
(click to view full)
July 19/06: European HTL. Jane’s reports that EADS Eurocopter is seeking partners for a “super lift” helicopter to be fielded around 2020 with the French & German militaries, and confirms that talks have been held with Sikorsky regarding a modified CH-53K with European avionics and a larger cabin.
The Germans apparently want to replace their CH-53Gs (actually modified CH-53Ds) around 2020, and will look for upgrade programs to bridge the gap. The French currently lack heavy-lift helicopters in the CH-53 or CH-47 class, though the supergiant Russian Mi-26 was evaluated recently. Eurocopter and Sikorsky recently partnered on the successful $3 billion LUH program, but the firm has said it is keeping all its options open and is making no commitments.
UPDATE: Germany is updating their CH-53Gs, and the 2 countries are also going ahead with the heavy lift helicopter program. The CH-53K is still a competitor. Where does it stand? Read “The European Heavy Lift Helicopter Program?”
April 5/06: SDD contract. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT receives a $3.04 billion modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-award-fee contract (N00019-06-C-0081) for the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) of the CH-53K aircraft, to include 4 SDD aircraft, 1 ground test vehicle, and associated program management and test support.
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT and is expected to be complete in December 2015. See also NAVAIR release.
SDD contract
Dec 22/05: Green light. A formal decision by the Honorable Kenneth R. Krieg, US Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, gives the estimated $4.4 billion HLR program the green light to proceed to the System Definition and Development (SDD) phase.
CH-53E Super StallionAugust 25/05: Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT received a $43.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order against a previous basic ordering agreement to perform requirements definition and engineering studies in support of the Marine Corps’ Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) Program. Work on the requirements definition and engineering studies will be performed in Stratford, CT and is expected to be complete in April 2006.
Jan 6/05: Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT received an $8.4 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for preliminary design work in support of HLR, as part of the initial system development and demonstration of the Marine Corps’ CH-53X Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) program. Work on the preliminary design contract (N00019-06-C-0081) will be performed in Stratford, CT and is expected to be complete in January 2008 (N00019-03-G-0003).
Dec 23/04: A $34 million time and materials delivery order, issued against basic ordering agreement N00019-03-G-0003, to perform requirements definition and engineering studies in support of the Marine Corps’ Heavy Lift Replacement Program. Work was performed in Stratford, CT, and was expected to be complete in May 2005.
This contract number is not exclusive to the CH-53K. Other awards under this particular contract covered the Presidential Helicopter program (Sikorsky lost) and other helicopter engineering.
Appendix A: Flying Between Scylla and Charbydis: Navigating the Political Shoals JHL: QTR ConceptDID’s coverage of the HLR program has also included a report about HLR’s potential merger with the US Army’s futuristic JHL program. The Joint Heavy Lifter (JHL) is imagined as an aircraft with cargo capacity that approaches a C-130 Hercules transport (about 20 tons), but with the ability to take off and land like a helicopter. No current US military helicopter platform even comes close. JHL’s competitors are deploying some radical and different technologies in their attempt to achieve these goals – from quad tilt-rotors to coaxial skycranes and even compound helicopters.
Marine Corps acquisition officials also weighed the option of participating in JHL. While Congress could always step in to force the issue – and may still do so – the Marine Corps note that this would be deeply unwise for a number of reasons:
“The Army’s proposed heavy lift requirement to transport the Future Combat System greatly exceeds our requirement,” said program manager, Col. Paul Croisetiere. “The actual aircraft hasn’t been designed yet, but initial analysis suggests the joint heavy lifter will be too large to operate from current and programmed amphibious shipping. We may have a use for it, but in more of a logistical role as a possible KC-130J [air tanker] replacement – we still need the CH-53K for tactical heavy lift.”
Joint Heavy Lifters may not be available any sooner than 2025, according to Croisetiere, which is more than 10 years after the Marine Corps will be forced to start retiring its current CH-53E fleet. Even if the Marines could use it, Croisetiere pointed out that as currently envisioned, JHL will be too big to operate from the Marines’ amphibious ships.
V-22 OspreyThis is a logical argument. However this rationale might sell better if the USMC hadn’t spent the last decade describing tilt-rotor technology as the necessary wave of the future that would make helicopters obsolete, in its quest to sell the $100 million per plane V-22 Osprey.
When budgets are also being squeezed hard by multiple cost overruns on a wide swath of programs, programs that appear to be similar to each other will become big targets for Congressional cuts and pressure to merge. The US Marines have been the leading service advocates of tilt-rotor technology as a transformational necessity. Having invested so much of their prestige and credibility in the V-22, some people on Capitol Hill seem inclined to view the Marines’ rejection of a program that includes similar Quad Tilt Rotor and OSTR (Optimum Speed Tilt-Rotor) options as inconsistent, and hence mere territoriality. If this view spreads, it will not bode well for the HLR Program’s political survival.
It certainly wouldn’t be the first time in US military procurement history that the promise of the shiny new thing has found itself in the way of fulfilling military necessities with cheaper, proven options.
MH-53J Pave Low IVThe natural response to such pressures would be twofold. One track would emphasize the comparatively speculative nature of the JHL Program’s technologies and their uncertain development timelines. The other track would tout the value of cheaper builds of proven helicopters, in order to meet immediate needs and an uncompromising timeline for fleet airframe life. This is exactly what Col. Paul Croisetiere has done.
Making that argument, however, flies in the face of almost everything the USMC said when some in Congress pushed for immediately available conventional helicopter options to replace the Marines’ extremely aged Vietnam-era CH-46 Sea Knights. Options that would also have cost about half the price per aircraft. If the CH-46s could be patched together via life extension programs and extensive maintenance while the V-22s sorted out their difficulties and eventually reached production many years late, why not the CH-53Es? Especially if pursuing a similar tilt-rotor technology like the JHL’s QTR would reduce the V-22’s per-aircraft costs while increasing overall interoperability, and therefore easing long-term maintenance and logistics costs as well?
These arguments may or may not be considered valid. Nevertheless, they should absolutely be expected as the Global War on Terror, unexpected future contingencies, and a looming demographic shift put increasing pressure on US defense budgets. The US Marine Corps has certainly prepared the ground well.
The HLR program may have an eventful political journey ahead of it.
Appendix B: Interesting Ideas: The CH-53X Skycrane Concept CH-53X Skycrane ConceptAs a point of interest, this is one of the more innovative suggestions we’ve seen re: the next-generation CH-53X. It proposes turning the CH-53 into a “Skycrane” variant, and using it in conjunction with the trend toward “battle box” containerized forces, plus underslung light armor & vehicles.
The idea is that this would improve both the CH-53E’s capabilities (via reducing aircraft weight but not power) and the USA’s transformational deployability (via faster and more versatile load and ship that would also improve tactical surprise).
Additional Readings & SourcesGermany is almost done selling off one of the world’s most impressive tank fleets, earning itself a solid market around the world in the process, and choking sales of competitive designs. In November 2013, Poland announced that it would buy a 2nd batch of Leopard 2 tanks from Germany, along with assorted other equipment. As usual, the package price was incredibly cheap: just EUR 180 million for 119 more tanks, plus range training fittings, machine guns, radios; and assorted armored tractors, cars, and trucks. Poland’s next question is what to do with the new gear…
Poland’s original set of 128 Leopard 2A4 tanks were bought and transferred in the mid-2000s. They need a full overhaul, and modernization would be an excellent idea. The new Leopards include another 14 2A4s, plus 105 of the more advanced Leopard 2A5s. This will form the high-end core of Poland’s armored brigades, with capabilities and survivability far ahead of its T-72 and PT-91 Twardy (locally designed upgrade beyond T-72M1) tanks.
The Polish Army needs commonality within its Leopard fleet at some point. Meanwhile, Polish industry is unhappy because the new acquisitions will replace the mothballed T-72 fleet with a German design, rather than having the MON fund a new Polish design by 2016. The logical solution is to involve Polish industry in a common upgrade effort that will begin by bringing the existing fleet to a more advanced Leopard 2PL standard, then follow by upgrading the newer Leopard 2A5s to create a common Polish standard.
Rumors have Poland looking for a final configuration that’s similar to Canada’s new Leopard 2A6Ms. That would reshape and strengthen the armor structure to 2A5 levels and beyond, upgrade the sights and communications, beef up the internal climate control to handle hot environments like Afghanistan, add extra mine blast protection underneath, and provide points to fit engineering utilities like dozer blades and mine clearance rollers.
A parallel track is working to make Poland self-sufficient in producing the 2 key ammunition types for its tank fleet: 120mm High Explosive shells for general use, and tungsten Armor Piercing Fin-stabilized Discarding Sabot shells for killing other tanks. Mesko S.A., which is being folded into Poland’s PGZ, has now received contracts for both types, and industrial investment is underway.
Contracts & Key Events Polish Leo-2A4sFebruary 22/16: A modernization of Poland’s Leopard 24A tanks will involve collaboration between Germany’s Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH and Poland’s state-run defense company Bumar-Labedy SA. The $144 million contract will see Rheinmetall build a prototype upgraded tank, dubbed the Leopard 2PL, and modernize a trial batch of about a dozen units. As with all ongoing Polish defense deals, the next phase will see work domesticated after a knowledge and technology transfer to Bumar-Labedy, who will take care of the modernization of the remaining tanks. At present, the Polish Army operates 128 Leopolds after a 2002 purchase from the German Bundeswehr.
October 6/15: Poland’s Armament Inspectorate has reportedly received three offers to upgrade the country’s Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks. Turkey’s Aselsan and Germany’s Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann are the three bidders, with a selection slated for later this month. The country has bought two batches of Leopard 2A4s from Germany, with the Polish Army also operating around a hundred more modern 2A5 variants. In total 142 MBTs will be modernized, with a prototype scheduled for production next year. The new design will be known as the Leopard 2PL, with the winning bidder set to collaborate with the Polish Armaments Group to complete the modernization program.
Nov 13/14: Ammo. The Ministry of National Defence’s Armaments Inspectorate signs a PLN 240 million ($71 million) multi-year contract for tank shells with Mesko S.A. at Lucznik Arms Factory in Radom. This is the companion buy to the Sept 27/14 contract, designed to make Poland self-sufficient in tank-killing APFSDS-T 120mm shells as well as high-explosive ammunition. The new shells will supplement, and eventually replace, German DM33A2 tungsten armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot shells.
Supplying 13,000 APFSDS-T shells from 2015 – 2017 is only part of the bigger industrial picture. The consolidation of Mesko and other firms into PGZ (Polish Armaments Group/ Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa in Polish) is still on, and modernizing the Lucznik factory is part of that. Polish authorities will invest about PLN 45 million ($13 million) in new tooling and technology lines, as part of Poland’s efforts to ensure “independence for the Polish arms industry in this segment of military production.”
Poland is taking significant steps toward a defensive posture that is part of NATO, but senior officials doubt that NATO would actually help. As such, they’re trying to rely on that help as little as possible. They aren’t withdrawing from NATO by any means, and are pursuing closer cooperation and training with the German Army that could extend to joint commands – but they’re also quietly reviving the Home Army by recruiting at shooting clubs, etc. Sources: Dziennik Zbrojny, “Polish combat ammunition for Polish Leopard 2 tanks” | Aviation Week Ares, “Poland and Germany Deepen Army Cooperation” | The XX Committee, “Poland Prepares for Russian Invasion”.
120mm APFSDS-T ammo & Poland’s posture
Oct 20/14: 2A5s. Leopard 2A5 tanks continue to arrive from Germany (q.v. Nov 23/13) by rail, to join the 34th Armoured Cavalry Brigade. They’re received by German contractors, who work beside the Polish Army on inspection and maintenance to certify their condition.
Of course, an order like this requires more than just tanks. Technical support vehicles and trucks, specialized technical equipment, AGDUS laser shooting simulators etc. also need to arrive. But the process is underway. Sources: Defence24, “Poland Receives More Leopard 2A5 Tanks”.
Sept 27/14: Ammo. The Ministry of National Defence’s Armaments Inspectorate finalizes a PLN 114.4 million ($34.8 million) contract with Mesko S.A. for 14,000 120mm high-explosive tank shells, to be delivered as a multi-year deal over 2014-2017 (q.v. January 2013). Negotiations were sole-source in order to maintain the same set of ammunition for training and supply/ support chain purposes, and to maintain Poland’s industrial base in this area. In addition:
“The administrator indicates lack of possibility of introducing another set of ballistic data regarding the new round into the fire control system of the Leopard 2A4 tanks. The fire control system of the Polish Leopards 2A4 has an option of introducing only one more type of ammo, but this slot is reserved for the new 120×570 mm round with a sabot projectile.”
Poland currently uses German DM33 aluminum/tungsten sabot shells, but they don’t have the same effectiveness against explosive reactive armors as the most modern AFPSDS ammunition. Sources: Defence24, “Polish Army Acquires New Ammo for the Leopard Tanks”.
120mm HE ammo
Sept 2/14: 2PL etc. Poland is backing off of its planned Leopard 2PL upgrade, until the major industry consolidation takes place into PGZ (Polish Armaments Group/ Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa in Polish). This will allow the MON to allocate this work directly rather than relying on chosen team-ups (q.v. Dec 10/13), but it also takes away a lot of the competitive incentive. What it will not change, is the need to find a partner from Germany or Turkey with the requisite know-how. An opportunity for KMW, and for Poland’s GAIN SA? We’ll see.
The initial 2012 plan involved prototype rollout in 2014-2015, with full modernization of Poland’s original Leopard 2A4 fleet taking place from 2015-2018. Unfortunately, waiting for PGZ will destroy that timeline.
Poland will also need to address the issue of armored vehicles to accompany 34 Brigade’s Leopard 2A5 tanks. 10 Armoured Brigade currently uses M113 tracked APCs and derivative M577 command vehicles alongside its Leopard 2A4s, but Poland doesn’t have uncommitted surplus armored vehicles to stand up the 2nd Leopard tank brigade. There are rumors that Poland is negotiating a transfer of mothballed M113s and M577s from the USA in order to fill this gap. That will bring the issue of a 2nd modernization to the fore, of course, in order to ensure that the new armored vehicles can all work together. Sources: DziennikZbrojny.pl, “Przetarg na modernizacje Leopardow z problemami”.
Dec 10/13: 2PL upgrade. Poland’s MON receives 3 responses to their modernization RFP. The teams are:
Sources: DziennikZbrojny.pl, “Przetarg na modernizacje Leopardow z problemami”.
Nov 23/13: More Leopards. Poland orders their 2nd batch of Leopard 2 tanks from Germany, along with assorted other equipment: range training fittings, machine guns, radios; and assorted armored tractors, cars, and trucks.
As usual, the package price was incredibly cheap: just EUR 180 million for 119 more tanks (14 2A4s + 105 2A5s), plus all of the extras.
119 Leopard 2s: 14 L2A4, 105 L2A5
Oct 30/13: 2PL upgrade. Poland releases an RFP for modernization of its existing Leopard tank fleet to the 2PL standard. Upgrades will include modifications including armor improvements, a suspension upgrade, and modernized sighting and fire control. It’s issued per Decision No 118 of the Minister of National Defence, bypassing the Public Procurement Law in the interests of national security. This allows Poland to issue the RFP to domestic firms only, despite EU regulations. The deadline is Dec 10/13. Sources: Dziennik Zbrojny, “Przetarg na modernizacje Leopardow z problemami”.
January 2013: Ammo. A contract is signed with the Mesko Works to equip Poland’s Leopard tanks with 3,300 more 120mm high explosive shells: 1,500 in FY 2013, and 1,800 in FY 2014. The contract could grow to 14,000 shells, over a period lasting until 2017. Sources: Defence24, “14 thousand shells for Polish Leopards”.
Additional ReadingsReaders with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
DID would like to thank our friends at DziennikZbrojny.pl for their assistance with ongoing developments.
In March 2007, Raytheon received a contract to develop the AGM-154C-1 variant of the popular JSOW glide bomb family. This new version would add moving target capability via improved imaging infrared seekers, better seeker algorithms, and a 2-way Link-16 data link. That combination allows the missile to be used as a secondary weapon against enemy ships, with some capability against certain moving land targets. The 2-way link ensures that targeting commands can be received, and missile status and position transmitted back, right up to the moment of impact. Most of those options are currently found only at the high end of the cruise missile market, giving the AGM-154C-1 an interesting positioning as a cheaper short-range alternative.
That development effort was successful, and in late 2008, the US DoD gave the go-ahead for JSOW Block III, which will be integrated on US Navy F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets and on the F-35 Lightning II. Now, the JSOW Block III system is the default version under the US Navy’s full rate production contract.
Note that other JSOW contracts have been issued within this time period. If they weren’t American contracts related to the Block III version, however, they’re not covered here.
Unless the entry says otherwise, Raytheon Missile Systems in Tucson, AZ is the contractor, and all contracts are managed by US Naval Air Systems Command.
FY 2014 – 2016
JSOW-C, Australia
(click to view full)
February 19/16: Raytheon and the US Navy have successfully commenced operational testing of the new Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW C-1) at China Lake. The AGM-154 Block III upgrade incorporates a new Link-16 weapon data link and a moving maritime target capability. This was the eighth successful test for the air-to-surface missile after seven deployments in the developmental and integration test phases. The latest test has been described by Raytheon as “a challenging battlefield scenario [which] included a well-defended target that used tactical countermeasures.” Once the free flight operational testing is complete, the JSOW C-1 will be released for full use by the Navy.
Dec 20/13: FRP-10. An $80.5 million contract modification exercises an option for 200 full rate production Lot 10 AGM-154C-1 JSOW unitary weapons, and a single AGM-154C-1 for a performance characterization test. All funds are committed immediately from US Navy FY 2014 weapon budgets.
Work will be performed in Dallas, TX (44%); Cedar Rapids, IA (24%); Tucson, AZ (22%); and McAlester, OK (10%), and is expected to be complete in August 2016 (N00019-13-C-0011).
FY 2014: 200
Dec 17/13: ANAO Report. Australia’s National Audit Office releases their 2012-13 Major Projects Report, which includes some interesting notes concerning the JSOW-C1. Australia had to place an interim buy of AGM-154Cs in time for the Super Hornet’s planned December 2010 Initial Operating Capability, but they won’t accept the JSOW-C1s and their moving target capability until February 2016. Why?
“The JSOW C-1 has been affected by software integration issues leading to an impact on Australian Super Hornet capability. The USN has slipped the integration of the JSOW C-1 into the next build of software for the Super Hornet…. The JSOW C-1 FOT&E test event in September 2014 has been affected by the integration issues with the software build leading to [test cancelation and] an impact on Materiel Release of the JSOW C-1.”
“There is [also] a chance that USN/Raytheon have insufficient Telemetry Instrumentation Kits (TIK) to support Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) and Raise Train Sustain firings of JSOW C/C-1.”
Oct 27/13: Testing. At the US Navy’s Trident Warrior 2013 demonstration, Super Hornet fighters simulated the launch of an AGM-154C-1 JSOW precision glide bomb, while the E-2D directed the imaginary weapon toward the positively identified target and received status updates from the “weapon.”
It mirrors a 2009 simulation involving a JSOW C-1 with a Navy P-3 Orion and USAF E-8C JSTARS battlefield surveillance aircraft. Sources: Raytheon, Oct 27/13 release.
FY 2011 – 2013OT&E: weapon’s great but the UI sucks; F/A-18 Super Hornet integration contracts and testing; Australia commits to JSOW for its Super Hornets and F-35As. Hard hats required
June 5/13: FRP-9. An $80.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for 200 full rate production Lot 9 AGM-154C-1 JSOWs, including associated support equipment, plus 1 more AGM-154C-1 for testing.
Work will be performed in Dallas, TX (44%); Cedar Rapids, IA (24%); Tucson, AZ (22%); and McAllester, OK (10%), and is expected to be complete in July 2015. All funds are committed immediately. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-13-C-0011).
FY 2013: 200
May 16/13: Australia. During Parliamentary hearings by Australia’s Joint Committee On Foreign Affairs, Defence And Trade, DMO’s New Air Combat Capability program manager, Air Vice Marshal Kym Osley, discusses the JSM and Australia, in response to a question from Sen. Fawcett. With Norway’s government fully finding the missile through F-35 integration in Block 4, Australia doesn’t need to be involved in that financially, and they haven’t made any commitments to JSM yet beyond discussing requirements etc.
Australia’s near-term plan is to use the AGM-154C-1 JSOW glide bomb as their initial maritime strike weapon, first on their F/A-18F Super Hornets and next on their F-35As. They believe that the USAF and US Navy will also make JSOW part of F-35 Block 4, which is planned to finish in 2020 and release to the fleet in 2021. F-35 software development remains very behind, but Australia hopes to have JSOW available on their F-35As by the RAAF’s own planned F-35A Full Operational Capability date, in 2023. Beyond 2023, Australia’s JP3023 program will be looking at a new maritime strike platform for use across its navy surface combatants and air force (F/A-18F, F-35A, P-8A). Hansard Australia [PDF].
April 26/13: Super Hornet. Raytheon Missile Systems in Tucson, AZ receives a $12.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to integrate the new AGM-154C-1 JSOW into the F/A-18E/F aircraft’s H10E Operational Flight Program (core operating system) software.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and is expected to be complete in February 2015. $7.7 million in FY 2013 Navy Weapons Procurement funds are committed immediately, with the rest available as needed. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, MD, is the contracting activity (N00019-10-G-0006, #2002).
Jan 22/13: Testing. Raytheon touts another pair of successful AGM-154C-1 integrated tests, this time against stationary targets with operationally realistic infrared and radio frequency countermeasures. Previous testing in the integrated test phase demonstrated JSOW C-1’s capability against 2 moving maritime targets, and those were also direct hits.
Jan 17/13: DOT&E report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The JSOW C-1 is included. Short version: the report is very complimentary about the weapon’s accuracy, but says that it isn’t ready for prime time.
Without being more specific, they say that reliability is well below specifications, largely because of software-driven problems. The software is also really poor as an interface for the pilot, “excessively complicated and could prevent successful mission execution.” Raytheon plans to update the software, but once it does, some of the previous integrated test data won’t be valid any more.
The program is headed for an Operational Test Readiness Review (OTRR) in Q2 FY 2013.
Testers not happy
Aug 21/12: Testing. Raytheon discusses the AGM-154C-1’s initial integration test using US Navy Super Hornets. The test presented 2 maneuvering ship targets, and involved a handoff from one fighter to another, followed by a successful retargeting from the smaller ship to the larger ship.
The firm says that the program remains on track for reaching initial operational capability in 2013.
Dec 19/11: FRP-8. An $84.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 226 more AGM-154C-1 JSOW glide bomb all-up rounds (in storage containers) with unitary warheads, including associated support equipment. This is full rate production Lot 8.
Work will be performed in Dallas, TX (44%); Cedar Rapids, IA (24%); Tucson, AZ (22%); and McAllester, OK (10%), and is expected to be complete in June 2014 (N00019-11-C-0032).
FY 2012: 226
July 28/11: FRP-7. An $85.6 million firm-fixed-price contract for 225 full rate production, Lot 7 AGM-154C-1 JSOW glide bombs with unitary warheads, including associated support equipment, and 1 AGM-154C-1 for performance characterization testing. The production lots involve all variants of JSOW, but new production lots have the Block III as the default version.
Work will be performed in Dallas, TX (44%); Cedar Rapids, IA (24%); Tucson, AZ (22%); and McAllester, OK (10%), and is expected to be complete in June 2013. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-11-C-0032).
FY 2011: 225
Oct 15/10: US NAVAIR PMA-201 accepts an initial 11 JSOW-C1 production rounds. The JSOW-C1 is assembled at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in McAlester, OK, and will be sent to the fleet once operational testing of its moving target capabilities is complete, in early 2013.
NAVAIR adds that the C1/Block III variant was “recently” tested during a 3-day Joint Surface Warfare Joint Capability Technology Demonstration, where the weapon was used in conjunction with an E-8C JSTARS ground surveillance aircraft, 2 F/A-18 Hornets, and 2 instrumented target ships. So far, about 3,500 JSOWs have been delivered to the fleet since 1998, with more than 400 used in combat. US NAVAIR.
Navy acceptance
FY 2007 – 2010From development to full rate production; F/A-18 Super Hornet captive test.
Send me a link?
(click to view full)
March 26/10: FRP-6. A $101.6 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-07-C-0093) for 313 full rate production Lot 6 (FRP-6) AGM-154C-1 Unitary Joint Stand-Off Weapon missiles, including associated support equipment. In addition, this modification provides for one extra AGM-154C-1, which will be used for performance characterization testing.
Work will be performed in Dallas, TX (44%); Cedar Rapids, IA (24%); Tucson, AZ (22%); and McAllester, OK (10%), and is expected to be complete in March 2012.
FY 2010: 333
March 4/10: Testing. Raytheon’s AGM-154C-1 JSOW Block III glide bomb hit a milestone by completing its first captive-flight test on an F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter, and demonstrating Link 16 compatibility. NAVAIR | Raytheon release.
Super Hornet flight
Feb 15/10: Testing. Raytheon announces that its AGM-154C-1’s Strike Common Weapon Datalink (SCWDL) communicated via Link-16 nodes with a Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft. The test demonstrated the weapon’s ability to function as a node on the network and moved the system one step closer to engaging moving maritime targets. The test was part of the Navy’s Joint Surface Warfare Joint Capability Technology Demonstration.
Feb 1/10: FY 2010 budget. The Pentagon releases its FY 2011 budget request. The USAF stopped participating in JSOW in 2005, but the US Navy continues.
The FY 2010 budget is $152.2 million (incl. $10 million RDT&E) for 357 weapons. The FY 2011 request is a slight procurement drop-off, to $143.9 million (incl. $12.9 million RDT&E) for 333 JSOW unitary glide bombs.
March 13/09: FRP-5. A $106.5 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-07-C-0093) for Full Rate Production of 280 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) unitary warhead AGM-154C-1s, plus 1 additional unit for performance characterization testing. Work will be performed in Dallas, TX (44%); Cedar Rapids, IA (24%); Tucson, AZ (22%), and McAllester, OK (10%), and is expected to be completed in March 2011.
The FY 2009 budget of up to $164.9 million covers 280 weapons, and includes $21.8 million in RDT&E finding.
FY 2009: 280
Dec 19/08: Testing. A $17.9 million modification to a previously awarded firm fixed price contract for the special tooling and special test equipment required to maintain Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JSOW-C) production rate requirements, and to support the transition to production readiness activities for the AGM-154C-1 Variant.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and is expected to be complete in March 2010 (N00019-07-C-0093).
Sept 19/07: Datalink. Rockwell Collins announces an $18 million contract by Raytheon Missile Systems to design, develop, and produce the Strike Common Weapon Data Link for the JSOW Block III precision glide bomb and the next generation of Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The Strike Common Weapon Data Link Program is ultimately sponsored by the U.S. Navy’s PMA-201 program management office.
The 2-way, anti-jam, dual waveform (UHF and Link 16) datalink will add the ability to provide target updates from the launcher to the weapon or vice-versa, retarget the weapon while in flight, abort if desired, and provide bomb hit indication (BHI).
March 8/07: Raytheon Missile Systems in Tucson, AZ receives a $93.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order against a previously issued broad basic ordering agreement (N00019-05-G-0008), that covers multiple systems. This order will be used for the Joint Standoff Weapon AGM-154C-1 Block III Network Enabled Weapon Moving Target Capability and Seeker Obsolescence Redesign. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and is expected to be complete in July 2009. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, MD issued the contract.
Efforts under this delivery order will include the design, development, integration, test and delivery of an AGM-154C-1 network enabled weapon moving target capability and qualification and production of a replacement for the obsolete seeker processor and detector components (Phase I). In addition, this order provides for delivery of a validated engineering change proposal (Phase II). See also Raytheon release.
JSOW C1 development
In our article P-8A MMA May Become an Multinational Program, DID asked for reader input re: current Japanese projects in this area.
Andrew Durston of Smiths Aerospace pointed us to an 2002 article that offered a thought-provoking analysis of the Martitime Patrol aircraft segment, and noted Japan’s indigenous P-X program. That article was written before a contractor or aircraft model had been selected for the P-8 MMA System Design & Development phase.
The first engineering and demonstration aircraft for the P-X maritime patrol and C-X transport programs are scheduled to commence at flight-test in 2007; they will eventually replace the Japan Defense Agency’s current 96 P-3C Orion and 26 C-1 transport aircraft. To take advantage of economies of scale, both aircraft, as far as possible, will have shared structure and avionics. Based on the rollout pictures, it’s interesting to note that both aircraft look a lot like their predecessors; the P-X has the P-3’s shape but uses jet engines, while the C-X strongly resembles the C-1.
The JMSDF has awarded the production of both aircraft to Kawasaki Heavy Industries in Gifu, Japan, which also manufactures Japan’s P-3C Orion aircraft under license.
The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is reportedly interested in creating mission system commonalities between their indigenous P-3 solution, the P-X, and MMA. A joint work effort between the Japan P-X and U.S. MMA programs has been underway for some time now, focusing on avionics and mission systems interoperability.
UpdatesFebruary 19/16: Honeywell Aerospace is to become the largest non-Japanese participant in Japan’s P-1 program. The US company has been selected by Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) to outfit the new maritime aircraft with its electrical and mechanical systems, such as the 131-9J Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), alongside works on the Cabin Pressure Control System, Engine Starter Bleed System Valve, Exterior and Interior Lighting, Personal Oxygen Unit, Ram Air Turbine, Bleed Air System, and Sonobuoy Dispenser. The announcement comes as the demand for maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft is increasing steadily, especially in the Asia Pacific region. All countries in the region are undergoing upgrades to the latest systems in order to protect shipping lanes and boost their presence, as disputes over territory in the South China Sea continue to grow.
Additional Readings & Sources
In an age of non-linear warfare, where front lines are nebulous at best and non-existent at worst, one of the biggest casualties is… the concept of unprotected rear echelon vehicles, designed with the idea that they’d never see serious combat. That imperative is being driven home on 2 fronts. One front is operational. The other front is buying trends.
These trends, and their design imperatives, found their way into the USA’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, which aims to replace many of the US military’s 120,000 or so Humvees. The US military’s goal is a 7-10 ton vehicle that’s lighter than its MRAPs and easier to transport aboard ship, while offering substantially better protection ad durability than existing up-armored Humvees. They’d also like a vehicle that can address front-line issues like power generation, in order to recharge all of the batteries troops require for electronic gadgets like night sights, GPS devices, etc.
DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. JLTV certainly qualifies, and recent budget planning endorsements have solidifed a future that was looking shaky. Now, can the Army’s program deliver?
The JLTV program began in 2005, with the Army’s recognition that its HMMWV contract would expire in a couple of years, and that a better vehicle was needed to face current threats. The US Army bears overall JLTV responsibility through a Joint Program Office within its Tank, Automotive, and Armament Command (TACOM) in Warren, MI. US Marine Corps participation is centered on a program office under the supervision of the Program Executive Officer Land Systems (PEO LS) Marine Corps at Quantico, VA.
JLTV has benefited from a number of military research programs. They include the Army’s Future Tactical Truck System (FTTS), as well as prototyping efforts on the Ford F350-based Ultra Armored Patrol. Ultra AP was an Office of Naval Research program, involving Badenoch LLC and engineers from the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Georgia Tech Research Institute. JLTV has its own requirements set, and was originally envisaged as having a $160 million Technology Development Phase (TDP) with 2 winners; a higher-level review increased the maximum to 3 winners, but did not increase funding.
Those TDP contracts were supposed to be placed in the 3rd quarter of FY 2008, but weren’t issued until Q1 FY 2009. Winners were subject to armor and ballistic testing, system tests, and live fire testing.
At the end of the TD phase, initial plans called for 2 System Design and Development (SDD) contract awards in Q2 FY 2011, in order to finish the base design and develop the remaining variants. That phase is now called EMD (Engineering & Manufacturing Development), and 3 contracts were issued in August 2012. Col. John Myers, Project Manager for the Army’s Joint Combat Support Services, has always said that that this will be another full and open competition – which means that losers in the TD Phase could conceivably invest, adapt, and win the SDD contract. That’s exactly what happened.
The EMD phase will be followed by a final competition that includes both low and full rate production, and the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Source Selection Authority plans to award a production contract to one winning team in 2015. Final numbers haven’t been determined yet, but the current projected quantity is about 50,000 JLTVs over an 8-year span. The ultimate value could rise to $30-40 billion over more than a decade, giving JLTV the potential to become the world’s largest single land system contract.
The JLTV Family of Vehicles JLTV family comceptJLTV is designed to be very modular, which could eventually lead to a dizzying array of variants if the US military wishes. Vehicles must show better performance than the current HMMWV fleet in protection, mobility in dry conditions, and other RFP areas such as power generation; and each category must also be able to tow a trailer with similar capacity. They must be externally transportable in sling mode by CH-47 Chinook or CH-53 Stalion family heavy-lift helicopters, and 2 must be transportable in a C-130 Hercules medium transport aircraft.
Initially, JLTV fell into 3 payload categories for the Technology Development phase, with individual variants in each category to come later.
JLTV Category A. General 4-seat utility vehicle, payload 3,500 pounds. May be thought of as the base vehicle, to be built during the Technology Development (TD) phase.
JLTV Category B. Will be used as the base for most variants. Payload must be 4,000 pounds, desired objective is 4,500. The TD phase will build the 6-seat Infantry Carrier and the C2OTM Command on the move variants. Category B Reconnaissance, Heavy Guns Carrier, TOW ITAS missile carrier, Medium utility, and Ambulance (3 seat + 2 litter) variants will be developed during the SDD phase.
JLTV Category C. The “small truck” class. Payload must be 5,100 pounds. The general shelter carrier and utility variant will be developed during the TD phase; its Hummer M1097 and M1152 analogues are used as mounts for semi-mobile command posts, as equipment carriers, and as light trucks. A larger (3 seat + 4 litter) JLTV ambulance variant will be developed during the SDD phase.
As the US military prepares for a production contract, the types have been set more clearly into 4 initial production variants:
IED land mines were the #1 killer of American troops in Iraq, and up-armoring flat-bottomed Humvees proved to be an inadequate response. This finally led to the MRAP program at the end of 2006, which will have ordered and produced nearly 16,000 blast-resistant vehicles in less than 3 years. British experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has been similar, with 1/8 of all its casualties inflicted on troops riding in poorly-protected Land Rover Snatch jeeps. Those conditions have prompted several senior officer resignations in protest, including highly placed SAS commanders.
While some countries like Australia and Germany were foresighted enough to develop and field mine-resistant vehicles before 2001, a collective realization is sinking in across the board that up-armoring flat-bottomed vehicles with inadequate carrying capacity, in order to provide a level of protection that is better but still poor, simply will not do. Future patrol vehicles will need to be designed from the outset for blast-resistance against land mines and even car bombs.
There’s no getting around it: JLTV’s requirements will drive up the cost of Army vehicles in combat zones. Smart designs like v-hulls, composite blast pans, crushable composite structures, and improved armors do help – but they come at a cost. They cost money, and they cost weight.
Cougar MRAP et. al.The current roster of MRAP vehicles cost around $450,000-$650,000 each, with additional costs for “government furnished equipment” like remote-control turrets, electronics and radios, IED jammers, and other ancillaries. These items can drive an MRAP’s cost to nearly $1 million each, compared to a HMMWV’s $250,000 or so. Given military death benefits of about $500,000 per soldier, however, a full Hummer with all hands lost actually costs $3.25 million – and that’s just the money. There is more to cost than just procurement cost. The question is, will there be more in the budgets to cover the JLTV difference? So far, the response has been to shrink the order until it fits, while attempting to cap costs.
