Ideas on Europe Blog

by Bogdan Căpraru (Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași; National Institute for Economic Research, Romanian Academy), Anastasios Pappas (Hellenic Fiscal Council; Kapodistrian University of Athens), and Nicu Sprincean (Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași; National Institute for Economic Research, Romanian Academy)

To kick off 2025, the JCMS blog is highlighting some of the great work published in JCMS in 2024. Here we feature the findings of ‘Fiscal Rules in the European Union: Less Is More’.  

A fiscal rule is a legally binding constraint, often enshrined in legislation or the Constitution, which governs the government’s fiscal policy. They can take different forms, limiting the size of the budget deficit, the growth of public spending or the accumulation of public debt, among others (for a fundamental taxonomy of fiscal rules, see Blanco et al., 2020). The main objective of imposing numerical fiscal rules is to put pressure on the government to follow a prudent fiscal path and to enhance fiscal discipline and credibility (Ulloa-Suárez, 2023), with the ultimate goal of improving the sustainability of public finances.

The fiscal rules of the European Union (EU) have been in place for more than 20 years. The first set of rules was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and focused on public debt and budget deficits. Specifically, Member States were required to keep their budget deficits below 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) and their public debt below 60% of GDP. Since then, the European fiscal framework has evolved, increasing the number and complexity of fiscal rules. In addition to the EU-level rules, many European countries have their own national fiscal rules, which can further complicate the fiscal framework. At the end of April 2024 the European Parliament approved new fiscal rules at the EU level.

Recognizing the complexity of the previous European fiscal framework, the new economic governance framework implies a reduction in the number of rules. The cornerstone of this proposal is the establishment of a single fiscal indicator – the net expenditure path – anchored in debt sustainability, while maintaining the thresholds of 3% of GDP for the budget deficit and 60% of GDP for public debt (European Commission, 2022).

Beginning with this approach, we may encounter several pertinent questions: Does the quantity of fiscal rules influence their efficacy? Moreover, does this relationship hold true when assessing national and supranational rules independently for their effectiveness? Additionally, what other factors have influenced compliance with fiscal rules within EU countries?

Does the number of fiscal rules affect their effectiveness?

Against this background, our new paper argues that there is a non-linear relationship between the number of fiscal rules in place and compliance with the EU’s numerical fiscal targets over the period 2000-2021. Thus, we explore the intricate dynamics between the number of fiscal rules and the adherence to the numerical fiscal targets outlined in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) within the European Union.

We find that fiscal rules contribute significantly to fiscal compliance among EU Member States, but only up to a certain threshold. Beyond this threshold, a higher number of fiscal rules may hinder compliance and thus reduce their effectiveness. This finding holds for both national and supranational fiscal rules.

In particular, our results show that having more than three fiscal rules in total can undermine compliance. When considering only supranational fiscal rules, we document that  more than two supranational numerical fiscal targets is less effective, leading to weaker compliance.

What other factors affect compliance with fiscal rules in EU countries?

Our paper examines a number of factors that influence compliance with fiscal rules in the European Union. These factors can provide valuable insights for the formulation of prudent fiscal policies. We classify these variables into macroeconomic factors, political factors, exogenous shocks (such as financial crises) and variables related to monetary policy.

Our results indicate that among macroeconomic factors, the output gap and public debt are significantly associated with compliance with fiscal rules. Specifically, the output gap is negatively associated with compliance, suggesting that the fiscal framework between 2000 and 2021 fostered procyclicality. Similarly, public debt is negatively correlated with compliance, suggesting that non-compliance is linked with the accumulation of additional public debt.

Political factors also play an important role in fiscal rule compliance. We analyse two variables: election years and the frequency of government changes. Both variables turn out to be significant determinants of fiscal rules compliance within the European Union. The negative coefficients of these variables suggest that compliance decreases in election years and that frequent changes of government undermine compliance. These results provide evidence of the existence of political business cycles in Europe and emphasise the importance of political stability in ensuring fiscal rules’ compliance.

Regarding financial crises, our analysis shows that the global financial crisis (2007-2009) and other systemic crises weakened fiscal rule compliance. Moreover, there is evidence that accommodative monetary policy facilitates compliance, as higher long-term interest rates are associated with lower compliance rates.

Contributions to existing literature

Our paper makes several important contributions to the existing literature. First, we provide evidence that an increased number of fiscal rules negatively affects numerical compliance. This finding contributes to the ongoing debate on the complexity of the former European fiscal framework and highlights the need for potential reforms. Second, we adopt a unique approach by separately assessing the impact of national and supranational fiscal rules on countries’ compliance with EU-level rules. Third, we examine the influence of specific factors that may contribute to fiscal rule compliance, thereby broadening our understanding of the underlying dynamics at play.

Conclusions

In this blog article, we discuss the non-linear relationship between the number of fiscal rules in place and compliance with EU regulations for a set of 27 countries over the period 2000-2021. We find strong evidence of a positive relationship between countries’ compliance with the fiscal rules contained in the Stability and Growth Pact  and the number of fiscal rules in place, both national and supranational. However, once a certain threshold is reached, the relationship becomes negative, suggesting that a higher number of numerical fiscal targets may undermine compliance possible due to complexity, confusion and enforcement difficulties. Thus, a smaller number of fiscal rules, both national and supranational, may be a more effective strategy to ensure compliance.

Our findings have important policy implications in the context of the new European fiscal framework, adopted at the end of April 2024. Before the adoption, in its Communications, the European Commission (2023a, 2023b) presented legislative proposals to implement the European fiscal framework, reiterating the need for “simpler rules” that take into account “different fiscal challenges” and incorporate “lessons learned from policy responses to recent economic shocks, including the interaction between reforms and investments under the Recovery and Resilience Facility”. The simplicity and flexibility of the new governance framework, which includes fewer fiscal rules, is consistent with our empirical findings. According to our results, fewer fiscal rules anchored to an important fiscal target, such as the reduction of the public debt ratio, can lead to greater efficiency in achieving the desired outcomes.

Bogdan Căpraru is a Professor of Finance and Banking at Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Romania. He is also an associate senior researcher at National Institute for Economic Research, Romanian Academy. Since July 2019 he has been a member of the Romanian Fiscal Council, nominated by the Romanian Association of Banks, and since September 2023 he has been elected Vice Chair of the Network of EU Independent Fiscal Institutions.

His research focuses on banking, central banking, financial regulation, independent fiscal institutions and fiscal and monetary policy. He has published in high-ranking academic journals and has various editorial experience as editor-in-chief and editorial board member. He is a columnist for major national media and an invited speaker at prestigious national and international institutions.

Anastasios Pappas is the Head of Research Department of the Hellenic Fiscal Council and Adjunct Professor of Economics at the MBA course of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. He has received a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration from the University of the Aegean (with scholarship), an MSc in International Banking and Financial Studies from the University of Southampton (UK) and a PhD degree in International Macroeconomics from the University of the Aegean. He has taught various courses (Macroeconomics, Microeconomics, Political Economy, Business Economics etc) at the University of Aegean and at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens at both undergraduate and postgraduate level. Furthermore, he has worked as an economist, credit analyst and consultant in various positions in private and public sector in Greece. His research interests cover topics concern, inter alia, Macroeconomic, Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Economic Forecasting, Financial Crises and Capital Mobility.

Nicu Sprincean is a Lecturer in Finance at Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, and a Scientific Researcher at National Institute for Economic Research, Romanian Academy. His research focuses on fiscal and monetary policy, business and financial cycles, banking and central banking, financial intermediation, and empirical finance. More details here.

