Boeing’s T-X offering Part II:
Boeing’s T-X offering:
Back in July 2005 it was apparent India’s sanctions against Denel and possible disqualification from a $2 billion artillery contract could have a major effect on the South African defense firm as a whole. In August 2005, those sanctions came to pass, barring Denel from a contract it was likely to win and accelerating efforts already underway to radically restructure the firm.
CEO Shaun Liebenberg launched that shift in late 2005 with some frank discussion of the global defense market, and the position of small-medium players like Denel in it. At DSEI 2005 in London, UK, the outline of this new strategy was already apparent. Many of the products Denel is known for will no longer define the firm. But could it find a way to stanch the bleeding and survive in a globalized market?
And how has it done since?
Denel’s Position
Mokopa Laser ATGMThe new CEO was frank about Denel not being viable under the current model. According to Liebenberg, global prime contractors succeed due to privileged relationships with their domestic customer who largely fund and promotes the development of new system platforms.
“Changes in the defence industry have forced consolidation and the forming of alliances worldwide… Although Denel has an enviable range of products, we no longer have a captive domestic market or the scale to succeed as an independent systems integrator and exporter of such a broad range of products…”
“Our analysis of the international defence environment shows much of global defence spend is not directly accessible to independent contractors like Denel,” Liebenberg explained. “The US Department of Defense in recent years has awarded contracts almost exclusively to US and NATO companies. These companies supply most other markets, too. Developing nations like India, Brazil and Israel have strong domestic industries to serve their own customer, whilst giving intense competition to other independents.”
Rooivalk and GripenDenel’s product range drives the full scope of its ambitions home. If anything, it’s surprising that the reckoning hasn’t come sooner.
Indigenous efforts in the missile field alone include the A-Darter (intended as a Sidewinder 9X/ ASRAAM/ AA-11 Archer contemporary), Ingwe and Mokopa anti-armor missiles (think TOW2 and Hellfire/Brimstone competitors), and Umkhonto-IR ship based anti-air missile. The firm also has a full line of optronics; 3 UAV projects (including a reconnaissance UAV, a high speed stealth UAV, and a target drone); a full-fledged new-generation attack helicopter project in the Rooivalk (Eurocopter Tiger/ AH-1Z/ Mi-28 contemporary); the Umbani bomb kit (a kit that converts ordinary bombs to something approaching a JSOW); world-class artillery systems in the G5, G6, and accompanying base bleed ammunition; vehicle turrets, a full line of military small arms; plus C4ISR products, licensed production of other helicopters, aircraft maintenance, and more.
Some products, like its artillery, are genuine world-beaters coping with a shrinking market for their specific product range. On the other hand, many of these expensive development projects were substitutable at home, and non-viable abroad from the get-go. Little wonder the new CEO has concluded that local defense spending clearly won’t suffice, even with some 45% of Denel’s business still deriving from the domestic market.
Worse, much of South Africa’s recent domestic spend has taken place in areas falling outside Denel’s product range, like fighter jets and naval systems. Denel’s involvement was limited to sub-contracts on the SA Navy’s corvette weapons suite, some workshare on the Gripen, Hawk and Agusta helicopter programs, and the hope of additional workshare as part of the Airbus A400M military transport. Liebenberg clearly understood, and stated, that some non-viable businesses would have to be made viable or exited entirely.
Denel’s New Strategy
Liebenberg believed that his company’s capabilities are attractive to global prime contractors for partnering. Liebenberg said Denel meets the pre-requisites to act as a specialised contractor that could slot into the value chain of the global players, because it has a technology edge or low cost production capabilities in several niche areas, plus good systems integration experience.
As such, he intends to pursue a strategy that focuses Denel business on being a domestic prime contractor, whilst becoming a specialized contractor or sub-supplier to other international defense contractors.
In keeping with Denel’s new strategic direction, formally announced by CEO Shaun Liebenberg in August 2005, the Group is showcasing some of its niche defence and aerospace systems at DSEI 2005 this week in London, UK.
Denel’s advanced LCT-30 combat turret will be part of the South African Army’s new generation infantry combat vehicle. Denel also hopes to interest more customers in its sophisticated sub-systems, like its ‘Eagle Eye’ target location binocular, Denel’s NATO certified LH-40C eyesafe laser rangefinder already in use with some European armies, the ‘Kenis’ infrared thermal imaging camera, and the Goshawk electro-optic stabilized airborne observation system. Denel is also supporting Zeiss Optronik of Germany with periscope equipment for a number of foreign navies.
Umkhonto-IR conceptYet Denel hasn’t given up on all of its bigger projects. Its Umkhonto IR surface-to-air missile, selected by the South African and the Finnish navies, remains on offer now that performance testing and live firings have concluded successfully [DID: Sweden would eventually buy them too, as a partial offset for the SAAF’s new Gripen fighters]. In the artillery department, its ‘Arachnida’ electronic targeting and combat management is already in service on the UK’s light artillery guns and was exported in quantity to a Middle East customer, and Denel’s world-class artillery ammunition is currently being evaluated in the NATO environment as well as in the United States. In 2007, Denel announced a strategic alliance with Germany’s Nitrochemie to develop a new generation of modular propellant charges for 105mm and 155mm artillery, and 2008 saw Germany’s Rheinmetall take a majority stake in Denel Munitions.
It’s going to be a long road ahead for Denel, as it always is in major corporate restructurings. Jack Welch, widely considered to be the gold standard of modern-day CEOs, offered his take on the restructuring/ crisis process in a Wall St. Journal article that covered the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The circumstances are different, but the process is universally applicable.
In a way, however, the scale of the problem is blessing to Denel. The very overreach that has landed the firm in such trouble has also made it sufficiently important to South Africa’s defense infrastructure that allowing the firm to fail will be seen as a last resort option. Given the roster of projects it has successfully brought to fruition, it’s also clear that Denel has some very talented engineers and personnel on hand.
Strong government support, a solid share of South Africa’s production allocation for the A400M global project, and success in its alliance efforts could yet steer the South African firm back to health. Yet the international defense market is becoming a difficult place for small-mid size firms without an in-demand flagship product. Unlike Apollo 11, failure is an option.
Updates and Key Events Hoefyster/ Badger –September 15/16: South Africa’s Defense Minister announced plans to update the country’s indigenous Rooivalk attack helicopter. Speaking at this year’s African Aerospace & Defence Show, Nosiviwe Masipa-Nqakula said the helicopter has “blooded” itself having carried out a series of successful operations as part of the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Manufacturer Denel is also working on marketing the helicopter to other African governments who are fighting insurgencies, namely Nigeria and Egypt, and further afield governments like India and Brazil.
November 10/15: South African firm Denel Vehicle Systems has also bagged a $63 million contract to develop and produce N35 mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles with UAE firm NIMR, with this contract reportedly covering the development of both 4×4 and 6×6 variants over the next two years. An initial batch of South African-produced vehicles will be followed by a transition in production to the UAE, including transfer of the production line’s supply chain and technical expertise.
July 22/09: A Denel release suggests renewed efforts to step up exports – even as it makes the importance of the Hoefyster IFV project, and the continued primacy of South African defense spending, clear:
“In 2005 Denel Land Systems was a company “in anticipation.” Inheriting an overdraft of R400m and a loss of R180m year-on-year, DLS was insolvent for all intensive purposes. Despite this however, the strategic and technical value of the company remained evident… Having technical expertise and an artillery capability among the best in the world does not automatically equate to sustainability however… All product lines manufactured by DLS were reviewed as a result, with non-core products such as hunting rifles immediately being exited. We simultaneously applied for recapitalisation funding, which was used to repay an overdraft and give DLS a “clean start”
Despite this however, DLS needed a catalyst for growth and sustainability. With over 70% of its business coming from the local market and notably from the SANDF, it was critical that DLS secured a sizable defence contract… we were conscious of the business and strategic value this type of contract would enable… The Hoefyster project has provided just the required impetus. With a total contract value of R8.3bn and the demand phase in activation already worth R1bn, the contract’s full effects are not confined to DLS, but also being felt by 60 local contractors – a glimpse of the scale of impact the company can have on the local economy.
While Hoefyster proved a critical element in ensuring DLS broke even during the financial year 2008/09… we have started visiting previously interested international parties and looking for new ones in the Middle East, Far East, South America and Africa. To step into these international markets however, strategic partners will be critical in ensuring access. As such, our focus has seen us already engage with a number of key players so as to establish supplier contract relationships.”
July 16/09: Denel Group CEO Talib Sadik discusses the organisation’s revised growth strategy in a corporate release, and offers an update on turnaround progress made to date. Since the turnaround began in 2006, Denel has inked strategic equity partnerships with Carl Zeiss, Rheinmetall Defence and Saab:
“While acknowledging the Group still faced challenges, most notably the continued posting of losses by Denel Saab Aerostructures and securing further recapitalisation, Sadik maintained it was important to acknowledge the milestones that had already been achieved. These included the improved relationship with the South African Department of Defence, enhanced risk management and programme execution, and the significant performance of and turnaround seen in some of Denel’s fully-owned (100% shareholding) businesses… Turbomeca Africa has continued to grow its profits year-on-year. We have also seen Carl Zeiss Optronics’ sales per person has increased from R0.8 million to R1.6 million since its restructuring, and are expecting Rheinmetall Denel Munitions to post its first profits in the new financial year,” explained Sadik. He added that Carl Zeiss Optronics has shown a 100% increase in revenue over a two year period, while Rheinmetall Denel Munitions’ order cover is in the region of 70%.”
Overall, losses are continuing at a declining rate, from R 1.56 billion in the 2004/05 financial year to R 347 million in 2008 (q.v. Sept 9/08 entry). Despite the net loss, Denel Group’s gross profit has grown from -6% in 2006/07 to 16% in 2008/09, while revenue per employee across the Group has more than doubled from R 353,242 in 2006 to R 745,460 in 2009. R&D has grown to R 1.12 billion in 2009 driven largely by development of the A-Darter 5th generation air-to-air missile, the Badger/Hoefyster 8×8 IFV, and subcontracting work on the A400M military cargo aircraft.
Denel’s order book has seen the most growth, from R 3.75 billion in 2006 R 16.05 billion (including confirmed contracts) at the end of 2009. The May 2007 IFV win played a large role in that increase, by adding R 8.3 billion to the order book.
Jan 19/09: In its analysis of the South African defense industry, analyst firm Forecast International sees Denel’s efforts paying off. In accordance with mandates attached to government recapitalization efforts valued at $455 million, Denel has proceeded with restructuring. Forecast International believes that amid rising uncertainty around the domestic defense market, the sector’s decision to discard self-sufficiency in favor of an industry structure optimized to increase access to the global defense market appears is looking like a good strategy. It adds:
“Since the South African Ministry of Public Enterprise opted to divest from unprofitable domestic defense enterprises and relax regulations on foreign investment in the defense sector in late 2005/early 2006, 10 major acquisitions involving foreign defense enterprises targeting South African enterprises have occurred… Since early 2006, Denel has sold 20 percent of it aerostructures division at a price of ZAR66 million to Saab to form the Denel Saab Aerostructures joint venture; 70 percent of its optronics division was acquired by Carl Zeiss Optronics in exchange for phased investment in Denel’s European logistics network; and Rheinmetall AG acquired a 51 percent stake in Denel Munitions in return for the provision of financing and advising on the business unit’s restructuring.”
While Denel has yet to operate at a profit, operating losses declined nearly 37% between 2007 and 2008, and decreased at a compound annual rate of 74% since restructuring efforts were initiated in early 2006.
Talib SadikSept 25/08: State-owned Denel (Pty) Ltd’s Chairman of the Board Dr Sibusiso Sibisi announces Talib Sadik’s appointment as Group CEO for a period of three years. Mr Sadik was appointed as Group Financial Officer of Denel in 2006, and has been an executive member of the Board of Directors since that date.
Sept 9/08: Denel’s Acting Group CEO Talib Sadik, announces that for the fiscal year that ended on March 31/08, the Denel Group increased gross revenue to R 3,894 million (2007: R 3,310 million) and posted a net loss of R 347 million (2007: R 549 million). Of the total turnover 56.8% was from domestic sales (2007: 47.5%) and 43.2% from export sales (2007: 52.5%). Sadik:
“We managed to improve the loss for the past year through focusing on core businesses, phasing out of legacy contracts, savings in operating costs and profits on the sale of non-core assets… Better contract negotiations including higher advance payment receipts towards the year-end and improvements in our debt collection process helped us to achieve the healthy cash situation.”
See full Denel release | Engineering News.
Sept 1/08: The finalized deal involving Rheinmetall and Denel Munitions comes into effect. Denel release [PDF].
June 1/08: Denel Group’s CFO Mr Talib Sadik becomes interim CEO of Denel.
Feb 8/08: Germany’s Rheinmetall Group signs an agreement with Denel (Pty) Ltd, indicating its intention to take a majority equity stake in Denel Munitions. The deal is finalized on Sept 1/08. Read “Rheinmetall Buying Majority Stake in Denel Munitions” for more.
A-DarterJuly 25/07: Denel’s Group CEO Mr Shaun Liebenberg, announces a net loss of R 549.1 million for the past year ended March 31/07 (2006: R 1,363.4 million) on turnover of R 3,268.1 million (2006: R 2,773.2 million). Gross profit rose to R 754.0 million (2006: loss of R131.1 million). His statement adds:
“Incremental sales by Denel Land Systems and Denel Munitions to clients in South America, Europe and the Middle East added to the increased turnover… At year-end Denel received a number of large contracts, notably the R8.3 billion ‘Hoefyster’ – the biggest in Denel’s 15-year existence, and the A-Darter air-to-air missile contract worth approximately R1 billion… BAE Systems awarded Munitions a contract worth R300 million over three years to supply brass cups, which are used in the manufacture of small calibre ammunition. Denel Optronics, in which German firm Carl Zeiss Optronics has acquired a majority holding, received a BAE Systems contract worth R200 million to produce 450 units of its unique pilot helmet tracker system for use in the Eurofighter-Typhoon jet.
…The agreement signed with Saab in Sweden in June 2006 regarding the establishment of a new aerostructures company, led to Saab AB (publ) taking an initial minority equity stake and operational management control, with Denel retaining an 80% holding… At the close of the financial year Denel and German company Carl Zeiss Optronics GmbH agreed on an equity partnership for Denel Optronics. Denel was to retain a minority share with Carl Zeiss Optronics taking a majority holding of 70%. The effective transaction date was after year-end, with final share transfer on 20 July 2007. The company now trades as Carl Zeiss Optronics (Pty) Limited.”
May 17/07: Denel wins the $1.2 billion, 264-vehicle contract for the South African Army’s new generation “Hoefyster” infantry combat vehicle program. The goal is to produce an 8×8 wheeled APC in the 25 ton class, designed as a family of vehicles that can be equipped with various turret and on-board options. It is described as the biggest single contract in firm history. The vehicle will not be Denel’s, however, but Patria Oyj of Finland’s popular AMV.
April 2007: Denel’s missile/UAV subsidiary Denel Dynamics announces a joint development agreement with Brazil’s Ministry of Defence and Forca Aerea Brasileira for the A-Darter short range air-air missile (SRAAM), signed as a government to government agreement via South Africa’s Armscor. The original contract was apparently signed in July-August 2006, but the formal cooperation launch was announced at the 2007 Latin American Aerospace and Defence exhibition in Brazil.
Additional ReadingsPrecision artillery fire offers an alternative to air support. It has a shorter reach, but very considerable throw-weight and repeatable fire, plus 100% persistence and availability in any weather. GMLRS is a highly accurate GPS-guided rocket that can be fired by ground forces 35 miles away and arrive on target, in under a minute, under any conditions, with a 200 pound unitary warhead that will take out a fortified house. That’s very useful. When integrated into a battlefield surveillance/strike setup like Task Force ODIN, their effectiveness is kicked up several more notches. Rocket pods can be carried on M142 HIMARS truck-mounted systems (1 pod, 6 rockets), or tracked M270 MLRS launchers (2 pods, 12 rockets).
In July 2011, Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control in Dallas, TX received a $438.2 million firm-fixed-price and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for Full Rate Production Lot VI. It includes:
They’ll go to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, as well as GMLRS pods for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers Japan, Jordan, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. Unlike last year, neither the Pentagon nor Lockheed Martin will discuss specific numbers of rocket pods per customer.
Work will be performed in Grand Prairie, TX; Camden, AZ; Orlando, FL; and Lufkin, TX, with an estimated completion date of April 30/14. One bid was solicited with one bid received by US AMCOM Contracting Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-11-C-0166). See also Lockheed Martin release.
UpdatesSeptember 15/16: The first units of the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternative Warhead rocket has rolled off Lockheed Martin’s production line. A company statement said the warhead was designed to engage the same target set and achieve the same area-effects requirement as the old MLRS submunition warhead, but without the lingering danger of unexploded ordnance. Lockheed received a US Army initial production contract for the warheads in June 2015.
May 24/16: Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $331.7 million foreign military sales contract by the US Army. The sale will see the company provide the defense departments of Israel, Singapore, Finland and Jordan with the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) which includes 290 alternative warhead rocket pods, 34 unitary rocket pods and 529 reduced range practice rocket pods. Work and delivery of the system is expected to be completed by March 31, 2018.
UkrOboronProm’s Mi-24PU1 attack helicopter. :
Raytheon’s Center Display unit:
Russia wants a “5th generation” fighter that keeps it competitive with American offerings, and builds on previous aerial and industrial success. India wants to maintain technical superiority over its rivals, and grow its aerospace industry’s capabilities. They hope to work together, and succeed. Will they? And what does “success” mean, exactly?
So far, preliminary cooperation agreements have been signed between Sukhoi/United Aircraft Corporation, for a platform based on Sukhoi’s T50/PAK-FA design. This DID FOCUS article consolidates specific releases and coverage to date, and adds analysis of the program’s current state and future hurdles.
The plane behind the project has taken on several names. The T50 may eventually become the SU-50, but for now it’s referred to as PAK-FA. The aircraft project is also known as FGFA (India: Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft), and PMF (Russia: Prospective Multirole Fighter). Key characteristics include:
Shaping: Some observers have tried to characterize the T50 as a copy. That’s a mistake. The PAK-FA’s first flight revealed a distinctively Russian stealth-driven configuration, which borrows from previous Sukhoi designs and priorities. The prototype has some clear stealth-limiting features, from fit quality, to features like Sukhoi’s standard spherical InfraRed Scan & Track (IRST) system mounted near the cockpit. Those may change in the production aircraft; meanwhile, a smaller tail, clear stealth shaping, and internal weapons carriage all indicate a strong push toward a stealthier plane.
The PAK-FA’s air intakes are set back from the leading edge root extensions (LERX), and one interesting wrinkle involves movable LERX shapes that come forward from the wings to join the aircraft body. This “PChN/ Movable LEX” feature apparently allows some of the maneuverability bonuses normally associated with canards on planes like the SU-30SM, SU-34, etc., but in a much lower profile design.
RT featureEngines: Reports concerning the fighter’s initial engines vary. Some sources contend that the engines used in its test flight are 5th generation engines, but most of them report that it is borrowing from the SU-35 program for now, until more advanced engines designed specifically for the plane can be fielded. Both descriptions could be correct. The SU-35S reportedly uses a heavily-upgraded and more reliable version of NPO Saturn’s AL-31F, named the Saturn 117S. It is said to offer over 30,000 pounds of thrust, with full 360 degree thrust vectoring, and is believed to equip initial PAK-FA fighters. The longer-term question is whether incremental 117S upgrades will let the aircraft reach its required “5th generation” performance levels, or whether the AL-41F project, which aims to use a new and improved engine core, will be able to replace the 117S in future.
Weapons: Russian reports cite carriage of 8 missile suspension points inside the fuselage, to match the F-22. While the Raptor has 2 body bays (with space-saving AVEL launchers) and 2 smaller side bays, the Russian plane is big enough to have 4 body bays and 2 side bays. Air-to-air weapons will certainly include the improved AA-11 (RVV-MD SRAAM) and AA-12 (RVV-SD MRAAM), but RIA Novosti adds that it has the ability to carry 2 ultra long range AAMs, presumably the 200-400 km Novator K-100-1. These “AWACS killers” are also intended for use on the SU-35, and their size may force the PAK-FA to carry them externally.
To date, the T50’s ground-attack weapon capabilities remain something of a mystery.
PAK-FA prototypeSensors: The PAK-FA’s advanced Tikhomirov AESA radar is still undergoing testing on other platforms, and its readiness could be important to the project. As is true of all 4+ generation Russian designs, the radar will be supplemented by an IRST that looks for the heat produced by engines and air friction. This allows long-range, no warning missile attacks, and offsets enemy advantages from radar stealth.
Another approach to offset enemy radar stealth involves L-band radars in the wing’s leading edges, to help the plane find other X-band optimized stealth fighters. The plane’s SH121 radar complex will reportedly add another 3 small X-band AESA radars around the front and sides of the aircraft, in order to provide full radar coverage. Harmonizing these features with stealth, and ensuring that they don’t become a maintenance nightmare, will be another important technical challenge for the new fighter.
The fighter’s biggest technical challenge will involve harmonizing all of these sensors into a single view for the pilot. Russia and India aren’t short on programming talent, but pilot ergonomics has been a long-standing weakness in Russian fighters, as western pilots found when they began flying East German MiG-29s. Good sensor fusion is a technically challenging task, especially if the goal is a system that can accommodate upgrades without ruinous expense. The talent is there, but both Russia and India have mixed histories trying to manage those kinds of military efforts.
Other Electronics: Sukhoi’s releases emphasize an advanced datalink that allows PAK-FA aircraft to share situational awareness, much like NATO’s “Link 16” standard. As the USAF has discovered, however, having other platforms share information with stealth aircraft, while retaining “low probability of intercept” to avoid giving the stealth aircraft’s positions away, is difficult. Russia and India will need to resolve that issue, or accept the operational limitations of a unique but incompatible datalink.
Test flightAll of these characteristics show a convergence of Russian design with leading-edge technologies. Russian 4+ generation fighter designs have always placed a premium on super-maneuverability, and so does the T50. Russian AESA radars are becoming service-ready, and the T50 looks set to be a key platform for their use. Engine improvements may even allow Mach 1+ supercruise if the T50’s weight can be kept down, and if Saturn can deliver on promised operational performance – but both of those “ifs” remain to be proven.
Once it becomes operational, this plane is expected to get the designation SU-50. The big question right now is how close it is to reaching that goal.
Development Timelines, Risks, & Differences of Opinion Defined Design? A Disagreement From YF-22 to F-22As of February 2014, 5 PAK-FA prototypes are flying, and 2 more are in ground test roles, which is short of the 8 that were expected to be available by the end of 2013. The “T3” prototype was the first to have the full avionics and radar suite, including the AESA radar. The plane is reportedly preparing for full operational trials in 2015, and VVS fielding in 2016-2017, but the history of stealth fighters justifies some caution about those dates.
In 2009, former Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. chairman Ashok Baweja took that caution several steps further, saying that that the current PAK-FA prototype and tests were only “proof of concept” level work. The Russians had already approved the design in 2008, so they clearly didn;t see things that way, but America’s F-22 program history made Baweja’s thesis plausible. The YF-22 prototype made quite a few modifications en route to its F-22A designation, over a period lasting several years. The Russian design has changed since 2009, including visible reinforcements to indicate a need for redesign in the wings and other areas. On the other hand, external design changes haven’t been much in evidence, and they continue to move forward with more advanced tests.
India’s low level of expertise designing advanced fighters, and the advanced nature of Russia’s project before India joined, both point toward a final FGFA design that’s much closer to the planes Russia is already flying.
Russian & Indian Timelines PAK-FA Mach flowDifferences of opinion re: the fighters’ readiness also express themselves in each side’s proposed timelines. Russia is focused on 2015-2016 production and 2017-2018 fielding, though senior officials acknowledge that full serial production won’t begin until 2020 – 2024.
Indian officials have pushed a timeline that’s up to 4-5 years longer, in order to develop many of the FGFA’s systems and make a long list of changes. As the cumulative cost and risk of their chosen course become apparent, however, they’re reducing their demands. A 2012 interview with Air Chief Marshal Browne suggests that India’s FGFAs will hew much more closely to Russia’s design, beginning with the current single-seat configuration instead of a new 2-seat layout. About 100 HAL engineers are already working on the project from a facility in Bangalore, and another contingent has moved to Russia to work in the Sukhoi design bureau.
That’s all well and good, but it’s 2014, and the joint R&D contract between Russian and India remains unsigned. Plenty of time remains for meddling, as India was expecting to receive prototypes in 2015, 2017, and 2018. India would still have to fund their own national program of FGFA (SU-50KI?) customization for the Indian air force by a joint team of Russian and Indian engineers. The difference is described as “mission hardware and software,” though it would be surprising if Indian bureaucrats’ fetish for “indigenization” was forced to stop there. Each prototype will be slightly different, creating an incentive for the military and political figures to press for additional changes and alternations.
If India’s FGFA R&D program can get underway in 2014, and if it progresses without major delays, a 2018 prototype would finalize the base configuration, and Indian development could end in 2019. Whereupon series manufacturing would begin at HAL in 2022.
Note the number of “ifs” required to meet even that target. Which will also have to contend with HAL’s known high-tech production industrial issues (vid. LCA Tejas & M-MRCA programs). They’ll need to be solved by the time FGFA production begins, because its manufacturing techniques are likely to be a step beyond anything HAL has attempted to date.
So much for the original plan of IAF service by 2017. If current dates hold true, India wouldn’t see operational serving FGFA fighters until 2025 at the earliest. At the same time, India’s planned FGFA buy is shrinking, from over 200 to around 144.
In a project of this nature, it’s par for the course for Russia and India to both end up being too optimistic in their initial schedules. There’s still more than enough room for that dynamic to happen within the revised schedules, as the project works through configuration, testing, and production issues. The history of modern fighters suggests that software could prove to be particularly troublesome.
Contracts & Key Events 2015 – 2016Sukhoi insists it will meet new 2016 production deadlines. Airshow demo
September 9/16: Russia’s Deputy Minister for Defense Yuri Borisov has said that the Sukhoi PAK-FA is ready for mass production with Moscow planning to acquire a squadron of aircraft in 2017. Equipped with advanced avionics and all-digital flight systems, the PAK-FA is set to become the first operational stealth aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces. An export version is expected to be available by 2025.
June 21/16: United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) has announced that its Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA is now ready for mass production. According to Russian newspaper Izvestia, the fifth generation fighter almost fully meets the requirements of the military’s combat capabilities. UAC is also currently preparing a proposal to be submitted to the Russian Ministry of Defense on starting serial production.
December 11/15: The Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Boisov has said that testing of the PAK FA is nearly complete. The 5th generation fighter is intended to replace the Mig-29 and Su-27 currently currently in service. The fighter is part of a development partnership between Russian manufacturer Sukhoi and India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The Indian Air Force may purchase 154 of the aircraft once they come into service in 2016. The PAK FA is set to rival the US made F-35 fighter, but holds a major export advantage in that it is much more cost effective.
August 27/15: Russia’s “fifth generation” Sukhoi PAK FA stealth fighter is to get the X-58USHK missile, which will reportedly reach mach 3.5. But the critical advantage the new combo would bring was expressed in the a Tass sub-headline: “The missile will be placed inside the fighter’s fuselage.” Thus the PAK FA – also called the T-50 – will remain stealthy, where the F-35’s weapons bay has grown even smaller on the new variants and most weapons will have to be mounted externally.
Feb 2/15: Agreement on production split. The Hindu reports that the main sticking point (who produces what) is settled between the Russians and the Indians. Up to now, the Indians were producing only 13 percent of the fighter, and none of the interesting technology bits. The agreed-upon split hasn’t been made public.
Feb 2/15: On (new) schedule. Originally slated for 2015 production, the PAK-FA, now being called the T-50 in press materials, is to be produced in Komsomolsk-on-Amur in 2016, according to company officials. There is no mention of an export market. India had already cut its order from 200 fighters to 144, but bureaucrats have also pushed back certification to 2019, after which production could be authorized. Complaints by the Indian Air Force in early 2014 may indicate some buyer’s remorse.
2014Negotiations with India turn tense, remain in limbo as Russia moves ahead; Better stealth than the F-22?
Oct 21/14: Sub-contractors. Russia’s Radio Electronic Technologies concern has provided the 1st batch of Himalayas internal electronic warfare systems for the new jet.
The Himalayas EW system was developed by RET’s Kaluga Scientific Research and Radio Technology Institute, and is manufactured at its Signal Radioplant in Stavropol. Sources: Defense World, “Russian T-50 Aircraft Gets Himalayas EW System”.
Sept 15/14: Negotiation. The Russians and Indians are saying different things to Defense News. “A “Russian diplomat in India” tells them they they “have finally sorted out all sticky issues that have been holding back an agreement,” adding that India’s workshare was eventually expected to increase from 13-18% to 40%. India’s MoD refused to confirm this, “especially those [issues] related to workshare between the two countries”.
We’ve seen enough programs involving India to be skeptics, even when Indian officials will confirm such stories. The magazine’s sources say that India and Russia will sign a final agreement on the program the end of 2014. Take that as the metric, and believe it when you see it. Sources: Defense News, “Indo-Russian Jet Program Finally Moves Forward”.
Aug 30/14: Tension. India isn’t pleased with the lack of response to its questions concerning the recent PAK-FA engine fire (q.v. June 10/14), NPO Saturn AL-41FI jet engine performance, Byelka AESA radar performance, the lack of permission for its pilots to fly the jet in Russia, and HAL’s low workshare. India’s lack of a firm development agreement is the 1-sentence argument for much of this situation, except for the engine fire question and HAL’s workshare.
HAL’s workshare has reportedly dropped from 25% to just 13%: tires, the VOR-DME basic navigation avionics, coolant for the radar, a laser designation pod and the head-up display. This list appears to justify analysis that HAL simply doesn’t yet have the capability to be a full partner in such a sophisticated aircraft, and may also be a function iof Indian dithering as Russia simply goes ahead and makes final decisions about the PAK-FA’s development..
Within HAL’s workshare, the Laser Designation pod itself is unlikely to come from India, but may be produced under license. Israel’s RAFAEL LITENING pods equip many Indian aircraft, including the SU-30MKI, but Eastern European and American pressure on Israel makes SU-50 integration tough to contemplate. Thales’ Damocles pod, which already equips Malaysia’s Su-30MKMs and would equip Indian Rafales, would be a more logical choice.
The real challenge here is twofold. One is the M-MRCA program, whose $10 billion cost growth really shrinks the overall room for PGF funding within India’s budgets. The related challenge is time, and “IAF sources told IHS Jane’s that this deadline [to begin Indian production in 2020 – 2021] would be missed by several years.” Sources: Daily Mail India, “India-Russia jet deal hits turbulence over ‘technical worries’ ” | IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Indian Air Force unhappy at progress of PAK-FA fifth-gen fighter”.
Aug 4/14: Negotiations. Still no firm production agreement re: the PAK-FA/ FGFA/ PMF, following the end of the initial engineering development contract in 2013. Russian sources continue to make hopeful noises, but at this point, it means very little until there’s a firm contract in place. Sources: Itar-Tass, “Sukhoi to sign another contract with India on FGFA”.
June 10/14: Fire. A commission will be investigating:
“Today after the regular test flight of the T-50 aircraft at the airfield of the M.M.Gromov Flight Research Institute in Zhukovsky near Moscow, while the plane was landing, a smoke above the right air intake was observed, then a local fire broke out. The fire was quickly extinguished. The plane is to be repaired…. This incident will not affect the timing of the T-50 test program.”
The Moscow Times suggested that the damage might leave the plane out of action for a little while, as people reportedly: “…saw smoke and flame billow out of the front of the engine and [it] caused visible damage to the exterior of the aircraft.” Sounds like an engine issue. Maybe one day, we’ll know. Sources: Sukhoi, “Sukhoi’s message over the incident with the T-50 aircraft” | Moscow Times, “Russian Advanced Prototype Fighter Jet Erupts into Flames on Landing”.
Fire
Feb 21/14: Production version. Sukhoi announces that their production version will not be waiting until 2016, while the current set of 4 flying and 2 ground prototypes continue their work at Zhukovsky. In fact:
“Today the flight model of the prospective 5th — generation fighter aircraft (PAK-FA, T-50) arrived to the 929th Chkalov State Flight Test Centre’s airfield in Akhtubinsk for State Joint Tests…. The PAK FA tests program included aero-dynamic features evaluation, tests of stability and controllability and of dynamic strength, function check of on-board equipment and aircraft systems. Optical locator system as well as active electronically scanned array radar was tested on the aircraft with positive results obtained. Air refueling mode was tested. Supermaneuverability tests of the aircraft are under way. Aircraft systems are being tested on the test stands, ground experimental works continue.”
It’s still possible for hardware or software problems to make the delivery of 60 combat-capable aircraft an impossible goal by 2020, and Russian reports aren’t going to involve public accountability or discussion of test results. Even so, the Akhtubinsk arrival is embarrassing timing for War Is Boring’s same-day report. Sources: Sukhoi, “T-50-2 fighter aircraft made the flight to Akhtubinsk” | Russia & India Report, “Russian Air Force receives first FGFA T-50 fighter for tests”.
Feb 21/14: No mystery. “Russia’s New Air Force Is a Mystery” wonders why Russia is buying SU-30MK2s, SU-30SMs and SU-35s, in addition to the future PAK-FA. It turns out that the answer is extremely simple: industrial priorities that bought up aircraft the Chinese stopped buying, took advantage of successful advanced SU-30MKx export developments, and aim to provide the SU-35 with a home country order base for potential exports. That sort of thing happens all the time, everywhere. The article ends up stinging itself with this quote re: the PAK-FA:
“The T-50’s schedule has stretched farther and farther to the right. Originally planned for handover to the air force’s Akhtubinsk flight test center for evaluation in 2014, recent announcements suggest this might now slip until the second half of 2016. This would derail plans to declare initial operational capability, and the start of full-scale production, at the end of 2016.
The best-case scenario would have seen 60 production T-50s delivered between 2016 and 2020, but this now seems a distant hope. As a result, the air force is badly in need of supplementary equipment.”
The 1st PAK-FA arrives in Akhtubinsk for testing that same day. Sources: War Is Boring, “Russia’s New Air Force Is a Mystery”.
Feb 7/14: Timelines. Russia and India are still negotiating the FGFA R&D contract, but India’s Chief of the Air Staff and Air Chief Marshal Norman Anil Kumar (A K) Browne tells the Press Trust of India that the 1st FGFA prototype will arrive in India this year, for testing at Ojhar AB, located NE of Mumbai. One imagines that he’s speaking on the basis of a draft R&D contract that would have Indian scientists and test pilots in Russia until the R&D phase is scheduled to end in 2019.
2022 is now given as the planned in-service date, as India slip farther and farther from the original plan of having these planes in service by 2017. That 2017 date was always a pipe dream, and even present dates depend on very large financial decisions being made very soon by an unpopular government, or by its electoral successor. It’s more realistic to assume that the draft R&D agreement won’t actually become a signed contract and disbursed funds until 2015 or later, with attendant effects on India’s schedule.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to develop the plane,m but even they are several years from serious fielding. Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) First Deputy Director Alexander Fomin is quoted as saying that testing and manufacturing ramp-ups will require: “At least… [6-10 years] before we build a sample of the fifth generation fighter plane and being its serial production.” Sources: Itar-Tass, “Russia fulfils FGFA obligations with India – Alexander Kadakin”.
Jan 21/14: India. India’s Air Force is directly criticizing the stealth fighter program, according to the minutes of a Dec 24/13 meeting chaired by secretary of defence production Gokul Chandra Pati:
“Business Standard has reviewed the minutes of that meeting. The IAF’s three top objections to the FGFA were: (a) The Russians are reluctant to share critical design information with India; (b) The fighter’s current AL-41F1 engines are inadequate, being mere upgrades of the Sukhoi-30MKI’s AL-31 engines; and (c) It is too expensive. With India paying $6 billion to co-develop the FGFA, “a large percentage of IAF’s capital budget will be locked up.”
On January 15, the IAF renewed the attack in New Delhi, at a MoD meeting to review progress on the FGFA. The IAF’s deputy chief of air staff (DCAS), its top procurement official, declared the FGFA’s engine was unreliable, its radar inadequate, its stealth features badly engineered, India’s work share too low, and that the fighter’s price would be exorbitant by the time it enters service.