JLTV vehicles will be smaller and lighter than MRAPs, which tends to lower relative cost. On the other hand, they will need to use more innovative design approaches and materials, in order to deliver quality protection. Their “government furnished equipment” costs can be expected to rise in cost over time, because that has been the consistent trend over the last several decades. Final average cost for every fully equipped JLTV could conceivably reach over $700,000, and containing costs under $500,000 is likely to prove very challenging.
The laws of physics also have their say, requiring mass in order to withstand certain levels of explosive power. A military Hummer maxes out at about 12,000 pounds fully loaded. Blast resistant vehicles with MRAP protection levels begin at around 30,000 pounds when empty, and the Cougar 6×6 MRAP depicted in the photo above has a fully loaded Gross Vehicle Weight of 52,000 pounds. On the other hand, Force Protection’s Cougar 6×6 has been hit by huge IED land mine blasts involving several hundred pounds of explosives – and had every single crew member walk away from the resulting wreck.
That outcome was partly the result of design that avoids killers like flat bottoms, which often take several hits from a single mine blast as the explosion is reflected back at the ground and returns to the vehicle, over and over again. Blast-resistant vehicles are also careful about the placement of items that can be blown up into the cabin, and their bottoms avoid nooks and crannies that would act as “blast traps,” catching the force of land mine explosions like a ship’s sail catches wind. Even design has its limits, however; more weight allows heavier construction, more vehicle stability against even a deflected blast’s awesome punch, and a better ratio of protection to usable interior space.
Design a 14,000 – 20,000 pound vehicle with the same mine protection as a Cougar 6×6 is close to a “mission impossible,” though the Army seems to be asking for exactly that outcome. FY 2011 testing has begun to reveal the weaknesses inherent in that approach, as weight is already proving to be an issue for the off-road mobility that the US Marines prize so highly.
Instead, a successful and survivable JLTV program needs to be built around an inevitable set of tradeoffs. Requirements like lower height for shipboard transportability mean reduced v-hull angles, and less room between the hull and the ground when a mine goes off. Those decisions may be more compatible with off-road capability, which benefits from a lower center of gravity – up to a point. On the other hand, a complex suspension might deliver improved off-road mobility, with great clearance underneath, at the cost of extra weight, extra cost, and possibly poorer reliability. In this weight class, interlinked engineering problems make it very difficult to make just one decision.
JLTV: To Be, or Not to Be? Oshkosh M-ATVJLTV’s biggest challenge will be to survive as a program. The US Army and Marine Corps both face huge maintenance budget “overhangs” as a result of long and hard equipment use required on the front-lines. Even the current rate of wartime supplemental funding has left both services short of the annual funds required for full maintenance and replacement. To make matters worse, both services have large, high-profile procurement programs (Ground Combat Vehicle, V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor, USMC armored vehicle replacements) that are set to suck up massive development and/or procurement funds. Meanwhile, urgent MRAP and M-ATV “JLTV bridge buy” contracts are filling a similar niche for protected patrol vehicles, and creating a small explosion of related design ideas and in-production technologies. All the while employing a set of companies and workers with powerful local lobbying leverage, amidst an overall budgetary environment in which US military spending is expected to decline.
When seen in that light, the US military’s strategy shift away from initial visions involving large JLTV System Design and Development contracts makes a lot of sense. Instead, a set of relatively small design and development contracts, coupled with options for self-financed projects that have demonstrated success in following rounds, will give the US military its pick of 6-7 different and fully developed JLTV vehicles, all for under $300 million.
Buying the vehicles in quantity will be a different ball game, and planned JLTV numbers have declined steadily. The program’s next challenge will be to get a significant number of JLTV vehicles bought and delivered, amidst a budget environment that has moved from “tightening” to “crisis imminent”.
M-ATV’s off-road mobility, and orders to date for over 8,000 vehicles, give Oshkosh an especially strong fallback position. If JLTV falters for budgetary and technical reasons, the Army’s “bridge buy” M-ATV vehicles are already being kept in the force, alongside some of Navistar’s MaxxPro MRAPs. It wouldn’t be ideal, but those fleets could form the basis of an expeditionary force, while the military goes back to buying modified HMMWVs or other less-protected vehicles.
JLTV: Participants and Platforms BAE/ Navistar’s ValanxUnsurprisingly, the JLTV field has displayed a certain degree of design convergence, within a very different set of core approaches to the problem. Since the competition will remain fully open at every step, it’s worth tracking all submissions. Even if a design loses a round, private development work could still make it a winner in the next round.
Government releases initially said that the JLTV program received 7 qualifying submissions in response to its initial Request for Proposal. Phase 1 saw Technology Development contract awards to 3 winners: AM General and General Dynamics’ General Tactical Vehicles joint venture (GTV Eagle), BAE and Navistar (Valanx), and a Lockheed Martin team that features heavy participation from BAE Systems’ Tactical Vehicle Systems division in Sealy, TX.
Phase 2 awarded Engineering & Manufacturing Development contracts to 3 winners: The team of Lockheed and BAE TVS from round 1, AM General for its solo BRV-O entry, and Oshkosh for its privately developed L-ATV.
BAE Systems: Valanx (won TDP, lost EMD) Valanx & trailerAt one time, the firms that are now part of BAE Systems had owned the world market for blast-resistant vehicles. BAE’s early lack of success in the MRAP competition was a rude shock, but a combination of acquisitions and execution brought them back to the #2 position by competition’s end. BAE firms also have a substantial combat vehicle heritage designing Bradley and CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, M113 tracked armored personnel carriers, Bv family armored all-terrain carriers, and other widely-used combat platforms. The US Army’s FMTV medium trucks offered an outstanding wheeled vehicle production background – except for one small problem. That group within BAE was already working with Lockheed Martin. BAE U.S. Combat Systems drew heavily on its combat vehicle heritage for the JLTV’s “Valanx” design, therefore, and covered its production gap with a strong alliance: Navistar, a huge commercial and military trucking firm who had finished #1 in the USA’s MRAP program. Navistar eventually split from the partnership, toward the end of the TD phase.
The Valanx reflects BAE’s combat vehicle heritage and design approaches. “Chicken tests” were performed for length of operation without oil, as were some other tests not done on normal trucks. MRAP lessons learned re: v-hull angle and materials, spacing between the “v” and ground, and aspects like fireproof spall liners were incorporated. Hull shaping and internal layout were designed to maximize sightlines, including the ability to survey the rear quadrant while sitting in the vehicle, as well as offering improved stowage. With respect to armaments, BAE’s RG-33 is reportedly the only MRAP vehicle in theater that has been equipped with a fully stabilized turret for accurate fire on the move. Their JLTV design’s body rigidity would build on that heritage, allowing the cupola hole to mount and fire substantially larger weapons than a HMMWV could safely carry.
Sightlines and stowage were only some of the user-centric design aspects incorporated into the vehicle. Close examination shows windows that are all the same, which means just one spare type to stock. The hydraulic suspension system will raise and lower the vehicle for off-roading or ship transport, but it can also pick up just one corner to make tire changes easier. The spare tire carrier is an integrated jack, and BAE claims that a “5% female” (female in lowest 5% of Army physical requirements) can change their JLTV’s tire, quickly, if required. Observers may also note the extra space from the tire to the wheel well rims; this allows units to bolt up different size wheel and tire assemblies in order to change the vehicle’s characteristics, lowering ground pressure with MRAP-size tires for off-road activities or heavier loads, or using smaller tires for less weight and more efficient on-road use.
The BAE team chose not to create a hybrid drive vehicle, on the grounds that a conventional drive train would let them meet all requirements at less weight and less cost. Instead, the Valanx’s lightweight independent suspension and drivetrain are made by Arvin Meritor, the US Army’s largest axle supplier. With that said, their Valanx does leverage BAE HybriDrive technologies used in thousands of Orion passenger buses, in order to exceed the military’s electrical power production requirements. A full set of embedded diagnostic and prognostic systems, leveraging several classified and non-classified databuses, will be used to help keep these vehicles running reliably. Navistar JLTV product page | BAE/ Navistar partnership announcement | Feb 2008 JLTV unveiling: BAE | Aviation Week article.
BAE also competed for the M-ATV interim buy, using 2 designs. One design is a lighter, improved version of their Caiman MRAP, which is derived in turn from the Army’s standard FMTV medium trucks. The second submission was a modified Valanx. Both lost to Oshkosh.
GDLS & AM General’s GTV EAGLE (won TDP, lost EMD) GTV’s designAM General are the builders of the current Hummer fleet. General Dynamics Land Systems builds M1 Abrams tanks, was a partner with Force Protection to deliver Cougar MRAPs via the Force Dynamics joint venture, and finally bought Force Protection in December 2011. The firm also has very strong systems integration capabilities, and is involved in key radio and electronics programs that will equip America’s future soldiers. GTV is the AM General/ GDLS joint venture for the JLTV, and Eagle is the name for their design.
In 2006, both AM General and General Dynamics were awarded JLTV “Best Technical Approach” trade studies by the Office of Naval Research. Their joint design stresses design maturity and proven components, and includes a “unique modular and scalable trailer that has mobility equal to the JLTV vehicle itself.” GDLS and AM General reportedly invested over $10 million for risk reduction development and maturation of this vehicle and its In-Hub Hybrid Electric Drive system. Their AGMV used a hexagon shaped armored capsule for its uses in mine protection, side blast deflection, and small-arms protection. GTV site | Defense Update Nov 2007 article.
Lockheed Martin & BAE TVS (TD & EMD Winner) LM/ BAE’s UVL Class CLockheed Martin’s 2006 purchase of small British specialist vehicle designer HMT was an interesting shift for the firm, which has not been a major contender for military ground vehicle design. The firm has put a serious effort behind that push, however, leveraging wins for research programs like Future Tactical Truck System, and using their own private development funds. These resources were invested to build, evaluate, and refine its JLTV designs over several prototypes, and thousands of miles of testing – choices that ended up giving this team the best maturity and technical risk rating available: “Excellent/ Very Low Risk”.
Even so, Lockheed Martin knew from the outset that it would need a very serious production partner in order to field a credible design, and a credible bid. It found one early in Armor Holdings, who designed and built the US Army’s FMTV medium truck fleet. This may be the Army’s second largest vehicle fleet, with well over 40,000 trucks delivered to date plus another 2,000 or so derivative Caiman MRAPs. In 2007, a multi-billion dollar deal made Armor Holdings part of BAE “General Tactical Systems” – and created a “firewall” within BAE Systems between its 2 JLTV teams. All FMTV-related expertise remains exclusively at Team Lockheed’s disposal, and has been used to create a fully joint design and volume production plan. Other team members include Alcoa Defense (aluminum materials technology, design), JWF (machining and fabrication), plus Cummins Engine, Allison Transmission, Bosch, Meritor Defense, Lotus Engineering, L3 Combat Propulsion Systems, and Vehma International of America.
Lockheed Martin is a systems design firm at heart, and that approach became a big focus for the JLTV. Within that approach, survivability uses a wide array of techniques, including diverting energy via a v-hull; absorbing energy; visual, noise and infrared signature reduction; and ergonomics and individual reaction analysis. Team spokespeople stressed that a number of these elements are proprietary, and are not obvious from external viewing.
Producibility can easily be set aside in the rush to solve hard engineering problems. As expected given the team’s FMTV background, this was also a focus. The 3rd focus was maintainability and readiness, which is a particular strength of the FMTV truck fleet. Armor Holdings had the FMTV’s proven electronic diagnostic and troubleshooting systems, while Lockheed brought higher-level prognostic approaches derived from projects like its F-35 fighter and its accompanying fleet-wide ALIS system. In the end, their joint commitment and effort was rewarded with a TDP contract. 2006 teaming announcement | Alcoa joins the team | LM Team unveils Category C prototype | LM team Category B testing release.
Phase 2 Engineering & Manufacturing Development: Outside Entries Ocelot unveiledAs intended, the EMD Phase bids also attracted bids that hadn’t been part of the earlier TD phase.
AM General: BRV-O (Won EMD). The day after the RFP was due, AM General announced that in addition to the GTV Eagle, it had also submitting its own privately-developed BRV-O (Blast Resistant Vehicle – Off road) as an independent bid. The firm has a set of partners, but wouldn’t discuss them, or offer specifics about their vehicle beyond boilerplate like “self-leveling suspension,” “crew capsule and modular armor”, and “C4ISR backbone”.
General Dynamics: Ocelot (???) Force Protection’s Cheetah lost the JLTV TD phase competition, then the M-ATV interim bridge vehicle competition, then faded into oblivion. The firm still has an offering in this weight class, however, thanks to Britain’s Light Protected Patrol Vehicle competition. Instead of entering the Cheetah, Force Protection worked in conjunction with its British partners to invent a modular, 7.5 ton Ocelot vehicle that could give the firm another crack at JLTV.
Orders for British “Foxhounds” pushed the vehicle into production, and JLTV is a tempting target, but General Dynamics bought Force Protection in December 2011. The company could enter the Ocelot as a stand-alone JLTV EMD contender, and compete against its GTV partnership with AM General. The question is whether it will choose to do so – as its partner AM General did. The EMD phase had 7 bidders, which leaves 1 unaccounted for. If Ocelot was that missing contender, it didn’t win, but it has enough of a production base to finance improvements and enter again.
International SaratogaNavistar: Saratoga (Lost EMD). Navistar wound up splitting from its Valanx partner BAE Systems to offer its Saratoga design. It looks a lot like some of the v-hulled HMMWV upgrades on the market, but early reports indicate that it doesn’t use a v-hull for underbody blast protection. Navistar launched the Saratoga in October 2011, after conducting its own automotive and blast testing. Their funding as the #1 producer of standard MRAP vehicles would have helped back Saratoga’s development.
Saratoga was reportedly aimed at the HMMWV Recapitalization/ MECV competition, but that went away. As JLTV’s requirements and cost targets have shrunk, however, Navistar apparently decided that a “less is more” solution was smart positioning. An emailed release said that the decision makers at Navistar:
“…believe it is appealing to nations facing uncertain futures and limited budgets… Down the road, there may be an opportunity for Navistar to bid for a JLTV production contract after the EMD phase is complete. We will seriously consider that option.”
Oshkosh: L-ATV (Won EMD). They may have lost the initial JLTV Technology Development competition, but their immediate fallback was a huge success. A reworked M-ATV version of their vehicle won the planned bridge buys to JLTV, using a less high-tech approach. The M-ATV’s 8,000+ orders could easily finance further JLTV research to improve their team’s perceived technical maturity, while providing a potential commonality angle.
Which is exactly what happened, leading to the smaller, privately-developed L-ATV. It includes an updated TAK-4i version of the firm’s widely-used TAK-4 independent suspension system, and can add an optional ProPulse hybrid diesel-electric drive train for power storage and export.
JLTV: Contracts and Key Events FY 2016Production RFP. AM General BRV-O
February 4/16: Following Michael Gilmore’s thoughts on the F-35 program, his report has also shed some light on the hotly contested Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) competition. His report goes into detail on how the three offerings for the USMC Humvee replacement faired in tests. While Lockheed Martin and competition winner Oshkosh met protection requirements, Humvee producer AM General fell short. The shortfall resulted in AM General losing out on a contract potentially worth $30 billion, one of the biggest Army contracts in recent times. Lockheed Martin went on to begin a legal proceeding against the award to Oshkosh; however, these were thrown out before the new year.
December 17/15: Oshkosh Corporation has been allowed to resume building tactical vehicles for the US Army. The go ahead was given after the company was forced to halt production of 17,000 Light Tactical Vehicles specified on the $6.75 billion contract which was awarded in August. Rival bidder Lockheed Martin had challenged the decision to award Oshkosh Corp the tender, bringing it to the watchdog Government Accountability Office. The GAO dismissed Lockheed’s objections, allowing the production to continue.
FY 2015Production RFP.
September 09/15: Lockheed is protesting the award to its competitor of the massive JLTV program. The GAO said that the decision on the protest would be made before things start to close up in D.C. for Christmas. AM General, the other firm losing to Oshkosh, opted not to protest.
August 27/15: It should go without saying that yesterday’s Oshkosh award of the JLTV program may well be contested. The Army has yet to debrief Lockheed or AM General, a key step in the process toward a proper GAO protest.
August 26/15: Oshkosh won one of the largest land forces defense contracts ever, taking the $30 billion JLTV contract. The initial order for 17,000 vehicles will start replacing Humvees in fiscal 2016 and really ramp in 2018. Runner ups were Lockheed and AM General.
Dec 12/14: Production RFP. USTACOM releases the 4th and final iteration of its JLTV RFP for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate Production (FRP). This comes right after the 3rd draft, indicating that changes were minimal. Contractors have until February 5, 2015 to send questions, with proposals due by Feb. 10. Communications with parties other than the 3 potential prime contractors will be kept to a minimum. The Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract should last 3 years of LRIP followed by 5 years at full rate. Pricing the years out will depend of whether Multiyear Procurement (MYP) is approved by Congress. Solicitation W56HZV-14-R-0039.
Dec 02/14: 3rd RFP Draft. USTACOM releases the 3rd iteration of its draft JLTV RFP. Communication remains limited to one-on-one meetings with the 3 EMD winners, under an approved Justification and Approval that allows limited competition. There will still be a lot of work ahead even after the final RFP is issued and a contract awarded, as the pursuit of a MYP strategy at the the full rate production stage will require congressional approval.
Source: W56HZV-14-R-0039.
Nov 19/14: Limited User Testing. Limited User Testing (LUT) has been completed by the US Army and Marine Corps between September and October with the prototypes that all 3 EMD participants had provided.
Oct 8/14: 2nd RFP Draft. the US military releases their 2nd Draft RFP for JLTV. It envisions a maximum of 8 years for the production contract & options, using range pricing to determine unit prices for vehicles and kits.
Per H.1.3.1., orders could rise to 16,700 vehicles on a firm-fixed-price basis that changes using agreed yearly cost escalation, with the JLTV mission package mix determined each year from 4 options: M1278 Heavy guns carrier, M1279 Utility/ cargo, M1280 General purpose, M1281 close-combat weapons carrier. They could add up to 97 refurbished JLTV-FoVs to make 16,797, but they need to exercise the refurbished options in Lots 1-5.
The government can also order up to 32 trailers on a firm-fixed-price basis in any increment, and up to 164,697 packaged and installed kits on a firm-fixed-price basis. Sources: TACOM Warren Procurement Network, “2nd DRAFT RFP W56HZV-14-R-0039” | FBO.gov #W56HZV14R0039.
FY 2013 – 2014Program updates; Test vehicles produced; RFP drafts begin, as initial variants become clearer.
Sept 24/14: The JLTV designs remain staples at shows like AUSA and Modern Day Marine eXpo, as the firm compete to build almost 17,000 vehicles, with the initial production contracts expected in summer 2015 (183 Army and 7 USMC). Will the military go beyond that?
“Overall, the Army aims to purchase about 49,000 of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, while the Marine Corps plans to acquire about 5,500 of the trucks. Both services have pledged their commitment to the program despite facing automatic budget cuts known as sequestration…. estimated the effort to develop and build the vehicles at almost $23 billion, or about $400,000 per truck, according to a 2013 report from the Congressional Research Service. Leaders have maintained each vehicle will cost about $250,000.”
We’ll see. Sources: DoD Buzz, “Army to Start Next JLTV Competition This Fall”.
Sept 5/14: LMCO. The Lockheed Martin Team’s JLTV program successfully completed the government’s Production Readiness Review (PRR) of their Camden, AK Ground Vehicle Assembly facility.
The Camden site has won a a Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award for Manufacturing Excellence before, but Lockheed doesn’t have a history with vehicles, and BAE’s Sealy, TX facility was gutted by Oshkosh’s money-losing bid for FMTV trucks. That makes this kind of approval more important to them than it is to other teams. Sources: LMCO, “U.S. Government Gives Green Light to Lockheed Martin Team’s JLTV Production Plans”.
June 25/14: Draft RFP v1. The government issues its initial draft RFP for JLTV. One advantage to EMD Phase selection: Joint Program Office JLTV will only answer questions or take comments from the 3 EMD contractors, though non-classified materials and answers will be posted and available to anyone. Sources: TACOM Warren Procurement Network, “1st Draft Request for Proposal (RFP), Attachments and Exhibits” | FBO.gov #W56HZV14R0039, “23–Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate Production (FRP) Special Notice – Draft RFP
Solicitation Number”.
Draft RFPs begin
June 18/13: Program update. Despite sequestration, JLTV program officials tell military.com that they’re on track to deliver a low-rate-initial production JLTV award to a single vendor in FY 2015. AM General, Lockheed Martin, and Oshkosh are scheduled to deliver 22 vehicles each for testing in August 2013. They’ll go through off-road and soft soil testing, shipboard and ship to shore tests, and blast testing. Testing will help create a requirements document that will be validated by late FY 2014 – early FY 2015, which in turn paves the way for an RFP. The final step is an open competition, followed by final award.
The official per-unit limit remains at to $250,000 per vehicle, thanks to on-going trade-offs throughout the Technology Development process. On the other hand, by the time the services finish adding communications, manned weapons stations or RWS, and other gear, it’s reasonable to expect a final price around $400,000 – 500,000+.
The wild card? Program managers acknowledge that another year of sequestration cuts would force new choices on the military, which could change the program. That’s very likely to happen, which could turn programs like the USMC’s HMMWV improvement (q.v. Sept 27/12) from complements to competitors. Military.com.
June 10-22/13: Test vehicles. The EMD phase vendors have manufactured their initial testing vehicles for the US government, with formal deliveries scheduled to run through August. The JLTV prototypes will receive additional “mission packages” from their manufacturers or from the government, in order to convert them to specific testing configurations like Heavy Guns Carrier. AM General | Lockheed Martin | Oshkosh Defense.
FY 2012RFP & responses lead to EMD awards; BAE/Navistar team splits; AM General submits its own bid; USMC’s HMMWV improvement complement.
Lockheed/BAE’s lineup
(click to view full)
Sept 27/12: USMC HMMWVs. Military.com reports on the USMC’s internal math, which says they won’t be able to replace 24,000 HMMWVs with 5,500 JLTVs bought around 2017 – 2022.
The rest will need to come from a HMMWV improvement program, without getting into the same “costs as much as buying new” swamp as HMMMWV RECAP. Solution? Start with a clear price limit, and try to figure out what you can afford for that. The interesting thing is that instead of focusing on blast protection, the program seems to aim at restoring vehicle performance, payload, and reliability to the level it was at before before conventional up-armoring. Military.com.
Sept 4/12: Thou Shalt not Protest. Navistar withdraws a GAO protest that it had filed just a few days earlier. According to the company they first filed their protest because of regulatory timing constraints, but after reviewing their debriefing, they decided not to proceed. BAE Systems will not challenge the award, either. Marine Corps Times.
Meanwhile Hardwire LLC announced that it was behind the mystery 7th (failed) bid. The company made blast chimney demonstrations on Humvees a couple of years ago. Defense News.
Aug 24/12: EMD triple award. 3 awards are made for the 27-month Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase, with an estimated completion date of Nov 8/14. The winners will deliver 22 vehicles within 12 to 14 months for further testing and evaluation. TACOM in Warren, MI received 7 bids, and the winners were:
Lockheed Martin Corp. in Grand Prairie, TX wins a $65 million firm-fixed-price contract. Work will be performed in Lockheed Martin’s Grand Prairie, TX facility, and BAE TVS’ Sealy, TX plant (W56HZV-12-C-0262).
AM General LLC in South Bend, IN wins a $63.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for their BRV-O. Work will be performed in Livonia, MI, and Mishawaka, IN (W56HZV-12-C-0258).
Oshkosh Corp. in Oshkosh, WI wins a $55.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for their L-ATV. Work will be performed in Oshkosh, WI (W56HZV-12-C-0264).
The awards vindicate AM General and Oshkosh’s choice to submit their own bids, while TD phase winners BAE (Valanx) and General Dynamics (Eagle) are on their own if they want to continue. Navistar (Saratoga) could also elect to continue with private development, and enter the production competition. The 7th bidder isn’t clear, but General Dynamics may have also bid its Ocelot/Foxhound.
BAE has the most interesting decision, as they remain involved in EMD through their participation in the Lockheed Martin-led team. A win with Lockheed would keep their Texas plant alive and in position to contest the next FMTV medium truck contract, which Oshkosh is now known to have bid at a significant loss. Shareholder dissatisfaction makes a repeat of that strategy unlikely for Oshkosh, which must give BAE hope to recapture the Sealy factory’s cornerstone. Their Valanx is associated with other facilities. Is it better for BAE to hedge its bets with Valanx development, or keep the development money for other things and go all in with Lockheed Martin? See also US Army, belatedly | FBO.gov | AM General | Lockheed Martin | Oshkosh | James Hasik sees industrial considerations in the award, and explains further.
JLTV EMD Phase
March 27/12: RFP bids in. BAE, Lockheed Martin, and Oshkosh announce their JLTV submissions. The due date had originally been March 13/12, but it was extended. The government plans to award up to 3 JLTV EMD contracts in June 2012, for delivery of 22 prototype vehicles and other equipment for testing.
AM General announces the next day that in addition to its joint GTV submission with General Dynamics Land Systems, it will be submitting a design of its own called the BRV-O (Blast Resistant Vehicle – Off road). AM General developed the vehicle itself, and says it has put BRV-O through 300,000 miles of road testing. It also says that it has a number of industrial partners for system integration, etc., but won’t name them.
BAE US Combat Systems’ JLTV team includes Northrop Grumman for systems integration, Arvin Meritor for the suspension, and now Ford for the engine. Their Valanx will use the same Power Stroke 6.7 liter turbocharged diesel that powers Ford’s commercial F-series trucks. BAE describes it as having “class-leading fuel economy and the best horsepower and torque of any engine in its class,” and told DoD Buzz that when Navistar and BAE Systems split, and BAE Systems needed a company to build them an engine, Ford was the obvious answer.
The partnership between General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General has confirmed that they’re bidding a design called the EAGLE. This double-v hull design is not the same as GD MOWAG’s light patrol vehicle offering that used to be based on the HMMWV, and now (EAGLE IV) uses the Duro truck as its base.
Lockheed Martin’s JLTV team includes BAE Tactical Vehicle Systems in Sealy, TX, plus Cummins Engine, Allison Transmission, Bosch, Meritor Defense, Lotus Engineering, L3 Combat Propulsion Systems, and Vehma International of America. Their release touted the weight and cost savings in their revised designs, using a combination of digital engineering analysis, virtual design builds, component tests and physical stress testing. BAE-TVS appears to be positioned as the manufacturing centerpiece, and has capacity after Oshkosh bid below cost to take their FMTV truck contract away.
Navistar has split from BAE Systems, and is offering its Saratoga design, which looks a lot like some of the V-hulled HMMWV upgrades on the market. Navistar launched the vehicle in October 2011, after conducting its own automotive and blast testing. Navistar Defense President Archie Massicotte said that: “The Saratoga is a solid design and now that we have seen the requirements of the JLTV migrate toward our vehicle capabilities, we are in a position to modify the Saratoga to fit those requirements.”
Oshkosh, as predicted, is entering its L-ATV derivative of the popular M-ATV, which has become the US military’s most widely ordered blast-resistant vehicle. Their bid includes their new and improved TAK-4i independent suspension, and an optional Oshkosh ProPulse diesel-electric hybrid powertrain.
Force Protection, which has been absorbed into GD Land Systems, was silent on whether or not it bid its Ocelot.
Bid surprises for some
March 4/12: Not that people doubt the Army’s ability to deliver a JLTV vehicle with HMMWV size and MRAP-level protection for $250,000… but they do. The Army is responding. Lt. Gen. Bill Phillips, principal military deputy to the assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology:
“In July [2011], the Army released the “Decker-Wagner” review of its acquisition processes… Phillips said the Army has already implemented 29 of the 76 recommendations in the report, and will implement a total of 63 of those recommendations total — with the majority complete by the summer… Now, he said, the service is looking at what capabilities a requirement provides, is it feasible in terms of execution on the timeline, and is it affordable.
One beneficiary of the Army’s new acquisition processes is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Phillips said the JLTV might have cost the Army close to $500,000 per vehicle if the Army had gone forward with the strategy it had during the technology development phase of the vehicle. Today, he said, as a result of how the Army changed the way it does requirements “we are confident we can bring this vehicle in for less than $250,000.”
Acquisition processes don’t change the laws of physics. Phillips cites the successful MRAP program as a reason for faith, but those vehicles cost over $500,000 each, and were far heavier than JLTV’s goal. The proof will be in the delivery.
Feb 28/12: Col. Dave Bassett, the project manager for Army tactical vehicles, tells the AUSA conference that he has confidence in the coming responses to JLTV. In his opinion:
“Industry, they don’t need another two years to design this vehicle… They are ready now to respond with mature designs to our solicitation.”
Jan 30/12: JLTV EMD RFP. FBO.gov solicitation #W56HZV11R0329:
“The solicitation for the JLTV EMD phase… shall be conducted on a source selection basis utilizing a “tradeoff” process to obtain the best value to the Government. The full and open competitive source selection process will result in an award to up to three firm-fixed price contracts for the EMD(Engineering & Manufacturing Development) phase focusing on fabrication, assembly, integration, testing and test support, and related requirements in accordance with the contract and the JLTV Purchase Description. Each JLTV Contractor shall deliver prototype vehicles, ballistic structures, armor coupons, additional test assets, and contractor furnished kits, trailers and data requirements. Contract award is currently planned for June of 2012. “
The response date in March 13/12. Per the program’s original plan, vendors that were not picked for the initial JLTV development phase can enter vehicles in this competition.
EMD phase RFP
Jan 26/12: Saved by the budget? Preliminary FY 2013 budget materials discuss coming shifts in Pentagon priorities, as the defense department moves to make future cuts. The JLTV ids an exception, however: “HMMWVs – terminated upgrades and focused modernization resources on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle,” in line with recent US Army declarations. Pentagon release | “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices” [PDF]
The US Army declares that it will not pursue offerings of upgraded HMMWVs, and intends to stick with the JLTV program, following an agreement with the Marine Corps. The question, of course, is whether Congress will go along with this decision. Lexington Institute.
Jan 17/12: Testing warnings. The Pentagon releases the FY2011 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The JLTV is included, and tests indicate a couple of warning signs. To sum up: they need roads, reliability has been poor, MRAPs are uncomfortable, and the laws of physics haven’t been repealed.
“During TD testing, all vendor vehicles experienced difficulty with mobility in soft soil due to vehicle weight and other vehicle design factors. In the TD, the reliability of vendor vehicles demonstrated between 71 to 902 Mean Miles Between Operational Mission Failure (MMBOMF) versus the required 3,600 MMBOMF. The Army increased the underbody threat requirement during TD to be equivalent to the protection provided by the [heavier M-ATV] vehicle. The ability to achieve the increased level of protection while also satisfying other JLTV requirements [DID: like, say, mobility in soft soil] is not known.”
Mobility will be an especial issue for the US Marines. The testers also complained about communications integration, and the same visibility and internal layout issues that have bedeviled other blast-resistant designs. BAE’s Valanx was supposedly designed to offset that, but:
“All three JLTV vendor vehicles had problems demonstrating functionality of government furnished command, control, and communication equipment in vehicles… Lack of adequate storage space for ammunition, restricted visibility due to small windows, positioning of window panels, and uncomfortable seats with poor seating arrangements were common problems between vendor prototypes and variants.”
Oct 10/11: NAV Saratoga. Navistar Defense introduces its Saratoga light patrol vehicle at AUSA. It’s initially aimed at the HMMWV Recapitalization/ MECV program, but ends up becoming Navistar’s JLTV offering. Navistar | Aviation Week Ares | Defense Update.
Oct 3/11: JLTV EMD RFP Draft. The latest Army-Marine Corps JLTV solicitation favors existing designs over new, and may lead to the program’s demise in favor of recapitalized and modified HMMWVs.
The $250,000 target cost will be a challenge all by itself, but the new solicitation may actually kill JLTV altogether, by driving both new and existing designs out of the competition. By reducing expected production to just 20,000 vehicles over 8 years (3 LRIP, 5 full-rate), it becomes more difficult for firms to recover costs for new designs. On the other hand, demands to hand over technical data rights, and a plan to re-compete the production contract for the winning vehicle after several years, make it unattractive for firms to place a valuable existing design at risk. US Army TACOM Page | FBO.gov | Defense News | Lexington Institute.
FY 2011Oshkosh debuts L-ATV; JLTV cut rumors prod Plan Bs.
L-ATV
(click to view full)
Sept 13/11: OSK L-ATV. Oshkosh unveils its smaller “L-ATV” protected patrol vehicle, which it describes as fully compliant with all JLTV program specifications. The firm was eliminated from the technical demonstrator contract phase, but the next phase will be re-opened to outside bidders. Oshkosh did the expected thing, and leveraged its M-ATV win to fund development.
The L-ATV will feature the improved TAK-4i independent suspension, which “uses a proprietary technology to deliver 20 inches of independent wheel travel – 25 percent more wheel travel than any vehicle in the U.S. military’s fleets.” It can also raise or lower the vehicle, ensuring transportability in ships and aircraft, while still offering enough height for all-terrain mobility and mine blast protection.
Sept 13/11: JLTV future. The Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee moves to cancel JLTV in their version of the FY 2012 defense bill, which would shift the MECV upgraded HMMWV effort into JLTV’s place. If the curt remains final, which is a long way from happening. AOL Defense.
April 28/11: As the teams prepare for the JTLV Engineering & Manufacturing Development contract awards in early 2012, BAE and Navistar’s Team Valanx adds Northrop Grumman to their consortium.
Northrop Grumman will serve as the C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) lead, responsible for the integration of command and control hardware and software, computers and communications equipment, and sensors and sensor suites for intelligence gathering and force protection. BAE Systems.
Oct 25/10: JLTV future. BAE’s Plan B: v-hulled HMMWVs. At AUSA 2010, BAE Systems announces its “Integrated Smart V,” a lightweight monocoque V-hull HMMWV that reuses a large percentage of existing HMMWV components, including the power train and wheel assemblies. It adds a layered monocoque hull with a V-shaped underbody that totally encapsulates the crew, and BAE line lead Chris Chambers adds that “…using clips attached to the monocoque V-hull, the ISV provides a rigid, uncompromising protection solution at an affordable price.”
BAE’s ISV solution comes as budget cuts make JLTV an attractive target, and the USMC looks for an option that will meet its height requirements for stowage aboard ship. They’re not the only firm to be thinking along those lines – Textron has a “capsulized” HMMWV of its own, and have teamed with another firm that has done work along similar lines: Granite Tactical Vehicles. HMMWV ISV could also offer an emergency HMMWV fleet recapitalization option that would bring new work to BAE’s land systems business, which has been hurt by its loss of FMTV truck production, and by the end of MRAP main production orders. BAE Systems.
FY 2010Australia contracts; Army strategy leaves JLTV in question; Interest from India.
Ocelot modularity
(click to view full)
Aug 17/10: JLTV future. DoD Buzz reports that the US Army’s latest Tactical Vehicle Strategy looks like bad news for the JLTV, with small buys spaced over time to equip deployed units. Bottom line?
“Here’s the basic plan. Overall, the Army will shrink its fleet of HUMVEEs, MRAPs and medium trucks to 244,000 by 2025 from its current 260,000. How? The service will rid itself of 4,000 of the hardest to maintain and most beat up MRAPS by 2025. It will scrap the 28,000-strong M35 fleet and replace it with new FMTVs for a fleet total of 76,000. That will mean a total reduction of 4,000 trucks. The HUMVEE fleet will shrink the most, going from 101,000 to 35,000 by 2025. But there appears to be one big hole in the Army plan. It does not project how many Joint Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicles it will be. The strategy’s answer: TBD.”
