Ideas on Europe Blog

Anna P. Lohse

Facilitated by the freedom of movement within the European Union (EU), the Erasmus programme established in 1987, and the Bologna Process initiated in 1999, physical intra-European student mobility has become a taken-for-granted aspect of higher education. Student mobility—whether for a short-term stay or the completion of an entire degree—is the core phenomenon of higher education internationalisation. The latter has gained significant importance on the policy agenda of countries worldwide over the past decades in light of short- and long-term economic goals (e.g., generating tuition fees, recruiting skilled migrants), the strengthening of international cooperation, and an increase of academic quality and students’ intercultural competencies. Internationalisation strategies now exist on national and institutional levels (Crăciun, 2019); outlining goals and measures involving various stakeholders including education ministries, foreign ministries, national higher education agencies such as the DAAD, British Council, or Campus France; university administrations, and interest groups.

 

An age of disruption

Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic greatly disrupted established practices and regulations of higher education internationalisation. After the Brexit referendum, there was uncertainty about whether the United Kingdom (UK) would continue to participate in the Erasmus programme and whether EU students would still have visa-free, discounted access to British degree programs. With the COVID-19 pandemic, global student mobility largely came to a halt for the first time in history. There was speculation about whether Brexit and the COVID-19 crisis would mark a turning point in higher education internationalisation. Regarding Brexit, some predicted, for instance, that British-European higher education relations would never be the same as before the referendum. Concerning COVID-19, there was speculation that the pandemic might usher in an era where physical mobility would no longer be the core focus of internationalisation, but rather transnational online degree programs.

However, when we look at the literature on institutional change and stability (e.g., Mahoney, 2000, Ebbinghaus, 2005), we find that societal institutions such as the church, nation states or higher education systems are relatively resistant to change—even in the face of major disruptive events. This is because of path dependencies, which exist, for instance, due to powerful actors preventing change in order to stay in power or because new policies and practices are not considered ‘normal’ by society.

 

Examining the disruptions’ impact in three major European higher education systems

The uncertainty about the status quo of European student mobility, combined with the diverging expectations of contemporary witnesses and the institutionalist literature, is the setting of my dissertation monograph Higher Education in an Age of Disruption. Comparing European Internationalisation Policies. In my book, I explore how Brexit and COVID-19 impacted student mobility policy and practices in England, France, and Germany between the years of 2016 and 2021. The three selected countries are not only among the top destinations for degree-seeking international and Erasmus students, but also represent different types of higher education systems. England is comparably market-based, while France is more state-dominated, and Germany traditionally follows the Humboldtian tradition of being state-financed while featuring a relatively strong academic self-governance. These differences allow for pertinent insights into how different higher education systems dealt with the disruptions.

 

Analytical approach of the study

The study involved 44 interviews with internationalisation experts from the three country contexts. These experts included heads of international offices of medium-sized to large universities and staff members from national education ministries and higher education internationalisation agencies (British Council, Campus France, DAAD). In addition, 234 documents were analysed, providing insights into events, debates, and changes related to Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic in the higher education sectors of England, Germany, and France. These documents included newspaper articles, parliamentary records, law changes, policy briefs, and statements from higher education stakeholders.

To assess whether and what kind of change occurred in higher education internationalisation, I developed indicators of the institutional dimensions of student mobility. According to Scott (2008), every institution consists of a regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive dimension.

In the regulative dimension of student mobility, country-specific immigration and university admission laws must be followed, as well as the statutes of mobility programmes (e.g., Erasmus). The normative dimension is reflected in the values and norms that internationalisation actors refer to in their daily practice. Of particular interest here is whether student mobility is pursued primarily for academic, political, economic, or cultural reasons (Knight, 2012). Furthermore, specific norms and activities in the higher education system are institutionalized through funding programs (e.g., by the EU or internationalisation agencies). The cultural-cognitive dimension includes fundamental perceptions and approaches that actors consider self-evident. Such taken-for-granted aspects include whether higher education is viewed as a fundamentally public or private good and, relatedly, whether a higher education system is predominantly market-based or state-led. These assumptions, in turn, influence whether higher education internationalisation is primarily conceived within a collaborative or competitive logic.

I coded both the expert interviews and documents according to the institutional dimensions and developed an analytical framework involving different types of overall institutional change. I classified no substantive change in all three institutional dimensions as overall institutional stability, change in one or two dimensions as partial change and change in all three dimensions as radical change.

 

Key findings

In all country-disruption combinations, I found partial change. That is, the regulative and/or the normative dimension of higher education internationalisation were altered in response to Brexit/the COVID-19 pandemic, but the cultural-cognitive frameworks underlying higher education internationalisation remained stable.

 

The regulative impact of Brexit on higher education internationalisation

Brexit was accompanied by substantive regulatory changes for student mobility. After years of protracted negotiations, the United Kingdom (UK) left the EU on February 1, 2020. Since January 1, 2021, EU students are required to apply for a paid visa for studying in the UK. Additionally, European students lost their right to reduced tuition fees. On December 24, 2020, the British government unexpectedly announced its withdrawal from Erasmus and the creation of its own mobility program. The non-reciprocal Turing Scheme, which solely provides scholarships for British outgoing students and not for incoming students, was presented as an optimized Erasmus program that would offer taxpayers “greater value for money” (Department for Education and The Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP 2020).

For Germany and France, Brexit resulted in the UK being re-categorized as a third country. As a consequence, British students in France now need to apply for a visa, while in Germany, they require a residence permit.

 

Normative impact of Brexit

In terms of normative aspects, the British government, in the wake of Brexit, intensified its focus on exporting educational offerings to non-EU markets. In the second national internationalisation strategy, “Global potential, global growth,” adopted in 2019, Europe hardly finds mention. Leaving the EU is portrayed as an opportunity to reposition the UK as an educational provider in the European and especially global market. In student exchange, the focus is shifted to Commonwealth countries and the Anglosphere, which also play a central role as target regions in the Turing Scheme. While the British government distanced itself from the EU and non-economic internationalisation motives, the English higher education sector intensified its efforts towards European university partnerships and exchanges. English universities emphasized the shared European history and values, openly expressing criticism of the British government’s actions through position papers and symbolic protests, such as flying the EU flag on university buildings.

Both the French and German higher education sectors reacted with dismay to Brexit. However, this initial dismay quickly gave way to a defiant attitude regarding the importance of European cooperation. In both countries, Brexit led to an increased pursuit of partnership agreements with Northern and Eastern European countries. These countries’ offerings of English-language programs were seen as an attractive alternative to the lost British Erasmus partnerships. French President Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 speech at the Sorbonne University provided the impetus for the creation of the European Universities Initiative (EUI). The rapid implementation of this proposal, which by mid-2024 has resulted in over 60 university alliances involving more than 500 universities, is considered the most significant European internationalisation policy since the Bologna Process.

 

Cultural-cognitive impact of Brexit

While Brexit-induced changes occurred on both the regulatory and normative levels in all three countries, the changes remained anchored in culturally-cognitive, institutionalized societal perceptions. The normative clash between the British government and the pro-European higher education sector represents a continuation of the divided post-war British politics and identity, characterized by British exceptionalism—representing idea of the UK’s special role within Europe and the world—while simultaneously being involved in European integration processes. While the British government used Brexit as an opportunity to institutionalize the departure from the EU through new regulations, English universities actively worked against this, for example, by joining the EUI.

Thus, the central cultural-cognitive conflict between British exceptionalism and competitive internationalisation on the one hand, and European integration and collaborative internationalisation on the other, continues to persist. In the case of France and Germany, the regulative and normative changes signal a continued commitment to a higher education internationalisation fundamentally oriented towards Europeanization and collaborative activities

 

The regulative impact of COVID-19 on higher education internationalisation

The COVID-19 pandemic posed very different regulatory challenges for the English higher education sector compared to the German and French higher education sectors. The key factor here is the market-based nature of the English higher education system. Since international students represent a vital source of income for English universities, the expected long-term decline in international student numbers at the beginning of the pandemic posed an existential threat to the financial stability of the sector.

In response, English universities began compensating for the anticipated loss of international students by gaming established admissions practices: they sent an unusually high number of study offers to domestic secondary school graduates to outcompete other universities. This approach threatened to throw the entire higher education sector into chaos, prompting the British government to temporarily reintroduce the student number cap, a limit on the number of students universities can admit. This cap had been abolished in 2015, thereby introducing full-on market conditions. However, when international student numbers unexpectedly increased rather than decreased during the pandemic, this regulatory change was abolished, and the sector returned to the previous conditions of a fully market-based system—despite the pandemic highlighting significant weaknesses in the system and triggering widespread calls for reform from within the sector.

In contrast, the state-funded higher education systems of Germany and France faced different regulatory challenges. Since—unlike in England—online teaching was not widely practiced in either country before the pandemic, their face-to-face-based regulations had to be expanded in a very short time. This included, for example, enabling the use of online platforms like Zoom, conducting online exams, and allowing online enrolment for students who would not initially be able to physically enter the host country. In Germany, this involved creating an enrolment status for students who participated exclusively in digital classes. In France, the pandemic accelerated the implementation of the digital visa process for international students, a measure that had already been decided under the Bienvenue en France strategy.

 

Normative impact of COVID-19

In the normative dimension, the COVID-19 pandemic in England reinforced the focus on profitable internationalisation activities, particularly the recruitment of international students, to ensure the survival of universities. In Germany and France, norms regarding the acceptance of digital teaching and administration changed. Virtual exchange and Collaborative Online International Learning (COIL) formats gained significant traction as ways to compensate for the loss of physical mobility. In Germany, the DAAD launched several funding lines shortly after the outbreak of the pandemic to systematically advance the digitalisation of internationalisation. It is noteworthy that the increasing digitalisation of internationalisation was already on the agendas of universities and the internationalisation agencies DAAD and Campus France before the pandemic. However, limited financial and personnel resources had previously hindered the rapid implementation of digitalisation reforms.

 

Cultural-cognitive impact of COVID-19

The observed developments in the three country contexts point to stability of the cultural-cognitive dimension in the three higher education systems. Although the pandemic exposed the risks of a market-based higher education system, England maintained its status quo. Demands for funding reforms demanded by higher education actors fell on deaf ears on the part of the British government.

In France, pandemic measures and the continuation of the Bienvenue en France strategy were largely directed by a crisis management team within the French government, pointing to a comparably strong state involvement. In Germany, coordination of pandemic measures occurred at both the state level and nationally through the DAAD, and there was a comparably strong focus on the pedagogical component of digital internationalisation. Both France and Germany continued to emphasize international collaboration during the pandemic through virtual exchange programmes with partner universities. Contrary to the expectations of some higher education actors, more market-oriented activities, like transnational online programs, did not become a part of France’s and Germany’s internationalisation portfolios during the pandemic.

 

Summary

The comparative study found that Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic did not lead to radical changes of existing internationalisation strategies in the three country contexts. Instead, both disruptions created windows of opportunities that accelerated ongoing gradual changes and reinforced existing internationalisation logics. This was particularly evident in the country-specific stances towards Europeanisation and the digitalisation of higher education.

 

 

Anna P. Lohse is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Education at Technical University Berlin, Germany. She received her PhD from the Hertie School – The University of Governance in Berlin and holds an MA in International Education from New York University.

 

References

Crăciun, D. (2019). Systematizing National Higher Education Internationalization Strategies: Reconceptualizing a Process. PhD thesis. Central European University. https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/222724257/craciundaniela.pdf

Department for Education & The Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP. (2020). New Turing scheme to support thousands of students to study and work abroad. Retrieved March 14, 2023 from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-turing-scheme-to-support-thousands-of-students-to-study-and-work-abroad

Ebbinghaus, B. (2005). Can path dependence explain institutional change? Two approaches applied to welfare state reform. Discussion Paper 05/2. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Knight, J. (2012). Concepts, rationales, and interpretive frameworks in the internationalization of higher education. In D. K. Deardorff, H. de Wit, J. Heyl & T. Adams (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of International Higher Education (pp. 27–42). SAGE Publications.

Lohse, A. P. (2024). Higher Education in an Age of Disruption. Comparing European Internationalisation Policies. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57912-7

Mahoney, J. (2000). Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. Theory and Society, 29(4), 507–548.

Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications.

The post Change or stability? How Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic affected higher education internationalisation policies in Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This blog draws on my paper presentation in the Digital Governance: Emerging Technologies and Evolving Accountability Settings in the European Union panel at the 54th UACES 2024 Annual Conference in Trento, Italy. I want to thank the UACES for the Microgrant funding that supported my participation in the conference.