Top MoD sources suspect the IAF is undermining the FGFA to free up finances for buying 126 Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) for an estimated $18 billion, an acquisition that has run into financial headwinds because of budgetary constraints….”
Perhaps if India hadn’t structured its MMRCA competition to completely ignore the costs of the competing aircraft, this wouldn’t be happening. But they did, and it is. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Russia can’t deliver on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF”.
Jan 16/14: T-50 trolling. Rosoboronexport’s parent firm Rostec decides to troll the aviation world, with claims that the PAK-FA will have better stealth than the American F-22 Raptor:
“The average [radar cross section value] for the T-50 fighter is between 0.1 and 1 square meter…. the T-50 is now ahead of not only all other fighters of the Russian Army, but also foreign models. For example, the visibility of the American fifth-generation F-22 fighter is 0.3-0.4 square meters, according to PAK FA chief designer Alexander Davidenko.”
This means almost nothing. First, the Russian PAK-FA range includes values that are a closer match for the Eurofighter than the F-22. Second, Davidenko couldn’t know the F-22’s real production values without access to American flight test data, and there are rumors that it’s smaller than 0.3 m2. The third issue is production. Davidenko’s claims for the PAK-FA back existing assessments that it’s a legitimate stealth aircraft design, but production work affects final values for any plane. If it’s shoddy and alignment is poor, for instance, a design with RCS of 0.1 m2 could easily hit 1.0 m2 in reality. Russia is known for many things, including excellent and robust fighter designs, but precision work? Not so much. A real comparison would require test data from production aircraft (q.v. Nov 12/12 caveats), including different values from various angles, and their different success levels against different radar bands. That isn’t on offer for either plane.
Other points in the release are more informative, if true. Rostec says that composite materials are just 25% of the fighter’s weight, but cover 70% of its surface. A new power system design from Rostec’s Aviation Equipment provides double the amount of electrical power offered by previous Russian systems. We hope they have better luck than Boeing has, but that power will be needed by Radioelectronic Technologies’ new avionics and related systems. With respect to the plane’s biggest current deficit, UEC has an initial-model of the next-generation AL-41F1 thrust-vectoring engines installed in a prototype now, and Rostec is feeding general expectations that the AL-41 will give the new fighter supercruise capability. Sources: Rostec, “The T-50 Fighter will feature even greater stealth capabilities” | Air & Cosmos, “Le T-50 russe serait plus furtif que le F-22”.
2013Test flights, incl. the new 5th prototype; Negotiations and tensions with India.
T50, incoming
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Oct 28/13: #5. Sukhoi flies the 5th T50 prototype at its Y.A.Gagarin KnAAZ aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Once it finishes local flight tests, the aircraft will join the program flight tests at Zhukovsky, near Moscow.
Sukhoi pegs the number of flights to date at “more than 450”, with another 2 planes are involved in ground tests as a complex ground stand and static testing platform, respectively. Sources: Sukhoi release, Oct 28/13.
Oct 21/13: Indian complaints. Aviation Week reports that India is dissatisfied with their development workshare, in a project they came op late and close to lockdown on their partner’s side, and for which they have only recently managed to produce anything resembling their specifications (q.v. April 10/13):
“We have a major opportunity in the FGFA program,” Indian air force (IAF) Deputy Chief Air Marshal S. Sukumar says. However, “at the moment [the 15% development share] is not very much in favor of Indian development. We are flagging it through the government. It should be much more focused towards indigenous development capability.”
The problem is that 4 Russian T50 prototypes have performed about 450 test flights since January 2010, and the VVS plans to begin inducting the fighter in 2015-2016. Even if they’re a year late, it doesn’t leave much room for development. That would have required fast decisions to begin the contract early, when the design was still in need of refinement.
India’s desires and its modus operandi are in conflict once again, and the question is whether the dichotomy will become a stumbling block in negotiations for the final $11 billion system development contract. At this point, the only way to square that circle would be to increase the number of differences between the Russian and Indian fighters, or to involve India in developing the “Block 10” next iteration of a fighter whose core technologies are already a big stretch for Indian firms. Either approach would drive up overall costs for the contract under negotiation (q.v. July 15/13), and add substantial risk to India’s plans to begin manufacturing at HAL in 2022 – itself a problematic proposition, given HAL’s record. Sources: Aviation Week, “India Concerned About Fifth-Gen Fighter Work Share With Russia”.
Oct 18/13: Aircraft issues. An article in The Aviationist looks at issues with the PAK-FA, which don’t get the same exposure as western projects with their public oversight. Piotr Butowski of the Polish Magazyn Lotnictwo notes that:
“…the plane still suffers from the strict g-limits…. The plane underwent a modernization in the Sukhoi facility on the Polikarpov Street in Moscow Dec. 2012 and May 2013. The airframe was reinforced according to the flight tests and static tests that were already carried out; many new [metal strip] overlays can be seen on the airplane’s surface.”
Problems and modifications aren’t abnormal. The 1st PAK-FA prototype has structural cracks in 2011, and the 2nd had an engine flameout cancel its public MAKES 2011 air show performance. Sources: The Aviationist, “Russia’s most advanced fighter jet’s troublesome childhood”.
July 15/13: India Delays. The FGFA project’s parameters may be set (q.v. April 10/13), but there’s a problem with the R&D deal, which was pegged at $11 billion equivalent. The Times of India:
“Defence ministry sources said the inking of the final design and R&D contract for the stealth fighter has been hit by a huge delay, with Russia also jacking up costs for the futuristic project. “It’s very unlikely the FGFA final design contract will be concluded in the 2013-2014 fiscal,” said a source. “The timeframes will now have to be revised. MoD has established a committee of specialists and finance officials to verify the rise in costs. An internal contract negotiation committee is also in progress…”
Russia isn’t going to wait, and will continue development of their version while they wait for India’s signature. Operational testing is slated to begin in 2014. If FGFA negotiations stretch into 2015, the net effect will be to severely delay India’s variant, even as the base Russian design becomes more and more firmly set.
April 25/13: VVS flight. The Russian air force’s (VVS) Chkalov Flight Test Center begins flying the PAK-FA prototypes, with a 2-hour flight from the M.M. Gromov Flight Research Institute in Zhukovsky (Moscow region).
At present, Sukhoi has 4 flying test planes, which are mostly flown by company test pilots, and 2 ground test planes. Sukhoi.
April 10/13: India. Sukhoi announces that the parameters for their joint FGFA project with India are set:
“The contract to develop a sketch and technical project of the Russian-Indian perspective multi-functional 5th-generation fighter (PMI/FGFA) was completed. The fighter design was fully developed. The both parties have agreed upon on the amount and division of work during the research and development (R&D) stage. A contract for the R&D is being prepared. It is to be signed this year.”
March 1/13: Plans & Schedule. High-level Russian and Indian sources offer a bit more clarity concerning dates, but they seem to be at odds regarding electronics.
Russian VVS commander Gen. Victor Bondarev expects weapons release trials to begin in 2013, as the number of aircraft rises from 4 – 8. If tests go well, the fighter could enter series production in late 2015 or early 2016. Based on past fighter programs, that may be a bit optimistic.
Meanwhile, IAF chief of staff Air Marshall N.A.K. Browne is expecting to sign the big design & development contract for the FGFA in 2013. They’ll receive 3 developmental prototypes in India in 2015, 2017 and then 2018, rather than the wider 2014-2019 window reported earlier. That SDD version would apparently be fully common between Russia and India, making Pogosyan (vid. Feb 7/13) correct to that point. India would then fund, as a separate project, FGFA (SU-50KI?) customization for the Indian air force by a joint team of Russian and Indian engineers. The difference is described as “mission hardware and software,” though it would be surprising if Indian bureaucrats’ fetish for “indigenization” was forced to stop there. Series manufacturing would begin at HAL in 2022.
If true, it means that India wouldn’t see operational serving FGFA fighters until 2025 at the earliest, and that’s only if HAL’s known industrial issues with high-tech production are fully solved by 2022. AIN.
Feb 7/13: Avionics. At Aero India 2013, Obedinnoe Avaitstroitel’noi Corporatsii (United Aircraft Corp.) President Mikhail Pogosyan says that the new fighter will “have a single set of on-board equipment [cockpit avionics],” as a requirement of the Indian Air Force. He adds that India’s fighters will also share the Russian single-seat configuration.
Both of those statements would represent major changes from India. India’s initial plans involved a 2-seat variant that would follow the example of programs like the SU-30MKI, and create a unique cockpit avionics set that used equipment from Indian companies and foreign vendors. If Pogosyan is correct, India has backtracked toward a standard type configuration, and joint funding of upgrades. UPI.
2012India’s timeline keeps falling back, as it cuts plans to 144 jets; No SU-50 for ROKAF; Prototype #4 flies; AESA radar testing begins.
#T2 lands
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Dec 12/12: #4 flies. The 4th prototype takes flight at the snowy Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association (KnAAPO). UAC.
Nov 12/12: RCS guess. Airpower Australia uses public-domain photos coupled with the Physical Optics (PO) method for predicting the Radar Cross Section of complex targets on Russia’s T50, using VisCam View software to produce a PolyChromatic Spherical Representation (PCSR). Without flight test data, it’s still a guess, but it’s a kind of guess that Moore’s Law has made available outside of large intelligence agencies.
Their guess? It won’t match the F-22, or even China’s J-20, but if they introduce a rectangular faceted design to the engine nozzles and add radar absorbent coatings, they might beat the F-35. Sources: Airpower Australia, “A Preliminary Assessment of Specular Radar Cross Section Performance in the Sukhoi T-50 Prototype” | WIRED Danger Room, “Russia’s Stealth Fighter Could Match U.S. Jets, Analyst Says”.
Oct 9/12: During an interview with India Strategic, Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne confirms that HAL has committed $6 billion to joint development. Plans have changed, and India’s 144 planned FGFAs will all be single seaters, now, hewing much more closely to the Russian baseline. In the same vein as India’s SU-30 MKIs, however, they’ll have some avionics and integration differences. According to the ACM Browne:
“… the first prototype is likely to be delivered to India in 2014 followed by two more in 2017 and 2019. The series production then “will only be ordered based on the final configuration and performance of the third prototype.”
See: India Strategic | IANS.
Aug 19/12: Even later to India. Reports now indicate that the 1st FGFA prototype flight tests should start in India in 2014, with deliveries to the Indian Air Force by 2022, a full ten years from now. This would be the start of a $30+ billion, 250 plane program over the next decade, at roughly $100 million each.
Closer to the present, Russia and India are reportedly finalizing the research and development phase at $11+ billion, split evenly between the two parties. Business Standard | AviationWeek.
Aug 8/12: Radar. Sukhoi announces that they’ve begun flight tests of the PAK-FA’s Tikhomirov “active phased array radar system” in both air-to-air and air-to-surface test modes. Initial trials toward flight refueling also take place this month. Sukhoi | The DEW Line | RIA Novosti.
May 14/12: Late to India. India is already backtracking on service dates for its FGFA variant of Sukhoi’s T50, bringing them closer to predictions made by outside observers years ago. M M Pallam Raju has moved the plane’s certification and production start date from 2017 back to 2019. Close examination shows that 2020 or beyond is more likely.
India’s Business Standard also highlights a number of areas that aren’t settled, where ongoing specifications changes and/or technical problems may end up delaying the fighter and send India’s costs skyrocketing. India reportedly wants 40-45 design changes to the current PAK-FA, including its own avionics and a “360 degrees” AESA radar. That last requirement is likely to involve AESA “cheek fairings” that need to maintain aircraft stealth levels, a tailcone radar, and the internal computing and software required to fuse all of those radars into a single picture. They also want at least 2,000 hours of certification flying, and possible configuration changes in light of tests. India now expects their fighters to prepare for service no earlier than 2019, and if the IAF fields a 2-seat version, it’s likely to take even longer. All of India’s changes add 3 types of risk.
One is technical risk. India’s history is littered with overly ambitious projects that India’s Ministry of Defense and associated state-run agencies approved, but could not execute. The cutting-edge nature of the FGFA project magnifies those risks, even with Sukhoi’s assistance.
The 2nd risk is cost risk. Sukhoi’s help, and the associated design, production, and testing of new FGFA equipment, won’t come for free. The more changes India makes, the more the project will cost them. Russia isn’t going to pick up the tab for changes to a design their air force has already approved, and even the “Tactical Technical Agreement” that specified Indian changes isn’t going to mean much if costs become a problem. Russia has forcibly renegotiated critical defense contracts with India several times, and won’t hesitate to do so again.
The 3rd risk is schedule risk. Since Russia is focused on fielding the current single-seat configuration in its current form, while India is focused on major configuration changes and is still debating a 2-seat variant, both of those timelines could turn out to be true. Russia could wind up fielding SU-50 squadrons several years before India even finishes development. India’s Business Standard.
Jan 29/12: Korea: No PAK-FA. The Korea Times quotes a DAPA spokesman, who confirms the potential F-X-III competitors:
“No Russian firm submitted an application to attend the program’s explanatory session, which was a prerequisite to participate, by the Friday registration deadline,” a spokesman of DAPA said. He noted that a representative from Swedish company Saab, which has been searching for additional export orders for its Gripen multirole fighters, successfully filed an application for the mandatory session along with Boeing, Lockheed Martine [sic] and EADS.”
This means that the Indo-Russian PAK-FA will not be part of the $7+ billion competition, despite reports (vid. July 20/11) that it was intending to participate, just as Russian disinterest kept the SU-35 out of F-X-2.
2011Prototypes #2 & 3 fly; Testing flameout; South Korean opportunity?
PAK-FA: takeoff!
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Dec 22/11: #3 flies. First flight of the 3rd PAK-FA prototype from Sukhoi’s KNAAPO aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Sukhoi.
Sept 6/11: Exports? Russia & India Report highlights an analysis by Russia’s unofficial Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT), which takes a look at potential buyers of the PAK-FA’s export version. They see a potential for 274-388 export units beyond India or states that spun out of the Soviet Union, like Kazakhstan et. al. Their projections for possible buyers, and their projected purchasing periods, include:
Aug 24/11: Flameout. Flight International conveys NPO Saturn general director Ilya Federo’s explanation of the MAKS 2011 failure:
“The motor did not fail – in fact, it was put by erroneous control input into a wrong mode that caused the surge. This is not an engine failure, but the wrong data input caused by a malfunctioning sensor feeding data to the flight control system. After what had happened the motor was checked [and] the malfunctioning sensor was replaced by a good one. Today, there is no issue with this engine.”
Aug 22/11: Flameout. After performing a basic fly-over with the PAK FA, Sukhoi intended to close Russia’s MAKS 2011 air show with a bang – and did, sort of. The pilot of its second prototype PAK-FA/T50-2 was forced to abort his take-off run, and the planned flying routine, after 2 bursts of flame erupted from the right engine.
The show’s organizers compounded the embarrassment by promising that the 1st prototype would fly instead – but it was not on site, and is believed to be in maintenance following its Aug 17/11 demonstration. Flameout: Flight International (incl. flame burst picture) | India’s Open magazine | China’s Xinhua || Appearance: Moscow Times | Pravda | RIA Novosti | Voice of Russia | Reuters | UPI | WSJ Emerging Europe blog | op-ed – Right-wing Heritage Foundation, USA.
July 20/11: PAK-FA for South Korea? As South Korea’s DAPA eases the criteria to try and foster more competition, DAPA’s Col. Wi Jong-seong says that “Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi expressed its intent to compete in the fighter jet procurement project early this year.” The report quotes him as saying that Sukhoi’s T50 PAK-FA will be up against Boeing’s stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II, and EADS’ Eurofighter Typhoon. Assuming we don’t have an F-X-2 repeat, where all competitors but one drop out.
At this point, FX-III is being touted as a 60 jet buy of high-end fighters, with a budget of 8.29 trillion won ($7.86 billion). Eurofighter reportedly offered a better deal than the F-15K in F-X-2, but lost. The firm recently proposed to phase in Korean assembly for Phase III, with the 1st 10 made in Europe, the next 24 using Korean components, and the last 26 assembled in Korea. Korea Times.
March 3/11: #2 flies. Russia’s 2nd PAK-FA fighter prototype successfully completes its 1st test flight in Russia’s Far East region of Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Note that China’s Xinhua cites local reports dated Feb 23/11, but Sukhoi’s release pegs the date at March 3/11.
UAC’s Mikhail Pogosyan adds that they expect to have a fleet of 3 test aircraft by year end, and says the existing jets have now made 40 flights since last January to test the model’s aero-dynamic characteristics and electronics. Beyond that, Pogosyan tells Russian media that the Indian Air Force will “acquire 50 single-seater fighters of the Russian version” before their 2-seat FGFA is developed. If true, it would go a long way toward ensuring that India meets its 2017 induction target. On the Russian end, plans are to purchase the first batch with existing engines, buying the first 10 aircraft after 2012 and then 60 after 2016. Russia’s Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies director Ruslan Pukhov predicts that Vietnam will be the 2nd export customer for the fighter. Sukhoi | Russia’s Pravda | China’s Xinhua.
Feb 9/11: With Aero India 2011 underway, Sukhoi offers some additional details regarding the December 2010 agreement with India:
“This is the first of a series of documents governing the obligations of the parties at different stages of the program. The PMF project includes the design and development of a next-generation fighter, which will have such advanced features as stealth, supersonic cruise speed, high maneuverability, highly integrated set of avionics, an advanced warning system about the situation, the internal deployment of weapons and the possibility of a centralized reporting and electronic warfare system. The fighter is being developed on the basis of the Russian perspective aviation complex (PAK FA) according to stringent technical requirements of the Indian side. The further development of the program envisages design and development of a two-place version of the aircraft and integration of an advanced engine with increased thrust. The two sides are supposed to cooperate in joint marketing of the complex in other countries.”
Feb 9/11: India. Indian defence minister AK Antony reiterates their target of a 2017 induction for the FGFA. India’s defense procurement history suggests that they’re unlikely to make it. Time will tell. Sukhoi.
20101st flight; Russian air force plans; Contract with India.
Sukhoi PAK-FA: 1st flight
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Dec 20/10: Contract. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev reportedly signs a set of defense and nuclear agreements in India, including the FGFA development contract. Details remain sketchy. Bloomberg | BBC.
Dec 16/10: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) Chairman Ashok Nayak tells Russia’s RIA Novosti that Russia and India have agreed on key features of the design contract for their joint fifth-generation fighter project. The cost of preliminary design is estimated at $295 million, with work expected to be complete within 18 months. The partnership will develop both a single-seat and a twin-seat version of the aircraft by 2016, focusing on the single-seat version in the initial stages of development.
Nayak said the contract could be signed by the representatives of India’s HAL and Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) during a visit by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to India on December 20-22. RIA Novosti.
Development contract
Nov 30/10: The right-wing American Heritage Foundation think tank releases an analysis of the Russia program and its implications: “What Russia’s Stealth Fighter Developments Mean for America“.
July 23/10: Testing. Sukhoi’s KnAAPO issues a release saying that:
“Sukhoi Company has completed the preliminary on-land and in-flight activities which involved all 3 engineering prototypes of the Frontline Aviation Advanced Airborne Complex (PAK FA)… These prototypes were used for testbed strength tests, on-land optimization of fuel systems and other work towards flight trials. The flying prototype has made 16 flights… enables execution of a complete program of flight trials… Vladimir Popovkin, the Russian Defense Minister First Deputy, in his interview to the Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper estimated the Russian Air Force’s demand for the 5th-generation fighters at 50 to 100 units. It is planned to complete all tests of the PAK FA airframe in 2011-2012, and to sign a contract in 2013 for a pilot lot of ten aircraft for testing the model’s entire weapons suite.”
July 13/10: Russia. RIA Novosti quotes senior Russian figures. Russian Air Force chief Col. Gen. Alexander Zelin confirms the expected delivery dates of over 60 planes, which they hope to begin in 2015-16, but equipped with older, “non-fifth” generation engines from existing SU-30 family planes.
“Deputy Defense Minister for Arms Procurement Vladimir Popovkin said the Defense Ministry would purchase the first 6 to 10 aircraft after 2012, based on the outcome of initial tests… The prime minister said 30 billion rubles (around $1 billion) had already been spent on the project and another 30 billion would be required to complete it, after which the engine, weaponry and other components would be upgraded.”
April 2010: Testing. The 1st flying prototype of the fighter, and the avionics testbed used for systems optimization before flight trials, are delivered to the flying test center of the OKB Sukhoi Experimental Design Bureau in Zhukovsky, near Moscow. On April 29/10, the flying prototype begins preliminary tests. Source.
March 29/10: Welcome to the new world of intelligence, where a pair of YouTube videos appear to provide insights into PAK-FA technologies. Veteran aviation journalist Bill Sweetman reports that:
“…the video highlights a new honeycomb core material designed for high temperatures. It also states that the T-50 will have no fewer than five radar arrays: the 1500-module forward active electronically scanned array (AESA), two side-facing X-band sub-arrays and two “decimetric” (L-band) arrays in the leading-edge root extensions. It also states that the goal is to fight the F-22 by closing within visual range. Another new video shows a novel inlet radar blocker… It uses flexible vanes with a rotating ring at the rear end: in the “stealth regime” it provides extensive blockage, but it clears the airflow when it doesn’t matter or you need full speed or power.”
Late March 2010: Testing. Acceptance trials of the flying prototype are fully completed. Source.
March 16/10: Russia. In “The future of the Russian Air Force: 10 years on“, RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik discusses planned buys and pending recapitalization of the Russian Air Force over the next decade:
“According to various media reports, the Ministry wants to buy at least 1,500 aircraft, including 350 new warplanes, by 2020. The fleet would include 70% new equipment at that point, said Air Force Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Alexander Zelin… The Defense Ministry has now signed contracts for the purchase of 32 Su-34 Fullback advanced fighter-bombers to be delivered by 2013, 48 Su-35 Flanker-E fighters by 2015, 12 Su-27SM Flanker-B Mod. 1 fighters by 2011, 4 Su-30M2 Flanker-C planes by 2011 and 12 Su-25UBM Frogfoot combat trainers. This year, the Defense Ministry intends to sign a contract for the delivery of 26 MiG-29K Fulcrum-D fighters by 2015. Additional contracts for the delivery of at least 80 Su-34s and 24-48 Su-35s are expected to be signed. In all, the Russian Air Force is to receive 240-260 new aircraft of these types. It is hard to say much about the specifications of another 100-110 aircraft, due to be manufactured primarily after 2015. They will probably include 25-30 MiG-35 fighters, another 12-16 Su-30 combat trainers for Su-35 squadrons and 40-60 Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA (Advanced Frontline Aviation Aircraft System) fifth-generation fighters…”
Feb 12/10: Testing. The PAK-FA prototype reportedly makes its 2nd flight at Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Times Now | RT .
Feb 6/10: Some aviation watchers ask “How long has the PAK-FA or T50 been flying?” They believe that the first prototype may have flown before January 2010, and that there may be more than 1 prototype, based on differences in available photos.
Jan 29/10: Fly! The first prototype PAK-FA fighter lifts off from KNAAPO’s Komsomolsk-on-Amur facility for a 47 minute flight, piloted by Sukhoi test-pilot Sergey Bogdan. Sukhoi says that the plane met all expectations. Sukhoi JSC release | NPO Saturn release [in Russian] | Russia 1 TV video | Pravda | RIA Novosti | Times of India | Aviation Week | Defense News | Agence France Presse | BBC | Canadian Press | Washington Post | China’s Xinhua | Aviaiton Week’s Bill Sweetman: Preliminary Analysis.
1st PAK-FA flight
Jan 6/10: India’s Business Standard covers the workshare and capability issues that have must be addressed before production contracts and arrangements can be finalized. The project is currently expected to have development costs of $8-10 billion, and Russia and Sukhoi have already made substantial investments.
The crux of the negotiations revolves around HAL’s designated development workshare, and the areas it will be applied to. On the other side of the table, the Russian United Aircraft Corporation is wary of India’s lack of design credentials, coupled with the cutting-edge nature of this project. HAL is intent on a 25% share, to include the mission computer and critical software (building on Indian SU-30MKI work), navigation systems, cockpit displays, counter-measures dispensing (CMD) systems, composites expertise and production to complement Russia’s titanium expertise, and modifying Sukhoi’s single-seat design into a twin-seat fighter for the IAF. HAL’s Chairman Ashok Baweja seems to have a different view of the fighter’s design state, referring to existing prototypes as “proof of concept” items rather than nearly final designs.
Once the 2 sides come to a firm agreement on issues of design and funding, UAC and HAL will sign a General Contract, and set up a joint venture to design and build the aircraft. That has not happened yet, while Sukhoi has continued to push forward with general design, and has produced a prototype aircraft. Business Standard describes India’s workshare as “almost finalised,” but as we’ve seen with other Indian procurements, that doesn’t necessarily mean anything.
Jan 3/10: Rollout. Reports surface that the first prototype of Russia’s PAK-FA aircraft has rolled out on the runway at KNAAPO’s plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, but did not fly. The test pilot reportedly switched on the engines and made 2 runs on the airstrip, while testing the brakes.
Russia’s vice premier Sergei Ivanov had promised that tests would commence in December 2009-January 2010, and the Russian Air Force reportedly plans to induct the fighter beginning from 2015. DNA India.
2008 – 2009Russia – India MoU signed; Russia approves their version’s design; Exports could be a challenge.
PAK-FA: early concept
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Oct 9/09: India. The Indian Ministry of Defence issues a release regarding the 9th meeting of the Russia-India Inter-Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation on Oct 14-15/09:
“Among the major new projects which will be high in priorities of the Indian agenda for bilateral defence cooperation between the two countries, will be projects for joint design and development of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) and of the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MTA). The co-development and co-production of the FGFA with Sukhoi Design Bureau Russia has been progressing, with several rounds of discussion already completed to finalize the technical requirements. During discussions in the meeting of the Commission, Shri Antony would highlight New Delhi’s interest in ensuring that the development phase of the FGFA is completed by 2016, as originally anticipated and that induction of the aircraft into the IAF can start by 2017.”
See also: Times of India.
Aug 28/09: Radar. Tikhomirov’s NIIP reportedly exhibits models of the PAK-FA’s active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. Tikhomirov reportedly says the AESA antenna entered bench testing in November 2008, and was mated with the radar’s other blocks for an initial integration test “this summer,” with a 2nd radar produced by mid-2010 for integration with the operational prototype aircraft.
The Milaz report adds that Sukhoi will complete 5 prototypes for initial testing, including 2 to be dedicated for ground test activities. Initial trials are scheduled for completion in 2011-12, with the company expecting to produce an initial batch of aircraft for operational trials by 2015.
April 16/09: Exports? Forecast International offers a cautionary market assessment of the FGFA:
“…with the PAKFA program under increasing tension and the West’s major aerospace firms seeking to shore up additional orders for soon to be closed fourth-generation aircraft production lines, Russia faces the prospect of declining presence in the world’s most high sought after arms markets… Faced with the considerable research & development costs associated with developing a new, advanced fighter platform, Russia is seeking to both distribute costs and ensure that a viable export market will exist… Sukhoi, is reported to have already invested as much as $115 million in company capital…
Several factors are working against the Rosoboronexport’s attempts replicate the international cost/production-sharing development model implemented for the F-35, which is expected to become the dominant fighter in the fifth-generation market… the unproven status of the PAKFA… its timeline for delivery its far behind its western competitors. Deliveries of the PAKFA are not anticipated to begin until 2017. Finally, as production of the Eurofighter Typhoon and Lockheed Martin F-35 ramp up, the western aerospace firms currently producing advanced variants of fourth-generation aircraft are likely to push hard to gain additional order to extend production lines.”
Aug 8/09: RIA Novosti quotes the chief of the Russian Air Force, Alexander Zelin, from the MAKS-2009 arms show. Zelin says there are problems with the PAK-FA’s proposed new engines, and:
“For the time being the aircraft will use Saturn engines. There are problems, I admit, but research is continuing.”
Dec 29/08: MoU. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) sign the deal to jointly develop and produce a 5th generation fighter aircraft. HAL Chairman Ashok K Baweja:
“We (HAL and UAC) are moving forward as per schedule. We (have) just done the general contract yesterday. I went to Delhi and signed the general contract.”
According to reports, Russia and India will simultaneously develop 2 versions of the aircraft: a 2-seat version for India, and a single seat version for the Russian Air Force. India Defence.
India – Russia MoU
Sept 29/08: India Today magazine reports that the Russian and Indian designs for the FGFA project will differ somewhat, while efforts continue to define India’s participation in a project that has reportedly already had its design frozen by Sukhoi. HAL Chairman Ashok Baweja is quoted as saying that the Indian aircraft will be a 2-seat aircraft, which changes some aspects of design and has an especial impact on stealth unless carefully managed. Bajewa added that both stealth and supercruise capabilities were expected for the aircraft, adding that both sides were closer to a real agreement defining India’s participation, almost a year after the original cooperation memo was signed. India’s capabilities in composite materials manufacturing was mentioned as a possible basis for industrial participation.
Meanwhile, Russia’s the United Aircraft Corporation President Alexey Fedorov says that the single-seat T50 is set to fly in Russia in 2009 as planned; Bajewa adds that it will be powered by an ALF-31 FP engine.
The most interesting quote was Indian Air Vice Marshal Kak’s, who noted that the opportunity to gain from being part of the design process was gone, and added that “…if we have missed out on the design phase, we have to analyse the cost-benefits of acquiring only super cruise and stealth technology for $10 billion.”
A fair question. One likely to be asked in the political realm as well, when the time comes to finalize the agreement. Which leads to the corollary questions: How important each aspect is to the IAF? And where, if anywhere, might enough of these performance benefits be acquired at less cost?
Summer 2008: Design approval. The fighter’s initial design is approved in Russia, and the prototype blueprints are delivered to the KNAAPO aircraft building company based in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Source.
Russia approves design
April 3/08: RIA Novosti reports that Russia plans to begin flight tests of a new fifth-generation fighter based on Sukhoi’s PAK FA project in 2009.
Feb 28/08: HAL explains some of the timelines facing the FGFA program. HAL Chairman Ashok Baweja explains the process, which is also the set of implicit points of failure where the project can become stalled or canceled:
“We have only signed an Inter-governmental Agreement which agrees to cooperate in developing the FGFA. Now from that will flow the project report, general contract, the structure of the company that will be set up, and where the funding will come from. An aircraft design, development, certification, the complete entity with its power plant, systems, weapons, trials, is a process which takes 15 years to be completed.”
2004 – 2007India signs key agreement, but it isn’t finalized.
India’s SU-30 MKIs
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Nov 6/07: India. Issues and rifts may be developing between India and Russia over the FGFA contract, which still lacks key signatories. Defense News reports that key difference include the design’s level of finalization (India wants more input and hasn’t finalized requirements, Russia says the design is final), India’s monetary share (HAL says $2 billion, agreement suggests $5-6 billion), and other issues. The Defense News report does claim that Sukhoi’s secret PAK-FA/ I-21/ T50 design has been selected as the foundation.
The first prototype of the aircraft is reportedly projected to be test-flown by 2015, but the number of aircraft to be built remains among the unsettled issues, and the 2 state-owned firms (Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. & Russia’s Sukhoi Design Bureau) have not signed any agreements yet.
All of these things are solvable by negotiations, of course, but that means the partnership is still effectively in negotiations, rather than a final deal.
Oct 18/07: India and Russia sign an Intergovernmental Agreement for joint development and joint production of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). The agreement was signed in Moscow, Russia at the conclusion of the 7th Meeting of the India- Russia Intergovernmental Commission for Military and Technical Cooperation.
India’s Defence Minister Mr. AK Antony and his Russian counterpart Mr. Anatoly Serdyukov also signed a Protocol which envisages a ‘new strategic relationship’ based on greater interaction at various operational levels. The two countries have agreed to strengthen and expand relations in all areas, especially in the areas of more frequent joint exercises and greater R&D cooperation. Talks with Russia to extend the 2000 Military Cooperation Agreement beyond 2010 have now begun, and Antony also expressed hope that the two countries would soon sign an Intergovernmental Agreement on co-development and co-production of Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MRTA). The India MoD release adds:
“The Defence Minister described the Agreement on FGFA as a ‘major landmark’ and said that the Indo-Russian relationship is on a trajectory to reach new heights. He Mr. Antony expressed satisfaction at the outcome of discussions on other important projects e.g., supply and licensed production of T-90 tanks, SU-30 MKI aircraft and other strategic issues. He admitted that there has been a delay in the delivery of the repaired and refurbished aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov along with supply of deck-based fighter aircraft MiG-29K and said it was decided that some more studies by technical groups would be done to go through the details. He appreciated the efforts made by the Russian side to resolve issues relating to life cycle support of equipment of Russian origin.”
Inter-Governmental Agreement
Aug 29/07: India. India’s MoD issues a familiar release, in response to renewed questions:
“Co-development of a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft has been identified as an important area of cooperation between the Indian and Russian Government. Technical discussions to work out the details are in progress. Efforts are on for finalizing the draft Inter Governmental Agreement in this regard. This information was given by the Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh in a written reply to Shri Gurudas Dasgupta and Shri CK Chandrappan in Lok Sabha today.”
March 1/07: India. “Advanced Combat Aircraft” release from India’s Minister of State for Defence Production Shri Rao Inderjit Singh:
“The co-development of a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft has been identified as an important area of cooperation between the Indian and Russian governments. Technical discussions to work out the details are in progress. Efforts are on for negotiations and finalization of the draft Inter-Governmental Agreement in this regard.”
Dec 10/04: The new fighter’s exterior design is approved. Source.
Russia’s SU-27/30 Flanker family fighters were invented in the 1980s and 1990s, and attempted to incorporate the lessons from America’s 4th generation “teen series” fighters (F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18) into their designs. They were successful, and India’s Air Force may now be flying the world’s second best air superiority fighter in the SU-30MKI. The MKI, and European designs like the Eurofighter, Rafale, and JAS-39 Gripen, are typically referred to as “4+ generation” aircraft.
The term “fifth generation” fighter is part marketing hype, and partly based in reality. There are no objective criteria for this designation, and very few examples, which means it’s mostly applied based on when the development of a front-line, advanced fighter begins. There are a few general constants on the American side: some level of stealth, and internal weapon carriage to maintain it; arrays of embedded sensors within the airframe’s structure, rather than as bolt-ons; and sensor fusion into single displays. On the other hand, level of application varies for each category, and key capabilities like super-maneuverability and supercruise (Mach 1+ without using fuel-guzzling afterburners) have not been constants.
F-22, bays openThe USA’s “5th generation” F-22A Raptor offers full stealth, supermaneuverability, an advanced AESA radar, huge computing power that creates a single “sensor fusion” picture from the plane’s array of embedded sensors and datalinks, and the ability to “supercruise” above Mach 1 instead of just making short supersonic dashes. It is operated by the USAF, and just over 190 aircraft will constitute America’s entire fleet. America has refused to export it, despite interest from very close allies.
To a lesser extent, there’s also the cheaper F-35 Lightning II, with some stealth, a smaller AESA radar, sensor fusion, and even more computing power and sensors embedded around the aircraft. It lacks supercruise or super-maneuverability, and will be produced for domestic use and export in Air Force, Marines/STOVL, and Navy variants.
Russia’s MiG 1.44 (if indeed it was a real project?) and/or “I-21” type aircraft were early attempts to keep up with the Americans, but lack of funds suspended both efforts.
The obvious solution was a foreign partner, but Europe had limited funds, and had invested in its own 4+ generation projects: Dassault’s Rafale, EADS’ Eurofighter, and Sweden’s Gripen. India, on the other hand, has a long-standing defense relationship with Russia, and the funds to pursue advanced projects. From their point of view, a joint development agreement is one way to restrict Russian cooperation with China along similar lines. See Vijiander K Thakur’s “Understanding IAF interest in the MiG fifth generation fighter” for more background.
Until similar aspects of the Russian design became clear, however, it was impossible to know exactly what Russia and India meant by “5th generation.” Some of those ambiguities were resolved when Russia unveiled its T50 demonstrators.
Appendix B: DID Analysis – Under Pressure (2008) The competition?If there’s one watchword to use for this deal, it’s “pressure.” Russia has been putting pressure on India lately to remain a customer, by giving China export rights to jet engines that will power Pakistan’s new fighters, and by working to evict India from its base in Tajikistan. Verbiage concerning deepened strategic cooperation needs to be seen in this light.
The second kind of pressure at work here is the fiscal variety. With the Navy also demanding funds for new ships, submarines and aircraft as India’s geostrategy shifts toward securing the Indian Ocean sea lanes, any additional fighters will face an extremely tight fiscal environment over the next decade and more.