See the full Army Tactical Vehicle Strategy [PDF].
Aug 9/10: Australia. The General Tactical Vehicles JV between General Dynamics and AM General in Sterling Heights, MI receives a $9 million cost-share contract for the design and development of 3 JLTV subconfigurations for Australia, and the delivery of 2 JLTV subconfiguration vehicles and 1 companion trailer for government testing.
Work is to be performed in Livonia, MI (47%); Sterling Heights, MI (41%); Muskegon, MI (9%); and South Bend, IN (3%), with an estimated completion date of May 19/11. JLTV bids were solicited on the World Wide Web with 7 bids received by the US Army TACOM Contracting Center in Warren, MI (W56HZV-09-C-0108).
June 23/10: Australia. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Owego, NY receives an $8.5 million cost-plus- fixed-fee contract. They will design and develop 3 JLTV sub-configurations for Australia with right-hand drive, and deliver 2 JLTV sub configurations vehicles and 1 companion trailer for Australian government testing.
Work will be performed in Owego, NY, and the contracted is expected to run until May 19/11. Bids were solicited on the World Wide Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s TACOM Contracting Center in Warren, MI (W56HZV-09-C-0109).
June 17/10: Australia. The BAE Land Systems – Navistar – ArvinMeritor team hands over 3 Australian JLTVs in a ceremony at West Point, MS. All 3 types are represented: a Category A General Purpose vehicle, a Category B Command and Control on the Move vehicle and a Category C Utility/cargo variant. The prototypes are very similar to American JLTV models, but include requested Australian modifications and a right-side driver. They will undergo tropical environment, reliability testing, and blast testing in Australia.
BAE Systems is Australia’s largest defense company, employing more than 6,000 people at 100 locations across Australia. BAE Systems.
May 26/10: Australia. Australia’s Overlander Phase 4 will have 3 new competitors. Australia’s Minister for Defence Materiel and Science, Greg Combet, announces that Thales Australia, Force Protection Europe, and General Dynamics Land Systems will each receive 6-month contracts worth up to A$ 9 million each, in order to develop “Protected Mobility Vehicle” prototypes. Those prototypes would compete against any winners from the American/Australian JLTV competition, for a roughly A$ 1 billion, 1,300 vehicle contract.
Force Protection is partnered with England’s Ricardo to develop the modular Ocelot, which is also competing for a similar contract in Britain. Bushmaster MPV manufacturers Thales Australia have designed a smaller vehicle called the Hawkei, named after one of Australia’s Death Adders. Their partners include Boeing Defence Australia, PAC Group, and Israeli armor manufacturer and designer Plasan Sasa. GDLS has several options, including a lighter variant of their RG-31 with Oshkosh’s TAK-4 suspension upgrade, currently serving with the US military in Afghanistan. As noted above, they are also partnered with Humvee manufacturer AMC General for the JLTV competition. Australian DoD | Force Protection | Thales Australia.
Made in Australia option
May 3/10: BAE. The BAE Systems/ Navistar/ ArvinMeritor team announces the handover of 7 JLTV prototypes and 4 companion trailers to the U.S. Army. The mix of vehicles included 2 JLTV Category A General Purpose vehicles, 4 JLTV Category B Infantry Carriers, and 1 Category C Utility Carrier. The team is now focused on completing the build of 3 additional variants and a companion trailer, to be delivered to Australia in June 2010.
Sites participating in this team’s JLTV development include: York, PA; Ontario, San Diego and Santa Clara, CA; Dearborn Heights, Sterling Heights and Troy, MI; Minneapolis, MN; Johnson City, NY; Austin, TX; Nashua, NH; Reston, VA; Melrose Park and Warrenville, IL; Fort Wayne, IN; West Point, MS; Huntsville, AL; and Laurinberg and Aiken, SC. Navistar.
April 28/10: GTV. The General Tactical Vehicles (GTV) team of General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General delivers 7 JLTV prototypes, plus 4 trailers and supporting equipment to the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps for Technology Development (TD) phase testing. The TD phase includes a 12-month test and evaluation process at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, in Aberdeen, MD, and at the Yuma Proving Grounds in Yuma, AZ. The delivery is ahead of schedule, and follows GTV’s previous ahead-of-schedule deliveries of armor samples, ballistic hulls and spare parts.
Don Howe, is the GTV senior program director, and David Caldwell is GTV deputy program director. Howe says that GTV has invested in additional JLTV vehicles and trailers as part of its independent R&D program. GD release.
March 30/10: GAO Report. The US GAO audit office delivers its 8th annual “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs report.
Because the program is at such early stages, the GAO report is more of a quick update than in-depth analysis. The JLTV program completed Preliminary Design Reviews during the summer of 2009, Critical Design Reviews are planned for early fiscal year 2010, and by Q4 FY 2011 (summer), the program expects to begin engineering and manufacturing development. FY 2008-2010 RDTE (Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation) funding is $306.68 million ($16.44 million Army, $143.24 million USMC).
Feb 25/10: LMCO. Lockheed Martin unveils its 4th operational JLTV prototype at the AUSA convention in Ft. Lauderdale, FL. It’s a 2nd variant of the original Infantry Carrier JLTV Category B model, which was unveiled in October 2007. Lockheed Martin’s team introduced their Category C Utility Vehicle in February 2008, and its Category A General Purpose Mobility model in October 2008.
Currently all of the Lockheed Martin JLTV prototypes are in system test, where they have accumulated over 30,000 combined test miles, more than half of which have been conducted off-road. Lockheed Martin.
Nov 4/09: The General Dynamics/ AM General joint venture, General Tactical Vehicles (GTV), announces that they are the first JLTV contractor to complete the JLTV Critical Design Review, adding:
“GTV is transitioning into the vehicle and trailer build and test phase for the JLTV units deliverable to the government in the spring of 2010 under its technology development contract awarded last October.”
Oct 6/09: Australia and… India? Aviation Week’s Ares reports that India is in discussions to join the JLTV program, and Australia has given notice that will continue their participation into the next phase. Meanwhile, the 3 selected vehicle teams are about 1/3 of the way through the existing phase, with Preliminary Design Reviews done and Critical Design Reviews coming up over the next 2 months.
With respect to a potential threat from the existing Oshkosh M-ATV, JLTV program officials state that the programs share 320 mission requirements, but JLTV adds another 580 to create a full Hummer-like family of light tactical vehicles. They see the programs as complementary, which could be true if the 580 additional requirements are dfficult for M-ATV to meet within its existing design. It would take a budget crunch to really test those theories – but one may be coming.
FY 2009JLTV Tech Dev contracts; GAO denied TD protests; Australia is in; British won’t be buying.
Lockheed’s Aussie JLTV
(click to view full)
Sept 30/09: Australian contracts. The US Army and Marine Corps formally awarded Technology Development (TD) contract modifications to each of JLTV’s 3 industry partners in accordance with the Australian Project Arrangement (PA). Under the original US contracts, each of the JLTV industry teams are delivering ballistic testing sample and a number of ballistic hulls for evaluation at Aberdeen Test Center, followed by prototype vehicles and trailers during April/May 2010, for 12 months of Government Testing at Aberdeen Test Center, MD and Yuma Test Center, AZ.
Program leaders on each side include USMC JLTV program manager Lt. Col. Ruben Garza, and Lt. Col. Alistair Dickie of the Australian Army. At present, 2 Australian Co-operative Program Personnel are supporting the JLTV Program Management Office at Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Harrison Township, MI. Australian vehicles will add reliability and performance testing for up to 15,000 miles per vehicle, followed by shipment to Australia for tropical environment testing, and additional reliability and ballistic testing. To this effect, US Army TACOM notes independent modifications made to BAE Systems, General Tactical Vehicles and Lockheed Martin contracts during July and August 2009:
BAE Systems Land & Armaments: Deliver 3 right-side operation JLTV vehicles and one companion trailer: a JLTV-A General Purpose Mobility, a JLTV-B-C2OTM/AU Command Control On-The-Move, a JLTV-C-UTL/AU Utility Vehicle-Shelter Carrier, and a JLTV/T-AU Prototype Companion Trailer.
General Tactical Vehicles (GTV): Design 3 right-side operation JLTV vehicles (Payload categories A, B, and C) and then build 2 (categories B and C), along with one JLTV-T/AU Prototype Companion Trailer.
Lockheed Martin: Design 3 right-side operation JLTV vehicles (Payload categories A, B, and C) and then build 2 (categories B and C), along with one JLTV-T/AU Prototype Companion Trailer.
Australia TD contracts
June 30/09: M-ATV. The US government awards the first big M-ATV delivery order, in order to field 5,244 vehicles in 2009-2010 that will act as a front-line bridge in Afghanistan between the limitations of existing Hummers and MRAPs, and JLTV. The initial $1.056 billion delivery order for 2,244 vehicles goes to Oshkosh, whose design is based on their MTVR medium truck and has a Gross Vehicle Weight of 16.5 tons/ 32,500 pounds. Additional orders follow.
The result could revive Oshkosh’s design for subsequent rounds of the JLTV competition, either as a solo venture or via renewed cooperation with Northrop Grumman. Read “M-ATV: A Win, at Last, for Oshkosh” for more.
March 18/08: Australia. Liberal Party opposition leader Malcolm Turnbull criticizes Australia’s involvement in the JLTV program, drawing a response from the Labor Party government. Turnbull:
“We’ve had another issue that we’ve raised in the Parliament this morning about a new armoured vehicle which should be made in Australia. The Thales company, which makes the Bushmasters in Bendigo, has been making these armoured vehicles in Australia for the Australian Army very successfully and the Government is looking for a new vehicle and it is actually inviting an American company to make a prototype… they say they are committed to jobs and yet every example…”
Australia has already raised its quota of Bushmaster MRAP vehicles several times, and the vehicle has a dedicated niche in Project Overlander. That niche is different from the JLTV’s niche, however, which is why American firms are submitting different vehicles. With respect to LAND 121 (Overlander) Phase 4, Mnister for Defence Joel Fitzgibbon notes that the original announcement had said that local Australian options would also be explored. An RFP to local industry is due in April 2009, and the DoD is expected to present options to the government in late 2009. Malcolm Turnbull interview transcript | Ministerial response.
Feb 26/09: Sub-contractors. ArvinMeritor, Inc. announces that they will be the JLTV drivetrain supplier for the Lockheed Martin team, which includes BAE General Tactical Systems; and for BAE U.S. Combat Systems, who leads the BAE/Navistar team. ArvinMeritor began working on new products and technologies for the JLTV program in 2006, participating in the Nevada Automotive Test Centers (NATC) Combat Tactical Vehicle Technical Demonstrator program.
Their solutions for the JLTV program include the Meritor lightweight, high mobility independent suspensions, an integrated all-wheel drive system, a central tire inflation system, semi-active damping, and MeritorWABCO hydraulic braking systems with electronic stability control.
Feb 26/09: LMCO. Lockheed Martin unveils a 4th JLTV prototype at the AUSA 209 conference; it is a 2nd variant design of the JLTV-B infantry carrier. All of the Lockheed Martin JLTV prototypes are in system tes, and have accumulated over 30,000 combined test miles, more than half of which have been conducted off-road to simulate mission conditions. Lockheed Martin release.
JLTV evaluationsFeb 17/09: GAO – Protests denied. The US GAO rules on JLTV protests from Northrop Grumman Space and Missile Systems Corporation, and Textron Marine & Land Systems Corporation. The protests are denied, allowing the JLTV program to move forward as the winning contracts are “unfrozen”.
The full decision was released to the public in early March 2009. See the bid evaluation grid at left for the 3 winners, and the 2 protesters. Northrop Grumman’s offering had by far the lowest cost of these 5, at an estimated $32.95 million compared to the overall average of $50.1 million. Their design and technology was considered to have moderate technical risk, however, which can result is escalating future costs once development begins. The winning bidders’ had better technical maturity and integration ratings than Northrop Grumman’s; only fellow protester Textron’s entry was worse, and at an estimated development price of $53.32 million.
Since the “Technical was significantly more important than logistics commonality, which was more important than cost; cost and past performance/small business participation were approximately equal in importance,” in the RFP criteria, the GAO saw no reason to overturn a selection made on that basis. Other areas of protest, including the adequacy of the GD/AMC team’s small business contracting plan, were also deined. Full decision re: file #B-400837 | Full decision, PDF format.
GAO go-ahead
Nov 17/08: No British JLTV. Aviation Week reports that Britain will not be part of the JLTV program via its Operational Utility Vehicle Systems (OUVS) project, even though a joint working group was set up with the JLTV program in Q3 2008. Britan’s minister for defense equipment and support Quenton Davies reportedly said that:
“The JLTV capability is a replacement for Humvee and performs both a utility vehicle and patrol vehicle role. It therefore goes beyond the requirement for OUVS and the two parties have agreed that there is not enough synergy to warrant collaboration on the acquisition of vehicles at this time.”
Britain already has 400 JLTV type patrol vehicles on order: Iveco’s Panther /MLV/ Lince, which is also in servce with or ordered by Italy, Belgium, Croatia, The Czech Republic, Norway, and Spain. It should be entering service in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009.
The British aren’t coming
Nov 7/08: GAO protest. Northrop Grumman and Oshkosh Defense file a formal protest with the US Congressional Government Accountability Office (GAO), requesting a review of the JLTV evaluation conducted by the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Source Selection Authority (SSA). They claim that the SSA misapplied the stated evaluation criteria, by giving design maturity more weight than advertised; did not make the value of a demonstrator vehicle clear; “relied unreasonably on company self-evaluations of design maturity and failed to conduct an adequate, independent assessment”; and undervalued their lowest cost bid.
The firm further charges that these changes amounted to an “unannounced agency decision to transform the solicitation from a TD (Technology Demonstrator) phase to a defacto System Development and Demonstration (SDD) effort.” That might be a very wise move for the JLTV program, but the government must advise bidders of any material shifts to a program’s criteria or direction during the bid process.
Contract awards are held up until a GAO protest ruling is issued – see Feb 17/09 for resolution. NGC release.
New dawn?Oct 29-30/08: JLTV TD contracts. The US Army issues contract releases on DefenseLink, as well as longer articles on Army.mil, as it makes 3 awards. See US Army: Army awards development contracts for JLTV | Army awards three Joint Light Tactical Vehicle technology phase development contracts || Defense News | Defense Update | WIRED Danger Room | Bloomberg | Crain’s Detroit | Milwaukee-Wisconsin Jounral Sentinel re: Oshkosh elimination | South Bend Tribune re: AM General. Also:
Oct 30/08: BAE Systems Land & Armaments-Grounds System Division in Santa Clara, CA won a $40.5 million cost share contract for the JLTV’s 27-month technology development phase. Work will be performed in Santa Clara, CA, Warrenville, IL, Johnson City, NY, and Troy, MI, with an estimated completion date of Jan 31/11. Bids were solicited via the Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s Tank & Automotive Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0426). BAE release | Navistar release.
Oct 30/08: General Tactical Vehicles in Sterling Heights, MI won a $45.1 million cost share contract for the JLTV’s 27-month technology development phase. As noted above, GTV is a joint venture partnership between AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. Work will be performed in Livonia, MI, Sterling Heights, MI, Muskegon, MI, and South Bend, IN, with an estimated completion date of Jan 31/11. Bids were solicited via the Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s Tank & Automotive Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0430). GTV release at: Geeral Dynamics | GTV | AM General.
Oct 30/08: Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY won a $35.9 million cost share contract for the JLTV’s 27-month technology development phase. Work will be performed in Owego, NY, and Sealy, TX, with an estimated completion date of Jan 31/11. Bids were solicited via the Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s Tank & Automotive Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0431). Work in Sealy, TX involves its core partner, BAE Systems’ Armor Holdings. Lockheed Martin release.
Tech Development Phase
Oct 29/08: Australia in. Australia’s Labor Party Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon announces that the Government has given approval to commence planning for Phase 4 of the multi-billion dollar LAND 121 “Overlander” project. Phase 4 will replace some of the Australian Defence Force’s 4,200 Land Rovers with a fleet of protected light mobility vehicles.
As part of their plan to examine all of their options, Australia has decided to participate in the JLTV’s technology demonstration phase. This is not a total commitment to the JLTV program’s 3 contenders, however; Australia’s DoD will also engage with industry to explore other options. Ministerial Speech | Australian DoD release.
Australia joins
FY 2008 and EarlierGetting it together.
USMC HMMWV, Iraq:
Fill ‘er up!
(click to view full)
August 2008: The US Army and Marine Corps present their synchronized joint wheeled vehicle strategy.
Feb 5/08: JLTV RFP. An RFP for the JLTV’s Technology Development Phase is issued to industry.
Dec 22/07: JLTV ADM. The Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) signs an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) directing the JLTV Program to move from the Concept Refinement Phase into the Technology Development Phase (TDP) of the DOD System Acquisition Process. Source: CRS.
November 2007: The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB)”…concerned that the Pentagon’s multi-billion dollar procurement plans for a raft of new tactical wheeled vehicles may be laden with excessive redundancy,” directs the Army and Marine Corps to develop and present a strategy by March 31/08. In the same month, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) calls for a similar assessment by July 1/08. The OMB report is extended to that date, in order to synchronize the 2 requests.
Sept 2007: JLTV dis-approval. The Pentagon’s acquisition executive, John Young, dis-approves the JLTV RFP, and directs the US Army and Marines to “go back to the drawing board and develop a robust technology development phase.” Source: CRS.
November 2006: JLTV approval. The US military Joint Chief of Staff’s Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) approves the JLTV program. Source: CRS.
Additional ReadingsWith so many contenders, a number of participants were assured of walking away disappointed. Adding these 5 teams to the 3 winners gives 8, but TACOM reports only 7 qualifying bids. The GAO would later clarify somewhat, by saying that there were 8 initial respondents, and 6 teams who were invited to bid. TACOM will not reveal who did not submit a bid, but a fully open EMD system development contract award ensures that any of these teams could conceivably continue investing, and find themselves back in the running.
DID offers all 5 partnerships that stated plans to contend for JLTV TD. We also explain why we’re not likely to see any of them return to the JLTV competition.
Force Protection and DRS. The life-saving performance of Force Protection’s Cougar and Buffalo vehicles in theater triggered the USA’s MRAP vehicle program, and the firm has been working on its lighter Cheetah vehicle for a couple of years. Despite a big jump on its competitors in testing and feedback from the US military, however, Cheetah did not make the final 3. That failure is a huge blow to Force Protection, who also dropped to a distant 3rd place in the USA’s MRAP competition, as orders for their Cougar MRAP vehicles faded toward the end. Force Protection partnership release | Cheetah product page.
The firm’s remaining hope was that Cheetah’s developed and tested status would lead to “interim bridge buys,” to fill the USMC and Army’s M-ATV needs for lighter blast-resistant vehicles between now and 2014. To that end, they brought the Cheetah within their Force Dynamics joint venture with GDLS. The M-ATV effort also failed, which doomed the Cheetah.
Force Protection formally wrote off its investment in the Cheetah, and no longer publicizes it as an offering. The company’s acquisition by General Dynamics removed the firm from any list of future contenders.
Blackwater and Raytheon. This was the most interesting partnership on a corporate level. Blackwater’s contract security forces have their own array of equipment; some is bought off the shelf, but the firm has quickly turned its field experience into a range of fielded designs for everything from protective vests, to blast-resistant vehicles, to a surveillance blimp. This JLTV design was reportedly based on a cut-down version of their Grizzly mine-resistant vehicle, with Raytheon acting as the electronics integrator.
A win for Blackwater (now Xe) would have had seismic implications, creating the potential for controversy on a political level, and invidious comparisons from a military procurement standpoint. The effective dissolution of Blackwater’s equipment group, and massive changes to the company, ensure that they won’t be back later on. Defense News report | Tactical Life feature | Blackwater USA vehicles video.
Team Boeing. Boeing seems like an unlikely contender for a vehicle program, but their key roles in the US Army’s Future Combat Systems program and Britain’s FRES armored vehicle program do give them credibility. Their main JLTV partner was Textron, whose comparatively lightweight M1117 Guardian ASV armored cars failed the extra-tough MRAP competition tests – but have been ordered by the hundreds in separate contracts to equip American military police and some foreign forces. Other JLTV partners included Boeing’s Future Combat System prime partner SAIC, Ford (engine options and power train), MillenWorks (offroad racing and rapid prototyping heritage, LTV design was reportedly the base), and Carlson Technology (maintenance and pit stop engineering experts). Their design featured a hybrid engine, and a full electric drive train that doesn’t need to be mechanically coupled to the engine. Boeing release.
The JLTV competition has changed significantly since then. Boeing would have to make wholesale changes to their design in order to compete, and they’ve shown no public interest in doing that.
KMW/ L-3’s F2USAKMW and L-3. Germany’s KMW is a global military vehicle leader, with products that include everything from Dingo 2 mine-resistant vehicles, to tiny air-portable Wiesel tracked infantry enhancement vehicles, to Leopard 2 tanks. KMW offered its new F2 wheeled vehicle family as a JLTV contender, using L-3 as its American partner and electronics integrator.
The F2 builds on KMWs Fennek reconnaissance vehicle design, which has been adopted by several European armies, and has seen combat use by Dutch and German forces. Fennek’s strengths include a low detection profile across the spectrum, very good mobility, long range, and excellent self sufficiency. Fennek’s mine protection is not seen as a similar strength, though the F2 presumably included additional protection. KMW partnership announcement | F2 family product page.
Unlike its fellows in this section, the Fennek remains a well-regarded, established product in the global defense space. It’s also a high-end product, designed for advanced reconnaissance missions. JLTV’s new price targets aren’t a fit for the Fennek.
NGC/ Oshkosh conceptNorthrop Grumman and Oshkosh. Oshkosh produces the US Marines’ MTVR medium truck, and the Army’s FHTV heavy trucks. The firm struck 3 different MRAP partnerships (PVI’s Alpha, Thales Australia’s Bushmaster, i3/Ceradyne’s Bull) – then struck out in the competition, while its competitor Navistar vaulted into the #1 spot. Northrop Grumman led this partnership, which leveraged Oshkosh’s vehicle manufacturing experience, its MTVR trucks’ TAK-4 off-road suspension, and its heavy truck work with ProPulse(TM) hybrid drive technology
Guest article by Sebastian Sobolev and Aleksandar D. Jovovic
Some years back, global defense companies flocked to the Indian defense market in search of opportunities that could offset declining home budgets. India’s attractiveness as a market was understandable: the country was embarked on an ambitious military modernization program to mitigate perceived threats from neighboring Pakistan and to compete with China in the maritime, air and land domains.
These initiatives ballooned military procurement accounts, which grew at an annual rate of 14% between 2005 and 2010. Yet contractors soon found themselves frustrated by opaque bureaucratic procurement processes, onerous domestic offset and work share requirements, and seemingly endless delays. With the emergence of a new government, what’s ahead for India?
India has made attempts to reform its procurement processes in the past; can contractors, foreign and domestic, expect anything different this time? The real battle may center on the competitive nature of India’s domestic defense firms, with the outcomes impacting opportunities for global defense providers. If Western defense suppliers are to compete in the Indian market, they would be well-served to understand the roots of the Indian procurement process, its current trajectory, and the potential opportunities that recent reforms may create.
Development of defense industrial capacity has been a key priority for India since the Nehru administration. Investment in the sector was seen as a means of spurring economic development, providing regional employment, and avoiding dependence on either Cold War bloc. Because development of this sector was a strategic economic and security priority, it was always centrally controlled, a structure that persists today. The choice of whether to import, co-produce, or indigenously develop a defense capability is made at the political level of the executive and Defense Ministry bureaucracies. Much of the decision-making authority beyond that lies with the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which governs the R&D and production activities of the state-controlled defense industries (DPSUs).
This structure also governs how foreign suppliers interact with indigenous industries. It imposes offset obligations, mandates technology transfer requirements, and, up until recently, it dictated which local institution a foreign supplier had to partner with on a given project. Waiving this last requirement has the potential to improve the business environment for foreign companies in India by introducing an element of competition into the indigenous industrial base. This will be particularly meaningful if India’s vibrant private sector is invited to the table.
As the initial cycle of great expectations deflated, some firms chose to shift their focus away from the Indian market entirely. Others settled in for the long haul, trading their rushed marketing campaigns for patience, and working to better understand what programs and requirements were real and enduring.
As downward budgetary pressure persists in the United States and Europe, companies continue to look abroad for growth opportunities, and the size of India’s defense budget and the scope of its modernization ambitions have again drawn attention. In the midst of this, India has experienced a transformational election, bringing to power a new and dynamic leadership armed with a strong parliamentary majority and public mandate for change.
Almost immediately, India extended its prohibitive FDI restrictions on the defense sector from 27% to 49%. Soon after, the Modi government took the radical step of decoupling the high profile corruption investigation of AgustaWestland from the firm’s ongoing support and supplier activities, as well as allowing the company to continue – with some restrictions – to place bids on upcoming rotorcraft programs. But clues on the trajectory of the defense market may be most evident in India’s domestic competitive landscape, rather than high profile developments involving foreign firms.
The Public – Private Divide IAF’s 748M AvroIndia’s private firms have been angling for a greater defense market share, with a few wins in areas such as shipbuilding. But even here, complex efforts such as the P-75 submarine program have been channeled to teams of foreign and Indian public sector shipyards.
The upcoming Avro transport aircraft replacement is the next test opportunity for foreign technology players and India’s private sector. However, in true statist fashion, the private sector was promised this program by decree, rather than real competition with the public sector’s HAL and others.
Other privately-owned firms have trumpeted their greater play in the defense sector. The Tata Sons conglomerate included defense in its major investment drive, while Larsen and Toubro announced a $400 million expansion in naval shipbuilding, and have set a target of growing their defense business fourfold. Mumbai-based Mahindra, which has boasted a modest defense footprint in land vehicles and naval subsystems since India’s independence, is investing in radar and aerospace production.
Shifts in favor of India’s private sector have yet to materialize, however, putting considerable onus on the new government and its implementation – rather that regulation – of the defense procurement portfolio.
Foreign providers face similar quandaries: the Avro replacement program is also illustrative in this regard. The government had admirable ambitions to source this (foreign-designed) platform competitively, but its approach to the competition bears the hallmarks of centralized control that have defined the procurement process. The government dictated the terms, limiting suppliers and imposing considerable requirements for domestic industrial participation. The result was a dearth of interest from foreign suppliers, as well as complaints from local Indian partners that the small batch of aircraft to be made in India rendered required investments uneconomical. As of this writing, they have yet to receive a bid, and the competition has been extended. Barring a sudden turnaround, the program appears to be headed for cancellation and re-competition.
Another critical airborne program has suffered similar fates in the past. India’s Light Utility Helicopter program (LUH), the replacement of the revered but dated Chetak and Cheetah fleets, has now been cancelled twice. This program could shape up to be a true competition between the private and public sectors, in each case paired with foreign partners in a “buy and make Indian” program, requiring local assembly and content. Rather than simply assign this effort to one or the other side, India’s procurement officials may create a true competition. Indeed, the public sector HAL has been positioning and developing in-house IP for some time, via its Druhv and indigenous LUH programs.
Ultimately, the driver of true competition, as well as commensurate foreign engagement, lies in the severe capacity constraints faced by India’s public sector defense industry – first and foremost by the aforementioned HAL.
Recent history does contain some bright spots for American suppliers doing business in India. Despite the loss of the $12 billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition to Dassault, Boeing has exported several high-end platforms to India, including the P-8i maritime surveillance aircraft and the forthcoming AH-64E Apache attack helicopter. Interestingly, the Apache is being sold with no expectation of co-production or technology transfer. Lockheed’s C-130 franchise has done well for itself in India, with repeat sales of its J-series Super Hercules. In this case, India’s private sector has embedded itself in the supply chain, with a Tata-Lockheed Martin JV supplying aerostructure components that include the center wing box.
Conclusion C-130J-30 departsUltimately, the real question in India is the extent of true domestic competition for defense funding. Will the new government open the market sufficiently to allow the private sector to compete and win, resulting in greater non-public sector investment in R&D and production capabilities? The circumstances seem favorable: this government is more committed to competition, has a more instinctive understanding of for-profit industry, and harbors greater awareness of the severe capacity constraints of the traditional public sector undertakings.
It is through this prism that global industry should consider its opportunities. The desire for more indigenous development and production will continue in an avowedly nationalist government. Nevertheless, global defense firms may be able to develop deeper and more fruitful partnerships with emerging private sector defense firms in India, perhaps even leading to greater exports of Indian content – much praised, but rarely experienced to date.
While higher FDI limits, greater flexibility in domestic industrial partnerships, and recent Western successes in exporting to India’s defense market are legitimate causes for optimism for foreign suppliers, aspects of India’s procurement process are likely to shed their bureaucratic and centrally-controlled past very slowly. India’s modernization ambitions are likely to continue drawing attention from Western contractors, but success in India will remain a longer-term proposition than the conventional wisdom of years past had suggested.
Avascent is the leading strategy and management consulting firm serving clients operating in government-driven markets. Sebastian Sobolev is a Project Manager, and Aleksandar D. Jovovic is a Principal. Use these links to reveal their emails and contact them.February 4/16: India has received the final batch of three Mi-17V-5 military transport helicopters from Russia, bringing the total to 151. The models are the most technically advanced of Rostec Corporation’s Mi-8/17 type including a KNEI-8 avionics suite. The new suite replaces the previously used multiple systems indicators with four large multi-functional that are easy to read and reduce the intensity of pilot’s workload. The completion of the sale comes as both India and Russia continue negotiations for forty-eight more of the helicopters, which are to be used in a variety of operations such as in deserts and mountains, matching the wide variety of environments found in India.
January 28/16: The Indian government has released a new policy paper outlining a revision to its current procurement structures. The Defence Procurement Policy 2016 (DPP-2016) aims to make the country’s defence industry more lucrative and reduce delays by eliminating repetitive procedures to the process. A new category that has been given the highest priority in how India gains its weapons has also been created named the Indigenous Design, Development and Manufacturing (IDDM). At present, the categories designated from highest to lowest priority are Make India, Buy and Make (India), Buy and Make Global, and Buy Global. However some commentators have said that the new category may confuse matters further as it seems to be a hybrid category of the Make and Buy categories, resulting in different interpretations of under which category a prototype will be developed.
August 6/15: With Indian defense exports slowly climbing, Tata Motors has delivered 585 military logistics vehicles to the UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA. The Indian firm also won a contract with the Indian government in July to supply over 1,200 6×6 trucks to the Indian Army. The delivery to MINUSMA took approximately five months and will equip Mali’s neighbors.
Additional Readings Global ProgramsThe multi-national Eurofighter Typhoon has been described as the aerodynamic apotheosis of lessons learned from the twin engine “teen series” fighters that began with the F-14 and F-15, continued with the emergence of the F/A-18 Hornet, and extended through to the most recent F/A-18 Super Hornet variants. Aerodynamically, it’s a half generation ahead of all of these examples, and planned evolutions will place the Eurofighter near or beyond parity in electronic systems and weapons.
The 1998 production agreement among its 4 member countries involved 620 aircraft, built with progressively improved capabilities over 3 contract “tranches”. By the end of Tranche 2, however, welfare state programs and debt burdens had made it difficult to afford the 236 fighters remaining in the 4-nation Eurofighter agreement. A 2009 compromise was found in the EUR 9 billion “Tranche 3A” buy, and the program has renewed its efforts to secure serious export sales. Their success will affect the platform’s production line in the near term, and its modernization plans beyond that.
The Eurofighter program emerged out of a long and conflicting set of multinational efforts to design a new European fighter. By 1983, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain had coalesced around the Future European Fighter Aircraft (FEFA) program. That partnership lasted only until 1985, as differences with France over carrier compatibility, weight limits, and French insistence on the lead industrial role, ended their partnership. Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain established Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH in 1986 to manage the Eurofighter project, while France went its own way and developed their Rafale fighter.
Both projects went on to develop clipped delta, canard-equipped twin-engine fighters, whose “radar shaping” designs significantly lowered their radar signature compared to earlier fighters like the Mirage F1, Tornado, or F/A-18A-D Hornet. Even so, it would be a misnomer to call these European jets stealth aircraft. The standard term is a “4+ generation” fighter, distinguishing them from “5th generation” aircraft like the American F-22A Raptor and Indo-Russian PAK-FA.
While the Rafale’s development emphasized weapon load and multi-role capabilities, squeezed budgets and ample fleets of strike aircraft led Eurofighter’s partner nations to focus on the air superiority role. An excellent aerodynamic design, very good thrust-to-weight ratio, and fast slew-and-point capability was fused with a very integrated set of electronic sensor and defensive systems, including a pilot-friendly cockpit design that offered the first use of voice commands in a fighter. This made Eurofighter’s Typhoon very capable in its chosen aerial role, able to compete with or best serving opponents short of the American F-22A.
Typhoons even proved capable of armed supercruise during 2011 Libyan operations, but this was only possible with low-drag “4 + 2” air-to-air missile configurations, at high altitudes, to Mach 1.2.
PIRATE IRST:For air-to-air combat, the Eurofighter currently relies on long range detection using its mechanically-scanned, phased array ECR-90 CAPTOR radar and PIRATE IRST(Infra-Red Search & Track) system, coupled with a good array of advanced air-to-air weapons. Non-British Eurofighters will also have a 27mm Mauser cannon on board, considered by many observers to be the best fighter cannon on the market.
On defense, the Typhoon’s Praetorian (formerly EuroDASS) self-protection suite is designed for 360 degree coverage, with high automation. The Defensive Aids Computer (DAC) controls a package that includes Towed Radar Decoys, a Missile Approach Warner (MAW), wingtip ECM pods, and a Countermeasures Dispensing System (CMDS). They are integrated with each other, and with the Eurofighter’s radar and IRST.
Unfortunately for the consortium, this aerial combat strength ended up being the flip side of their biggest weakness. Initial “Tranche 1” machines were severely hobbled on the export market by their poor ground attack capabilities, a serious weakness in a world of multi-role fighters. When combined with the plane’s $100+ million cost, the result has been a slew of lost export competitions. Dassault’s Rafale, which had gaps of its own, could not capitalize on that failing, and is still looking for its first export win. Embarrassingly, the Eurofighter has usually lost to modernized, multi-role versions of the very F-16s and F-15s it was meant to supplant. That, in turn, has affected both prices and the pace of upgrades.
A list of current weapons may help snap the plane’s evolution into clearer focus:
As the list above notes, the Tranche 2 fighters that began delivery to member countries in 2008 have added precision ground attack capabilities under programs like P1E, but still fall well short of the full capabilities and weapon arrays offered by competitors like the American F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-15E Strike Eagle. Their lack of a helmet-mounted display (HMD) compounded this issue, preventing the Typhoon from taking full advantage of its new air-to-air missiles, and detracting from their ground attack capabilities. A BAE “Striker” HMSS Helmet-Mounted Display is in low-rate production now, but it didn’t become operational until 2011.
Tranche 3 Eurofighters will reportedly be based on the Tranche 2 standard, with provisions for dorsal conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) that can extend range while creating minimal drag. The other big change involves upgraded power systems and electronics that can more easily support future growth and upgrades. The weapon bus can handle fiber optic cabling, onboard computing is upgraded, and a high speed data network improves sharing with weapons or other platforms. The most important upgrade remains a CAPTOR “E-Scan” Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar to replace the ECR-90. Industry is developing it for a 2015 delivery date, but there doesn’t seem to be a contract framework in place. The lack of an AESA radar leaves the Eurofighter a generation behind its American counterparts in radar technology, and until it catches up, it’s likely to suffer in export competitions.