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Little? Yes. We are a tiny, isolated, island in a corner of the North Sea, now quite alone in the world, lost, and lonely.

We’ve turned away from our closest allies, our neighbours on our continent, with whom we used to enjoy a close affinity, and a leading role, as a full member of the European Union.

But our relatively new Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, has made it clear: there is no path back.

For the past five years, Sir Keir, as Labour leader, has repeatedly and emphatically declared, “There is no case for going back into the EU and no case for joining the Single Market or customs union.”

No case! That’s the door closed shut. Not even ajar.

Yet Labour’s promises hinge on one critical factor: economic growth – and lots of it.

Persisting with barriers to trade with our biggest trading partner in the world by far – our own continent – is the antidote to economic growth.

If Sir Keir refuses to look east towards Europe for economic opportunity, will he turn west instead, aligning with Trump’s America? Increasingly, this seems to be the strategy.

Starmer is now pursuing a trade deal with the USA, a long-cherished but elusive goal of Brexiters. He has assembled a ‘mini-Cabinet’ of senior ministers tasked with achieving this objective.

Back in 2019, when Trump was President and Starmer wasn’t yet Labour leader, he opposed Brexit plans to prioritise ties with the USA over the EU.

Such a deal, he warned, would have “obvious consequences for our public services, for businesses, for food and environmental standards and for workers’ rights.”

It was not something, he strongly stated, that Labour “will ever countenance.”

How times change.

Now, despite being desperate for an economic lifeline to reverse Britain’s post-Brexit fortunes, Starmer has dismissed Europe as the solution.

Of course, Trump may well say ‘NO’ or demand huge trade-offs for a trade deal.

But Reform leader, Nigel Farage, has offered the Labour government his help to seal what GB News described as a “mega-Brexit deal” with the US. Mr Farage told The Telegraph:

“The US is our most important relationship in the world. Forget Brussels.”

If Britain looks west rather than east, the dream of Rejoiners – to rejoin the EU – could be extinguished for a generation or longer.

This, despite consistent polling showing that most Britons believe Brexit was a mistake and now support EU membership.

A new poll published on the front page of The Observer shows voters clearly favour prioritising more trade with the EU than the US.

But where is the big campaign to explain why we should join the EU again? It doesn’t exist.

In the nine years since the referendum, there has not been any prominent, powerful, professional campaign to present to the nation the positive benefits of EU membership for Britain and Britons.

If Britain chooses the west, the chance to reorient eastward may slip away – perhaps forever.

This could well be Britain’s last opportunity to chart a course back to Europe.

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A Trump official said:

“The federal government will not recognize automatic birthright citizenship for children of illegal aliens born in the United States.” 

The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1868, guarantees birthright citizenship.

Trump’s order seeks to reinterpret this Amendment, which grants citizenship to all individuals born on U.S. soil. Legal experts argue this action is unconstitutional and will likely face immediate legal challenges.

It remains unclear whether the order applies retroactively to children already born to undocumented migrants or only to those born after its implementation.

The irony of this decision is striking. The United States was founded and built by a mix of undocumented migrants, forced migrants, and enslaved people.

European occupation of what is now the United States began in the late 15th and early 16th centuries.

By the 17th and 18th centuries, waves of settlers from England, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and other nations colonised the land – none of them ‘documented’ in the modern sense.

The displacement of Indigenous peoples during this time involved violent conquest, forced removal, cultural suppression, and the introduction of devastating diseases.

Many historians and Indigenous leaders describe this displacement and genocide as foundational to the country’s formation.

The concept of “illegal immigration” did not exist then.

However, the forcible displacement of Indigenous peoples and the imposition of foreign systems of governance raise significant moral and ethical questions about the legitimacy of European claims to the land.

Additionally, between the 17th and 19th centuries, millions of Africans were forcibly brought to the Americas through the transatlantic slave trade.

Enslaved individuals, denied freedom and subjected to brutal exploitation, played a critical role in building the United States’ economy, particularly in agriculture and infrastructure. Their unpaid labour laid much of the nation’s early wealth.

Today, it is undeniable that a significant portion of the U.S. population are the children – i.e. descendants – of both ‘undocumented’ and enslaved migrants.

Many African Americans trace their ancestry to enslaved people brought to America during the transatlantic slave trade.

President Trump’s promise to ‘Make America Great Again’ stands in stark contrast to the historical reality that the nation was built on the labour and sacrifices of marginalised and often undocumented groups.

Indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, and exploited migrants played foundational roles in shaping the country while being denied recognition, rights, and freedom.

In the end, it was ‘illegal migrants’ who made America ‘great’ in the first place.

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He said:

“I am aware this is a dream of mine, that instead of a Brexit we will have a Breturn.”

Mr Tusk, who was previously a President of the EU Council, added:

“Perhaps I’m labouring under an illusion. I’d rather be an optimist and harbour these dreams in my heart – sometimes they come true in politics.”

Sir Keir has consistently ruled out the UK rejoining the EU or its Single Market or customs union.

And yet, it’s not only Mr Tusk who has a dream of Britain’s Breturn. Millions of Britons also share this dream, and every UK poll now shows a majority want to rejoin the EU.

But what exactly is the case AGAINST continuing with Brexit and INSTEAD doing a Breturn?

Sovereignty? Far from gaining sovereignty, Brexit means Britain now has no say in EU decisions, despite being affected by them.

Migration? Britain faces a labour shortage, with almost a million chronic job vacancies. Migrants have always been essential, contributing positively to the economy and public services.

Housing, Schools, and Hospitals? Reduced EU migration has worsened shortages of skilled workers, from builders to healthcare professionals.

“Taking Back Control”? EU membership never meant losing national identity; other EU nations maintain sovereignty and strong support for the union.

Laws and Bureaucracy? EU laws are collaboratively agreed upon, bringing collective benefits like fair mobile charges, flight compensation, and accountability for tech giants. The EU operates democratically, with decisions shaped by elected representatives.

Economic Gains: EU membership boosted Britain’s economy, yielding a tenfold return on membership fees. The Confederation of British Industry estimated it added £3,000 per year to each family’s income. [Source: CBI Report: Our Global Future, page 11]

Peace and Freedom: The EU has been instrumental in maintaining peace and democracy, winning the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. Membership also granted Britons freedom to live, work, and trade seamlessly across Europe.

Global Strength: The EU’s economic might enables its members to secure favourable trade deals and exert influence on the global stage. Outside the EU, Britain struggles to achieve comparable agreements.

Rights and Protections: EU laws safeguard workers, consumers, and travellers, offering paid holidays, anti-discrimination measures, and fair work conditions. Such protections are difficult to replicate nationally.

Trade: The EU remains Britain’s largest trading partner, with nearly half of exports and over half of imports linked to the bloc. Erecting trade barriers with this critical market has been economically damaging.

Brexit means we are poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power.

The case for Breturn – Britain returning to the EU as a full member – is overwhelming. It may take years to achieve a democratic reversal of Brexit, but it’s a worthwhile fight.

In a democracy, losing doesn’t mean having to give up. Ask Brexiters, they know. (See graphic below)

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It was pure gobbledygook.

Brexit at that time didn’t mean anything – there was no consensus on what Brexit should entail, not among the electorate, politicians, or even Brexit campaigners themselves.

But on 17 January 2017, Mrs May unilaterally defined her version of Brexit in her speech at Lancaster House, London.

Paradoxically, she claimed that the referendum was, “not the moment Britain chose to step back from the world” but “the moment we chose to build a truly global Britain”.