 

My Experience at the UACES 54th Annual Conference:

In September, I had the privilege of attending the UACES Annual Conference in Trento, an enriching experience for any PhD candidate like myself. For doctoral researchers, attending academic conferences is crucial for professional growth and meeting degree requirements. These events offer opportunities to present research, receive feedback, and engage in vital scholarly discussions. However, limited financial resources often make participation in such gatherings challenging, potentially hindering students’ ability to acquire the experiences necessary for an academic career. This is why initiatives like the UACES Microgrant are invaluable—they help PhD students and early career researchers to reach essential milestones. The UACES funding support allowed me to attend this conference, share my research, and actively engage with the European studies community. It marked a major step toward completing my PhD and provided an exceptional platform to network, collaborate, and learn from experts in the field.

 

Presenting My Research:

During the conference, I presented the paper The EU Cybersecurity Strategy: Promise and Paradox of a Human-Centred Approach in the Digital Governance: Emerging Technologies and Evolving Accountability Settings in the European Union panel. The paper sought to explore the human-centred approach to cybersecurity within the EU, examining how the EU has framed these cybersecurity policies within a comprehensive and holistic digital governance framework by asking how the EU framed human-centred cybersecurity policies.

Cyberspace and cybersecurity governance have emerged as one of the most significant geopolitical challenges of the 21st century. The European Union (EU) has prioritised developing a comprehensive framework for cybersecurity governance, focusing on specific rules and institutions related to cybersecurity, the digital economy, and the protection of digital human rights. This approach comes at a time when cyberspace is increasingly seen as the merging of internet technologies with various human activities—such as communication, commerce, education, and even warfare—activities that were once confined to the physical world. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic compelled the migration of daily activities (such as education, healthcare, and work) to the online sphere, resulting in a proliferation of digital threats. This underscored the difficulty of safeguarding individuals and their security in the digital realm.

Recognising the crucial importance of cyberspace and focusing on European values based on democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the promotion of human rights, the EU launched in 2020 the European Union Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade and subsequently, in March 2021, the Digital Compass 2030: the European Path to the Digital Decade, both with a vision focused on the digitalisation of the economy and society. The documents emphasise the EU’s commitment to a secure, protected, sustainable, and people-centric digital transformation in line with the EU’s values and fundamental rights. This strategy aims to strengthen European collective resilience against cyber threats, ensuring that all citizens and businesses benefit from secure and reliable digital services and tools. Nevertheless, this strategy presents the EU’s vision of reconciling market and societal digitalisation, promoting the industrial and technological resources necessary to benefit from its ambitious Digital Single Market.

The Paradox of a Human-Centred Approach

EU has adopted a cybersecurity strategy labelled a human-centred approach in the digital domain, aspiring to be a human-centric digital development model to create a digital environment that prioritises the well-being and rights of individuals. However, the strategy often emphasises frames such as strategic autonomy, geopolitical commission, digital sovereignty, and digital leadership. While crucial for the EU’s competitiveness and influence, these frames create a complex dynamic when positioned alongside a human-centred approach. My paper delved into this paradox, exploring how the EU faces a significant dilemma: maintaining its relevance as a global actor in the digital space while safeguarding its core values, including protecting individual rights and fostering an open, secure cyberspace. The challenge lies in reconciling the EU’s pursuit of digital sovereignty with its commitment to ensuring a safe and inclusive digital environment for all its citizens.

 

A Transformative Experience

Attending the UACES 54th Annual Conference was a transformative experience for me. It provided an opportunity not only to present my research but also to engage in meaningful discussions on the future of digital governance and cybersecurity in the EU. The exchange of ideas and the feedback I received were invaluable for my academic journey, and the connections I made will likely influence my work in the future.

I am deeply grateful to UACES for their financial support, which made this experience possible. As I progress with my research, I look forward to continuing my engagement with the broader European studies community.

The post 54th UACES Annual Conference: The EU Cybersecurity Strategy: Promise and Paradox of a Human-Centred Approach appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In September 2024, I was delighted to attend the UACES Annual Conference, held at the University of Trento, largely thanks to the financial support I received through a UACES Microgrant. PhD students frequently have issues obtaining funding for such activities, which greatly affects their capacity to participate in academic workshops, seminars, and conferences—key events for their professional growth and degree completion. Thus, opportunities such as those provided by the UACES Microgrant are not only critical for fulfilling graduation requirements but also essential for acquiring the certifications and qualifications needed to pursue an academic career after earning a PhD. UACES’ support allowed me to travel to Trento and witness in person the results of my work as co-convenor of the European Green Deal thematic track, as well as to present my work on Chinese green technology policy and its relevance for the EU in the wake of the myriad of anti-subsidy investigations that have recently been completed or are currently underway. 

The European Union (EU) and China are currently entangled in a critical debate over subsidies in the green energy sector, highlighting the complex intersection of trade, competition, and climate policy. As both sides vie for dominance in the burgeoning market for renewable energy and electric vehicles (EVs), investigations into state subsidies reveal deeper tensions about market fairness, economic competitiveness, and the future of the global green economy.

 

The Rising Tide of Chinese EVs in Europe 

China has rapidly emerged as a global leader in the electric vehicle industry, both in terms of production capacity and technological innovation. Chinese automakers such as BYD, NIO, and Geely have become household names in China and are now expanding aggressively into international markets, including Europe. In fact, Chinese EV brands have been growing their market share in the EU, partly due to their lower price points, which attract budget-conscious consumers. 

In contrast, European automakers, including companies like Volkswagen, BMW, and Stellantis, have faced challenges in scaling up their EV production, particularly due to higher labour costs, supply chain bottlenecks, and less direct state support compared to their Chinese counterparts. As the EU pushes toward its ambitious Green Deal, which includes plans to ban the sale of new internal combustion engine vehicles by 2035, European automakers are under pressure to scale up their EV production quickly to meet both consumer demand and regulatory requirements. 

However, the influx of cheaper Chinese EVs has raised alarms in the European automotive industry. For European automakers, the concern is that their higher production costs—driven by strict labour laws, environmental regulations, and less generous subsidies—are putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Many fear that without protective measures, the European EV market could soon be dominated by Chinese imports, much like what has happened in the solar panel sector, where Chinese manufacturers now control a significant share of the global market.

 

The EU’s Investigation into Chinese Electric Vehicle Subsidies 

In September 2023, the European Union announced a formal investigation into what it claims are unfair Chinese government subsidies for electric vehicle manufacturers. According to the EU, China’s financial support for its domestic EV producers allows them to sell vehicles in Europe at significantly lower prices than European counterparts, undermining the competitiveness of European automakers. 

The investigation, spearheaded by the European Commission, focused on the allegation that Chinese EV manufacturers are able to flood the European market with artificially low-priced vehicles due to the massive state support they receive at home. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her annual State of the Union address, framed the issue as one of fairness, asserting that the EU must defend itself against a flood of cheap Chinese products that benefit from state-backed financial advantages. She warned that this practice puts European companies at risk, particularly those working in an already competitive and capital-intensive industry like EV production. 

As a result of the investigation, the EU has proposed provisional countervailing duties on Chinese EV imports, ranging from 17% to 36%. The investigation process allows Chinese automakers and other interested parties to submit evidence, as the Commission seeks a balanced approach that complies with both EU and World Trade Organization rules. Chinese companies, meanwhile, argue that such measures could harm consumers by raising EV prices in Europe and slowing down the region’s green transition. The final determination is expected by the end of October 2024, with any duties likely to remain in force for five years. The EU’s decision will have far-reaching implications for its relationship with China and its ability to protect key green industries from external competition​.

 

China’s Response and Retaliatory Threats 

China has reacted sharply to the EU’s investigation, describing it as a form of protectionism that could damage the otherwise strong economic relationship between China and the European Union. The Chinese government has long maintained that its green energy sector, particularly its electric vehicle industry, has grown largely through technological advancements, economies of scale, and operational efficiency, not solely because of state subsidies. Chinese officials argue that European consumers benefit from the lower prices of Chinese-made EVs, which help accelerate the transition to cleaner energy. 

Beijing has also signaled that it may retaliate if the EU investigation leads to punitive measures such as tariffs or restrictions on Chinese imports. The potential for a tit-for-tat trade conflict looms, which could affect not only the automotive sector but also other areas of economic cooperation between the EU and China, including renewable energy technologies, where both sides are key players. 

China’s Ministry of Commerce warned that the investigation could have a negative impact on EU-China relations and undermine global efforts to combat climate change. China views itself as a critical partner in the global green energy transition and contends that international cooperation, not trade barriers, is essential for meeting global climate goals.

 

The EU’s Broader Concerns About Chinese State Subsidies 

The investigation into electric vehicle subsidies is part of a broader European concern about China’s growing economic influence in key sectors, particularly those related to green technology. Over the past decade, China has made substantial strides in industries like solar power, wind energy, and battery production, often supported by state-backed subsidies and low-interest loans. Chinese companies, benefiting from government policies aimed at fostering innovation and expansion, have gained significant market shares globally, in some cases overwhelming European and U.S. competitors. 

The solar panel industry provides a clear example of this dynamic. In the early 2010s, Chinese manufacturers rapidly scaled up production of photovoltaic panels, quickly becoming the world’s largest producers and exporters. European solar panel manufacturers struggled to compete with the low prices of Chinese products, which many argued were made possible by state subsidies and cheap labor. The result was a wave of bankruptcies among European solar companies, and today China controls the majority of the global solar panel supply chain. 

European policymakers fear that a similar pattern could emerge in the electric vehicle sector. The EU, through its Green Deal, has ambitious plans to lead the world in green technologies and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. However, this vision is complicated by the reality of China’s competitive edge in industries like EVs and renewable energy infrastructure, where European companies face stiff competition from their Chinese rivals.

 

Conclusion 

The EU’s investigation into China’s green energy subsidies, particularly in the electric vehicle sector, represents a critical moment in the evolving relationship between two of the world’s largest economic powers. While both sides are committed to addressing climate change and advancing the green energy transition, their economic competition in key industries like electric vehicles and solar energy is becoming harder to ignore. 

For Europe, the challenge lies in finding a balance between protecting its domestic industries and remaining open to the benefits of international trade and competition. For China, the investigation is a test of how its growing economic influence will be managed on the global stage, particularly in areas where state subsidies have played a key role. 

As the world shifts toward a more sustainable future, the outcomes of these investigations will not only shape EU-China relations but also set important precedents for how green technology markets will evolve globally.

The post Global Green Tensions: Unpacking the EU-China Dispute Over Electric Vehicle Subsidies appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Author: Pramiti Parwani.

Pramiti Parwani is a PhD Fellow at AIGHD, and is also based at the Amsterdam Law School at the University of Amsterdam (in the Law Centre for Health and Life and the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance (ACELG)). Her PhD examines how the legal and institutional frameworks in the European Union and India influence the ‘capabilities’ of least developed countries to access pandemic vaccines for their populations. She combines third world approaches to international law (TWAIL) with the Capabilites Approach in her work, to examine barriers at different stages of the vaccine supply chain- from research and development, to manufacturing capacity to regulatory approval.

This blog draws from my PhD thesis, and is based on my presentation in a EUHealthGov panel at the UACES 2024 conference. My thanks to the EUHealthGov network for funding to support my participation at the UACES conference, and to the participants for the insightful discussions during the panels. Any mistakes remain my own.

Following the export restrictions and vaccine hoarding during the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about global vaccine inequity still remain during the mpox outbreak. These health crises have clearly demonstrated the risks of over-reliance on foreign sources for pandemic health supplies, including vaccines, and underscore the urgent need to strengthen local vaccine manufacturing capacity—especially in regions where local production has been minimal or non-existent. While calls to expand local pharmaceutical production, including vaccine manufacturing, have long been prevalent, these efforts have received a significant boost during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. In Africa, while local vaccine production collectively only meets 1% of the total demand of the continent, a new plan for regional vaccine manufacturing intends to scale up vaccine production to be able to supply 60% of the total demand in the continent by 2040.

Consistent with the stated objective in the EU Global Health Strategy to strengthen its leadership as a global health actor, the EU invests in health-related infrastructure projects around the world. In order to mitigate fragmentation of overseas development cooperation from different Member States, the EU has introduced Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) to develop a streamlined approach to its external financing. Team Europe Initiatives form a crucial part of the Neighborhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe (Regulation (EU) 2021/947). By pooling resources from both EU institutions and Member States, TEIs enhance coordination amongst them, enabling more cohesive and structured overseas development assistance. This approach strengthens the EU’s image as a unified actor in its external actions and reinforces its influence on the global stage.