India already faces cost pressures given limited defense budget and pressing need to refurbish its existing fleet, modernize its fighters via the MRCA competition, and bring the Tejas LCA on line to replace its MiG-21s. Not to mention adding new platforms to patrol India’s vital sea lanes, fulfill naval fighter needs, upgrade its transport aircraft fleet, and extend the IAF’s reach. Meanwhile, India’s SU-30MKIs remain one of the best 4th generation aircraft in the world, with a comfortable edge over regional rivals, good growth prospects, and superiority over most current and planned US aircraft as well.
SU-30MK2s, ChinaThen there’s pressure in future, as the strategic agreement lays the foundations for something of a dilemma down the road. There are no real guarantees when dealing with Russia, only its interests of the moment and the logic of cash. Any fighter whose R&D is partly underwritten by India can easily be sold to China later on if relations turn sour, or if India does not buy enough aircraft to make exclusivity worthwhile from Russia’s point of view. One might think that this would be counterbalanced somewhat by Russian wariness about giving a potential rival its best technology, but past experience shows that even this will be for sale. China’s real military budget is about 4-5 times India’s according to most credible estimates, and is likely to remain so.
Given the amount of Russian equipment in India’s military, and the limitations of defense budgets in a democracy that prevent a massive “throw-out and re-equip” exercise, India’s options for retaliation would be very limited.
India faces high hurdles to retaining future exclusivity – and is handing a potent lever to Russia for future “negotiations” involving Russian armaments.
Additional Readings Background: PAK-FAThe development of Saab’s fighter-bomber:
Iran’s S-300 spotted at the Fordow nuclear facility:
When Russia committed to a multi-year buy of Mi-28 attack helicopters in 2006, it appeared that the Mil design bureau’s Mi-28 (NATO code: Havoc) had eclipsed Kamov’s more radical Ka-50 (NATO code: Hokum) as Russia’s future attack helicopter. A critical loss in Turkey’s attack helicopter competition, and conflicting promises concerning the Kamov machine’s future in Russia, left the platform’s very future in doubt. Russia’s 2005 defense budget, for instance, was supposed to include 12 Ka-50 helicopters – until that funding was cut.
Fortunately for the VVS, growing Russian natural resource revenues, and the accompanying growth in Russian defense budgets, are creating new options. So, too, is a major investment in modernizing its manufacturers, which has put the Ka-52 into production.
By 2009, just a handful of coaxial, single-seat Ka-50’s had been delivered to the Army Aviation Training and Conversion Unit at Torzhok. Some even saw action in Chechnya, where their high cruising speed (300 km/h), protection, and ability to carry either armaments or fuel tanks gained them respect as scout/ attack/ command helicopters.
Many countries would consider that an odd combination, but it works quite well with Russian doctrines that emphasize durable combat punch for scouts, and central on-site direction of all combat aviation.
The Ka-52 “Alligator” is a 2-seat version of the Ka-50, using a side by side layout common to transport helicopters instead of the front-and-rear layout common in attack helicopters. This changes the helicopter’s aerodynamics somewhat, reducing maximum speed from 310 km/h to 300 km/h (192 – 186 mph), and increasing fuel consumption slightly. On the other hand, this change is expected to make it easier for the helicopter crew to perform battlefield observation and coordination roles. The extra crewman in the Ka-52 forced some reductions in fuel, armoring, and gun ammunition; it carries 240 rounds for its fuselage-mounted 2A42 30mm cannon, instead of 470 in the Ka-50.
Even so, the Alligator’s main rival isn’t the Ka-50, it’s the more conventional Mi-28N attack helicopter that Russia is also buying. Based on published materials, photos, and several Russian sources, we’ve compiled a side-by-side comparison that also includes Boeing’s current AH-64D Apache Longbow as a reference point, and normalizes measurements to the same units:
Ka-52KNote that the Ka-52’s operational sensor fit is somewhat unclear, and a range of options have been tried that are not always present in photos. A nose turret can hold a laser range-finder and infrared sights, a small ball under the fuselage can hold optical sights, a FLIR system can supposedly be integrated with Zenit’s Shkval electro-optical sighting system in a ball mounted on top of the fuselage aft of the canopy, and mast-mounted sights have been reported. What is certain is that an effective modern scout helicopter requires a combination of zoom and infrared/FLIR cameras, and lasers capable of rangefinding or target designation. The most advanced helicopters add millimeter-wave radars, creating additional options in uncooperative weather, improving their awareness of what’s going on in the airspace around them, and providing targeting options for some missiles. A 2013 deal with French optronics leader Sagem (q.v. Aug 28/13 entry, below) may begin to add more clarity on this front.
The Ka-52K is a naval variant that will operate from Russia’s Vladivostok Class amphibious/air assault LHD ships. It adds folding rotors and folding stub wings, but not the folding tail found in some naval helicopters. A maritime radar in the nose has been mentioned, possibly a “mirror” radar that combines 2 bands for surface scanning and long-range search. So has the ability to carry Kh-35 medium-range anti-ship missiles, or even supersonic Kh-31s. Improved corrosion resistance is also a standard feature for naval helicopter variants, and the question is how far the Russians will go.
A Turkish-specific, NATO-compatible variant of the Ka-52 called the Erdogan was developed in cooperation with Israel’s IAI to compete in Turkey’s attack helicopter competition, but lost to Italy’s AW129T Mongoose.
Contracts and Key Events 2015 – 2016Export Contract Paris Air Show
September 7/16: Russia’s Izvestia reported that during a recent meeting between Egyptian and Russian defense ministers, both sides agreed to proceed with the training of Egyptian pilots on flying the Ka-52K naval attack helicopter. It’s believed that Egypt will now go back and formulate what training requirements are needed for the pilots. The attack helicopters will go toward operations tackling jihadists in the Sinai desert.
August 10/16: Navalized versions of the Ka-52K are to be installed with a compact active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. The radar operates in dual-band millimetric and centimetric wavelengths which allows the Ka-52K to detect large naval targets up to a range of 180 km. Initially developed for French-built Mistral-class vessels, the sale was cancelled by France after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The helicopters already built are likely to be added to the air wing of the Project 11435 Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier.
July 20/16: Russia’s latest KA-52K Katran helicopters are to be tested in the field during upcoming military action in Syria. The helicopters will be on board the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and will join the Syrian campaign from October 2016 to January 2017. Reasoning behind the deployment, according to Viktor Murakhovsky of Arsenal Otechestva magazine, is that it “is a test of the operational and technical capacity and ability of our air carrier strike group, since previously Russia has never used air carriers in real combat conditions.”
January 4/16: A deal has been reached which will see Egypt acquire forty-six of a navalized variant of the Ka-52 Alligator helicopter. The Ka-52K was developed to operate on the French manufactured Mistral class helicopter carrier that had been initially ordered for the Russian Navy. The $1.28 billion order went south amid sanctions placed on Russia over Ukraine in 2014. Egypt became the alternative purchaser of the warships after signing contracts in October so the acquisition of the helicopters originally developed for it is not surprising.
December 29/15: Egypt is to receive the President-S missile Approach warning system according to an official from the Russian Radioelectronic Technologies Group (KRET). Contracts for the purchase are currently being drafted with delivery of the system due to commence in the near future. The President-S system will provide protection to both military and civilian aircraft and helicopters from airborne missile threats, as well as those launched from ground and sea based defense systems. It can destroy and suppress the optical homing warheads of air and anti-aircraft missiles, including the homing warheads of man-portable air defense missile systems. The purchase of the system coincides with the procurement 50 Ka-52 reconnaissance and attack helicopters, with deliveries to be carried out between 2016-2018.
September 25/15: Egypt has signed an agreement for fifty Russian attack helicopters, seemingly confirming reports from August which indicated that the country would receive around fifty helicopters by 2019. The Egyptians are thought to be buying the navalized Ka-52K version of the Alligator scout/attack helicopter, most likely those intended to equip the Russian Mistral LHDs now also destined for Egypt following a contract earlier this week.
September 1/15: The Ka-52 helicopter export contract mentioned back in June at the Paris Air Show appears to involve Egypt’s acquisition of 50 of the attack helicopters.
2013 – 2014Production and delivery; French optronics coming.
Ka-52 “Alligator”
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Aug 5/14: +32. IHS Jane’s reports that Russia has ordered its 32 Ka-52K helicopters for use with its Vladivostok Class LHDs. The order isn’t a surprise (q.v. Oct 9/13, June 24/14), it was just a question of when the contract would be placed:
“Speaking to IHS Jane’s, a Russian defence industry source stated that the order included 32 Ka-52K helicopters. These will be built by Progress Aresenyev Aviation Company ‘Nikolai Sazykin’, a subsidiary of Russian Helicopters.”
Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Russia orders Ka-52K helicopters for Mistral-class LHDs”.
32 Ka-52Ks
Aug 4-5/14: Rostec subsidiary Russian Helicopters showcases its new military helicopter models at the Defence Ministry’s Innovation Day exhibition in the suburbs of Moscow. Displayed helicopters include the Ka-52K naval scout/attack helicopter, Mi-8AMTSh-VA armed transport helicopter optimized for polar regions, the upgraded Mi-26T2 super heavy-lift helicopter, and the Mi-38 successor to existing Mi-8/Mi-17 models. Sources: Russian Helicopters JSC, “Russian Helicopters presents new military helicopters at the Defence Ministry’s Innovation Day exhibition”.
June 24/14: During an inspection tour at Progress aircraft manufacturing company in Arsenyevsk, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yury Borisov offers a production update:
“The plant is in a stable position and has a long-term contract on the delivery of 146 Ka-52 Alligator helicopters for the period up to 2020. Further plans include [the sale of] 32 ship-based helicopters…. Navy is expecting Ka-52 helicopters, which will be placed on board the Mistral-type ships currently under construction…. We paid great attention to import replacement issues, including as far as components received from Ukraine as concerned. These issues are not critical. They can be resolved quite painlessly.”
That last bit is especially important after Russia cut off its Ukranian supply chain by invading and annexing Crimea, then militarily supporting guerrilla movements that are trying to annex Eastern Ukraine as well. Sources: Voice of Russia, “Russian Defense Ministry plans to buy 32 Ka-52K helicopters for Mistral ships.
Dec 25/13: 2013 production. During a visit to Russian Helicopters’ Progress Arsenyev Aviation Company production plant, Lt. Gen. Victor Bondarev thanks them for producing 14 Ka-52s on schedule in 2013, as part of overall Russian deliveries of over 100 helicopters. Sources: Interfax/AVN, “Russian Air Force took delivery of over 100 new rotorcraft in 2013”.
Oct 9/13: Ka-52K. RIA Novosti quotes “a Deputy Defense Minister” as saying that Russia plans to order 32 Ka-52Ks, conditional on successful final helicopter testing in 2014.
That could become a tight schedule, since the Russian Navy is expected to take delivery of its 1st LHD in November 2015, and the Ka-52 will need some flying and testing time before it’s ready for service. Even if Russian Helicopters’ Progress Arsenyev division delivers 6 helicopters just a year after the order, the Vladivostok wouldn’t have anything like an operational Ka-52K wing for many months after delivery at least. It would appear that the new ship design and its key helicopters will be conducting their break-in period together, which has a way of making everything more difficult. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Russian Defense Ministry to Order 32 Shipborne Helicopters in 2014 – Official”.
Aug 28/13: Partnership. At MAKS 2013, Kamov and France’s Sagem Defense announce a partnership to add Sagem’s optronics and [the Franco-Russian] LINS 100 inertial navigation systems to the Ka-52, “which will address a requirement expressed by several countries… [the partners] plan to start integration of a new optronic system in early 2014.” The release specifically mentions leveraging Sagem’s experience as the supplier of the roof-mounted Strix surveillance and targeting turret on Airbus Helicopter’s EC655 Tiger HAP/ARH/HAD scout and attack helicopters.
So much for the direct information. What this release says indirectly, is that the Ka-52’s surveillance and targeting systems have been a hindrance to international sales, and need improvement. Otherwise, the outstanding requirement(s) would be addressed already. Sources: Sagem re: Strix | Sagem DS Aug 28/13 release.
Feb 22/13: RIA Novosti reports that the Southern Military District has received its 1st batch of Ka-52s, and is scheduled to start operations in March. RIA.ru [in Russian].
2011 – 2012Full-rate production contract; Navalized Ka-52K confirmed; Crash.
Ka-52 “Alligator”
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Aug 9/12: Ka-52K changes. Oboronprom confirms that Russia will build the navalized Ka-52K Alligator helicopter for its new Vladivostok Class amphibious ships, which also prompts speculation about the design changes involved. Past displays have shown folding rotor blades, folding wings, and the standard anti-corrosion treatments.
Navy Recognition says that the Ka-52K will also include a modified version of the MiG-35 fighter’s Zhuk-A AESA radar in the nose section, and will be able to carry Kh-31 Krypton or Kh-35 Kayak anti-ship missiles. Those missiles weigh in at over 600 kg/ 1,300 pounds each, however, which could make them challenging weapons for the helicopter to carry. It’s within the limits, but testing will tell. The level of Russian interest of these missiles was regarded as unconfirmed by the people we talked to.
Subsequent research indicates that the AESA radar was a contractor offer from Phazotron, not a military requirement. It would be useful, but it would also be expensive. The importance of Russia’s Vladivostok Class ships may justify that, but word is that Phazotron has a cheaper back-up upgrade offer: a more conventional dual-band phased array radar, with frequencies optimized for closer ground scans and long-range surface (naval) scans. Sources: Navy Recognition, “Special version of Ka-52K Helicopter with advanced radar and antiship missiles for Russian Mistral” | Voice of Russia, Russia to build helicopters for Mistral carriers” | DID interviews and discussions.
June 2012: Take-off magazine covers the Ka-52, and offers some production and deployment information:
“In May 2011, the delivery started to Chernigovka air base in the Russian Far East, where the Russian Air Force had activated its first full-ledged 12-ship Ka-52 air squadron by the end of the year. In 2012, Chernigovka air base took delivery at least five more Ka-52s. In addition, five new Ka-52s built by Progress by late 2011 were fielded with CTCC in Torzhok early in 2012.
Overall, over 20 production-standard Ka-52s were manufactured in the town of Arsenyev during 2012. 16 of them were fielded earlier this year with a second RusAF airbase, the one in Korenovsk, Krasnodar Territory. Their final assembly and check flights prior to the delivery to the air base had been handled by Rostvertol JSC, to which premises they had been brought in semi-assembled from Aresenyev-based manufacturing plant by RusAF airlifters.”
March 14/12: A Lenta report implies that the September 2011 contract reports may have referred to a multi-year contract aimed specifically at Ka-52 helicopters. From the Rus Navy translation:
“In 2011, Russian defense ministry tied a number of long-term aircraft procurement contracts; under one of them, the ministry purchased 140 attack helicopters Ka-52 Alligator, director of Oboronprom corporation Andrei Reus told Kommersant. Reus did not specify details of the contract only saying that “conditions were acceptable”.”
March 13/12: A Ka-52 crash, during a training exercise in the Tver region NW of Moscow, kills both pilots. It seems that the type’s unique ejection seats either didn’t save them, or weren’t triggered. While this is the 1st Ka-52 crash, there had been 2 crashes of the related Ka-50. Pravda | RTT News.
Crash
Sept 7/11: RIA Novosti offers a video tour of the Ka-52 factory, and says:
“In the next ten years, Russia’s Air Force will adopt 140 Ka-52 helicopters, a model better known as the Alligator. Dmitry Petrov, general director of the holding company Russian Helicopters, commented on a major contract that the aircraft manufacturer signed with the Ministry of Defense. Petrov spoke during a guided tour of Progress, the helicopter factory at Arsenyev, Primorye Territory, where the Alligators are assembled.”
While the report implies that the recent contract is entirely focused on Ka-52s, it should be taken with some caution. Russian Helicopters produces a wide variety of types. It is possible that the attribution could be a reporter error, or even a translation issue.
Sept 3/11: While discussing a $4+ billion Russian contract with state-controlled Oboronprom for 140 military helicopters by 2020 (no type breakdown), General Director Andrey Reus confirms that the 1st navalized Ka-52K Alligator attack/scout helicopter shipment for use on Russia’s new Mistral LHDs will finish by the end of 2012. RIA Novosti | Voice of Russia.
Ka-52 contract?
Feb 9/11: Itar-Tass reports that Russia will use 2 of the pending Mistral amphibious landing ships in the Pacific Fleet, including protecting the South Kurile Islands, which are disputed territory with Japan. As for the ships’ complement and design, Helicopters of Russia Holding Company Deputy Director-General Andrei Shibitov says that:
“Ship versions of the Ka-27K, Ka-29K and Ka-52K helicopters will be used. Their number on each ship will be determined by the Defence Ministry.”
Another Russian official states that using those coaxial rotor helicopters will require a slight elevation of the ship’s deck, to ensure enough clearance height in the hangars.
Jan 2/11: Buy in. Russian Defense Ministry official spokesman Col. Vladimir Drik says that they plan to start buying Ka-52 Alligator helicopters for the VVS (Air Force) in 2011. RIA Novosti.
2008 – 2010Dec 7/09: Industrial. Russian Helicopters JSC, which includes the Kamov, Mil, and Kazan design bureaus, announces a combined public and private investment of RUB 6 billion (about $200 million) to modernize manufacturing at the Arsenyev Aviation Company Progress plant, which makes the Ka-52. The “full scale technical overhaul” will take place from 2009-2015, and will improve production of the Ka-50 Black Shark and Ka-52 Alligator scout/attack helicopters, the new Ka-60/62 medium helicopter, and the new Mi-34C2 Peregrine light helicopter.
The first stage will overhaul foundry operations at Progress, beginning with a foundry production competence centre that is expected to open in early 2010. It will be followed by reconstruction and re-equipment of the composite and mechanical engineering sections with advanced control machinery that will reduce required space and personnel, an energy efficiency program, a “machine-working competence centre,” and the “introduction of modern digital and information technologies”. When discussing Phase 2 benefits, the firm points to the September 2008 introduction of the TruLaser 3530 laser cutting machine, which led to a saving of RUB 14.7 million (around $500,000) over 12 months with an 8-fold drop in labor intensity. The total economic impact of introducing new production machinery is expected to be as high as RUB 160 million ($5.3 million) initially, alongside RUB 40 million ($1.3 million) from installing cold solidifying mixture lines and low-pressure casting machines.
More investments may follow. These investments are being made pursuant to a wider Russian federal program titled “The development of the defense industrial complex of the Russian Federation in the years 2011-2020,” and Russian Helicopters COO Andrei Shibitov says that up to 70% of the Russian helicopter industry’s equipment is worn out.
Nov 27/09: During the FS Mistral’s visit to St. Petersburg, Russia, the amphibious assault ship holds a “cross deck” exercise with Russian Navy helicopters. They include landings by a Ka-29 utility helicopter with a French officer on board, as well as landings using a Ka-27 Helix anti submarine warfare helicopter and the first deck landing for the Ka-52 scout/attack helicopter, which also simulates a refueling on the flight deck. French Navy [in French] | DID: “Russia to Order French Mistral LHDs?.”
FS Mistral landings
Dec 26/08: RIA Novosti reports that the Russian government has approved the production of Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopters. They will be built at the Arsenyevsk plant, in the country’s Far East. Deliveries of the first 12 Ka-52s to the Russian Air Force will reportedly begin in 2009.
Approved
Nov 9/08: Various media reports now quote Russian Air Force chief Colonel-General Alexander Zelin, who says they will place a 2009 order for 12 Ka-52 “Alligator” helicopters, subject to successful completion of mandated testing. Col.-Gen. Zelin stresses that this is not a substitute for the Mi-28s, which are expected to begin arriving in 2009.
Meanwhile, Kamov indicates that they have been given the go-ahead for “full production,” and hope to complete 30 helicopters for Russia by 2012 while pursuing export orders. Avio News | Frontier India | RIA Novosti
Nov 10/08: Moscow News’ “Russian choppers on top” reports that the industry is being restructured, much as Russia has centralized the fixed-wing aircraft industry into the state-owned United Aircraft Corp.:
“But the industry has its specifics, Mikhail Kazachkov from the Helicopter Industry Association told RIA Novosti in an interview. Its bane is the lengthy production time: an idea to finished product takes, on average, 12 years. The authorities have decided to restructure the helicopter industry, to optimize its cash flows and make it more competitive. For that purpose they brought its separate branches under one umbrella, called Helicopters of Russia.”
Additional Readings The Ka-52A CH-47 Chinook assisting an Apache stuck in a muddy Texas field :
Explosion of SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket:
The US military’s long run of unquestioned air superiority has led to shortcuts in mobile land-based air defenses, and the US Marines are no exception. A December 2005 release from Sen. Schumer’s office [D-NY] said that:
“Current radar performance does not meet operational forces requirements… consequences could potentially allow opposing forces to gain air and ground superiority in future operational areas.”
One of the programs in the works to address this gap is the AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR mobile radar system. It’s actually the result of fusing 2 programs: the Multi-Role Radar System (MRRS), and Ground Weapons Locator Radar (GWLR) requirements. When the last G/ATOR software upgrade becomes operational, it will replace and consolidate numerous legacy radars, including the AN/TPS-63 air surveillance, AN/MPQ-62 force control, AN/TPS-73 air traffic control, AN/UPS-3 air defense, and AN/TPQ-36/37 artillery tracking & locating radar systems.
G/ATOR systems were supposed to be transportable in C-130 Hercules tactical transport aircraft, and by MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotors (underslung), CH-53 heavy helicopters (underslung or internal), or CH-47 heavy lift helicopters (underslung or internal). That’s still sort of true.
The radars themselves were originally slated be mounted on HMMWV jeeps, which would have fit all of these requirements. Issues with weight and protection eventually pushed the Marines to abandon the system’s 3-jeep model, and to make the radar itself a towable trailer.
My ride’s here…The system can still be carried in a single C-130, and consists of: (1) a Radar Equipment Group trailer, (2) a Power Equipment Group 60kW generator in an ISO container, and (3) a Communication Equipment Group mounted on a HMMWV. The PEG container will usually be mounted on an MTVR truck, which will also tow the REG trailer. The USMC will also have the option of leaving the truck behind, and airlifting the radar trailer, power container, and C2 HMMWV in 3 separate CH-53 helicopter or MV-22 tilt-rotor loads.
Flexible Fielding: G/ATOR Increments Incoming…The AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR is intended to be a software-based radar. This idea has become common for radios, and many fighter radars offer a number of different modes (air scan, ground looking SAR maps, etc.) via software. The idea for G/ATOR is similar: common hardware that can switch in the field from air traffic control, to aerial volume search and targeting, to artillery counterfire tracking. Northrop Grumman says that some specific switches would require a radar shutdown and restart as the new software is loaded.
This kind of flexibility also lets the USMC field the radar, then add new capabilities via 3 blocks of upgrades:
Initial Increment I/ Block 1 – in testing. supports 2 distinct mission areas: Short range air defense, and air surveillance in tactical air operations centers (TAOC), including baseline IFF (identification, friend or foe). It replaces the AN/UPS-3, AN/MPQ-62, and AN/TPS-63 radar systems. G/ATOR program manager Capt. Lee Bond (USN, ret.) explains one of the advantages it offers:
“There are threats out there today – like small hovering UAVs – that were not envisioned when our legacy radars were developed and fielded a generation ago. So the performance of our legacy radars against those emergent threats on the modern battlefield is spotty at best. The smaller and slower the target gets and the lower to the ground it flies, the trickier it is for the traditional radar to find it. G/ATOR absolutely wipes out those limitations and gives you complete situational awareness of everything in the sky.”
Increment I engineering will allow growth to accommodate all following increments without equipment re-design, and will provide an open architecture that makes it easier to upgrade the computers, computer programs, and firmware in all subsequent increments. Its development phase was supposed to end at the end of April, 2012, but Milestone C approval didn’t come until January 2014.
Increment II/ Block 2 – development underway. will address the Marine Expeditionary Force counter fire/targeting missions, adding ground counter-battery and target acquisition against enemy mortars, rockets, or artillery. It replaces the AN/TPQ-46 radar system.
The baseline requirements remain, and the Marines have added program R&D funding to investigate the potential for additional capabilities within this area.
Increment III – planning only. This set of improvements will actually come after IV. It adds tactical enhancements for the air mission, including decoy/electronic counter-counter measures capabilities, electronic protection equipment and software, sensor netting, an advanced radar environmental simulator (RES), and a logistics integrated data environment (IDE, a computer system for managing and monitoring fleet health, spares supply, maintenance instructions, etc.). “Non-cooperative target recognition” capabilities are very useful for identifying enemies, and they’re even more useful if a Marine Corps Hornet’s IFF system has a problem on the way back in.
There’s no firm timeline for Increment III yet, and its components could change. Future plans involve sensor netting and integration with the USMC’s shoulder-fired Stinger air defense missiles, or their successors.
Increment IV/ Block 4 – RFI out. will add an air traffic control (ATC) capability, which is extremely useful in disaster relief situations like Haiti. IFF Mode 5/S capability has also been moved here. The baseline requirements remain, and the Marines have added program funding to investigate the potential for additional capabilities in this area.
Development will come before Increment III. Existing radars and software for this task are already well-understood, so this was seen as a safer step with a quick payoff. 2015 is the target for development to begin, with late 2018 or 2019 the target for entering service. It will replace the AN/TPS-73 radar system.
The G/ATOR ProgramAt present, the Marine Corps’ Approved Acquisition Objective is a total of 45 G/ATOR systems, about a 30% drop from the 2005 baseline of 64 systems. The Marines had wanted 81 systems before G/ATOR became a formal program.
G/ATOR began in 2007, and has left the System Design and Development (SDD/EMD) Phase to begin low-rate production. Formal government developmental testing (DT) is underway. Initial DT1B1, DT1B2, and DT1B3 phases have been completed at Wallops Island, VA, and Yuma Proving Grounds, AZ.
Tactically, the TPS-80 G/ATOR will fit below the USMC’s existing AN/TPS-59 long-range radars, offering less range, but finer detail within its scan radius. An evolved version may even replace the USMC’s longer-range radars, under the joint service 3DELRR (“3-dealer”) program, though the initial 2014 award went to a Raytheon offering before GAO challenges were filed.
G/ATOR TPS-80: Technology Challenges Now: TPS-63Once all of these increments are implemented, AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR will use its active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology to provide aircraft detection, tracking, and engagement; cruise-missile detection and engagement; ground-weapon location; and military air-traffic control – all in one package.
Radars are all about time & energy management. That has traditionally involved electronic hardware, but these days it relies more on software: marshaling and directing the energies required, placing them high or low as needed, emitting signals at precise times to shape them. The electronics and software must collect and analyze the results, in order to create the right kind of “complete” picture. G/ATOR’s various tasks have very different, even contradictory time/energy requirements. Fulfilling those tasks would require a radar that offered new levels of flexibility.
Both the Marines and Northrop Grumman acknowledged the challenges up front. It has been treated as a technologically difficult program since its inception in 2007.
Making G/ATOR thinkable APG-81 test mountA trio of technology developments made G/ATOR thinkable.
The 1st was a growing trend toward active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, which are composed of thousands of individual solid state transmit/receive modules that can operate individually or in assigned groups. In addition to the flexibility they offer, AESA radars have smaller sidelobes beyond the main beam focus, which helps to reduce false alarms for applications like counterfire targeting.
The 2nd trend is the growing dominance of software over hardware, especially in controlling and interpreting information from AESA-type radars. Northrop Grumman already had experience implementing different modes in its AESA fighter radars, including a project to turn them into high-bandwidth communications relays.
In G/ATOR’s case, the connection was very direct. Northrop Grumman personnel have confirmed that the F-35 fighter’s AN/APG-81 radar technologies were adapted for use in G/ATOR, and that it will use the APG-81 facility and production line.
The 3rd trend is Moore’s Law, which makes an exponentially-increasing level of computing power available to control radar systems and analyze their returns.
These advances make G/ATOR thinkable, but actually developing it requires very advanced engineering expertise. This is especially true when the radar in question will face the kinds of ground environments and general unpleasantness associated with the US Marines, as opposed to clean air force maintenance hangars and navy decks.
Northrop Grumman’s management made a decision that the benefits of a successful program justified a significant corporate commitment, and gave the program access to top talent within the firm. Now, all they had to do was execute.
Execution, Without Dying The new G/ATOREvery program encounters engineering and financial challenges, and G/ATOR has been no exception.
Creating a radar that can do all of these things, while taking Marine Corps level abuse, required new engineering. To offer just a few examples:
Weight. The ability to take Marine Corps level abuse also requires survivability. Which meant extra weight. The program’s shift away from 3 unarmored and integrated HMMWVs to a “MTVR truck + trailer + HMMWV” configuration cost the development team about a year for re-design, refining, and approval.
Temperature. G/ATOR is designed to operate in ambient temperatures of -40 to +55 degrees Centigrade, and must keep its electronics at a common temperature to avoid data errors. Instead of using heavy 2-stage cooling systems, however, the radar uses forced circulation from fans blowing ambient uncooled air through the array. As a side-benefit, that made the radar lighter.
Scope. These basic design challenges were exacerbated by scope increases, as potential flexibility became thinkable and then real. This is exciting, because new capabilities create additional growth opportunities, and new potential uses. On the other hand, it’s also taxing to a design team already challenged by the core project.
Upgradeability. Then there’s the double-edged sword that is Moore’s Law of geometrically expanding processor chip power.
If a chip is obsolete in 5 years, and may not be produced at all in 10, but the radar must last 30 years, what is one to do? One option is to switch to a processor with 100% more growth capacity early in the project. Given Moore’s Law, that only buys you about 5 more years, maybe 10 at the most. The US military’s growing insistence on open systems architectures and modularity (OSA/ MOSA) will help make future swap-ins easier, but OSA/MOSA implementations are not created equal. Engineering design quality is the difference, which takes time.
Gallium Nitride. Quality engineering also opens new doors, because base technology matters. Thinning air for the generator’s carburetor currently pushes the TPS-80’s PEG below its full 60 kW power output at altitude. Back in 2007, the US military was near the beginning of its efforts to use Gallium Nitride (GaN) as a more efficient semiconductor material. More efficiency equals better performance, so the promise was clear, but the development risks weren’t. In response, the program stuck with conventional Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) electronics, but conducted studies and planned for a switch down the road.
Those studies showed that GaN circuits could draw just 50 kW for full radar power, allowing full effectiveness at 10,000 feet or beyond. Higher altitude naturally improves a radar’s field of view, and is a defining feature in places like Afghanistan, so the tactical impact is significant.
By 2012, research had made considerable advances thanks to investments by DARPA, the US Army, the USAF, and defense firms. The USMC kept its promise to set aside funds for the GaN switch, and USAF development dollars from the 3DELRR program built on good engineering and early planning to help complete the shift. In late FY 2013, the G/ATOR program office began the technology switch from to GaN.
Not cheap.Finally, there’s the financial end.
On the bad news front, the deliberate devaluation of the US dollar pushed a huge rise in gold’s American dollar price from 2007, which has backed off somewhat for now. Gold’s rise has been the subject of many reports, but few link that to gold’s industrial use in the kinds of high-fidelity connectors needed by a radar’s advanced electronics.
On the good news front, G/ATOR has made enough progress that it’s attracting interest in early deployment. That can be dangerous to a program, because the system will still have gaps, which can be exploited by politicians as an excuse to remove funding. The G/ATOR team has had to think hard about this, and one of their conclusions was that they could leverage Urgent Operational Requirements to finish the production program 3 years early. Faster replacement means less money spent maintaining earlier radars, which aren’t in ideal shape. It would also cut 3 years of variable costs out of production.
The current trend is to stretch defense programs out into costlier timelines, in order to save a bit of money each year. Events get a vote, however, and it remains to be seen whether G/ATOR manages to buck the general trend.
G/ATOR TPS-80: Industrial PartnersIndustrial partners for the G/ATOR TPS-80 program include:
G/ATOR began with the Marines, but its team doesn’t expect it to stay there.
When their Highly Expeditionary Long-Range Surveillance Radar program fell victim to budget constraints, the Marines joined the USAF’s 3DELRR air and ballistic missile defense program. In a 2012 interview, G/ATOR program manager Capt. Lee Bond said that G/ATOR’s scope would provide 85% of 3DELRR’s specifications, with the additional capabilities from increments II & IV thrown in for free. He believes that using G/ATOR as a base could cut 2 years from development time, and lower costs by 20% due to economies of scale. Northrop Grumman has openly stated their intent to pursue this path.
Bond also believes that G/ATOR would exceed the expected specifications for the US Army’s coming Multi-Mission Radar solicitation, depending on how the Army defines “simultaneous” multi-mission capability.
Northrop Grumman remains interested in future naval applications, which could lead to scaled G/ATOR technologies equipping smaller ships like the USA’s Littoral Combat Ships, or being incorporated into emerging multi-band radar naval arrays like AMDR. Northrop Grumman will say only that they’re looking at naval applications, and a November 2013 ONR study will look at replacing many of the US Navy’s older air surveillance radars with a G/ATOR derivative.
Then, there are foreign buys. The USA isn’t the only country worried about finding a very different set of targets on modern battlefields, or needing high-performance artillery-tracking radars for deployments abroad. Budget cuts in some countries make multi-mission radars attractive, and Northrop Grumman’s experience has been that ground-based radar exports have been worth 2.0x – 2.5x the value of American orders.
Official expressions of interest aren’t possible until a new system is cleared for those discussions, but Northrop Grumman says that they’ve receive a number of unofficial expressions of interest. Once G/ATOR passes Milestone C and can move into Low-Rate Initial Production, the USMC will be freer to respond to official inquiries from foreign governments. That happened in January 2014.
TPQ-53 on truckNorthrop Grumman’s competitors haven’t been idle, of course. Lockheed Martin is busy introducing its new AN/TPQ-53 counter-battery radar, while Raytheon has its MPQ-64 Improved Sentinel series of air defense radars. Abroad, Saab’s Giraffe series of land and sea radars already fuses air surveillance and counter-battery targeting, and their Giraffe 4A is designed as a next-generation capability with the same capabilities as G/ATOR Block 2. All of these radars can also take advantage of new technologies, and some variants offer features within G/ATOR’s proposed set.
On the other hand, the TPS-53 grew out of an Army RFP that optimized its architecture for the counter-battery mission, making future additions and changes more difficult. The MPQ-64 Sentinel is a widely-used air defense radar, but its parameters re: range, elevation angle, power, etc. create their own limitations. Both competitors are likely to see continued improvement, but G/ATOR’s level of back-end integration remains unique, and its architecture is likely to give it rate-of-improvement advantages per dollar spent. To date, the TPS-80 G/ATOR remains the only Pentagon JROC-approved program that has funded integration of all of these capabilities into 1 system.
Contracts & Key EventsUnless otherwise noted, US Marine Corps Systems Command in Quantico, VA issues all contracts to Northrop Grumman’s Electronic Systems unit in Linthicum Heights, MD.
FY 2014 – 2016LRIP contracts begin; Tracking works well, but TPS-80 has reliability issues; 3DELRR loss is appealed; Contract to examine TPS-80 as a ship radar; G/ATOR to get BMD capability?
Oorah!
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September 2/16: Northrop Grumman has been awarded a $375 million Navy contract for procurement of the Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) system. Due for completion in 2020, the contract will cover nine G/ATOR low-rate initial production systems. G/ATOR provides a highly mobile, multi-mission radar system designed to support global expeditionary requirements and offers multi-faceted detection and tracking capabilities to engage a range of hostile threats while providing robust air traffic control.
Nov 3/14: USMC Plan. The USMC’s Aviation Plan to 2030 deals with radars as well. G/ATOR may have lost the 3DELRR competition for now (q.v. Oct 21-22/14), but it might gain a ballistic missile defense capability anyway:
“TPS-80 Block III is not a formal acquisition program, but consists of software developments that will enhance the radar’s performance and capabilities. Threats will continue to evolve over the course of the radar’s lifecycle and maintaining currency to detect emerging threats will remain a priority…. These software upgrades may include but are not limited to, Non-Cooperative Targeting Recognition (NCTR), Electronic Protection (EP) and Theatre Ballistic Missile (TBM) Tracking.”
If the USMC does go ahead with Increment III, they’ll have some interesting choices to make. Sources: USMC, Marine Aviation Plan 2015 [PDF].