The Prime Minister outlined her unequivocal red lines – closing doors on most possibilities before any negotiations with the EU had even taken place.

• No partial membership of the European Union, associate membership, or anything that “leaves us half-in, half-out”.
  

No model already enjoyed by other countries.

No holding on to “bits of membership as we leave”.

No membership of the EU Single Market.

No free movement of people.

No to being part of the EU Common Commercial Policy (CCP) or the EU Common External Tariff (CET).

Michel Barnier, the EU’s Chief Brexit Negotiator, was ‘astounded by the sheer numbers of doors she is closing here, one after the other.’

In his diary entry for 17 January 2017, published in his book, ‘My Secret Brexit Diary’, he asked:

Have the consequences of each of these decisions been fully thought through, assessed and discussed?

Does she realise that, in doing this, she is excluding almost all models of cooperation we have managed to construct up to now with our partners, even the closest among them?

Can we be sure that the referendum vote gave the British government carte blanche for such a total break?

He concluded:

‘In fact, for her to say all this, amounts to writing off not only membership of the European Economic Area – of which Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are members – but also the kind of partnership we have with Turkey, which has a customs union agreement with the EU.’

No version of Brexit – be it Theresa May’s, Boris Johnson’s, Liz Truss’s, Rishi Sunak’s, or the as-yet-defined Brexit of Keir Starmer – has ever enjoyed the consensus support of the electorate.

Even Kemi Badenoch, new Tory leader and a staunch Brexiter, has admitted that the “no plan” Brexit approach was “a mistake.”

We’ve been had.

Successive Prime Ministers hijacked the simple word “Leave” and shaped it into THEIR visions of Brexit, none of which align with the public’s expectations or interests.

• A Brexit nobody voted for – watch 4-minute video



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by Sarah Wolff (Leiden University), Helena Carrapico (Northumbria University), and Agathe Piquet (UC Louvain)

To kick off 2025, the JCMS blog is highlighting some of the great work published in JCMS during autumn 2024. Here we feature the findings of ‘Out of Sight, Out of Mind? UK-EU Member States Bilateralism as an Enabler of Europeanisation’, which was published as part of the Symposium on ‘Selective Reconstruction: Re-engagement in the Post-Brexit UK-EU Security Relationship’.

Extensive scholarship has examined the UK’s role in multilateral (e.g. United Nations, World Trade Organisation) and mini-lateral venues (e.g. E3 with France and Germany on Iran; G7 and G20 on economic issues) since Brexit, but less attention has been given to the 24 bilateral declarations signed between the UK and EU Member States from 2021 to 2023. Bilateralism has been one of the UK’s preferred strategies for achieving foreign policy coordination with EU Member States post-Brexit. This article finds that, despite clear efforts to de-EUise UK foreign policy, there is no evidence of purposeful de-Europeanisation.

Purposeful de-Europeanisation would imply a repudiation of shared European values, a divergence from common priorities, and an end to social encounters between UK and EU member state officials. Instead, through a frame analysis of these declarations and interviews, the article highlights that bilateralism has enabled continued Europeanisation, albeit to a lesser extent compared to the pre-Brexit situation. Closer relations with European capitals have thus allowed Europeanisation of UK foreign policy to persist. In other words, while the UK has distanced itself from the EU as a political entity, it has not rejected the common European values and priorities that remain shared with EU Member States.

De-EUisation and Europeanisation in foreign policy: conceptual and methodological reflections

Renewed bilateralism, initiated by the UK through the 24 joint statements it agreed upon with EU Member States, raises questions about the UK government’s intentions regarding EUisation and Europeanisation of its foreign policy. The recent strengthening of these bilateral ties (e.g. with the war in Ukraine), during a time of troubled relations with the EU, could suggest the UK’s intention to pursue ideational transfers.

To understand the UK’s intentions in its post-Brexit bilateralism, it is crucial to distinguish between EUisation and Europeanisation. EUisation refers to the more top-down transfer of institutional and organisational practices and policies between the EU and its Member States. In contrast, Europeanisation is a broader process of social learning and diffusion of ideas and values through multiple interactions, including those outside formal EU structures.

In the context of foreign policy, we argue that de-EUisation is characterised by three dynamics that reflect the institutional, political and organisational aspects of policy change:

1. the disengagement from EU structures, ranging from a reduced rhetoric or substantive support and commitment to a complete withdrawal;
2. the rescaling of foreign policy discourse namely, where non-EU geographical spaces are given preference; and
3. the reorganisation of foreign policy bureaucracy through a reinforced control over the national officials seconded to Brussels, including a redeployment of staff away from EU institutions.

De-Europeanisation, on the other hand, is made of three cognitive and social processes:

1. the rejection of shared European values;
2. the divergence from ‘previously established common European […] priorities that have emerged through Europeanisation’, resulting from ideational transfers and discussions; and
3. the end of social encounters with European national officials, including outside formal EU venues.

Using this framework, this article examines the 24 bilateral declarations signed between the UK and EU member states to assess whether they reflect intentions of de-EUisation, de-Europeanisation, or a continuation of Europeanisation in the UK’s foreign policy.

De-EUising but still Europeanising: away from Brussels but closer to European capitals

The analysis of bilateral declarations underscores the de-EUisation of UK foreign policy, marked by disengagement from EU structures, a re-scaling of foreign policy discourse to the global level discourse, and counter-Brusselisation via bureaucratic reorganisation.

The UK’s foreign policy has increasingly shifted away from the EU, especially under the leadership of Boris Johnson. The Global Britain strategy emphasised the UK’s autonomy and global ambitions, with less emphasis on EU cooperation. This shift was evident in the UK’s decision to have a reduced involvement in EU foreign policy structures and its focus on bilateral relations with individual EU member states. The signing of bilateral declarations with EU countries was part of this broader strategy.

These declarations reveal limited references to the EU, with most emphasising the desire to go beyond current UK-EU cooperation frameworks. Comparatively, there are more references to cooperation through NATO, highlighting the UK’s preference for alternative multilateral venues over EU structures. This re-scaling of foreign policy discourse to a global level and the bureaucratic reorganisation of UK institutions, including the transformation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office into the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), further illustrate the UK’s de-EUisation efforts. The reduction of UK staff in Brussels and the redeployment of personnel to bilateral embassies in Europe also signalled a shift away from an EU-centric foreign policy.

Secondly, the article finds that despite the clear trends of de-EUisation, the bilateral declarations also suggest a desire for continued Europeanisation of UK foreign policy. This is evidenced by three dynamics:

1. Persistent Shared Values: The bilateral declarations consistently align with EU foreign policy values, including human rights, democracy, international law, and multilateralism. These shared values and the many references to a specific European like-minded community reflect a continued Europeanisation of UK foreign policy, even as the UK seeks to redefine its global role.
2. Convergence Towards Shared Security Priorities: The UK’s bilateral declarations with EU member states also demonstrate a strong alignment with EU security priorities, ranging from international conflicts, cybersecurity and disinformation, to migration, organised crime and terrorism. This common understanding of priorities suggests that the UK remains committed to addressing shared security challenges with its European partners, even outside formal EU structures.
3. Continuation of Social Encounters: The bilateral agreements emphasise the importance of regular consultations and meetings between UK and EU officials, ensuring the exchange of ideas and practices, including through new fora (e.g. joint trainings, joint defence capabilities). While the level of institutionalisation achieved through these bilateral agreements may not match that of the EU framework, they still provide a mechanism for social learning and ideational transfers, contributing therefore to continued Europeanisation.