One of the most politically high-profile TEIs is the Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and Health Technologies (MAV+) programme. With the aim of facilitating equitable access to safe, effective, and affordable medicines in Africa, the MAV+ initiative seeks to provide support for scaling-up vaccine production capacity on the continent. The project was announced in 2021, and  brings together the EU, 16 EU Member States, and the European Investment Bank, to provide financial, technical, and policy support across three components –supply aspect, demand aspect, and a broader facilitating environment for pharmaceuticals production.

The supply side focuses on industrial growth by involving the private sector, maintaining quality assurance systems, and supply chain management. The demand side includes trust-building activities and health promotion to overcome vaccine hesitancy. It also tackles the issue of fragmented market demand, which can impede the expansion of manufacturing capabilities across the continent. Lastly, the initiative also aims to improve pharmaceutical development by improving the underlying enabling environment – by facilitating access to finance in order to foster private investment, strengthening regulatory systems to accelerate pharmaceutical approvals, and intellectual property management. The MAV+ project was launched with a €1 billion financial commitment – an amount that has been the subject of some confusion. While this amount was initially understood by African partners as new funding, in reality, the amount mainly consists of previously allocated funds.

It was further understood that the initiative would be complemented by private funds and efforts, although further details are scarce. The most notable private component comes from  BioNTech, a German company, which in 2021 announced its plans to establish mobile vaccine production units – called ‘BioNTainers’ – in Africa. The BioNTainers are shipping containers repurposed for vaccine manufacturing, and were promoted as a “modular system, scalable and turnkey solution for local manufacturing” to provide a fast-track solution to expanding vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa. The press release announcing the BioNTainers mentioned that BioNTech staff would initially run the BioNTainers, before providing training to local personnel to take over.

In 2023, the first BioNTainer facility was inaugurated in Rwanda. Although the funding for the facility comes from BioNTech, the MAV+ project provides indirect support by strengthening the business and regulatory ecosystem in Rwanda. In 2022, Team Europe actors launched a twinning project with the Rwandan National Regulatory Authority as part of the MAV+ program, with the aim of enhancing the the regulatory environment for the approval of health products. Around the time of the inauguration of the BioNTainer facility in Rwanda, Team Europe also pledged an additional €40 million through the MAV+ project to support vocational and technical education to cultivate a workforce for pharmaceutical manufacturing in Rwanda, in addition to fostering a start-up ecosystem within the country. Further, the launch of the BioNTainer facility in Rwanda was attended by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and a Vice President of the European Investment Bank, another partner in the MAV+ initiative. In her speech at the inaugration, President von der Leyen highlighted the Team Europe approach.

Such support, even where indirect, to private manufacturers from public funds, should include associated requirements for technology transfer and increased access to affordable medicines. Currently, however, there are no binding obligations for BioNTech to share its technology with other manufacturers. Many observers argue that BioNTech could have more effectively facilitated timely access to safe and effective vaccines in Africa by collaborating with existing African manufacturers through the WHO mRNA technology transfer hub and independent licensing agreements. In contrast, the BioNTainer “cut-and-paste model” of exporting portable, modular vaccine production units does not  support technology transfer, and has been criticized for being little more than a “neo-colonial stunt”. Human Rights Watch had previously identified at least seven manufacturing facilities in Africa, and an additional 100 facilities in other low-and-middle-income countries, which had capacity to establish or expand vaccine production at a short notice, provided that existing vaccine manufacturers would be willing to share their technology.

In light of the concerns mentioned above, and given the EU’s considerable external impact through the Team Europe Initiative, some key points need attention as the MAV+ project progresses. First, to ensure the success of the project, it is essential that African partners, such as the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (AfricaCDC) and Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM), maintain ownership and control over important decision-making processes, considering the unique local circumstances and needs. This approach is crucial for fostering a sustainable production and knowledge ecosystem on the continent while minimizing excessive reliance on external support.

Second, the importance of this ownership becomes even more pronounced when EU support – directly or indirectly – helps establish a favorable business and regulatory environment for EU companies abroad. Further study is necessary to better investigate the indirect market-making effects of overseas development cooperation by the EU.

Third, when EU support indirectly serves the interests of EU private entities, this should be leveraged to better regulate their activities. As discussed above, while BioNTech gains access to new markets in Africa and benefits from an improved drug regulatory authority in Rwanda through the MAV+ project, the BioNTainer model is not best suited for strengthening Rwandan local production capabilities. Therefore, there should be a greater emphasis on technology transfer, which is currently only addressed in a limited and ad-hoc manner in the MAV+ project.

The EU’s commitment to emerging as a global health leader comes with a responsibility to ensure that it oversees development cooperation efforts through the Team Europe Approach to enhance health sovereignty in partner countries. There is a need to optimise efforts under the MAV+ project in a manner that prioritizes local ownership and technology transfer to help foster sustainable health systems.

The post Scaling up vaccine manufacturing in Africa: The Team Europe Initiative appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Author: Ricardo Pereira, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. Ricardo Pereira is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at Dublin City University. He serves as a data coder for the project ”EXCEPTIUS Exceptional Powers in Times of Sars-CoV-2 Crisis.”. His research has primarily revolved around topics, such as Private Security Companies, EU Health Security, and Securitization studies.

During the 54th UACES annual conference in Trento, the paper about the collective securitisation process of COVID-19 carried out by the European Union (EU) was discussed under the panel The EU as a Global Health Actor – Between Securitisation and Cooperation organised by the EUHealthGov network. The paper aimed to understand how the Union in March 2020 became empowered by the member states to assume the role of coordinator of the EU response against the pandemic and its consequences across social, economic, and health sectors by asking How the EU discourse, particularly the Commission, did reflect the collective securitisation of COVID-19, between 2020 and September 2021. As argued by the literature in EU Health law and policy, the shared competence of the EU on health was bumbling at the time the pandemic emerged. The pandemic instigated the debate about the competence of the EU on health as stated by the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen as well as by the Commissioner for Health and Food Safety Stella Kyriakides.

The ongoing research has already looked at 52 speeches from the Commission between 2020 and 2021 under discourse analysis. It is possible to identify three paths of securitisation: threat construction; security construction; and announcement of measures. The first relates the EU discourse regarding COVID-19 as a threat to referent objects such as EU citizens, EU values, and EU institutions, while the second describes the call of the Union for a unified front against the pandemic. The third path refers to the implementation of measures. These three paths should be seen as interdependent and overlapped, once the analysed speeches presented the EU’s position as a security actor facing a multidimensional threat such as the COVID-19 pandemic through (extra)ordinary measures.

The present analysis took the work of Bengtsson and Rhinard (2019) about the collective securitisation of health in the EU as the initial status quo to analyse the evolution of the Union’s response to the pandemic. Following the model of collective securitisation of Sperling and Webber (2019), the research aims to analyse how the organisation constructed COVID-19 as a threat; how the Union developed its role as a health security actor capable of responding in a coordinated and cooperative approach to such a threat; and understand the recursive interaction between EU institutions that led to the implementation and possible routinisation of measures into new practices, agendas, and vocabulary.

In this vein, the research has tracked four periods of securitisation carried out by the EU already. The first comprehends the period between February and March 2020. During this time, COVID-19 was described as a test of EU core values of cooperation and solidarity. The Commission discourse constructed COVID-19 as a brutal threat by defining the pandemic as a global health crisis, following the international community discourse of main organisations such as WHO and NATO. Furthermore, the EU called for attention to pandemic consequences for the EU as an institution and its values by highlighting the impact that a sanitary nationalist approach could have. At the same time, the Commission called for a central response to the pandemic by appealing to a European memoir of cooperation and coordination. Historical memories such as the reconstruction of Europe after World War II were used to develop a sentiment of unity across member states. Consequently, this move would result in the beginning of the EU’s empowerment to respond to the pandemic in one voice, despite existing punctual divergences across time such as in the cases of Poland and Hungary. The joint procurement of personal protective equipment based on a stockpile under rescEU, as well as the development of financial mechanisms such as green lanes, and the activation of the general escape clause, are some examples of this move.

The second period between April and September 2020 could be named as the Marshall Plan for the post-COVID-19. Although the decrease in infections and deaths, the concern regarding the damages caused in the economic and financial sectors, led the Commission to describe the pandemic event as “the largest recession in 100 years”. The COVID-19 pandemic should be seen this way as a multidimensional event. It has not just impacted people’s health, but also the social and economic spheres around the globe. The Commission’s construction of COVID-19 as a multidimensional threat, relying on the interdependence between health, economic, social, and environmental sectors, would create a space for the discussion about the competence of the EU on health. In the summer of 2020 mechanisms such as SURE aimed to support jobs across the Union, also, during this time the draft for a European BARDA started. During the third period, the number of infections and deaths rose and the brutal threat discourse was back in the daily EU vocabulary. The role of the EU as an actor in the fight against the pandemic was established and its agenda was focused on strengthening the public health structure of the Union by empowering institutions such as ECDC and EMA, as well as implementing a strategy for vaccination across the EU territory at the end of the year.

During 2021, the fourth and last period of analysis, the Commission framed COVID-19 variants as the new exceptionality of the pandemic. The international role of the EU was coined by the Commission as “the pharmacy of the world” due to its move from scarcity at the beginning of the crisis to one of the main exporters of protective equipment and vaccines in the world. In this regard, the EU’s role in the African continent should be also underlined with the construction of vaccine factories, although critique can be addressed to the process of how it was designed. There has not been effective investment in logistical processes to deliver these vaccines to remote populations, and the know-how has not been shared with the communities where these factories are located. At the EU level, extraordinary measures of surveillance were implemented through the use of the digital certificate or the creation of Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA).

To conclude, preliminary conclusions can be highlighted. Regarding the threat construction, the characterisation suis generis by the EU of COVID-19 as a brutal threat through the classification of a global health crisis. As a securitising actor, the EU showed a more stable process of conducting the process. In the words of Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen, the EU member states during the pandemic agreed to empower the Union to respond to the pandemic under three keywords: coordination, cooperation, and solidarity. Moreover, the pandemic represents a window of opportunity to discuss the competence of health in the EU as well as new approaches to public health in the Union. To conclude, the next steps of this research will contemplate, empirically, the analysis of the following years of the EU4Health programme. The research aims to assess if measures developed to respond to COVID-19 were routinised on the Union structure. Furthermore, theoretically, the present research pretends to look for representations of security integration in the health domain, arguing this way for the utility of collective securitisation for security and integration studies.

The post Between a breeze and a storm of change: EU collective securitisation of COVID-19 appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Over the past decade, the European Union has increasingly experimented with novel forms of public engagement, most recently as part of a New Push for European Democracy. A paradigm of deliberative and participatory innovation that envisages unmediated forms of citizen involvement is advocated by a network of political actors, civil society organisations, and academics. The European Commission in particular has sponsored processes that engage (small sets of) citizens in dialogues and mini-publics; institutional competition over a discourse of “citizen centred” democracy has the European Parliament propose a European Agora with citizens “deliberating on the EU’s priorities” on a regular basis. 

An important narrative justifying the salience of such institutional innovations is that Europeans want greater citizen involvement – which pertains to broader claims about shifting expectations towards democratic politics as citizens would seek more individualised and direct forms of participation. Initiatives such as the Conference on the Future of Europe are said to bolster the democratic legitimacy of the EU because participatory and deliberative innovations could answer such a demand. Crucially, this narrative is anchored in statistical evidence: the public resonance of participatory innovations are connected to (very) large majorities of survey respondents supporting notions such that “citizens should have a bigger say in EU decision making” (Bertelsmann; cf. Eurobarometer) – an empirical proposition that also features in domestic contexts such as the first citizens’ assembly of the German Parliament. 

However, political psychology and public opinion scholarship caution us against straightforward interpretations of this kind of survey data – least to infer strong expectations about the legitimation and trust-building value of participatory and deliberative innovations. Both regarding general statements about citizens’ “say” or “voice” as well as responses to specific forms of involvement such as mini-publics (e.g. PEW), it remains unclear what (different groups of) citizens mean when they react to these questions. The issue is exacerbated in the context of public perceptions of the EU which are mediated by ambivalence, misinformation, and the strong role of national frames for opinion formation. 

How do citizens form opinions on participatory innovations? 

Against this background, my research scrutinises the narrative about the public resonance of citizens involvement in the EU and poses the question: how do different groups of EU citizens form opinions about participatory innovations (PIs) such as mini-publics? While there is a growing body of scholarship that seeks to measure the effects or the external legitimacy of PIs, the state of the literature remains ambivalent: not only is there conflicting evidence but consistent findings e.g. about the influence of demographic or political factors are open to various theoretical interpretations. 

To get a better understanding of the way that citizens form opinions about PIs, I develop a qualitative empirical design that utilises (focus) group interviews to gauge the discourse of participants in three Western EU member states. 32 groups of three to four participants (n=120) were sampled in Germany, Ireland, and Italy on the basis of education, residence (urban/rural), and political vote choice (GAL-TAN). To further address methodological limitations of existing studies, video vignettes were developed which introduce a participatory and deliberative decision-making scenario in a realistic way. 