Oct 23/14: A $207.3 million contract modification for 4 G/ATOR low-rate initial production systems, including operating spares, contractor engineering services and support, developmental and operational test support, and transition to production. $175.6 million is committed immediately, using FY 2013 and 2014 USMC RDT&E and Procurement funds; $94.7 million will expire on Sept 30/15.
Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, Maryland (55%); East Syracuse, NY (24%); Stafford Springs, CT (5%); San Diego, CA (5%); Big Lake, MN (3%); Londonderry, NH (2%); High Point, North Carolina (2%); Wallingford Center, CT (2%); Camarillo, CA (1%); and Woodbridge, IL (1%), and is expected to be complete by October 2017 (M67854-07-C-2072).
4 LRIP radars
Oct 21-22/14: GAO PRotests. The USAF confirms that Northrop Grumman has formally issued a protest against the USAF’s 3DELRR award to Raytheon. The next day, Lockheed Martin confirms that they are also filing a protest.
That halts the program until the challenge receives a ruling, which could take up to 100 days. In order to succeed, the challengers need to show that either Raytheon’s radar isn’t technically acceptable, that it wasn’t the lowest priced – or that something in the process went awry, ensuring that that competitors were treated differently or criteria weren’t applied fairly. Sources: See DID’s GAO Primer | Defense News, “Northrop Challenges 3DELRR Contract Award” | Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Lockheed Martin challenges contract to Raytheon”.
Oct 6/14: Raytheon wins. Raytheon is on quite the radar streak lately, adding the USAF’s 3DELRR area air and missile defense radar to its naval AMDR win.
3DELRR loss, and appeal
March 31/14: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2013, plus time to compile and publish. Our program dashboard has been updated accordingly. G/ATOR technologies are mature and its design is stable and demonstrated, but its production processes are not yet mature. Fortunately, the performance-boosting GaN technology for the T/R modules is maturing on schedule. Unfortunately, G/ATOR has a number of issues with system startup, random crashes, operator control console freezes, and an unstable command and control interface (q.v. Jan 28/14). In response:
“The G/ATOR program office has put together a plan to incorporate software fixes to correct system start up and prevent crashes. Some hardware alterations may be required. The program office plans to increase and improve system performance by upgrading the software integration lab to support accelerated testing and conducting field testing with users every six months to demonstrate reliability growth and operational relevance….
The program is authorized to procure 57 G/ATOR systems; however, only 45 were funded in the fiscal year 2014 President’s budget. According to the program office, the 12 unfunded G/ATOR systems will require funding by fiscal year 2016 in order to meet initial operational capability…. In addition, the concurrent development and production of G/ATOR may be adversely affected by personnel shortages caused, in part, by the impending retirement of highly experienced acquisition workforce staff.”
January 2014: Milestone C approval is given to the AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR Block 1 radar, which allows low-rate initial production contracts to begin. Sources: GAO-13-294SP, “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” (q.v. March 31/14).
Milestone C
Jan 28/14: DOT&E Testing Report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2013 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). G/ATOR is included, and it seems to be having serious software issues, creating MTBOMF of 42.8 hours in the Field User Evaluation instead of the 500 hour goal:
“G/ATOR reliability-related software deficiencies have continued and have kept the radar from meeting its Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failure (MTBOMF) requirements. After allowing additional time for the software to further mature prior to the program’s Milestone C decision (scheduled for 1QFY14), the program added a fourth developmental test period to assess improvement…. it remains unclear if G/ATOR will meet key reliability metrics by the start of IOT&E (scheduled for 3QFY17)….
500 hours MTBOMF cannot be realistically achieved within the context of the current G/ATOR test schedule through IOT&E…. The program has not yet finalized an acceptable reliability growth strategy, has not completed an adequate test design for the IOT&E…. Over 80 percent of the Block 1 and Block 2 procurement is planned with GaN radar modules, yet it remains unclear if adequate production representative versions of the system will be available in time for IOT&E.”
Dec 4/13: Testing. Northrop Grumman announces that G/ATOR tests at MCAS Yuma have been successful, including support for 2 Weapons and Tactics Instruction (WTI) events. The firm says that the TPS-80 “detected and tracked targets that other systems at the exercise were not able to”, extracting targets from heavy clutter backgrounds and exceeding its objective-level (best case) availability requirements.
We’ll have to wait until early in 2014 to read the DOT&E’s report, but it sounds like the program is headed to Milestone C and Low-Rate Initial Production. Sources: Northrop Grumman, Dec 4/13 release.
Nov 6/13: Saltwater G/ATOR? Northrop Grumman announces an 18-month, $6 million study to explore replacement options for the US Navy’s AN/SPS-48 (all carriers, LHA/LHD amphibious air support, and LPD-17 amphibious ships) and AN/SPS-49 (all carriers, FFG-7 frigates, CG-47 cruisers, LHD amphibious air support, LSD-41/49 amphibious ships) air surveillance radars.
The Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR) Study’s terms of reference would modify an existing radar to act in this capacity, and Northrop Grumman states that they’ll be using their AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR. Existing FFG-7 frigates are too old and limited to be good upgrade candidates, and the CG-47 cruisers and LSD ships are currently in the middle of major modernizations. With that said, the pace of major ship maintenance periods still leaves the USN with a number of options if they decide that this is a good idea. EASR is sponsored by the Office of Naval Research under its Integrated Topside program. Sources: NGC, Nov 6/13 release.
FY 2010 – 2013System development extended; Testing begins; Increment II begins.
G/ATOR REG
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Sept 11/13: GaN. A $10.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification will raise the EMD Phase cost ceiling, in order to fund G/ATOR’s transition to Gallium Nitride electronics. GaN improves the radar’s performance, which allows the Marines to either push it harder or throttle back the generator. Fueling generators adds to both logistics burdens and operational risk, and even with full fuel, G/ATOR was falling short at higher altitudes that sap its generator’s power. GaN electronics offers full performance at just 50 kW, instead of the generator’s sea-level limit of 60 kW. Since higher altitude equals a wider field of view, the difference matters on the battlefield.
The G/ATOR program has always known about this difference, but it chose to wait until the underlying electronics were more proven, and the industrial infrastructure made it a low-risk switch. Time has delivered both changes, and development financing from the 3DELRR program (q.v. Aug 26/13) appears to have bridged the last technical gaps within the TPS-80 design.
Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD, and is expected to be complete by Dec 31/14. This contract wasn’t competitively procured, as it’s within the scope of the current contract and its changes clause (M67854-07-C-2072, PO 0115).
GaN transition
Aug 26/13: 3DELRR. Northrop Grumman announces that they completed their 3DELRR radar demonstration back in July. They refer to it as “The U.S. Air Force system variant of the Department of Defense AN/TPS-80 radar…” but unlike the USMC’s current G/ATORs, this S-band radar uses Gallium Nitride transmit/receive modules. That technology is in the USMC’s plans, and the development work may pay off for the Marines, just as all the work on the USMC’s TPS-80 G/ATOR would offer dividends to the USAF.
As one might expect, given their design’s lineage, Northrop Grumman also touts “successful system ambient air cooling under extremely hot operating conditions,” as well as the radar’s well-developed system self-test and calibration capabilities. Sources: Northrop Grumman Aug 26/13 release.
June 28/13: More SDD. Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Linthicum Heights, MD receives a $24.5 million cost-plus-incentive-fee, firm-fixed-price contract modification that increases the G/ATOR EMD phase’s estimated ceiling cost.
These price hikes parcel out as $21.1 million for development using FY 2013 funds, with $13.6 million committed immediately. EMD work will be performed Linthicum Heights, MD (88%); Yuma, AZ (10%); and Syracuse, NY (2%), and is expected to be complete by April 25/14.
The added $3.4 million for extra production engineering support uses FY 2012 funds, with all funds committed immediately. Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD (81%), and Syracuse, NY (19%), and is expected to be complete by Feb 16/14.
This brings announced EMD contracts to around $533.7 million, but the GAO’s August 2012 figures already had G/ATOR development spending pegged at $539.5 million of a planned $893.1 million. The gap is easily explained, as announcements only cover contracts above a certain threshold. Note that the original baseline for G/ATOR development was $364.3 million in $FY13 (M67854-07-C-2072).
May 24/13: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/12 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF]. The news isn’t good for the G/ATOR program, which is shrinking sharply, again, even as the number of Marines has risen. G/ATOR numbers have now shrunk by about 30% since the program’s inception:
“Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) – Program costs decreased $912.1 million (-27.4%) from $3,325.9 million to $2,413.8 million, due primarily to a decrease in quantity of 12 systems from 57 to 45 systems (-$464.0 million) and associated estimating allocation (+$0.9 million) and a revised cost estimate for anticipated production efficiencies associated with funded design investments (-$447.0 million). Other decreases were attributable to a reduction in support costs (-$52.2 million) and initial spares requirements (-$12.9 million) resulting from investment in efficiencies and economic order discounts. These decreases were partially offset by increases to the cost estimates for investments in the production efficiency initiative (+$33.3 million) and technology refresh assumptions and associated potential future change orders (+$18.8 million), and the application of revised escalation indices (+$27.5 million).”
SAR – another radar cut
April 15/13: Budget. The FY14 request submitted by the Navy barely changes from the previous year’s budget, at $78.2 million. FY16 also remains stable, but FY15 and FY17 are lower by $19 million and $26 million respectively. Air Defense/Air Radar AD/SR Capability System Demonstration (DT)(1B) and Operational Assessment (OA) are extended by 2 quarters, while LRIP and Milestone C both slip by 1 quarter. Milestones further out in the plan (IOT&E, IOC, FRP decision) are supposed to be unaffected by these changes earlier in the schedule. US Navy PE 0204460M [PDF].
March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. G/ATOR appears for the 1st time, and the overall report is good.
GAO acknowledges that performance requirements for G/ATOR have grown from 5 key performance parameters in 2005, to 16 in 2012. Program officials describe this as a “clarification,” but there’s no question that KPP expansion creates more development work. This explains some, but not all, of the program 145% RDT&E jump since the 2005 baseline. Overall program cost is up 101.2%, to $3.034 billion as of June 2012, despite a drop from 64 to 57 radars.
On the bright side, things have been much more stable since the program was re-baselined in January 2010. All 6 critical TPS-80 technologies are approaching full maturity, with 100% of design drawings released, using GaAS (Gallium Arsenide) electronics. The GAO gives no specific timeline for incorporation of better GaN (Gallium Nitride) electronics, but does say the program could save as much as $500 million from the change, while reducing weight and power demand.
Dec 21/12: More SDD. An $8.6 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to increase G/ATOR’s estimated EMD (same as SDD) phase cost ceiling, in light of an expected cost overrun. $2.1 million is committed immediately.
Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD (75%) and Syracuse, NY (11%); Wallop’s Island, VA (11%) and Yuma, AZ (3%); and is expected to be complete April 25/14 (M67854-07-C-2072).
July 26/12: Testing. Northrop Grumman Corporation’s initial AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR Increment 1 system has been delivered to Surface Combat Systems Center (SCSC) Wallops Island in Eastern Virginia for G/ATOR’s 1st and 2nd phases of developmental testing. Yuma, AZ will host the 3rd and final DT phase, and operational assessment. NGC.
June 6/12: Increment II. The USMC is asking Northrop Grumman’s Electronic Systems sector in Linthicum Heights, MD to begin developing G/ATOR’s Increment II Ground Weapons Locating Radar (GWLR) software, which will track incoming shells and rockets back to their point of origin. The amount of the contract has yet to be negotiated. Military Aerospace & Electronics.
Dec 7/11: More SDD. A $32.3 million contract modification for the continuation of GATOR Increment I, to support the changes made to the risk reduction change order.
Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD (95%), and Syracuse, NY (5%), and is expected to be complete by Dec 31/13. This contract modification was not competitively procured, as the contract effort is within the scope of the current contract and is entered into pursuant to the changes clause (M67854-07-C-2072).
Nov 17/11: Northrop Grumman Corporation announces that its 1st Ground Based Radar Conference drew more than 90 attendees over 3 days, representing 10 nations. Besides the G/ATOR system, Northrop Grumman also sells AN/TPS-78 and AN/TPS-703 solid-state tactical mobile radar systems; and the Highly Adaptable Multi-Mission Radar (HAMMR) AESA radar for on-the-move, 360 degree coverage.
Feb 7/11: Testing. Northrop Grumman announces that they’ve integrated all subsystems of the AN/TPS-80 Ground / Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) system. This 1st complete system is currently undergoing system-level integration, performance, and live target testing at the company’s Electronic Systems sector engineering and manufacturing complex, located next to Baltimore’s Washington International Marshall Airport.
As noted above, G/ATOR’s subsystems include the Radar Equipment Group (REG, AESA antenna and all associated control and processing electronics) mounted on a lightweight tactical trailer, the Communications Equipment Group (CEG) and the Power Equipment Group (PEG).
1st complete G/ATOR I
Feb 4/11: More SDD. A $38.3 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification, extending the GATOR Increment I development program. It will support the agreed-upon expansions to the original integrated performance baseline, and extend the contract’s period through April 30/12.
Work will be performed in a contractor facility at Linthicum Heights, MD (85%); and by Northrop Grumman’s subcontractor, Sensis Corp., located in Syracuse, NY (15%). Work is expected to be complete in April 2012 (M67854-07-C-2072).
April 5/10: Testing. Northrop Grumman Corporation announces the next system test phase.
This phase will use a fully populated G/ATOR array, complete with all transmit/receive modules, radiating elements, prime power and distribution, RF manifold, and associated control and processing electronics. This newest series of tests includes detailed verification that the G/ATOR’s active electronically scanned array (AESA) hardware will support all of the system’s multi-mission capabilities, and demonstration of all required AESA functions including beam generation, steering and control, performance at full rated power, operating bandwidth and automated array calibration techniques.
Testing of this array is taking place at the company’s antenna test facility in Norwalk, CT; in 2009, a prototype partial G/ATOR array was tested at the same facility, and expanded testing on that prototype radar array continues at NGC’s engineering and manufacturing complex in Baltimore. Once the 2nd, full array completes testing, it will be integrated with the other G/ATOR components for the next levels: full systems-level integration testing, and subsequent environmental testing.
January 2010: G/ATOR program is re-baselined due to cost and requirements growth. Source: GAO.
Re-baselined
Dec 29/09: More SDD. A $35.5 million contract modification increases the estimated cost ceiling and target cost of CLIN0001, finalizing change orders to the configuration the G/ATOR’s new up-armored MTVR carrier trucks. It also covers the modification and implementation of the upgraded UPX-40 as the identification-friend-or-foe system, and a change of the IFF system from government furnished property to contractor-acquired government property.
Approximately 80% of the work will be performed by Northrop Grumman in Linthicum Heights, MD, and approximately 20% will be performed by Northrop Grumman’s subcontractor, Sensis Corp. in Syracuse, NY. The contract modification was not competitively procured, as the contract cost increase is within scope of the current contract and is entered into pursuant to the changes clause (M67854-07-C-2072).
Dec 10/09: Program support. General Dynamics Information Technology in Fairfax, VA received a $5.8 million task order under a firm-fixed-price contract. They’ll provide on-going technical, managerial and logistics support for Program Executive Office – Land Systems, Program Manager Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR).
Emerging development efforts include engineering, architecture and logistical analysis of G/ATOR. Support requirements include supporting the G/ATOR Milestone C processes, and engineering and technical reviews (since Milestone B is complete). Additional support requirements include development and maintenance of programmatic information to be displayed in a G/ATOR Program Operations Center, information security, admin support, information assurance, joint interoperability, family of system definition/development and business analysis to define investment strategies, contract administration, planning programming and budgeting planning, logistics support, equipment specialist, earned value management system, program management plan support and cost/risk assessments. Due to in-sourcing, cost proposal and analysis efforts will not be required.
Support requirements include for the contractor to conduct/complete the logistics assessment of the manpower, personnel and training requirements and facilities analysis needed to support G/ATOR, the development of Manpower Training Integrated project team, to use as input and/or the development of the Manpower Personnel and Training plan. Work will be performed in Quantico, VA, and the contract will end in December 2010. The Marine Corps System Command in Quantico, VA manages the contract (M67854-02-A-9014, #0042).
Nov 16/09: More SDD. A $44.5 million modification under previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee contract. It increases the estimated cost ceiling for the G/ATOR’s SDD phase, target cost, and target cost plus target fee of contract line item number 0001 by $17.5 million to reflect “undefinitized change orders for the UPX40,” which is an identification friend-or-foe (IFF) system. Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD (75%), and Syracuse, NY (25%), and is expected to be complete on Sept 15/11. Contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.
That alternation also confirms a change in G/ATOR’s intended towing vehicle, from Humvee jeeps to up-armored MTVR medium trucks. Experiences in Iraq caused the Marines to re-think their intended use of Humvees, and their MTVR trucks with TAK-4 suspension for all-terrain mobility were the natural next step up. The change would improve the radar’s mobility and survivability, at the cost of added weight and limited helicopter portability. The radar module itself will remain helicopter-portable, but its accompanying vehicle will not be – unless the USMC decides to mount G/ATOR on a modified M-ATV MRAP, or future vehicles like the JLTV Category C.
Another contract modification increases the estimated cost ceiling, target cost and target cost plus target fee of contract line item number 0001 by an additional $27 million, to reflect the estimated cost increase associated with the 9-month schedule extension (M67854-07-C-2072).
New vehicle platform
Oct 6/09: More SDD. A $14 million modification under a previously awarded contract to increase the estimated cost ceiling for G/ATOR system development and demonstration to reflect its anticipated cost overrun. The contract modification was not competitively procured, as the cost overrun is within scope of the current contract, and is entered into pursuant to the changes clause. Discussions with US MARSYSCOM indicate that this increase is cumulative with the March 2009 ceiling increase.
Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD (75%) and Syracuse, NY (25%), and is expected to be complete in September 2011. Contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year (M67854-07-C-2072).
Oct 5/09: Testing. Northrop Grumman announces that a prototype G/ATOR partial array antenna has completed successful testing at a company antenna test range in Norwalk, CT. The partial array is now being integrated with additional radar subsystems for follow-on testing at Northrop Grumman’s Electronic Systems sector headquarters in Baltimore, MD. Meanwhile, a 2nd G/ATOR AESA is scheduled for testing at the Norwalk, CT test facility later in 2009.
The G/ATOR AESA array can be thought of as “networked mini-radars,” so meeting all test objectives with a partial array that includes transmit/receive functionality, hardware and software communications, array tuning, and calibration techniques gives Northrop Grumman a high degree of confidence that the first fully populated array (currently under integration/test) will likewise be a success. Northrop Grumman representatives told DID that some test objectives were exceeded, and all were met. They added that their goal was, and is, to field a test radar that is as close to Full Rate Production versions as possible, using the same people and processes.
FY 2006 – 2009SDD re-award, after initial award canceled; Additional funds and cost overruns, incl. early finding for interaction design.
G/ATOR concept
(click to view full)
March 3/09: More SDD. A maximum $40.5 million contract modification reflect the anticipated cost overrun associated with completion of the G/ATOR’s SDD phase. The contract modification was not competitively procured, as the cost overrun is designated as being within the scope of the current contract.
Northrop Grumman estimated an additional $36 million to complete the SDD phase, of which the Government is immediately funding $16.8 million to support contract requirements for completing the Critical Design Review (CDR) scheduled from March to mid-April 2009. In addition, the contract modification increases the contract value by $4.5 million for engineering services and support over the life of the contract through June 2012. Those engineering services will be requested on an as-needed basis, and the Government has begun by requesting $238,695.
Work will be performed by Northrop Grumman Corp., in Linthicum Heights, MD (69%), and by Northrop Grumman’s subcontract, Sensis in Syracuse, NY (31%). Of the total funds obligated with this contract modification so far, $120,215 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year (M67854-07-C-2072, P00024).
Dec 19/08: Sub-contractors. A $6.4 million modification to a previously awarded contract for Human Systems Integration (HSI) work, to be completed by June 2012. Work will be performed by Northrop Grumman Corporation in Linthicum Heights, MD (69%), and by their subcontractor Sensis, in Syracuse, NY (31%). The modification was not competitively procured, sine it’s classified as an engineering change within scope of the current contract (M67854-07-C-2072):
“The contractor shall develop and implement a plan to effectively apply HSI principles during G/ATOR design, production and integration. The contractor shall ensure Human Factors Engineering, Manpower, Personnel, Training, System Safety, Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health (ESOH), and Personnel Survivability requirements are incorporated into the layout, design, and arrangement of equipment having an operator or maintainer interface.”
As technology companies in Silicon Valley and beyond are beginning to realize, serious interaction design generally needs to begin earlier in the process. This is an improvement over the frequent practice of saving HSI for last, when it’s very difficult to change anything no matter what the findings show.
June 26/08: PDR. Northrop Grumman announces that G/ATOR has completed its 3 1/2 day Preliminary Design Review (PDR) at Northrop Grumman Corporation’s Electronic Systems sector headquarters, granting approval to proceed to critical design. The PDR involved an extensive U.S. government review and subsequent approval of the G/ATOR system and subsystem design for both hardware and software, including a program management review of cost and schedule.
The PDR was attended by more than 70 Marine Corps, Navy, Army, and other Department of Defense officials and civilian subject matter experts. NGC release.
PDR
June 17/08: More SDD. A $28.2 million modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee contract to extend the schedule by 8 1/2 months and increase the level of effort for G/ATOR system development and demonstration.
At this time, no additional funds are being committed, but the option is there if additional support and engineering effort is needed. Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD (75%) and East Syracuse, NY (25%) and is expected to be complete December 2016 if all options are exercised (M67854-07-C-2072).
March 10/08: Sub-contractors. Curtiss-Wright Corporation announces a contract from Northrop Grumman to provide their new VPX boards and subsystems, high density digital signal processing products and optimized software tools.. The result will be a rugged air-flow-through radar processing subsystem using open architecture-based standards and software.
The initial $4.3 million contract is for development, which is expected to be complete in 2010. This subsystem will be designed and manufactured at Curtiss-Wright’s motion control facility in San Diego, CA, and will include products from its Leesburg, VA and Ottawa, Canada locations. The production phase of the G/ATOR program will be executed as an option under the current contract, and is planned to start in 2010.
Feb 27/08: No fries, chips. A $10.7 million modification to previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for design and development of a new Serial Rapid I/O processor for the G/ATOR. Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD (75%) and East Syracuse, NY (25%), and is expected to be complete March 2011 (M67854-07-C-2072).
Sept 6/07: SRR. Northrop Grumman Corporation and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) successfully reviewed and agreed upon 768 G/ATOR contractual design requirements during the recent System Requirements Review (SRR) held at Northrop Grumman’s Electronic Systems sector headquarters in Baltimore, MD. NGC release.
March 30/07: Northrop Grumman wins again, with a $256.6 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for System Development and Demonstration of the USMC’s Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), Increment I. The contract includes a Radar Environmental Simulator (RES); alternative generator; the G/ATOR Technical Data Package; Model Driven Architecture Models; interim contractor logistics support; and performance based logistics; Other direct costs and travel; and engineering services and support.
The Pentagon DefenseLINK’s announcement also cites production of 2 G/ATOR Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) systems, and 13 full-rate production (FRP) G/ATOR systems. Northrop Grumman’s release cites 2 LRIP and 15 FRP systems. A 2012 change revised that to just 8 LRIP systems.
Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD (75%) and East Syracuse, NY (25%) and is expected to be complete in March 2016, if all options are exercised. This contract is a result of a full and open competition solicitation available to industry via the Navy Electronic Commerce Office, with 5 offers received (M67854-07-C-2072).
Main System Development
Sept 16/05: Initial SDD. A $7.95 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for the Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) Increment I system development and demonstration. Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD (75%) and East Syracuse, NY (25%) and is expected to be complete September 2009. The award is a result of a full and open competition solicitation that was available via the Internet, with 5 offers received (M67854-05-C-2000).
Northrop Grumman’s Sept 22/05 release estimated the total value of the contract at $125 million over 4 years and 4 system capability increments. It doesn’t matter, because the award is protested, and the Navy decides to re-compete it.
Canceled SDD
Additional Readings & Sources Background: AN/TPS-80 G/ATORDID thanks the personnel of Northrop Grumman for multiple interviews over the life of this article.
News & Views
Related Systems
Despite China’s ominous military buildup across the strait, key weapons sales of P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot PAC-3 missiles, and diesel-electric submarines to Taiwan had been sabotaged by Taiwanese politics for years – in some cases, since 1997. The KMT party’s flip-flops and determined stalling tactics eventually created a crisis in US-Taiwan relations, which finally soured to the point that the USA refused a Taiwanese request for F-16C/D aircraft.
That seems to have brought things to a head. Most of the budget and political issues were eventually sorted out, and after a long delay, some major elements of Taiwan’s requested modernization program appear to be moving forward: P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, UH-60M helicopters, Patriot missile upgrades; and requests for AH-64D attack helicopters, E-2 Hawkeye AWACS planes, minehunting ships, and missiles for defense against aircraft, ships, and tanks. These are must-have capabilities when facing a Chinese government that has vowed to take the country by force, and which is building an extensive submarine fleet, a large array of ballistic missiles, an upgraded fighter fleet, and a number of amphibious-capable divisions. Chinese pressure continues to stall some of Taiwan’s most important upgrades, including diesel-electric submarines, and new American fighter jets. Meanwhile, other purchases from abroad continue.
Fortunately for Taiwan, there is movement beyond the stalled backwaters of F-16 and submarine sales. Can a combination of foreign weapon sales approvals and domestic efforts break Taiwan’s defense equipment logjam? Can the broader US-Taiwan defense relationship be saved, or is it eroding fatally?
Those are questions for the future. This Spotlight article will focus on the here-and-now instead, chronicling key developments and purchases as they arise.
Aerial AcquisitionsIn the modern era, control of the air is the first requirement of effective defense. For an island country, control of the sea, or the ability to deny that control to enemies is equally strategic. Taiwan’s key modernization efforts in both areas remain troubled, which impairs the amount of real deterrence, and security, their military modernization can bring them.
ROCAF Mirage 2000-5The ultimate issue for Taiwan is one of numbers. In the air, quantity has a quality all its own. Taiwan expects to retire its F-5 and Mirage 2000v5 fighters by 2020. The ROCAF is moving to modernize its old F-16 fighters, but any fighter has a fixed airframe life, measured in flight hours. Modernization is a medium term solution, not a long term one, and does nothing to address the growing numeric imbalance across the strait. Even as US military studies suggest that the USAF and US Navy will find it more and more difficult to fly fighter reinforcements to Taiwan, and keep them in its airspace.
With 24 ROCAF F-16 fighters out of service for upgrades at any point, 16 in the USA for training at Luke AFB, and 30% of the remaining machines (32) unavailable for other maintenance, Taiwan’s fleet of 146 F-16s shrinks to about 74 F-16s in operational service. If equivalent rates hold true for the 71 locally built and upgraded F-CK-1C/Ds, that means about 50 operational Hsiung Ying fighters, for a total available fighter fleet of just 124 machines. Most of which will be 1980s level technology.
Consistent reports indicate that the USA has asked Taiwan to hold off on their request to add 66 new F-16s, in order to avoid a direct “no.” Reports suggest that a strong lobbying effort from China is dooming that effort, even as the PLAAF continues to add aircraft like the 4+ generation J-10, and equally advanced long-range SU-27 family fighters to its arsenal.
The Obama administration confirmed that perception in September 2011, when it opted to approve ROCAF F-16 fleet upgrades, rather than new F-16C/D Block 52 sales. They attempted to thread the needle by offering more advanced technology than the equipment in F-16 Block 52s, which have been sold to countries like China’s ally, Pakistan. The question is whether this is actually a worst-of-all-possible worlds outcome: showing weakness abroad on Taiwan, failing to extend the F-16 production line and American jobs at home, and offering cutting-edge technology that risks falling into the hands of Chinese intelligence.
The USA is also selling Taiwan the newest version of its attack helicopter, the AH-64E Apache Guardian. Its Longbow radar mast allows it to use radar guided, fire and forget missiles, and it also carries Stinger missiles for defense against enemy aircraft. Engine and communications upgrades, including the ability to control UAVs remotely, round out that package. The 30 Apaches would serve alongside Taiwan’s 60+ AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters, as a rapid reaction force able to counterattack beachheads and exploit the hilly island’s natural chokepoints.
Sea ControlAt sea, the situation is simultaneously less overtly perilous, and less hopeful. China’s navy is certainly growing, but is not yet overwhelming. The problem is that without air superiority as cover, no Taiwanese surface navy can expect to survive, in order to maintain control of the seas around Taiwan. Britain faced the same equation in World War 2, and prevailed by winning in the air.
ROC Seadragon subIf that isn’t possible, a good submarine force is the classic military solution. Submarines are capable of either destroying efforts to cross the strait, or strangling Chinese trade as it moves through Southeast Asia’s key choke points. Modern missiles give them vastly longer offensive reach, and modern submarines are very difficult to find and target once they put to sea. For a nation like Taiwan, they’re the ultimate conventional deterrent against invasion.
Taiwan’s comprehensive failure to field this trump card stems even more directly from Chinese pressure. The USA approved a sale request in 2001, but they haven’t produced conventionally-powered subs for many decades, and don’t want to be the supplier. Without that option on tap, Chinese diplomacy has utterly strangled Taiwan’s efforts to find a party who is (a) able to make diesel-electric subs; and (b) is willing to sell them to Taiwan. The Republic of China currently relies on 2 submarines that are too old for anything but training missions, and 2 Hai Lung (Sea Dragon) class submarines. The Hai Lungs were ordered from the Dutch firm Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij (RDM) in 1981, as a derivative of their Zwaardvis (Swordfish) class. A follow-on order for 4 more submarines was blocked by the Dutch government in 1992 thanks to Chinese pressure, and RDM went out of business a few years later.
Since then, Taiwan has explored a number of alternatives to obtain diesel-electric submarines, without success. They are even reportedly considering building their own boats from foreign designs. Australia’s experience suggests that this course may be fraught with peril, and Taiwan has a number of technology gaps to address: ship design technology, torpedoes, sonar, propulsion systems, combat systems, and submarine periscope lenses. On the other hand, if the alternative is no submarines at all, and submarines are one of your most critical national defense needs, the perils of caution may outweigh the risks of inexperience. Taiwan seems determined to face the peril, and a report is expected by June 2014.
Land Defense CM11 tankLand defense improvements currently center on portable missiles, mobility, and massed counterattack against amphibious or paradropped beach-heads. The missiles provide dispersed, hard-to-target defenses against enemy aircraft and armored vehicles. Helicopter mobility allows rapid response to enemy airdrops or pre-positioned guerrilla units. Massed counterattack means the heavy armor of tanks, which remain the most important and element for crushing enemy beach-heads.
Taiwan’s situation with respect to tanks isn’t very good. The Republic of China Army currently fields about 480 M60A3 tanks acquired in the 1990s, but the M60 first entered US service in 1960, and the A3 version entered US service in the late 1970s. They’re joined by 450 much older CM11s (modified M48H 105mm turrets with improved fire control, mated to M60 hulls), and 300 of the M-48 medium tanks whose base design dates back to the 1950s: 50 M48A3s, and 250 CM12s (modified CM11 turrets mated to M48A3 hulls).
Contracts & Key Events Patriot RadarThis article focuses on foreign imports, and the vast majority come from the USA. The US DSCA references to “the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States” are diplo-speak for “Taiwan” or “Republic of China”. DID uses the conventional term instead. Note that DSCA requests are not contracts; those are separate announcements, and sometimes years pass between the two events. Having said this, a DSCA request does open the door to contracts as permitted weapons exports through the Foreign Military Sales process, unless Congress moves to block the proposed sale within 30 days.
Note that upgrades to the ROCAF’s locally-designed and built F-CK-1 fighters are covered in a separate article, as an Indigenous Taiwanese program that sits outside this article’s scope.
2014 – 2016September 2/16: Sikorsky is to produce and deliver 24 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters to Taiwan. The $135 million sale will see the aircraft uniquely configured for the Taiwanese government with delivery by October 2018. This follows a recent $158 million contract modification to produce 14 more Black Hawks for the US Army.
April 20/16: Taiwan is currently embarking on a project to develop its own indigenous fighter engine. Work is being undertaken by the country’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) and is seen as part of the incoming Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) push to prioritize Taiwan’s defense industry. The engines are being developed for locally produced jets such as the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) and AT-3 trainers. While about 90% of the IDF and AT-3 are produced in Taiwan, some key technologies such as its engine is built in cooperation with foreign companies before the plane is assembled domestically.
March 3/16: Taiwan’s new government is keen on developing their own indigenous jet trainer aircraft to replace its AT-3s. The military fears however, that the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) lacks the skills necessary for the development, alongside Taiwan’s inability to manufacture its own engines. The military may instead prefer the acquisition of the Alenia Aermacchi M346, with the AIDC participating in a 20% workshare of the project.
July 21/15: Lockheed Martin and Alenia Aermacchi have both responded to a Request for Information for Taiwan’s advanced jet trainer, according to Taiwanese media [Chinese]. The US company is expected to offer the T-50 Golden Eagle aircraft, in conjunction with South Korea’s Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), whilst the Italian firm will likely push the M-346 AJT. Taiwan’s defense ministry is expected to make a decision regarding the purchase of new trainers to replace the current fleet of F-5E/F and AT-3 aircraft next year, with the winning aircraft design likely to be assembled in Taiwan by Aerospace Industrial Development Corp.
Dec 09/14: Frigates. Taiwan has a NT$5.5 billion ($176M) budget approved and ready to acquire 2 Perry-class frigates whose sale is well on its way to finally be approved by the US, after years of stalling (q.v. Sept 10/14). The US Senate approved S. 1683 on December 4, and since a similar bill (HR. 3470) had already been passed by the House in April, a reconciled law should be on the President’s desk soon.
China is not happy, but they’re making a lot of fuss for 2-4 weaponless ships that the US Navy gave up upgrading and Australia found tough to modernize.
Sources: Reuters: “Taiwan says to buy two U.S. frigates despite China anger” | Xinhua: “China firmly opposes US arms sale to Taiwan“.
P-3C arrivesNov 3/14: Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, TX receives a $271.8 million firm-fixed-price modification to install 142 F-16S aircraft upgrade kits. The total cost is, of course, much larger, since the kits must also be bought – which is at least a $1.85 billion proposition (q.v. Oct 1/12). Work will be performed in Taiwan, and is expected to be complete by May 31/22.
This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. The USAF’s Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity (FA8615-12-C-6016, PO 0006).
F-16 upgrade installation
Oct 29/14: UH-60M. A Taiwanese Army official tells a legislative committee that UH-60Ms will begin to arrive soon, with the first 6 to arrive in mid-December 2014, and the rest of the 60 arriving in 6 more batches into 2018. Of the 60 UH-60Ms, 45 will be used by the Army, and the other 15 will be used for disaster relief by the Ministry of the Interior’s National Airborne Service Corps.
In other news, the 2 pilots who crashed their AH-64 onto a city roof are “still undergoing a series of flight tests before they can resume training missions.” Could be a while, guys. On the P-3 front, a flight simulation system has recently become operational in Taiwan to help train people for the sea control plane. Sources: Focus Taiwan, “Taiwan to take delivery of first batch of Black Hawks in December”.
UH-60 contract schedule
Oct 28/14: Minehunters. Italy’s Intermarine S.p.A. and Lockheed Martin win a contract to support local construction of 6 mine countermeasures vessels (q.v. Sept 5/12), which will be built at a brand-new Ching Fu Shipbuilding facility in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. The ships are expected to be about 52m long and 700t.
Intermarine will build the 1st hull at its shipyard near La Spezia, Italy, but Ching Fu will finish it and build the remaining 5 ships. Lockheed Martin’s role is focused on the combat system. Sources: Intermarine SpA, “Mine Countermeasure Vessels” | Defense News, “New Spanish Frigate Detailed, Deal for Taiwan Minesweepers Announced”.
6 minehunters
Oct 23/14: Jet Trainers. Defense Minister Yen Ming says that Taiwan wants to buy advanced trainers. Right now, the progression out of basic flight training goes from T-34 turboprops, to the AT-3 jet trainer, to the supersonic F-5E/F as a Lead-In Fighter Trainer. The T-34s will remain for now, but the AT-3s and F-5E/Fs would be retired.
The announcement comes right after a dual-crash of AT-3 jet trainers during a routine aerobatic training mission in Kaohsiung, southern Taiwan. Lt. Col. Chuang Pei-yuan was killed.