Conclusion

Could the recent intensification in UK foreign policy bilateralism be seen as an instance of de-EUisation and/or de-Europeanisation of its foreign policy? Despite the UK’s exit from EU structures, shift towards global ambitions, and reorganisation of its administration to reduce EU focus, Europeanisation persists through extensive bilateral diplomatic ties. The UK continues to promote values and priorities fundamental to European countries and maintains social interactions with European capitals. This ongoing Europeanisation is not solely a product of the UK’s former EU membership but is also rooted in broader historical ties and shared values across Europe.

The article contributes to understanding the evolution of bilateralism in times of crisis, with UK and EU partners seeking closer cooperation in response to challenges such as the war in the Ukraine. We call for further research on how polycrisis, including the Eurozone debt crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, has intensified bilateralism both within the EU and between the EU and third countries, questioning whether this trend strengthens or undermines European integration.

Sarah Wolff is Professor in International Studies and Global Politics at the University of Leiden. She is an expert on EU-UK relations, EU migration policy as well as the gender and religious dimension of EU foreign policy. She can be followed on Linkedin.

Helena Farrand Carrapico is Professor in International Relations and European Politics at Northumbria University, UK. Her research focuses on European internal security governance, in particular on the UK-EU relationship post-Brexit. She can be followed on LinkedIn.

Agathe Piquet is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at UCLouvain Saint-Louis Bruxelles. Her primary research interest lies in EU internal security policies, with a particular focus on the processes of Europeanisation. She can be followed on Linkedin.

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Or as historian Timothy Garton Ash, Professor of European Studies at Oxford University said on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme:

“There is good evidence that politics of appeasement by mainstream liberal centre-right parties trying to win back voters by adopting some of the more extreme rhetoric and policies doesn’t work.

“Because voters say why should I have the dog whistle when I could have the real dog?”

Today, in seven EU countries, electorates have voted for the “real dog” meaning that their governments include far-right parties. In another four EU countries, “the dog” is close to winning.

In Austria, The Freedom Party (FPÖ) secured almost 29% of the vote in the September 2024 parliamentary elections and is about to form the government, marking Austria’s first far-right-led administration since World War II.

In Italy, The Brothers of Italy, a right-wing nationalist party, leads the government under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.

In Finland, the Finns Party, a right-wing nationalist group, secured 46 seats in the Eduskunta (parliament) during the April 2023 general elections, becoming the second-largest party with 20.07% of the vote.

In Hungary, The Fidesz party, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has been in power since 2010. Fidesz is known for its national-conservative and sovereigntist policies.

In Slovakia, The Slovak National Party, a right-wing nationalist party, is part of the governing coalition.

In Sweden, The Sweden Democrats, a nationalist party, have significant influence over the government through a confidence and supply agreement, despite not being formal coalition members.

In The Netherlands, The Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders, has gained substantial support, leading to the formation of a right-wing government.

As of January 2025, several European countries have far-right or right-wing nationalist parties that are gaining significant support and are close to achieving governmental power.

In Romania, Pro-Russian far-right candidate Călin Georgescu is leading in the polls for the upcoming presidential election, with over 40% support.

In Germany, The Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-wing populist party, has been increasing its vote share in recent elections.

In France, the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) led by Marine Le Pen is a far-right party making significant gains and securing Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).

In Spain, Vox Party is one of several far-right and right-wing parties gaining voters.

And in the UK?

In last year’s general election, the far-right Reform UK party (yes, it is far-right) gained 5 seats with just over 14% of the vote share. Its leader, Nigel Farage, is convinced that he will be Britain’s next Prime Minister.

How did this happen?

Because liberal-thinking, middle-of-the-road parties and politicians, who should have known better, let the blame-game grow. The anti-immigration, anti-refugee, anti-EU, pro-Brexit message gained momentum without being properly challenged.

In the process, both the Tories and Labour have transitioned from being pro-EU parties to basically Brexit parties.

I have written multiple articles about this. For example, ‘How freaky hair ‘won’ in the Netherlands and Britain’

Even today, Labour promotes an anti-migrant message, and continues to support Brexit, even though the way ‘Leave’ won the referendum was fraudulent and undemocratic; Brexit is doing huge harm to Britain; it cannot be ‘made to work’, and polls consistently show that most people think it was a mistake.

Instead of attempting to ape the far-right, now is the time all good parties to come to the aid of the people by powerfully exposing the false diagnoses and empty promises promoted by far-right politicians.

YES, people need affordable homes, decent wages, better access to medical care, good education for their children. And NO, it’s not the fault of migrants.

Properly fixing those problems will see off far-right parties that always exploit hardship by wrongly scapegoating others.

Going down the far-right route will simply cause division, hatred, and societal decay, and still won’t give us affordable homes, decent wages, better access to medical care, or good education for our children.

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• Related article from 2025: ‘The Brexit nose job’

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• Related article from 2023: ‘How freaky hair ‘won’ the Netherlands and Britain’

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• Related article from 2023: ‘Brexit is unfinished business by a long way’

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• Related article from 2021: ‘What they really want – the end of the EU’

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• Related article from 2017: ‘How did we get stuck with Brexit?’

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• Related article from 2016: ‘Tim Faron versus Nigel Farage’

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• Related article from 2015: ‘Nigel Farage: Ban terminally ill migrants’

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• Related article from 2015: ‘Who do you think you are kidding, Mr Farage?’

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• Related article from 2014: ‘Why did UKIP win in Clacton?’

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• Related video: ‘Rise of the far-right? British newspapers are to blame’

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• Related video: ‘When Nigel Farage was caught out’

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by Gilles Pittoors (KU Leuven)

To kick off 2025, the JCMS blog is highlighting some of the excellent work published in JCMS in autumn 2024. In this blog, we feature ‘Everything Everywhere All at Once? Introducing a Field-Theoretic Model for Party Politics in the European Union’  which puts forward a new approach to the European political party system.

Much like the debate on EU democracy at large, ideas about the role political parties play in the EU’s political system are caught in a dichotomy. On the one hand, those who think of the EU as a collection of national democracies consider supranational democratic politics unrealistic or even undesirable, instead contemplating the role of national parties in structuring the political debate in Member States and translating this to the European level. From this perspective, European party politics comes down to coordinating often loose networks of like-minded national parties. On the other hand, those who perceive the EU as a kind of proto-federal system put more emphasis on supranational democratic politics, banking on the polity-building capacities of strong ‘Europarties’ and a democratic praxis that will Europeanise national politics.

Both of these models are rooted in the experience of the coherent nation-state and thus neither capture the reality of European politics: the former takes too little account of the structure inherent in European party politics, while the latter creates unrealistically hierarchical expectations for what a European party (system) could be. Therefore, a new model is needed that departs from the nation-state as  ultimate reference point, and instead theorises parties as genuine multilevel actors whose behaviour can only be understood by appreciating the dynamic European context in which they operate.

Beyond the nation-state

I argue that simply applying models from the national context to the EU does not do justice to the complexity of European politics, and therefore introduce the European Multilevel Party Field (EMPF) as a novel concept to study party democracy in the EU. I argue that the EU is a polity characterised by non-domination in which politics occur simultaneously in every direction all the time — it is a situation of ‘everything everywhere all at once’. Fundamentally, the EU is not a state, but “a multi-state, multi-democracy, multi-people political order” that circumscribes Member States without itself being a state. In this messy context, structure is not characterised by constitutional hierarchy or hegemonic domination, but by a form of mutual dependence among actors that need to collaborate across levels and territories. Indeed, actors’ political activities are no longer bound to the neatly delineated territory of nation-states, but extend beyond their familiar borders and across levels of governance.