F-35A Lightning IIEven as these upgrades are being discussed, however, the Eurofighter’s export window as a leading-edge fighter choice is closing. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is aerodynamically inferior, but it offers a stealth fighter with a tested AESA radar, a wider array of sensors, and sensor fusion at an even higher level. By the end of this decade, 5th generation projects like the Russo-Indian PAK-FA will also become viable choices for some export targets.
Successful upgrades can keep the Eurofighter Typhoon competitive, even in that environment, if its production line lasts long enough. The key word will be “competitive.” As an example, see this comparison of the Eurofighter vs. Saab’s single-engine contemporary, the 4+ generation JAS-39 Gripen. Saab already has a development contract for an ES-05 Raven AESA radar, and is significantly ahead in weapons integration:
Eurofighter: What’s Next? A Weak Core Eurofighter 2020Tranche 3 aircraft are expected to deliver a few important new capabilities, including an AESA radar and Conformal Fuel Tanks. At present, however, only Tranche 3 Eurofighters are designed to add CFTs. The biggest question at present is whether Tranche 3A aircraft will be the only CFT-capable Typhoons. The status of core countries’ Tranche 3B orders is very unclear, but Britain and Germany have already firmly ruled out further buys, and it appears likely that Tranche 3A will be the last production order from the original member countries.
In 2011, Eurofighter’s CEO placed the end of production at 2015, barring a major export win like India or Japan, or a Tranche 3B purchase from the consortium partners. By 2014, that date had been revised to 2017/18, but 2015 still marks the point that parts of the supply chain will begin to stop.
This will leave core countries with smaller fleets, for 2 reasons. One is limited orders. The other is Typhoon fleets that won’t serve in parallel. UK Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy has said that he expects the RAF to operate on the basis of a Typhoon fleet of 120 aircraft. By the time the last jets of the 3A tranche come into service, between 2015 and 2020, the first batch of Tranche 1 Typhoons would be approaching the end of their life. This is likely to be true in other partner countries as well. A 2009 Der Spiegel article illustrates some of the issues in Germany, for instance:
“The German air force didn’t get the first jets until July 2006. It now has 38 Eurofighters. But 14 of them have been sent back for repairs. Some of them still suffer instrument failure during flights. Of the six single-seat aircraft at the Neuburg air base only four are fit for service on average. That’s just enough to provide day and night cover for Germany’s airspace. The defense ministry recently admitted to budget committee members that the approved sum of [EUR] 14.7 billion would only be enough to pay for 143 Eurofighters. Parliament would have to approve an additional [EUR] 3 billion if the air force was to get the planned 180 aircraft…”
Upgrade Lifeline? IPA7 tests KEPD-350sAt the same time, remaining aircraft in these existing fleets offer strong opportunities for piecemeal upgrades, from moves to give Tranche 1 planes precision ground attack capabilities, to helmet-mounted sights, AESA radar retrofits, and even thrust-vectoring engines to create super-maneuverability. Conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) could also become possible, if Eurofighter devises an appropriate upgrade process. It would be logical to make that part of a life-extension structural refit, which would help existing customers keep expensive investments in service for longer. Key export order competitors like the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, F-15 Strike Eagle, F-35 Lightning II, JAS-39 Gripen, Rafale, and Russian SU-30MKx/SU-35 already field every one of these capabilities – but none currently field all of them.
Weapon upgrades are absolutely expected. Expansion of the Typhoon’s ground attack weapon choices is an ongoing process. MBDA’s medium-range stealthy Storm Shadow cruise missile is in testing for full integration by 2015, reportedly thanks to Saudi Arabia and Oman. Taurus’ similar KEPD 350 will undergo partial testing at the same time. Saudi Arabia also reportedly wants to add the French Damocles surveillance and targeting pod, which makes sense because the Israeli LITENING-III runs up against their boycott.
Storm ShadowIn the air, 2017 is expected to mark full integration of the long-range Meteor air-to-air missile.
Over the medium term, planned weapons reportedly include Diehl’s medium-range PILUM and HOSBO glide bombs, short-range MBDA Brimstone light strike missiles, and possibly their longer-range SPEAR-3 successors. Raytheon’s AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles have been discussed, and they would fix a critical deficiency for an important mission. So, too, would anti-ship missiles, which all of its competitors already carry. None of these items come with a schedule, however.
National budgets will play a role in the pace of these upgrades, as they have throughout the Eurofighter’s history. The question, for current and future customers, is timing. Until integration is done, the absence of key capabilities like long-range precision strike and anti-radar missiles will continue to hobble the Typhoon’s positioning as a fully multi-role aircraft.
What has changed now is the consortium’s seriousness about winning exports, along with a dawning understanding that most of these upgrades are now basic requirements for serious players. The question is whether this understanding came too late.
Exports Required Eurofighter DisplayExport wins will be necessary in order to finance the full range of timely improvements, and keep the line open past 2017/18. An August 30/09 Financial Mail article reported that Eurofighter GmbH was hoping for sales of 300 Eurofighter Typhoon to 10 export countries by 2020, but that will be very challenging.
The Eurofighter’s cost of $100-140 million each is already creating tough sledding against F-35 stealth fighters whose production quantities will eventually create prices in the $100 million range, and F/A-18 Super Hornets or JAS-39E/F Gripens that can be sold for around $60-70 million. With existing operators interested in selling some of their aircraft, even an export win or 2 may not change the Eurofighter’s overall production numbers.
The Tranche 3A release from Eurofighter cited active export campaigns in Switzerland, India, Japan, Romania, Greece, and Turkey, while “exploring possible opportunities” in South Korea, Bulgaria, Croatia, et. al. Romania (F-16s) and Turkey (F-35A) never went ahead with a real competition. Subsequent losses in Brazil (JAS-39E/F Gripen), India (Rafale, unfinalized), Japan (F-35A), South Korea (F-35A), Switzerland (JAS-39E Gripen, canceled by referendum), and the UAE (TBD, q.v. Dec 19/13 entry) have hurt.
Greece, which canceled an order for 30-60 Eurofighters in 2005, and bought F-16s instead, still had plans for an additional next-generation fighter buy to counter Turkey’s planned purchase of 100 F-35As. With Greek finances in tatters, however, don’t hold your breath.
After that, Eurofighter’s options narrow sharply. On the bright side, the Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar all have fighter competitions in progress, and successful sales to Saudi Arabia and Oman help the Typhoon’s chances within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
With Japan and South Korea out, the once-promising Asian market has few options left for Eurofighter. A MiG-29N replacement competition in Malaysia has run into trouble due to finances, and they are exploring leasing deals. That will be a tough win for Eurofighter. In Europe, Eastern European countries like Bulgaria and Croatia would normally be problematic sales due to the Eurofighter’s costs, but Germany is pushing hard, and offering umbrella maintenance agreements and training packages. Even if they succeed, however, the end result is just a handful of sales.
Typhoon at Sea? Naval variant, cutawayIndia was pitched with very explicit offers to have their needs and investments drive the Typhoon’s future enhancements, and significant roles for Indian industry. At Aero India 2011, Eurofighter and BAE even unveiled an initial internally-funded design for a navalized Eurofighter than can operate from aircraft carriers. In a direct nod to potential Indian sales, they touted the plane as being able to take off from “ski jump” carriers without catapults – a design that describes all of India’s current and planned carriers, as well as the initial design for Britain’s own Queen Elizabeth Class. Eurofighter GmbH describes the goal as 95% commonality with land-based aircraft, and required changes as “limited… include a new, stronger landing gear, a modified arrestor hook and localised strengthening on some fuselage sections near the landing gear, as well as updates the EJ200 engines,” which could include thrust-vectoring as well as structural reinforcement.
It didn’t help. India picked the French Rafale, which already has a carrier-capable version, as their future M-MRCA medium fighter. The Indian Navy is currently flying MiG-29Ks as its naval fighters, and plans to add Indian-designed LCA Naval light jets.
Britain could have been a long-shot backup option, but they’re planning to use the F-35B from future carriers, which won’t be fitted with steam catapults and arrester wires after all.
Brazil might have been a future option, on the assumption that they will replace their aircraft carrier at some point. Unfortunately for Eurofighter, Brazil picked Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen as their future air force fighter, and Saab also has plans for a naval variant.
That leaves a carrier-capable Eurofighter variant without a plausible future customer.
Eurofighter: Industrial Structure & Orders IPA7 over ManchingTechnically, the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) is the customer for the Eurofighter project. Eurofighter GmbH is the contractor, with joint ownership by all of the key industrial partners: BAE Systems, EADS, and Finmeccanica. Overall, Eurofighter GmbH cites a total of 100,000 supported jobs in 400 companies across Europe.
Aircraft production work shares were designed to correspond to the number of aircraft ordered under the 1998 Umbrella Contract:
The Eurofighter’s 2 EJ200 turbofans deliver 20,000 pounds thrust each in reheat mode, and are manufactured by the EUROJET partnership of Avio (Italy), ITP (Spain), MTU Aero Engines (Germany) and Rolls-Royce (UK).
The Euroradar consortium supplies the ECR-90 CAPTOR radar, and is developing the “E-Scan” AESA successor for introduction by 2015. It is led by Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Sensors and Airborne Systems in Edinburgh, UK (formerly BAE Systems Avionics), and also includes EADS and Spain’s Indra.
The Eurofighter contract was designed to protect the fairness of each participants’ agreed manufacturing work shares, by making it very expensive to back out of committed orders. On the other hand, European defense spending continues to decline due to pressure from welfare state commitments and debt burdens, even as European military operational deployments and their costs have increased. Hence the fractious contract negotiations around Tranche 3, and also the investigation of foreign sell-offs by the member countries.
In June 2009, the partners took a diplomatic way out, splitting Tranche 3 into 2 parts. At the end of July 2009, the 4 partner nations placed a EUR 9 billion Tranche 3A order, which will keep production going for several more years. The table below summarizes the Eurofighter’s evolving production plans, from the original 1985 plan to the 1998 agreement, and then planned and actual orders for each production tranche.
Note that 24 of Britain’s Tranche 2 aircraft have been diverted to Saudi Arabia, in order to satisfy Saudi demands for early delivery. In response, Britain ordered 24 more Tranche 3 aircraft as replacements. In practice, this means that Britain has ordered only 16 of its originally planned 88 Tranche 3 Eurofighters – and high-level statements indicate that Tranche 3A agreement absolves Britain of the need to place any further Eurofighter orders. Other reports explain the gap by claiming that the other 48 British Tranche 3 aircraft will go to Saudi Arabia, meaning that all of Saudi Arabia’s 72 planes will have been siphoned off from British orders.
Maintenance contracts to keep the fleets in service involve a small core of multi-national contracts for key systems and general service, followed by a number of national umbrella contracts to address other areas, and then a set of national maintenance agreements that are less comprehensive. See the chart below for tracking of the main support contracts currently underway:
Contracts & Key Events New dawn, or twilight?DID coverage focuses on purchases related to consortium aircraft buys under Tranche 3, platform improvement efforts, international opportunities, and sales. See the “Additional Readings” section for coverage of the comprehensive support contracts for the various countries, and of the Saudi and Austrian export deals.
2014 – 2016Germany confirms no Tranche 3B, but how much will they have to pay?; German maintenance costs an issue; Eurofighter needs new orders, soon. with Brimstones
February 3/16: Last weekend’s expected signing of a deal for Kuwait to purchase twenty-eight Eurofighter jets has been put off. Italian Ministry of Defense officials cited “procedural” delays on Kuwait’s behalf, and that no clear date had been set. It had been expected that the deal would close quickly after some initial delays over pilot training had pushed an agreement into 2016. News of the deal came as Kuwait’s initial plan to purchase F-18 Super Hornets from Boeing was scrapped after their frustration over congressional delays in gaining approval for the sale. The loss of the sale to the Eurofighter has put into question the security of some jobs at Boeing’s St. Louis plant. The plant specializes in the manufacture of the Super Hornet, and were set to start production of the $3 billion deal before the change.
January 28/16: After delays in gaining approval from the US to buy new F-18 Super Hornets, Kuwait instead looks set to sign contracts for twenty-eight Eurofighter Typhoon jets to replace their older F-18s. An official in the Italian Ministry of Defense said minister Roberta Pinotti would visit Kuwait on Sunday to sign papers finalizing the deal estimated to be worth $8.7 billion. Talks had been ongoing since November with issues over pilot training delaying the deal, but should be completed within eighteen months. The switch in allegiance will no doubt annoy manufacturer Boeing, and may see renewed frustrations over the lengthy congressional approval process for foreign military sales.
December 14/15: Kuwait’s purchase of 28 Eurofighter jets from Finmeccanica is set to experience further delays, as contracts may not be signed until 2016. The CEO of Finmeccanica expressed concerns last week, saying that he did not expect a sale to be agreed upon before December 25. The $9 billion purchase has been delayed repeatedly since a memorandum of agreement was signed in September. Reasons for the delay have apparently arisen due to disagreements over pilot training and the dispatching of specialized personnel. On December 1, the Kuwaiti government requested parliament to release a supplementary budget of $20.4 billion to fund military weapon purchases over the next ten years.
November 30/15: A $9 billion Eurofighter sale to Kuwait has been delayed. Italian defense company Finmeccanica announced that problems with pilot training and the dispatching of specialized personnel has resulted in the deal being postponed until mid-December. An initial memorandum of agreement for 28 fighters was signed in September and it was hoped contracts would have been signed by November. Kuwait is one of several Gulf nations currently driving to acquire high-tech aircraft and weaponry to protect themselves from neighbouring Iran as well as internal threats in the region.
November 13/15: BAE Systems is slowing Eurofighter production in order to sustain production lines out past 2018, in addition to cutting jobs on the fighter’s UK production line. The decision reflects the company’s orderbook, covering production orders which conclude in 2018 and an expected uptick in production as a result of an order for 28 Eurofighters by Kuwait, following an agreement between the Italian and Kuwaiti governments earlier this year; however a finalized deal has yet to materialize.
October 19/15: In further bad news for the German Eurofighter program, a malfunction with the aircraft’s external fuel tank grounded [German] the fleet from flying with the additional fuel pod attached, reducing the ability of the fighters to operate at longer distances. One of the German contingent of Eurofighters deployed to the Baltic region saw one of its fuel tanks fall off last week, leading to the grounding. This follows news earlier this week that the German government has temporarily suspended deliveries of new Eurofighters, citing manufacturing defects. German press also reports [German] that the EUR1 billion ($1.27 billion) contract to develop the CAPTOR-E radar system for the fighter, signed in November 2014, is now delayed by five months, as well as being above budget.
October 14/15: Germany’s Defence Ministry has halted deliveries of Eurofighter Typhoon fighters following the discovery of a technical fault with the Airbus-manufactured jets. The technical problem is thought centered around the connection between the aircraft’s vertical stabiliser and the fuselage. This is the second time quality control measures for the European fighter have caused problems, with manufacturing defects in September 2014 [German] also leading to a suspension of deliveries. In both cases BAE Systems was the consortium member responsible for manufacture of the defective parts; however this latest problem is not thought to pose any immediate flight safety issues for operators of the aircraft.
September 14/15: Kuwait is buying 28 Eurofighters through the Italian government, following an order for a dozen of the aircraft in December 2012. The order is the first in three years for the multinational Eurofighter, with the Eurofighter consortium’s partner company Alenia Aermacchi reportedly having led the marketing campaign in the Gulf state. Oman similarly ordered twelve of the multi-role fighters in December 2012, with the aircraft already in operation with six national air forces.
Dec 12/14: Weapons. BAE announces that the 1st Brimstone trial onto a Typhoon was completed, following a June 19/14 award to study integration between the missile and the aircraft. The firm says that “6 Brimstone missiles were fitted to the aircraft, each wing carrying a launcher with three missiles. Training missiles were used for the purposes of the trial and demonstrated that the weapon can be fitted to the aircraft.” Of course that’s not the toughest part in such an endeavor, and full integration is not expected before 2018.
November 2014: Weapons. The 1st release of a Storm Shadow cruise missile was performed successfully by the Italian IPA2 test aircraft, following initial tests in August. Now that inert drop tests and store release trials were performed, Phase 3 will involve environmental data gathering, followed by additional flights to assess handling qualities.
BAE Systems was also able to test the installation of a Storm Shadow onto a RAF Typhoon. Source: Eurofighter.
Captor-E conceptNov 19/14: Sensors. NATO’s Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) finally signs a EUR 1 billion/ GBP 800 million / $1.273 billion contract with Eurofighter Jadgflugzeug GmbH to finish and integrate Euroradar’s Captor E-Scan movable AESA radar (q.v. March 22/12, July 30/12, Nov 15/13, Oct 17/14), whose absence is currently a big disadvantage compared to every other top-tier fighter on the market. This deal was supposed to be done by the end of 2012, and the delay has been costly, but better late than never.
Captor-E is touted as having an unspecified “very large” antenna size that’s expected to be comparable to F-15s (APG-82v1) and F-22As (APG-77). That means more raw power for performance, and more T/R modules available for specialized functions; though materials, build quality, and the number of the T/R modules will all modify final performance statistics. Instead of using a fixed mounting like American fighters and the French Rafale, Eurofighter’s Captor-E will be mounted on a movable plate for an extremely Wide Field of Regard (WFoR). The current contract release appears to have expanded the touted FoR from about 120 to 200 degrees, thanks to the combination of mechanical movement and electronic beam steering. Eurofighter sees that capability as very useful for fire-and-evade dogfighting maneuvers that use the Eurofighter’s speed and maneuverability to their fullest, without breaking the launching fighter’s radar lock. The tradeoff is paid in poorer reliability and higher maintenance costs, compared to a fixed AESA array.
The contract value for Finmeccanica alone will be EUR 400 million, as the leader of the Euroradar consortium. Finmeccanica-Selex ES will produce the new radar at its facilities in Edinburgh, UK and Nerviano (Milan), Italy while Finmeccanica-Alenia Aermacchi’s Turin, Italy site will be responsible for the navigation systems during the integration phase. Airbus DS in Germany, and Spain’s Indra, round out the consortium. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter And NETMA Sign One Billion Euro Radar Contract” | UK MoD, “€1 billion contract to develop cutting-edge radar for Typhoon” | Airbus Group, “New radar ensures superiority of the Eurofighter” | Finmeccanica Selex ES, “€1 billion contract signed between the Eurofighter consortium and the inter-governmental agency NETMA” | Defense News, “Action Pending on AESA Radar for Typhoon”.
CAPTOR-E AESA Radar
Flying low…Oct 17/14: P1E. BAE Systems announces that deliveries of Eurofighter Typhoon Phase 1 Enhancement upgrades have created 17 P1Eb standard aircraft in service with the RAF. A further 18 are to be delivered by April 1/15, under a EUR 1.2 billion program that will eventually convert all 67 Tranche 2 Typhoons in RAF service; BAE offers a useful summary of key features.
Now that the UK has completed testing and undertaken initial fielding, the upgrade package will also become a proven installation option for other Eurofighter Tranche 2 customers, beginning in 2015. Meanwhile, future P2E and P3E upgrades are being planned, but the biggest wild card and competitive disadvantage remains:
“Eurofighter is still waiting for the partner nations to sign a production contract for the introduction of the Captor-E [AESA radar]…. A program source confirmed that the signing of the deal had slipped to the end of 2014, and “the staffing process within some partner nations is taking more time than originally planned.” “Germany is still sorting out some details,” a second source said.”
Sources: BAE Systems, “Royal Air force now flying their most advanced fighter jets ever” | Defense News, “British RAF Now Flying Improved Typhoon Aircraft”.
Sept 30/14: Defects. Germany suspends their remaining 32 Eurofighter deliveries, pending resolution of a manufacturing defect and negotiations re: what to do about it. They also sharply cut the estimated number of safe flying hours in each of their 108 delivered Eurofighters to just 1,500, and Austria and Britain are apparently taking similar measures. The timing is terrible, coming on the heels of revelations that budget cuts have forced the German armed forces into deep disrepair, with most of its key equipment unready for war.
BAE Systems and Britain’s RAF reportedly discovered that some of the rivet holes in the rear fuselage of the jet were drilled in ways that could introduce splinters and cracks into the rear fuselage, giving it less ability to resist wear and tear. That section is built by BAE, and tests are underway to get a more precise estimate of the effect on the fighter’s safe lifespan.
Meanwhile, the problem isn’t an immediate safety issue, and the Luftwaffe won’t hit even this low hours limit until 2018, so the planes aren’t grounded. Exports to Oman and Saudi Arabia are expected to continue.
Note that 1,500 flight hours is a ridiculously short life span, even for fighter jets whose forecasts in a capable military amount to just 150-300 hours per plane per year. Base figures of 5,000 – 8,000 are expected, with deep repair and refurbishment extending some airframes to around 10,000. The original official limit of 3,000 hours was itself just half of the Eurofighter Typhoon’s 6,000 hour design life, with the expectation that hard flight data would extend the official limit as experience offered greater certainty. It’s a very German approach, but the introduction of a big uncertainty is pushing estimates the other way for now. Sources: German Bundeswehr, “Eurofighter: Flugbetrieb der Luftwaffe aktuell nicht von industrieller Flugstundenreduzierung betroffen” | Der Spiegel, “Desolate Bundeswehr-Ausrustung: Hersteller warnt vor Mangeln am “Eurofighter” | Defense-Aerospace, “Eurofighter: Air Force Flight Operations Currently Not Affected By Flight Hours Reduction” | Agence France Presse, “Germany ‘erring on side of safety’ regarding Eurofighter defect” | Reuters, “UPDATE 2-Manufacturing flaw halts some Eurofighter deliveries” | Reuters, “Austria says Eurofighter has part problem” | SwissInfo, “Austria says Eurofighter has part problem, some deliveries halted” | Russia Today, “Eurofighter hull hitch: Germany halves fighter flying hours” || Der Spiegel, “Marodes Material: Bundeswehr erfullt Nato-Anforderungen derzeit nicht” (re: massive disrepair in armed forces) | Deutsche Welle, “Bundeswehr struggles with faulty defense equipment”.
Manufacturing defect could shrink fighter lifespan
Aug 5/14: Weapons. Italy’s Alenia Aermacchi has confirmed that the 1st phase of tests for Storm Shadow long-range cruise missile integration (q.v. July 26/13, Nov 20/13) is complete.
They add that the fighter will be able to carry 2 Storm Shadows and up to 8 air-to-air missiles. That’s a good load for fighting your way in and out, which is useful to customers like Saudi Arabia and Oman who are paying for the work. The ability to add drop-tanks would be another valuable load-out, extending the Storm Shadow’s reach. Countries like Britain would find that exceedingly useful, but weight and aerodynamics make this combination a more challenging load-out. Perhaps Tranche 3 upgrades and Conformal Fuel Tanks (q.v. May 13/14) can offer this capability in a more elegant way. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Success For Italian Eurofighter Storm Shadow Trials”.
July 16/14: HMD. BAE unveils its Striker II Helmet-Mounted Display (HMD), which builds on the original Striker system flying with Eurofighter and Gripen fleets.
The new system removes the need for night vision goggles, integrating a center-mounted ISIE-11 sensor based on Intevac Photonics’ patented electron bombarded active pixel sensor (EBAPS) advanced imaging sensor technology. The result is brighter and lighter than standard HMD/NVG combinations. the system is fully digital, and new hybrid opto-inertial technology is designed to reduce jitter and other syncing issues as the HMD tries to stay aligned with the pilot’s head movement and display its symbology. Sources: BAE Systems, “BAE Systems Unveils Digital Striker II Helmet-Mounted Display System with Superior Tracking, Night Vision Capabilities”.
June 19/14: Weapons. BAE announces an initial GBP 5 million study contract from the British Ministry of Defence, to conduct initial integration studies for the dual-mode radar/laser guided Brimstone 2 short-range light strike missile. Brimstone is already operational on Britain’s Tornado GR4 strike fighters, and this is an expected development that will improve the Typhoon’s capabilities for close air support against land targets and swarming motorboats.
Initial wind tunnel tests are already underway at Warton, Lancashire, and the study also intends to explore a common launcher for future derivatives like the 75+ km SPEAR 3 light strike missile. The target date for Brimstone 2 integration is 2018. Sources: BAE, “UK Study Contract Awarded to integrate Brimstone 2 onto Typhoon”.
June 10/14: Crash. A Spanish Eurofighter Typhoon crashed just before landing at Moron de la Frontera AB, killing the pilot. The pilot was an experienced flyer with 600 flight hours in the type, and the cause is under investigation.
It’s the first Spanish Air Force plane to go down, though a consortium prototype and a Saudi Eurofighter have crashed in Spain within the last decade. Sources: The Local – Spain, “Eurofighter jet exploded shortly after 2pm shortly after take-off for a routine practice mission” | Reuters, “UPDATE 2-Eurofighter jet crashes at Spanish base, killing pilot” | UK Daily Mail, “Eurofighter jet crashes just short of southern Spain airbase runway killing pilot”.
Spanish crash
June 9/14: Weapons. The Eurofighter’s weak weapons array has come back to bite it again, this time in Malaysia and Qatar. In “response” to this demand for “maritime attack capabilities,” which all of its competitors already possess in full:
“Peter Maute, the head of combat aircraft sales at Airbus Defence, said the Boeing Harpoon and MBDA’s Marte and Sea Brimstone missiles were being considered as possibilities…. work on the weapons was done by Eurofighter in its development simulator but that full integration would have to await a customer. Qatar and Malaysia are known to have stipulated a maritime-strike capability for their next purchase of combat jets.”
One hears “discussion,” study” and “plan” a lot, with respect to key Typhoon capabilities. In a competitive market, that doesn’t substitute for action. If you await a customer, you’ll be watching them buy something else: F-16s with Penguin Mk3s, F-15s with SLAM-ERs, JAS-39 Gripens with RBS-15s, Rafales with Exocets, Russian jets with Kh-31/ Kh-35s, or Super Hornets with Harpoon and SLAM-ER anti-ship and land strike missiles. It’s also doubtful that most customers would consider the short-range Brimstone missiles to be a “maritime attack capability,” unless one confines potential targets to small boats. Sources: Defense News, “Eurofighter Studying Missiles To Give Typhoon Maritime Attack Capability”.
May 21/14: P1Eb. Eurofighter GmbH formally unveils the Phase 1 Enhancements B package in Berlin at the ILA 2014 airshow. It’s essentially the EP2 capabilities (q.v. Oct 30/13) of enhancements to the existing radar for Meteor missile compatibility, DASS defensive system improvements, MIDS/Link-16 interoperability updates, as well as Flight Control System (FCS) and the Utility Control System (UCS) improvements. Plus Storm Shadow cruise missiles, which weren’t announced in EP2 because payments are coming from outside the core group. Storm Shadows should be integrated by 2015, but full Meteor long-range air-to-air missile integration isn’t scheduled until 2017.
The FCS/UCS upgrades will inprove compatibility with future civil airspace requirements, and also allow the pilot to switch seamlessly between air-to-air and air-to-ground modes.
Overall, there’s less here than meets the eye. The Eurofighter’s aerial performance is very good, and they have a reputation for implementing very good pilot interfaces. With the exception of Meteor, however, comparable or better capabilities are already fielded in competitive aircraft like the F-15. This is more of a partial catch-up than a paradigm shift in anything. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter Unveils ‘Paradigm Shift’ In Capability At Berlin Air Show”.
May 13/14: CFTs. BAE Systems has begun wind tunnel tests for conformal fuel tank designs, based on a “geometrically perfect 1/12th scale model” of the Tranche 3. The CFTs are created using additive manufacturing, then attached and removed for the tests.
CFTs are one of the big changes inherent in the Tranche 3 aircraft, which will form a small portion of the core partners’ Typhoon fleets. Removing drag-creating fuel tanks from underwing hardpoints is a big plus, but a great deal depends on good design. Boeing and Northrop Grumman managed to craft CFTs that added 3,500 pounds of fuel to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, while creating nearly zero drag at sub-sonic speeds. Even those CFTs impose a trans-sonic penalty, which will be an issue for Super Hornets, but the Eurofighter has such a good power to weight ratio that a minor trans-sonic penalty won’t matter. Sources: BAE, “British Engineers test new configuration of fighter jets in high speed wind tunnel”.
April 30/14: Germany – Costs. Germany’s Bundesrechnunghof (Federal Court of Auditors) publishes a supplementary annex to its 2013 report, and the Eurofighter is one of their subjects. The press release goes over known ground by saying that the EUR 11.5 billion budget will buy just 140 planes, instead of 180. What’s new is an acknowledgement that Eurofighter maintenance costs continue to increase, driven by added need for support and spares, and that life-cycle costs are expected to be roughly double the 1997 estimate of EUR 30 billion.
2011 and 2012 reportedly had the Eurofighter fleet consuming about 1/3 of the air force’s maintenance budgets, even though the fleet was smaller than planned and didn’t reach its maximum flight hours. By 2020, the fleet is expected to rise from 86 to 140, and flight hours would roughly triple to 28,400 per year. A comparative graph in the full report shows the rising operating & maintenance costs from the F-4F Phantom, to the Tornado fleet, to the Eurofighter fleet. The United States has seen similar trends as it fielded each new generation of fighters, but the Tornado is known to be a maintenance problem, and the Eurofighter still graphs significantly above it.
The Bundesrechnunghof adds that even Germany’s Ministry of Defence doesn’t seem to know the full cost, and explains the Ministry’s rationalizations for not knowing. Other countries seem to manage such things, somehow. Perhaps the Germans could visit those countries and find out. Sources: German FCA, 2014 Pressemitteilung 04 – Bemerkungen 2013, weitere Prüfungsergebnisse [Press release] | “2013 Bemerkungen – Weitere Prufungsergebnisse – Nr. 09 “Kostentransparenz beim EUROFIGHTER herstellen” [Eurofighter summary, incl. link to full report] | Langfassung der Bemerkung Nr. 09 [Full report, PDF].
German costs
Feb 27/14: Pessimism, or Realism? Airbus CEO Tom Enders doesn’t sound very sunny about Eurofighter’s future:
“Enders said he’s also “not very optimistic” about securing further deals for the Eurofighter combat jet…. “We do hope we can still score one or two other successes in exports,” he said. “But we also have to prepare for a scenario — due to lack of export orders plus cancellations from others — that we’ll have to ramp down production of this otherwise very impressive aircraft sooner rather than later.”
Sooner would be an end of production in 2017, which means that preparations within the supply chain would begin sometime in 2015. Sources: Bloomberg BusinessWeek, “Airbus CEO Says Turkish Delay in Taking A400M Threatens Ramp-Up”.
Feb 25/14: Germany. The Handelsblatt business daily says that Airbus is demanding EUR 800 – 900 million in compensation for Germany’s Tranche 3B cancellation. Britain finessed its absence from Tranche 3B by substituting Saudi jets, which were bought under a direct government-to-government deal with Britain, but the other partners aren’t able to do that.
That’s a steep price. Negotiations are expected, but even if Germany ends up paying in full per their original contract, it will still be a small percentage of what they would have paid to buy 37 new Typhoons. Obvious options involve some shifting of payments into R&D or upgrade work, or a refundable “export loan” whose repayment depends on reaching a certain number of fighter exports.
The larger question for Eurofighter GmbH is whether financially fragile Italy and Spain take the same approach as Germany, or stand by their Tranche 3B orders. Sources: Sky News Australia, “Airbus ‘wants money’ for scrapped jets” | Frankfurter Allgemeine Wirtschaft, “Airbus will Entschadigung fur abbestellte Eurofighter”.
Feb 20/14: Germany. German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen removes 2 senior procurement officials: Stephane Beemelmans and Detlef Selhausen. Part of the issue involves Eurofighters, specifically, a EUR 55 million euro (~$75 million) settlement to Germany’s MTU in lieu of EUR 340 million for Eurofighter Tranche 3B engine work. Not bad, but Bundestag budget committee approval is required for contracts over EUR 25 million, and the payment was authorized without that. Relationships with these individuals were already tense, so that was the end of the road. Sources: Defense News, “Germany Plans Procurement Overhaul After Program Missteps” | Der Spiegel, “Rustungsprojekt “Eurofighter”: Verteidigungsministerium gab Millionensumme ohne Bundestagsvotum frei” | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Wie von der Leyen aufräumen will”.
Feb 19/14: Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia finalizes their contract for 72 fighters, agreeing on price escalation terms to upgrade the fighters bought under the Salaam program toward Tranche 3 standard (q.v. Feb 21/13, Aug 1/13, Dec 19/13). BAE was very involved in the process, but because the underlying agreement is actually with the British government, the amendment must also be negotiated between the governments involved.
BAE had continued Eurofighter deliveries during the long negotiations, which meant rising amounts of cash committed without booking any profits. Clearing this issue up frees BAE to deploy its cash reserves more freely, while also removing a source of uncertainty for potential Gulf Cooperation Council customers.
The firm describes the settlement as “broadly consistent with the Group’s prior trading outlook for 2013.” That outlook (q.v. Dec 19/13) estimated a 6-7 pence earnings per share drop without any agreement, or about GBP 250 million (~ $410 million) maximum, based on total shares revealed in a recent transaction. That’s on top of the original GBP 4.43 billion pounds/ $7.4 billion. Sources: BAE Systems, “Agreement on Salam Price Escalation” and “Feb 20/14 Transaction in Own Shares” | Reuters, “UPDATE 2-BAE Systems agrees pricing on Saudi Eurofighter deal”.
Saudi finalization
Feb 19/14: Germany. News reports are describing a German decision to cancel 37 Eurofighters, based on Deputy Defense Minister Stephane Beemelmans’ testimony before their the parliamentary defense committee. That isn’t quite true.
What it means is that Germany doesn’t intend to pay for a Tranche 3B, which would have included 37 fighters to finish their agreed purchases. A Tranche 3B offer was reportedly extended to the core countries by Eurofighter on June 9/10, but Europe’s financial woes have left the core partners uninterested. Indeed, Germany ended their plans for a Tranche 3B order back in 2011 (q.v. Oct 21/11). 2014 was supposed to be a year of decision for the core countries, but with Germany and Britain on the sidelines, Spain or Italy become that much more difficult to convince.
The wording of the July 31/09 Tranche 3A agreement, and of the broader Eurofighter partnership agreements, determine how much the decision costs Germany in cancellation fees. Britain found a way to disclaim any Tranche 3B buy the moment the Tranche 3A contract was signed, but they appear to have done so by shifting Saudi exports under their own account, which avoids any penalties.
Unless Eurofighter GmbH finds additional orders somewhere, the production line will begin shifting toward upgrades and maintenance only in 2015 (q.v. Jan 25/11). Sources: Reuters, “Germany cancels delivery of last 37 Eurofighter jets: source” | Handelsblatt, “Deutschland bestellt 37 Eurofighter wieder ab”.
Feb 9/14: Italy. The center-left Democratic Party is reportedly preparing a policy document that would cut F-35 buys from the current reduced plan for 90 F-35A/Bs to around 45 planes, while trying to make Italy invest in Eurofighter’s Tranche 3B buy.
Significant reductions in planned buys by Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, etc. will all hit Italy’s own F-35 Final Assembly and Check-Out plant. Part of the party’s push despite this incentive is ideological, reflecting a bias that’s in favor of European defense programs and less friendly toward the USA. Part of it reflects a level of general uneasiness with F-35 costs, capabilities, and delivery dates. Sources: Defense News, “Italian Lawmakers Consider New Cuts to JSF Purchase”.