The question is which trainer will be available to Taiwan, given the likelihood of Chinese counter-pressure. The big 4 are Britain’s Hawks, Italy’s M-346 Master, Korea Aerospace/ Lockheed’s supersonic T-50 Golden Eagle family, and Russia’s Yak-130. Beyond, Czech firm Aero is releasing new L-159T and L-169 trainers, which can perform the same air policing and light attack roles as the Hawks, Yaks, and Golden Eagles; and Boeing & Saab are supposedly working on their own jet trainer offering. Since even Boeing & Lockheed have international partners, which of these countries will have the fortitude and willingness to offer them to Taiwan?
On the other hand, if Taiwan moves some of its indigenous F-CK-1 fighters into the F-5F’s LIFT role, their advanced AT-3 trainer replacement options would expand to include Brazil’s Super Tucano, Swiss Pilatus trainers, and Beechcraft’s T-6 family from the USA. Sources: Focus Taiwan, “Taiwan set to purchase advanced trainers in 2017: defense minister”.
Oct 19/14: Submarines. The Taiwanese submarine Hai Hu (Sea Tiger) launches a pair of UGM-84 Harpoon missiles, demonstrating a successful upgrade that vastly increases the submarine’s reach to over 100 nautical miles. Taiwan now employs all 3 types of Harpoon missile, launched from its frigates, F-16s, and submarines. Sources: Agence France Presse, “Taiwan tests submarine-launched missiles: report”.
Subs: Harpoon capability
Oct 19/14: AH-64E. Taiwan receives the last 6 helicopters, completing delivery of the 30 it ordered under the TWD 59.31 billion ($1.95 billion) contract. It now has 29 available for service (q.v. April 25/14). Sources: Focus Taiwan, “Taiwan takes final delivery of Apache helicopters”.
A-64Es all delivered
Oct 14/14: PATRIOT. Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control in Grand Prairie, TX receives a $595.5 million foreign military sales contract modification, covering FY 2014 production for Kuwait, Taiwan, Qatar, and the UAE. They’re selling 152 PAC-3 cost reduction initiative missiles, 15 PAC-3 launcher modification kits, and the associated ground equipment, tooling, and initial spares. $543 million is committed immediately.
The PAC-3 CRI missile was used as the base for the PAC-3 MSE missile, but the MSE missile also added a number of new technologies, and changed the missile’s structure. In contrast, PAC-3 CRI missiles offer PAC-3 performance at a slightly lower cost.
Work will be performed in Grand Prairie, Lufkin, and El Paso, TX; Camden, AR; Chelmsford, MA; Ocala, FL; Huntsville, AL; and Anaheim, CA; and will continue until May 31/16. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-14-C-0034, PO 0008).
PAC-3 missiles: Kuwait, Qatar, Taiwan, UAE
Sept 10/14: Frigates. Taiwan won’t get its 2 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates (q.v. Aug 5/10, April 22/12, Nov 13/13) on schedule, because the US Senate can’t be bothered to authorize the sale. That will keep 2 aging Know Class frigates in continued service until 2016. The Chinese-language United Daily News reported Tuesday that the frigates were expected to be delivered in 2016, under a project budgeted at NTD 5.56 billion ($185.42 million) in total.
Note that the frigates being decommissioned by the USA had all major weapons removed long ago, making them essentially large Coast Guard cutters with sonar and torpedoes. Source: Taiwan’s Want China Times, “Delivery of US Perry-class frigates to Taiwan could be delayed”.
Sept 10/14: Submarines. US CNO Admiral Jonathan Greenert confirmed that he had a conversation with Taiwanese officials during a recent visit, covering the sale or provision of submarines to Taiwan. Neither he nor the Taiwanese would talk about the content of that conversation.
The best case scenario would involve the USA transferring a few key technologies like periscope lenses, torpedoes, and combat systems, albeit at technology levels that don’t surpass what they believe China to have. That way, stolen technologies wouldn’t matter. The worst case scenario is that the issue was discussed, and Greenert explained why no help is likely.
The event was held by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and focused on the US’s Asia Pacific rebalancing strategy. Sources: Taiwan’s Want China Times, “US chief of naval operation discusses sub deal with Taiwan”.
Sept 2/14: P-3Cs. Weapons for Taiwan’s P-3Cs become an issue:
“The Chinese-language China Times yesterday cited a recent report by the Control Yuan’s National Audit Office as saying that…. 12 P-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft from the US cost US$1.96 billion and are under the operational command of the Air Force 439 Composite Wing unit…. [but] the US disagreed with a plan to have the aircraft carry ordinances, such as mines and depth charges, made by Taiwanese manufacturers.”
Taiwan’s P-3s can carry Harpoon anti-ship missiles, but they really need modern torpedoes in order to engage enemy submarines successfully. Depth charges can be used against submarines, but their limit of 50m handicaps them. Meanwhile, mines would turn them into a potent blocking force if they can survive long enough over the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan has American Mk-46 lightweight torpedoes available for use aboard its destroyers and frigates, but until the P-3s are ready and able to deploy their own torpedoes, CNA News quotes a ROCAF commander who says that submarine contracts from Taiwan’s P-3s would be passed on a nearby ship. If there is one.
Aug 30/14: Tien Kung. Lin Yu-fang of the parliament’s defense committee says that Taiwan plans to spend TWD 74.8 billion (about $2.5 billion) from 2015 – 2024, buying the locally-made Tien Kung 3 (Sky Bow 3) medium range air defense missile system to replace the aging Hawk batteries, and defend the island against aircraft and cruise missiles.
That will make the Tien Kung 3 Taiwan’s lower-tier air defense counterpart to its new PATRIOT missiles, but the country denies that the Tien Kung 3 will be used to equip its 10,500t, American-built Kee Lung (Kidd) Class destroyers. Those ships will continue to rely on Raytheon’s SM-2 missiles for protection. Sources: Defense News, “Taiwan to spend $2.5 billion on anti-missile systems” | Taiwan’s Want China Times, “Taiwan denies Tien Kung missiles to be deployed on destroyers”.
Aug 20/14: AH-64E. Deliveries are a bit delayed. Taiwan is set to take delivery of 6 more AH-64E Apache attack helicopters in late August, which would bring their fleet to 23. This batch was supposed to arrive in May, and the delay is reportedly due to shipping issues. The final batch is now expected in October. Sources: Focus Taiwan, “Taiwan set to take August delivery of more Apache helicopters”.
Aug 20/14: F-16S: Lockheed Martin announces a successful Critical Design Review for integration of Northrop Grumman’s SABR radar in an F-16 (q.v. July 31/13). The SABR AESA radar will equip Taiwan’s F-16S upgrade, as well as Lockheed Martin’s global F-16V offering. Lockheed Martin is now describing Taiwan as the F-16V’s launch customer. Sources: Lockheed Martin, “F-16V Completes Major Capability Milestone”.
Aug 11-12/14: Fighters, incl. F-35B? Taiwan’s MND reaffirms its continued interest in F-16C/D or better fighters, while openly stating their goal to acquire F-35s at some point:
“Ministry of National Defense spokesman Maj. Gen. Luo Shou-he said Taiwan’s Air Force is ideally looking for aircraft with short-take off and vertical-landing capabilities and acknowledged that “it is our goal to acquire F-35s.” He admitted that it would be nearly impossible to obtain the fighters in the short term, “but we will continue to make effort on this issue.”
That seems to point clearly to F-35Bs, which make excellent sense when facing an opponent with thousands of runway-damaging ballistic missiles. The MND also denied China Times reports that the Mirage 2000-5 fleet was had maintenance issues because the French weren’t cooperating, leading to cannibalization of existing fighters. The MND said the fighters were being well-maintained by the French – the question is how much credence to give that assertion. Sources: Focus Taiwan, “Taiwan to seek U.S. sales of more advanced fighter jets: official” and “F-16C/D jet fighters still a consideration: Defense Ministry”.
July 15/14: Crash investigation. The AH-64E crash (q.v. April 25/14) is ruled as pilot error:
“The investigation report shows that the primary causes of the accident were the combination factors of human errors and environment,” Maj. Gen. Huang Kuo-ming told reporters.
The environment refers to fast descending clouds, which disoriented the pilots while they were flying at a low altitude. Still, they should have checked the instruments to maintain adequate height. Taiwan has received 18 of their 30 helicopters, though they only have 17 now. Sources: Defense News, “Pilots Blamed for Taiwan Apache Crash”.
June 3/14: Submarines. ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) Navy Command Headquarters has confirmed that Taiwan will try to replace part of the pressure hull on one of its existing Tench/ Guppy-II Class submarines. The boats were modernized to Guppy II standards in 1949, and transferred to Taiwan without torpedo systems in 1973, for use in anti-submarine training. Once in Taiwan, they were renamed SS-791 Hai Shih (ex-Cutlass) and SS-792 Hai Pao (ex-Tusk). Attempts to restore their torpedo firing capability reportedly failed, leaving them as surveillance and training vessels only.
The first problem is that they’re the world’s oldest serving submarines. While their core diving mechanism is simple and reliable, their continued safety under the compressing water pressure of a dive is a concern. MND has said that China Shipbuilding Corp (CSBC) and the Ship and Ocean Industries Research and Development Center (SOIC) have been appointed to oversee replacement of SS-791 Hai Shih’s lower pressure hull, in an TWD 450 million (about $15 million) program that will take place at a Navy Maintenance Command dry dock. Some old piping may also be replaced.
SS-791’s problem is the entire pressure hull, and its external hull would still be 70 years old after the replacement. A mistake would kill the boat, and even success may not leave Taiwan with an operational training submarine. But perhaps that isn’t the point. This is a good initial step, if the goal is moving CSBC and SOIC toward the capabilities they need to build a design provided by the USA, or to lead a local project to reverse-engineer and build a new submarine. If an unsafe submarine is sacrificed in the process, that may be seen as an acceptable “last hurrah.” Sources: China Post, “Old Taiwanese submarine to get new pressure hull: MND” | Taipei Times 2007, “Feature: World’s longest-serving sub feted” | San Francisco Maritime National Park Association, “Museum documents an operating US, WW II built submarine in Taiwan”.
CrashApril 25/14: Crash. During a training exercise, a Taiwanese AH-64E crash-lands on the roof of a low-rise residential building in Taoyuan county. Guys, that’s not what we were supposed to be training today.
The Helicopter is a complete wreck, but the pilots suffer only minor injuries, and no residents are hurt. Sources: The Daily Mail, “How did they get out alive? Lucky escape for pilots of Apache attack helicopter after it crashes into a housing block in Taiwan” | South China Morning Post, “Two Taiwan pilots injured as Apache chopper crashes into building”.
AH-64E crash
April 10-14/14: Frigates. The US House of Representatives passes HR.3470, a bill authorizing the sale of 4 decommissioned US frigates to Taiwan. It also officially reaffirms US support for the Taiwan Relations Act, which has lately found itself honored mostly in the breach. The bill was passed by voice vote, so there are no exact totals. The next step is consideration by the US Senate, which requires cooperation from Senate Foreign Relations committee chair Bob Menendez [D-NJ].
Success would bypass the State Department’s DSCA and make the USS Taylor [FFG-50], USS Gary [FFG-51], USS Carr [FFG-52], and USS Elrod [FFG-55] available to Taiwan, though Defense Minister Yen Ming has said that Taiwan would only buy 2. Taiwan would also have to add weapons back if they want anti-aircraft or anti-ship capabilities. The frigates have some residual value as anti-submarine platform without that, but Chinese control of the air and prominent use of missile attack craft would give them very short lifespans unless these capabilities are restored in some way. Taiwan was happy for the gesture, while China followed with predictable staged theatrics. Sources: GovTrack on HR 3470 | The Diplomat, “US House Approves Frigate Sale to Taiwan” | Focus Taiwan, “Taiwan planning to buy two warships from U.S.: defense minister” | Reuters, “China angered by latest U.S. arms sale plan for Taiwan” | Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs [in Chinese].
April 5/14: F-16. A CNA report says that the ROCAF will begin the process of upgrading its F-16 fleet in the second half of 2016, after the initial jets that are in the USA for compatibility testing etc. are finished. They don’t have an end date for the conversions yet. Sources: Taiwan’s Want China Times, “Taiwan air force to start upgrading F-16s from 2016”.
April 4/14: Submarines. So, good news?
“Minister of National Defense Yen Ming told a legislative committee that the United States “is willing to help us build the submarines together.”
The question is, what does that actually mean? the US hasn’t disavowed helping Taiwan acquire submarines over the past 8 years, they just haven’t done anything. Sources: Kyodo News International, “Washington agrees to help Taiwan build attack submarines”.
Feb 5/14: P-3s. Despite problems with the flight control systems in some recent deliveries (q.v. Jan 2/14), the ROCAF says that their overall delivery timetable will not be delayed, and could even be ahead of schedule. Sources: FOCUS Taiwan, “U.S. delivery of P-3C aircraft to Taiwan on schedule: military”.
Jan 27/14: F-16s. There are rumors that the USAF will remove the The Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite (CAPES) program from the 2015 budget request, in favor of a general F-16 service-life extension program (SLEP). We’ll know more in early March 2014. Taiwan was already complaining about having to pay most of the integration costs for the new configuration, but a USAF pullout would raise prices again. With the economy going soft, that could become a problem.
One option would be to make a troublesome switch from riding the USAF’s coat-tails and adopt the South Korean model for a BAE-led upgrade, which will integrate a different set of avionics that includes Raytheon’s RACR AESA radar instead of Northrop Grumman’s SABR AESA. Unfortunately, South Korea is still in the study phase, so even the ROKAF couldn’t tell Taiwan what’s involved in a switch. Singapore has also formally requested upgrades to its F-16 fleet, but the RSAF doesn’t seem to have decided on their exact configuration either, and their use of Israeli technology in some areas could be hard to duplicate.
Unless NGC strongly believes that Singapore will pick their SABR radar over Raytheon’s RACR, they’re the contractor with the most to lose if Taiwan’s upgrade fails. Can they deploy enough lobbying resources to keep CAPES, and hence their confirmed foothold in F-16 radar replacement? Stay tuned. Sources: Defense News, “F-16 Upgrade Dropped From US Budget Proposal, Sources Say”.
Jan 22/14: AH-64E. The China Post reports:
“The Army Aviation Special Forces Command yesterday said the grounding of the Apaches is set to be lifted in mid-February following the six-day Chinese New Year holiday that runs from Jan. 31 to Feb. 4, once they replace the main transmission boxes. So far, the command has received several batches of new main transmission boxes and has installed them in half of the 12 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters.”
A subsequent report moves that date back a bit. The groundings will be lifted during the week of Feb 10/14. Sources: Taiwan’s China Post, “Army to lift grounding order on Apache helicopters after CNY” | “Grounding order for Apache helicopters to be lifted next week”.
Jan 21/14: Size cuts. Taiwan’s Defence Minister Yen Ming (KMT Party) proposes to cut Taiwan’s military by 20%+, from a current size of 215,000 to 170,000 – 190,000. There doesn’t seem to be a firm plan, only vague statements that cuts would take place across all 3 services, “in stages contingent upon the government’s budgets, the acquisition of new weapons and demographic changes.”
The news report touts it as “the latest sign of warming ties with former rival China”, which would cast this as a foolish move. Before jumping on that, however, we’d refer readers to the demographic reference. There has been a small widening at the very bottom of Taiwan’s population pyramid lately, but the proportion of children aged 0-14 has dropped from a 1990 census of 26.9% to 15.65% in 2010. If you’re trying to recruit a military, that matters. As StrategyPage recently noted:
“Some Taiwanese politicians, desperate to find volunteers for the military have proposed that the descendants of Chinese soldiers who fled to northern Burma and Thailand after the communists won the Chinese Civil War in 1949, be granted Taiwanese citizenship if they join the Taiwanese Army…. Taiwan, like many other nations during the last two decades, is finding that moving from conscription to an all-volunteer military is not easy. For two years now the military has been only able to recruit 30 percent of the soldiers it needs to be all-volunteer by 2014.”
This issue isn’t specific to American equipment, of course, but it will affect those buys. Recruitment shortfalls usually indicate that the high-end of the recruiting pool is suffering the most – exactly the people who will be needed to operate and maintain advanced new equipment. Sources: Channel NewsAsia, “Taiwan to slash armed forces by up to 20 percent” | StrategyPage, “Attrition: Taiwan Wants To Recruit From The Lost Army”.
Jan 2/14: P-3Cs. Taiwan’s 2nd P-3C sea control aircraft arrived on Dec 12/13, but 2 more were still hung up in Guam by a malfunction in the flight control system. P-3C #3 received a fix and arrived on Dec 17/13, but #4 is still waiting in Guam as of this date.
Why the delay? No P-3C supply facility at the military base in Guam, and U.S. personnel on Christmas vacation. At least Taiwan isn’t paying for the repairs; since that’s true, we can also expect corrective action within the refurbishment process. The rest of the 2013 – 2015 delivery schedule remains intact (q.v. Oct 31/13), but Taiwan’s 40 year old fleet of 11 twin-engine S-2T Trackers won’t formally retire until 2017. Focus Taiwan, “Malfunction delays U.S. delivery of P-3C aircraft to Taiwan”.
Jan 2/13: AH-64Es. A 2nd batch of 6 attack helicopters arrives, but none of the new helicopters are cleared for flight yet. Taiwan has checked its own AH-64Es and found no obvious problems, but they’re still waiting for the US Army report that will clarify why the US AH-64E’s main transmission failed in December. Training will take place in simulators until then.
AH-64Es #13-18 will arrive in March 2014, #19-24 will arrive in May 2014, and #25-30 will arrive in July 2014. Sources: Focus Taiwan, “Taiwan to receive six more Apache choppers Thursday”.
2013Long-range radar ready; National programs to develop a new fighter and a submarine gain traction; The real American problem with submarines for Taiwan.
AH-64E
click for video
Dec 17/13: AH-64Es. Taiwan’s Army is notified of a main transmission failure in a US Army AH-64E attack helicopter. They respond by grounding all 6 Apache helicopters, pending a full investigation by the U.S. into the cause of the malfunction. Sources: Defense News, “Taiwan Grounds New US-Made Apache Helos Over Malfunction Fears” | Focus Taiwan, “Taiwan to receive six more Apache choppers Thursday”
AH-64Es grounded
Dec 17/13: BMD Radar. Raytheon IDS in Sudbury, MA, has been awarded a $6.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price, cost-reimbursement contract modification to create a testing environment related to the Taiwan Surveillance Radar program. The TSR is a huge, fixed radar installation based on an improved version of the PAVE PAWS system, used to track ballistic missiles thousands of kilometers away. Taiwan reportedly shares its data with the USA.
The technical term for this contract is “follow-on support string upgrade engineering change proposal.” In English, they’ll create a controlled site-like testing environment in the USA to test modifications, and perform system troubleshooting. You certainly don’t want to use the main radar for that. Work will be performed in Sudbury, MA and is expected to be complete by Nov 8/17. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/HBNA at Hanscom AFB, MA manages the contract (FA8730-13-C-0003, PO 0005). The same contract was also posted on Dec 13/13.
Dec 9/13: Submarines. Taiwan’s United Daily News reports that defense minister Yen Ming and Navy Command Headquarters chief Adm. Chen Yung-kang are strong supporters of a made-in-Taiwan submarine program. Partisan wrangling over the USA’s request for a NT$ 10 billion “contract design fee” (about $340 million) is generally seen as the key obstacle to progress on the 2001 sale approval, but the report also cites:
“…the U.S. Navy’s reluctance to build diesel-electric submarines at a U.S. shipyard because it fears that Congress would ask it to buy the conventional submarines to save money if an American shipyard had the capability to build such a ship.”
Taiwan’s shipbuilding industry association is scheduled to come up with a comprehensive assessment report by June 2014, and the military is reportedly doing its own due diligence in parallel. This won’t be easy. Taiwan would need to update its ship design technology, and would neither either considerable help or external sources for torpedoes, sonar, propulsion systems, combat systems, and submarine periscope lenses. Sources: FOCUS Taiwan, “Talk of the Day — Taiwan thinking of building its own submarines”.
Nov 13/13: On the list. Submarines remain high on Taiwan’s agenda, but they aren’t the only items. The ROCN will replace 2 of its FF-1052 Knox Class anti-submarine frigates in 2014, using 2 refurbished FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates. The rest may be replaced with local catamaran corvettes that have more of a surface warfare bent. The ROCN also seem to like the new minehunters, as they reportedly want to build some local MCM ships based loosely on their 2 new Ospreys. That’s a smart decision, and feasible for smaller shipyards.
Taiwan’s Marines reportedly want to buy another 48 AAV-7 amphibious personnel carriers, bringing their total fleet to 102 and allowing them to retire their ancient LVTP-5A1s.
The Air Force would like precision strike weapons, but if they’re thinking in terms of JDAM-type weapons, that won’t help them get inside Chinese air defenses. They’ll probably need to use their own weapons for that, and JDAMs are approved for export but the Air Force has delayed the purchase until 2014 or later. The ROCAF plans to go outside the USA entirely for its new jet trainer, but replacements for the AIDC AT-3 Tzu Chung have been canceled before. The last AT-3 was delivered in 1990, but South Korea’s T-50 family is reportedly quite tempting. China has been antagonizing South Korea lately, and a TA-50 sale would also provide Taiwan with a local interceptor and light attack jet. Sources: Defense News, “Taiwan Still Hungry for More US Arms”.
Nov 4/13: AH-64. Taiwan’s first 6 AH-64E attack helicopters have been re-assembled in Taiwan’s Kaohsiung Harbor, after arriving by ship. Four were flown to the Aviation and Special Forces Command in Tainan’s Guiren Township for initial flight testing, and the other 2 will arrive as part of the official ceremony on Nov 7/13. The US reportedly asked Taiwan’s military authorities not to reveal the AH-64E’s cockpit layout or configuration in its public display. If only it were that easy (q.v. Oct 28/13).
The helicopters will become operational in April 2014, with Guiren Air Force Base in Tainan serving as a training and basing focal point. More than 60 Taiwanese pilots and maintenance personnel returned to Taiwan in August 2013, after completed 20 months of training in the USA that will let them act as instructors. Still, there were limits, which echoed circumstances surrounding the delivery of Taiwan’s AH-1W Cobras over a decade ago:
“While Taiwanese pilots and maintenance personnel managed to get a full understanding of the aircraft software and hardware, the pilots were unable to obtain training in certain special flight skills. The Taiwanese trainees were asked to leave the classroom or training site whenever the American instructors were giving lectures on certain critical courses or special flight maneuvers, the officials said.”
They’ll have to figure those out on their own. A 2nd batch of Apache helicopters is scheduled for delivery in late December 2013, and 3 more batches of 6 will complete deliveries by the end of 2014. Sources: Focus Taiwan, “Taiwan takes delivery of first Apache choppers” | Focus Taiwan, “Talk of the Day — AH-64E Apache choppers debut in Taiwan” | Flight International, “Taiwan receives first batch of AH-64E Apaches” | Focus Taiwan, “Apache choppers to bolster Taiwan’s combat capability: expert”.
AH-64Es arrive
Oct 31/13: P-3Cs. President Ma Ying-jeou yesterday touted the P-3’s capabilities, during an official ceremony at Pingtung Air Base. The delivery schedule is supposed to fly in planes #2-4 by the end of 2013, planes #5-9 in 2014, and #10-12 in 2015, when the full P-3 squadron will be commissioned. Taiwan’s aged S-2Ts are scheduled to be decommissioned by 2017. Sources: Taipei Times, “President hails P-3C patrol aircraft”.
Oct 26/13: Espionage. Taiwan’s MND announces that a Major and 12 other officers are under investigation for selling details concerning Taiwan’s upgraded E-2C 2000 (aka. E-2K) AEW&C air surveillance planes. The last 2 planes only arrived in Taiwan on March 8/13.
E-2Ks aren’t the most modern version, but they are the most widespread type in the US Navy, so compromising their radar system or battle management system is a problem for the US Navy, as well as for Taiwan. National Party Rep. Ting Shou-chung acknowledged to Voice of America that this kind of leak could make the USA more reluctant to share advanced technology with Taiwan, but basically, it’s too late to fix the damage. Poor security has been a problem in Taiwan for some time now (q.v. Additional Readings). Even so, recent years have seen authorization and delivery of the USA’s most modern attack helicopters (AH-64E) and air defense missiles (PATRIOT PAC-3), a large ballistic missile defense radar, and some of America’s most modern AESA fighter radar technology for Taiwan’s F-16s. More significant technologies aren’t likely to be available to Taiwan anyway, the USA can’t take back what’s already given, and it’s more than unlikely that the USA would derail existing contracts. Sources: MND announcement [in Chinese] | Epoch Times, “Taiwanese Major Sells Military Secrets to China”.
Espionage: Hawkeye 2000 compromised
Sept 23/13: P-3Cs. Taiwan will be receiving its first P-3Cs at Pingtung AB within the next day or two, depending on Typhoon Usagi’s progress and course. Four of the 12 planes are expected by the end of 2013.
Subsequent reports indicate that the plane arrived on Sept 25/13. Sources: Taipei Times, “P-3C maritime patrol aircraft to arrive in Taiwan”.
Aug 8/13: AH-64E. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $92.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, as part of Taiwan’s AH-64E buy and associated support. The Pentagon says that this brings the cumulative total face value of this contract to $716.7 million. The original DSCA request, including 30 helicopters, weapons and 6 years of support, had a maximum of $2.532 billion (q.v. Oct 3/08).
FY 2009 procurement funds are being used, which was the year Taiwan placed the order. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL acts as Taiwan’s agent (W58RGZ-09-C-0147, PO 0025).
SABR AESAJuly 31/13: F-16s. Raytheon’s RACR AESA may have won the South Korean F-16 upgrade contract, but refits for Taiwan and the US military will use Northrop Grumman’s SABR instead. It will also become the standard radar for Lockheed Martin’s “F-16V” new-build/ upgrade offering, replacing Northrop Grumman’s own APG-80 AESA used in the F-16E/F.
The Taiwanese deal still needs a firm radar contract, but this is a 10-figure combined opportunity. It’s a huge win for Northrop Grumman, whose AESA radars also equip USAF F-22A (APG-77) and global F-35 family (APG-81) fighters. Northrop Grumman.
SABR AESA radar picked
July 28/13: Submarines. US Under Secretary of Defense James Miller responds to Rep. Robert Andrews’ [D-NJ] letter by repeating what we already know. Taiwan’s government approved full funding for an American study re: diesel submarine design and feasibility in 2008, but the State Department and Pentagon still haven’t agreed to conduct one.
He adds, disingenuously, that “Taiwan has not submitted any requests for technical assistance or export licensing support pertaining to a submarine program.” First, the State Department’s DSCA would have to allow such a request to go forward to the Pentagon. Second, export licensing support and technical assistance would have their parameters defined by a feasibility study. Taipei Times.
May 14/13: Support. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. in Hurst, TX receives a maximum $85.4 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, foreign military sales (FMS) contract for engineering and technical support services to Iraq and Taiwan. Orders will be placed as required.
Iraq operates Bell IA-407s, and also has a handful of UH-1N twin-Hueys. Taiwan’s heliborne strike force currently relies on OH-58D Kiowa Warrior scouts and AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, and a dwindling stock of aging single-engine UH-1H Hueys remains the backbone of their utility helicopter fleet. It’s reasonable to assume that most of these funds will be spent in Taiwan.
The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 1 bid received by US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-13-D-0131).
April 25/13: PATRIOT PAC-3. Deputy Defense Minister Andrew Yang says that Taiwan has already deployed a PATRIOT PAC-3 battery in the north, which is ahead of the expected 2014 date. He adds that Taiwan will deploy the next 3 PAC-3 batteries in the south. Focus Taiwan.
April 24/13: AH-64. A $19.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, as part of Taiwan’s order for AH-64E helicopters and related support. The Pentagon says that this order brings the total cumulative face value of this contract to $624.4 million, of the maximum $2.532 billion noted in the October 2008 DSCA request. DID is having a hard time squaring that with known announcements.
Oddly, the Pentagon’s notice cites FY 2009 procurement contract funds as the source; presumably, they’re referencing Taiwan’s original order funding. The US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL acts as Taiwan’s FMS agent (W58RGZ-09-C-0147, PO 0022).
April 9/13: Keep an eye out. It didn’t take long for Taiwan’s long range mountaintop radar in Hsinchu County to come in handy. The Americans have reportedly asked the ROCAF to strengthen radar sweeps toward Northeast Asia for possible missile launches, and relay surveillance information. The Hsinchu radar is in the BMEWS class, with the ability to detect and track ballistic missiles from a range of up to 5,000 km. China Post.
UH-60M OFTApril 8/13: UH-60M. L-3 Link Simulation & Training announces a contract for 2 Taiwan Army UH-60M Operational Flight Trainers (OFTs). The contract is the result of a letter of agreement between the U.S. and the Taiwan Army, and is the 1st export of their UH-60M OFT. The 1st trainer will be operational at Shinshou Training Facility in Q4 2014, and the 2nd will follow in Q1 2015. A companion contract provides for 1 year of support, with a 1-year extension option. The US Army’s Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI) will manage the purchase as Taiwan’s agent.
The OFTs are mostly similar to those used in the US Army’s Flight School XXI program. A 6-degree of freedom electric motion system is coupled with a supplemental motion system that simulates helicopter vibration. High-fidelity software is designed to accurately simulate each platform’s engine, electrical, hydraulic, navigation and communications systems, and even aircraft survivability equipment. It’s even compatible with night vision goggles. The big difference will be a Taiwan geo-database, for faithful reproduction of flights over their home terrain.
April 5/13: As the US DSCA submits South Korea’s request for stealth-enhanced F-15SE Strike Eagles and F-35A stealth fighters, US-Taiwan Business Council president Rupert Hammond-Chambers points to that process as a clear example of the political weakness in Washington. “The threats the [South] Korean air force face are the same as those of Taiwan’s air force,” and the argument that China could easily ground Taiwan’s F-16s by staging a massive missile attack on air bases applies equally to North and South Korea. Taipei Times | Read “Korea’s F-X Multi-Role Fighter Buys: Phases 2 & 3” for full coverage of South Korea’s fighter modernization.
March 13/13: Beyond F-16s. Citing a newly released quadrennial defense review, Taiwan’s media say that the ROCAF wants to step beyond their upgraded F-CK-1s, and develop a new fighter with features like lower radar cross-section, long-range, and aerial refueling receiver, as well as the ability to launch missiles against land targets or ships.
Taiwan’s military currently estimates that the fighter and small submarine development programs will cost about NT$500 billion (about $16.9 billion). Which means they’ll be lucky to keep the real total below $20 billion. Senior officials are also careful to add that they haven’t given up on getting more F-16s, which could squeeze development budgets for something new.
On the other hand, Liberty Times quotes KMT Legislator Lin Yu-fang statements that “For our national survival, we need to build up our defense capability under our own steam,” as a result of the USA’s increasing reluctance to assist Taiwan. Focus Taiwan.
March 13/13: Submarines. Taipei’s MND responds to reports that Taiwan has given up on buying new submarines abroad, by confirming that they’re “reviewing the relevant plans and budgets” for a 4-year local development project that was brought to the TWD 7 billion (about $236 million) National Defence Industrial Development Foundation in late 2012.
The ROCN actually foresees a budget closer to TWD 10 billion (about $340 million) to fund design, equipment acquisition, building industrial capability, and testing for a 1,000t – 2,000t submarine. Even that figure seems awfully low for a country that hasn’t built submarines before, and probably won’t be able to use an existing design as a base. Asia One.
March 8/13: E-2 AWACS. The last 2 upgraded Hawkeye 2000s arrive at Kaohsiung International Airport Station in southern Taiwan for follow-up tests and inspections (q.v. Nov 8/11 entry). This completes Taiwan’s E-2T Hawkeye upgrades, and restores its militarily critical AWACS fleet to full strength. Focus Taiwan.
All E-2 upgrades delivered
Feb 19/13: P-3s. StandardAero-San Antonio Inc. in San Antonio, TX receives a $10.6 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification, exercising an option for the overhaul of 16 T56-A-14 propulsion systems for the Government of Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales Program.
That model of the T56 is unique to the P-3 family, and that number of engines would equip 4 refurbished P-3s. Or serve as fleet spares, which is more likely.
Work will be performed in San Antonio, TX and is expected to be complete in February 2014. All funds are committed immediately, and the US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ manages the contract on behalf of its FMS client (N00019-09-D-0014).
Feb 8/13: P-3s. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training in Owego, NY receives a $9.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to incorporate engineering change proposals (ECPs) in Taiwan’s 12 P-3 aircraft. Upgrades will improve both Harpoon Block II compatibility, and improved radar and signals emission location.
Specifically, the ECP implements the Complimentary Navigation Message, which updates RINU-G and Control Display Unit software with a message set that helps the radar/GPS guided Harpoon Block 2 Missile with precision targeting. They’ll also replace the standard AN/ALR-95 Electronic Support Measures system with the more advanced AN/ALR-97. The final modification upgrades technical publications to reflect the “Mode-T” software instead of the “Mode “4” software.
Work will be performed in Owego, NY (31%); Jacksonville, FL (18%); Van Nuys, CA (16%); Aberdeen, MD (14%); Cedar Rapids, IA (13%); McKinney, TX (3%); Marietta, GA (3%); and Woodland Hills, CA (2%), and is expected to be complete in February 2014. All Foreign Military Sales contract funds are committed immediately, and will be managed by the US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ on behalf of their ROC client (N00019-09-C-0031).
Feb 1/13: Long-Range Radar. Agence France Presse reports that Taiwan’s US-made long-range early warning radar is now deployed near the northern county of Hsinchu, on its mountaintop perch. The NT$40.9 billion (about $1.35 billion at 2013 conversions) project loks similar to existing Pave Paws stations, and reportedly has a 5,000 km range. The added warning time for ballistic missile attacks is just minutes, but it matters a bit more when minutes were all you had before. The ability to add a bigger picture view on top of the short range PATRIOT radars is very important for national command and control.
As a bonus, the radar’s ability to see into Chinese airspace, and even to monitor North Korean launches, makes it an equally valuable asset to the USA. If Taiwan decides to share that data, which is a reasonable assumption, it becomes a more valuable ally. AFP.
SRP long-range radar deployed
2012F-16 upgrade program begins; A domestic submarine program?; Budget for 4 frigates in 2013?; Stinger missiles; Harpoons prepped.
F-16V
click for video
Oct 24/12: Planes? No tanks. Defense Minister Kao Hua-chu tells a legislative hearing that the cost of Taiwan’s F-16 upgrades is the reason for delays to tank purchases and self-propelled artillery upgrades. He adds that before requesting the 70-ton M1s, they would have to conduct a compatibility evaluation on the country’s infrastructure, such as roads, highways and bridges.
It’s certainly possible for large purchases to squeeze out less important items, within a defense budget. Then again, it’s also pretty common for a party that doesn’t really want to implement stronger defenses to use this sort of thing as an excuse to avoid doing what needs to be done. The KMT’s recent record makes it hard to tell which interpretation is the truth. Focus Taiwan.
Oct 1/12: F-16s. Lockheed Martin announces a contract valued at up to $1.85 billion to begin upgrading 145 ROCAF F-16A/B Block 20 fighters to the “F-16S” (not T?) configuration, including an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, embedded global positioning, electronic warfare upgrades, and other avionics improvements. Note Lockheed’s use of the word “begin”; the complete upgrade is very likely to cost more than $1.85 billion.
The F-16S upgrades will follow the Sept 21/11 DSCA request, which Lockheed Martin has firmed up into a global offering. The firm’s proposed F-16V was announced at Singapore’s airshow in February 2012.
Contract: F-16 upgrade
Sept 5/12: Minehunters. The ROCN plans to spend TWD $35.9 billion ($1.2 billion) to buy 6 domestically built minehunting ships over a 12-year period, but that budget has yet to obtain final legislative approval:
“Although information on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) mine warfare capabilities remains sketchy, naval analysts, including James Bussert of the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia, believe each of the three PLAN fleets comprises one squadron of mine layers. The US Navy estimates the PLAN uses as many as 30 types of mines (including submarine-launched) and has an inventory of between 50,000 and 100,000…. Taiwan has strategic oil reserves of approximately 1.45 million kiloliters of crude, which would last the nation for about 30 days. Besides disrupting shipments of crude and natural gas, which could bring Taiwan to a standstill, the mining of Taiwanese harbors and waterways would severely undermine the confidence of global cargo fleets and thereby cause serious damage to Taiwan’s economy.”