Despite excellent research on the nature of the EU’s political system and complex party politics, both scholars and practitioners continue to grapple with the question of how to capture and understand the fundamental nature of party politics in the EU. While most scholars would subscribe to Schattschneider’s assertion that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties”, the impact of European integration on party politics remains difficult to pinpoint. Moreover, in addition to bridging citizens and politics, whose disconnect is at the core of the EU’s democratic deficit, parties in the EU could act as vehicles of cross-level linkage, transnational policy diffusion, and inter-institutional coordination. Such potential is the main motivation behind the EU’s increasing support for Europarties, hoping these would act as “transmission belts” from citizens to ‘Brussels’.

However, it is one thing to say that parties play an important role in European democracy, and quite another to consider whether the prevailing conceptual models underpinning these arguments make sense in the EU context. At the end of the day, parties have a clear task to fulfil: to represent their constituents, a task that spans from the local to the European level in a messy multilevel context that no longer reflects the neatly organised nation-state. The discussion on EU party politics has paid too little attention to this messy nature of EU politics as characterised by non-domination and far-reaching mutual dependence, which is fundamentally different from the politics of the nation-state in which most of our notions of political parties and party systems have emerged.

An alternative model

Building on organisational field theory, the EMPF presents an alternative model that acknowledges both the agency of actors and the structuring framework in which they operate, making it more suitable to capture the cross-level (multilevel) and cross-border (transnational) interactive nature of EU politics. Conceptualising the European party system as a political field and Europarties as inter-organisational alliances, the EMPF asserts that parties in the EU behave in accordance with their position in the field, interpreted in terms of dynamic and relative power relations to other actors. This position is defined by the dominant rules and norms of the field, as well as by the relative capital of each actor.

Parties act based on their interpretation of what is the best thing to do in a given circumstance, whereby the ultimate purpose is to gain competitive advantages over their rivals and achieve their political goals. In turn, each action triggers a reaction across the field, perpetuating a permanent renegotiation of the field’s balance of power, political configuration, and actors’ distribution in it across political levels and national borders. The messy nature of the EU’s political system is thus structured through the bottom-up creation of field-wide alliances that impose jointly defined rules and norms, while enabling parties to influence EU policies in a way that reflects their and their voters’ preferences.

This approach can be used to address a wide range of topics in EU party politics; from the formation and development of Europarties, to the strategic behaviour of individual actors. As such, the EMPF presents an original model that allows for capturing how EU party politics work in real life, without using the nation-state as a reference point. A key task for future research is the operationalisation of the EMPF for application to empirical (case) research: to figure out how the field’s structure can be concretely measured, which specific factors motivate actors, which variables can predict and explain outcomes, and how this has changed over time (particularly in relation to EU enlargement). This would allow for the development of the EMPF into a comprehensive theory of European party politics, enabling researchers to predict political outcomes and offering insights into what kind of policies can and cannot emerge. Furthermore, field theory has previously been used to describe parliamentary, bureaucratic and civil society networks in the EU. Future research should elaborate how the EMPF relates to these approaches, and whether integrating these into a broader field-theory of European integration would be possible.

Finally, the EMPF also opens new perspectives on EU party democracy as characterised by a dynamic and continuous interaction between mutually dependent actors across different levels and political arenas that cannot be disentangled. For instance, connecting to recent research on citizen participation in the EU, a field approach could be used to argue in favour of the bottom-up transnational engagement and socialisation of parties, civil society and individual citizens. Importantly, I do not posit the EMPF as the ultimate democratic model for the EU, but extend an open invitation to future researchers to further elaborate on this field-theoretic approach in the process of making sense of the EU as a democratic polity.

Dr Gilles Pittoors is Lecturer at the KU Leuven’s Department of Political Science and Research Associate at Ghent Univeristy. He has previously worked at the European Parliamentary Research Service, the Université Libre de Bruxelles and the University of Groningen. His research focuses primarily on questions of transnational democratic governance and the Europeanisation of national politics.

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Nigel Farage was having none of it. An American President, he said, had no right to meddle in British affairs. The President, in short, should “butt out”.

The Mirror ran the headline:

“Nigel Farage tells Barack Obama to keep his nose out of the Brexit debate.”

Zoom forward almost nine years and spot the difference.

Now, Nigel Farage is actively encouraging his close ally and incoming President, Donald J. Trump, together with the unofficial deputy President, Elon Musk, the world’s richest person, to meddle in British affairs.

Mr Musk spends considerable time trashing Labour Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, on his X platform (formerly Twitter). He has described Reform as the UK’s “only hope” and has urged Britons to vote for it.

On 16 December, Mr Farage – who believes he is going to replace Sir Keir as Britain’s Prime Minister – met Mr Musk at President Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort.

The meeting came following widespread media reports that Mr Musk is considering a sizeable donation to Mr Farage’s Reform Party – maybe as much as $100m – as a “f*** you Starmer payment”.

Mr Farage, the leader of Reform, formerly leader of UKIP and Brexit parties, was reported to say that the two had discussed money and that there will be “ongoing negotiations” with the tech billionaire.

Under UK law, a foreign person is not allowed to donate to a UK political party, although a foreign business based in the UK can.

So, maybe it should come as no surprise that four days before the meeting – on 12 December – Mr Musk registered a new limited company in London called X.AI London Ltd.

However, a foreign-owned company based in the UK can only donate to a UK political party if it is carrying on business in the UK at the time of the donation.

A mere registration in the UK does not qualify. The company must actively conduct business within the UK. For example, it should have operational activities, employ staff, or generate revenue within the country.

So far as can be ascertained, X.AI London Ltd has not yet started to trade here.

There is already considerable evidence that Putin’s Russia has meddled deeply into Britain’s affairs and helped to fund and fuel Brexit. See my video at theRussianConnection.co.uk

Now, expect more meddling by Trump and Musk into UK politics, aided and abetted by PM wannabe Nigel Farage for his own ends.

Mr Farage has offered to broker a new US-UK free trade agreement to turn the UK further away from the EU. He said:

“The US is our most important relationship in the world – forget Brussels.”

Is this a trap for Sir Keir?

If he accepts the trade agreement, Farage will take the credit. If he doesn’t, Farage will claim that the Labour government has damaged Britain’s prospects.

“Take back control” was the Brexit mantra. But since Brexit, outside actors seem to be controlling our affairs.

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On 9 September 2024, the world’s press gathered in Brussels. On that day, Mario Draghi, former Italian Prime Minister and previous President of the European Central Bank, presented his eagerly awaited report on “The Future of European Competitiveness”. The publication of the so-called Draghi report was timed to coincide with the start of the Commission’s next mandate, which the Commission itself has declared to be the decisive phase in its fundamental reorientation. The Commission intends the Draghi report to have a significant impact on policy-making and priority-setting in the European Union (EU) in the coming years.

The Draghi report provides a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and opportunities facing the EU and develops strategic approaches to promote stability. Draghi notes that growth in the EU is slowing down, mainly due to weak productivity. He also sees recent negative developments in foreign trade, energy supply and external security as a threat to the EU’s previous growth model. But one of the main reasons for him is the poor performance in terms of breakthrough innovation and the initial concentration of innovation activities in medium to low R&D intensive sectors, which is forcing the new European institutions to adopt a new approach to EU R&D policy.

The report recommends creating science as a ‘fifth freedom’ and a ‘Research and Innovation Union’ to reduce the R&D spending gap between the EU and its main competitors. Draghi’s view is undoubtedly that the future of the EU hinges on the success of science and research and its policy.