Jan 15/14: Testing. Test flights with the KEPD 350 cruise missile begin from at Manching Military Air Systems Center, north of Munich. They’re technically part of the Storm Shadow integration program, thought the KPED 350 won’t be fully integrated, and will include flutter tests, air data system large store interference assessment and aerodynamic data gathering. Sources: Eurofighter, “Eurofighter Typhoon: Flight tests with Taurus KEPD 350 missile started”.
2013Saudis abandon local assembly; Competitions in Denmark, South Korea; Problems in Germany?; Testing begins for Storm Shadow & KEPD 350 missiles; Tranche 3 flies; 400th delivered; New CEO has a big job ahead.
Saudi Eurofighters
(click to view full)
Dec 19/13: Low Rents of Arabia. A BAE investors release suggests that the UAE “have advised that they have elected not to proceed with [Eurofighter] proposals at this time,” and adds that negotiations with the Saudis over Tranche 3 upgrades to their Al-Yamamah buy of 72 planes may be deadlocked.
The UAE’s decision is a very big blow to the Eurofighter’s future in the Gulf. A UAE buy offered the prospect of sustaining production for several years beyond 2018 by making Eurofighter the GCC’s de facto standard fighter, just as key competitions in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar were coming up. If the UAE goes back to the Rafale instead, their fellow Mirage 2000 operator Qatar becomes a much harder target for Eurofighter, and the standardization momentum that was bringing unlikely customers like Bahrain to the table evaporates.
The British government tried to use diplomacy on Eurofighter’s behalf, but they may have done more damage than good. None of the Gulf Cooperation Council were pleased with Britain’s failure to support the Syrian rebels. They were even less pleased when Britain’s government pushed hard for an Iranian nuclear deal that most of them regard as both catastrophically stupid and directly threatening. In contrast, France has played a leading role in pushing the Syrian issue, and was a very public dissenter regarding the Iranian deal. Sources: BAE, “BAE Systems – Status of prospective business in the UAE and Salam pricing discussions” | The Telegraph, “Blow for Britain and BAE Systems as UAE rules out Eurofighter deal” | The Telegraph, “David Cameron’s Typhoon debacle a sign of Britain’s declining Arabian influence”.
UAE loss
Dec 9/13: Tranche 3. British Single Seat aircraft #116 conducts the 1st Eurofighter Tranche 3 flight, with pilot Nat Makepeace at the controls. The biggest differences from earlier versions include a structure that can mount dorsal conformal fuel tanks; and a modified nose with a new internal structure, power, cooling and electronics for the future E-Scan AESA radar.
Another development aircraft has been modified to take an E-Scan development radar for testing purposes. It’s currently being prepared at Warton, UK, ahead of its coming 1st flight. Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3 Takes to the Skies” | BAE Systems, “Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3 Takes to the Skies”.
1st Tranche 3 flight
Dec 4/13: #400. The 400th Eurofighter Typhoon has been delivered. The single-seat fighter in question was handed over to the German Air Force at Cassidian’s Military Air Systems Center, located in Manching, Southern Germany. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter Typhoon Marks Delivery of 400th Aircraft”.
#400
Nov 27/13: Testing. Flight tests of the Storm Shadow missile (q.v. Nov 20/13) begin from Alenia Aermacchi’s Flight Test Centre at Decimomannu Air Base, in Sardinia, Italy. Sources: Eurofighter, “Eurofighter Typhoon: Flight tests with Storm Shadow missile started”.
Nov 22/13: Industrial. BAE and Finmeccanica’s Selex ES announce a teaming agreement to provide Electronic Warfare Operational Support (EWOS) for future Eurofighter Typhoon customers, “and the Eurofighter Typhoon core programme where appropriate.”
Electronic warfare is often a pretty “black box”, as-is affair, but its importance makes it something that customers want to be able to modify for local threats and local needs. Technology has made that ideal easier, as software-defined digital systems are fielded. The flip side is that full export customer access to key items like threat libraries and operational modes creates a greater attack surface area for the core countries’ enemies to steal secrets. Under this agreement, the partners pledge to provide willing customers with a “sovereign” EWOS capability. That word is usually associated with full ability to maintain and modify a system, but absent further details, use of the word alone isn’t something to rely on.
Selex ES SVP Electronic Warfare, Chris Bushell, adds that the partners have “agreed to also look at non-Typhoon EW support solutions where there is mutual benefit to doing so.” Sources: BAE, “Boosting Eurofighter Typhoon Electronic Warfare Support”.
Nov 20/13: Weapons. At the Dubai Air Show, Eurofighter GmbH commits to full integration of the stealthy, medium range GPS/IIR guided Storm Shadow cruise missile by 2015. Storm Shadows are already used by Eurofighter customers in Britain, Italy, and Saudi Arabia (q.v. July 26/13). Ground tests are complete, and flight tests will begin using the IPA2 test aircraft upgraded to the P1E equipment standard.
The similar KEPD 350 missile in service with Germany and Spain won’t be fully qualified, but it will be flight tested at the same time on the IPA7 test aircraft. That will cut time and costs if a customer decides to spend the money and pay for full integration. Sources: Eurofighter, “Flight tests for Storm Shadow and Taurus stand-off precision missiles announced”.
Nov 15/13: CAPTOR-E AESA. The Eurofighter’s new AESA radar has finished its 4-nation program review at Cassidian’s site in Ulm, Germany, with antenna, repositioner, and Antenna Power Supply and Control Unit results that meet the theoretical design.
Next, the antenna sub-system will go to Selex Edinburgh for integration and test with receiver and processor. Final integration of the Captor-E radar into Eurofighter test plane IPA5 is planned in springtime 2014. Source: EADS Cassidian, Nov 15/13 release.
Nov 12/13: Bahrain. Flight International quotes Col. Salah Al-Mansoor from the Royal Bahraini Air Force’s planning headquarters, who says that Bahrain will be upgrading its 21-plane F-16 fleet to roughly F-16V status from 2014-2018, under a deal whose initial outline is already agreed with Lockheed Martin. Bahrain would represent the 3rd such F-16 upgrade, after Taiwan and South Korea. Major upgrades under the Common Capability Integration Program will reportedly include an AESA radar (NGC APG-80 or SABR, or Raytheon RACR), new cockpit displays, the Link-16/MIDS datalink, software upgrades, and Lockheed’s AN/AAQ-33 Sniper surveillance and targeting pod. Al-Mansoor also mentions GPS-guided JDAMs, an upgrade to AIM-9X short range air-to-air missiles, and “the D-model version of Raytheon’s AIM-120 AMRAAM”. That last is unlikely; the AIM-120D isn’t approved for export, and is still working toward Initial Operational Capability in the USA.
Col. Al-Mansoor says that the kingdom is considering a follow-on order of new F-16s, adding that “We must analyse and determine the cost of the future force structure.” The RBAF’s 16 F-5E/F fighters need replacement, and a winner is expected to be announced in January 2014 at the Bahrain international air show. BAE’s Eurofighter remains the front-runner, but the same outlay that would buy just 12 Eurofighters would net Bahrain around 20-22 F-16E/F Block 60s or similar F-16V equivalents, with all of these upgrades already baked in.
Questions remain. Can Bahrain buy new F-16s and Eurofighters, given the need to aid countries like Egypt and pacify its own restive population? Is the F-16 CCIP + Eurofighters their best Plan B, or could they decide to operate an all-F-16 future fleet of upgraded and new fighters, offering lower short and long-term force structure costs, and commonalities with the nearby UAE? Finally, what about Gulf monarchs’ growing wariness concerning US intentions and support? How will that play into Bahrain’s decisions? Flight International, “Bahrain to launch F-16 upgrade in 2014”.
Nov 4/13: Tranche 3. The 1st Tranche 3 Typhoon (BS116), has successfully completed engine ground runs at Warton, UK, from green screen checks through Stage C checks of the engine’s integration with all onboard systems. 1st flight is expected to take place before the end of 2013 – and does, in December. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, Nov 4/13 release.
Oct 30/13: EP2. The NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) signs a development contract with Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH for Evolution Package 2. It includes enhancements to the existing radar, DASS defensive system, and MIDS/Link-16 system, as well as Flight Control System (FCS) and the Utility Control System (UCS) improvements to inprove compatibility with future civil airspace requirements. MBDA’s Storm Shadow cruise missile isn’t mentioned (q.v. July 26/13).
Development is supposed to be done by the end of 2015. Earlier reports (q.v. July 30/12) suggested that the radar enhancements may involve a new AESA system, but current sources indicate that EP2 this just adds Meteor missile capability to the existing Captor-M radar (q.v. June 18/13). Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, Oct 30/13 | AIN, “Eurofighter Signs New Contract, Describes AESA Radar Status”.
EP2 development
Oct 28/13: P1E. The Eurofighter Typhoon Phase 1 Enhancements (P1E) program has finished flight testing in Manching, Germany and Getafe, Spain, and will be ready for installation and retrofit on existing Tranche 2 aircraft by the end of 2013.
P1E implements full Air-to-Surface capability, with full integration of a Laser Designator Pod (RAFAEL LITENING III), full smart bomb integration (Paveway laser-guided, and dual-mode Paveway IV/ EGBU-16 GPS and laser), Helmet Mounted Sight System upgrades for ground attack use, Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe, improved Radios and Direct Voice Input, Digital integration of Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (full IRIS-T integration with HMSS for high off-boresight shots, and allowing future AIM-9X integration), and an updated MIDS/Link-16 Datalink for wider interoperability. All of these enhancements will come factory-installed in Tranche 3 aircraft. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, Oct 28/13 | Aviation Week, “Partners Chart Course For Eurofighter Typhoon Enhancements”.
Tranche 2 P1E upgrades approved
Aug 19-20/13: South Korea. Conflicting messaging from DAPA and contractors give a somewhat muddled picture, but the upshot is that Eurofighter was disqualified on a questionable technicality, and the F-35 for budgetary reasons, apparently leaving the F-15SE as the de facto winner. That was reversed in late September, when South Korea’s government decided to cancel the competition and start over. In effect, they’ve signaled that it isn’t really a competition, they want the F-35. Which is confirmed in November, when the F-35 is picked as a sole-source winner. Read “South Korea’s Reboots F-X Multi-Role Fighter Buy, Wants 5th Gen” for full coverage.
Loss in Korea
Aug 7/13: Bahrain. BAE Systems says that Bahrain “has expressed an interest in Typhoon and the British government are leading very early discussions”. That’s new, and the motivation is interesting.
Bahrain’s King Hamad al-Khalifa reportedly told British Prime Minister David Cameron that they were interested in buying Eurofighter jets to “create a cohesive defence system between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)” nations. Saudi Arabia is the linchpin of the GCC, and Oman is a respected member. This is a clear dividend from their purchases, and the king’s comment may also be good news for prospective sales in the UAE (40-60 jets), Kuwait, and Qatar. At the same time, every one of these sales is expected to be hotly contested, with competition in place or expected from Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Lockheed Martin’s F-16E/F, and Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen. Reuters.
Aug 1/13: Saudi Arabia. BAE’s 2013 Half-Year Results says that deliveries have resumed, with the Saudi fleet up to 28 fighters, construction beginning on new facilities, and pilot training in-country progressing:
“Four Typhoon aircraft were delivered in the first half, adding to the initial phase of 24 Typhoon aircraft deliveries between 2009 and the end of 2011…. A [GBP] 0.3bn contract was signed in March for the construction of airfield facilities at King Fahd Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Discussions on the provision of maintenance and upgrade facilities in-Kingdom, and further capability enhancement of the Typhoon aircraft remain ongoing. Under an order received at the end of 2012 to deliver training to the RSAF, the first graduation ceremony of cadets from the King Faisal Air Academy was held in May [2013].”
With respect to finalizing terms for Tranche 3 upgrades, BAE’s accompanying presentation cites “good progress,” and says “Significant trading bias to second half anticipated.” Translation: we expect a deal before the end of the year. That will need to be taken care of before BAE can talk about further sales, though they do cite a “KSA B2” opportunity as one of their top prospects. Half-Year Results statement [PDF] and presentation [PDF] | Daily Mail.
July 26/13: Storm Shadow. AIN reports that key Tornado upgrades may end up being funded by Saudi Arabia and Oman. RAF assistant chief of the air staff AVM Ed Stringer says that “Storm Shadow will be on the Typhoon sooner than you think.” From “Middle East Customers Funding Eurofighter Upgrades”:
“…further indication that some key upgrades to the combat jet are being funded by Saudi Arabia and possibly Oman. The four original partner nations have proved reluctant to collectively fund in the near term enhancements… such as integration of the MBDA Storm Shadow cruise missile. The four partners have also so far failed to approve full development of the Captor-E AESA radar by the Euroradar consortium…. “Other Typhoon customers are involved [in providing] funding profile,” [RAF Air Vice Marshal Ed Stringer] added…. During a briefing at the IDEX show in Abu Dhabi earlier this year, a BAE Systems official said that the Storm Shadow would enter flight-test on the Typhoon this year because this is a requirement of the Royal Saudi Air Force.”
The RSAF already uses Storm Shadow missiles on their Tornado strike fighters.
July 7/13: Germany. Der Spiegel takes a strafing run at the Eurofighter program in Germany, pointing out both its budget overruns, and citing recent documents that discuss safety and quality issues with the planes. Germany and the other Eurofighter partners are expected to make their Tranche 3B decisions sometime in 2014, so the articles feed into a live political debate as an election approaches.
On the budgetary front, the Bundestag approved EUR 14.7 billion for 180 fighters, but Der Spiegel says that EUR 14.5 billion has already been spent on just 108 machines. The current Bundeswehr estimate is reportedly EUR 16.8 billion for 143 fighters (Tranche 1 through 3A) by 2018. That would average out to EUR 117.5 million/ $157 million per plane.
The 2nd issue involves quality control problems. On Oct 1/08, the military did not extend the Manching, Bavaria plant’s license to remain a Bundeswehr aviation site. Aircraft were still accepted after more detailed inspections, but that could leave the government liable in the event of a crash on German soil. Later, on April 18/13, an auditor from the Bundesamt fur Ausrustung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung der Bundeswehr (BAAINBw) in Koblenz cited the ejection seats as a fleet-wide problem area. Der Spiegel alleges that German quality control and inspections have suffered as a result of austerity measures and military “reforms,” but it isn’t the first time this has been publicly cited as an issue. In August 2010, an RSAF Lt. Col. and member of the Saudi Royal family was killed in a 2-seat Typhoon crash near Moron, Spain, when his parachute separated from the harness. His Spanish counterpart ejected safely. The accident led the RAF to modify its fleet’s ejection seat harnesses. Der Spiegel re: budgets [in German] | Der Spiegel re: reliability [in German] | Reuters.
Program problems
July 5/13: South Korea. DAPA suspends bidding on its fighter competition, after none of the entries (Eurofighter, F-15SE, F-35A) could meet South Korea’s industrial demands, and performance specifications, and budget limits. Something clearly has to be rethought, if South Korea wants those fighters. If they don’t drop the number bought, then either the budget must be increased, or cost-adding elements like industrial offsets need to be revised, or the performance specifications need to be relaxed and new competitors contemplated. Yonhap | Yonhap follow-on.
July 2/13: P1E Weapons. BAE announces that they have finished initial Paveway IV GPS/laser guided bomb trials with a Eurofighter, as part of the Phase 1 Enhancement Programme that will give Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 2 planes independent precision strike capabilities. Other elements of the program include the LITENING laser designation & surveillance pod, and EGBU-16 Enhanced Paveway laser/GPS guided bomb. BAE Systems.
June 20/13: Qatar. AFP says that the Middle Eastern Emirate intends to launch its RFP for 24-36 fighters “soon.” They own a fleet of Mirage 2000-5s, which recently flew to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya.
French President Hollande will visit Doha for high-level economic talks on June 22, and France has close ties with the Emirate, but the Qataris aren’t waiting around. They reportedly spent time in May 2013 evaluating the Eurofighter Tornado with the RAF, and will soon host a Eurofighter team in-country for flight trials. Boeing also remains in the mix. Agence France Presse.
June 19/13: Industrial. New Eurofighter GmbH CEO and former Airbus Military head Alberto Gutierrez seems to understand what his firm needs to do. Now, can he do it? He tells Reuters:
“In this market, where we are, there is competition and we have to keep on going, finding out whatever improvement is available to catch up, to make the product cheaper and a way of getting into decisions leaner and faster…”
All true. The problem is, he has just admitted that his plane is behind competitors in key areas, too expensive, and hobbled by an industrial structure that doesn’t foster either lean costs or fast action. Fixing even 1 of those problems is a serious challenge. Fixing all 3 in time to land new orders, before the plane goes out of production, while keeping governments from derailing improvement plans, starts edging toward “Mission: Impossible” territory.
June 18/13: Weapons. Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH signs a full weapon system integration contract with the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) for MBDA’s Meteor long-range air-to-air missile. This will reportedly include 2-way datalink integration, which will offer parity with the JAS-39 Gripen and an advantage over the Dassault Rafale.
Germany became the last of the 6 core Meteor partners (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden) to sign a contract for missile stocks, on May 31/13. The NETMA contract completes the other coverage loop, and means that MBDA now has contracts to integrate its missile onto all 3 originally-envisaged platforms: the Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, and Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen.
BAE had done some preliminary work (q.v. June 20/11, July 11/12) in Britain, which led to an unguided test firing (Dec 6/12). That was an excellent set of 1st steps to cut integration time for everyone, but that isn’t the same as full integration. Further design and test work on the missile system will continue at Alenia Aermacchi, BAE Systems, and EADS Cassidian… which doesn’t seem like a very efficient way to conduct things.
What the releases don’t say is when integration will be complete. Eurofighter GmbH has now confirmed the date as 2017. That’s about 3 years later than Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen (2014), and later than original Eurofighter forecasts of mid-2015, and but a year earlier than the French Rafale (2018). Eurofighter | MBDA | UK MoD | Aviation Week.
Full Meteor air-air missile integration contract
June 7/13: Engine. EUROJET Turbo GmbH celebrates the delivery of its 1000th EJ200 production engine, of over 1,500 orders places so far. This one was assembled at ITP for Spain, and the firm touts 789 engines in service so far on operational Eurofighter Typhoons. To date, the engines have accumulated over 390,000 flying hours. Eurojet [MS Word] | Eurofighter.
1,000th EJ200
May 23/13: South Korea. EADS Cassidian reportedly announces that they would invest $2 billion in the K-FX fighter development project, and help market the plane internationally, if the Eurofighter is chosen for F-X-3. Investments would include a maintenance repair and overhaul (MRO) facility that could extend to the KF-X, and an aerospace software center.
It isn’t a bad idea for EADS. Barring multiple orders from new sources, it’s very unlikely that the Eurofighter will still be in production by 2022. Upgrades and maintenance will continue for some time, but the C-203 KF-X design could offer EADS a new option to sell, with a fundamental design that can improve toward stealth fighter status. The question is whether South Korea wants to go forward. Yonhap News.
April 5/13: South Korea. An un-named military official tells the government’s Yonhap News Agency that after 2 years of discussions and negotiations with DAPA, EADS has changed its industrial offer. Instead of having the first 10 made in Europe, the next 24 made using Korean components, and the last 26 assembled in Korea, EADS has offered to build just 12 in Europe, with the other 48 Tranche 3 planes at KAI in South Korea.
The news report is imprecise, leaving the question of structural manufacturing vs. kit assembly unaddressed. It also fails to address how EADS can promote the idea of 20,000 South Korean aerospace jobs for a 5-year period, when the company also says that building the Typhoon for the much larger orders of the core country participants created just 10,000 jobs in Europe. On its face, the statement seems less than plausible, but it does point to the likelihood of significant structural manufacturing in Korea. Yonhap.
April 4/13: South Korea. The ROKAF has picked Taurus’ KEPD 350 long range cruise missile for their future fighter force. They’ll have to pay extra to integrate it with their F-16s and F-15Ks. The proposed F-15SE Silent Eagle is different enough that it will probably require added testing, so Eurofighter may garner a slight advantage from German & Spanish plans to add the KEPD 350 to Eurofighter by 2015. Read “Korea’s F-X Multi-Role Fighter Buys: Phases 2 & 3” for full coverage.
March 26/13: Tranche 3. The Tranche 3 Instrumented Production Aircraft 8 test plane has joined all major structural pieces, and moves on to the next production station on the final assembly line in Manching. Work is now focused on hydraulics, defensive aids, test flight instrumentation, and electrical systems with over 110 km of complex special cabling.
IPA8 will play an important role testing and integrating new features like the AESA radar, new weapons, etc. EADS Cassidian.
March 13/13: Denmark. The Danes pick up their fighter competition as promised, following their announced hiatus in April 2010. Invited bidders include the same set of Lockheed Martin (F-35A), Boeing (Super Hornet), and Saab (JAS-39E/F) – plus EADS (Eurofighter), who had withdrawn from the Danish competition in 2007. The goal of a 2014 F-16 replacement decision has been moved a bit farther back, and now involves a recommendation by the end of 2014, and a selection by June 2015.
The Flyvevabnet are reported to have 30 operational F-16s, with 15 more in reserve, out of an original order of 58. Past statements indicate that they’re looking to buy around 25 fighters as replacements, but there are reports of a range from 24-32, depending on price. Danish Forsvarsministeriet [in Danish] | Eurofighter GmbH | Saab | JSF Nieuws.
Feb 21/13: Saudi Arabia. BAE’s end of year investor presentation [PDF] discusses changes in Saudi Arabia, including a contract amendment that formally abandons Saudi plans for a final assembly line in-country. That insistence had been holding up deliveries, and the remaining 48 aircraft will begin arriving in 2013. Meanwhile, work to “expand the multi-role capabilities” of Saudi Typhoons continues, as do negotiations to continue expanding those capabilities toward Tranche 3 levels.
Pricing remains an issue several years after the contract, and the next stage of support contracts is also in long negotiations:
“Under the Saudi British Defence Co-operation Programme (SBDCP), orders totalling £3.4bn were awarded for support through to 2016, including the provision of manpower, logistics and training to the RSAF…. The initial three-year Typhoon support contract finished at the end of June and two subsequent six-month extensions have been secured. Discussions continue with the customer on the next five years of support. Discussions on Typhoon price escalation with the Saudi Arabian government remain ongoing. Negotiations are also ongoing for the provision of maintenance and upgrade facilities in-Kingdom, and further capability enhancement of the aircraft.”
Feb 11/13: DACT distilled. A veteran Eurofighter test pilot doesn’t see the logic behind Lockheed Martin test pilot Bill Flynn’s recent claim that an F-35 will beat any 4+ generation aircraft, including the Eurofighter Typhoon:
“The F-35 thrust to weight ratio is way lower [than Eurofighter] and its energy-manoeuvrability diagrams match those of the F/A-18…. starting from medium altitude and above, there is no story with a similarly loaded Typhoon…. [F-35] Transonic acceleration is… better than in an F/A-18 or F-16, but mainly due to its low drag characteristics than to its powerplant. That means that immediately after the transonic regime, the F-35 would stop accelerating and struggle forever to reach a non operationally suitable Mach 1.6…. The Typhoon will continue to accelerate supersonic with an impressive steady pull, giving more range to its BVR (Beyond Visual Range) armament…. Angle-of-attack is remarkably high in the F-35, as it is for all the twin tailed aircraft, but of course it can not be exploited in the supersonic regime, where the limiting load factor is achieved at low values…. Excessive energy bleeding rates would operationally limit the F-35 well before its ultimate AoA is reached.”
Both Britain and Italy will eventually find out for sure, as they will soon have both types in service. Italy will be the best test, as its F-35As are more capable dogfighters than Britain’s F-35Bs. About 2 months earlier, the Aviationist had canvassed Italian pilots, who fly both the F-16 and the Eurofighter, for their opinion concerning those 2 platforms:
“During more or less a decade of service with the Italian Air Force, the F-16 has been extensively used to train Typhoon pilots in WVR engagements. According to the Italian pilots, the F-16 matches the F-2000 under 10,000 feet. But above FL100 the Typhoon becomes quite difficult to beat since its superior aerodynamics give the Eurofighter can out maneuver the Viper at every engagement.”
Sources: The Aviationist, “No way an F-35 will ever match a Typhoon fighter jet in aerial combat” Eurofighter test pilot says” | and “How does the F-16 perform against its adversaries in dogfight?”
vs. F-35 & F-16
2012EUR 2 billion support deal; Oman buys 12; India loss.
Eurofighter & Paveways
(click to view full)
Dec 21/12: Oman. It isn’t Christmas over there, but the RAFO is getting a present anyway. The Sultanate signs a GBP 2.5 billion (about $4.057 billion) deal with Britain for 12 Eurofighters, and 8 Hawk LIFT advanced trainers. This makes them the Eurofighter Typhoon’s 3rd export customer, a status they share with their neighbor Saudi Arabia. The deal includes in-service support, and deliveries are expected to begin in 2017.
See “Oman’s Air Force Upgrades: From Jaguars to F-16s & Eurofighters” for full coverage.
Oman buys 12
Dec 6/12: Weapons. 1st firing of MBDA’s Meteor long range air-air missile from a Eurofighter Typhoon. It’s part of Britain’s Future Enhancements Flight Test Programme, and builds on BAE’s unpowered trials to verify safe separation. The flight trials were conducted with integrated support from QinetiQ and MBDA. BAE | Eurofighter.
Nov 29/12: UK Updates. BAE Systems has finished upgrading 43 RAF Eurofighters under the Retrofit 2 program, which began as its own effort but was subsumed into the wider Typhoon Availability Service (TAS) contract. Their Tranche 1 Block 5 standard installs the PIRATE forward looking infra-red (FLIR) system, improves air-to-air capability; and adds precision strike by using a combination of Paveway II family laser-guided bombs, and RAFAEL’s LITENING-III surveillance and laser designator pod. Eurofighter GmbH.
Nov 6/12: UAE. British Prime Minister David Cameron issues a joint communique with the UAE. The 2 countries will improve their defense ties, with specific commitments that include:
“Deepen our defence ties by; continuing the development of our joint plans for the security of the UAE and wider Gulf region; increasing our joint exercises and training; and by investing in the British military presence in the UAE.
Establish a defence industrial partnership that involves close collaboration around Typhoon and a number of new technologies.”
The Eurofighter is competing with France’s Rafale for a 60-plane buy, and these sorts of agreements are normal under the circumstances. It’s also normal for specific defense deals to depend on the customer’s final choice, though the joint communique includes economic relations beyond defense. UK PM | Reuters.
Nov 6/12: Flight costs. From Britain’s House of Commons:
Mr Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the average hourly cost was of flying the Typhoon fighter (a) with and (b) without fuel costs. [126215]
Mr Dunne [holding answer 1 November 2012]: The standard marginal flying hour cost for a Typhoon is £3,875, including the cost of fuel. Excluding fuel costs the figure reduces to approximately £2,670.”
Even GBP 3,875 (about $6,200) is considerably cheaper than published American fighter costs per flight hour. The comparable F-15 Eagle family is generally quoted as being in the $17,000 – $30,500 range. The difference has less to do with the respective machines, and more to do with differing approaches to calculating those costs, especially in one’s choice of what to include. A standard calculation method would be informative, but it doesn’t exist.
RAF flight costs
HEAOct 16/12: HMD. Eurofighter GmbH touts the new “Head Equipment Assembly (HEA), developed by BAE Systems’ Electronic Systems, [which] comprises the aircrew helmet and all the sub-system elements needed to display a real world overlaid picture on the helmet visor.” The accompanying video has a Typhoon pilot explaining why this is so powerful, and expressing his belief that it’s impossible to beat an enemy if they have a system like this and you don’t. “Once you’ve had this helmet on, you don’t ever want to be without it.”
All well and good, but American fighters have had these capabilities for almost a decade now. A fact that they have used to their advantage in international competitions against the Typhoon, and against other fighters like the French Rafale that lack an accompanying HMD.
Why HMDs matter
July 2012: Japan. The Japanese Ministry of Defense releases its “Defense of Japan 2012” White Paper. Among other things, it explains exactly why the F-35 won. All 3 contenders fulfilled all mandatory requirements, but the F-35 was rated as the overall winner based on the 2nd stage evaluation of capability, industrial participation, cost, and support.
Part of the problem is that Japan simply accepted Lockheed Martin’s paper performance and cost promises at face value, in the absence of data. Even then, the Typhoon was seen as the most fuel-efficient plane, and its bid had the best industrial benefits for Japan. On the other hand, EADS and BAE had trouble meeting Japan’s purchase cost targets while giving Japanese firms all of that work, and picking EADS/BAE would have meant deviating from Japan’s strongly American industrial links and equipment infrastructure. The Eurofighter Typhoon also had a compatibility problem with the JASDF’s KC-767 aerial tankers, who don’t carry hose-and-drogue refueling pods. KC-767 retrofits would have been required, driving up the program’s expense. Read “Japan’s Next Fighters, From F-X Competition to F-35 Buys” for full coverage.
LuftwaffenJuly 30/12: Eurofighter vs. F-22. Combat Aircraft leaks some results from the 2012 Red Flag exercises. WIRED Danger Room:
“In mid-June… [8] Typhoons arrived at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska for an American-led Red Flag exercise involving more than 100 aircraft from Germany, the U.S. Air Force and Army, NATO, Japan, Australia and Poland. Eight times during the two-week war game, individual German Typhoons flew against single F-22s… The results were a surprise to the Germans and presumably the Americans, too. “We were evenly matched,” Maj. Marc Gruene told Combat Aircraft’s Jamie Hunter. The key, Gruene said, is to get as close as possible to the F-22 … and stay there. “As soon as you get to the [close-in] merge … the Typhoon doesn’t necessarily have to fear the F-22,” Gruene said.”
That’s interesting, and an impressive testament to the Eurofighter’s design and ergonomics. On the other hand, let’s acknowledge that it isn’t exactly easy to “get to the merge” against an opponent who is invisible to your radar at range, moving up to 50% faster than you are, and able to see you just fine on their own radar.
vs. F-22
July 30/12: AESA. NETMA(NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency) has reportedly issued an RFP to Eurofighter GmbH for the development of an E-Scan Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar. Eurofighter CEO, Enzo Casolini says the 2015 target remains, per announcements in June 2011:
“The timescale is to answer the RFP by October this year and to have an agreement with the nations by the end of the year. The target is to have a contract by the middle of next year and to have an E-Scan entering into service by 2015.”
See: Arabian Aerospace.
July 11/12: Weapons. BAE describes cockpit assessment trials for the long-range Meteor air-to-air missile. They took pilots from “each of the Eurofighter nations,” and put them through a range of scenarios in a modified simulator. That led to a series of recommendations for the final cockpit design.
On the one hand, getting the user interface really right pays big dividends in combat. On the other hand, the fact they’re doing these exercises a good indication of how early they are in the process. It also points to how much more is involved in this sort of thing, beyond just hanging a new missile on a pylon. BAE Systems.
July 10/12: Gulf opportunities. Reports from Farnborough shed some light on potential Eurofighter Typhoon sales to Oman, Qatar, and the UAE.
Dassault has been sounding quite confident about the Rafale’s ultimate prospects in the UAE, but BAE Systems’ business development director Alan Garwood told Reuters that he believed the UAE’s interest is “real and genuine,” adding that they “could tell by the questions they were asking us that they were serious.” BAE is still working with the British government to put together a package for 60 planes. With the loss in India, and the near-certain demise of Tranche 3B, the UAE represents the fighter’s largest near-term opportunity. Oman is a higher-odds opportunity, and Garwood said that:
“We’ll start formal negotiations [for 12 jets] with Oman towards the end of August [2012] I would imagine. The two governments have targeted it for completion this year and we want it done this year as well… I see no reason why we shouldn’t be able to do that.”
With respect to Qatar, he would say only that: “We are talking to the Qataris quite a bit.” That’s normal in a competition like this, which is reported to include Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Lockheed’s F-35A Lightning II, and Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen. Reuters | WSJ’s The Source blog.
July 9/12: Upgrades at last? At the opening of the Farnborough defense exhibition, British Prime Minister David Cameron discusses the Eurofighter’s future:
“Typhoon’s growth potential is huge and the four partner nations, Italy, Germany, Spain and the UK have agreed the next steps required to further exploit this. The integration of the METEOR missile, an Electronically Scanned Radar, enhancements of the Defensive Aids System, further development of the air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities and integration of new weapons.”
With Tranche 3B fading away, and India out as a big export win, upgrades like these are the only way to keep part of the manufacturing base going for much longer, and are also its best hope for landing significant export orders. The question is when some of these upgrade “agreements” will become signed contracts with actual dollars behind them. Read “Eurofighter’s Upgrades: Enough? In Time?” for more.
March 30/12: “Contract 1”. Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH signs a major 5-year contract with NATO’s Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA), to support the fleet of Typhoon jets across the 4 Eurofighter core nations: Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. The overall contract total is not disclosed, but is estimated to be around EUR 2 billion (currently $2.66 billion).
BAE estimates its share of the total at GBP 446 million (about EUR 533 million). Finmeccanica estimates its share of the total at “more than EUR 500 million.” EADS declined to give figures.
“Contract 1” replaces previous Integrated Logistics Support (PC1-11) contracts and a number of sustainment contracts, covering items like day-to-day support, studies, and customer queries and investigations. It also includes continued development, testing, and upgrade work on the fighters’ systems. Replaced contracts will morph into Contract 1 over a period of time, but they will not include any of the major support contracts announced by various member countries in 2009. Eurofighter GmbH | BAE | Finmeccanica | Defense News.
“Contract 1” for support
March 30/12: #321. A Finmeccanica release notes that so far, the consortium has delivered 321 Eurofighter Typhoons to customer nations.
March 22/12: AESA – just a sim. EADS Cassidian touts the benefits of an “E-Scan” AESA radar for the Eurofighter, and touts its operation of the largest assembly line in Europe for the individual transmit/ receive modules that make up those radars.
The German BWB’s 2-year study, using IABG GmbH’s MILSIM (man-in-the-loop simulator), is nice enough. What it isn’t, is a development and production contract. American F-15 Strike Eagles, F-16s, and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets are offered with AESA radars right now. France’s Dassault just received the 1st RBE2-AA AESA radar for its Rafale production line. Saab is well underway developing its own ES-05 Raven AESA radar for the JAS-39E/F Gripen NG, which will join the Eurofighter’s notional AESA design in using a pivoting plate approach. They’re doing so in conjunction with Finmeccanica’s SELEX Galileo, the current leader of the Euroradar consortium. Unless the Eurofighter consortium and its governments get moving soon, their fighter will begin to find itself at a severe disadvantage in international competitions.
Jan 31/12: India loss. Dassault’s Rafale is picked as the “L-1” lowest bidder for India’s 126-aircraft M-MRCA deal, even after the complex life-cycle cost and industrial calculations are thrown in. Some reports place its cost as $5 million lower per plane. Next steps include the negotiation of a contract, in parallel with parliamentary approval and budgeting.
Until a contract is actually signed, however, India’s procurement history reminds us that even a “close” deal is just 1 step above a vague intention. The contract may take a while. Even the French government sees a deal as only an 80% probability within 6-9 months. The budgeting is likely to be even trickier. The IAF’s exclusion of cost considerations in picking its finalists means that the only question now is: how far over the stated budget will a full Rafale buy go? Some reports place the deal’s cost at around $15 billion – an increase of up to 50% from previous estimates. If economic downturns or squeezed defense budgets make those outlays a big enough issue, early enough in the process, it could have the effect of re-opening the competition. British PM David Cameron has expressed an intent to change India’s mind, and both Saab and Boeing are still positioned within India, in order to be ready for a renewed opportunity.
Eurofighter’s problem is that it’s hard to see how it might succeed in a competition that was re-opened for financial reasons. Dassault | President Sarkozy [in French] | Economic Times of India, see also their timeline | Indian Express | Rediff (thanks for using our descriptions, sans attribution) | Times of India || Aviation Week | BBC | UK’s The Guardian | Reuters report and expert roundup.