Fieldwork in Italy: group interviews 

The costly fieldwork was kindly supported by a UACES scholarship, which allowed us to host eight group interviews in the North and in the South of Italy. With my co-author, Elena Pro, we recruited participants in Tuscany and Campania and conducted the interviews in Florence and Naples – with further support at the EUI and Parthenope University. 

With a view to the practical requirements of the research design, I could not have realised the project without the additional support from UACES. It was crucial to travel to the field in-person: Outsourcing recruitment and/or moderation would not only have been beyond the budget of my doctoral research but also methodologically risky in that I would have lost significant control over the process. The scholarship subsidised expenses for two one-week field trips in April and July. 

Funding for doctoral research 

I am grateful for the support by UACES, which allowed me to study how Italian citizens form opinions about participatory and deliberative innovations in the EU. Dedicated research and fieldwork grants for doctoral students are scarce, while the possibilities to collect original empirical data as part of a PhD seem greater than in the past. Digital applications and connectivity lower the bar to implementing comprehensive research designs and the UACES grant allows early-career scholars like me to realise them as part of their PhD.

The post Forming opinions about participatory innovations in the EU – fieldwork in Italy, supported by UACES appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU) in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty has fuelled a debate over how can a unified foreign policy be created while preserving the diversity of its Member States’ national foreign policies. Indeed, as a sui generis global actor, which does not classify as a state or a supranational organisation, acting on the global stage is essential for the EU to be recognised and legitimised. Recent international events – such as the return of war on European soil, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the rise of great power competition – have all called for more assertive and credible action. How can the EU answer this call?

 

To be able to ‘speak with a single voice’ has been the most widely shared answer between academics, practitioners, and leaders. It is assumed that the EU’s global presence is directly and positively correlated to its ability to act in unison. This is because the EU’s foreign policy-making process relies on unanimity and consensus in order to create a single foreign and security policy out of a multitude of diverging interests, histories, strategic cultures, and conceptions of global issues among Member States. It follows that agreement is a necessary condition for the EU to implement a foreign policy worthy of its name. When Member States disagree and are incapable of coming up with a decision and a single message to be communicated to the rest of the world with a single voice, the EU is usually posited not to be able to act on the global stage.

 

Consequently, as the role of the EU as a global actor has expanded, so has a ‘single voice mantra’ been entrenched in the study of its external action. Many will claim that the academic debate has now moved on from attempting to establish a correlation between the EU’s ability to speak with a single voice and its capacity to act externally. However, I argue that, still, most academic conceptualisations and analyses of the EU and the kind of power it is and projects have been inspired by debates in Comparative Politics and International Relations, which use the unitary state as a yardstick. The model of the state is mirrored at the political and policy level with a strong normative bias in favour of integration, with the objective that one day the Union will become a federation. Why should we move on from it?

 

1 – Let’s take a good look at empirical evidence

 

Although forging substantial and procedural unity is a struggle for the Union’s foreign policy, its track record shows that it is not always optimal. Empirical evidence shows that the impact and performance of the EU are inconsistent regardless of the EU’s ability to speak with one voice across multiple policy areas. Indeed, if unity does not come naturally but after draining internal negotiation activities, it can reduce the EU’s flexibility, resources, and credibility in diplomatic engagement with third parties. When the EU is united and assertive in multilateral settings, it can be accused of bullying by third countries, as seen in recent clashes in the UN General Assembly over the conflict in Ukraine.

 

2 – Let’s be realistic about the future

 

If the correlation between internal unity and agreement and the EU’s capacity to act on the international stage does not satisfactorily hold up with the current political and decision-making structure of the EU, it is unlikely it will do so in the future. The complex and often duplicated nature of the EU has only been emphasised by the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty has fragmented its external competencies between the Commission and the Member States. With the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, further integration in foreign and security policy is ever more improbable. Indeed, in an EU30+, the possibility that Member States may renounce their sovereignty through the extension of Qualified Majority Voting in foreign affairs is low. As of now, disagreement and fragmentation are here to stay.

 

3 – Let’s do with what we have – and be creative about it

 

Yes, Member States are not always uniformly committed to collective action on all sets of issues. The Union thus often fails to produce an overarching foreign policy that is cohesive and continuous – all characteristics that are usually associated with national foreign policies. However, a more normative argument can also be made: by dismissing all actions that do not fit in the container of the unitary state, we only have a half-painted picture of the foreign policy practice and potential of a post-modern actor. The EU should not renounce the post-Westphalian governance project that is embedded in its DNA by reducing the scope of international manoeuvre to unitary action only. The fact that its presence on the global stage challenges conventional expectations of diplomacy and international relations away from state-centricity can be a source of strength in an increasingly interconnected and complex world.

 

So what? Moving from unity to multiplicity

 

The normative, theoretical, and political prescription for a unitary foreign policy, with the issue of internal consensus and unanimity at its core, might not be the most fruitful. The Union has neither the characteristics of an international organisation nor those of a federal state but has both. It can speak with one voice as well as sing with many different ones. I attempt to build a pragmatic approach to capture this hybrid, shape-shifting characteristic by recognising the ‘multiplicity’ of the EU’s foreign policy machinery. A collective global actor, the Union has a diverse and dense system of foreign policy-making, which contains variable geographies and changeable relationships and balances between its actors, instruments, and practices. Multiplicity hence results in an ambiguous and ever-changing structure which depends on the interaction with other elements inside and outside the system, creating different forms that the EU assumes when acting internationally. It follows that there is never a single European Union acting on the global stage, but multiple. This ability to be both united and diverse might be a starting point to analyse how the coexistence of different voices can provide the EU with a sui generis ability to pragmatically adapt to different global contexts and events.

The post Why we should move away from the ‘single voice mantra’ – once and for all appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Ukraine, among others, are current candidates for the enlargement of the European Union (EU) that have experienced periods of war and grave human rights violations in the past or present. In the case of the countries of the former Yugoslavia, they underwent transitional justice processes in the 1990s and still attempt to address the consequences of the contentious past. In the case of Ukraine, the conflict continues, the future remains uncertain, and the claim for peace solutions is constant.

 

Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the armed conflict once again became a significant issue on the public agenda. However, in this new stage of global tensions and armed conflicts, the lessons left by the conflict that occurred in the Balkan wars of the 1990s are not often mentioned. The oversights committed during transitions and the effectiveness of the institutional reforms that followed the transition were not deeply analyzed, despite the increase in initiatives that aim to strengthen peace achievements through rule of law mechanisms since the transition times (an issue that the EU has considered in the integration processes of the Western Balkans).

 

In the past, the EU has recognized the importance of supporting reconciliation processes and strengthening the rule of law. Documents such as the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions (2018) have emphasized that the Western Balkans (key actors for regional stabilization) must address issues such as consolidating reconciliation in response to the wounds left by the conflicts. This premise has been maintained over time, from the path leading to the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreements to recent communications such as that of the European Council on the “Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans” (2024) which insists on the development of measures that reinforce the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights.

 

The implementation of these types of measures is important to improve the health of democracy. Nonetheless, no democratic or reconciliation project can be achieved by excluding the interests of women when deep social transformation and the maintaining of peace are pretended. Regarding this, the democratic transition in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s offers important historical lessons concerning the building of conflict narratives and the exclusion of women’s agency in those processes. Matter that paradoxically contrasts with the increasing support for gender agenda.

 

Indeed, bodies such as the European Parliament have stated that women are not only war victims but also peacebuilders and survivors, highlighting the importance of including a gender approach in this topic. Moreover, the EU has been engaged in developing measures to realize gender equality and women’s human rights, promoting legislation, gender mainstreaming, and specific measures for the empowerment of women. Despite this, it is criticized that the EU does not fully understand the principle of equality and gives it secondary importance, reinforcing a protective role instead of adopting a transformative approach to the structural causes of armed conflicts and gender inequality.

 

After the end of the aforementioned armed conflict, there was no doubt about the exacerbating consequences of war on women’s rights and the need to pursue gender-based crimes. Beyond this, it has been noted that one of the major failures during the transition was the inadequate protection of women’s interests during and after the conflict and the essentialization of gender by institutional actors. This problem is not unexpected, considering that international law usually associates gender roles in conflict with essentialist and stereotypical gender conceptions.

 

The role of gender in armed conflict

 

Historically, the understanding of war has been tied to assumptions such as internal enemies, legitimate or illegitimate aggression, military interventions, and other concepts associated with male values. Moreover, gender stereotypes have influenced the development of laws applicable to armed conflict, reducing gender matters to the protection of victims (women suitable to certain prototypes).

 

Women suffer intense violence during war, but after and before conflict, they are also vulnerable to domestic violence, lack of opportunities, employment discrimination, and others. In accordance with this, many studies investigate whether there is a difference between violence in times of conflict and peace. Regardless of the answer, it is generally concluded that law and judicial decisions often fail to capture the wide range of violence and its relation to broader phenomena such as structural violence.

 

In this regard, it is asserted that the legal framework applicable to armed conflict does not make gender distinctions except in some cases that set out special protection for pregnant women’s integrity and prevent acts of sexual violence, appealing to fragility paradigms. These references do not defend an equality status free of stereotypes, except for a few cases, such as Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention, which promotes equality regarding the treatment of prisoners of war.

 

According to international law, the role of law is to control the immediate crisis scenarios and humanitarian disasters generated by the war. On this matter, it is pointed out that reducing war to an “extraordinary” fact disregards women’s interests because it puts aside the analysis of the interconnected series of events, including the structural inequalities that are precede and influenced by them. Also reinforces the ideals of the “protective” role (played by States, agreements, or organizations, that represent the white male imaginary) under which women’s lives are considered valuable only when their affectation endangers the stability of a State, or a hegemonic social group, in exceptional circumstances.

 

Despite this, the institutionalization of the gender approach and the struggles of the feminist movements, just as the judgments of the international courts, have transformed the content of the international framework, including many provisions related to gender issues. These developments have impacted both international law and local experiences of peacebuilding.

 

In particular, the convictions provided by the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda laid the groundwork for understanding gender crimes. And subsequently, the Rome statute recognized rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, etc., as grave crimes against humanity and war crimes. This recognition coincided with the revelation of the magnitude of the sexual violence that occurred in the former Yugoslavia, during the Second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna  in 1993.

 

Based on the previous notes, the advances in these matters have been remarkable. Nevertheless, as indicated by transitional justice studies, the most significant advances in matters of human rights protection of women focus on specific and symbolic cases, while major shortcomings persist in most cases due to issues such as revictimization. Concerning this, the reproduction of rhetoric that infantilizes women is criticized, overlooking the effects and causes of conflicts and the diverse roles women play in war, and reducing gender studies to condemning sexual violence.

 

Even in the more apparently successful experiences, multiple mistakes have been made in providing justice solutions for women, just as succeeded during the Yugoslavia trials. In these trials, women were subjected to inappropriate treatment because the processes were focused on the perpetrator prosecution and the goal of issuing convictions, a purpose materialized in contexts of threat and harassment to women. Besides, after finishing the trials, women confronted difficulties related to social and family reintegration, concerns ignored by authorities and society.

 

Transition in the former Yugoslavia and the gender issues

 

Transitional justice encompasses objectives such as delivering justice to perpetrators of past wrongs, achieving recognition and reparation for victims, establishing truthful and common public narratives for past wrongdoings, exploring new conditions for lawful order and social justice, etc., all aimed at overcoming and preventing war. Furthermore, as noted by Gray & Levin (2013), transitions not only represent unique opportunities to advance the goals of sustainable peace but also to address broader issues of justice, such as forms of gender injustice, which are crucial for achieving long-term social stability.

 

Addressing broader issues of justice does not fully resolve structural problems such as gender-based violence, which pre-dates the conflict and transcends the boundaries of transitions. Likewise, the inclusion or exclusion of women has not prevented the signing of peace agreements and the initiation of transitional processes. Nonetheless, the exclusion of women impacts the degree of resource distribution, marginalization, etc., concerns that are linked to the causes and consequences of conflicts. Indeed, as Rooney (2018) noted, a lower percentage of benefits for the most marginalized in a conflict-affected community “intensifies the value and contentiousness of any redistributive gain involved, be it material, cultural, or symbolic”.

 

In the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the signing of the Dayton Agreements represented a transcendental political, social, and economic change. Besides, the implementation of new democratic projects was not isolated from the goals of gender equality, which was already a predominant issue on the international public agenda. Nevertheless, women continued to face many obstacles in entitling their rights within both public and private life in post-conflict countries.