Against this background, the question arises as to how science and research have become such an important policy area in the EU today. This question is addressed in a special issue recently published in the Journal of European Integration History entitled “EUropeanisation in and through Science: Unveiling the Long-Term Dimensions of European Integration” (Irion & Volf 2024). The six contributions to this special issue, written by historians and political scientists, take a multi-angle view of the impact of integration within the political framework of the European Union and its predecessors, covering a wide historical range of almost seventy years – from the formative years of post-war European cooperation to contemporary debates on research infrastructure.

The articles highlight that an indispensable part of the EU’s complicated journey to its present form is the fascinating but often overlooked story of the Europeanisation of science and research which comprises two interrelated strands: the transformation of European science and research in the wake of political, economic and monetary integration, on the one hand, and the transformative impact of scientific research on the evolving European Union, on the other.

Each contribution explores this symbiotic relationship, examining in detail how the various actors, institutions, practices and policies have been shaped by the process of European integration and, conversely, how they have influenced the development of the EU. In doing so some authors even look at networks and institutions that have emerged on the margins or even outside the EU framework, but have interacted with its structures in a lively way. One example is the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), which in the 1950s was one of the first major instances of scientific cooperation in post-war Europe. Another is the Standing Committee for the Social Sciences of the European Science Foundation (ESF), which was set up in the 1970s and is another organisation independent of the EU.

Looking at the EU itself, the Commission’s initiative for the so-called Framework Programmes illustrates how research is being integrated into the fabric of European governance in the 1980s. The special issue also looks at the evolution of key concepts within European research policy. It examines the evolution of ‘scientific excellence’ in European research, tracing its transformation from a critical concept in the early 1990s to a normative standard within the European Research Council (ERC) since 2007. The European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC), launched by the European Commission in 2009 and which represents a turning point in the organisation and management of European research infrastructures, is also investigated.

Taken together, the articles sketch the landscape of European scientific cooperation and examine its various forms and impacts, but there is still much to be explored in this area. We would therefore like to provide a starting point and some food for thought.

David Irion is a PhD candidate and research fellow at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich (Germany). His current research focuses on the emergence and development of European research policy since the 1980s.

Irion, D. & Volf, D. (2023) EUropeanisation in and through Science: Unveiling the Long-Term Dimensions of European Integration – Introduction. Journal of European Integration History, 30(2): 205–216. https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2024-2-205

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In the evolving landscape of the global higher education market, higher education institutions (HEIs) have transformed from  ivory towers  into dynamic hubs of innovation and societal engagement. Influenced by technological advancements and the growing complexity of global issues – such as pandemics and climate change – universities now play a crucial role in integrating scientific knowledge into policy-making processes. Beyond the traditional use of higher education in science diplomacy as soft power tool for governments, universities now play a more dynamic and independent role as actors of “informal” diplomacy. They engage in addressing global issues not only through the application of knowledge but also through activities and initiatives such as the establishment of joint universities, multi-disciplinary research networks, new universities alliances, and partnerships with industries. This shift prompts intriguing questions: what is informal diplomacy in the context of higher education? Are universities simply extensions of state-centric actions, or do they possess autonomy and agency in their own right?

The use of higher education as a tool of soft power is not a new concept. Soft power, defined as the ability to influence others through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion, has long been associated with science and technology. These fields are considered crucial sources of soft power, with science contributing to enhance a country’s reputation, building trust, and fostering collaboration. Science diplomacy, defined as leveraging scientific collaboration and engagement to address global issues and foster cooperation, is therefore a means to advance national interests by bolstering influence, promoting a country’s values, and pursuing strategic objectives aligned with national priorities.

In this more traditional understanding of science diplomacy, HEIs serve as channels for state-led soft power initiatives. Notable examples include the Fulbright programme, the British Council and the controversial Confucius Institutes. Similarly, European Union (EU) programmes such as Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe, are important vectors for promoting European values, fostering collaboration, and enhancing mutual understanding. Taken together, these initiatives that promote the exchange of students, faculty, culture, research, knowledge, and expertise, can be regarded as diplomatic activities essential for developing mutual understanding and promoting foreign policy objectives through soft power.

In essence, whereas soft power refers to a country’s ability to influence others through cultural appeal and attraction, science diplomacy focuses on international scientific cooperation to foster mutual understanding and address global challenges. At the same time, among these more traditional science diplomacy initiatives and activities, new trends are also emerging, exemplified by the proliferation of international branch campuses (IBCs) that are overseas extensions of educational institutions, strategically deployed as ‘embassies of knowledge’. The evolution of China’s stance towards IBCs is emblematic of this shift, transitioning from a recipient to a prominent host. Opening Fudan University’s IBC in Hungary amid political tensions and collaborating with Russia on a new IBC, underscores China’s strategic deployment of IBCs for geopolitical influence.

In parallel with government-led diplomatic efforts, we are witnessing the emergence of autonomous ‘informal’ diplomacy driven by universities themselves. This form of diplomacy is characterized by a structured and unstructured exchange of knowledge, ideas, and initiatives among academic institutions and stakeholders outside formal diplomatic channels. Unlike traditional diplomacy, which revolves around political and economic negotiations, this type of diplomacy places emphasis on the role of ‘knowledge’ as a key factor in fostering understanding, cooperation, and addressing common global challenges.

For instance, the German Jordanian University (GJU) exemplifies informal diplomacy through its collaborative initiatives and partnerships with industry. Through student delegations, research collaborations, and dual studies programs, GJU serves as a dynamic platform for fostering international connections and promoting mutual understanding. Similarly, Brown University’s Humanitarian Relief Initiatives also demonstrate the tangible impact of higher education diplomacy. By working directly with communities in need, particularly in regions like the Philippines, Brown University fosters cross-cultural understanding and collaboration, enhancing the university’s leadership in disaster response.

In addition, the rise of university alliances further illustrates the diplomatic role of HEIs. University alliances are transnational collaborative networks formed by higher education institutions from different countries to address common problems, promote knowledge exchange, and foster international cooperation in various fields. For example, the European Universities Initiative alliance, operating at the EU level and currently comprising 64 Alliances and over 500 universities, serves as an example of universities as informal diplomatic actors coming together around specific ‘missions’ to address global ‘grand challenges’ and promote cross-border collaboration. Finally, universities are also engaged in practical actions that contribute to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) goals without relying solely on formal diplomatic channels. For instance, Western Sydney University, named the world’s number one university in terms of its contribution to the United Nations SDGs, exemplifies how universities can play a role not only in engaging in education and research projects but also in advancing sustainable development worldwide.

While universities  increasingly position themselves as autonomous agents of diplomacy, they may face potential challenges and tensions when navigating between being conduits of state action and autonomous agents pursuing their own initiatives seeking to influence policy-making. For instance, they may face constraints on academic freedom and cooperation and encountering obstacles in fostering scientific exchanges across borders. Additionally, ethical considerations are also essential, especially when collaborating with institutions known for questionable research practices or human rights violations.

Moreover, limited funding and resources might make it difficult to sustain international research projects and cover essential expenses, particularly amidst competing budgetary priorities. In striving for equitable partnerships, universities must address power imbalances between institutions from developed and developing nations while also facing severe dilemmas of responding to rising tensions impacting campuses and students’ demands, including the risk of universities being ‘instrumentalised’ or ‘geopoliticised’ by governments. For instance, Pro-Palestinian protests on US university campuses have escalated globally, with students and faculty members demanding academic institutions divest from companies linked to Israel’s military campaign. These protests have led to various demands, including severing financial ties with Israel and its affiliated entities, transparency over financial connections, and amnesty for protesters. The impact has been significant, with Columbia University and California State Polytechnic University Humboldt closing due to the occupations, Portland State University pausing financial ties with Boeing over its links to Israel, and Trinity College Dublin agreeing to end certain investments in Israeli companies.