The question is whether they will build their own design to accompany the new Osprey Class (q.v. Aug 2-10/12), or a foreign design. Sources: Taipei Times, “Taiwan plans to build six minehunting Navy ships”.
Aug 28/12: PATRIOT. The Taipei Times reports that new PATRIOT PAC-3 defense sites will begin construction in September 2012 around Greater Taichung and Greater Kaohsiung cities. A private contractor will handle the NT$ 61.4 million (about $2 million) contract, but the move has a significance that’s out of proportion to its size.
The PAC-3 systems would join Taiwan’s 3 upgraded PAC-2/ Config-3 units, currently deployed around the capital city of Taipei in Wanli, Nangang, and Sindian. The 4 new PAC-3 batteries from the October 2008 notification are reportedly being considered for a number of sites, including Greater Taichung’s Dadu Mountain, Greater Kaohsiung’s Jenwu District, Greater Tainan’s Hutoupi, protection for Taiwan’s E-2 2000 Hawkeye early-warning planes at Pingtung’s airport, and possibly the small airport terminal at Chiayi. About 386 missiles have been ordered so far, and the full PAC-3 systems are scheduled to arrive in 2014-2015. Another 2 PAC-3 batteries would follow under the 2010 DSCA request, as part of a future purchase phase.
Aug 2-10/12: Minehunters. Taiwan’s 2 Osprey Class minehunting ships arrive after their 2-year refurbishment and training period in the USA, and are inducted into the ROCN in welcoming ceremony at the Zuoying naval base, in the southern port city of Kaohsiung.
Taiwan’s fleet of minehunters now numbers 10 ships, but these are by far the newest and most capable. Designed in the 1990s instead of the 1950s, Osprey Class ships are equipped with an array of mine-hunting devices including Raytheon AN/SQQ-32 sonar, remotely-operated AN/SLQ-48 Mine Neutralizing Vehicles (MNV), video sensors, remotely-controlled mine detonators, cable cutters, and a pair of .50 caliber machineguns. The minehunters have a cruising speed of 10 knots, and mission endurance of 15 days. China Post | Taiwan Today | Defense Update.
2 Minehunters arrive
Aug 3/12: P-3s. The good news is, a Taiwanese P-3C Orion aircraft recently completed its 1st functional trial flight in late July 2012, and Taiwan should begin receiving its new P-3C sea control aircraft in 2013. The bad news is, the military’s plan to build a hangar at an air base in Pingtung County in southern Taiwan has gone nowhere.
The ROCAF says that the new planes could be placed in C-130H hangars, but that isn’t a long-term solution. The problem appears to be lack of jurisdictional clarity between the ROCAF and Navy over who will control the planes, and hence who will issue the RFP. Focus Taiwan.
July 24/12: Tanks. The Taipei Times reports that Taiwan is looking to join countries like Morocco, and try to obtain refurbished M1 Abrams tanks. The tanks used in Iraq and Afghanistan need major maintenance overhauls, and one option for the Army would be to sell the tanks to allies, and let them pay for the RESET costs.
“Ministry of National Defense spokesman Major General David Lo… told local media yesterday that efforts to acquire used battle tanks from the US were currently under evaluation… Deputy Minister of National Defense Chao Shih-chang… [said] the Army was seeking to procure 200 tanks to bolster its forces, adding that the great bulk would be deployed in Hukou Township… [with] the 584th Armored Brigade… Taiwan’s efforts to procure the 70-tonne main battle tank go back to the early 2000s, when it requested M1-A2s from the US, a request that Washington turned down.”
July 13-22/12: Upgrade MoU signed. Reports indicate that the US and Taiwan have signed the $3.7 billion MoU to upgrade Taiwan’s F-16s, with upgrades occurring at a rate of 24 fighters out of service at a time, beginning in 2016 and continuing to 2028. The actual Letter of Acceptance (contract) is expected to be finalized within a couple of months, but it has a number of reported twists and conditions that are puzzling.
One of the oddest is that Taiwan will have no say in which radar (Northrop Grumman SABR or Raytheon RACR) is picked in 2013-2014, and then installed. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin’s recent agreement with state-run AIDC appears to have shut BAE out of the picture, without the opportunity to compete or be evaluated.
Another odds proviso is that Taiwan won’t recover it’s engineering costs to integrate the new AESA radars, if the US Air National Guard adopts the same radar and methods to retrofit its own F-16s. Taiwanese sources told Defense News that the MoU allows “some” reimbursement if other F-16 customers adopt the same retrofit. The most likely near-term customers are Korea and Singapore. AIDC [in Chinese] | Defense News | Defense Update | Reuters India (abridged) | Reuters, via Aviation Week.
July 11/12: LMCO-AIDC MoU. At the 2012 Farnborough Air Show, Taiwan’s AIDC and Lockheed Martin sign a memorandum of understanding to expand their strategic relationship, and jointly explore opportunities for the Taiwan F-16 A/B Retrofit Program.
The MOU defines potential collaboration on F-16 retrofit modifications, F-16 component parts manufacture and other potential offset projects. Its practical effect is to shut BAE Systems out of any competition (vid. March 14/12 entry). Lockheed Martin | Reuters.
F-16 upgrade MoU
June 25/12: F-16s. Reports from Taiwan indicate that the Ministry of National Defense is giving the USA’s May 2012 draft Letter of Acceptance for F-16 modernization some hard thought, as it screens the items and prices in the USA’s rumored $3.8 billion response. A decision is expected by the end of July.
The United Evening News reports that the $600 million cost for the AESA radars in particular has created unease among “senior government officials,” who are reportedly asking for other options. There’s certainly precedent for installing previous-generation APG-68v9 radars in early-model F-16s instead, as is being done for Pakistan. It would be a major improvement on Taiwan’s current radars, and equal other F-16C/D Block 52 fleets around the world, but would remain a generation behind AESA performance. Both Raytheon and Northrop Grumman are touting their RACR/SABR next-generation radars as drop-in refits for older F-16s, but Taiwan is being told that additional system engineering work would be required. The Pentagon has reportedly promised to remit some of those custom design costs, if other countries choose to add AESA radar systems to their F-16A/Bs in the future. The China Post | Focus Taiwan | Agence France-Presse.
May 29/12: AH-64 helicopters. Boeing in Mesa, AZ received a $97.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification “of an existing contract to procure Block III Apache AH-64D attack helicopters in support of Foreign Military Sales.” Which means Taiwan. Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/17. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by the U.S. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-09-C-0147).
This brings total ROC Apache Block III contracts to $683.8 million so far, of the maximum $2.532 billion noted in the October 2008 DSCA request. This current total includes equipment like fire control radars and air-launched Stinger missiles, which were part of that request.
May 17/12: Minesweepers. Taiwan’s CNA reports that the former USS Oriole and USS Falcon Osprey Class coastal minehunting ships are scheduled for delivery to Taiwan in July after being refitted and reactivated. They are due to be commissioned into service in October 2012.
May 17/12: F-16s. The US House of Representatives approves Rep. Kay Granger’s [R-TX-12] amendment to the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310), which requires the Obama administration to approve the sale of 66 new F-16s to Taiwan. It’s 1 of 19 amendments that passes on a voice vote, before the House passes HR 4310.
Granger’s amendment is companion legislation to her House Bill (H.R. 2992) that “Directs the President to carry out the sale of no fewer than 66 F-16C/D multirole fighter aircraft to Taiwan”, and to Sens. Cornyn and Menendez’ Taiwan Airpower Modernization Act of 2011 (S.1539). Unless the Senate also passes a similar amendment to the 2013 budget, however, it won’t matter. Neither HR 2992 nor S 1539 has passed individually, and the final 2013 defense budget needs to pass both the House and the Senate with the same text. The wording is also somewhat questionable, as the President isn’t really the decider, and can always offer the excuse that the State Department never forwarded a request. Which is true – the State Department is blocking that request. Forcing approval of that request, either by State’s DSCA or via legislation removing this request from DSCA’s hands, might have been a better tactic. Rep. Granger | The Hill.
May 6/12: UH-60Ms. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT received a $43.2 million firm-fixed-price contract for engineering services, to convert 4 more UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters “to the specific unique configuration for Taiwan.” In other words, to finish the 4 helicopters bought on June 30/11. This brings the total cost of those 4 helicopters to $91.8 million, or $23 million per machine so far.
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, with an estimated completion date of Oct 31/14. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by Taiwan’s FMS agent, the US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-08-C-0003).
4 UH-60Ms
May 2/12: Link-16. Data Link Solutions in Cedar Rapids, IA receives a $9.4 million firm-fixed-price delivery order to Taiwan of MIDS-LVT terminals, as a Foreign Military Sale transaction.
Work will be performed in Wayne, NJ (50%), and Cedar Rapids, IA (50%), and is expected to be complete by Dec 31/14. This contract was competitively procured via FBO.gov and the SPAWAR E-commerce website, with 2 offers received. The competition was real, as Taiwan has shifted its buys back and forth over time. US Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in San Diego, CA manages the contract, on behalf of its FMS client (N00039-10-D-0031).
April 27/12: F-16s. Sen. John Cornyn [R-TX] has lifted his hold on the confirmation of former Obama aide Mark W. Lippert, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. It comes after Obama’s Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs, Robert L. Nabors II, sends a letter that promises to consider sales of new F-16s to Taiwan. Careful reading shows that this is all it promises, and Obama’s former aide will play a large role in any decisions. Unless there’s another reason to believe in a policy about-face, therefore, it’s unreasonable to expect any change, despite this language:
“We understand your desire to see Taiwan’s air force modernized with the addition of new F-16C/Ds… especially given the pending retirement of F-5s… [The new ASD] would use the position as the U.S. Chair of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Review Talks and the interagency Monterey Talks to oversee the development of a combined review of Taiwan’s long-term defense strategy and resourcing plan, to include on Taiwan’s air and missile defense needs… We recognize that China has 2,300 operational combat aircraft, while our democratic partner Taiwan has only 490… The Assistant Secretary, in consultation with the inter-agency and the Congress, will play a lead role as the Administration decides on a near-term course of action on how to address Taiwan’s fighter gap, including through the sale to Taiwan of an undetermined number of new U .S.-made fighter aircraft.”
April 22/12: More frigates? Media reports say that Taiwan may look to increase its fleet of FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates from the current set of 8. The defence ministry has reportedly briefed President Ma Ying-jeou, and is said to be ready to include a budget for 4 more in 2013.
These frigates are generally sold for very little money, except the cost of refurbishment. Taiwan’s FFG-7 frigates are fully armed, and include the original pop-up launcher for SM-1 air defense and Harpoon ship attack missiles. The US Navy has removed missiles from its own frigates, however, so adding them back would be part of the refurbishment contract, if Taiwan wants that. Bangkok Post. See also Aug 5/10, Jan 10/10.
March 20/12: Cracked AMRAAMs. The Taipei Times reports that the ROCAF currently has 120 AIM-120C-5 and 218 AIM-120C-7s in inventory, with deliveries that began in 2004. Unfortunately, some of them were experiencing cracking in their pyroceramic radome nose cones. American investigators concluded that Taiwan’s high humidity, plus the pressure created by supersonic flight, were the problem. The ROCAF will respond by improving storage and rotation cycles.
The Taipei Times does note that Taiwan’s radar-guided MBDA MICA and locally-built Tien Chien II missiles aren’t having this problem, despite being exposed to the same conditions.
March 14/12: F-16s. Lockheed Martin and BAE are both pushing to perform Taiwan’s F-16 upgrades, as part of a wider competition in this area between the 2 firms. BAE’s recent wins in providing fire-control and advanced ethernet capabilities for 270 US ANG F-16s, and upgrades for some Turkish F-16s, sends notice that Lockheed can expect competition in Taiwan, South Korea (up to $1.6 billion for 134 KF-16s), and Singapore (70 F-16C/Ds).
Taiwan will be a challenge for BAE, because its armed forces and government have a long-standing relationship with Lockheed Martin that they may be loath to jeopardize. Defense Update.
March 13/12: Thai Submarines. Thailand has dropped plans to buy 4 second-hand German U206A submarines, and let their option rights expire on Feb 29/12. Reports say that Thai Defence Minister Sukumpol Suwanatat refused to approve the deal, after several reviews of the navy’s submarine purchase plans.
The tiny 550t submarines are especially well-suited for shallow, constricted waters and near-coast operations. They’re old, but they’d fit Taiwan’s needs extremely well, offering a bridge buy whose layout and plans would also help teach Taiwanese designers. Or, the stealthy, shallow-water U206s may find another global buyer who values their unique specialties, and has a near-term need. Colombia has already bought 2 of the 6 submarines available. Europe Online.
Feb 27/12: Submarines. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense officially denies a magazine report saying that Taiwan was going to buy Greece’s U214 Papanikolis Class submarines, since Greece couldn’t pay.
The Hong Kong-based Chinese-language magazine, Asian Week (probably “Yazhou Zhoukan”), added that HDW officials has visited Taiwan in October 2011, and been told that a deal was possible for under $800 million each, plus 10-20 years guaranteed support, and US approval. The report added that HDW had officially informed the US about the proposal. Taipei Times.
UGM-84 HarpoonFeb 22/12: Harpoons for subs. Modernizations will allow Taiwan’s navy to arm its 2 submarines with UGM-84 Harpoon missiles, beginning in 2013. The move will greatly increase their submarines’ reach, allowing attacks from up to 70 miles away. That makes it much harder for enemies to protect themselves against a submarine attack, by widening the required search field.
Taiwan already equips its F-16s and some navy ships with other variants of this missile, but a submarine’s stealth adds a new level of difficulty for Taiwan’s enemies. Local reports indicate that integration will involve the addition of a stand-alone fire-control system for the missiles, to avoid the added time and expense of full integration. It will also require either changes to the torpedo tube mechanisms, or conversion/addition of a dedicated torpedo tube. For tactical reasons, it’s much better to have all torpedo tubes missile-capable, as this allows fast salvos of multiple missiles. Since firing a missile announces the submarine’s presence and location rather loudly, attacks on well-defended naval groups (like, say, an invasion force) will be much more effective as a missile swarm, rather than using the classic kung-fu movie approach where the attackers conveniently fight the defender one at a time. If, indeed, the submarine lives long enough to keep launching more attacks. See also July 29/10 entry. Taipei Times | 9abc | India’s Zee News.
Sub modernization
Feb 21/12: Submarines. The Taipei Times reports confirmations from the ROC Navy that it will begin a domestic submarine program in 2013, with “assistance from one or a number of foreign countries”, in order to create a small 1,000t – 1,500t design. The goal is reportedly to deliver a prototype within 3-4 years, and the ROCN would reportedly seek budgets for the program within 2 months.
Semi-native sub program?
Feb 13/12: PATRIOT. The USA’s FY 2013 budget documents include information about Taiwan’s PATRIOT PAC-3 missile orders. Looking through past years as well, one sees 386 PAC-3 missiles ordered from FY 2010-2013: 96 in FY 2010, 96 in FY 2011, 154 in FY 2012, and 40 missiles for FY 2013.
Feb 7/12: Minesweepers. An article about the Iranian mine threat to the Strait of Hormuz notes that the former US Navy Osprey Class minehunting ships Oriole and Falcon have been authorized for sale to Taiwan (vid. Jan 29/10 entry), but are still being refurbished in Texas.
Jan 5/12: Stingers. Raytheon Missile Systems in Tucson, AA receives a $7.8 million firm-fixed-price contract, to buy FIM-92H Block 1 Stinger missiles for Taiwan. The designation FIM-92H refers to FIM-92D missiles, which have been upgraded to the current FIM-92 RMP Block I standard. They can be used with air-to-air launchers on helicopters, or they can equip troops on the ground.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/16. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by Taiwan’s contract agents at US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-09-C-0520).
2011$5.3b F-16 upgrade program; Taiwan is a security risk for secrets; Political dogfight over F-16s in USA; Taiwan to try building submarines itself?; Major PATRIOT missile buy; AH-64D Block III attack helicopter buys; Upgraded E-2 surveillance planes returning; 1st 4 UH-60M helis ordered; Plans for new torpedoes.
ROCAF F-16A Block 20
fires AGM-65 Maverick
(click to view larger)
Dec 30/11: PATRIOT. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Andover, MA receives a $34.3 million firm-fixed-price contract, providing initial funding for 3 Taiwanese Patriot fire units and training equipment. DID is investigating possible connections to the Dec 16/11 announcement.
Work will be performed in several locations within Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, Italy, Greece, and Canada, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 31, 2016. One bid was solicited, with one bid received. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract, incl. services as Taiwan’s agent (W31P4Q-12-C-0069).
Dec 30/11: PATRIOT. Lockheed Martin in Grand Prairie, TX receives a $606 million firm-fixed-price and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for FY 2012 PATRIOT requirements – which includes missiles, launchers, and ground support for Taiwan. Within the PATRIOT system, Lockheed Martin produces the PAC-3 missile, the missile canister 4-packs, a fire solution computer, and the Enhanced Launcher Electronics System (ELES).
Work will be performed in Grand Prairie, TX; Camden, AR; Lufkin, TX; Chelmsford, MA and Ocala, FL, with an estimated completion date of July 30/15. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by US Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract, as Taiwan’s FMS agent (W31P4Q-12-C-0002).
Dec 30/11: AH-64D. Longbow Limited Liability Corp. in Orlando, FL receives an announced $64.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, but Longbow LLC pegs its actual value at $181 million, with options to extend performance past 2015, to 2017.
It’s said to include 15 Longbow Block III Fire Control Radar assemblies for Taiwan’s AH-64Ds, marking the Block III version’s 1st export order.
For the US Army, the order includes 14 Block III Radar Electronics Units, which are smaller then their predecessors, and offer lower weight, maintenance and power requirements. The Army is also buying 14 Unmanned Aerial System Tactical Common Data Link Assembly (UTA) systems and spares, which provide a 2-way, high-bandwidth data link that lets the helicopter crew control nearby UAV flight paths, sensors and lasers at long ranges, while receiving high-quality imagery from the UAVs on the helicopters’ own displays.
Work will be performed in Orlando, FL, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/15. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract, including its work as Taiwan’s FMS agent (W58RGZ-10-C-0005). Lockheed Martin | Northrop Grumman.
Dec 30/11: AH-64D. Raytheon Missile Systems in Tucson, AZ receives a $13.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to fund FIM-92H Block-1 Stinger missiles and their air-to-air launchers for Taiwan. China’s near-certain air superiority in the event of a conflict makes aerial combat weapons for Taiwan’s attack helicopters a smart move. Their maneuverability and near-earth flight profile would make them a very difficult foe for many fast jets.
Taiwan’s DSCA request was for up to 173 missiles, which will be used on its AH-64 helicopters (q.v. Oct 3/08 entry). A $45.4 million contract has already ordered 171 of the missiles, plus ancillary equipment that included 24 of 35 requested Stinger Captive Flight Trainers with live guidance systems, but no rocket motors (q.v. June 25/09).
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/16. One bid was solicited, with one bid received. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract, as Taiwan’s FMS agent (W31P4Q-09-C-0520).
Dec 27/11: E-2s. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $6.9 million delivery order modification exercising an option for sustainment, engineering and technical services, and travel in support of ROCAF E-2Cs.
Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (70%), and Pingtung Air Force Base, Taiwan (30%), and is expected to be completed in January 2013. The US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract on behalf of its FMS client.
Dec 19/11: E-2s. Taiwan gets 2 of its E-2Ts back as Hawkeye 2000s. The arrival of the 2 planes in Kaohsiung city brings their fleet size back to 4, with 2 more still in the USA for upgrades. Taiwan News.
Dec 16/11: PATRIOT. Raytheon announces a $685.7 million Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract from Taiwan for additional PATRIOT fire units, featuring current electronics, an improved man-machine interface, and claims of lower life-cycle costs. The firm adds that this award is in addition to the 2009 contract for new systems, and the 2008 contracts to upgrade Taiwan’s existing systems. Work under this contract will be performed at Raytheon’s Integrated Air Defense Center in Andover, MA; El Paso, TX; and Huntsville, AL.
When queried, the firm clarified that this order will be built from the ground up as PATRIOT PAC-3, and that “fire unit” means the complete system, including radars, generators, antenna, ECS command module, and missile launchers. Taiwan is already beginning to build experience with the equipment, as Raytheon recently delivered the first upgraded Configuration-3 radar system, 10 months ahead of the original requested program plan. See also Taipei Times.
Major PATRIOT contract
Dec 15/11: Submarines. More reports that Taiwan is moving toward its own submarine program, per the Sept 19/11 entry below. The story adds one expert’s recommendation that the money and time might be spent on fast-attack missile boats like the Chinese Type 022. Which would be a good recommendation, if standard combat scenarios weren’t assuming PLAAF control of the air over the Formosa Straits.
The Taipei Times also reports that Taiwan turned down a proposed 2003 deal to buy up to 8 Sauro Class boats from Italy as they were decommissioned. The Fincantieri submarines had entered service between 1980 and 1992, which means they would have had limited remaining service life, and Taiwan decided that it was better not to buy them. Unfortunately, no deal for new submarines turned up.
Dec 7/11: AH-64 helicopters. Boeing in Mesa, AZ received a $141.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for “services in support of 30 Apache AH-64D attack helicopters for Taiwan.” See also the June 10/11 and Oct 8/10 entries for that order.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/17. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by the U.S. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL, who is acting as Taiwan’s agent (W58RGZ-09-C-0147).
Dec 7/11: BMD Radar. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA receives a $42.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price contract for the Surveillance Radar Program. Specifically, this system includes a UHF phased array radar integrated with Taiwan-furnished Identification Friend-or-Foe beacons; 2 Missile Warning Centers; and communications and interface architecture and protocols to specific nodes within Taiwan’s military communications infrastructure, consistent with US restrictions
The SRP is a Foreign Military Sales Program managed by the USAF Electronic Systems Center at Hanscom AFB, MA, to provide Taiwan with the elements of a missile and air defense capability. Work will be performed in Sudbury, MA, and is expected to be complete by Nov 9/12 (FA8722-05-C-0001, PO 0062).
Dec 7/11: PATRIOT. Raytheon in Andover, MA received a $12.7 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee, and cost-reimbursable contract. The award will modify an existing contract for technical services in support of Taiwan’s PATRIOT air defense missile system.
Work will be performed in El Paso, TX, and Taipei, Taiwan, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/15. by the U.S. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL, who is acting as Taiwan’s agent (W31P4Q-11-C-0317).
Nov 8/11: E-2s. Taiwan ships its 3rd and 4th E-2T Hawkeyes to the USA for upgrades to Hawkeye 2000 configuration (vid. Oct 3/08 entry). The move leaves Taiwan without any operational E-2Ts, as the first 2 planes aren’t expected to return from their upgrades until the end of 2011.
In their absence, the ROCAF does have 2 newer E-2C+ Hawkeye 2000s to rely on, but the move remains a calculated risk. Taiwan News.
Oct 5/11: PATRIOT. Raytheon IDS in Andover, MA receives a $20.4 million firm-fixed-price and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, to provide PATRIOT technical assistance services to Taiwan. Work will be performed in El Paso, TX; Taipei, Taiwan, and Andover, MA; with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/15. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W31P4Q-11-C-0317).
Nov 18/11: F-16 dogfight. Sen. John Cornyn [R-TX] sends a letter to President Obama, that also clarifies Taiwan’s current position re: the F-16s:
“Shortly after your Administration announced the F-16 A/B upgrade package, I wrote to President Ma to ask him for clarification on Taiwan’s military requirement for new F-16C/Ds. On Oct. 14, I received an unequivocal response, stating that Taiwan needs both the upgraded F-16A/Bs and the new F-16C/Ds to fulfill its “self-defense needs in qualitative and quantitative terms.” The sale of new F-16C/Ds to Taiwan also has the backing of 47 Democrats and Republicans in the Senate and 181 Democrats and Republicans in the House of Representatives who this past year have sent letters of support to your Administration. In your recent speech to the Australian Parliament, you stated that “The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay.” I applaud this rhetoric, but it will ring hollow unless it is followed by meaningful action…”
Nov 14/11: A day after the New York Times publishes an editorial urging President Obama to sell out Taiwan, Rep. Ed Royce [R-CA-40] tells a Formosa Foundation group in Los Angeles that Congress is not contemplating abandonment. That may seem like harsh language, but the New York Times op-ed reads:
“President Obama… should enter into closed-door negotiations with Chinese leaders to write off the $1.14 trillion of American debt currently held by China in exchange for a deal to end American military assistance and arms sales to Taiwan and terminate the current United States-Taiwan defense arrangement by 2015.”
“Sell out” is a perfectly appropriate description. New York Times | Taipei Times.
Pakistani F-16D-52Sept 21/11: F-16 Block… 59s? The US DSCA issues up to $5.95 billion in ROCAF F-16 related upgrade and support requests, over 3 separate notifications. The procedure for Foreign Military Sale mode requests is that if Congress doesn’t block the sale within 30 days, negotiations and contracts can commence. The US military is technically the buyer and contract manager, but they do so on behalf of their FMS client. The exact DSCA requests include:
Pilot Training: Many foreign militaries train their combat pilots in the USA, taking advantage of America’s larger swathes of open airspace for training, and of training alongside combat-proven American pilots. Taiwan already trains its F-16 pilots at Luke AFB near Glendale, AZ, and a buy request worth up to $500 million would continue funding this program over the long term.
The training provides a “capstone” course that takes experienced pilots and significantly improves their tactical proficiency. Funding would cover flight training, supply and maintenance support, spare and repair parts, support equipment, program management, publications, documentation, personnel training and training equipment, fuel and fueling services, and other related program requirements.
L-3 Communications Corporation in Greenville, TX would be the lead contractor for this service, but there would be about 90 U.S. contractors providing various forms of aircraft maintenance and logistics support at Luke AFB. US DSCA [PDF].
Spare Parts: This Foreign Military Sales Order II program (FMSO II) request would provide funds for blanket spare parts orders, under the Cooperative Logistics Supply Agreement (CLSSA), to support Taiwan’s F-16A/B Falcon, F-5E/F Tiger II, and F-CK IDF Ching Kuo fighters, and C-130H Hercules transport aircraft. The estimated cost is up to $52 million.
Procurement of these items will be from many contractors providing similar items to the U.S. forces, and implementation of this sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives. US DSCA [PDF].
RACR retrofitF-16 Fleet Retrofit: This request [PDF] would retrofit up to 145 F-16A/B Block 20 fighters. The technologies involved in some aspects of this retrofit are something of a surprise, as they go beyond the new F-16C/D Block 52 aircraft Taiwan was said to be looking for – a type that was recently sold to China’s ally Pakistan. These retrofits are more advanced than that, rising to a technology level that would be ahead of any F-16 the USAF flies, and similar to (but not the same as) the UAE’s unique F-16E/F Block 60 Desert Falcons.
The estimated cost is up to $5.3 billion. The most advanced gear includes:
Other performance improvements would involve:
To improve the plane’s offensive performance, especially in ground strike mode, Taiwan wants the following ancillary equipment and weapons:
Also included in the buy request: More 20mm ammunition, alternate mission equipment, update of Modular Mission Computers, new cockpit multifunction displays, communication equipment, Joint Mission Planning Systems, maintenance, construction, repair and return, aircraft tanker support, aircraft ferry services, aircraft and ground support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and other forms of U.S. Government and contractor support.
F-16 manufacturer Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company in Fort Worth, TX would be the prime contractor, but additional contracts could include:
Taiwanese sources state that these buys would be paid for over a period of 10-12 years, once contracts are negotiated. Implementation of this sale will require at least 5 contractor representatives for engineering and technical support, over the first 2 years of the program. Another 2 trips per year will be required for U.S. Government personnel and contractor representatives for the duration of the program, for program and technical support. See also: Focus Taiwan | Bloomberg | Reuters.
Sept 21/11: Reactions Sen. John Cornyn [R-TX] is among those who remain unimpressed by the upgrade offer. He has added a Senate rider that incorporates the language of his “Taiwan Airpower Modernization Act” (vid. Sept 12/11), as an amendment to H.R. 2832, the House Trade Adjustment Assistance bill that’s now making its way through Senate concurrence. The core of his disagreement is that upgrades don’t meet Taiwan’s request, and confirm Chinese influence on weapon sales that violates of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This also seems to be the widespread perception in Taiwan, though the KMT is defending the deal as expected.
Upgrades also won’t keep the F-16 production line rolling in Cornyn’s state past mid-2013, whereas a 66-plane order would add several years of continuation for about 2,000 jobs.
Cornyn’s amendment fails in the Senate. On the other hand, Rep. Kay Granger, [R-TX-12, which is Fort Worth] has introduced an S.1539 companion bill in the Republican-controlled House. If it passes there, it could find itself back in the Senate as a stand-alone bill. See also Focus Taiwan re: Taiwanese politics | Sen. Cornyn statement | Rep. Granger statement | Rep. Duncan Hunter [R-CA] op-ed | US-Taiwan Business Council [PDF] | Associated Press | Breitbart Big Peace op-ed re: security issues | Houston Chronicle | Miami Herald | Fort Worth Telegram Sky Talk re: House bill | WSJ Washington Wire || Special addition: FP magazine offers Taiwanese YouTube editorial animation videos.
DSCA: F-16 upgrade request
GR9 in Afghanistan w.Sept 19/11: Fighter Plan B – Go VTOL/STOVL! The Washington Times reports that a U.S. Defense Department study has concluded Taiwan’s best response to the threat of massive Chinese missile strikes against its airfields, is by buying short-takeoff and vertical-landing jets such as the V/STOL(Vertical/ Short Take Off and Landing) AV-8B Harrier II, or the new F-35B Lightning II STOVL(Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing capability) model. Read “Plan B: A V/STOVL Fighter for Taiwan?” for the full analysis and report.
Sept 19/11: Submarines. Focus Taiwan reports that Taiwan is considering building its own diesel-electric attack submarines:
“The military has commissioned a local shipbuilder to contact a non-U.S. country capable of building submarines for cooperation in building conventional submarines… sources said the Naval Shipbuilding Development Center has been very busy studying the blueprint of the country’s two… submarines… Moreover, naval authorities are preparing to send personnel abroad to study production technology or negotiate technology transfers for building pressure-resistant hulls, the most difficult part in submarine production, the sources said. Initially, the military may start from building small submarines weighing in the hundreds of deadweight tonnages.”
Maybe they can get a real deal from Germany for its 500t U-206As?
Sept 14/11: F-16 dogfight. Foreign Policy magazine reports that Sen. John Cornyn will not stall Senate confirmation of Ashton Carter as the Deputy Secretary of Defense. That kerfuffle had nothing to do with the Taiwanese sale; instead it involves assurances of Carter’s full support for the F-35 program, which faces strong budget pressures, and is assembled in Fort worth, TX.
Sept 12/11: F-16 dogfight. Amid rumors that the Obama administration will refuse Taiwan’s F-16 request, Sens. John Cornyn [R-TX] and Robert Menendez [D-NJ], introduce S.1539, The Taiwan Airpower Modernization Act of 2011. It would remove the decision from the administration’s hands, and force the USA to approve the sale of 66 new F-16s to Taiwan. This would not force a sale itself, of course, since Taiwan must choose to buy. But it would remove all approval road blocks.
The bill’s co-sponsors include Sens. Richard Blumenthal [D-CT] and Joe Lieberman [I-CT], Sens. Tom Coburn and James Inhofe [both R-OK], and Jon Kyl [R-AZ]. It has been referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who must then approve it for submission to the Senate. GovTrack for S.1539 | Bloomberg | Fort Worth Star-Telegram | Texas Insider.
Aug 30/11: Security Sieve. The Wall St. Journal publishes Taiwan is Losing the Spying Game, by Taipei Times deputy news chief and Jane’s Defence Weekly correspondent J. Michael Cole. Key excerpt:
“…another factor may be at work: the penetration of almost every sector of Taiwanese society by Chinese intelligence. For the U.S. government and defense manufacturers, any arms sale to Taiwan carries the risk that sensitive military technology will end up in Beijing… Anyone who has followed developments in Taiwan over the years knows how deeply Chinese forces have infiltrated Taiwan’s military, especially its senior officers… Taiwan’s reputation has not been helped by a string of embarrassing cases involving members of the armed forces or civilians who spied for China… Even more damaging are the instances when culprits got away with a light sentence… Whether warranted or not, Taiwan is increasingly perceived as leaking secrets like a sieve.”
Taiwanese leaks
August 17/11: F-16 dogfight. According to the Taipei Times, President Ma Ying-jeou said the island was still seeking to acquire F-16C/Ds while the Ministry of National Defense denied having been notified by Washington officials of a refusal to proceed with the sale. The US State Department is saying no decision has been made yet. Vice President Joe Biden was in China until yesterday but this issue was not on the agenda, according to the Washington Times.
August 14/11: F-16 dogfight. No sale? That’s what Republic of China MND officials say that a US DoD delegation told them at the Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition. This would confirm reports from June 2011, though the decision remains to be officially confirmed by US sources – something expected to happen by October 1st. In an interview with Defense News, deputy defense minister Andrew Yang said just last week:
“If we don’t get the F-16C/Ds to replace our vintage fighters, then we lose our leverage and immediately face the challenge of fulfilling our responsibility of preserving peace and stability in the region. [..] Otherwise, the U.S. has to send its own military to replace our daily patrols in the region.”
Instead, retrofits on older F-16A/Bs are being offered, reportedly including ASEA radars, targeting pods and other upgrades. After all, even the USAF is considering upgrading its F-16 fleet to guarantee a smooth bridge until it has enough F-35s. Whether all, or only some, of the 146 jets would be upgraded appears to still be up in the air. AviationWeek | DefenseNews | Taipei Times.
July 14/11: F-16 dogfight. The US State Department is trying to convince Sen. John Cornyn [R-TX] to lift his hold on the nomination of Bill Burns as deputy secretary of state. Cornyn is demanding that the administration (and the State Department, who handles formal sales requests) clarify its policy on Taiwan arms sales first. Foreign Policy magazine.
June 30/11: UH-60s. A $48.6 million firm-fixed-price contract for 4 “green” (basic) Black Hawk helicopters and government-furnished equipment to contractor-furnished equipment in support of Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan. Work will be performed in Startford, CT, with an estimated completion date of May 30/13. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-08-C-0003).
A series of queries that ended up with the US Army have confirmed that these are UH-60Ms, and are just the basic airframes plus installation. That still leaves key items like engines (which will be installed, but are bought separately), defensive systems, training, and spares to be handled by other contracts, and leaves the prospect of modifications by the receiving country for that country to address. This is also the pattern used by Sweden’s recent CSAR/MEDEVAC buy. Note that there is a larger Taiwanese UH-60M request outstanding (vid. Jan 29/10 entry).
June 27/11: F-16 dogfight. Defense News reports that Taiwan’s June 24 petition to submit a letter of request (LoR) for new F-16 fighter jets was blocked by the U.S. State Department, under orders from the U.S. National Security Council.
Current US laws require Taiwan’s defense needs to be the sole criterion for judging military sales requests. This request could be worth more than $8.5 billion, and would extend the F-16 production line for several more years beyond its current planned closure, in 2013.
June 14/11: The Taipei Times reports that:
“A senior military official who requested anonymity said the Ministry of National Defense had been forced to return NT$1 billion (US$34 million) allotted for military equipment purchases to the national treasury because Washington was stalling on a decision to sell the submarine plans and F-16C/D aircraft long requested by Taipei… starting next year, it would only allocate the “lowest operational necessity” costs for the potential purchase of the submarine plans and F-16C/Ds, the official said, adding that the funding would very likely be lowered to about US$10 million and become symbolic funding rather than actual funding. This does not mean that the Republic of China government has grown pessimistic about or is no longer interested in acquiring the F-16C/Ds and submarine plans from the US, the official said…”
June 10/11: AH-64s? Reports surface that Taiwan has signed a contract for 30 AH-64D Apache Longbow Block III attack helicopters under its Sky Eagle program, making it the type’s 1st export customer.
Per earlier contracts & requests, Taiwanese AH-64s will include Hellfire Longbow fire-and-forget light strike missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles among its weapon options. In exercises, helicopters have proven to be very challenging opponents for fixed-wing aircraft, and the growing aerial imbalance over the China Strait makes some form of aerial engagement capability a necessity for any Taiwanese attack helicopter. The Dec 3/08 DSCA entry set a maximum estimated price of $2.532 billion for 30 helicopters, all associated equipment and initial support, and requested stocks of Stinger and Hellfire Longbow missiles.