 

During the conflict, women occupied different social roles; however, when it finished, the demands of the patriarchal social context led women to return to their traditional roles (for instance, the motherhood). In this context, the violence increased (mainly in the domestic sphere), exacerbated by factors such as the deterioration of individual/collective mental health, as well as the challenge to rooted gender stereotypes. At the same time, the authorities took advantage of the essentialization of gender to release their responsibility in executing post-conflict politics. Hence, caregiving tasks related to social reconstruction measures were assigned to women appealing to the “innate peacemaker” stereotype.

 

On the other hand, regarding the administration of justice by judicial bodies, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) set an international precedent in recognizing the relationship between gender and the commission of certain crimes. This tribunal contributed to exposing the accountability of perpetrators in positions of power, enabled the representation of women in trials, and served as a deterrent and tool in the fight against gender-based violence within the international context. Despite this, it was also criticized for substantial shortcomings in both retributive and distributive justice, the slow advance of trials, and the secondary trauma inflicted on victims, particularly women. These failures had an impact on women, who years later established a people’s court in which women’s agency was vindicated.

 

Both the successes and the failures in peace-building processes have significant repercussions on the future of countries that choose to move from a period of serious human rights violations towards a more peaceful and democratic time. In the case of failures, their persistence over time hinders and delays objectives such as the reduction of internal conflicts. On the other side, excessive triumphalism delays necessary discussions on entrenched issues like inequality and the loss of goals realized during transitions due to the effect of weak democracies.

 

It is criticized that during the aforementioned transition, ethnic divisions and nationalist projects were institutionalized instead of tackling the structural causes of the conflict. Therefore, as happened in other cases, successes achieved in the prosecution of gender-based crimes became fragmented, leaving unresolved discussions such as the connection between poverty, gender discrimination, and war damages, as well as the complexity of structural discrimination or its consequences during wartime.

 

No armed conflict should be preferred over the possibility of peace, even considering the consequences of an imperfect peace. Nonetheless, the peace that excludes women from their own agency and voice is neither just nor lasting.  In the Western Balkans, the transition ended a period of violence, and armed confrontation has not returned despite the social, economic, and political challenges faced by the countries. Notwithstanding, there are growing points of war tension around the world, sustained and compounded by structural injustice problems. In this context, it is always important to review the lessons learned in previous experiences, such as the importance of including gender approaches as the key to overcoming the violent past or present.

The post Gender and war: Reflections on the future of Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The July 4th Election

The British Conservative Party had been in power for the past 14 years. Public perceptions of the party have varied greatly over their 14-year tenure, but for the past four years, the party and its leaders have been under consistent scrutiny for a series of scandals and political and economical faffs. These incidents include, but are not limited to, the following: Brexit negotiations; the Covid-19 pandemic; ‘Partygate’ under former Prime Minister Johnson; the internal Conservative Party leadership debacle (i.e. Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, and Rishi Sunak); former Prime Minister Liz Truss’s economic mismanagement and the resultant crisis in the British economy; and the domestic cost-of-living crisis. In response to widespread unpopularity, Rishi Sunak, British Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party, decided to call a snap general election on May 22, 2024. I argue that the result of this snap election, which will be expounded in greater detail in the proceeding paragraphs, offers insight into the changing nature of Anglo-British political identity.

The general election was set for July 4, 2024 and was expected to generate a massively changed British government, differing significantly from the current set of sitting officials elected in 2019. As predicted, there was substantial restructuring. After 14 years of Conservative government, the Labour Party had finally regained the public’s electoral mandate, achieving a majority of 412 seats, up from their previous standing of 201. The Conservative Party, by contrast, dropped to 121 seats after previously holding 372. The UK’s ‘third party’, the Liberal Democrats, also capitalised on the perceived failings of the Conservatives, increasing their number of seats from eight to a considerable 64.

Although this was a national, pan-UK election, the most significant changes occurred in England, the largest – in geography, by population, and by GDP per capita – of the four home nations (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) that comprise the UK. Unlike the other home nations, England is not granted devolved governmental powers like Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland; all English laws and policies are created and voted on within Westminster Parliament, meaning representatives from the other home nations are able to influence the trajectory of English lawmaking and politics. The English, however, do not possess the same ability to impact lawmaking and politics (due to devolution in a vast number of policy areas, i.e., sports and the arts, education and training, health and social care, etc.) in the home nations. Concerns about England’s national identity and Anglo-specific issues have been largely neglected, if not suppressed, by the structure of British government, namely, Westminster Parliament and devolution. Furthermore, England and Englishness are often, rightly or wrongly, conflated with Britain and Britishness. It is because of this conflation that I feel the term Anglo-British identity is appropriate.

 

Tory England

The Conservative Party (colloquially referred to as ‘The Tories’), technically a pan-British political party, has, under various leaders in both historical and contemporary (the last decade) contexts, found its greatest support in England. In fact, support for the Conservatives is almost exclusively grounded in England, particularly Southern England (excluding most London boroughs). In turn, the party has positioned itself as the party of England and English interests; it has also presented itself, both pre- and post-devolution (1997), as the party most concerned with maintaining the British political union, with England at its core, in the face of increased political fragmentation between the home nations. The modern Conservative Party is more internally divided than ever, as evidenced by the formation of various party member groups, including the New Conservatives, National Conservatives, and Popular Conservatives, coupled with the constant change in party leadership and reshuffling of cabinet ministers.

Nevertheless, the party has attempted to maintain an overarching ideological identity, including a somewhat cohesive imagination of British national identity. The Conservative Party’s image of British national identity is centred on the idea of British sovereignty, guided by a ‘Britain first’ mentality with England at its core. Brexit can (and should) be viewed as a manifestation of the Conservative Party’s ‘Britain first’ mentality. In keeping with the Conservative’s Anglocentrism, the Brexit result was channelled through the English electorate in particular. As evidenced by the exit statistics of the Brexit referendum, it was English voters who essentially determined the result of the referendum: 53.4% of the English voting population who voted in the referendum voted to leave the European Union (EU), meaning 15,188,406 voted ‘leave’ in England (see: Brexit Referendum Results – BBC ). It could be argued that Brexit was at least in part an expression of English nationalism.

Yet, UK-wide statistics illustrate that many Britons, including English voters, now regret leaving the EU, especially the younger generations. In fact, as of May 2024, 55% of people consulted in a Statista poll consider leaving the EU to have been a mistake (see: Bregret – Statista ). The polls leading up to the July 4th election predicted a massive change in government as the British electorate grew increasingly frustrated with the perceived failings of Brexit, the cost-of-living crisis, and general dissatisfaction with the Conservative government. Therefore, the result of the election did not come as great a surprise to those involved in, or attuned to, UK politics. Still, it hugely significant that England, the traditional bedrock of Conservative electoral support, almost completely reorientated itself towards the Labour Party. The aforementioned political and economic failings of the Conservative Party, as well as the numerous scandals within the party, all contributed to this political turn. Yet, there is another factor at play as well.

 

A Change in English Identity? Tory England No More

Labour’s victory in the July 4th election signals a change in Anglo-British identity, shifting from a more traditionalist, inward-looking, and sovereigntist set of values and beliefs, those commonly associated with the Conservative Party, to a new identity that places greater emphasis on progressiveness, community, and interdependence. Keir Starmer, formerly the Leader of the Opposition and now the UK’s Labour Prime Minister, spoke about reclaiming Englishness from the right, arguing in an open letter that “Labour is now the true party of English patriotism”. Starmer goes further, stating that the Conservatives have done a disservice to “some of our proudest national institutions – from the BBC, to the National Trust and England football team – … [and have shown through their actions that] they don’t have faith in the strength of our history, identity and flag to withstand discussion” (to read the letter in full, see: Starmer Open Letter – The Telegraph). Through interchanging between the two identities as he writes, Starmer outlines how Englishness is a vital aspect of Britishness, making them practically inseparable.

Prime Minister Starmer’s conceptualisation of English identity is more progressive, multiculturally sensitive, and compatible with multiple identities, meaning that individuals are able to hold a combination of identities. We may therefore see a marked drop in the number of individuals in England who identify as exclusively English – as opposed to Anglo-British or even, Anglo-British-European. Thus, the massive shift in UK government we have just witnessed, especially the change in party allegiance amongst English voters, suggests that the Anglo-British political identity is changing in response to the perceived failings of the Conservative government. England, the vital base from which the Conservatives garnered their support for their past 14 years of government, has expressed its desire for political change, endorsing a new value set manifest in Keir Starmer’s Labour Party.

This shift is significant on three levels:

1) At the home nation (English) level: Starmer’s variant of Englishness is more inclusive and accessible to those who do not necessarily meet the stereotype of what it means to be English (i.e., white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant – WASPs), as well as to newcomers to England who wish to assimilate;

2) At the national level of the UK: a more equitable and open English nation(alism) will lead to greater cooperation and harmony amongst the home nations, creating a more robust British political union with less animosity between the four home nations;

3) At the international/European level: a renewed, more outward-looking and agreeable English identity will point England and the UK in the direction of multilateralism, potentially leading England and the UK towards an ever-closer relationship with the EU – although rejoining is off the cards, at least for the immediate future, a foundation can be set.

 

The End (For Now)

To conclude, in reflecting upon the July 4th election in the UK, I believe that the result is indicative of a changing Anglo-British identity, moving away from the more exclusive and closed-off version put forth by the Conservatives and shifting towards a more open and inclusive form under Labour. It is still too early to say with any certainty that the majority of English people who voted Labour did so out of genuine belief in the Labour platform as opposed to voting for Labour as a means of expressing their disenchantment with the Conservatives. That being said, I believe that Starmer’s reframing of Englishness may continue to change what it means to be English, including the relationships between Englishness, Britishness, and Europeanness, in the coming years.

 

 

WORD COUNT: 1521

The post The Resurgence of Labour: what it means for Anglo-British Identity appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Inga Ulnicane

The release of ChatGPT in late 2022 captured the public imagination. It provided a tool everyone can play around with, making Artificial Intelligence (AI) accessible to many. It also raised a lot of urgent questions, including about protecting copyrights, fighting disinformation, and avoiding discrimination. These and other questions were dealt with in several governance and policy initiatives, developed in the context of a new hype characterized by high positive and negative expectations surrounding ChatGPT. In my recent article ‘Governance fix? Power and politics in controversies about governing generative AI’ (Ulnicane 2024), I examine emerging governance of generative AI with a particular focus on activities of the G7, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the AI Safety Summit.

 

Focusing on risks, neglecting purpose & society

To examine the key ideas about the generative AI governance, I draw on the Responsible Innovation approach, which already for more than ten years has been widely used in technology governance research and practice.  While the Responsible Innovation approach is broad and fluid, I in particular focus on three features. First, it focuses on collective stewardship of technology towards socially beneficial goals and goes beyond individual responsibility of technology developers. Second, the Responsible Innovation approach emphasizes the importance of inclusion of the public in a two-way consultation, assigning an active role to society in co-shaping technology. Third, its approach to technology governance goes beyond mere risk management to encompass the purpose and direction of innovation.

The initial international initiatives for governance of generative AI fall short of the premises of inclusive and purposeful governance of technology, as suggested by the Responsible Innovation approach. They predominantly focus on risks, framing the public debate about generative AI largely in terms of existential vs immediate risks. Concerns about the risk management dominate over the considerations of purpose of this technology. Generative AI can be characterized as being largely a supply-driven technology push with unclear public demand. Its early governance initiatives pay relatively little attention to its contribution to tackling major societal challenges of our time. Moreover, they assign a rather passive role for society that needs to adapt and contribute to risk mitigation rather than actively co-shape the technology. This creates a kind of paradox of generative AI governance, when a technology that is used widely by society is at the same time governed narrowly by technical experts.

 

Governance fix: instrumental, narrow & technocratic

I coin the term ‘governance fix’ to highlight the instrumental and technocratic approach to governance in generative AI policy. To do that, I build on the concept of ‘technological fix’ that presents technology as a quick and cheap solution to complex and uncertain social problems. According to the ‘technological fix’ concept, technical solutions are seen as superior to political, economic, educational and other social science approaches to tackling problems. Accordingly, engineers are best placed to solve social problems and there is no need for public participation.

While technological fix remains a highly popular approach, it has received considerable criticism for being incomplete, ineffective, mechanical, not getting to the heart of the problem, and creating new problems as it solves the old ones. Prioritization of technical solutions allows technology companies to promote their vested interests, while letting policymakers avoid searching for more complex approaches to addressing problems that require immediate attention.