This underscores the complexities and challenges universities face in addressing geopolitical tensions while upholding their academic mission and values. In this respect, another crucial aspect for universities is managing public perception and trust. Effective science communication and transparent engagement are essential for building public support and understanding for diplomatic efforts, countering scepticism and ensuring the legitimacy of university-led initiatives in the informal diplomacy arena.

As universities continue to evolve into dynamic hubs of global engagement and diplomacy, stakeholders must recognize and embrace the opportunities and challenges presented by this (r)evolution. Key questions arise from this discussion: How can universities maintain their autonomy while navigating geopolitical tensions? What mechanisms ensure equitable partnerships amidst power imbalances and challenges in international collaboration? And how do knowledge activities intersect with diplomatic power? These questions are not merely academic; they are at the heart of redefining diplomatic norms in the 21st century, enabling universities to shape a more interconnected, sustainable, and peaceful world.

Marina Cino Pagliarello is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the Florence School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute (Italy), Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economic and Political Science European Institute, and honorary lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University College London.

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This week’s vote on the Consent motion was unremarkable enough that there was hardly any media coverage in the run-up, even in Northern Ireland itself.

Positions had been long-known and the result (a simple majority) was a given, despite the (sometimes long-winded) efforts of some MLAs to convince others.

For a mechanism that had raised so much interest back in 2023 in the Windsor Framework, this might be seen as a victory for boring politics.

But to watch the debate unfold – as I did for a few hours – was to be struck by the shallow foundations on which the entire NI Protocol rests. There was scarcely a voice raised that thought the Protocol was a good thing for Northern Ireland.

Instead, those voting in favour of its continuation for another four years spoke of it being a necessary consequence of a decision to leave the EU that had been foisted upon the region by voters in England, and the least bad option among a menu of all bad options.

Likewise, even if Unionist arguments about EU laws being imposed upon Northern Ireland without local agreement were somewhat undercut by others observing that the Unionists had said how wonderful the Windsor Framework would be only 18 months ago, there was still some sympathy for the view that the Protocol wasn’t what Northern Ireland would have chosen for itself.

As we now move into the UK’s own review of the Protocol, perhaps some of these dynamics will come out more properly, to allow for the finding of some common ground. But even if Unionists can reconcile with others about what to do, they still need to convince both London and the EU that this is worth reopening a topic that caused so much grief last time around.

Northern Ireland is thus likely to find itself locked into a system that it barely tolerates and in which there is limited scope to build durable accommodations. A fundamental shift in British policy – towards joining the customs union or single market, say – is far beyond the horizon, so the local arena is likely to remain the primary one.

As attention drifts away from Belfast, the danger of an accidental crisis grows: someone in Brussels forgets to check the implications of a piece of legislation; someone in the Assembly doesn’t realise the effects of some routine directive; someone in London fails to connect broader developments in relations to the Northern Irish case.

While I think we can all agree that a return to the ‘hot Brexit’ period is very much to be avoided, that should not blind us to the perils of more mundane relations.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic123

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic133

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It’s time to say goodbye to the UACES family, where I’ve had the honor of serving as Communications Manager and Interim Chair over the past two years. Like everything in life, this journey came with its ups and downs, successes and challenges. Yet, I wouldn’t trade a single moment of it. I can genuinely say that this experience has been incredibly rewarding, and I wholeheartedly encourage all of you to become part of this amazing community. 

This experience has been truly unique and unforgettable for many reasons. First, UACES introduced me to processes I never imagined I’d be part of—not just individually, but as a member of the entire Graduate Forum Committee. From organizing conferences and arranging events to participating in discussions about academic journal management and even coordinating the timing of pre-event cocktails, I found myself immersed in aspects of academia I had previously only observed. These experiences not only allowed me to contribute but also offered me fresh perspectives on the academic world. 

Second, thanks to the incredible people I met along the way, I now feel like I have a door waiting to welcome me in almost every European city. I won’t be visiting as an unwelcome guest but as a close friend, having shared unforgettable memories through UACES events. The friendships I’ve formed within the UACES community go beyond casual connections. They are colleagues and collaborators I look forward to growing with, standing in solidarity with, and learning alongside throughout what I hope will be a long and fulfilling career in academia. 

Finally, perhaps my favorite part of this journey has been the feeling of being surrounded by hundreds of mentors—offering both personal and professional guidance for navigating potential challenges I face now or may encounter in the future. The PhD journey is filled with new experiences, and part of the process is learning to manage expectations and time while prioritizing mental health to ensure a sustainable path forward. As part of the UACES Graduate Forum, I had the privilege of being in constant contact with incredible colleagues—from rising-star postdocs to well-established professors. I truly don’t think I could have found an equivalent experience anywhere else. 

Overall, I wholeheartedly encourage you to become part of this wonderful family. You will enjoy every moment of it. If you have any questions or need advice, please don’t hesitate to reach out to me! 

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Faced with the current state of international politics at the moment, many have been questioning what is the place for diplomacy? With the rise of far-right governments who seek to undermine the role of multilateral cooperation, one could ask: does it even exist anymore? And if so, why is it relevant to study it? My PhD research seeks to understand precisely how it is possible that international cooperation is able to take place, despite overall rhetorical contestation.

In order to better understand it, my research takes the case of the cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Brazil. While bilaterally, this partnership is often faced with contestation, in the multilateral fora, namely in United Nations Human Rights Council, this is not always the case. To comprehend how this cooperation is taking place, I wanted to go beyond the textual analysis of resolutions and go to where this cooperation takes place: Geneva.

In this sense, I was very lucky that the UACES microgrant allowed me to pursue a week of field work in Geneva to conduct interviews with diplomats working at the Human Rights Council. During my short stay in Geneva, I was also able to observe one of the sessions of the Universal Periodic Review, which allowed me to see how delegates work with each other in action. Thus, this research trip was crucial to the development of my research, and to understanding how the process of cooperation, and mostly how diplomacy has a significant – yet frequently overlooked – impact in world politics. In fact, international relations and diplomacy studies are often seen as different fields of research and with distinct purposes. Nonetheless, if there is one key takeaway from my fieldwork in Geneva is that it is incredibly valuable to not forget that world politics takes place in the form of human interactions.

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Photo taken during field work: Mauna Kea is shrouded in clouds in the background

Anna-Lena Rüland

Large science projects, also known as “Big Science”, are typically presented as a win-win for all stakeholders involved, including for the local community. Yet research has shown that local opposition to Big Science is common, although it tends to be short-lived and often fails to raise wide-spread awareness. Some argue that this is because activists that oppose Big Science struggle to appear legitimate while criticizing a project that is generally associated with economic development and scientific progress.

The story is different for the kiaʻi mauna (Hawaiian for protectors of the mountain). The kiaʻi have sustained opposition to the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea, Hawaiʻi Island, since 2011, and have managed to raise wide-spread attention of their resistance. In a recently published article, I investigate why the kiaʻi have succeeded in sustaining such momentum. Based on interviews that I conducted with community members, local astronomers, and kiaʻi, I found that there are six factors which explain the resilience of local resistance to the Thirty Meter Telescope. To the local community, most of my findings are unlikely to be a revelation. But for those that are not familiar with Hawaiʻi, a deep dive into the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy holds valuable lessons about science-society relations.