US Army AH-64 project manager Col. Shane Openshaw is quoted as the source for the news, and says that Taiwan’s helicopters will be delivered from 2012-2013. The contract signing is consistent with April 2011 reports, and this will be treated as the full contract signing – but see also April 12/11, Oct 8/10, July 26/10, April 12/10, June 25/09, and Oct 3/08 entries, plus Flight International | Rotorhub | Asian Skies blog.
AH-64E attack helicopter order
May 26/11: F-16s 45 American Senators (out of 100) write to President Obama, supporting Taiwan’s request to buy 66 F-16C/D Block 50/52 fighters, in order to help keep pace with China’s buildup. Its authors include Senate Taiwan Caucus heads Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and James Inhofe (R-OK), as well as Senate China Working Group leaders Mark Kirk (R-IL) and Joe Lieberman (I-CT). Expressed concerns include both the imbalance created by China’s buildup of advanced fighters, and the economic benefits of the F-16 production line. The President is expected to ignore the letter, however, and the US State Department continues to stall the necessary approvals for the request to go forward. Full text [PDF] | Foreign Policy magazine | Flight International.
May 24/11: Harpoons for subs. US FBO.gov discusses the ongoing effort to arm Taiwan’s 2 submarines with Harpoon missiles:
“The Naval Air Systems Command, Precision Strike Weapons – PMA-201, intends to award a sole source contract to The Boeing Company, St. Louis, MO, for the acquisition of Encapsulated (ENCAP) Harpoon Certification Training Vehicle (EHCTV) Servicing Site and Weapons Station (WS) Support Equipment (SE) in support of the Taiwan Navy ENCAP Harpoon program. It is anticipated that a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) delivery order against Blanket Ordering Agreement N00019-11-G-0001 will be issued. This acquisition is being pursued on a sole source basis under the statutory 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.302-1, only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. It is anticipated that a Firm-Fixed Price type contract will be issued. THIS NOTICE IS NOT A REQUEST FOR COMPETITIVE PROPOSALS.”
May 23/11: Submarines. Taiwan’s government denies that it has backed off of its program to buy 8 diesel-electric submarines, amidst reports that the program has been scaled down to 4 boats. The USA agreed to the 8-boat sale in 2001.
Nevertheless, the main problem remains, no matter how many are ordered. Despite policy papers from think-tanks like the neo-conservative AEI, The USA doesn’t produce diesel-electric submarines, and the countries who do make them have been too intimidated by Chinese threats of trade retaliation to supply them. Asia Times believes the rumors may be a political ploy by the Ma KMT government, which sees its support slipping before the 2012 elections and knows that defense is a weak issue. Floating the rumor and then responding looks like action, though it changes nothing. Iran’s Press TV | Asia Times.
May 16/11: Torpedoes. Taiwan’s military reportedly plans to budget $860 million to purchase new Mk54 and Mk48 torpedoes over the a 10-year period.
$300 million will reportedly be used to buy 600 Mk54 lightweight torpedoes, replacing existing Mk46s. They’re designed to launch for ships, and from aircraft like Taiwan’s incoming P-3C Orion sea control planes.
Another $160 million will be spent on the purchase of 40 Mk48s, replacing the existing German-made SUT heavyweight torpedoes Taiwan acquired with its 2 Hai Lung II (Zvaardis) Class subs built by the Netherlands. Another $400 million would cover 100 Mk48s, if Taiwan finds a way to source and purchase the 8 diesel-electric submarines it wants. See also July 20/10 entry, Focus Taiwan.
May 10/11: Defense committee member Rep. Lin Yu-fang [Nationalist Party] is quoted as saying that Taiwan intends to push back the due date for buying Patriot missiles from 2014 to 2017, and postpone buying Black Hawk helicopters from 2016 to 2019-2020. He says that those monies will be spent instead on the transition and recruitment costs associated with scrapping conscription, and fielding an all-volunteer force by 2015.
Defense Ministry spokesman Luo Shou-he cited the reason as production delays by U.S. defense contractors, but the contractors don’t seem to think so. Agence France Presse, via My Sinchew | AP, via Washington Post.
April 12/11: Defense News reports that representatives from the U.S. government and Boeing will arrive in Taipei in May 2011, to wrap up the AH-64 Block III Foreign Military Sale deal. Author Wendell Minnick.
March 23/11: P-3 MPA. CAE announces a series of military contracts in more than 10 countries valued at approximately C$ 100 million, including a contract to build P-3C training devices for the Taiwan Navy. They’ll design and manufacture a P-3C Level D operational flight trainer (OFT) as well as a P-3C operational tactics trainer (OTT) for the P-3’s sensor operators. Both training devices will be delivered to Taiwan in 2014.
Feb 17/11: AMRAAM missiles. Focus Taiwan covers a ROCAF report on the May 2010 AMRAAM International Users’ Conference, in which the USAF’s 649th Armament Systems Squadron raised the issue of “Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS).” In English, that means people who manufacture some parts of the missile are either going out of business or ceasing production. The 649th ARSS said component shortages could begin as soon as 2012, and recommends that countries revise their AMRAAM support contracts to include maintenance and warranty clauses.
The longer term hope is to issue contracts for Raytheon to develop replacement components, as part of a joint logistics support plan extending to around 2030. Taiwan will join some other AMRAAM users in raising the issue of humidity, which makes it harder to store and maintain the missiles, and could accelerate their spares problem.
Jan 6/11: P-3C. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors Tactical Systems in Eagan, MN receives a $47.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for the initial outfitting of 12 Taiwanese P-3Cs with new avionics components.
Work will be performed in Eagan, MN, and is expected to be complete in December 2012. The US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ manages the contract, on behalf of its foreign Military Sales customer (N00019-09-C-0031).
2010USA’s non-public Direct Commercial Sales process now open to Taiwan; Major $6+ billion FMS request for 60 helicopters, 2 minehunting ships, sub-launched missiles & PATRIOT air defense upgrades; AH-64 helicopter buy; Sub-launched Harpoon missile buy; ATACMS ballistic missile buy; Up to 20 “Search & Rescue” helis; E-2C early-warning aircraft upgrades; We could use some new tanks; Military balance keeps tilting against Taiwan. ATACMS from M270
Dec 30/10: E-2C. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $6.6 million delivery order modification, exercising an option for engineering, technical and sustaining services in support of Taiwan Air Force E-2C aircraft under the Foreign Military Sales program.
Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (75%), and at the Pingtung Air Force Base, Taiwan (25%), and is expected to be complete in December 2011. The US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract on behalf of its Foreign Military Sale customer (N00421-05-G-0001).
Dec 26/10: P-3C. The China times in Taipei reports that Taiwan will receive its first P-3C Orion sea control aircraft in 2011. They end up being about 2 years ahead of themselves. Agence France Presse.
Dec 23/10: E-2 Hawkeyes. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives an $11.9 million firm-fixed-price delivery order to convert 2 E-2T aircraft into E-2C Hawkeye 2000 aircraft. These efforts will also support the transition to an anticipated performance based spares & maintenance solution for the aircraft.
Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY, and is expected to be complete in September 2012. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract on Taiwan’s behalf (N00019-10-G-0004).
Dec 23/10: Missiles. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Grand Prairie, TX receives a $916.2 million firm-fixed-price contract, with some cost-plus-fixed-fee contract line item numbers. They’ll provide 226 ATACMS missiles; 24 launcher modification kits; ground support equipment; contractor field support; and initial spares in Foreign Military Sales to United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan.
This order is probably deliberately ambiguous. ATACMS missiles are used with tracked M270 MLRS (2 pods) and FMTV medium truck-mounted M142 HIMARS (one pod) systems, with the ATACMS missile replacing all 6 of a pod’s 227mm rockets. In exchange, it offers a GPS-guided strike range of around 150 miles – which could technically cross the Taiwan Strait at its narrowest points, but in practice would be limited to the very useful ability to hit any target in Taiwan from a central firing location.
Taiwan doesn’t operate the HIMARS systems the UAE has purchased, or the MLRS. On the other hand, its 57 Thunderbolt 2000 systems mounted on HEMTT heavy trucks do carry rocket pod options that include 2 sets of 6 227mm rockets each, which indicates potential ATACMS compatibility. The UAE’s latest DSCA request included 100 ATACMS missiles and 60 training rockets, but a 2006 request could cover another 200 missiles. This leaves Taiwan’s actual ATACMS order ambiguous, pending more direct clarification.
Work will be performed in Grand Prairie, TX; Lufkin, TX; Ocala, FL; Camden, AR; and Chelmsford, MA, with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/13. One bid was solicited with one bid received by U.S. Army Contracting Command, AMCOM in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-11-C-0001).
DSCA: ATACMS missiles
Oct 8/10: AH-64 order. Boeing in Mesa, AZ receives a $141.7 million firm-fixed-price contract for 31 AH-64D Apache helicopters and 2 fixed-site Longbow crew trainers, matching “the Taiwan AH-64D aircraft configuration.” Work is to be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of July 30/15. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by the US Army’s AMCOM Contracting Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-09-G-0147).
This is just the initial contract. The amount is enough to get work started, but won’t even come close to paying for 31 helicopters. See April 12/10, and also Oct 3/08, which identified the helicopters as AH-64D Block IIIs. Past experience, and the specifics of this Pentagon announcement, strongly imply that Taiwan’s AH-64D Block IIIs may not be the same as other nations who order the type.
Sept 13/10: Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control in Dallas & Grand Prairie, TX received a $7.8 million firm-fixed-fee and cost-plus-fixed fee contract for PAC-3 FY 2010 subset efforts to include the following: United States enhanced launcher electronics system kit cables; Taiwan control interface circuit card assembly redesign; Taiwan power and control circuit card assembly redesign; Taiwan missile test set; Taiwan portable four-pack test set; Taiwan seeker digital processor parts; United Arab Emirates (UAE) portable 4-pack test set; UAE guidance processor unit redesign – tooling and test equipment.
The estimated completion date is Oct 31/12, with work to be performed at Dallas, TX (95.74%), Camden, AZ (0.25%), and Ocala, FL (4.01%). One bid was solicited and one bid received (W31P4Q-10-C-0002).
Sept 6/10: BMD progress. Taiwan expects its initial missile defence shield to be ready in 2011, including 6 batteries of Patriot PAC-3 missiles, a “long-range early warning radar system,” and an integrated command and control system that also incorporates its own “Tien Kung” missiles. The China Times places the overall cost at about T$ 300 billion (currently about $9.39 billion), with about T$ 150 billion going toward the Patriot systems and T$ 40 billion to the long-range radar. Agence France Presse.
Aug 12/10: DCS OKed. The U.S. Department of State confirms that it will allow U.S. companies to make a number of defense sales to Taiwan as Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), instead of as Foreign Military Sale (FMS) packages. Items expected under $100 million or so in expected DCS deals include support for Taiwan’s air defense radar system, and an improved radar for its F-CK Ching-kuo fighters.
For Taiwan, DCS sales have 2 big advantages over FMS transactions. One is that they don’t have to pay middleman fees to the US military units who must oversee and manage the entire process. If the item in question can be competitively sourced and is well-understood, that can lower costs. The other, bigger advantage is that they don’t require the same level of public notification and political approval, which gives them a lower political profile. See the “Additional Readings” section below, for more on the differences between DCS and FMS sales. Taiwan’s CNA | CNA follow-up.
FMS, or DCS
Aug 5/10: Frigates. Reports surface that America will sell Taiwan 2 more refurbished FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Class Perry frigates for $40 million. On the other hand, “The Ministry of National Defense declined to comment on the report and a spokeswoman at the American Institute in Taiwan said she was not aware of it.”
The ROC Navy already operates 8 similar FFG-7 derivative Cheng Kung Class frigates, alongside its 6 high end Kang Ding Class Lafayette derivatives. AFP via Taipei Times | Pakistan’s The News International
July 29/10: Harpoon order. A $66 million firm-fixed-price contract for:
Work will be performed in St. Charles, MO (55.3%); McKinney, TX (10.7%); Toledo, OH (6.2%); Huntsville, AL (4.5%); Lititz, PA (3.7%); Middletown, CT (2.7%); Grove, OK (2.3%); Galena, KS (1.6%); Minneapolis, MN (1.5%); Motherwell, UK (1.2%); Elkton, MD (1.1%); Kirkwood, MO (1%); Anniston, AL (0.8%); Clearwater, FL (0.7%); McAlester, OK (0.6%); Melbourne, FL (0.6%); and various locations in and outside the contiguous U.S. (5.5%). Work is expected to be complete in June 2011. This contract was not competitively procured (N00019-10-C-0053).
Harpoon missiles
July 26/10: Hellfire missiles. The Longbow, LLC joint venture in Orlando, FL received a $39.5 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for engineering services supporting the Hellfire and Hellfire Longbow missiles. Work is to be performed in Orlando, FL (50%); Baltimore, MD (25%); United Arab Emirates (10%); and Taiwan (15%), and will run to Sept 30/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, AMSAM-AC-TM-H in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-10-C-0256).
The Hellfire Longbow missile is a fire-and-forget version of the Hellfire anti-armor missile. Unlike the semi-active laser guided Hellfires, Hellfire Longbow missiles rely on millimeter-wave guidance, and work in conjunction with the mushroom-shaped Longbow radar mast that’s mounted on top of the AH-64D attack helicopter’s rotor. Taiwan became a Hellfire missile customer in 2005, but doesn’t operate the Longbow variant yet.
July 20/10: Radars. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA receives a $29.2 million contract modification for the surveillance radar program, which aims to provide Taiwan with elements of its missile and air defense system. This is a foreign military sales program managed by the 850th ELSG/PK at Hanscom Air Force Base, MA, and $8,324,987 has been committed (FA8722-05-C-0001, P00073).
July 20/10: Taiwan’s Liberty Times reports that Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou ordered the country’s defense ministry to draft a draw up a shopping list of weapons Taiwan needs. It reportedly includes MK-54 lightweight torpedoes to replace aging Mk-46s, “dozens” of M1A2 tanks, and amphibious landing vehicles. Taiwan’s current tank corps is headlined by a set of about 480 M60A3 Patton tanks, which are 1960s-1970s technology, and a larger set of M48 variants, whose design dates from the early 1950s. UPI.
July 19/10: Tilting balance. A report sponsored by Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense, and published in Taiwan’s naval studies journal, estimates that China will increase the number of short- and medium-range missiles pointed at the island to 1,960 by the end of 2010. That would rise from the last current count of 1,300-1,400. The report estimates that these missiles would have the ability to destroy 90% of Taiwan’s infrastructure. AP | Reuters | RTT News | Taiwan News.
This day also marks the start of an annual computerized wargame by Taiwan’s military, simulating an invasion by China. During the 5-day drill, Chinese forces attack from Guangzhou and Nanjing, while Taiwanese forces test counter-attack strategies. eTaiwan News | Agence France Presse.
June 23/10: E-2s. Taiwan News reports that upgrades are beginning for Taiwan’s E-2T fleet of early warning aircraft. The ROCAF retains 2 E-2Ts and 2 newer E-2C+ Hawkeye 2000s, but it sent 2 “folded and wrapped” E-2Ts by truck from Kaohsiung’s Hsiaokang Airport to the city’s port under heavy escort, for loading onto a Taiwanese freighter and shipment to the USA.
Upgrades are being done in batches of 2, and are expected to finish up in 2012, at a total cost of NT$ 5.6 billion (currently about $175 million). See also July 21/09, Oct 3/08.
E-2 upgrades
June 1/10: Patriot. Raytheon Co. in Andover, MA receives a $21.3 million firm-fixed-price contract, covering spares for Taiwan’s PATRIOT Config-3 upgrade, and for Kuwait’s Patriot radar upgrade.
Work will be performed in Andover, MA, with an estimated completion date of June 30/13. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W31P4Q-09-G-0002).
April 30/10: Patriot. BAE Systems in Sealy, TX received a $5.6 million firm-fixed-price contract for 8 of its M1086A1P2 and 9 of its M1A096A1P2 Patriot vehicles with Patriot kits installed for the country of Taiwan, as well as 7 M1088A1P2 FMTV tractor-trucks, for a total of 24 vehicles purchased with this modification. Work is to be performed in Sealy, TX, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/10. One bid was solicited with one bid received by the TACOM Contracting Center in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0460).
Taiwan appears to have chosen FMTV medium trucks, as opposed to the Oshkosh HEMTT heavy trucks used by the US Army. While Oshkosh will own the next FMTV medium truck contract as well, BAE Systems retains the rights to key variants, and are currently the only production source for FMTV vehicles.
Chinese Type 022April 12/10: Corvette. Taiwan unveils a proposed design for a 1,000 tonne “carrier killer corvette,” as some media sources describe it. The catamaran design looks a lot like China’s current Type 022 catamarans, but would be armed with Taiwanese Hsiungfeng III ship-to-ship missiles. At this point, the project itself is not a firm decision, and could be built locally (most likely) or become a foreign tender.
While fast attack craft with advanced ship-killing missiles are always dangerous to carriers, they are also very dangerous to amphibious assault groups in an invasion scenario. Other potential uses could include coastal patrol, and even acting as a naval “cavalry screen” against China’s Type 022s, in order to buy space for American naval forces. See: Naval OSINT (with picture) | Defense News | Manichi Daily News, Japan | Singapore Straits-Times | UPI.
April 12/10: AH-64s. Defense News reports that a contract for 30 AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters is expected to be signed in May 2010, for arrival in Taiwan between the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013. Focus Taiwan.
March 16/10: Tilting Balance. The U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission holds a public hearing on “Taiwan-China: Recent Economic, Political, and Military Developments across the Strait, and Implications for the United States.” Much of the debate surrounds Taiwan’s remaining request for F-16s, either implicitly or explicitly. Mark Stokes, of Project 2049, lays out a framework for thinking about these issues in his testimony:
“Aerospace power will become an increasingly powerful instrument of PRC coercion… Aerospace power likely will dominate any conflict in the Taiwan Strait and could shape its ultimate outcome… The cross-Strait security situation often is viewed within the context of a military balance. However, PLA capabilities should be judged against specific political objectives in a given scenario and assessed in light of Taiwan’s vulnerabilities, as well as assumptions upon which U.S. decisions… are made… An amphibious invasion is the least likely yet most dangerous scenario… Coercive strategies could include a demonstrations of force as seen in the 1995/1996 missile exercises, 1999 flights in the Taiwan, or in the future a blockade intended to pressure decision makers in Taiwan to assent to Chinese demands, strategic paralysis involving attacks against the islands critical infrastructure, limited missile strikes, flights around the island, just to name a few.
A coercive campaign could be geared toward inflicting sufficient pain or instilling fear in order to coerce Taiwan’s leadership to agree to negotiations on Beijing’s terms, a timetable for unification, immediate political integration, or other political goals. Military coercion succeeds when the adversary gives in while it still has the power to resist and is different from brute force, an action that involves annihilation and total destruction.”
See also RAND’s testimony regarding the overall military balance, and the challenge of Chinese missile salvos aimed at RoCAF air bases. Hearings page | Taipei Times | WIRED Danger Room.
Feb 25/10: Javelin missiles. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL received a $21 million firm-fixed-price contract for FY 2009-2011 hardware production of Javelin anti-tank missile systems to Taiwan.
Javelin is a joint venture between Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. Work is to be performed in Tucson, AZ (50%, Raytheon), and Orlando, FL (50%, LM), with an estimated completion date of Jan 17/11. One bid was solicited with one bid received by Aviation & Missile Command Contracting Command, CCAM-TM-H in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-09-C-0376). See also Oct 3/08 entry.
More Javelin missiles
Feb 22/10: Tilting balance. The Associated Press receives a US Defense Intelligence Agency report (DIA-02-1001-028) that supposedly says Taiwan’s air force is not ready to withstand an attack from China. While the Taiwanese have 400 combat aircraft to serve in various roles, “far fewer of these are operationally capable.” The F-5 fleet is near the end of its combat life, and its F-16A/B Block 20s need upgrades. Its Mirage 2000v5s are the most advanced in the fleet, but they are so expensive to maintain, and have had such chronic difficulties with the aircraft’s turbine fan blades, that Taiwan is considering retiring them.
That’s significant for Taiwan’s F-16 request, because under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, decisions on Taiwan’s weapon requests must be “based solely” on judgments concerning Taiwan’s defense needs, without other political considerations. AP | Defense News | Reuters
Feb 11/10: War by other means. Democratic Progressive Party lawmaker Kuan Bi-ling alleges, and the Fisheries Agency confirms, that Chinese pressure on Indonesia has led to a government-recommended boycott of fishing vessels made in Taiwan. The economic impact is estimated at NT$ 100 million per year. The move is not a military move, but it does have some military implications. It’s both a protectionist strike in favor of China’s growing shipbuilding sector, and a way of weakening Taiwan’s breadth of expertise in that area. Taiwan News.
Feb 3/10: EC225 helicopter order. Taiwan is spending $112 million for 3 of Eurocopters’s EC225 Super Puma MkII+ helicopters in search and rescue (SAR) configuration, with an option for up to 17 more machines.
The order is carefully calculated, and the ROC government says the helicopters are for civilian use. The choice of helicopter is also careful, as China’s own Ministry of Communications already operates 2 EC225s for SAR duties, as does Japan’s Coast Guard to the east. On the other hand, EC225s could be converted to medium military helicopters quite quickly – a point that has been brought up before over Eurocopter’s EC175/ Z-15 and Z-9 joint ventures in China. France uses the military EC725 for SEA and Special Forces duties, and Mexico and Brazil have also ordered it. To this point, China has been silent concerning this order. Taiwan News | Defense News | DNA India | The Guardian, UK | Reuters.
EC225s
Jan 31/10: F-16 dogfight. eTaiwan News quotes Premier Wu Den-yih, who says that Taiwan and the U.S. are still discussing F-16s and diesel-electric submarines:
“The premier also told reporters that the government would calculate if the cost of the package announced by the U.S. was not too high. The weapons had to come at a reasonable price for a useful quality level, he said. Wu said discussions on the F-16 jets were most likely to bear fruit, while the price tag for the submarines was “scary.” …Opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen said yesterday that Taiwan’s success in achieving the arms purchase was the result of hard work by the previous DPP administration.”
Link 16 DisplayJan 29/10: DSCA – One from category A, one from category B… The US DSCA announces up to $6.45 billion in official requests to recapitalize Taiwan’s battlefield helicopter fleet with 60 UH-60Ms, complete the upgrade of its Patriot missile system to PAC-3 status with missiles and command facilities, add Link-16 capability to key assets, purchase 2 Osprey Class minehunter ships, and buy 12 Harpoon Block II test missiles.
In response, the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, released a statement condemning the move. There are reports that China will cut off military-to-military cooperation with the US, boycott Obama’s planned nuclear summit in April 2010, and even levy trade sanctions. As media like the UK’s Financial Times point out, however, growing protectionist sentiment in the USA makes trade sanctions against American firms an extremely risky move for the Chinese. China Post | Radio Taiwan International | Taiwan News | Taiwan Today | AllGov | The Australian | BBC News | UK’s Financial Times re: China’s risks | New York Times | Reuters | Times of India | Wall Street Journal | Voice of America | China Daily | China’s Xinhua | China’s Xinhua re: sanctions. See also Taiwan News: “The shadow over Taiwan’s arms procurement.”
UH-60M Black Hawks. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Taiwan’s official request for up to 60 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters to replace its aged UH-1H Huey fleet, at an estimated cost is $3.1 billion. The principal contractors will be United Technologies’ subsidiary Sikorsky Aircraft in Stratford, CT (UH-60M), and General Electric Aircraft Engines in Lynn, MA. The DSCA adds that:
“The purchaser has requested offsets; however, at this time they are undetermined and will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and contractors.”
Specific equipment sought includes:
Taiwan doesn’t operate Black Hawks yet, but its Navy operates S-70C Seahawk helicopters, so it has some experience with the general type. Implementation of this proposed sale may require the assignment of 2 contractor representatives for a period of up to 2 years.
DSCA: UH-60M request
MIDS-LVT/ Link 16: The US DSCA announces [PDF] Taiwan’s official request to buy 35 Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVT-1), 25 MIDS On Ships Terminals, plus spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, training personnel training and training equipment, repair and return, software and hardware updates, publications and technical documentation, and U.S. Government and contractor engineering and support services. The estimated cost is $340 million.
This may seem like an afterthought, but it’s actually a critical contract. MIDS-LVT terminals are a standardized way of embedding “Link 16” datalinks into ships, aircraft, and land systems. By transmitting encrypted information to each other and filtering out duplications, Link 16 allows participating platforms to see the same tactical picture – what one sees, all can see. This dramatically improves awareness amidst the inevitable “fog of war” , and can help to minimize friendly fire incidents. LVT-1 terminals are used in aircraft, as well as ground units like Patriot missile systems. They include both Tactical Air Navigation System, and voice capabilities.
The prime contractor will be selected through a competitive procurement conducted by the U.S. Government, involving ViaSat and the BAE Systems/ Rockwell Collins joint venture Data Link Solutions. Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips involving U.S. Government and contractor representatives to participate in training, program management, and technical reviews.
DSCA: Link-16 datalinks
Osprey Class minehunters The US DSCA announces [PDF] Taiwan’s official request to buy 2 Osprey Class coastal mine-hunting ships, including refurbishment and upgrade, overhaul of their AN/SQQ-32 sonars, transportation, support and test equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is $105 million.
The USA’s 12 Osprey Class mine-hunters were built from 1993-1999 out of fiberglass-reinforced plastics, in order to minimize their magnetic signature. These 804t/ 57m vessels locate mines using the high definition SQQ-32 sonar, then neutralize them using a remotely controlled UUV(Unmanned Underwater Vehicle). Despite continued threats in critical global areas like the Strait of Hormuz, and adequate performance, the Osprey Class was taken out of US Navy service in 2006-2007. Taiwan would join Egypt (2), Greece (2), Lithuania (2), and Turkey (2) as customers for these second-hand vessels. Approval for the transfer of Oriole [MHC-55] and Falcon [MHC-59] was authorized back in the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-229), but the US State Department had dithered over the request (q.v. Nov 18/09 entry).
For this contract, a U.S. Prime contractor for the refurbishment will be chosen after a competitive source selection. Implementation of this sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government personnel or contractor representatives.
DSCA: Minehunters request
Harpoon Block II missiles. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Taiwan’s official request for 12 “Harpoon Block II Telemetry” missiles. The DSCA release cites 10 “RTM-84L” and 2 “ATM-84L” missiles, which have telemetry payloads for missile tests, instead of the warheads found on standard RGM-84 (ship-launched) and AGM-84 (air-launched) variants. In addition to the missiles, Taiwan would receive containers; training devices; spare and repair parts; supply/technical support; support equipment; personnel training and training equipment; technical data and publications; and U.S. Government and contractor support.
The estimated cost is $37 million, the prime contractor will be Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis, Missouri, and implementation of this sale will not require any additional U.S. Government personnel or contractor representatives.
The Harpoon Block II could be militarily significant, because its GPS guidance and improved clutter resolution allow it to attack land targets, as well as ships. See also the Oct 3/08 entry, requesting submarine-launched Block II missiles. Taiwan is building its own “HF-2E Hsiung Feng” land attack cruise missiles with much longer ranges, however, so the Block II’s land-attack capability would not be a new military development in the region.
DSCA: Harpoon missile request
Patriot Missiles & C2. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Taiwan’s official request to complete its Patriot upgrade plans, adding PAC-3 missiles and additional command equipment.
The estimated cost is $2.81 billion, and the principal contractors will be Raytheon Corporation in Andover, MA, and Lockheed-Martin in Dallas, TX. “The recipient, which already has PAC-3 missiles in its inventory, will have no difficulty absorbing these missiles… Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government and contractor representatives.” See also Dec 23/09, Oct 16/09, Jan 26/09, and Oct 3/08 entries.
DSCA: PATRIOT missile request
Jan 14/10: E-2s. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, N.Y., received a $6 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement to provide engineering, technical and sustaining services in support of Taiwan’s 6 E-2T/E-2C+ Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft. Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (75%), and at Pingtung Air Force Base, Taiwan (25%), and is expected to be complete in January 2011. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00421-05-G-0001).
Jan 14/10: P-3C planes, shipped by land. Since the P-3 production line isn’t active any more, all 12 of the mothballed P-3s slated for Taiwan had to come from stored US Navy aircraft at AMARG’s “boneyard” near Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, AZ. The problem is that all 12 were labeled “non-flyable” due to structural fatigue, which made the 2,000 mile trip to Lockheed Martin’s refurbishment and re-winging facility in Greenville, SC, a bit of a challenge.
After considering and rejecting rail transport due to offloading and re-loading risks, the AMARG team decided to use a flatbed truck. That’s an unusual method, but it worked. Their approach has stirred interest from other P-3 operators, and even US federal government agencies. Read “Delivering Your Plane, By Truck” for more.
Jan 10/10: Frigates? Reports surface that Taiwan plans to buy 8 FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates from the USA, then outfit them with more advanced systems. Australia has already laid down a blueprint for that kind of modernization, adding SM-2 Standard and RIM-162 ESSM anti-aircraft missiles to their FFG-7 Adelaide Class frigates at great expense. But reports in the Taipei-based China Times speak of refitting the frigates with an AEGIS combat and radar system. That would break new technical ground, and may prove difficult to add, given the FFG-7 ships’ limited “growth space.” Agence France Presse | Information Dissemination.
Jan 3/10: The Washington Post adds fuel to speculation that approval of additional equipment sales for Taiwan – but not F-16s – is imminent:
“The Obama administration is expected to approve the sale of several billion dollars in Black Hawk helicopters and anti-missile batteries to Taiwan early this year, possibly accompanied by a plan gauging design and manufacturing capacity for diesel-powered submarines for the island…”
Taiwanese Patriot batteries already exist, of course, and their expansion contract is a done deal as of late December 2009. The next step is exporting the PAC-3 missiles themselves. Washignton Post | Radio Taiwan.
2009Major order for new PATRIOT missile ground systems; P-3 sea control planes ordered; Taiwan buys Stinger air-air missiles for its coming AH-64 attack helicopters.
Patriot system
(click for explanation)
Dec 23/09: Patriot SAM. Raytheon announces Foreign Military Sales contract awards totaling $1.1 billion to fund new production of Patriot Air and Missile Defense System for Taiwan. The awards include ground-system hardware through an initial contract valued at $965.6 million, and an initial spares contract valued at $134.4 million.
See the Oct 3/08 DSCA release; this is the contract for the radars, ground stations, and other ancillary equipment besides the missiles themselves. The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages this contract for new-production Patriot fire units, which will include new advances in technology, improved man-machine interfaces, and (hopefully) reduced life-cycle costs over earlier generations.
Major PATRIOT contract
Dec 10-13/09: UH-60s yes, U214s maybe? Reports surface that Taiwan will not get its F-16s approved, but will get its purchase of UH-60s approved. The reports add that a 3-way sale would let Taiwan buy U214 submarines from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems’ HDW subsidiary. Radio Taiwan International | Taiwan Today.
Nov 18/09: F-16 dogfight. Rep. Ileana Ross Lehtinen [R-FL] introduces co-sponsored bill H.R. 4102. The bill cites key provisions of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act that are not being followed, including the stipulation that weapon requests be “based solely” on judgments concerning Taiwan’s defense needs, without other political considerations. It also cites Taiwan’s expressed desire for F-16 C/D fighters, and the lack of any arms transfer notifications to Congress for Taiwan during calendar year 2009 – despite Taiwan’s expressed desire for F-16s, H-60 Blackhawk helicopters, diesel submarine design, and additional Patriot PAC-3 systems. Nor have the Osprey class minehunter coastal ships Oriole [MHC-55] and Falcon [MHC-59] been transferred, even though Congress authorized the sale of these ships in the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-229).
The bill is essentially a Congressional freedom of information request, requiring reports 90 days after enactment and at least annually thereafter, so that Congress is aware of any discussions conducted between any executive branch agency and the Government of Taiwan during the covered period; and any potential transfer of defense articles or defense services to the Government of Taiwan. This would prevent unelected agencies from using their refusal to present requests to Congress as a way to keep such sales off of the political agenda.
The bill has been referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; if it is not killed by that committee, it would proceed to a floor vote. See Taiwan Today | Bill tracking via GovTrack.
Oct 16/09: Patriot SAM. Raytheon in Andover, MA receives a $77.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for Taiwan’s Patriot hardware upgrade program. Work is to be performed in Andover, MA (8%), and Burlington, MA (15%), with an estimated completion date of June 30/15. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W31P4Q-09-G-0001).
See also the Jan 26/09 and April 23/08 entries, below.
July 21/09: E-2s. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives an unfinalized $154.1 million contract to upgrade all 6 of Taiwan’s E-2 Hawkeye AWACS aircraft from Group II configuration to the more advanced Hawkeye 2000 (H2K) export configuration. See Oct 3/08 entries for more details.
Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (40%); St. Augustine, FL (22%); Rolling Meadows, IL (6%); Dayton, OH (6%); Windsor Locks, CT (5%); Greenlawn, NY (4%); Mississauga, Canada (4%); Marlboro, MA (4%); and other various locations throughout the United States (9%); and is expected to be complete in June 2013. As Northrop Grumman is the E-2’s manufacturer, this contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-09-C-0040).
E-2C 2000 AWACS upgrade
June 30/09: F-16s. A Flight International article says that Taiwan may see progress regarding its F-16 orders:
“Taiwan’s plans to buy new Lockheed Martin F-16C/D fighters appear to be gaining some traction, with the outgoing de-facto US ambassador to the island saying that senior officials in Washington are likely to consider the issue shortly… Taiwan’s defence minister Chen Chao Min said this week that, contrary to media reports, Washington had not asked Taipei to choose between upgrades to its existing F-16A/Bs and new F-16C/Ds. Requests for mid-life upgrades for the F-16A/Bs and the new fighters are proceeding in tandem, he added.”
June 25/09: Stinger SAMs for AH-64s. Raytheon Missile Systems in Tucson, AZ receives a $45.4 million firm-fixed-price contract from Taiwan for 171 FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, 24 Captive Flight Trainers (CFT) with seekers but no rocket motors, 68 Air to Air Launchers (ATAL), 7 Launcher Circuit Evaluators, 2 Digital Launcher Test Sets (DLTS), 60 Coolant Reservoir Assemblies, 3 Launcher Emulators, one Lot of CFT Spares, one Lot of ATAL Spares, and one Lot of DLTS Spares.
The missiles will equip Taiwan’s 30 requested AH-64D Block III Apache attack helicopters; see also Oct 3/08 entries.
Work is to be performed in Tucson, AZ with an estimated completion date of July 31/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by the US Aviation & Missile Command Contracting Center at Redstone Arsenal, AlL (W31P4Q-09-C-0520).
March 16/09: Tilting balance. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry announces its defense review, including plan to cut its troop numbers by 60,000, and end the standard 12 months of compulsory military service within 5 years. This will leave the island with 215,000 troops.
The review adds that China currently has at least 1,300 ballistic missiles pointed at Taiwan, and has deployed advanced Russian-made SU-27 and SU-30 fighters near the island. Defense News.
March 16/09: F-16 dogfight. Taiwan News reports that the country intends to continue pursuing F-16 fighters. The country does not have a formal embassy in the USA, but the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) serves the same functions. TERCO spokesman Vance Chang responded to media requests by noting that the F-5E/F fighters that make up most of the country’s air force have been in service for more than 34 years.
“The planes now are obsolete and spare parts are difficult to obtain… [given China’s ongoing modernization] our air superiority capability is at a serious disadvantage.”
The U.S.-Taiwan Business Council represents about 100 companies, including Lockheed Martin. The organization’s president, Rupert Hammond-Chambers, adds that under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, the USA “has an obligation to assist Taiwan to maintain a credible defense of its air space, which includes modern fighters.” This would explain a July 2008 US Navy PACOM evaluation that deemed the F-16s militarily unnecessary, a silly position on its face but explicable if one begins from the desired political result.
March 13/09: P-3 MPAs. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors Tactical Systems in St. Paul, MN receives a $665.6 million firm-fixed-price contract for the procurement of phased depot maintenance, structural service life extension, and avionics modification to refurbish and sell 12 P-3C maritime patrol aircraft to the government of Taiwan. This contract also provides for ground handling, support equipment and publications.