I suggest that in the case of generative AI, we can observe a ‘governance fix’ approach that, similarly to ‘technological fix’, considers governance as a technocratic endeavour that can be quickly developed and implemented by experts without public participation and deliberation regarding goals, direction and purpose of generative AI. As an alternative to this narrow and technocratic approach, I suggest participatory and inclusive governance that focuses on co-shaping technology towards socially beneficial goals.

 

Let’s continue the conversation!

AI, including generative AI, continues to pose major political questions. More research on politics, power and policy of AI is in the works. If you are interested to collaborate, please get in touch. Those attending the ECPR General Conference in Dublin, might be interested to attend the featured roundtable ‘Politics, Political Science, and Artificial Intelligence’ on Monday, 12 August 11:15-13:00 and a panel ‘Challenging power in Artificial Intelligence politics and policies’ on Wednesday, 14 August 16:15-18:00. Hope to see many of you there!

 

Reference:

Ulnicane, I. (2024) Governance fix? Power and politics in controversies about governing generative AI, Policy and Society, puae022, https://doi.org/10.1093/polsoc/puae022

The post Governance fix for generative AI? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

EUHealthGov held its fourth Practitioner Perspective on 11th July 2024. We were delighted to host Gloria Ghéquière, Advisor in the Cabinet of the Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Social Affairs and Public Health, Frank Vandenbroucke, to discuss the work done on health by the Belgian Presidency of the European Council between January and June 2024.

This period has continued to see a wide range of pressures on healthcare systems beyond the perennial challenge of ageing populations and the implications this has for costs and workforce. For example, climate change not only increases the risk of new pandemics, but also raises questions about the location of hospitals and drinking water installations in flood areas. A further consideration is market challenges as illustrated by increased medicine shortages of cheap basic medicines, as well as increasing costs for new innovative treatments. Against this backdrop what becomes clear is that there is a role for the EU to play with regard to health. The Belgian presidency drew overall on a range of policy proposals to develop further the European Health Union and to help keep health high on the agenda following the European Parliament elections and anticipating a new Commission mandate.

A key focus of the Belgian presidency’s work has been medicine shortages, which received most support across the Member States. This is a structural problem, with a twentyfold increase in medicine shortages seen between 2000 and 2018. Whereas Europe produced just over half (53%) of global active pharmaceutical ingredients in 2000, today production is found in Asia which is explained by an economic model of extreme economic cost-cutting and increased risk. Belgium has been instrumental in launching the idea of a Critical Medicines Act, which would allow investment in critical production in Europe, but also to establish international partnerships to stabilise global supply and to diversify supply chains.  Belgium also connected this idea with the solidarity mechanism at EU level which ensures that no patient in the EU should die or experience extreme consequences as a result of medicine shortages.

The Belgian presidency also promoted prevention of non-communicable diseases, by building on pre-existing EU initiatives such as the Beating Cancer Plan, and has recently welcomed the Commission’s recommendations for a Smoke Free Environment. This leads to a range of considerations regarding challenges of implementation, not only in connection with political will, but also how preventive actions may be located in the portfolios of different Directorates-General, and questions of how these do (or do not) work together.

Further topics covered by the Belgian presidency included work on a clinical trial coordination mechanism to be able to carry out publicly and privately-funded clinical trials on a large scale across the EU in a much more efficient way, and finalising negotiations on the European Health Data Space.

More about the Belgian presidency’s work can be found in the Council’s recommendations from June 2024 available here.

The post Summary: Health and the Belgian Presidency: Practitioner Perspective with Gloria Ghéquière appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The European Union (EU) has long aspired to be a global leader in climate change governance, a vision encapsulated by its ambitious European Green Deal and its goal to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. However, the internal complexity of the EU, characterised by its multi-level governance and diverse member states, often poses challenges to presenting a unified stance on global climate strategies. My research investigates the pivotal role of the European Commission in unifying the EU’s voice in global climate policy, particularly under the leadership of the von der Leyen Commission (2019-2024).

 

The European Commission as a Policy Entrepreneur

At the heart of the EU’s climate strategy lies the European Commission, often acting as a policy entrepreneur. This role involves not only drafting and proposing climate policies but also navigating the intricate landscape of inter-institutional relations within the EU. The Commission’s ability to act as a policy entrepreneur is essential in driving forward the EU’s climate agenda, especially in the face of diverse and sometimes conflicting interests among member states.

One of the key theoretical frameworks employed in my study is constructivist role theory, which emphasises the social constructs, norms, and identities that shape the behaviour and interactions of actors within international relations. This approach allows us to understand how the Commission perceives its role and how it strategically navigates its interactions with the European Parliament and the Council to achieve a cohesive climate strategy.

 

Navigating the Joint Decision Trap

A significant challenge in EU policymaking is the ‘Joint Decision Trap’ (JDT), a situation where the need for consensus among member states leads to sub-optimal policy outcomes. The JDT often results in decisions that reflect the lowest common denominator, limiting the ambition and effectiveness of EU policies. My research explores how the Commission can overcome or mitigate the effects of the JDT through strategic coalition-building and informal negotiations.

For instance, the Global Methane Pledge, co-launched by the EU and the United States at COP26, demonstrates the Commission’s ability to align diverse interests within the EU and present a united front on the global stage. This initiative, aiming to reduce global methane emissions by 30% from 2020 levels by 2030, required the Commission to engage in extensive internal consensus-building and external diplomacy.

 

Inter-Institutional Dynamics

The interplay between the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council is crucial in shaping the EU’s climate policies. The Parliament, often regarded as the ‘greenest’ institution due to its strong environmental advocacy, plays a vital role in pushing for ambitious climate measures. However, the level of support from the Parliament can vary, influenced by its internal political dynamics and the broader societal discourse on environmental issues.

My research highlights instances where the Commission successfully leveraged the Parliament’s support to advance its climate agenda, as well as cases where it had to navigate fluctuating levels of support. The dynamic relationship between these institutions underscores the complexity of EU climate policymaking and the Commission’s strategic role in aligning their positions.

 

Provisional Findings

Based on the initial interviews conducted:

1. Commission’s Self-Perception as Policy Entrepreneur
   • European Commission officials consistently view themselves as policy entrepreneurs, expressing optimism about their capacity to lead future climate initiatives. This self-perception reinforces the Commission’s proactive stance in driving EU climate policy.
     • Interview References: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
2. Equal Weight of Member States
   • Coordination among member states is less varied than anticipated. Despite differences in size, each member state is given equal weight during internal negotiations, which facilitates a more balanced and inclusive decision-making process.
     • Interview References: 3, 5
3. Stability vs. Fluctuation in Parliamentary Support
   • The European Parliament’s support for the Commission’s climate initiatives is not constant, influenced by its electoral nature. In contrast, the stability of the Commission is seen as an advantage that can be leveraged to achieve sustained policy outcomes.
     • Quote: “The Commission should use its stability as a tool to achieve something.”
     • Interview Reference: 5

 

Conclusions

The European Commission’s role in unifying the EU’s stance on global climate strategies is both complex and pivotal. By acting as a policy entrepreneur and strategically navigating inter-institutional relations, the Commission can effectively drive forward the EU’s ambitious climate agenda. Understanding these dynamics is essential for appreciating the EU’s approach to global climate governance and its efforts to maintain its leadership role in this critical area.

As we move forward, the lessons learned from the von der Leyen Commission’s tenure will be invaluable in shaping future climate policies and ensuring that the EU continues to lead by example on the global stage.

The post The EU’s Unified Climate Voice: An Analysis of the European Commission’s Role appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

‘Decenter:  to cause to lose or shift from an established center or focus. Especially: to disconnect from practical or theoretical assumptions of origin, priority, or essence’ (Thesaurus dictionary, 2024).

 

The call for decentring European studies has grown stronger and louder by the year. The need for a re-thinking of Eurocentrism in EU external action has been undeniable – one could think about the example of the (in)famous speech Borrell delivered in November 2022 at the College of Europe, whereby he made clear that the EU is a well-tended garden whose ‘gardeners’ shall, at all costs, protect it from the jungle threatening its borders.

 

Even though the decentring agenda is known mainly in academia and selected policy circles, the importance of bringing this discussion one step further is increasingly such in a growing complex world, whereby issues of race, inequality, and coloniality are becoming increasingly central. This blog argues that this agenda should be further radicalised and (re)constructed because, in its current formulation, it carries two main dangers: creating dynamics of ‘Othering’ and promoting forms of ‘narcissistic recentering’. This argument is based on the draft review paper on decentring presented at the UACES Graduate Forum, where I critically analyse over 30 academic publications that embrace and operationalise the decentring agenda.

 

The decentring framework as it is currently conceived welcomes us to reason in three fundamental steps: provincializing, engaging, and reconstructing. The three intellectual steps would allow both academics (and, one day, policymakers) to engage in an interesting exercise: first, provincializing means abandoning Eurocentric ontological and epistemological frames, moving beyond the ever-historical, cultural, racial, political, and social centrality of Europe as the ultimate model to imitate economically, socially, and politically. Secondly, engaging means entering relations with partners (or ‘Others’ more in general) to discover their own historical, cultural, social, and political structures – how they matter, how they came to be, and how they relate to “ours”. Finally, reconstructing means bringing the two perspectives together – but in an optic to make the European Union a more legitimate and stronger actor on the global scene, rather than to even more strongly recognize the need to provincialize our understanding of the world.

 

These intellectual steps come together as a sort of Hegelian dialectics, whereby a thesis (the EU) meets an antithesis (the ‘Others’) to engage in a synthesis (understanding each other better) which, however, is dangerously producing and reproducing hierarchies of power that are currently structuring our world.

 

First, the provincializing exercise should be one of re-learning, more than un-learning, first and foremost to understand that ‘Others’ also form part of our shared history, and their values, world views, struggles and identities have been profoundly shaped, altered, and directed by their relationship to Europe, through colonial exploitation and violence. Ignoring dynamics of co-constitution, especially with specific regions of the world where colonialism had its most significant impact, means rejecting in the first place the provincialisation effort that the framework prays for in the first place. Re-learning, rather than unlearning, is fundamental in disentangling complex dynamics of co-creation, while, at the same time also seeking to understand, to uncover and to incorporate those epistemologies and ontologies that were silenced during colonial times. This intellectual engagement is much more complex than simply looking into how “different” others seemingly are from the European model. Decentring would mean eliminating the idea that Europe is the model in the first place.

 

Secondly, from this reasoning, it naturally follows that the step of engagement derives directly from the genuine need to re-learn, together with un-learning, to abandon existing hierarchies that put Europe at the center.

 

Thirdly, reconstruction should not consist of a ‘narcissistic recentering’ exercise – reconstruction should not be about making the European Union stronger, more legitimate, and more capable of ‘extracting’ good deals from its partners. It should be about reparative justice, the destruction of built-in hierarchies, and the end of Western capitalism as the go-to models that the world should adhere to. It should be about recovering and uncovering common epistemologies and ontologies that would make the world a more diverse, inclusive, and just.

 

To do so, the European Union – and by that, I mean both the academics studying it, and the policymakers building it – should come to terms with a complex past, built around civilisational hierarchies and race, whose consequences are still impacting third countries and ‘internal Others’ in the EU to this day, but are too often left invisible.

The post A reflection around decentering European studies appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

EUFutures Research Network Workshop

Litigation Strategies at a Time of Digital Transformation: New Directions of EU Law

(Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA, 2 May 2024)

How can we explain the successes and failures of interest groups in the European Union (EU) when they choose to litigate in the digital field, bottom-up?

On 2 May 2024, a group of academics and early-stage researchers gathered in Science Po Grenoble – UGA to try and find an answer to the question above, to open a wider conversation on the emerging issues of litigation at a time of digital transformation, and even more broadly, to discuss the future direction of EU (digital) law. Kindly organised by the UACES/James Madison Trust funded EUFutures Research Network, the workshop provided a forum for both senior and junior scholars to exchange ideas and build synergies. Speakers included: Maria Tzanou (Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Sheffield), Kris van der Pas (Postdoctoral researcher, Tilburg University), Maria Magierska (PhD Researcher, European University Institute), Oles Andriychuk, (Professor of Law, University of Newcastle), Giulia Gentile (Lecturer in Law, Essex Law School), Ivanka Karaivanova (PhD Researcher, European University Institute), Sarah Tas, (Assistant Professor, Maastricht University), Adrian Kuenzler (Assistant Professor, Zürich University), Mathieu Fasel (Phd Candidate, University of Lausanne), Elaine Fahey (Professor of Law, City, University of London), Sabine Saurugger (Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA, PACTE) and Fabien Terpan (Professor of Law, Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA, CESICE).

The event consisted of four ‘strategically’ compiled panels, which provided a diversity in terms of legal fields but also heterogeneity in the research stage of participants. For the more junior scholars, in particular, the workshop delivered a calm environment to present their research and gain valuable feedback on their ongoing projects, either doctoral or post-doctoral.