India loss
2011HMD at last; Tranche 3 sub-system contracts; German cuts to 3B plans; Competitions in Bulgaria, India, Japan (loss), South Korea, UAE; Opportunities in Indonesia & Turkey?; AESA by 2015?; Paveway IV and EGBU-16 bomb tests; PILUM glide bomb; Naval Eurofighter; Negative British NAO report; 100,000 flying hours.
Eurofighter over Dubai
(click to view full)
Dec 20/11: Japan loss. Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces that Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II has won the F-X competitive bid process for 42 planes, beating the Eurofighter and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet International. As F-4 replacements, the F-35As will have an air defense role, but Japan does have a large cadre of dedicated F-15Js to perform that mission. Conclusion? Their undeclared role is as strike fighters.
Note that there’s still an F-XX program in the future, aimed at replacing Japan’s F-15Js. Numbers as high as 100+ planes have been floated, but that will depend on both economic straits, and local geopolitical threats. Read “Japan’s Next Fighters, From F-X Competition to F-35 Buys” for full coverage.
Japan loss
Nov 16/11: UAE. The UAE is either engaged in the mother of all hardball negotiations, or the potential Rafale sale is crashing. Critical comments at the highest levels are accompanying the invite to Eurofighter, strengthening the belief that the Typhoon is more than just a stalking horse to lower the French bid.
The question is, how big is the opportunity? Reports have surfaced that the UAE may be about to cut its planned new jet order, regardless of its choice, and buy more of its unique F-16E/F Block 60s. Read “Derailed Denouement in Dubai: What’s Up With the UAE’s Fighter Deal?” for a snapshot.
Nov 13/11: UAE. Flight International reports that the UAE must have liked their October briefings re: Eurofighter’s capabilities, because they’ve asked Eurofighter GmbH for an RFP bid to replace their current fleet of Mirage 2000-9s. The UAE has been in negotiations to buy Rafale planes for several years now, but hasn’t been able to clinch a deal.
It’s hard to tell if the UAE is just looking to add pressure and get a better price from Dassault, or if their interest is serious. One sign that they might be serious is the fact that they’ve also received classified technical briefings regarding the F-15E Strike Eagle and F/A-18 Super Hornet, but haven’t asked for RFP bids from the Americans. Flight International believes that this may be a prelude to consideration of the stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle or F/A-18 Super Hornet International for the UAE’s planned 2018-2025 fighter modernization. The obvious 3rd contender there is Lockheed Martin’s F-35.
Nov 12/11: Eurofighter GmbH touts their Dubai flying display, complete with a graphic showing their impressive flight plan.
They also tout a range of technologies that they hadn’t advertised much before, including thrust-vectoring engine nozzles, an AESA radar, and MBDA’s Marte anti-ship missile. The release appears to blur the line between concepts/plans, and field-ready equipment.
Oct 21/11: Germany & Tranche 3B. Germany announces further defense cuts, which include a proviso that their Eurofighter orders will end at Tranche 3A, instead of adding another 37 planes in a Tranche 3B.
With Britain also saying that Tranche 3Ais the end, and the governments of Spain and Italy under severe financial strain, it appears less and less likely that there will be a Tranche 3B. The question is how to escape termination costs. Negotiations can be expected, but one option is to count future exports as re-sales of scheduled orders from existing partner countries. Aviation Week.
Aug 18/11: Sub-contractors. Finmeccanica’s SELEX Galileo contracts with BAE Systems Manufacturing at Hillend in Fife, in GBP 20+ million procurement and electronic manufacturing services contract related to Tranche 3A’s Captor radars. Work at the Hillend facility will run from 2011-2013.
BAE’s release adds that the facility has won over GBP 165 million in Captor and Typhoon DASS orders, over the last 12 years.
July 20/11: South Korea. As South Korea’s DAPA eases the criteria to try and foster more competition, DAPA’s Col. Wi Jong-seong says that “Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi expressed its intent to compete in the fighter jet procurement project early this year.” The report quotes him as saying that Sukhoi’s T-50 PAK-FA will be up against Boeing’s stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II, and the Eurofighter Typhoon. Assuming we don’t have an FX-II competition repeat, where all competitors but one drop out.
At this point, FX-III is being touted as a 60 jet buy of high-end fighters, with a budget of 8.29 trillion won ($7.86 billion). Eurofighter reportedly offered a better deal than the F-15K in F-X-2, but lost. The firm recently proposed to phase in Korean assembly for Phase III, with the 1st 10 made in Europe, the next 24 using Korean components, and the last 26 assembled in Korea. Korea Times.
June 27/11: Weapons. Diehl BGT and Israel’s RAFAEL unveil a new weapon for Eurofighter at the 2011 Paris Air Show. The PILUM long-range glide bomb concept has a range variously reported as 100-160 km/ 62 – 99.5 miles, but it’s a developmental weapon, so exact figures remain to be proven. PILUM uses RAFAEL Spice’s combination of GPS/INS and imaging infrared guidance, within Diehl’s HOSBO modular glide bomb system. HOSBO is a steamlined glide bomb that can carry a modular payload, including warheads of various sizes and types, even warheads designed to disrupt electronics. This JSOW Block III competitor will be able to attack defended targets, vehicles, ships, or even smaller targets. It will be integrated on Germany’s Tornado and Eurofighter aircraft. Will the Saudis, who fly both types, want any? Diehl BGT release | Jerusalem Post.
June 24/11: HMD. A Reuters report offers an update on progress with the Eurofighter’s BAE “Striker”/ HMSS helmet-mounted displays. HMDs are now considered a standard feature for fighter jets, as they’re required in order to take full advantage of new short range air-to-air missiles, and boost ground attack capabilities.
British RAF pilots tested the first helmets in summer 2010. So far, about 50 total helmets have been delivered to Italy, Germany, Spain and UK, at a delivery rate of about 8 per month, but none are being used over Libya. They’re expected to become operational in the RAF by the end of 2011.
June 22/11: AESA. After a year of preliminary industry funding, Eurofighter GmbH and Euroradar agree to continue development, and announce 2015 as the target date for entry into service of a Typhoon with the new “E-Scan” AESA radar. A later date wasn’t really feasible, given the delivery schedules involved in critical competitions like India’s M-MRCA. Indeed, even a 2015 date could be a disadvantage as the Eurofighter competes with France’s Rafale, which has begun testing its own RBE2-AA. The firm does say that:
“The new AESA array, larger than the ones available to our competitors thanks to the Typhoon’s voluminous radome, will be fitted on a repositioner that will provide a wider field of regard when compared to those installed or scheduled for introduction on other fighters. The new radar will offer customers the freedom to retrofit their existing Typhoons when required.”
E-Scan AESA date announced
June 20/11: Weapons. Eurofighter IPA1 has completed the first of a series of Meteor missile trials, beginning with safe separation across the flight envelope on the Aberporth range in Britain. Eurofighter GmbH.
May 17/11: Leadership. EADS Cassidian Spain has appointed 56 year old Luis Hernández Vozmediano as their new Head of the Eurofighter program. He has spent virtually his entire professional career at EADS, and has been heavily involved in Britain’s A330 Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA), and the related American KC-X pursuit. Eurofighter GmbH.
May 11/11: Turkey. Eurofighter has courted Turkey for a long time, despite Turkey’s political & industrial commitment to the F-35 program. Hurriyet reports growing interest in a fighter split-buy, to reduce dependence on the USA.
Naturally, Italy’s government is pushing Turkey to solve that problem by joining the Eurofighter consortium. Turkey might also pick a hi-low approach, and join South Korea and Indonesia in KF-X instead. The real wild card? Turkey’s current account deficit is hitting levels that worry some observers. High levels have been predictors of Turkish economic crises in the past.
April 27/11: India. Fulfilling long-standing rumors that it had gained a leading position in India’s M-MRCA future fighter competition, Eurofighter is confirmed as one of 2 finalists, alongside Dassault’s Rafale. Read “India’s M-MRCA Fighter Competition” for full coverage.
April 2011: Weapons. EADS Cassidian Spain achieves the first 1,000 pound EGBU-16 Enhanced Paveway II precision guided munition release. The EGBU-16 is the selected dual mode bomb for Germany, Spain and Italy, whereas the locally-developed Paveway IV is the dual mode choice for the UK. Eurofighter GmbH.
March 7/11: Weapons. The first ever Eurofighter release of a Paveway IV dual guidance bomb takes place from development aircraft IPA6, in an hour long test flight over the Aberporth Range in Wales. BAE Systems | Eurofighter GmbH, incl photo.
March 10/11: Indonesia? The Times reports that more of Britain’s fighters could be leaving the force, if Indonesia’s interest in up to 24 Typhoons pans out. That could be politically challenging, though. Britain has led the way into attacks on Libya for bombing its civilians, but Indonesia has used its BAE Hawk light attack jets against its own insurgencies, and in East Timor. That triggered a defense export ban 12 years ago. Indonesia continues to operate a large fleet of Hawk jets, but it has since filled its high end air superiority slot with a handful of Sukhoi’s SU-27/30 Flanker family fighters – a cheaper choice with similar capabilities.
The UK MoD says it has “no current plans” to export Typhoons to Indonesia, but that means little to nothing when the statement is carefully parsed. If Indonesia really is interested in adding Typhoons, one option might be to re-export 24 RAF Tranche 1 aircraft that haven’t been given precision ground attack modifications. The Times [subscription-only] | Agence France Presse | The Guardian | UPI.
March 2/11: Britain’s reluctance to invest in additional Typhoon fighters is partly explained by the findings of an NAO report, which notes that:
“The cost of the Typhoon project has risen substantially. Despite the MOD’s now buying 72 fewer aircraft (down from 232 to 160, a reduction of 30 per cent), the forecast development and production cost has risen by 20 per cent to [GBP] 20.2 billion. This is a 75 per cent increase in the unit cost of each aircraft. The cost of supporting each aircraft has also risen by a third above that originally expected. The MOD now estimates that, by the time the aircraft leaves service, some [GBP] 37 billion will have been spent.”
There are concerns that the report might affect the jet’s chances in India. Meanwhile, a report in The Register highlights the importance of paying attention to Tranche buy totals, in an atmosphere of declining budgets. Note that the retirement of the RAF’s Tranche 1 jets will happen long before they reach their service life design limits, raising the possibility of resale:
“Probably the most dismal figure we are given is that the RAF will actually put into service just 107 Typhoons. At the moment it has received 70: the last of the 160 planes ordered by the UK will be delivered in 2015. But, we are told, “by 2019” all the Tranche 1 jets (which were still being delivered to the RAF at the start of 2008) will be “retired” – that is, thrown away. We’ll pay for 160 jets (actually we’ll pay for 232), but we’ll only ever get a fleet of 107.”
UK NAO report
March 2/11: During high level visits, British officials continue to press the case for the Eurofighter as Japan’s future F-X fighter, over offerings from Boeing (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet or F-15SE Silent Eagle) or Lockheed Martin (F-35A/B/C). One interesting wrinkle is that reconnaissance capabilities could become an important requirement, a move that would give the F-35 family an edge. BAE et. al. are fighting an uphill fight, but they’re not alone: in January 2011, the European Business Council in Japan launched a defense and security committee to promote defense-related business cooperation. Asahi Shimbun | Japan Times | L.A. Times.
Naval conceptFeb 21/11: Aero India 2011 sees Eurofighter and BAE unveil an interesting wrinkle: an initial design for a navalized Eurofighter than can operate from aircraft carriers, based on an internally-funded set of studies and simulations. In a direct nod to potential Indian sales, they tout the plane as being able to take off from “ski jump” carriers without catapults – a design that describes all of India’s current and planned carriers, as well as the initial design for Britain’s own Queen Elizabeth Class.
Eurofighter GmbH describes the goal as 95% commonality with land-based aircraft, and required changes as “limited… include a new, stronger landing gear, a modified arrestor hook and localised strengthening on some fuselage sections near the landing gear, as well as updates the EJ200 engines,” which could include thrust-vectoring in flight.
India is currently planning to use MiG-29Ks as its naval fighters, but it’s currently the type’s only customer, and the Typhoon is seen as a leading contender in its M-MRCA competition for land based aircraft. Britain is planning to use the F-35C from its future carrier, but further cost increases or delays for the multinational program could open an opportunity for a jet type that the RAF already flies. Eurofighter GmbH.
Naval concept unveiled
Feb 4/11: Bulgaria RFI. Bulgaria issues another fighter replacement RFI, soliciting information from Boeing (F/A-18E/F), Dassault (Rafale, Mirage 2000), EADS (Eurofighter), Lockheed Martin (F-16), and Saab (JAS-39 Gripen) re: 8 new and/or second-hand fighter jets, to replace its existing fleet of 12 MiG-21s.
Bulgaria issued a similar RFI in 2006, for 20 jets, but the global economic crash, and Bulgaria’s own issues in trying to pay for past defense purchases, forced a hold. The Defense Ministry has taken pains to emphasize that this is just an exploratory request, and is not the start of a purchase tender. Nevertheless, November 2010 saw the formation of a National Steering Committee and an Integrated Project Team, to draft preliminary fighter replacement operational, technical, and tactical requirements. That followed October 2010 remarks by Bulgaria’s Defense Minister Anyu Angelov, who discussed spending BGN 1 billion (around $725 million) for the purchase of an uncertain number of new fighter jets to replace its MiG-21s, while modernizing its fleet of 16 MiG-29A air superiority jets. Sofia News Agency.
Feb 3/11: Upgrades. The first Spanish single-seat instrumented production aircraft version 4 (IPA4) completes 500 hours of flight at the EADS Cassidian Spain facility at Getafe, near Madrid. After a functional upgrade from its original Tranche 1 air superiority standard to Tranche 2, this aircraft is testing new technology including a Link-16 MIDS system, as well as integration trials and the launching of precision air-to-ground weapons.
The UK has already upgraded a number of its Eurofighters along similar lines, and added advanced LITENING targeting pods. Eurofighter GmbH believes that this Spanish IPA4 platform may serve as a model for the possible upgrade of the Tranche 1 fleets currently in service with Eurofighter customer nations. That’s the good news. The bad news is that an upgrade program of this type may also be seen as an alternative to ordering the final Tranche 3B set of Eurofighters. Eurofighter GmbH.
Jan 28/11: Sub-contractors. Premium AEROTEC’s Varel, Germany plant has successfully started assembling structural components for the Eurofighter. EADS Cassidian announces that Varel’s first 3/2b Eurofighter fuselage section, a 3m section that mates with the wings, has been delivered to the Augsburg plant, where the entire fuselage center section will be assembled.
Premium AEROTEC is a spin-off of the former Airbus sites in Nordenham and Varel and the former EADS site in Augsburg. It began operations on Jan 1/09, and in addition to various Airbus passenger aircraft components, it manufactures the fuselage center section for all Eurofighter aircraft, including the 4 program partners (United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Germany) and export customers Austria and Saudi Arabia. This makes Premium AEROTEC GmbH, with over 6,000 employees and 2009 revenues of EUR 1.1 billion, the largest supplier of structures for the Eurofighter. The company has production plants in Augsburg, Bremen, Nordenham and Varel in Germany; and in Ghimbav, Brasov County, Romania. Premium AEROTEC | EADS Cassidian.
Jan 25/11: Eurofighter GmbH’s CEO sees 2011 as a pivotal year, in order to avoid the end of production in 2015. India’s M-MRCA competition, and hopes of a Tranche 3B from its consortium countries, are the key underpinnings.
Britain has been very clear that there will be no Tranche 3B buy there, and the austerity programs underway (voluntarily or otherwise) in Germany, Italy, and Spain make a Tranche 3B buy extremely unlikely.
100k milestone @ MoronJan 25/11: Eurofighter GmbH announces that the multinational operational fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons in service since the second half of 2003 achieved 100,000 flying hours in January 2011.
As aircraft are delivered and air forces declared their Typhoons to be operational, usage has accelerated. The first 5,000 flying hours was achieved by November 2005, and 10,000 hours was reached in August 2006. May 2007 included the 20,000 hour milestone, and by August 2008 the Typhoon had surpassed 50,000 hours. According to the firm, global operational fleets currently have more than 260 aircraft in service, with 6 squadrons in the UK (4 in Coningsby, 1 in Leuchars and 1 in Mount Pleasant, Falkland Islands); 4 squadrons in Italy (2 in Grosseto and 2 in Gioia del Colle); 3 squadrons in Germany (Laage, Neuburg and Nörvenich), as well as 1 each in Spain, Austria and in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
At present, all 148 Tranche 1 aircraft have been delivered, and Tranche 2 production is in full swing.
100,000 fleet flight hours
Jan 4/11: HMD. BAE announces that its “Helmet Mounted Symbology System” (HMSS) is scheduled to enter service with the RAF in 2011, giving Britain’s Eurofighters the same helmet mounted sighting capability already enjoyed by pilots of competing aircraft, via systems like the Israeli/American JHMCS.
The HMSS does add some advanced wrinkles. A Eurofighter pilot can now look at multiple targets, lock-on to them, and prioritize them by voice-command. This will work even for targets over the shoulder, or targets picked up by the radar but located underneath the aircraft.
HMD at last
2009 – 2010EUR 9 billion Tranche 3A deal; Tranche 3A sub-system contracts; Tranche 3B offer on table; Private work toward a “CAPTOR-E” AESA radar.
CAPTOR-E
(click to view full)
Oct 5/10: Sub-contractors. Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Galileo announces a EUR 242 million (about $333.5 million) contract for 88 Captor-M mechanically scanned phased array radars, as part of the Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3A buy. Deliveries would begin in 2012.
The CAPTOR-M is the Eurofighter’ standard radar. Contracts are in progress to develop and field new CAPTOR-E Active Electronically Scanned Array radars for future buys or retrofits, vid. the July 20/10 entry. SELEX Galileo [PDF] | Defense News.
Sept 7/10: Sub-contractors. Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Galileo announces [PDF] a EUR 400 million sub-contract from BAE Systems, to supply Tranche 3A fighters with the Praetorian Defensive Aids Sub System (DASS), delivered to the same standard as the Tranche 2 fighters. SELEX Galileo leads the EuroDASS Consortium of Elettronica, Indra Sistemas, EADS and SELEX Galileo, which shares the production of more than 20 major Line Replaceable Items (LRIs) that make up the system. First deliveries are expected in mid-2012.
The Praetorian DASS includes Electronic Support Measures (ESM) to find hostile radars, active Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) to confuse them, and Missile Approach Warning (MAW) systems, tied into an array of defensive subsystems that include chaff, flares, and towed decoy options.
Aug 19/10: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman announces a contract from EADS Military Air Systems business unit to deliver 88 inertial measurement units (IMU) for Tranche 3A of the Eurofighter Typhoon. The IMU system is the sole sensor which measures the motion of the aircraft and continuously provides motion data to the flight control computer. In a secondary function, the IMU provides backup navigation data.
The IMUs, which provide motion data for the aircraft, will be built by the company’s German navigation systems subsidiary, Northrop Grumman LITEF, which also provided IMUs for Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 of the aircraft. More than 400 Northrop Grumman LITEF IMUs have been delivered and are already in service on Eurofighters in Germany, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, Austria and Saudi Arabia
July 20/10: AESA. Eurofighter GmbH and Euroradar announce that they have begun full scale development of an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar to serve in the Eurofighter, with a target in-service date of 2015. The Eurofighter/Euroradar groups have been conducting preliminary AESA development and flight testing since 2007, and Selex Galileo is already working towards integrating an AESA array with the UK’s Eurofighter (vid. Feb 19/10 entry).
Full-scale development of a CAPTOR AESA successor is a new step that could become a factor in Tranche 3B discussions, or later 3A upgrades. Still, SELEX Galileo CEO Steve Mogford says move represents a standalone offer, and is not linked to the proposed Tranche 3B production phase. The Euroradar consortium has reportedly proposed retaining as much “back-end” CAPTOR equipment as possible, as part of delivering the proposed E-Captor AESA system. The consortium also plans to make CAPTOR-E a mechanically scanned AESA radar, rather than mounting it in a fixed position as American fighters have done. This will expand the AESA radar’s slightly narrower cone, and also make it easier for the aircraft to use “launch and break away” tactics against aerial opponents that are beyond visual range. Eurofighter GmbH | Flight International | Microwave Journal.
June 9/10: Tranche 3B offer. At the ILA Air Show in Berlin, Germany, Reuters relays word from a Eurofighter GmbH spokesman that it has submitted a Tranche 3B offer to the partner nations for 124 more Eurofighters, finishing the planned Tranche 3. Defense industry sources at the Berlin Air Show said the offer was around EUR 10 billion.
To date, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain have so far taken delivery of a combined 222 Eurofighter Typhoons, out of 473 ordered. Eurofighter says a production decision is needed within a year, in order to avoid the beginning of a supplier shutdown and a production gap. The member countries will face a choice between declining defense budgets, versus the likely need to pay some cancellation costs if there is no Tranche 3B.
Feb 19/10: Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Galileo announces [PDF] a GBP 19 million contract from Britain’s defense ministry to install a first of type, multi-function, wide field of regard AESA radar on a British Eurofighter as a technology demonstration program.
The AESA TDP will focus on Day/Night All Weather targeting, high resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), air to air targeting, and communications. It’s designed to raise the technology readiness levels of the enabling hardware, de-risk the capability and demonstrate maturity of concept. Following ground and antenna range testing, the radar is planned to fly on a Royal Air Force Typhoon around 2013.
Future weapons array?July 31/09: NETMA (NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency), Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH and EUROJET Turbo GmbH signed the Tranche 3A contract, a EUR 9 billion (about $12.96 billion) order for 112 aircraft and 241 EJ200 engines (224 engines to equip 112 planes, plus 17 spares). This new contract also sets the baseline for subsequent support contracts.
BAE cites a work value of GBP 2 billion (EUR 2.35 billion), Finmeccanica cites EUR 3 billion worth of work from Tranche 3A, divided between subsidiaries in Italy (EUR 1.6 billion) and the UK (EUR 1.4 billion). Rolls Royce values its 37% share in the EUROJET order at GBP 300 million (EUR 352 million). The EJ200 includes advanced integrated Health Monitoring, and is already supported by availability-based contracting terms. Eurofighter GmbH | UK MoD | BAE Systems | EADS | Finmeccanica | Rolls Royce | BBC | Deutsche Welle | Financial Times | Hamburg Local | Reuters says last buy for Britain | London Telegraph | Times Online | UPI Asia.
Tranche 3A
Additional ReadingsReaders with corrections or information to contribute are encouraged to contact editor Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
tag: typhoonfocus, eurofighterfocus
Block IV Tomahawk is the current generation of the Tomahawk family of cruise missiles. The BGM-109 Tomahawk family began life in the 1980s as sub-sonic, low-flying nuclear strike weapons, before being developed into long-range RGM/UGM-109 conventional attack missiles. They’re most frequently launched from submarines and surface ships, and have been the US Navy’s preferred option for initial air strikes in Iraq, Libya, et. al. Britain has also bought Tomahawk missiles, and launches them exclusively from submarines.
Block IV is the latest variant. It adds innovative technologies that improve combat flexibility, while dramatically reducing the costs to buy, operate, and support these missiles. That’s why the Block IV program, under US Navy PMA-280, has been one of the USA’s defense acquisition success stories over the last decade.
Tomahawk missiles have become the US Navy’s major land strike missile. The USA has bought more than 4,000 over the years, and March 2011 saw the 2,000th GM-109 Tomahawk fired in combat, from USS Barry [DDG 52]. The missile typically flies at 50 – 100 feet above ground using terrain-following radar, and navigates to its targets using a combination of GPS/INS, computer matching of the land’s radar-mapped contours to the missile’s internal maps (TERCOM), and final matching of the target scene (DSMAC). Once on target the missile can fly a direct horizontal attack mode, trigger preprogrammed detonation above the target, or use a pop-up and dive maneuver. CEP is often described as being about 10 meters.
There are 3 fielded variants.
The xGM-109C/D Block III missiles will serve in the US Navy until FY 2020, and can be fitted with either a 1,000 pound unitary conventional warhead (xGM-109C), or a conventional submunitions warhead with hundreds of smaller bomblets (xGM-109D). The Tomahawk Block III has a 750 nautical mile range. Unfortunately, mission planning requires 80 hours of work.
The xGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV achieved Initial Operating Capability in 2004, and current Pentagon plans will end purchases in 2015. Block IV reportedly increases missile range to 900 nautical miles, but it only uses the unitary warhead. Mission planning has been cut from 80 hours to just 1 hour, which makes a big difference to combat usage. The missile also has a 2-way UHF SATCOM datalink that allows the missile to be redirected in flight, or commanded to loiter over an area and wait for instructions from a Fleet HQ’s Maritime Operations Center.
Submarine Launch 109 UGM-109 launchSubmarine-launched UGM-109 missiles are more expensive than their ship launched RGM-109 VLS counterparts, because the submarines’ launch mechanism is more involved and more strenuous. UGM-109 “all-up-round” storage and interface canisters come in 2 types: CLS and TTL. CLS canisters launch UGM-109s from vertical launch tubes installed on many of America’s Los Angeles Class (SSN 719 on), all Virginia Class, and all SSGN Ohio Class submarines. TTL canisters are used to launch Tomahawk missiles from a submarine’s torpedo tubes, which is Britain’s preferred method.
In both cases, a Tomahawk launches “wet”, unlike most anti-ship missiles. The canister remains in the vertical-launch or torpedo tube, while the missile is ejected. Once the UGM-109 has reached a safe distance from the submarine, its rocket booster ignites underwater to power it airborne. That booster falls away just before the missile ignites its jet engine. If the submarine needs to “clear the tube” for torpedoes, anti-ships missiles, mines, UUVs, etc., TTL canisters can be ejected into the sea after launch, as a separate evolution. In contrast, CLS vertical-launch canisters are only removed portside, when the submarine comes into base for servicing and reloading.
Tomahawk: The 2019 Evolution LRASM-A ConceptThere was a plan to develop a successor to the retired xGM-109B ship-killer by 2015, as an interim capability for the US Navy’s Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) program. That was shelved in the FY 2014 budget, as the Navy opted to drop the interim capability. Instead, they’re moving ahead with OASuW’s main xGM-84 Harpoon missile replacement program for air and sea launch. The LRASM derivative of Lockheed Martin’s subsonic but stealthy AGM-158B JASSM-ER is the initial air-launched missile, but there will be competition for air and naval missiles beyond FY 2019.
Raytheon has partnered with Norway’s Kongsberg to offer the stealthy, and accurate JSM for the air-launched OASuW, and their entry has the unique ability to fit inside the F-35C’s weapon bays. They could also offer Kongsberg’s NSM counterpart in the naval realm, but that would leave Tomahawk in the cold. Or would it?
The key to the next set of Tomahawk improvements is actually a warranty. The missile has a 15-year warranty and a 30-year service life, so 2019 will begin a recertification cycle for the fleet that could last until 2030. Threats continue to evolve, so why not add some missile upgrades while they’re back in the shop anyway? The US Navy already has a specifications sheet of possible improvements, and they’ve done a number of capability studies.
Raytheon is investing almost $40 million of its own funds in parallel, and they’re still talking to the Navy about that final package, which will break down into 3 broad categories.
MI conceptAnti-Access/ Area Denial Communications Suite. Saddam Hussein had a sophisticated anti-aircraft system, but he didn’t have the kind of high-end jamming and emissions triangulation capabilities expected of future opponents. The challenge is twofold: keep the enemy from cutting off your communications, and keep your communications from alerting the enemy.
One option that has been mentioned in public involves adding a Line Of Sight datalink capability. The flip side of that move would involve training and tactics changes that push missile control farther down the command chain. That may be necessary, but is the US Navy comfortable doing that? There’s more to these A2/AD-CS discussions than just picking technologies.
Autonomy. The Tomahawk is already an autonomous weapon, in the sense that it can be fired at pre-planned fixed targets and left alone. To remain relevant, it needs to add dynamic terminal autonomy: the ability to acquire targets on its own and hit them, even if the target is moving or has moved. It would also be useful to expand the missile’s navigation autonomy, by offering backups for hardened SASSM M-code GPS.
Both kinds of upgrades are being contemplated. Early tests that aren’t autonomous involve Rapid In-flight Target Update, which allows units that have a lock on a target to transmit rapid final scene updates for the missile’s DSMAC guidance. This is still done via Fleet HQ as Standard Operational Procedure, but that’s enough to hit moving targets in some circumstances. Ships would become vulnerable to Tomahawk strikes if the targeting platform can survive their defenses, and the same is true for land-based air defense systems that can repeatedly move to new fixed locations.
Raytheon and the Navy are looking for more, with a focus on mature technologies to cut down program risk. An ESM system for noticing and geolocating emissions has already begun testing. Raytheon personnel stress its quality, to the point that Navigation via Signals of Opportunity (NAVSOP) might be possible as a backup to GPS. During the attack run, ESM can allow the Tomahawk to home in on an active enemy ship or air defense radars, or even on other intercepted signals. That begins to add autonomous moving target capability, and the firm plans to take the next step by flight testing a dual-mode ESM/ active radar seeker system before the end of 2014. Finally, passive visual spectrum (camera or imaging infrared) guidance has also become popular for long-range strike missiles, because it doesn’t give the missile’s location away by creating electro-magnetic emissions. Raytheon has confirmed that CCD/IIR upgrades are also under consideration for Tomahawk, but stressed that no final decisions have been made about a future guidance package.
Core Strengthening. All of these capabilities are great, but they demand more computer processing power, more memory, more onboard power, etc. The missile’s core will need redesigns, in order to keep up.
Raytheon had to develop a Multi-Function Modular Processor to handle those computing needs. Other efforts will look to add new technology, like the Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) warhead to allow mid-flight reprogramming, and improve performance against reinforced targets like bunkers. Still other attempts will take advantage of existing upgrades. As an example of the latter, Block III introduced the ability to throttle the missile’s Williams F107-WR-402 turbofan, and Raytheon has been expanding its usefulness over time. It’s a capability that’s obviously handy for adjusting the missile’s time of arrival, or extending range, but the firm has recently been testing a “high speed dash” mode. It’s still subsonic, but it represents some impressive flying that close to the ground.
The Missing Link Saab S340-AEWEven after all of these upgrades, the Tomahawk is still a 1970s design that relies on low altitude to hide from radar. That isn’t really subject to change, even though downward-looking radars are proliferating on small AWACS planes and aerostat blimps, and radars in modern ships and air defense systems are taking big steps forward.
All of the Tomahawk’s proposed technologies are well and good, and they will expand the missile’s usefulness substantially. Adding them to thousands of existing missiles is very cost effective, and makes a great deal of sense. As budget crunches force the Navy to re-examine every aspect of their programs, however, the Navy will have to make decisions about the cost, capability profile, and limitations of every weapon in their arsenal. Raytheon is trying to position Tomahawk as best they can, but the final decisions will lie elsewhere.
Contracts & Key Events 45 min. documentaryUnless stated otherwise, US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contracts to Raytheon in Tucson, AZ. In general, these contracts aren’t competitively procured, pursuant to the “only 1 responsible supplier” exemption in 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1).
Key subcontractors include Lockheed Martin in Valley Forge, PA (Weapon Control System element), QinetiQ North America in San Jose, CA (Command and Control element), and Boeing Inc. in St. Louis, MO (Command and Control element).
FY 2016
January 19/16: Tomahawk cruise missiles could get a lot more destructive if a new development program is successful. Researchers from Energetic Materials Research and Engineering have been successfully utilizing residual fuel left inside a missile during impact and turning it into a fuel-air explosive that can contribute to the blast created by the missile’s warhead. At present the team are looking to find the best way to implode the fuel tank to generate a cloud of fuel that will mix with surrounding air to ignite into an intense, high-temperature explosion. If successful, the add on to the missile could increase the Tomahawks payload without any need to change the dynamics of the warhead.
January 15/16: Testing of a new sensor on the Tomahawk missile has been successful. Raytheon owned T-39 test aircraft carried out a number trials over a three week period engaging moving targets on land and at sea. The development of the sensor was part of company funded, independent R&D looking to enhance the current Tomahawk long-range precision strike/land attack role. Since 2005, Raytheon has been investing in increasing the missile’s seeker capabilities and effectiveness in varying environments.
October 7/15: Raytheon has demonstrated how a Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile can be used to assess battlefield damage, loiter and then attack a target following analysis of the data it provided to operators. The test demonstrated how the missile could be launched from one location, travel to a second area of operations and communicate via a UHF SATCOM link with a third location half-way around the world, before striking a target. The Block IV Tomahawk demonstrated flexible mission planning capabilities in flight during previous testing in August, with this latest round of testing also demonstrating that multiple missiles could be coordinated from a single control point.
FY 2015
August 6/15: Raytheon’s Block IV Tomahawk cruise missile demonstrated mission planning capability during flight tests announced on Wednesday. The upgraded software allowed planners to adapt the missile’s mission profile on the fly, with this new capability now set to be rolled-out across the fleet of Tomahawks in service. The Block IV missile demonstrated similar capabilities in March 2014, when the missile received information in-flight and re-targeted itself to strike a moving vehicle.
Oct 11/14: American A2/AD. Rep. Randy Forces [R-VA-4] sends a letter to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Odierno on the eve of the AUSA conference, pushing for the Army to set up a modern version of its Coastal Artillery: long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles that would be forward-based in friendly countries to endanger Chinese vessels and shipping. Missiles like LRASM and the longer-ranged but less stealthy AGM-109 Tomahawk are obvious candidates for this sort of thing, significantly outranging competitors like Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile or Boeing’s SLAM-ER. The RAND study that Forbes refers to actually posited using shorter-range missiles like NSM, but its maps also showed the number of deployment sites required for effective coverage.
The idea would be a nice turnabout on China’s Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, and a Philippine deployment would produce a very tangible benefit all by itself, at low cost. On the other hand, Rep. Forbes probably underestimates the difficulty of getting many countries beyond the Philippines to accept an inherently provocative deployment whose use is technically beyond their control. Recent American waffling around the world suggests an even less palatable conclusion: the penalty for saying yes would be immediate, without any assurance that the weapons would actually be used to help the accepting country if push came to shove.
Contrast with the Russian approach. They just sell SS-N-26 shore batteries to interested countries, helping customers to create the same barrier under their own control, without the offsetting political challenges. India’s derivative PJ-10 BrahMos missile may also wind up being used this way, if India can get its act together on the export front. Sources: RAND, “Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific” | Breaking Defense, “Army Should Build Ship-Killer Missiles: Rep. Randy Forbes”.
FY 2014
Final dive
(click to view full)
Sept 24/14: Orders. Raytheon in Tucson, AZ receives a $251.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for 231 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles for the U.S. Navy (211: 147 vertical launch systems and 64 capsule launch systems / $224.5 million/ 89.4%) and the United Kingdom (20 torpedo tube launch systems / $26.7 million/ 10.6% – q.v. July 1/14 DSCA request). All funds are committed immediately, using foreign funds and FY 2013 & 2014 US Navy weapon budgets.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland (4%); Ft. Wayne, IN (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Ontario, CA (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Dallas, TX (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations inside and outside the continental United States (11.8%); work is expected to be complete in August 2016.
This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 by US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-14-C-0075).
US/UK order
July 31/14: Raytheon in Tucson, AZ, receives an $8.7 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification for Tomahawk Depot Missile maintenance, including inventory management for the US Navy and the United Kingdom, and direct fleet support for resolving technical issues with forward deployed, in-theater weapons.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%); Camden, AR (36%); and various other continental United States locations (4%); and is expected to be complete in March 2015. Funds will be obligated on individual delivery orders as they are issued by US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-13-D-0002).