Work will be performed in St. Paul, MN (50%); Greensville, SC (27%) and Marietta, GA (23%), and is expected to be complete in August 2015. This contract was not competitively procured, and is managed by the Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-09-C-0031). See also the Sept 12/07 DSCA request.
P-3C MPAs
March 11/09: F-16 dogfight. Taiwan’s speaker is quoted as saying that the US has refused to sell Taiwan 66 more F-16s for about $5 billion, in order to augment and modernize the Republic of China’s fighter defense fleet. Wang Jin-pyng was quoted as saying that:
“The U.S. doesn’t want to give them to us… They wouldn’t name a price. It’s mainly because mainland China would oppose the sale.”
See: Taiwan News | Reuters | Washington Post.
Feb 23/09: P-3 MPAs. Defense News reports that Taiwan, the U.S. Navy and Lockheed Martin have finally settled issues over price and offset options, and are to soon sign a $1.3 billion contract to refurbish and supply 12 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft. Taiwan had traditionally been opposed to buying refurbished aircraft taken from AMARC in Arizona, but re-starting the P-3C production line was not a realistic option. Lockheed Martin has re-started a production line to re-wing existing P-3Cs, however, and countries like Norway, Canada, and even the US Navy have been taking advantage of that capability to extend the service lives of existing aircraft.
Delivery of the P-3s would end the career of Taiwan’s 37 ancient S-2T Trackers, which are reportedly down to just 3 operational aircraft, even as China’s own submarine fleet grows by leaps and bounds.
Jan 26/09: Patriot SAM. Raytheon announces a $154 million Foreign Military Sales contract to upgrade more of Taiwan’s Patriot Air and Missile Defense Systems ground systems and radars from Configuration-2 to Config-3 standard, enhancing the ROC’s ability to deal with threats like China’s growing array of ballistic missiles pointed at the island.
Work under this contract will be performed by Raytheon IDS at the Integrated Air Defense Center in Andover, MA; the Warfighter Protection Center in Huntsville, AL; the Mission Capability and Verification Center at White Sands, NM, and by Raytheon Technical Services Company in El Paso, TX.
FY 2006 – 2008$6+ billion request for PATRIOT missiles & systems, new AH-64 attack helicopters, E-2 early-warning aircraft upgrades, Javelin anti-tank missiles, submarine-launched Harpoon missiles, and aircraft spares; $1.96 billion request for 12 P-3C sea control aircraft; 2 new E-2 Hawkeye 2000 early warning planes commissioned.
Oct 3/08: DSCA Shopping Lists. It would appear that the financial crisis in the USA has a silver lining for Taiwan’s military, as a series of DSCA announcements worth $6.363 billion are issued to Congress’ extended session. All export requests are listed in DSCA releases as being “…consistent with United States law and policy as expressed in Public Law 96-8. The U.S. is committed to providing military assistance under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act.”
Purchase requests include:
Ar/Missile Defense – Patriot PAC-3 [see announcement, PDF]:
See also Nov 9/07 request re: upgrading its Patriot PAC-2 batteries to be PAC-3 compatible (Config-3). The estimated cost of this request is $3.1 billion, and the prime contractors will be Raytheon Corporation in Andover, MA and Lockheed-Martin in Dallas, TX. Taiwan has not previously purchased PAC-3 missiles, but they do use PAC-2s. They will require several U.S. Government representatives for 2-week intervals twice annually, to participate in program management and technical reviews.
DSCA: PATRIOT request
Hawkeye 2000 test aircraftAr/Missile Defense – Hawkeye 2000 [see announcement, PDF]:
Taiwan already flies 2 E-2C+ Hawkeye 2000 and 4 E-2T Hawkeye aircraft for airborne early warning and control, and wants to upgrade the E-2Ts to the Hawkeye 2000 configuration used by the USA, France, Japan and others. The upgrade will include provisions for the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (Link 16 for a common battlespace picture), avionics, navigation and non-navigation upgrades, and aircraft electrical, mechanical, and survivability upgrades, all necessary hardware installations, support equipment, spares and repair parts, installation and training, publications and technical documents, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related elements of logistics and program support.
American Hawkeye 2000s also have Cooperative Engagement Capability, which allows them to provide shared battlespace pictures and targeting for properly equipped Patriot PAC-3 and PAC-2 missiles. If CEC is not included, the JTIDS/Link 16 can be used to share a battlespace picture and provide advance warning, but cannot be used for targeting.
The estimated cost is up to $250 million, and the prime contractor will be Northrop Grumman Corporation in Bethpage, NY. Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 6 contractor representatives to the recipient for a not to exceed a 5-year period.
Taiwan has requested industrial offsets with this order; they will be defined in negotiations with Northrop Grumman.
DSCA: E-2C 2000 AWACS upgrade request
Air Force – Aircraft Parts [see announcement, PDF]:
This blanket order would allow Taiwan to requisition follow-on spare parts as required to maintain its C-130H Hercules transports, F-5E/F Tiger II fighters, F-16A/B fighters, and F-CK IDF fighter aircraft. The requisitions can include communication equipment, radar, and other related elements of logistics support, as well as spares. The estimated cost is $334 million, and items will be ordered from appropriate contractors as needed.
Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government and contractor representatives to the recipient.
AH-64D w. ArrowheadArmy – Apache Longbow attack helicopters and weapons [see announcement, PDF]. Taiwan currently flies AH-1W Cobras in this role, and an attack helicopter deal has been in the works since 2002. The AH-64D beat Bell’s AH-1Z Viper on the grounds that it was battle proven, while the AH-1Z remains developmental.
Taiwan is requesting 30 AH-64D Apache Longbow Block III attack helicopters, the helicopter’s most modern configuration which is just beginning to enter service in the USA. The helicopters will be equipped with 30 Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensor (MTADS/PNVS “Arrowhead”), 17 AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars and AN/APR-48 Radar Frequency Interferometer (FCR/RFI), 69 T700-GE-701D Turbine Engines. Composite horizontal stabilators, crew and maintenance trainers, depot maintenance, all necessary support equipment, tools and test equipment, integration and checkout, spares and repair parts, training and training equipment, and other forms of support are included in the base purchase.
The request also includes applicable weapons for these helicopters: 173 FIM-92F Stinger Block I Air-to-Air Missiles, 35 Stinger air-air missile Captive Flight Trainers with live guidance systems but no rocket motors, 1,000 AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire anti-armor missiles that can use the APG-78 and their own radar’s millimeter-wave guidance for “fire and forget” capability, and 66 M299 Hellfire missile launchers.
The estimated cost is $2.532 billion, and Taiwan has requested industrial offsets; these will be defined in direct negotiations with the contractor(s). Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 2 U.S. Government personnel for a period of 6 years to provide intensive coordination, monitoring, and technical assistance. In addition, 6 contractor representatives will be in country serving as Contractor Field Service Representatives for a period of 5 years, with the possibility of a 5-year extension. The principal contractors will be:
DSCA: AH-64D request
Army – Javelin missiles [see announcement, PDF].
Taiwan wants to buy 182 more man-portable Javelin anti-armor missile rounds and 20 command launch units, plus 40 missile simulation rounds, trainers, rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, support equipment, spare and repair parts, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $47 million.
Raytheon/Lockheed-Martin’s JAVELIN Joint Venture in Orlando, FL will be the prime contractor. Implementation of this proposed sale will require a U.S. Government Quality Assurance Team consisting of 1 contractor and 2 U.S. Government representatives in country for 5 days to accomplish the initial deployment of the missiles. Taiwan won’t need more help than that, as they were one of the Javelin “fire and forget” missile’s early customers in 2002.
DSCA: Javelin missile request
UGM-84 Harpoon launchNavy – Harpoon missiles [see announcement, PDF].
Taiwan requests 32 UGM-84L Sub-Launched Harpoon Block II missiles for its 2 Seadragon Class submarines. Harpoon Block II includes GPS guidance that makes them easier to use near shore (for instance, against amphibious landing ships on final approach), and also gives the missiles some land attack capability out to their 150 mile range. Taiwan’s request adds 2 UTM-84L Harpoon Block II Exercise missiles, 2 Advanced Harpoon Weapons Control System (Version 2) for installation on the Seadragon Class, 36 Harpoon containers, 2 UTM-84XD Encapsulated Harpoon Certification and Training Vehicles, test equipment and services, spares and repair parts for support equipment, and other forms of support.
The estimated cost is $200 million, and the contractor is Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas in St Louis, MO.
The US DSCA notes that “The recipient has previously purchased both air and surface launched HARPOON missiles and will be able to absorb and effectively utilize these submarine-launched missiles.” As such, no additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives will be required.
DSCA: Sub-launched Harpoon missiles request
Sept 29/08: Taiwan News reports that:
“The Pentagon was expected to notify the U.S. Congress of its intention to sell the arms to Taiwan by the end of its current session last Friday. Taiwan has expressed worries that if the U.S. missed the deadline, the Legislative Yuan would have to start the process of approving a budget for the arms package from the start… Congress had been extended to deal with the current financial crisis, and therefore the arms deal could still be approved.
The package includes Patriot missiles, Apache helicopters, diesel-powered submarines, anti-tank missiles, submarine-launched missiles and P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, but not new F-16 fighter jets Taiwan was hoping to buy.
The U.S. State Department notified the Taiwanese media late on Friday that government departments were still reviewing the deal, and that once it was approved, Congress would be immediately notified.”
This did not sound like anything close to a sense of urgency, but events would prove otherwise. Pro-China elements in the US State Department are still blocking approval of Taiwan’s unofficial request for F-16C/D fighters.
April 23/08: Patriot SAM. Raytheon announces a $79 million Foreign Military Sales award from the U.S. Army to provide Taiwan with Patriot Configuration-3 radar upgrade kits and related engineering and technical services. This is part of a much larger order; see Nov 9/07 entry for more.
Work will be performed by Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems at the Integrated Air Defense Center in Andover, MA; the Warfighter Protection Center in Huntsville, AL; and the Mission Capability and Verification Center in White Sands, NM.
Nov 9/07: PATRIOT upgrade request. The US DSCA announces [PDF] “The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States” formal request to upgrade and refurbish their 3 existing PATRIOT fire units’ ground support equipment to the latest Army Configuration 3 under a $939 million contract. Raytheon Corporation in Andover, MA will be the prime contractor. Although the purchaser generally requires offsets, at this time, there are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale and no additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives will be required.
Obviously, this effort is less helpful than acquiring new Patriot PAC-3 missiles to add to Taiwan’s defense. Instead, they are adding Patriot PAC-3 radar and communications enhancements to Taiwan’s existing Patriot batteries, turning them into a PAC-2 GEM+ type configuration in use by a number of US allies. The PAC-2 missile is larger than the PAC-3, and uses a fragmentation warhead instead of the PAC-3 missile’s “hit to kill” approach. Patriot’s widely-touted performance during the 1991 Desert Storm operation turned out to be significantly overstated, but when coupled with PAC-3 class radars et. al., it has demonstrated useful capabilities against incoming ballistic missiles. The specific sale includes:
It also includes non-MDE (Military Designated Equipment under US Arms transfer laws) items such as
all necessary modification kits, communication support equipment, tools and test equipment, integration and checkout, spares and repair parts, installation and training, publications and technical documents, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, other related elements of logistics and program support, and 4 telemetry kits for its live fire training.
DSCA: PATRIOT upgrade request
P-3 Orion, armed –Sept 12/07: P-3 MPAs. The US DSCA announces [PDF] the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States” official request for 12 ‘excess’ P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, with strong surveillance and anti-submarine capabilities. The estimated cost is $1.96 billion. DSCA adds that:
“This sale is consistent with United States law and policy as expressed in Public Law 96-8. The United States is committed to providing military assistance under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. The recipient’s current patrol aircraft are reaching the end of their fatigue and operational service life. To maintain national security it is necessary that recipient replace these fixed-wing aircraft with an airborne operational capability for land-based maritime patrol and reconnaissance, including economic exclusion zone surveillance and protection, command and control, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-surface warfare. The recipient can absorb these additional aircraft into its inventory.”
Offset agreements associated with this proposed sale are expected, but they will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and contractors. Principal contractors include Lockheed Martin of Eagan, MN; Lockheed Martin Aircraft Center of Greenville, SC; Rockwell Collins of Cedar Rapids, IA; Raytheon Company of McKinney, TX, EDO (Condor Systems) of Morgan Hill, Ontario Canada; and L3 Wescam of Ontario, Canada. There may be up to 32 U.S. Government and contractor representatives with varying technical skills and disciplines who will be required, following the delivery of the aircraft, to provide support for 1 year after the last aircraft delivery. The exact request includes:
Plus a mobile operation command center, Command Control Communications Computer Intelligence Surveillance, Reconnaissance, (C4ISR) network integration, training devices, medical services, support and test equipment, engineering technical services, supply support, operation and maintenance training, ground support C2 facilities, documentation, spare/repair parts, publications, documentation, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related support elements.
DSCA: P-3C MPA request
April 16/06: President Chen Shui-bian presides over the commissioning of 2 E2C+ Hawkeye 2K planes recently purchased from the United States, and calls for an end to KMT blocking of his special military budget requests. The 2 new planes join 4 E-2Ts bought in 1995. China Post.
Additional ReadingsReaders with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
Background: Policy60 Years of the KC-135 Stratotanker:
Remote control Tigr firing tests:
GoPro Footage from the MiG-29 SMT:
In March 2011, MD Helicopters, Inc. in Mesa, AZ won a competition for the Afghan Air Force that could reach as many as 54 helicopters over the life of the 4 year contract, giving it an implicit value of up to $180 million. Discussions with MD Helicopters confirmed that these are MD 530Fs, designed for high altitude and/or hot weather operations, where thinner air costs helicopters some of their lift.
The MD 530F uses Rolls Royce’s 650 shp 250-C30 engine, instead of the 500E’s 450-shp 250-C20R. That drives a 5-bladed set of main-rotor blades that have been extended 6 inches, along with lengthened tail rotors on a correspondingly longer tail boom. In a typical working configuration, at a design gross weight of 3,100 pounds/ 1,406 kg and a useful load of over 1,509 pounds/ 684 kg, it can hover out-of-ground effect at 11,600 feet/ 3,536m (ISA + 20°C). An optional cargo hook is rated for 2,000 pounds/ 907 kg, and the helicopter also has a flat aft cargo compartment floor for internal loads. These may be training helicopters, but they can be repurposed for light utility tasks. MD Helicopter designs are not unknown in the military market.
Hughes’ OH-6 Cayuse/”Loach” was legendary as a light utility helicopter and gunship. OH-6s still serve with some militaries, their AH-6J/M “Little Bird” descendant is still used as a light gunship by US Special Forces’ 160th SOAR, and the MD500/530 Defender series of light attack helicopters is still in operation around the world in Israel, South Korea, and elsewhere.
The purchase and breakup of Hughes Helicopter into Boeing (AH-64 Apache, AH-6 Little Bird) and MD (civilian helicopters) badly hurt this helicopter family’s global momentum and presence, as Boeing chose to focus on the AH-64 Apache as its military offering. After its 2005 purchase and recapitalization by Patriarch Partners, MD tried to re-enter the light military segment, but losses in the US Army’s ARH armed reconnaissance and LUH light utility competitions left them still looking for a new military foothold.
Military MD-530FWhile Mexico’s Navy uses the innovative MD Explorer, whose quieter NOTAR rotorless tail design sharply lowers the advance warning given to its targets, other military export orders have been slim. The Afghan order could reverse that trend, and the fleet will now be used well beyond the primary trainer role, re-establishing MD Helicopters as a global competitor in the light utility space.
MD-530GMD Helicopters has a July 2010 Memorandum of Understanding with Boeing for the AH-6i Light Attack Helicopter [PDF], which has been selected by Jordan and bought by Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the firm is developing their own MD-530G armed scout variant, and the Afghans have given them a contract to apply the upgrade to their fleet.
MD-530G modifications begin with upgraded landing skids that can handle 3,750 pounds maximum weight. A Rhode & Schwarz M3AR tactical radio, Robertson fuel system, and Kinetic Defense ballistic armor panels follow. Mission equipment includes L-3 Wescam’s MX-10 day/night surveillance & targeting turret, and MACE Aviation’s Extended Range Weapons Wing (ER2W) with up to 4 weapon stations, linked to a MOOG Storage Management System (SMS) and other required electronics. Initial weapon options will involve Dillon Aero’s multi-barrel M134D-H 7.62mm Minigun on the inside 2 hardpoints. Possibilities for the wingtip hardpoints include FN Herstal’s HMP-400 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun Pod (400 rounds), FN’s RMP 12.7mm Rocket Machine Gun Pod (250 rounds + 3 rockets), or 7-shot 70mm rocket pods. Raytheon’s laser-guided 70mm TALON rockets can be carried on FN’s RMP, or in Arnold Defense’s M260 pod.
MD’s main global competitors are armed variants of the Bell 407, variants of Eurocopter’s EC145 and EC635 – and for advanced militaries, armed VT-UAVs like Northrop Grumman’s MQ-8 Fire Scout.
Contracts & Key Events Afghan MD-530FsAugust 29/16: The Afghan Air Force has received its final batch of four MD-530 Cayuse Warrior helicopters. Unlike the previous delivery of five, the latest units are equipped with rocket and .50 caliber firing capabilities. This brings to 27 the number of Cayuse warriors now operated by the AAF, who often engage in providing aerial escort to convoys, providing over-watch to ANDSF operations and responding to “troops in contact” situations.
January 14/16: MD Helicopters are to manufacture and deliver twelve more MD 530F Cayuse Warrior Scout Attack helicopters to the Afghan Air Force. The addition will add to the twelve already in use by the air force. The previous 2015 order saw the aircraft delivered and operational within nine months, and have already seen successful operational duty. Five training variants are also in use and have been upgraded to the Cayuse configuration. The order adds to the gradual increase in participation by the Afghan Armed Forces in running and conducting their own security operations under the eye of the US.
September 28/15: Afghan pilots flying the country’s recently-operational MD-530 helicopters have expressed criticism of the Cayuse Warrior aircraft, citing a lack of range and jamming of the twin .50 cal machine guns installed through a contract last October. The mountains bordering the helicopters’ Kabul operating base are posing a challenge for the small helicopters, with the thin air reducing lift, limiting effective range and placing Taliban operating areas out of reach.
August 13/15: Afghanistan’s armed MD-530 helicopters have been used in combat for the first time, reports indicated on Wednesday. The Afghan Security Forces announced in July that the helicopters would be equipped with rocket pods to complement .50 cal machine guns. MD Helicopters was awarded a contract in March 2011 for the first six helicopters, with an additional order for a further twelve announced in September 2014.
Oct 8/14: Investigation. The Associated Press reports that the US Dept. of Justice Department is looking into allegations that a former Army Colonel gave MD Helicopters inside information to help them win key foreign contracts that restored their offerings to the global military market. Meanwhile, the contracts remain valid.
“(Retired Col. Bert) Vergez provided [main MD investor Lynn] Tilton with details about upcoming contracts to give her company an advantage over the competition, according to internal company documents obtained by the AP and interviews with people knowledgeable of the investigation but not authorized to discuss the matter…. [his] hiring by Tilton so quickly after hanging up his uniform may have violated rules requiring that federal officials wait a year or more before receiving compensation from a company they dealt with while working for the government…. Vergez, who is no longer employed by MD Helicopters or Patriarch Partners, did not return emails and telephone calls seeking comment.”
Former MD Helicopters employees Philip Marsteller and Robert Swisher have also filed a civil suit against Vergez, Tilton and MD Helicopters / Patriarch Partners under the Federal False Claims Act, a whistleblowing law whose “qui tam” provisions would allow them to receive 10-30% of any judgement rendered. Their claim says that they warned the company that the hiring would be illegal, and notes their concern over the “level of Col. Vergez’ subservience to Tilton and his continuing involvement in MD’s Army contracts.” Sources: US Dept. of Justice, “The False Claims Act: A Primer” [PDF] | AP Big Story, “Company wins new contracts despite federal probe”.
Oct 1/14: Arm 17. MD Helicopters, Inc. in Mesa, AZ receives a maximum $44.2 million firm-fixed-price, unfinalized contract for the Afghan Air Force, to arm 17 of their MD-530F helicopters. The fleet order for enough MD-530Fs is already in place (q.v. Sept 26/14), and they’ve already created that modification: the MD-530G. $21.7 million is committed immediately.
The MD-530G is the right kind of helicopter to make a difference on Afghanistan’s battlefield, in an environment where the Afghan military is doing most of the fighting. Can they keep the helicopters running and supplied with working weapons, pilot them effectively, and hold enough ground to let the MD-530Gs work? Time will tell.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of Sept 29/15. One bid was solicited with 1 received by US Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-14-C-0081). See also AIN, “MD Helicopters To Supply ‘Cayuse Warrior’ for Afghan Force”.
Arm them
Sept 26/14: MD Helicopters, Inc. in Mesa, AZ receives a $35.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for 12 more Afghan MD-530F primary trainer helicopters, bringing announced orders to 18. Meanwhile, MD Helicopters has been finalizing its MD-530G armed scout model/ conversion. All funds are committed immediately.
Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Sept 29/15. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL is the contracting agency. The contract was announced on this date, but awarded Sept 19/14 (W58RGZ-11-C-0070, PO 0019).
12 more
May 8/12: Sub-contractors. For each new Afghan MD-530F, Cobham Aerospace Communications will supply 4 of its N301A audio controllers; Cobham Antenna Systems will provide VHF communications, VOR/LOC/GS V-Dipole, DME, and Navigation Splitter Antennas; and Cobham Commercial Systems will supply an Artex C406-2HM emergency locator transmitter. Cobham plc [PDF] | Arabian Aerospace.
Feb 21/12: A US Army article discusses the training process and personnel involved in the MD-530F effort.
Sept 13/11: MD Helicopters, Inc. presents the first 3 Afghan MD-530Fs to the U.S. Army, as part of the Rotary Wing Primary Training Aircraft-Afghanistan Program.
Sept 7/11: MD Helicopters, Inc. in Mesa, AZ receives a $14.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to provide logistics support and flight training devices for the Afghan Air Force’s MD 530Fs. Work will be performed in Shindand, Afghanistan, with an estimated completion date of March 31/16. One bid was solicited for this, with one bid received by U.S. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-11-C-0070).
AAFMarch 14/11: MD Helicopters, Inc. in Mesa, AZ wins an initial $19.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for 6 new primary training helicopters, 2 corresponding flight training devices, and critical spare parts for the Afghan Air Force.
That initial order could reach as many as 54 helicopters over the life of the 4 year contract, giving it an implicit value of up to $180 million. Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ with an estimated completion date of March 31/16. The U.S. Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL solicited 9 bids, with 4 bids received (W58RGZ-11-C-0070).
First 6 helicopters and infrastructure
Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
GoPro Footage from the MiG-29 SMT:
Elbit Systems has enjoyed considerable domestic and export success with its Hermes 450, which sits at the smaller end of the MALE (Medium Altitude, Long Endurance) UAV spectrum. As UAVs proved themselves, Elbit wasn’t interested in ceding the market for larger and more capable MALE UAVs to the likes of IAI and General Atomics.
They invested company funds to create the larger Hermes 900, but those kinds of investments eventually need a buyer. In 2010, their home country of Israel stepped up, and became the anchor buyer for the “Kochav” (“Star”). They weren’t the last. A comparison with the popular Hermes 450 is instructive…
The Hermes 450 is a common medium surveillance UAV, with a 10 m wingspan and a maximum take-off weight of 550 kg/ 1,212 pounds. The 450 offers about 17-20 hours endurance at up to 18,000 feet altitude, and about 180 kg/ 396 pounds of payload capacity via up to 2 body mountings and optional wing pylons. Satellite communications can be attached, but it requires changes to the aircraft body.
It serves in Israel as a dual surveillance/attack UAV, where it has reportedly been modified to carry fuel tanks, or up to 2 RAFAEL Spike missiles. It also serves unarmed with a number of international customers, including Azerbaijan, Brazil, Georgia, Mexico, Singapore, and the US Border Patrol; and with Britain as the Watchkeeper WK450B ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) UAV.
Hermes 900The Hermes 900 offers a larger platform, whose 15m wingspan and 1,180/ 2,204 pound maximum takeoff weight is comparable to the MQ-1 Predator, or to Israel Aerospace Industries’ popular Heron family. Compared to the 450, it offers a higher flight altitude of up to 30,000 feet, with a longer flight time of up to 30-36 hours, and a 350 kg/ 772 pound payload capacity that’s about double the 450’s.
The Hermes 900 incorporates an Internal Auto Takeoff and Landing system that enables auto-landing even on alternate non-instrumented runways, and has advanced features including built-in autonomous emergency procedures, Air Traffic Control radio, radio relay, and an IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) transponder. Satellite communications can be installed for additional control range.
Payloads can include the SELEX Gabianno T-200 X-band SAR/GMTI and MPR land and maritime surveillance radar, the DCoMPASS surveillance and targeting turret, AES 201V ESM/ELINT signal interception and location equipment, the Skyfix/ Skyjam–COMINT/DF communication snooping & optional COMJAM jamming system, or a Communications relay for friendly troops. A maritime configuratoin can add an Automatic Identification System (AIS) to ID compliant ships, Communications relay that lets the operator ‘talk through’ to vessels at sea, and Windward Ltd.’s MarInt satellite-based maritime intelligence analytic system.
Known customer nations to date include Israel, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Elbit actually claims 8 total customers, leaving the missing service branches or countries unclear.
Both the Hermes 450 and Hermes 900 are controlled by Elbit Systems’ Universal Ground Control Station, which can control 2 UAVs at any given time from a single station, with a single operator.
Contracts & Key Events 2014-2016Order from Brazil; Switzerland picks Hermes 900; Hermes 900 becomes a Star.
Swiss testing
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August 26/16: Thales UK is now operating three Hermes 900 as part of the United Nations (UN) Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali. A three year contract had been signed back in December and holds options for a further two years. The contract covers the deployment of three aircraft (two for operational duties, the third as a spare) with two control stations and flight crews to enable the simultaneous use of both aircraft.
April 5/16: Elbit Systems has signed a number of joint venture agreements with Indian companies in order to offer its UAV systems to the country’s market. Adani Aero Defence and Alpha Design Technologies are to co-operate with the Israeli UAV giant to offer their Hermes 450 and Hermes 900 UAVs to the Indian armed forces. The agreement will see local manufacture at a production facility in India for the airframes and payloads, and meets the terms of the government’s “Make in India” policy that encourages foreign investment and partnership with Indian industry.
November 27/15: Switzerland is to buy six Hermes 900 Heavy Fuel Engine (HFE) UAVs from Elbit Systems in a deal worth $200 million. The delivery of the UAVs is expected to be completed by 2020 when the current UAVs in service are retired. The Hermes are thought to provide a considerable increase in the capability of the Swiss Air Force, who currently operate the Ruag Aerospace ADS 95 Ranger for their reconnaissance and surveillance needs. The Hermes saw extensive action during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza last year as well as being used by Brazil when it hosted the World Cup.
September 29/15: Israel’s Elbit Systems has been awarded a $70 million contract by an undisclosed Latin American buyer for the Hermes 900 UAV system. The company was awarded a similar contract in June 2011, also to an undisclosed customer in the region, with the Swiss parliament approving the $250 million acquisition of six Hermes 900 UAVs earlier this month.
June 6/14: Switzerland. The Swiss UAS 15 program picks the Hermes 900 with a heavy fuel engine over IAI’s Super Heron-1, while stressing that their UAVs will remain unarmed. The UAS 15 program has a budget of SFR 250 million (about $280 million), and it will be submitted as part of Switzerland’s 2015 armaments program bill. This isn’t a contract yet, and there won’t be one until the money is approved. The Swiss government confirms that the purchase will involve:
“1 system with 6 drones including sensors, ground components, logistics package, training resources and training.”
The Hermes 900 HFEs will replace Switzerland’s ADS 95 Ranger collaboration between IAI, Oerlikon, and RUAG, which was also exported to Finland. Those tactical UAVs have served since 2000, and the state of the art has moved on since then. Ranger UAVs have an excellent safety record in-country over populated areas, but after the government’s recent tepid and failed defense of its fighter procurement, we’re going to go out on a limb and predict that this will become a major political issue. Absent a serious defense this time, public antipathy to drones in general could hand the government and defense forces another loss.
IAI and Elbit’s UAVs were short-listed as finalists after pre-testing (q.v. Sept 6/12), but the Swiss say that “Hermes 900 HFE has been favoured because it delivered the better overall result in all assessed criteria” during the full evaluation. Regardless of what happens with the Swiss buy, that will be a positive boost for Elbit’s marketing efforts. Swiss Air Force, “ADS 95 Ranger” | Swiss government, “Armed Forces reconnaissance drone system to be replaced” | Elbit Systems, “Elbit Systems Selected as Preferred Supplier for Swiss UAS program”.
Swiss pick Hermes 900
March 26/14: Elbit Systems Ltd. announces a contract from the Brazilian Air Force (“FAB”) for 1 Hermes 900 system, to be delivered within 2 months and equipped with “a new and advanced intelligence gathering system considered as a breakthrough operational solution.” It will form part of the security measures for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and will be operated by FAB in combined missions with their existing Hermes 450 fleet, which was bought in 2011.
Elbit’s AEL SYSTEMAS S.A. subsidiary will supply technical and engineering support, as well as spares and maintenance services.
Elbit’s UAS Division General Manager, Elad Aharonson, is quoted in Ha’aretz calling this sale “…the eighth customer to be equipped with this leading platform…”. That indicates no less than 3 unannounced customers, after Israel, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico. Note that different armed branches within the same country are counted separately. Mexico’s Federal Police bought the Hermes 900, but if the Mexican Air Force and Navy ever decided to their own ink orders, that would make 3 customers in Mexico. Announcements made so far don’t indicate that sort of thing, but they’ve also been vague, and one can expect them to often be partial. If there are unannounced external sales beyond the core 5 countries, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan are good places to start the search, and we’d be curious about Nigeria. Sources: Elbit Systems, “Elbit Systems Awarded Contract to Supply Brazil with Hermes 900 UAS” | Ha’aretz, “Israel’s Elbit System wins contract to supply Brazil with Hermes 900 drone”.
Brazil buys
March 20/14: Kochav. Israel gives the Hermes 900 a name: Kochav (Hebrew for “Star”). Sources: IAF, “A Star Is Born: A Name Is Chosen For the “Hermes 900″ UAV'”.
2012 – 2013Orders from Israel, Colombia & Mexico; Maritime patrol configuration introduced.
Hermes 900-MP
(click to view full)
Oct 7/13: Chile. The Chilean Navy is reportedly evaluating the Hermes 900 for maritime patrol tasks. The UAV already serves with the Chilean Air Force (FACh). Sources: Flight Global, “Chilean navy considers Hermes 900 deal”.
Feb 6/13: Maritime. At Aero India 2013 in Bangalore, Elbit Systems launches a Hermes maritime configuration. It includes the SELEX Gabbiano T200 radar (q.v. June 27/11), an Automatic Identification System (AIS) to ID compliant ships, radio relay that lets the operator ‘talk through’ to vessels at sea, and Windward Ltd.’s MarInt satellite-based maritime intelligence analytic system. Sources: AIN, “Elbit Takes New Orders for Hermes 900, Develops Maritime Version of UAS” | Defense Update: “Hermes 900 Takes on Maritime Missions”.
Jan 27/13: Israel. Elbit Systems announces a $35 million contract from the Israel Ministry of Defense to develop “advanced features for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“UAS”) to be supplied within three years. One of the mission requirements is the quick re-configuration of the UAS’ payloads.”
This isn’t as specific as one would like, but the rest of the release focuses exclusively on the Hermes 900, and links this contract to the Dec 31/12 announcement.
Dec 31/12: Israel. Elbit Systems announces $315 million in contracts from Israel, including $90 million for more Hermes 900 UAS, to be supplied within 3 years, and 8 years of maintenance services.
Another $25 million funds “advanced observation and long-range target acquisition systems… to be supplied over a three-year period.” No word on whether they’re air, land, or sea systems.
Israeli follow-on order, and platform R&D
Sept 6/12: Switzerland. Out of the 11 systems made by 9 companies that were originally in the running for Switzerland’s UAS contract, IAI’s Heron-1 and Elbit’s Hermes 900 are the finalists. In-flight evaluations will take place in September and October 2012 from the Emmen airbase, over central Switzerland and in the Jura region. Hermes 900 flights end on Oct 19/12.
The chosen UAV will replace an older Israeli UAV, the Ranger from RUAG, Oerlikon, & IAI. Sources: armasuisse, “Evaluation ADS 15” | UAS Vision, “Hermes 900 and Heron 1 in Final Flight Tests for Swiss Air Force Contract”.
Aug 5/12: Colombia. Elbit announces yet another Latin American customer. This sale involves Hermes 450 and 900 unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to “a Latin American customer.” The buyer is later identified as Colombia, while Elbit’s own release confirms its 1st export sale as Chile.
Elbit said the contract includes the Hermes Universal Ground Control Stations (UGCS), Elop’s DCoMPASS surveillance turrets, and satellite communication systems that allow the UAVs to operate over remote areas. Deliveries will be made over the next 2 years. Elbit Systems | Israel’s Arutz Sheva | Asian Defense News | Flight International.
Colombia buys 450s and 900s
Jan 3/12: Mexico. Israel’s Elbit Systems announced a $50 million contract to supply Hermes 900s to:
“…a governmental office of a country in the Americas. The UAS will be operated in a variety of perimeter security missions…. The contract includes Universal Ground Control Stations (UGCS) and a variety of payloads and capabilities including: the Electro-Optics Elop Division’s advanced payloads systems, the Elisra Division’s intelligence COMINT systems, SAR/MPR multi mode radar and additional sensors.”
Some sources claim Colombia as the destination, but that turns out to be a subsequent order. The buyer is later identified as Mexico’s Federal Police. Elbit Systems | Aviation Week | Defense Update.
Mexico Federal Police
2007 – 2011From unveiling to orders from Israel & Chile; Radar picked.
Israeli Hermes 900
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June 27/11: Radar. Elbit Systems has picked Selex Galileo’s Gabbiano-series X-band surveillance radars for the Hermes 450 and Hermes 900. The Hermes 450 will get the 43kg T20 radar, while the Hermes 900 will carry the more powerful 62kg T200 for land and maritime surveillance. defpro | Flight International.
June 6/11: Chile. Elbit Systems announces its 1st export sale for the Hermes 900 UAV, plus ground control, DCoMPASS surveillance systems, and an unidentified radar system, to “a customer in Latin America.”
Other press sources point to Chile, which had already chosen the Hermes 900. The 2010 earthquake demonstrated the need for advanced, rapid response, long endurance aerial surveillance systems. In response, Chile’s competition looked at 4 Israeli UAVs: Elbit’s Heron 900 and IAI’s Heron at the high end, and the Hermes 450 and Aeronautics DS Aerostar at the low end. Defense Update.
1st export: Chile
May 18/11: Chile. Flight International reports that Elbit Systems’ Hermes 900 has been picked over IAI’s Heron-1 by the Chilean defence forces.
Jan 10/11: Testing. Elbit Systems’ 1st Hermes 900 UAV has accumulated 350 flight hours, while its 2nd prototype will soon enter flight testing.
A follow-on order from Israel is expected within the framework of the nation’s next multi-year plan. Flight International.
May 5/10: Israeli order. Elbit Systems of Haifa, Israel announces a 3-year, $50 million contract to supply the Israeli Defence Forces with its brand new Hermes 900 systems, along with additional Hermes 450 UAVs. The contract also includes “enhancement of [the IDF’s] existing UAS intelligence capabilities,” which presumably means sensor improvements and extensions.
The award continues ongoing contracts from Israel, including a $30 million contract for Hermes 450 systems in November 2007. Elbit release | Globes | Aviation Week | Defense Update | Flight International.
1st order: Israel
Dec 14/09: Testing. Elbit Systems announces that its Hermes 900 UAV has completed a successful Maiden Flight, and will enter serial production following additional flight tests.
April 1/09: Flight delays. Elbit Systems unveiled the Hermes 900 in mid-2007, but the UAV’s 1st flight has been delayed. The firm is reportedly accelerating efforts to make that flight before the end of 2009, so potential customers can evaluate the design. Flight International.
June 12/07: Elbit announces its Hermes 900 UAV offering, which will share ground control infrastructure with the smaller Hermes 450. Defense Update.
Additional Readings The UAV