The first panel’s overarching objective was to shed light on strategic litigation in the context of EU data protection law. Covering a broad array of legal knots under the procedural arrangements laid down in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the panel questioned what the main features and characteristics of this strategic litigation are, what makes data protection litigation ‘strategic’ and what this litigation potentially has missed out (Tzanou). The conversation then turned to explore why the actors of strategic litigation do (or do not) choose an EU (extra-)legal avenue through the lenses of the utilisation of the EU remedies system by civil society actors in the field of data protection (Van der Pas). Finally, the panellists highlighted the role of NGOs as a specific player and their role as ‘early flaggers’, ‘protectors’ and ‘quasi-enforcers’ of the GDPR, arguing that their conduct effectively places them as indispensable actors in the political and legal procedures’ setting (Magierska).

The second panel combined presentations on fundamental rights law, consumer protection law and competition law. Ultimately, it was suggested that the EU case law on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ application in the digital environment offers interesting insights on the experimentalist theory on the effectiveness of human rights, whereby the long-term nature of the impact of fundamental rights appears nonetheless at odds with the fast-paced dynamics of the digital environment (Gentile). A conceptual argument was made that contrary to what is stated is the Digital Markets Act (DMA) itself and to what is acknowledged in EU law more generally, the DMA does not envisage a comprehensive, but a selective –and thus only public – enforcement (Andriychuk). It was further claimed that such interventionist and all-inclusive rules can only be justified by ‘public policy’, ‘societal interests’, ‘political reasonableness’ considerations. A similar plea was put forward with respect to consumer protection where evidence of the EU’s intervention in the domestic enforcement of EU law was presented, most recently with the Digital Services Act (DSA), which, de facto, devotes the majority of its provisions to the administrative regulation and channels enforcement into the public domain (Karaivanova). By looking into specific examples of constraints in the judicial protection on digital consumer’s matters, the potential of the national public authorities to fill the litigation gaps in the domain was demonstrated.

The DSA and DMA were also the focus of the discussions during the next, third panel. It was highlighted that while there are a significant number of cases relating to data protection brought forward by NGOs, there is a relative scarcity of legal actions concerning content moderation (Tas). However, the DSA is expected to considerably stir collective actions against online platforms for the flaws of their content moderation systems, removing some of the procedural barriers faced by NGOs in the past. The DSA is certainly trying to better protect users and guaranteeing legal certainty across the European single market. (Fazel). However, the fact that it has become the sole reference text on digital regulation for social media platforms places all the more weight and responsibility on the DSA and its implementation. The conversation then took a turn to competition law with a novel take on the recent CJEU jurisprudence relating to Big Tech companies (Kuenzler). It was argued that while the competition law investigations are not necessarily explicit in recognising the distinct role of consumers in concentrated markets, the investigations are in fact best understood as an effort to ‘clear the channels of consumer influence’. By doing that, they will further be able to allow digital markets to benefit from an intensified extent of administrative action taken on behalf of consumers.

The fourth and final panel, on the one hand, considered EU Law as global governance, focusing on movements of consumers between regimes, strategic litigation by Big Tech across jurisdictions and Big Tech’s lobbying across jurisdictions with respect to regulatory standards (Fahey). On the other hand, the panel highlighted that even though the EU external commitments are rarely challenged by the Court, this was not the case with the EU-US frameworks for data transfer (Saurugger and Terpan). And not only that they were challenged but they were successfully challenged – the CJEU, through rulings indirectly triggered by public interest groups, invalidated the Safe Harbour and later the Privacy Shield. But how can we explain the success of litigation strategies while so many factors pushed in the opposite direction? Answering this question will provide an understanding of the conditions leading to successful litigation strategies, especially those pursued by public interest groups, in the EU and beyond.

All in all, the conference demonstrated, firstly, how integration through law in the EU has shifted decidedly towards a court-centric perspective. Secondly, it successfully bridged the gap between the most recent developments of EU digital law and the established routes of litigation strategies of interest groups. Finally, it tried to predict the future direction of the EU digital transformation following the emergence of the Single Market to a Digital Single Market and considered the potential successes of strategic litigation. The conversation will continue during the UACES Annual Conference in Trento, Italy in September 2024. The contributions will be published at the end of 2024 in the Nordic Journal of European Law, Special Issue 4 entitled ‘EU law in the era of digitisation: on strategic litigation causes, actors and processes’.

The post Workshop Report: Litigation Strategies at a Time of Digital Transformation: New Directions of EU Law appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This piece was originally posted as part of the UK Election Analysis project. Do visit for lots of other pieces on all aspects of the 2024 General Election.

Given that the past decade of British politics has arguably been shaped by the question of Europe more than any other single issue, one might have expected to find the matter to be front and centre in the election campaign. The economic and social consequences of Brexit still reverberate, with profound dissatisfaction among the general public about how it has been handled and with previously strong advocates on both sides of the Leave-Remain divide still very present in the political debate. And yet, Brexit and present and future relations with the European Union (EU) were almost entirely absent from both the long and short election campaigns. How might we explain this and what consequence will it have for the new government?

Nothing to see here; move along

To some extent, the difficulties of European policy for the government provided a strong reason not to dwell on the topic in the post-Johnson period: the issue had been caught up with the ex-Prime Minister and both Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak wanted to change the conversation as part of an attempted refresh. For Sunak, the conclusion of the Windsor Framework deal in early 2023 and then the publication of the Strengthening the Union Command Paper in February (which opened the door to the resumption of the Northern Ireland Executive) drew a line under matters, allowing him to argue the fundamentals of the relationship with the EU were now settled and agreed.

For their part, Labour had long been content to let the Conservatives tear themselves up over Brexit and as they rose in the polls, there appeared to be an incentive in not pushing any particular line on the issue, mostly for fear of alienating disillusioned Leave/Conservative voters. As much as there were some grumbling on all sides about the policy of ‘make Brexit work’, it offered some reassurance that improvements could be made, without overturning the basic choice made in the 2016 referendum.

The result was a tacit ceasefire on the issue between the two main parties: neither leader voluntarily used the topic in their head-to-head TV debates – even the question asked about it in the final debate saw minimal discussion – and there were only passing mentions in the fine print of the manifestos.

Moreover, smaller parties also seemed to have made a similar decision. The Liberal Democrats and Greens retained their position of rejoining the EU, but neither put it at the heart of their campaigning, in stark contrast to 2019. On the other side of the debate, Reform UK also subsumed European matters into one small part of their general critique of mainstream politics, their manifesto more a list of complaints than a policy.

The only exceptions were found in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The SNP was more proactive about the failure of Brexit as part of Westminster’s failure of Scotland and about the need for EU membership as part of an independent Scottish future. In Northern Ireland, the Windsor Framework produced much self-justification from the DUP and criticism from the TUV, as well as being prominent across the community as a key part of the economic and political landscape.

Perhaps the best marker of all of this came on 23rd June, the eighth anniversary of the referendum vote. Whereas in previous years there had been notable amounts of public debate and discussion, this time there was only a half-hearted probing of Labour’s policy.

What happens in Brussels doesn’t stay in Brussels

As much as the key political figures in the election did not want to discuss relations with the EU, it is also clear that the new government will not have so much choice in the matter.

The European Political Community summit at Blenheim Palace on 18th July will be an early reminder of this, as Prime Minister Starmer welcomes leaders from across the continent and will have to decide how much he offers beyond warm words. While there will be understanding that he has only just entered the job, his ability to start delivering on action will also be noted.

Part of this might involve movement on a new security pact with Germany, modelled on the Lancaster House arrangements with France, for which Labour has already laid some groundwork. But this bilateral move will not remove the need to engage on issues as diverse as carbon pricing, fishery quotas, Northern Ireland consent to the Protocol and the general review of the main EU-UK treaty in the coming 18 months. Despite Foreign Secretary David Lammy’s flash tour of European capitals immediately after the election, talk of a non-binding security pact with the EU leaves matters very open.

Add to this the potential changes the EU itself will be undergoing in the next period of time and it is clear that not having an active interest and engagement with European affairs might prove to be a false economy for the new government. The consolidation of the radical right in the European Parliament and the constraining of the French political system following the legislative election, as well as the general day-to-day production of new EU legislation, will all produce impacts on the UK, which remains unavoidably exposed to the developments of its closest and largest neighbour. Whether Labour has an effective playbook to manage this will become apparent soon enough.

The post The sleeping dog of ‘Europe’: UK relations with the EU as a non-issue appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The EU-Ukraine relations started with Ukraine’s independence in 1991, but they were not unproblematic. Ukrainian leaders wanted to get benefits both from the EU and Russia, at the same time not coming too close to either. Ukrainian citizens were divided on whether the country should integrate with East, West or stay on its own. The EU was not sure in its policy towards Ukraine and many EU members valued partnership with Russia more. Yet 24th February 2022 changed EU-Ukraine relations. Apart from freezing its cooperation with Russia and providing military help for Ukraine’s fight against Russian invasion, the EU made Ukraine an EU candidate country on 23rd June 2022. How and why did this rough change in the EU’s policy towards Ukraine happen?

 

EU-Russia & EU-Ukraine

Cooperation with Russia was important for the EU for many reasons and the fear to disturb it kept the EU from developing better ties with Ukraine. Beneficial EU-Russia partnership was a core reason of the EU’s weak response to Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas in 2014. Russian full-scale invasion in 2022 made a difference. Already a day before the invasion the EU introduced its first sanctions’ package against Russia, a few days after the invasion Russian banks were switched off from SWIFT and by the time when Ukraine became an EU candidate country, there were already six EU’s packages of sanctions against Russia. This shows a substantial change in the EU’s policy towards Russia.

Not only EU countries understood Russia better in 2022, but Eastern EU member-states made an effort to convince countries like Germany, France and Italy to stop their trade with Russia. For instance, Germany supported embargo on Russian oil in mid-spring only after other European countries’ were able to push and shame Germany for trading with the aggressor. When ‘business as usual’ with Russia became not possible, closer EU-Ukraine relations was a possibility.

 

Ukraine chose the EU

Russian full-scale invasion destroyed also Ukrainians’ hopes for friendship with Russia. Ukrainian politicians finally applied for EU membership on 28th February 2022. The support of ordinary Ukrainians for joining the EU skyrocketed from 47% in 2013, 52% in 2021 to 82% in 2022. This, together with Ukraine’s successful resistance to Russia, was convincing EU’s decision-makers to support faster EU-Ukraine integration.

 

The need to protect Europe

The EU was always afraid to provoke Russia, but its caution did not prevent Russian unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The EU’s leaders’ awareness about the need to change the strategy was growing. Eastern EU-member states’ politicians had a real fear of Russian possible attack on their own countries and even Western Europeans felt Russian threat. It was the moment when European decision-makers agreed that the EU had to develop a stronger response to Russia and fostering relations with Ukraine was one of the new measures.

On the other hand, Russian brutality and war crimes created a huge wave of sympathy among EU citizens and politicians. The EU as a perceived promoter of human rights and security in Europe felt pressure to support Ukraine with all means. In spring 2022, the majority of Europeans (60-88% in different countries) condemned Russia, sympathized Ukraine (89%) and supported Ukraine’s integration into the EU. The EU politicians felt the moral need to help Ukraine to win this war and to become an EU member afterwards.

 

A new EU candidate

With all the above arguments in place, an EU candidate country status was still a symbolic gesture, which did not require final decisions from EU member-states. The threat to the EU and the moral obligation were crucial in the EU’s decision to make Ukraine an EU candidate country, but this status was a sign of a moral support for Ukraine with no big real impact.

Currently, Ukraine is already on the accession track and EU-Ukraine relations are deepening every day. It seems that the EU did not stop with its first step and the candidate status received a bigger meaning. The future will show if and when Ukraine will become a new EU member. However, it is relevant to understand how the first big step towards Ukraine’s membership in the EU happened after Russia invaded Ukraine and the EU felt the need to amend its relations with both Russia and Ukraine.

The post The renewed chance for the EU’s enlargement by Ukraine appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Unity is strength. These were the words of the German Chancellor Scholz as he met with President Macron and Prime Minister Tusk in Berlin. Similarly, in his Sorbonne speech, President Macron appealed to more unity in face of constant geopolitical changes, calling for a strong bloc who is capable of leaving its footprint in the international setting. Unity has then become a hot debate topic in everyday politics, as leaders often proclaim that a united EU is able to better assert itself in the international arena.