Sept 9/14: Testing. Raytheon touts a recent pair of live warhead test firings from the USS Hampton [SSN 767: UGM-109] and USS Lake Champlain [CG 57: AGM-109], demonstrating “enhanced flex retargeting” and improved flight performance. Sources: Raytheon, “Tomahawk enhancements showcased in back-to-back flight tests”.
July 17/14: Political. The Senate Appropriations Committee approves a $489.6 billion base FY 2015 budget, plus $59.7 billion in supplemental funding. If they get their way, xGM-109 Tomahawk Block IV production would continue at full rate, with $82 million in extra funding. It has been set to end with a 100 missiles, but the added funds would drive it toward the standard annual buy of 180-200.
The budget still has to be voted on in the whole Senate, then reconciled in committee with the House of Representatives’ defense budget, then signed into law by the President. Sources: DID, “FY15 US Defense Budget Finally Complete with War Funding”.
July 1/14: UK request. The US DSCA announces Britain’s formal request for up to 65 UGM-109 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles plus containers, engineering support, test equipment, operational flight test support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, spare and repair parts, and other support. The estimated cost is up to $140 million. DSCA adds that:
“The UK needs these missiles to replenish those expended in support of coalition operations.”
Which is to say, over Libya. The principal contractor will be Raytheon Missile Systems Company in Tucson, AZ, and Britain doesn’t need any more contractors on site from Raytheon or from the US government. Sources: US DSCA #14-30, “United Kingdom – Tomahawk Block IV Torpedo Launched Land-Attack Missiles”.
DSCA request: UK (140)
April 28/14: Testing. Raytheon announces a successful captive-carry test flight, using a small T-39 Saberliner business jet fitted with their passive ESM seeker. The jet flew at subsonic speed and at varying altitudes, while the “passive seeker and multi-function processor successfully received numerous electronic signals from tactical targets in a complex, high density electromagnetic environment.”
This test brings the Raytheon-funded multi-mission processor to Technology Readiness Level 6. The next step for the company-funded effort is an active seeker test, which will combine the processor with ESM and active radar. That combination would likely form the core of future Tomahawk upgrades. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon tests new guidance system for Tomahawk cruise missile”.
April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF]. It makes early termination official, and explains the savings:
“Program costs decreased $1,832.1 million (25.8%) from $7,109.0 million to $5,276.9 million, due primarily to a decrease of 1,161 TACTOM missiles from 4,951 to 3,790 (-$1,249.2 million) and associated schedule, engineering, and estimating allocations
Note that SecNav Mabus’ comments regarding 4,000 GM-109s in stock (q.v. April 13/14) appear to have been in error. Many have been used over the years.
Termination
April 13/14: Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus sees an inventory of 4,000 Tomahawks that “will carry us through any eventuality that we can foresee,” but Raytheon wants to avoid shutting down their line and cutting the chain to more than 100 suppliers in 24 states. Their lobbying is helped by the fact that the USA’s byzantine procurement and budgeting processes add some strategic risk. News that the Navy was even thinking of a next-generation replacement reportedly came as a surprise to Raytheon in January 2014. Which means that it’s entirely imaginable to have a 20 year wait between the last Tomahawk delivery, and a comparable new operational missile.
On the other hand, every defense production line shuts down eventually, and a dollar spent on Tomahawks can’t buy new ships, fighters, air defense missiles, etc. Rather than waging a frontal assault that tries to keep missile orders coming, Raytheon is reportedly looking to accelerate the combined xGM-109 recertification/ upgrade process by a few years, so it picks up where Tomahawk production leaves off. Raytheon senior program manager Chris Sprinkle says that Raytheon has invested $30 million of their own funds in R&D for upgrades, and plans to invest another $8 million or so. Sources: Arizona Daily Star, “Proposed halt of Tomahawk missile buys raises concerns at Raytheon”.
March 4/14: FY15 Budget. The Navy unveils a preliminary budget request briefing. It doesn’t break down individual programs into dollars, but it does offer planned purchase numbers for the Navy’s biggest programs from FY 2014 – 2019.
The plan confirms 196 Tactical Tomahawk missiles in FY 2014, and proposes to end production with 100 missiles ordered in FY 2015. Source: US Dept. of the Navy, PB15 Press Briefing [PDF].
Feb 19/14: Datalink test. A Tomahawk Block IV missile is launched from the USS Sterett [DDG 104] on a loitering fire test:
“… [the missile] flew a preprogrammed route while receiving updates from a simulated maritime operations center and from advanced off-board sensors updating the missile’s target location. Throughout the flight, the missile maintained communications with all the command and control assets and provided updates on its location before hitting the target.”
Raytheon told DID that this is the first of many tests involving “off-board sensors”, though 2014 will also see a number of flight tests using new on-board ESM and radar sensors. Many will be captive-carry tests, using one of the US Navy’s T-39 Sabreliner modified business jets. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon, U.S. Navy test Tomahawk Block IV’s latest communications upgrades”.
Feb 14/14: Upgrades. Tomahawk program manager Capt. Joe Mauser tells Defense Tech that they’re working on a new Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) warhead for the Block IV, in order to improve performance against reinforced targets like bunkers.
At the same time, Raytheon is working on a new active & passive dual seeker (q.v. Oct 7/13). Raytheon has been elbowed aside from the OASuW program, which is currently owned by Lockheed Martin’s stealthy LRASM-B. A low-cost upgrade that accomplishes some of OASuW’s goals offers Raytheon the opportunity to get some funds, keep their missile relevant for years to come, and position themselves as a weaker Plan B if further budget cuts remove their competitor. Sources: DefenseTech, “Navy Wants Its Tomahawks to Bust More Bunkers”.
Jan 14/14: #3,000. Raytheon announces that they’ve delivered the 3,000th Tomahawk Block IV missile, as part of FY 2012’s FRP-9 production contract. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon delivers 3000th Tomahawk Block IV to US Navy”.
#3,000
Oct 7/13: ESM multi-mode. Raytheon announces a successful field test of a new multi-mode seeker technology that would add an advanced Electronic Support Measure (ESM) antenna and processor to the Block IV Tomahawk missile. Raytheon told DID that the system is based on the firm’s own technology, rather than being a direct offshoot of the attempt to add AARGM technology to the Tomahawk (q.v. April 27/12).
Raytheon is correct that the current Tomahawk is an open architecture ‘truck’ capable of integrating new payloads and sensors, and an ESM seeker is a helpful addition to recent improvements like the 2-way datalink. ESM would turn the missile into a radar and communications killer that could deal directly with enemy air defenses, and could begin to engage some kinds of moving targets. The challenge is that the missile still needs to survive long enough to hit its target, and the Tomahawk’s low-level flight isn’t enough to protect it from the kind of advanced air defenses that would make you want to use unmanned ESM missiles. Its best use case might be against enemy ships. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon demonstrates new seeker technology for Tomahawk Block IV missile”.
FY 2012 – 2013April 17/13: UK. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Britain’s request to import follow-on support and keep their UGM-109 Tomahawk Weapon Systems (TWS) ready for use. Work can include missile modifications, maintenance, spare and repair parts, system and test equipment, engineering support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.
The estimated cost is up to $170 million, but actual costs will be negotiated in a series of contracts. The principal contractors will be Raytheon Missile Systems Company in Tucson, AZ; Lockheed Martin in Manassas, VA, Valley Forge, PA, and Marlton, NJ; Boeing in St. Louis, MO; BAE North America in San Diego, CA; COMGLOBAL in San Jose, CA; and SAIC in Springfield, VA and Patuxent River, MD. Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 1 U.S. Government and 2 contractor representatives to the United Kingdom for the duration of this case.
DSCA: UK support request
April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.
News for the Tomahawk program is mixed. The OASuW Harpoon replacement program canceled plans for an interim solution based on the xGM-109 family, even as it plans to award Technology Development contracts in FY 2013. Raytheon will need to consider its competitive options carefully, as OASuW could grow to be a huge opportunity.
Within the existing Tomahawk program, yearly budgets are rising even though the number of missiles per year remains constant at 196. This is pushing flyaway cost for new missiles from $956,000 in FY 2013 to about $1.2 million. The extra funds are going to 2 areas: obsolescence replacement/ diminishing manufacturing sources, and restoration of planned missile improvements. The former category includes such key components as the Williams turbojet engine and the satellite datalink, and is important enough that FY 2011 – 2011 contract savings are being applied to address it. Improvements will begin with missile communications that will work even in jamming-rich or otherwise hostile environments.
March 11/13: UK. A $6.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 4 torpedo tube launched (TTL) Tomahawk Block IV all-up-round missiles for the government of the United Kingdom under the Foreign Military Sales Program. All funds are committed immediately.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32.6%); Camden, AR (13%); Ogden, UT (10.5%); Dallas, TX (3.5%); Minneapolis, Minn. (3.3%); Glenrothes, Scotland (3.3%); Spanish Fork, UT (3.1%); El Segundo, CA (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2.6%); Anniston, AL (2.5%); Ft. Wayne, IN (2.3%); Ontario, Canada (2.2%); Vergennes, VT (2.1%); Berryville, AR (1.8%); Westminster, CO (1.6%); Largo, FL (1.5%); Middletown, CT (1.3%); Huntsville, AL (1.2%); Clearwater, FL (0.8%); Moorpark, CA (0.8%); El Monte, CA (0.6%); Salt Lake City, UT (0.6%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside CONUS locations (5.6%); and is expected to be completed in February 2015 (N00019-12-C-2000).
4 for Britain
March 7/13: Support. A $12.8 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for services in support of Tomahawk missile depot maintenance, including direct fleet support for resolving technical issues with forward deployed, in-theater weapons and inventory management for the US Navy and the United Kingdom.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (70%); Camden, AR (24%); Commerce Township, MI (4%); Indianapolis, IN (1%); and various other continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside CONUS locations (1%) until February 2014. $2.4 million is committed immediately, of which $2.3 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-13-D-0002).
Jan 17/13: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The Tomahawk gets high marks. It continues to meet its standards, and remains operationally effective and suitable (maintainable).
The one thing Pentagon OT&E would like to see is restored flight testing of the Block III model, until it goes out of service in FY 2020.
Dec 18/12: CCLS. A $45 million firm-fixed-price contract modification from the USN for 120 Tomahawk Block IV Composite Capsule Launching Systems (CCLS), which are used to launch UGM-109s from vertical submarine tubes. All contract funds are committed immediately.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (24.61%); Lincoln, NB (23.17%); Camden, AR (12.48%); Rocket Center, WVA (10.3%); Carpentersville, IL (8.74%); Joplin, MO (6.63%); Hopkinton, MA (4.76%); Huntsville, AR (4.37%); Alamitos, CA (2.05%); Torrance, CA (1.47%); Downers Grove, IL (0.75%); and Brooksville, FL (0.67%), and is expected to be complete in July 2015 (N00019-12-C-2000).
Dec 17/12: 252 missiles. A $254.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising a US Navy option for 252 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round (AUR) missiles: 132 RGM-109s designed to launch from strike-length Mk.41 cells on surface ships, and 120 UGM-109 CLS missiles that are fired from different vertical launch tubes installed on American submarines.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Ft. Wayne, IN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland (4%); Dallas, TX (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations in the continental United States and outside the continental United States (11.8%); and is expected to be completed in August 2015. See also Raytheon.
FY 2013: 252
Sept 3/12: OASuW. Aviation Week offers a look into the Tomahawk’s potential future. In June 2012, the US Navy announced a sole-source contract to Raytheon to develop the interim Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon (OASuW) by modifying a Tomahawk Block IV missiles with new sensors and data links. The missile is expected to enter service by 2015… but it’s likely to face competition from Lockheed Martin’s LRASM-A, among others.
Full OASuW Technology Development awards are expected to begin in FY 2013, after a Q2 Milestone A decision. The technical Development phase runs from FY 2013 – FY 2017, to an expected total of $557.2 million. Initial Operational Capability is currently set for 2024.
July 12/12: CCLS. A $45.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, buying 123 Tomahawk Block IV Composite Capsule Launching Systems (CCLS) for the US Navy.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (24.61%); Lincoln, NB (23.17%); Camden, AR (12.48%); Rocket Center, WVA (10.3%); Carpentersville, IL (8.74%); Joplin, MO (6.63%); Hopkinton, MA (4.76%); Huntsville, AR (4.37%); Alamitos, CA (2.05%); Torrance, CA (1.47%); Downers Grove, IL (0.75%); and Brooksville, FL (0.67%), and is expected to be complete in July 2014 (N00019-12-C-2000).
June 7/12: 361 missiles. A $337.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for 361 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles for the Navy. This includes 238 RGM-109E missiles that are launched from strike-length Mk.41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells on surface ships, and 123 UGM-109E missiles that are launched from submarines equipped with the Capsule Launch System (CLS).
Raytheon’s release says that the buy includes replenishment of weapons used during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya, as well as the FY 2012 buy.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Fort Wayne, IN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland, UK (4%); Dallas, TX (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations inside and outside the continental United States (11.8%), and is expected to be complete in August 2014 (N00019-12-C-2000).
FY 2012 + Libya replacement: 361
April 27/12: New sensors? FBO.gov:
“The Naval Air Systems Command intends to negotiate and award a sole source order under Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) N00019-11-G-0014, pricing arrangement cost-plus-fixed-fee, for engineering services necessary to support a study to assess the possibility of integrating, onto the Block IV Tomahawk weapon, Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) technologies.”
The AGM-88E AARGM uses GPS to navigate to the target’s vicinity, then finds targets that are moving or have moved using a combination of emission-locating ESM and an active millimeter wave radar seeker. AARGM is meant to destroy enemy air defense systems, but a system for a missile of this size would also be able to target enemies like ships. ATK received a $452,000 contract on Aug 22/12.
xGM-109E Block IV TLAMs: A Program Success Story Fly.Block IV missiles offer a number of improvements over previous versions: the missile’s purchase cost drops by almost half, to about $750,000, while lowering its future maintenance costs, and upgrading its capabilities.
Capt. Bob Novak, who was the Tomahawk All-Up-Round (PMA-280) program manager until August 2005, began leading the Tomahawk AUR program team in 2002 during a critical time in the development of the Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile. Under his leadership the program awarded the Navy’s first-ever weapons multi-year contract, and was estimated to have reduced the cost per missile from Block III to Block IV by almost 50%, saving $1 billion over planned lifetime costs while upgrading the missile’s capabilities. While reducing the Block IV Tactical Tomahawk’s purchase costs, improved design and manufacturing also reduced maintenance/ recertification requirements from once every 8 years for Block III missiles to once every 15 years.
PMA-280 was honored with several prominent awards, including the Secretary of Defense Value Engineering Award, the Daedalian Award, and the Ed Heinemann Award.
Boom.One important new capability that Block IV Tomahawk brings to the US Navy’s Sea Strike doctrine is derived from the missile’s 2-way satellite data link, which enables the missile to respond to changing battlefield conditions. The strike controller can “flex” the missile in flight to preprogrammed alternate targets, redirect it to a new target, or even have it loiter over the battlefield awaiting a more critical target. Block IV Tomahawks can also transmit battle damage indication imagery and missile health and status messages via the satellite data link, allowing firing platforms to execute missions in real time.
Global Positioning System-only missions are also possible in addition to the missile’s previous terrain-mapping guidance mode, thanks to an improved anti-jam GPS receiver for enhanced mission performance.
The majority of Tomahawk cruise missiles are currently launched by Navy surface vessels, such as the Ticonderoga Class (CG-47) cruisers and Arleigh Burke Class (DDG-51) destroyers. The later series of Improved Los Angeles Class (SSN-688I) and the newest Virginia Class (SSN-744) attack submarines are also armed with 12 dedicated Tomahawk launch tubes, while earlier Los Angeles boats and the newest Seawolf Class (SSN-21) have to sacrifice some of their stored torpedoes to carry and launch Tomahawks through their torpedo tubes. But the USA’s premier Tomahawk carrier vehicle in future will be the Ohio Class SSGN stealth strike subs, with launch capacity for an astounding 154 Tactical Tomahawks each.
Additional Readings & SourcesDID would like to thank Raytheon Tomahawk Program Director Roy Donelson, and Growth Program Manager Chris Sprinkle, for their assistance with this article. Any mistakes are our own damn fault. Readers with corrections or information to contribute are encouraged to contact editor Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
Weapon & Program BackgroundThe 5.56mm M-16 has been the USA’s primary battle rifle since the Vietnam war, undergoing changes into progressive versions like the M16A4 widely fielded by the US Marine Corps, “Commando” carbine versions, etc. The M4 Carbine is the latest member of the M16 family, offering a shorter weapon more suited to close-quarters battle, or to units who would find a full-length rifle too bulky.
In 2006 an Army solicitation for competitive procurement of 5.56mm carbine designs was withdrawn, once sole-source incumbent Colt dropped its prices. The DoD’s Inspector General weighed in with a critical report, but the Army dissented, defending its practices as a sound negotiating approach that saved the taxpayers money. As it turns out, there’s a sequel. A major sequel that has only grown bigger with time.
The M4/M16 family is both praised and criticized for its current performance in the field. In recent years, the M4 finished dead last in a sandstorm reliability test, against 3 competitors that include a convertible M4 variant. Worse, the 4th place M4 had over 3.5x more jams than the 3rd place finisher. Was that a blip in M4 buys, or a breaking point? The Army moved forward with an “Individual Carbine” competition, but as the results started to show the M4 again lagging – even with ammunition changed to a round specially formulated to make the M4 shine – the Army abruptly stopped the process once again, stating that the performance superiority of the competing gun was not better to a degree making it worthwhile. The Army stated after the tests that only a result that was twice as good as the existing gun’s performance would signify an actionable performance difference.
More recently, the Marines have considered adding
various after-market upgrades to the platform in order to increase accuracy, learning from the private sector and competitive shooting circuit what appears to be providing the best bang.
It seemed like a routine request. Order more M4 carbines for US forces in the FY 2007 supplemental, FY 2008 budget, and FY 2008 supplemental funding bills. It has turned into anything but a routine exercise, however – with serving soldiers, journalists, and Senators casting a very critical eye on the effort and the rifle, and demanding open competition. With requests amounting to $375 million for weapons and $150 million in accessories, they say, the Army’s proposal amounts to an effort to replace the M16 as the USA’s primary battle rifle – using specifications that are around 15 years old, without a competition, and without considering whether better 5.56 mm alternatives might be available off the shelf.
The M4 offers a collapsible buttstock, flat-top upper receiver assembly, a U-shaped handle-rear sight assembly that could be removed, and assortment of mounting rails for easy customization with a variety of sight, flashlight, grenade launchers, shotgun attachments, etc. It achieves approximately 85% commonality with the M16, and has become a popular weapon. It has a reputation for lightness, customizability, and, compared to its most frequent rival the AK-47, a reputation for accuracy as well. The carbine’s reputation for fast-point close-quarters fire remains its most prominent feature, however. After Action Reviews done by the Marines after the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed that urban warfare scenarios made employment of the M16A2 difficult in some situations; Marines were picking up short AK-47s with folding butt-stocks, or scrounging pistols for use inside buildings.
Like its predecessor the M16, the M4 also has a reputation as an excellent weapon – if you can maintain it. Failure to maintain the weapon meticulously can lead to jams, especially in sandy or dusty environments. Kalashnikovs may not have a reputation for accuracy, or lightness – but they do have a well-earned reputation for being able to take amazing amounts of abuse, without maintenance, and still fire reliably. The Israeli “Galil” applied these lessons in 5.56mm caliber, and earned a similar reputation. Colt’s M16 and M4 have never done so.
The original order for the M4 Carbine in the mid-1990s was a small-scale order, for a specifically requested derivative of the Army’s primary battle rifle, to equip units who would otherwise have relied on less accurate 9mm submachine guns. As such, its direct development and sole-source contract status raised little fuss. Subsequent contracts also raised little scrutiny.
So, what changed?
1. Extended combat in dusty, sandy environments that highlighted the weapon’s weak points as well as its comparative strengths, leading to escalating volumes of complaints;
2. The emergence of alternatives that preserve those strengths, while addressing those weak points;
3. The scale of the current request for funding.
There have been sporadic attempts to field more modern weapons during its tenure, including the unwieldy 20-or-so pound, 2 barrel, “someone watched Predator too many times” XM-29 OICW, and more recently the aborted contract for the G36-derived XM-8 weapon family from Heckler & Koch. Still, the M4’s designers could never sing B.B. King’s famous tune.
The M16/M4 family has achieved a great deal of success, and garnered many positive reviews for its features and performance. Even its critics acknowledge that it has many positive attributes. The M4 has also attracted criticism – and at least 1 comprehensive fix.
According to briefing documents obtained by Gannett’s Army Times magazine:
“USMC officials said the M4 malfunctioned three times more often than the M16A4 during an assessment conducted in late summer 2002 for Marine Corps Systems Command at Quantico, VA. Malfunctions were broken down into several categories, including “magazine,” “failure to chamber,” “failure to fire,” “failure to extract” and “worn or broken part,” according to the briefing documents. During the comparison, the M4 failed 186 times across those categories over the course of 69,000 rounds fired. The M16A4 failed 61 times during the testing.
The Army conducted a more recent reliability test between October 2005 and April 2006, which included 10 new M16s and 10 new M4s… On average, the new M16s and M4s fired approximately 5,000 rounds between stoppages, according to an Army official who asked that his name not be released.”
In a subsequent letter to the magazine, M4 manufacturer Colt argued that the US Army had disagreed with the USMC study, then added that the Army and Colt had worked to make modifications thereafter in order to address problems found.
Gannett’s Army Times magazine also obtained a copy of Project Manager Soldier’s Weapons Assessment Team’s July 31, 2003, report:
“The executive summary said that M16s and M4s “functioned reliably” in the combat zone as long as “soldiers conducted daily operator maintenance and applied a light coat of lubricant.”
Soldiers had their own comments, however, which were also included in the report and relayed in the magazine article. 3rd ID soldier:
“I know it fires very well and accurate [when] clean. But sometimes it needs to fire dirty well too.”
25th Infantry Division soldier:
“The M4 Weapon in the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan was quick to malfunction when a little sand got in the weapon. Trying to keep it clean, sand free was impossible while on patrols or firefights.”
82nd Airborne Division soldier:
“The M4 is overall an excellent weapon, however the flaw of its sensitivity to dirt and powder residue needs to be corrected. True to fact, cleaning will help. Daily assigned tasks, and nonregular hours in tactical situations do not always warrant the necessary time required for effective cleaning.”
75th Ranger Regiment member, SOCOM:
“Even with the dust cover closed and magazine in the well, sand gets all inside; on and around the bolt. It still fires, but after a while the sand works its way all through the gun and jams start.”
The 507th Maintenance Company, ambushed outside Nasariyah in 2003 during the opening days of the ground invasion of Iraq, might concur with all of the above. The post-incident report released by the US Army had this to say:
“Dusty, desert conditions do require vigilance in weapons maintenance… However, it is imperative to remember that at the time of the attack, the 507th had spent more than two days on the move, with little rest and time to conduct vehicle repair and recovery operations.”
Even without those extenuating circumstances, however, there have been problems. A December 2006 survey, conducted on behalf of the Army by CNA Corp., conducted over 2,600 interviews with Soldiers returning from combat duty. The M4 received a number of strong requests from M-16 users, who liked its smaller profile. Among M4 users, however, 19% of said they experienced stoppages in combat – and almost 20% of those said they were “unable to engage the target with that weapon during a significant portion of or the entire firefight after performing immediate or remedial action to clear the stoppage.” The report adds that “Those who attached accessories to their weapon were more likely to experience stoppages, regardless of how the accessories were attached [including via official means like rail mounts].” Since “accessories” can include items like night sights, flashlights, etc., their use is not expected to go away any time soon.
US Army Ranger Capt. Nate Self, whose M4 jammed into uselessness during a 2002 firefight after their MH-47 Chinook was shot down in Afghanistan’s Shah-i-kot Mountains, offers another case. He won a Silver Star that day – with another soldier’s gun – and his comments in the Army Times article appear to agree that there is a problem with the current M4 design and specifications.
M4 SOPMODSOCOM appears to agree as well. While US Special Operations Command is moving ahead on their own SCAR rifle program with FN Herstal, they’re also significant users of the M4 Carbine’s SOPMOD version. By the time Capt. Self was fighting of al-Qaeda/Taliban enemies in Afghanistan with a broken weapon, Dellta Force had already turned to Heckler & Koch for a fix that would preserve the M4 but remove its problems. One of which is heat build-up and gas from its operating mechanism that dries out some lubricants, and helps open the way for sand damage.
In response, H&K replaced Colt’s “gas-tube” system with a short-stroke piston system that eliminates carbon blow-back into the chamber, and also reduces the heat problem created by the super-hot gases used to cycle the M4. Other changes were made to the magazine, barrel, etc. The final product was an M4 with a new upper receiver and magazine, plus H&K’s 4-rail system of standard “Picatinny Rails” on the top, bottom, and both sides for easy addition of anything a Special Operator might require.
HK416, labeledIn exhaustive tests with the help of Delta Force, the upgraded weapon was subjected to mud and dust without maintenance, and fired day after day. Despite this treatment, the rifle showed problems in only 1 of 15,000 rounds – fully 3 times the reliability shown by the M4 in US Army studies. The H&K 416 was declared ready in 2004.
A rifle with everything they loved about the M4, and the fire-no-matter-what toughness of the Kalashnikov, was exactly what the Deltas ordered. SOCOM bought the first 500 weapons right off the assembly line, and its units have been using the weapon in combat ever since. Other Western Special Forces units who liked the M4 Carbine have also purchased HK416s, though H&K declines to name specific countries. US Major Chaz Bowser, who has played a leading role in SOSOCM’s SCAR rifle design program:
HK416: Desert Testing“One thing I valued about being the weapons developer for Special Operations is that I could go to Iraq or Afghanistan or anywhere with whatever weapons I wanted to carry. As soon as the H&K 416 was available, it got stuffed into my kit bag and, through test after test, it became my primary carry weapon as a long gun. I had already gotten the data from folks carrying it before me and had determined that it would be foolish to risk my life with a lesser system.”
Actually, they don’t even have to buy the whole gun. Christian Lowe of Military.com reports that:
“In a routine acquisition notice March 23 [2007], a U.S. Special Forces battalion based in Okinawa announced that it is buying 84 upper receiver assemblies for the HK416 to modify their M4 carbines… According to the solicitation for the new upper receiver assemblies, the 416 “allows Soldiers to replace the existing M4 upper receiver with an HK proprietary gas system that does not introduce propellant gases and the associated carbon fouling back into the weapon’s interior. This reduces operator cleaning time, and increases the reliability of the M4 Carbine, particularly in an environment in which sand and dust are prevalent.”
But the US Army won’t consider even this partial replacement option. The Army position was reiterated in a release on April 2/07:
“The M4 Carbine is the Army’s primary individual combat rifle for Infantry, Ranger, and Special Operations forces. Since its introduction in 1991, the M4 carbine has proven its worth on the battlefield because it is accurate, easy to shoot and maintain. The M4’s collapsible stock and shortened barrel make it ideal for Soldiers operating in vehicles or within the confines associated with urban terrain. The M4 has been improved numerous times and employs the most current technology available on any rifle/carbine in general use today.
The M4 is the highest-rated weapon by Soldiers in combat, according to the Directorate of Combat Development, Ft. Benning, Ga. In December 2006, the Center for Naval Analysis conducted a “Soldiers’ Perspective on Small Arms in Combat” survey. Their poll of over 2,600 Soldiers reported overwhelming satisfaction with the M4. The survey included serviceability and usefulness in completing assigned missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
The Cry for Competition: How Much Is That HK In the Window? HK416sThe HK416 isn’t the only alternative out there by any means – but it has been a catalytic alternative. In an analogous situation, limited USMC deployment of mine-resistant vehicles like Force Protection’s Cougar and Buffalo in Iraq, and the contrast between v-hulled casualties and Hummer casualties, led to a cascade that now looks set to remove the Hummer from a front-line combat role. The technology to deal with insurgencies that used land-mines has been proven for over 30 years – but awareness of that fact didn’t rise within the US military and among its political overseers until an obvious counter-example was fielded. One that demonstrated proven alternatives to the limited options people had previous been shown. Likewise, the use of the high-commonality HK416 has served to sharpen awareness that the M4 might not be the best option on offer for US forces.
Couple that with a major buy that looks set to re-equip large sections of the US military with a new battle rifle, and the question “what if we can do better?” starts to take on real resonance. The Army’s $375 million sole-source carbine procurement, on the basis of specifications that have not been changed to reflect these realities, is starting to raise hackles – and attract a wide spectrum of opponents.
Gannett’s Army Times quoted former Army vice chief of staff Gen. Jack Keane (ret.), who tried at the end of his tenure to update the USA’s infantry rifle with the XM-8 project, as saying:
“We are not saying the [M4 and M16 are] bad,” said “The issue for me is do our soldiers have the best rifle in their hands… The fact of the matter is that technology changes every 10 or 15 years and we should be changing with it. And that has not been our case. We have been sitting on this thing for far too long.”
An aide to Sen. Tom Coburn [R-OK] agreed, and added that the substantial price reduction created by the mere threat of an open competition in 2006 was evidence that Colt had been using its sole-source status to overcharge the government. The Senator has sent a formal letter to the Secretary of the Army requesting an open competition in order to ensure both the best deal, and the best off-the shelf rifle that incorporates modern improvements. The winner could well be Colt, said Coburn’s aide – but they should have to prove it, and earn it. “This is supposed to be a battle rifle.” He said. “We’re supposed to have a rifle that just doesn’t jam.” Impossible, of course – but one that jams far less often, and requires far less maintenance to avoid jams, while offering all of the M4’s compactness and add-on ease… that would represent a significant step forward.
Ironically, even Colt may have a better system ready to go. In a letter to Army Times magazine, Colt COO James R. Battaglini (US Marine Corps Maj. Gen., ret.) said:
“The gas piston system in the H&K 416 is not a new system. Rifles were being designed with these systems in the 1920’s. Colt proposed a piston operated weapon to the Army in the early 1960’s. Today Colt Defense has the ability and expertise to manufacture in great numbers piston system carbines of exceptional quality should the U.S. military services initiate a combat requirement for this type of weapon”
Unfortunately, fighting the Army for improvements is no easy task. Colt CEO William Keys, who is also a retired USMC General, explained out to Army Times that Colt has to build what the US Army asks for, to the Army’s exact specifications:
“If we have a change that we think would help the gun, we go to the Army… which is not an easy process, by the way. We spent 20 years trying to get [an extractor] spring changed. They just said ‘well, this works good enough.’ “
Sen. Coburn’s letter to Secretary of the Army Peter Green took a dim view of this entire situation:
“I am concerned about the Army’s plans to procure nearly a half a million new rifles outside the any competitive procurement process… There is nothing more important to a soldier than their rifle, and there is simply no excuse for not providing our soldiers with the best weapon – not just a weapon that is “good enough”… In the years following the Army’s requirements document [DID: for the M4 in the early 1990s], a number of manufacturers have researched, tested, and fielded weapons which, by all accounts, appear to provide significantly improved reliability. To fail to allow a free and open competition of these operational weapons is unacceptable… I believe the Army needs to rapidly revise its rifle and carbine requirements. Free and open competition will give our troops the best rifle in the world…”
The positions were, and are, clear. The US Army says the M4 isn’t broken, and adds that an Army-wide fix would cost $1 billion. Critics contend that these costs may be exaggerated given some of the potential solutions, and add that an army already planning to spend $525 million to re-equip the force with M4s has a moral and financial imperative to see if a better rifle exists. Meanwhile, calls about the M16/M4 had been coming in from Oklahoma, and other Senators and representatives had also been hearing from constituents on this matter.
By 2007, a second letter from the Senate was likely if the Army dug in its heels – and that letter would have had far more signatures at the bottom. In the end, however, legislative tactics forced the Army’s hand. The issue finally came to a head when Sen. Coburn [R-OK] exercised his ability as a Senator to block nomination of the proposed new Secretary of the Army, until the US Army relented and agreed to testing at the Army’s Aberdeen Test Center in Maryland. Secretary Geren was confirmed shortly thereafter, in July 2007.
The tests were conducted. The M4 finished last. The Army declared that performance to be acceptable. By 2010, however, there were noises about an “Individual Carbine Competition”, which became a full solicitation. A number of firms are lining up to provide new designs for the Army’s next-generation carbine, including Colt. Some of them even offer alternate caliber options that could make a real difference to lethality at range, a serious need in environments like Afghanistan. By August 2011, known competitors and designs included:
Smith & Wesson was also reported to be entering the competition, but eventually decided not to take part.
The bigger question is whether this competition, like the ones before it, will ultimately prove to be an expensive mirage. As of April 2013, in the words of the old magic 8-ball, “signs point to yes.” Though one could also use “outlook not so good.”
Any Last Words? G36s: NorwegianSgt. Charles Perales of Fort Bragg, NC had this to say in a letter reprinted by Defense News:
“My unit – B Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment – was deployed to Afghanistan from April 2005 to March 2006. While there, we were attached to Special Forces at Camp Tillman on the Afghan border… I saw first-hand what happens when your weapon jams up because of the harsh environments we have to call home there. An 18B weapons sergeant was shot in the face due directly to his weapon jamming. I just can’t believe that after things like this happen, the Army is still buying more M4s.
Why not rotate them like we used to before the war? All rapid-deploying units used to get the new M4, the support units would get the excess M16s and so on. I’m not saying they need to outfit the whole Army with a new weapon, but why not start phasing it in? …Soldiers’ lives are on the line. Why is it a hassle to make an improvement that could save lives?
The M4 isn’t a bad weapon; it just needs improvements. It’s about time people stop fighting to keep things the same and start moving toward a better weapon system.”
The last word will be left to SOCOM’s Major Chaz Bowser:
“We buy new laptop computers every few years across the gamut, so couldn’t we do the same with our single most important piece of military equipment? … Waiting for a leap-ahead technology based on a kinetic energy weapon platform is a waste of time and money, so we need to look at what is out there now… What the Army needs is a weapon that is now ready for prime-time and not a developmental system… The requirement comes from the field, not from an office in some garrison activity, not from some consultant and definitely not from a vendor.
Let’s do this quickly without all the bureaucracy typically associated with change. Find someone in our ranks who can make a decision – who hasn’t floated a retirement resume with a gun company – and make the decision now. Just look how fast we were all issued the ‘highly coveted’ black beret or the digital uniform. Find that recipe card, change out the word ‘Velcro’ with ‘battle rifle’ and that may be a start to finding a solution [DID: which, he acknowledges, could be Colt’s M4 if that’s what the competition shows]. Our men and women deserve much better than we are giving them, and shame on us.”
Updates: The Tests, Reactions, and Subsequent Developments FY 2012 – 2016Army looks to cancel Individual Carbine; USMC won’t join IC; Smith & Wesson out – will sell their innovations to law enforcement and civilians.
Remington ACR
(click for video)
January 13/16: Remington has completed its $40.1 million delivery of M4 carbine rifles to the Philippine Army ahead of schedule. Over 56,000 of the rifles have been delivered in total, and will replace the antiquated 1960s era variant of the M-16 currently in use by the PA. Prior to distribution, a third of the new arms will undergo mandatory ballistic testing while the M-16s will be distributed to reservists.
March 16/15: The Army released a Sources Sought notice (W15QKN-15-X-7820), looking for one vendor that can bundle together a series of aftermarket improvements to the M4A1 carbine. The package, to be called the M4A1+, includes increased accuracy, rails, mounting surfaces, neutral, non-black, color, coatings, backup sites and a kitchen sink full of other, smaller improvements.