 

This link between unity and external action is reflected in the approval of EU sanctions against Russia in February 2022, as these passed with an unprecedent speed. Thus, as the EU displayed a united front, it emanated strength and influence. On the flip side of the coin, the EU might struggle to display a united front in certain geopolitical issues, as EU Member States (MS) demonstrate divergent domestic interests. In the Middle East, for instance, the EU has been facing difficulties in conveying a united message. Consequently, if the EU is not able to speak in a single voice, its credibility may be undermined vis-à-vis third parties.

 

So, could a lack of European unity lead to an undermined role for Europe? Though the answer to this question would entail delving into the various complexities of EU policy, it is possible to take a positive outlook to external action. In fact, despite being internally divided, the EU nonetheless concludes international agreements. Take trade policy as an example. Within the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) MS displayed polarised views, but the EU still reached an internal position and effectively concluded the negotiations. Therefore, the key question should not be whether there is a correlation between internal cohesiveness and effectiveness, but instead, how EU unity can be forged. Indeed, in the article I presented at the UACES Conference in Amsterdam, I argued that there is no strict correlation between EU internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness, as a disunited EU is capable of achieving its goals by forging unity during the negotiation process.

 

The contribution of the UACES Conference

 

Attending the UACES Conference in June was utterly beneficial for the development of valuable skills and new connections, as I had the opportunity to get to know interesting colleagues who work in a similar field. As a result, I enriched my perspective of EU studies, gaining new insights into the role of feminist and LGBTQ+ theories on the understanding of complex phenomena. Moreover, the establishment of these links, allowed me to reflect on different forms of evolving my research. Here, I highlight the perspective of international law – an area I am very captivated by.

 

In addition, the conference was marked by its welcoming atmosphere where great feedback was provided – though I focus on trade policy in my research, I had the opportunity to reflect on the importance of analyzing the link between cohesiveness and effectiveness in security negotiations. In fact, obtaining results in this field would be of remarkable societal relevance, as it could lead to a thorough understating of current geopolitical issues (e.g. military support for Ukraine), therefore paving the way for the understanding of collectively beneficial outcomes.

 

I would therefore like to thank UACES for the opportunity to present my research in such a dynamic and thought-provoking event.

The post A Reflection on EU Internal Unity through the UACES Conference appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In recent years, Europe has witnessed a notable surge in the popularity and influence of populist radical right parties. This trend has been particularly evident in the 2024 elections for the European Parliament, where this party-family has secured significant victories, reflecting a broader shift in the political landscape across the continent.

One of the most prominent figures in this phenomenon is Giorgia Meloni, leader of Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). Meloni is the first female Prime Minister of the country and managed, in only a decade, to take FdI from being a smaller political to the first party in Italy. In Meloni’s agenda emerge many of the populist radical right ideological traits, particularly the return to conservative social values, such as, the traditional family, women appointed to their roles of mothers, as well as stances against immigration and the LGBTQ+ community. The success of FdI is mirrored in other European countries, suggesting a growing resonance with populist radical right ideologies.

For instance, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) represents the complex dynamics of the populist radical right on the EU level. Although the AfD did not perform particularly well in the 2021 federal elections, losing parts of the votes obtained in the previous 2017 elections, it has consistently achieved stronger results in the recent European Parliament elections. This apparent discrepancy highlights the different dynamics at play in national versus European elections, suggesting that the AfD’s message resonates more with voters when framed within the broader context of European governance and identity politics.

In France, the Rassemblement National (RN), led by Marine Le Pen, further underscores the persistence of the populist radical right in Europe. The RN has made significant inroads in French politics, despite challenges in securing Le Pen’s presidency in 2022 and the majority in the July 2024 legislative elections. The party has, nonetheless, been able to secure substantial representation over the years, highlighting its growing influence in the French political scene. This success reflects the RN’s dédiabolisation (de-demonisation) – the strategic rebranding to shed its extremist image and appeal to a broader – and possibly younger – electorate. This process, initiated by Marine Le Pen, involved softening the party’s rhetoric and distancing it from its more controversial and radical past.

Other parties in Europe have seen its share of influence, such as in the Netherlands with the Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders. Known for his outspoken stance against Islam and the European Union, Wilders has managed to maintain a significant following despite facing legal and political challenges. Similarly, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary has also become a stronghold of populist radical right politics, through the implementation of policies that emphasise national identity, and against the European Union, immigration and the LGBTQ+ community.

In this light, the success of these parties in various European countries points to a larger phenomenon that is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. The populist radical right’s ability to tap into the public’s fears and frustrations about immigration, cultural change, and globalisation has proven to be a powerful political strategy. This trend should not be overlooked and considered as just a passing phase, but it reflects deep-seated concerns among significant portions of the European electorate.

Moreover, the rise of the populist radical right has had profound implications for the European Union. These parties often challenge the very foundations of the EU, advocating for policies that prioritise national interests over collective European goals. This has led to increased tensions within the EU, as member states navigate the complex dynamics of sovereignty and integration.

The persistence of populist radical right parties in European politics indicates a fundamental shift in the political landscape. As long as issues like immigration, economic inequality, and cultural identity remain contentious, these parties will continue to find fertile ground for their messages. The challenge for Europe will be to address the underlying causes of this political shift while maintaining the principles of democracy and unity that have long defined the continent.

The post The Success of the Populist Radical Right – What does it mean for the European Union? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Let’s cut to the chase: What ARE the strongest arguments for the UK to rejoin the EU?

I asked Chat GPT 4.0 for the answer, which it gave in precisely 2 seconds.

Clearly, I’m now redundant. But the case to rejoin the EU certainly is not. If only we could rejoin the EU as fast as AI gave its reasons to do so.

Read the rational arguments configured by Artificial Intelligence.

• THE ANSWER BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Rejoining the European Union (EU) is a complex and multifaceted issue, but there are several strong arguments that proponents put forward:

1. ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Trade and Market Access

• Single Market Access: Rejoining the EU would grant the UK seamless access to the Single Market, facilitating trade by eliminating tariffs, reducing non-tariff barriers, and simplifying regulations.
• Customs Union: Membership in the customs union would eliminate customs checks and tariffs on goods moving between the UK and EU, reducing costs and delays for businesses.

Investment and Growth

• Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): The UK could attract more FDI, as EU membership makes it a more attractive location for multinational companies seeking access to the European market.
• Economic Stability: Being part of a larger economic bloc can provide more stability and resilience against global economic fluctuations.

2. POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC INFLUENCE

International Influence

• Global Power: EU membership amplifies the UK’s voice on the global stage, allowing it to participate in shaping EU policies and decisions that have international implications.
• Collective Security: Collaboration on security, defense, and foreign policy within the EU can enhance the UK’s strategic capabilities and influence.

3. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ADVANTAGES

Freedom of Movement

• Work and Travel: Rejoining the EU would restore the right of UK citizens to live, work, and travel freely across EU member states, benefiting individuals and businesses alike.
• Cultural Exchange: Enhanced opportunities for cultural and educational exchanges can enrich the lives of UK citizens and foster greater understanding and cooperation.

Rights and Protections

• Worker and Consumer Rights: EU regulations often provide robust protections for workers and consumers, ensuring higher standards and benefits.

4. SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL COLLABORATION

Research Funding and Collaboration

• EU Research Programs: Rejoining would provide access to EU research funding and collaborative projects, which are crucial for advancing scientific and technological innovation.
• Educational Opportunities: Participation in programs like Erasmus+ enhances educational opportunities and cross-border academic collaboration.

5. REGIONAL STABILITY AND COHESION

Northern Ireland Peace Process

• Good Friday Agreement: Rejoining the EU could help stabilize the situation in Northern Ireland by addressing issues related to the border with the Republic of Ireland, thus supporting the peace process.
• Regional Development: EU funding and policies aimed at regional development could benefit disadvantaged areas in the UK.

6. ENVIRONMENTAL AND REGULATORY STANDARDS

Climate Change and Environmental Policies

• Sustainability Goals: Collaborating with the EU on climate change initiatives can enhance the UK’s ability to meet its environmental targets and commitments.
• High Standards: EU environmental regulations ensure high standards for pollution control, biodiversity, and sustainable development.

7. PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL UNITY

Changing Sentiments

• Public Support: If public opinion shifts significantly in favor of rejoining, it would provide a democratic mandate to reconsider EU membership.
• National Unity: Rejoining the EU could help address divisions within the UK, particularly if Brexit has led to political and social fragmentation.

These arguments collectively present a strong case for the UK to consider rejoining the EU, emphasising economic prosperity, political influence, social benefits, scientific collaboration, regional stability, environmental sustainability, and the potential for enhanced national unity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Watch this 9-minute video on why the UK joined the EU, and why we might join again for the same reasons

______________________________________________________

Follow my journalism on:

• Facebook
• LinkedIn
• YouTube 
• Jon Danzig’s World

_______________________________________________________

The post Strongest arguments to rejoin the EU appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This blog post summarises the contribution I submitted for the UACES 2024 Graduate Forum held this June in Amsterdam. I want to thank UACES for having organised and provided funds for attending this event!

 

Human rights constitute the core values of the European Union, enforceable both internally and externally. Through the Amsterdam Treaty-consolidated acquis communautaire, they have become a cornerstone of the EU law. Yet, the EU’s journey towards human rights inclusion in the treaties has been lengthy. It has been largely shaped by significant case law, notably from the German Constitutional Court, which standardized human rights based on common constitutional traditions. Equally important is the role of the European Convention and Court on Human Rights as a source for EU human rights, despite the EU Court of Justice denying the possibility of an EU membership in the convention. Finally, the third source of human rights can be found in international human rights law, especially its constituent treaties. All relevant sources were subsequently enshrined in treaty provisions, thereby enriching the construction of EU legal instruments, and ultimately fostering an EU principled approach.

Recently, this principled approach has been further concretised in EU regulatory efforts, encompassing a growing array of policies, and spanning from environmental protection to supply chains.

 

Environmental Protection and Human Rights

The EU Green Deal (EGD) has been a central policy of the 2019-2024 Commission. At its core are the commitments to achieve a carbon-neutral EU by 2050, first outlined and subsequently consolidated in the 2021 Regulation amending the broader EU climate law. While the instrument itself does not explicitly mention human rights, many associated policies include provisions that address human rights considerations. This is particularly evident in due diligence-based instruments and other regulatory frameworks such as the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which includes provisions addressing human rights considerations in international partnerships. Other instruments related to the EGD also include human rights provisions. The EU Battery Regulation mandates risk assessments and necessary actions linked to due diligence in cases where human rights abuses are at risk. The EU auditing regime has also been expanded to include assessments of sustainability and human rights impacts. Notably, the 2022 Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) extends human rights and sustainability requirements, previously established in non-financial reporting, to sustainability reporting, merging these concepts under a broader umbrella of sustainability.

These amendments underscore the EU’s commitment to a principled approach to human rights and its expanding influence in the business sector. Moreover, they demonstrate the inseparable nature of human rights and sustainability. Legislative developments, including recent case law from the European Court of Human Rights, support the integration of environmental rights within the realm of human rights. However, the intersection of environmental and human rights represents just one aspect of the broader EU human rights efforts. The imminent introduction of the due diligence directive presents an additional dimension to this unfolding debate.

 

Human Rights Through Supply Chains

The development of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D) was some years ago but has only recently concluded. Developing a human rights due diligence policy for supply chains was not just an independent EU initiative; it followed existing instruments in several member states. Notably, three EU member states had already developed instruments covering supply chains. The French Loi de Vigilance (Law of Vigilance – 2017) and the German LkSG (Supply Chain Act – 2021) are broad-spectrum due diligence instruments, while the Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Law (2019) is subject-specific. The CS3D aims to complement these national actions by establishing a unified EU framework for environmental and human rights due diligence applicable to large companies. The CS3D mandates the application of EU human rights standards through due diligence within the EU. It also extends these requirements to supply chains and large companies from third countries operating within the EU internal market. It also provides mechanisms for member states to enforce penalties in cases of non-compliance. The overarching goal is to hold businesses accountable for upholding human rights, prevent gross violations within and outside of the EU borders, and establish penalty regimes for violations.

The CS3D stands out as a pivotal instrument demonstrating the EU’s principled approach, not only for its intrinsic value but also for its establishment of a unified EU-wide system to enforce human rights standards in the business sector. This framework complements existing international frameworks established by the UN, OECD, and the ILO. The CS3D represents the next phase of EU human rights policy and aligns with a global trend toward holding large corporations accountable. This aspect reinforces the EU’s role as a prominent global advocate for human rights, showcasing its commitment to external enforcement beyond traditional conditionality measures. This instrument encapsulates the evolution of the EU’s principled approach, building on past efforts and paving the way for future developments in human rights protection.

The post Advancing a Principled Approach: Human Rights and Environmental Integration in the EU Business Sector appeared first on Ideas on Europe.