Feb 18/15: The Marines are considering adding
various after-market upgrades to the platform in order to increase accuracy, learning from the private sector and competitive shooting circuit what appears to be providing the best bang.
June 14/13: The Army excuses their decision to cancel the Individual Carbie competition by saying that none of the candidates met their criteria of 3,592 mean rounds between stoppages, using the new M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round. As a point of comparison, the original requirement for the M4 was 600.
The Army’s PEO Soldier says that SOCOM’s M4A1 achieved 1,691 MRBS, but refuses to release the results of the trials and provide a basis for relative comparison. Military.com.
May 2/13: Military.com reports that the Individual Carbine’s Phase II firing tests are done, but the US Army is about to cancel the Individual Carbine competition, and direct its tiny $49.6 million in FY 2014 to other things. The original plan involved 3 Phase III contracts, and soldier user tests that would include a total of 800,000 rounds fired.
Overall, the budget for new carbines is $300 million through 2018, and the decision on how to proceed reportedly rests with Secretary of the Army John McHugh. This paragraph sums it up best:
“Gun makers involved in the competition said they have heard nothing from the Army about Phase III of the competition. Competitors didn’t want to be named in this story but said they would not be surprised if the effort was canceled because they never believed the Army was serious about replacing the M4 family.”
March 19/13: Inspector General. In testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the Pentagon’s Inspector General says they’ll audit the Individual Carbine program, as “DoD may not have an established need for this weapon nor developed performance requirements… such as accuracy, reliability, and lethality”.
Aside from the presumptuousness in the wake of incidents like Wanat, they’re also absolutely wrong on a factual level – the IC competition has had those standards for 3 years now. Source.
Aug 1/12: Political. Sen. Tom Coburn [R-OK] delivers a floor speech about the M4 and the Army’s failure to replace it. He reminds the Senate about the dust testing in which the M4 came in last, and points out that the average rifle age is 26 years, compared to 12 years in Germany, or 8 years for US Special Forces. The Army has been able to rush MRAP competitions for much more expensive equipment, but:
…secretary of Army Guerin… assured me that we would have a new competition for a new rifle for our troops. That was 2007. Here we are, six years later, and the army is now telling us we’re going to have a new competition in 2014… Because the guys that are responsible for making the decision on purchasing the rifles are not the guys that are out there on the line. Because if they were, we would have already had this competition…
On July 13, 2008, in the battle of Winot [sic] in Afghanistan, 200 Taliban troops attacked the U.S. troops at a remote outpost in Eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban were able to break through our lines… Believe it or not, do you know what killed most of us? Our own rifles. Practically every one of our dead was found with his m-16 torn down next to him where he had been trying to fix it. That’s occurring now. Except it’s not getting any press.
…You know, a lot of people do a lot of things for our country, but nobody does for our country what the soldier on the frontline does – nobody. Mr. secretary of the Army. This is a moral question. Get the rifle competition going. Members of congress, members of the senate who are on the armed services committee don’t allow this to continue to happen.
Nov 17/11: USMC sticking with M16A4 & M27 IAR. Military.com reports that the USMC has considered the HK416-derived M27 IAR as a future individual weapon, but decided to stick with improvements to the M16A4 rifle for that role.
It also means that the Marines won’t be adopting the winner of the Army’s Individual Carbine competition, which lowers the odds of having IC turn into a contract for a new weapon. HK might still walk away a winner in the USMC, though. The M27 IARs are being evaluated as future substitutes for FN’s M249 5.56mm light machine gun, and have been fielded to Afghanistan in a combat trial.
Nov 10/11: Smith & Wesson out. Military Times’ Gear Scout reports that Smith & Wesson won’t be competing in the Individual Carbine:
“I talked to David Holt, S&W’s VP of Military Programs who confirmed [the M&P4] was S&W’s entry into the U.S. Army’s individual carbine competition. He explained the company’s decision not to compete in the Army’s search for a new carbine… cited the program’s long acquisition timeline as one of the factors that made it difficult for Smith and Wesson to assume the risk of joining the carbine fray… They’ve put a lot of hours into the project and are very proud of the reliability improvement’s [sic] they’ve made over the M4 design. So, the carbine will likely end up for sale on the commercial LE/Gov market…”
FY 2009 – 2011M4s and M249s fail at the Battle of Wanat; Key “Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer” report leads to caliber questions; SOCOM cancels FN’s 5.56mm SCAR-L; US Army going through the competition motions, slowly, and giving mixed signals.
B.E.A.R. in detail
click for video
Aug 8/11: ADCOR. Military.com covers ADCOR’s announced interest in the IC competition, and its B.E.A.R. design. It’s a gas piston system with some clever features for keeping dust out, a free floating barrel, an adjustable cyclical rate, faster and simpler cleaning, and a “forward charging handle” that lets the soldier clear a jammed weapon with their off hand (also present in Remington’s ACR). Military.com | ADCOR page.
June 21/11: Data Rights Issue. Daniel E. Watters of The Gun Zone explains how the Army got here, the deal with Colt, and the difficulty they’ll have getting a new weapon in the Individual Carbine competition. Read “Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition.”
June 14/11: M4. FBO.gov releases Presolicitation W56HZV-10-R-0593, covering 70,000 – 100,000 M4 and M4A1 carbines over 5 years. The Government expects to order 25-30% in each of years 1 and 2, and 13-17% in each of years 3 through 5. They’re certainly serious about the M4, if not about its replacement.
The contractor(s) winning the best value competition will also be required to provide ancillary equipment as specified by the contract, and will be paid only for produced items, not for setup and manufacturing costs. Bidding is restricted to firms in the U.S. & its territories, and the carbines will be produced in accordance with the M4/M4A1 Technical Data Package (TDP) and the license agreement between the U.S. Government and Colt Defense, LLC. That TDP is restricted/ export controlled, and requires submission of a Non-Disclosure Agreement. The TDPs will not be available until an NDA is submitted, and an FBO.gov solicitation is issued. Read “Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition” for an analysis of how the Army reached this point, and what it could mean in practice.
June 14/11: Competition. Defense Procurement news reports that the US Army still has a 2-track strategy (vid. March 10/10 entry). One is the IC competition. The other involves competing the M4 design, now that the Army and not Colt owns the data rights. Colt has reportedly reacted to the announced Army plans by ramping up their lobbying efforts, so Congress can pressure the Army to keep the program with them.
May 25/11: Lobbying. An Associated Press article lays out the hired lobbyists and political backers for some of the Individual Carbine contenders, while discussing possible offerings. See also Fox News‘ coverage. Contenders, and their lobbyists, include:
Colt:
CM901 multicaliber rifle (5.56mm – 7.62mm)
Roger Smith, a former deputy assistant Navy secretary @ $120,000 a year
Rep. Rosa DeLauro [D-CT, Appropriations]. Rep. John Larson [D-CT], Sen. Joe Liberman [I-CT, retiring].
FN Herstal:
SCAR-L 5.56mm.
American Business Development Group @ $120,000/ year.
Sen. Lindsey Graham [R-SC, SASC], Joe Wilson [R-SC, HASC].
HK USA:
HK416 5.56mm.
Parted ways with Greenberg Traurig in 2009, and with Mark Barnes and Associates in early 2010. No replacement mentioned.
Remington:
Adaptive Combat Rifle multi-caliber (5.56mm or 6.8mm).
$500,000 over last 2 years to Winborn Solutions, and Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
Sen. Chuck Schumer [D-NY]
Smith & Wesson:
(M&P4, will not be entering the competition)
Greenberg Traurig @ $360,000/ year
April 18/11: Competition. In published responses to questions from industry over Draft RFP W15QKN-11-R-F003, the US Army has laid out a schedule for its “Individual Carbine”. The RFP is expected in May 2011, with Phase 1 evaluations from July to October 2011, and Phase 2 evaluations extending to July 2012. The contracts, if any, would be awarded in October 2012, followed by even more evaluations of the remaining contenders, lasting until March 2013.
While there is no caliber or mechanical type requirement, the Army may not choose to do anything, in the end. It is openly espousing a “dual path” strategy to upgrade existing M4s, even as it launches this competition. Given a long past history of declaring that new designs don’t offer enough benefits over existing M4s to justify a purchase, outside observers can be forgiven any skepticism they may have over the Army’s determination to field anything else when all is said and done. PROCNET Q&A responses | PEO Soldier | Gannett’s Army Times | Aviation Week Ares.
Jan 31/11: Competition. The US Army issues Draft RFP W15QKN-11-R-F003 for an “Individual Carbine.” In practice, the solicitation announces an Industry Day on March 30/11, and offerors are directed to NOT submit proposals at this time. Interested parties are advised that only firms within the Small Arms Industry will be granted admittance at the Doubletree Hotel Washington DC – Crystal City, and that ITAR export control procedures are in effect.
Col. Doug Tamilio, the service’s project manager for soldier weapons, reportedly said in a statement that “We’re challenging industry to develop the next-generation carbine and we’re looking forward to the results.” On the other hand, there have been previous industry days (vid. 2008), and other next-generation carbines have been shelved in the past, on the nebulous ground of not being enough of an improvement over the M4. FedBizOpps | Wall St. Journal.
SCAR-L top, SCAR-HJune 25/10: FN SCAR. Military.com reports that SOCOM has decided to cancel further 5.56mm SCAR-L Mk.16 rifle purchases on cost and efficiency grounds, and will probably recall the 850 fielded weapons, rather than continue to support them. SOCOM will be adding to their stock of 750 7.62mm SCAR-H Mk.17 riles, however, and will field an extended SCAR-H Mk.20 with sharpshooter enhancements.
SOCOM cancels 5.56mm SCAR-L
March 10/10: Competition. In testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, senior Army officers state that [PDF]:
“We are currently taking a dual approach to improve the current weapon, the M4, as we move forward with a new carbine requirement. The Project Manager (PM) released a market survey in January 2010, seeking the best industry has to offer for improvements to the current M4. The PM expects to release an RFP soon to compete the upgrade program. Additionally, the Army will conduct a full and open competition to address a new requirement for an individual carbine. Once the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approves the new requirement, the PM will initiate the competition with the release of an RFP for comments from industry. This is the first step in conducting the competition. The Army is working with the other Services in these programs to ensure their requirements are included in our process and they are always invited to participate in the programs’ development and production.”
Jan 12/10: HK. Heckler & Kock announces that they will begin producing civilian variants of the HK416 and the 7.62mm HK417 in a new HK manufacturing facility in Newington, New Hampshire. It’s co-located within an existing 70,000 square foot facility, and would create an American manufacturing base from which to offer military HK416s as well. EVP Wayne Weber of Heckler & Koch USA:
“It is our intention for all U.S. made HK products to equal the quality and reliability of the products made in Germany… By establishing American-based manufacturing, we can compliment our German production and ensure that HK can be more competitive in the U.S. and comply with government contracts requiring U.S. manufacturing. HK products made in the USA will be fully compliant with federal solicitations giving preference to domestically produced products.”
USMC M240B,Nov 30/09: Report. US Army TRADOC releases a paper by Major Thomas P. Ehrhart of the Command and General Staff College titled “Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer” [PDF]. It points out that American forces are routinely engaged in Afghan firefights beyond 300 meters, where their weapons are less effective than their opponents. Excerpts:
“Comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about [50%] of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage United States forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6000 feet. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain.
There are several ways to extend the lethality of the infantry. A more effective 5.56-mm bullet can be designed which provides enhanced terminal performance out to 500 meters. A better option to increase incapacitation is to adopt a larger caliber cartridge, which will function using components of the M16/M4. The 2006 study by the Joint Service Wound Ballistics – Integrated Product Team discovered that the ideal caliber seems to be between 6.5 and 7-mm. This was also the general conclusion of all military ballistics studies since the end of World War I.
The reorganization of the infantry squad in 1960 eliminated the M1D sniper rifle and resulted in the loss of the precision mid-range capability of the infantry squad… All 5.56-mm weapons are most effective when employed within 200 meters due to velocity limitations. Once contact is made, the fight is limited to machine gunners, mortars and designated marksmen. In the table of organization for a light infantry company8 only the six -M240B 7.62-mm machine guns, two- 60-mm mortars and nine designated marksman armed with either 7.62-mm M14 rifles or accurized 5.56-mm M16A4’s rifles are able to effectively engage the enemy. These weapons systems represent 19 percent of the company’s firepower. This means that 81 percent of the company has little effect on the fight. This is unacceptable.”
Reclaiming the Infantry Half-Kilometer
Oct 12/09: Field. The Associated Press reports that M4 carbine and M249 SAW light machine gun failures contributed to the debacle at Wanat, Afghanistan, in which an American outpost was overrun by the Taliban, and to another situation at nearby Kamdesh. An excerpt:
“[Douglas Cubbison of the Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, KS] study is based on an earlier Army investigation and interviews with Soldiers who survived the attack at Wanat… The Soldiers said their weapons were meticulously cared for and routinely inspected by commanders. But still the weapons had breakdowns… Cubbison acknowledges the high rates of fire during the two-hour battle may have led to the failures. But he says numerous problems occurred relatively early in the engagement.”
Defense Tech adds that:
“Basically, the most damning conclusions are compiled in the recommendations section of the report. There are a few instanced specified in the report of an M4 fouling, and one where the M4 fouled and the Soldier picked up a SAW and that was jammed up as well… Staff Sergeant Phillips poured out fire, as recalled by another Engineer Specialist loading for him, [SSG Phillips] went through three rifles using them until they jammed.”
Debacle at Wanat
FY 2007 – 2008Army holds test – M4 last by far.
M4, EDT-III
(click to view full)
Sept 17/08: Competition. Military.com’s Christian Lowe reports that that the Army issued a solicitation to industry in August 2008, asking companies to submit proposals that would demonstrate “…improvements in individual weapon performance in the areas of accuracy and dispersion… reliability and durability in all environments, modularity and terminal performance.”
The intervening years have seen a number of new carbine designs hit the market, as well as a number of “personal defense weapons” that attempt to deliver carbine-class firepower in a weapon only slightly larger than a pistol. Most use calibers other than 5.56mm or 9mm, however, which has prevented their adoption for use by pilots, vehicle crew, and other specialists who need an extremely compact weapon. The Army solicitation also asks for ideas on a “subcompact” variant that would fit in this category.
The article quoted Richard Audette, project manager for Soldier weapons at the US Army’s Picatinny Arsenal. The Army is currently working on its carbine requirements document, and is trying to write it in a way that does not exclude other calibers:
“We’re at the point now where we’re going to go out and compete… We’re looking for anyone that has a world-class carbine… We’re interested in any new technologies out there… We want to know about everything that’s out there, regardless of caliber… If you’ve got a 6.8 [mm caliber weapon], we’re interested in that and seeing what that brings to the table.”
What the Army will insist upon, however, is production capacity. Colt can churn out 10,000 M4s per month, and in June 2009 the M4s blueprints will no longer be a Colt exclusive. Experience with ongoing M16 orders suggests that this will expand production capacity, and drive down prices. In contrast, manufacturers of weapons in promising new calibers like 6.8mm have not received large military orders to ramp up their production capacity to the same levels. Producibility is certainly a valid concern. It must be part of any fair and reasonable competition. It can also be abused to become a back door method of ratifying existing decisions, while adopting the veneer of competition. Which will it be in this case? Only time will tell.
July 11/08: Demonstration. Military.com reports that about 30 legislative aides signed up to attend a July 11 demonstration at Marine Corps Base Quantico. Congressional and industry sources report that the event feature the standard 5.56mm M4 carbine, plus the FN SCAR Mk17 7.62mm (SCAR MK16 is the 5.56mm version that was tested by the Army), – and a modified “M4-style MURG (Modified Upper Receiver Group)” rifle capable of firing a new 6.8mm special purpose cartridge round, among others. Attendees included FN-USA, HK, LWRC who offers receiver group switchouts like HK’s and adds a 6.8mm version, Barrett (REC-7 6.8mm), and Bushmaster. All reportedly avoided commercial sales pitches, and stuck to facts and demonstrations.
Complaints persist from troops on the front lines regarding the current 5.56mm round/riling combination’s lethality. The ballistic characteristics of calibers around 6.8mm have yet to feature a breakthrough military purchase in the face of 5.56mm standardization, but these calibers are gaining growing recognition for their balance of size (can be used with M16 magazines), light weight, and knock-down power.
Participants reportedly had the opportunity to observe the effects of different caliber rounds in translucent ballistic jelly, which simulates human tissue, and to fire the weapons involved. Sens. James Coburn [R-OK] and Ken Salazar [D-CO] remain very active in this area, but the number of participants suggests that their efforts may be gaining traction in spite the Army. Military.com | American Mohist.
Late December 2007: Test results. DID obtains some exact results from the Army’s testing. The Army has now done 3 dust tests. In the late 2006/Jan 2007 report “Baseline Reliability and Dust Assessment for the M4, M16, and M249,” the M4 jammed 9,836 times – 1 jam every 6 rounds. In a May 2007 “Extreme Dust Test II”, with no competitors, the M4 had 1 jam every 88 rounds, using heavy lubrication. In the November 2007 “Extreme Dust Test III”, as DID has discussed, the competing rifles were subject to significantly more maintenance and lubrication than elite American forces like Delta used in their weapon selection process, or indeed in HK’s own field testing of its HK416s prior to shipment.
We’ll begin with the Army’s overall results, from its own release:
“Even with extreme dust test III’s 98.6 percent success rate there was a total of 863 class 1 and 2 weapon/magazine stoppages with 19 class 3 stoppages. During extreme dust test II conducted during the summer, there were 296 total class 1 and 2 stoppages and 11 class 3 stoppages.
A class 1 stoppage is one a Soldier can clear within 10 seconds; a class 2 stoppage is one a Soldier can clear, but requires more than 10 seconds; and, class 3 is a stoppage that requires an armorer to clear.”
DID will simply point out that 10 seconds can be a rather fatally long time when people are shooting at you, and at your friends. So, what happens when the Extreme Dust Test III stoppages are broken out by weapon?
The M4 Carbine is the Army’s existing weapon.
The HK416 is a modified M4 carbine, which can be and has been converted from existing rifles. Used by US Special Forces.
FN SCAR is US special Forces’ new weapon, designed by SOSOCM. It just went into production in late 2007.
XM-8 is a developmental rifle. It’s an advanced version of HK’s G36, a rifle in wide use by many NATO armies. The US Army cancelled the XM-8 weapons family 2 years ago.
The failure of M4 barrels at 6,000 rounds confirms SOCOM objections that date back to the Feb 23/01 report “M4A1 5.56mm Carbine and Related Systems Deficiencies and Solutions,” which ended up concluding that “M4A1 Carbine… does not meet the requirements of SOF.” The barrel replacement also increases the rifle’s life cycle costs when compared with the 10,000 round advertised barrel life, as additional barrels are sold to the Army for $240 each. A longer, heavier M16 barrel, which is a competed production weapon, cost $100 by comparison. While the dust test is indeed an extreme test, the 10,000 round requirement is under “all conditions” – not just ideal conditions.
Dec 18/07: The US Army publishes “M-4 Carbine Has High Soldier Confidence Despite Test.” Not exactly a headline to inspire confidence, as the Army acknowledges that the M4 Carbine finished last among the 4 contenders – but amazingly, asserts that the rifle is just fine and shows no interest in buying even the HK416’s parts swap-out into the existing M4:
“After being exposed to the heavy dusting, 10 of each weapon fired 6,000 rounds apiece. They were fired in 50 120-round cycles. Each was then wiped and re-lubricated at the 600 round mark. After 1,200 rounds were fired from each weapon, they were fully cleaned and re-lubricated… “While the M-4 finished fourth out of four, 98 percent of all the rounds fired from it went off down range as they were supposed to do,” Brig. Gen. [Mark] Brown [commander of Program Executive Office Soldier and the Natick Soldier Systems Center] said. “However, the three other candidates did perform better at about a 99 percent rate or better, which is a mathematically statistically significant difference, but not an operationally statistical difference.”… The Army has put an option on an existing contract for 64,450 M4s, according to the general.”
“A mathematically statistically significant difference, but not an operationally statistical difference.” Statistically, 99% is a 100% improvement over 98%. Operationally, I jam every 68 rounds is almost one jam for every 2 30-round magazines. Whereas one jam in 257 rounds would only happen about once in 8 30-round magazines. Readers are left to contemplate the operational significance of those probabilities in a sustained, serious firefight.
4-Rifle test: M4 finishes dead last
June 29/07: Testing. A document circulated on Capitol Hill asking for testing includes these excerpts:
“The Army has claimed “83% reported confidence that the M4 will not suffer major breakage or failure that necessitates repair before further use” – A soldier should be 100% confident that his weapon will not break the next time he fires it… Since the M16 was introduced in Vietnam the answer has always been “It’s the soldiers’ fault”… The Special Operations Command has the most proficient soldiers in the world, they shoot the most and they operate in the most difficult environments – In 2001 SOCOM was highly critical of the reliability of the M4, and they chose to adopt a new weapon – the SCAR. Our Tier 1 units – like Delta Force, and Seal Team 6 have all abandoned the M4 for other weapons that is [sic] significantly more reliable.”
M4 Carbine Contracts Announced to Date M4 carbine, firingThe following contracts concern the M4 Carbine and its variants directly; other than spare parts or magazines, all other related contracts for accessories etc. were excluded. We also excluded M16 contracts that did not also include M4s.
No announced DefenseLINK contracts have fit these criteria since February 2009, though some sole-source orders may be found in other venues. The FBO.gov June 14/11 presolicitation may lead to additional announced orders.
March 6/14: US Army Contracting Command at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ awards $16.3 million in contracts as a firm-fixed-price, multi-year contract for M4 rifle bolts under the M4 product improvement program. Each request will be competed between Colt Defense LLC in West Hartford, CT (W15QKN-14-D-0027) and FN Manufacturing LLC in Columbia, SC (W15QKN-14-D-0026), though 6 bids were received. The contract runs until Feb 28/18.
Jan 7/13: Colt Defense LLC in West Hartford, CT receives $14 million firm-fixed-price contract for the M4 Product Improvement Program replacement barrel and front sight assembly. Work location will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/16. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 6 bids received by the US Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-13-D-0040).
Dec 19/12: From FBO.gov, amended solicitation #W15QKN-13-R-0039, originally issued Nov 27/12:
“…requirement for up to a total of 350,000 Replacement Bolts used in the conversion of the M4 Carbine to the M4A1 Carbine. To meet continuous requirements for FY13 through FY17, the United States Government intends to award one or more four-year IDIQ contracts with Firm Fixed Price (FFP) orders based on Other Than Full and Open competition… Competition for this requirement shall be other than full and open, and limited to the United States and its territories, island possessions and protectorates, in accordance with the license agreement between the US Government and Colt Defense LLC, limiting distribution of the Technical Data Package (TDP). The authority to limit competition is in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii)(A), only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. FAR 6.302-1(a)(2) applies when supplies or services required by the agency are available from only one responsible source, or for DoD, NASA and the Coast Guard, from only one or a limited number of responsible sources, and no other type of supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.
The maximum contract ceiling price for the total anticipated contract award is $21,350,000.00. The maximum quantity of units is
350,000. The anticipated award date for this action is 3rd Quarter of Fiscal Year 2013.”
Nov 16/12: The GAO dismisses Colt’s protest.
Oct 9/12: Colt protests again. For the 2nd time in 5 months, Colt lodges a protest of the US Army’s efforts to upgrade its M4 carbines to M4A1s. This protest is aimed at the amended Sept 21/12 solicitation. Military.com.
July 24/12: Colt Protests, Wins. The US Government Accountability Office’s ruling forces the US Army to rework the original M4A1 upgrade competition that Remington had won (q.v. April 25/12 entry), so vendors in the competitive range could re-submit. Colt protested both Remington Defense’s win, and the miscalculation of royalties Colt would receive.
More than 6,000 soldiers in the 101st Airborne have already received the rifles, but the Army will need to resolve these protests if it wishes to begin installing conversion kits in summer 2013. The M4A1 includes a heavier barrel, a full automatic trigger assembly, and ambidextrous fire controls. A free-float forward rail, which improves accuracy is widely available on civilian guns, might receive a contract by the end of 2014. What’s conspicuous by its absence is a more reliable firing system. Col. Scott Armstrong of PM Soldier Weapons:
“There were 11 [vendors] that competed in that; they went through nearly a year of testing…. None of the offerers completed the first phase or outperformed the current bolt and bolt carrier group on the M4A1 configuration. Areas that the competitors really fell short in were reliability, durability as well as high temperature and low temperature conditions. The M4A1 bolt outperformed [the competition] in all of those areas.”
See: GAO ruling | Military.com
April 25/12: M4s from Remington. Remington Arms Company, LLC in Ilion, NY receives an $83.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for 24,000 M4A1 carbines. Remington is positioned for any future carbine competition, if there is one, with the ACR. Meanwhile, its “R4” seems to have found a production niche, now that Colt no longer owns all rights. This is the 1st non-Colt M4 contract, and Remington beat 5 other bids – presumably including Colt.
Work will be performed in Ilion, NY until April 12/17. U.S. Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI manages the contract (W56HZV-12-D-0056).
Oct 5/11: GTD, Inc. in Lola, MT, received an $8.6 million firm-fixed-price indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for M4/M4A1 Carbine Trigger Components. Work will be performed in Lola, MT, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/16. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 4 bids received by the U.S. Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-11-D-0207).
June 14/11: RFP. FBO.gov releases Presolicitation W56HZV-10-R-0593, covering 70,000 – 100,000 M4 and M4A1 carbines over 5 years. The Government expects to order 25-30% in each of years 1 and 2, and 13-17% in each of years 3 through 5.
The contractor(s) winning the best value competition will also be required to provide ancillary equipment as specified by the contract, and will be paid only for produced items, not for setup and manufacturing costs. Bidding is restricted to firms in the U.S. & its territories, and the carbines will be produced in accordance with the M4/M4A1 Technical Data Package (TDP) and the license agreement between the U.S. Government and Colt Defense, LLC. That TDP is restricted/ export controlled, and requires submission of a Non-Disclosure Agreement. The TDPs will not be available until an NDA is submitted, and an FBO.gov solicitation is issued. Read “Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition” for an analysis of how the Army reached this point, and what it could mean in practice.
Feb 2/09: Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a $9.5 million firm-fixed-price 5-year Requirements contract for 18,000 Barrel & Front Assemblies; 13,600 Hand Guards; 7,100 Heavy Barrel Assemblies; 22,000 Receivers and Cartridges; and 200,000 Extractor Spring Assemblies. Work is to be performed at Hartford, CT with an estimated completion date of Sept 28/12. US Army Tank and Automotive Command Rock Island in Rock Island, IL manages this contract (DAAE20-03-D-0191).
April 17/07: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT, was awarded on April 6, 2007, the full delivery order amount of $50.8 million as part of a firm-fixed-price contract for M4 and M4A1 carbines. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by July 30, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on Feb. 16, 2007 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (W52H09-04-D-0086). See also July 26/06.
Jan 22/07: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a delivery order amount of $5.6 million as part of a $24.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for Unique Spare Parts for the M4 and M4A1 Carbine. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by May 30, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on April 5, 2004. The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Rock Island, Ill., is the contracting activity (DAAE20-03-D-0191).
Sept 26/06: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a maximum $10 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for M4A1 machine guns. The M4A1 Carbine and variants will be utilized with the family of carbines that are currently in the U.S. Military arsenal. The M4A1 Carbine will come in four basic versions, which consist of longer and shorter versions of the M4A1 Carbine. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by September 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $278,300, will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division in Crane, Indiana (N00164-06-D-4805).
July 26/06: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a delivery-order amount of $53.8 million as part of a $242.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for procurement of M4/M4A1 carbines. Work will be performed at Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on June 30, 2006. The Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Rock Island, Ill., is the contracting activity (W52H09-04-D-0086).
Jan 13/06: Small business qualifier Center Industries Inc. in Wichita, KS received a $7,712,600 modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for aluminum magazines for the M16 rifle/M4 carbine. Work will be performed in Wichita, KS and is expected to be complete by Oct. 31, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on Dec. 30, 2005 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-02-F-0022).
April 1/05: FN Manufacturing Inc. in Columbia, SC received a delivery order amount of $6.7 million as part of a $29.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for M16A4 rifle and M4 carbine. Work will be performed in Columbia, SC, and is expected to be complete by Dec. 31, 2008. There were 2 bids solicited on Dec. 20, 2004, and 2 bids were received by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (W52H09-05-D-0080).
FN Manufacturing LLC writes in to say that they have won “the vast majority of M16A2, A3 and A4 contracts as well as spare parts contracts for these systems since 1989” through “full and open competition.” Having said that: “…never was FN Manufacturing LLC, or any other small arms manufacturer, awarded M4 contracts. The M4 cannot be competed and always has been awarded sole source to Colt because of licensing rights restricting full and open competition until 2009.”
Aug 30/04: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a delivery order amount of $0 as part of a $123 million firm-fixed-price contract for 124,803 weapons in either M4 carbine or M4A1 carbine configurations. Work will be performed in West Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on Oct. 14, 2003 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (W52H09-04-D-0086).
Jan 15/04: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received Jan. 13, 2004, a delivery order amount of $4,029,095 as part of an $8,058,190 firm-fixed-price contract for M4 unique spare and repair parts. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by Jan. 30, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on Sept. 18, 2003 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-03-D-0191).
July 31/02: Colt’s Manufacturing Company Inc. in Hartford, CT received an $18.5 million undefinitized contracting action for 25,764 M4 carbines and 300 M4A1 carbines, in support of the U. S. Air Force, U. S. Army, and foreign military sales countries on July 30, 2002. Work will be performed in West Hartford, CT, and is to be complete by Sep. 30, 2004. This was a sole source contract initiated on June 6, 2002 by the U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-02-C-0115).
Sept 19/96: Small business qualifier Colt’s Manufacturing Company Inc. in Hartford, CT received a $5.5 million firm fixed price contract, with a potential value of $.5 million if all options are exercised, for 9,861 M4 Carbines, 5.56mm and 716 M4A1 Carbines. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT and is expected to be complete by April 30, 1998. This is a sole source contract initiated on September 6, 1996 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive & Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-96-C-0391).
Appendix A: Testing, Testing – Fairly? XM-8 FamilyThe promised tests included the M4 and 3 other rifles: the M4-based HK416, the FNH USA-designed Mk16 SOCOM Combat Assault Rifle (best known as FN SCAR-L), and the H&K XM8 carbine. Unlike the M4, the HK416, XM8, and FN-SCAR all use gas-piston operating systems to achieve automatic fire. The XM8 family is an very updated version of the popular G36 in use with many NATO militaries; it was slated to be the M4’s replacement, but that RFP was suspended by the Army in July 2005 and then canceled in October 2005. The FN-SCAR is a “live” program, and July 2007 marked the beginning of Special Operations Command’s operational tests of the FN-SCAR 5.56mm Mk16 and the 7.62mm Mk17, which could become its future mainstays.
Miltary.com reported that the US Army sand tests will include 10 samples of each weapon through which engineers will fire 6,000 rounds. Each weapon and loaded magazine will be exposed to “extreme dust” for 30 minutes then test fired with 120 rounds. Each weapon will be wiped down and lubricated every 600 rounds, with a full cleaning every 1,200 rounds. The firing, collection of data and analysis of data is expected to take approximately 5 months.
FN SCAR w. Grip PodOne’s first reaction upon seeing the proposed testing regimen was to compare it very unfavorably with the regimen Delta Force put the HK416 through, firing it day after day without maintenance for thousands of rounds. Or even the testing HK itself uses for its HK416s. Indeed, it seems on its face to be a test designed to minimize the very weaknesses in the M4 incumbent that have triggered this controversy. Those who believe the cycle is reasonable cite 300 rounds as the soldier’s 1-day load, and say that under sand storm conditions, a once a day wipedown is the bare minimum for any weapon. Every 600 rounds is thus a safety factor of 2 against the worst possible conditions. Of course, sandstorms have a way of lasting more than one day, and when they do – as in the initial portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom – even vehicle interiors may feature a fine particulate haze.
Within its chosen regimen, there were 3 key ways the Army could choose to bias the test. One was the size of the particulate in the dust chamber – which can be made large in relative terms to lower the number of problems with fouling and jams. The biggest problems in theater are with the very fine particulates. This is especially relevant given the October 2004 report prepared by the Desert Research Institute for the US military. “Geochemical and Physical Characteristics of Iraqi Dust and Soil Samples” [PDF, 2.9 MB] stated that:
“…current chamber test methodology misrepresents real-world conditions. The character of the soils and dust collected from areas of military activity in Iraq is greatly different from the material used in current weapons testing procedures. Current procedures employ laboratory generated dust that is 99.7% silicon dioxide (i.e. quartz), contains no salt or reactive chemicals, and contains coarser particle sizes than most of the Iraq samples. Use of this material cannot simulate conditions in Iraq that have contributed to the weapons failures.”
The next item to watch was whether the rifles used were randomly chosen, or cherry picked and then pre-maintained to perform at an unusual reliability level vs. a field weapon. A third way of gaming the testing system could involve the level of lubrication used. One source noted that the first dust test new M4s had 9,836 jams in 60,000 rounds – almost one jam every 6 rounds. The Army kept working on the test until they figured out a “generous lubrication” approach that used far more than the manufacturer recommended, but lowered jams to 1 in 88 rounds. A fair test must match the manufacturer’s manual for each weapon, or use the same lubrication for each weapon based on the minimum recommended among all test weapons.
Additional Readings Background: Weapons & Key TrendsBelgium is embarking on minor but useful modernization of its remaining F-16 fleet, which is expected to serve until at least 2022, and could easily end up serving past 2030. Under Belgium’s 2000-2015 Modernization plan, the Belgian Defense Forces plan to keep just 60 F-16s in the fleet, creating a total of 48 operational aircraft (46 for NATO duties and 2 for domestic air defense).
The F-16.net database shows a current active fleet of 49 F-16As and 10 F-16B trainers/ fighters, with likely delivery dates from 1982-1991. A Mid-Life Upgrade modernization was ordered in 1997 – 1998, which included a full Aircraft Structural Integrity Program.
This upgrade will help the F-16s remain useful for deployments like Kandahar, Afghanistan and Baltic air policing, but it won’t substantially change the fighter’s core capabilities. The AN/APG-66(V)2 radar remains, for instance, instead of being replaced with the APG-68(V)9 or something equally modern. Belgium’s addition of JHMCS helmet-mounted displays in recent years was more consequential.
On the other hand, the M6 OFP adds the Universal Armament Interface, which will make it much easier and cheaper for the Belgian Air Force to add new weapons to their F-16s. This upgrade may be one that becomes consequential with the passing of time.
UpdatesJanuary 13/16: The Belgian government has approved a plan to modernize its airforce by 2030, but at a cost of a reduction in personnel. $10 billion will be made available for upgrades to equipment and machinery, however it will necessitate a decrease in the military and civilian workforce from 32,000 to 25,000. While no preferences have been made as to what will be bought, the investment will see thirty-four fighter bombers bought to replace the fifty-six aging F-16s in service. This will go alongside two new frigates, six minesweepers and two new UAVs. Brussels is also considering participation in the Tanker Aircraft Program.
May 12/14: The US DSCA announces Belgium’s official export request for upgrades to its F-16A/B Block 15 Mid Life Upgrade (MLU) aircraft with:
The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control in Orlando, FL, and implementation of any negotiated sale won’t require any additional US government or contractor personnel in Belgium. Sources: US DSCA #14-13, “Belgium – F-16A/B Block 15 Aircraft Mid-Life Upgrade”.
DSCA request: Belgium