Hawaiʻi is a unique case with a unique history, much of which has considerably shaped local resistance to the Thirty Meter Telescope. To provide some of the background knowledge that is needed to understand the controversy, I draw on the excellent work of Hawaiian scholars that have meticulously chronicled the history of astronomy development on Hawaiʻi and local opposition to it. Their research indicates that a multitude of factors have triggered local opposition to astronomy development on Mauna Kea. For instance, it has been argued that astronomy development on Mauna Kea, a volcanic mountain of great cultural significance to many Native Hawaiians, infringes on indigenous practices and rights. Existing research also indicates that past mismanagement of the mountain, that has seen the construction of 13 telescopes over 40 years, has led to local discontent. Finally, some scholars contend that local opposition to astronomy development on Mauna Kea mirrors a broader struggle to decolonize Hawaiʻi, whose annexation by the US in 1898 is politically and legally contested.

Within this tense context, the proposal to build the Thirty Meter Telescope, a construction that rivals imposing landmarks like the Parisian Arc de Triomphe, almost instantly triggered local resistance. When the Thirty Meter Telescope was first proposed in 2010, local opposition materialized in the form of legal challenges. Later, in 2014 and 2015, a growing number of local community members, by then known as kiaʻi, engaged in non-violent direct action to prevent the telescope’s construction. Between 2015 and 2019, during the height of the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy, thousands of kiaʻi blocked access to the telescope construction site. Only the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 eventually put a halt to the blockade.

In my article, I identify six factors that help to explain why the kiaʻi have succeeded in sustaining opposition to the Thirty Meter Telescope since 2011. These six factors are:

• Multi-generational leaderful organization

Including different generations of (Native) Hawaiians in the resistance was essential because each generation was able to contribute different skillsets and experiences. Over time, this facilitated effective task division. For instance, younger kiaʻi were able to publicize local opposition on social media. Kiaʻi of an older generation that had participated in past Hawaiian movements, in turn, helped to shape kiaʻi strategies by sharing their knowledge of which tactics had proven successful in previous resistance movements. Having several leaders, or in other words a leaderful organization, was crucial for similar reasons. This organizational strategy enabled the effective distribution of responsibilities among a group of individuals that had the willingness, capacity, and skills to take on leadership tasks. As local resistance continued, distributing leadership responsibilities among several individuals also ensured that leaders did not burn out.

• Grassroots resources

Sustained local opposition would not have been possible without a continuous flow of tangible and intangible grassroots resources like money, food, and time. These were needed for the kiaʻi to vary the use of tactics throughout their struggle and to draw attention to local grievances.

• Versatile tactics

Combining different tactics such as legal challenges, non-violent direct action, and campaigning on social media significantly stalled telescope development and helped the kiaʻi to bring attention to their cause. Especially social media campaigns helped the kiaʻi to recruit likeminded individuals for their struggle and to gain additional supporters, both of which were needed to sustain resistance and to raise wide-spread awareness.

• Anti-science counterframing

Local opposition furthermore sustained momentum because the kiaʻi successfully framed the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy as a multidimensional issue, where not science itself but rather questionable research practices of “mainstream” science were up for debate. Making this distinction in framing the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy was crucial for the kiaʻi because it helped them to counter popular media frames which presented the issue as one of “science vs. religion” and portrayed the kiaʻi as anti-science.

• Local and national political opportunity

The kiaʻi also succeeded in sustaining momentum for their advocacy because the local and national political context were conducive to it. At the national level, advocating to protect a place of great cultural significance to an indigenous population resonated with a greater awareness of indigenous (land) rights. At the local level, the kiaʻi experienced little pushback as those in favor of the telescope were not as well organized and media-savvy as the kiaʻi. Local community members that supported the Thirty Meter Telescope moreover tended to be less vocal than the kiaʻi because their pro-telescope activism was met with disapproval and, in some cases, harassment.

• Place attachment-driven commitment

Finally, local opposition persisted because activists were deeply committed to preventing further astronomy development on Mauna Kea. This commitment was largely driven by a strong attachment to the mountain, including to its unique environment and the cultural sites that it harbors.

What do we learn from this? I believe that there are at least two important take-aways from the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy. First, it demonstrates that there are instances where activists succeed in framing their struggle against Big Science as legitimate. This, in turn, is an important precondition to sustain and raise wider support for it. Second and more broadly, the controversy also underlines the need for Big Science proponents to be knowledgeable about and respectful of the distinct circumstances and historical grievances of the local community which is or will be hosting a project. This especially applies to contexts where particular groups have been or continue to be marginalized. Acquiring such context sensitivity requires Big Science proponents to engage with and, where possible, thoroughly embed themselves in the local community. This is easier said than done, but community-based research practices that have been introduced in fields like archaeology or anthropology may provide a blueprint for the effective inclusion of local communities into the planning, design, and outreach activities of Big Science initiatives.

Dr. Anna-Lena Rüland is a research fellow at University College London. In her current research, she focuses on science diplomacy, research security, and European science, technology and innovation policy.

References

Rüland A-L (2024) Sustaining Local Opposition to Big Science: A Case Study of the Thirty Meter Telescope Controversy. Technology in Society 78: 102597. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2024.102597.

Salazar JA (2014) Multicultural Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Struggle in Hawaiʻi: The Politics of Astronomy on Mauna a Wākea. University of Hawai’i at Manoa, Honolulu.

TMT International Observatory (2022) About. Available at: https://www.tmt.org/page/about (accessed 11 September 2024).

The post When does local resistance to Big Science persist and raise wide-spread attention? Lessons learned from the Thirty Meter Telescope controversy. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On Tuesday 5 November 2024, the EUHealthGov network held its second event. This one-day knowledge exchange workshop brought together academics, policymakers and practitioners to discuss health law and governance in the context of growing uncertainty and intertwined crises. The COVID-19 pandemic has not unfolded in isolation from other overlapping, interacting, and mutually reinforcing crises: from climate change, the war in Ukraine and in Palestine, sharply rising socioeconomic inequities and the cost-of-living crisis, to an exacerbated distrust in liberal democratic institutions, Brexit, and the rise of the far-right and Euroscepticism reflected in the newly elected European Parliament. At the same time, EU law and policy appears increasingly characterised by a state of permanent crisis, which institutionalises governance architectures and tools associated with emergency responses.

The purpose of this workshop was to exchange ideas, experience, and work-in-progress around one question: how do contemporary uncertainties and crises affect health law, policy, and governance in the EU, the UK, and their evolving relationship?

First, Dr Tomislav Sokol (Member of the European Parliament), joined us online and shared an exhaustive and detailed overview of the health-related priorities currently on the agenda in the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The workshop was taking place a few months after the European Parliament elections and in the middle of the Commissioner hearings determining the confirmation of the new college of Commissioners for Ursula von der Leyen’s second term.

Examining these ongoing developments, Dr Louise Bengtsson (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies), provided her analysis of the new von der Leyen mandate and the role of health policy in this new political landscape. She highlighted the increased overlap and fluidity between Commissioner portfolios, as well as the central focus on competitiveness and security. Amidst the growing role of the EU in health since COVID-19 highlighted by Bengtsson, Dr Mechthild Roos (Augsburg University) presented her current research, which uses the framework of input/throughout/output legitimacy as a lens to understand the European Parliament’s involvement during the crisis phase of the pandemic. She highlighted how the Parliament sought to balance its support for swift, necessary emergency responses on one hand, and the need to prevent the risk of institutionalising modes of governance that bypass ordinary legislative procedures on the other hand.

Diving into the legal and political ins and outs of specific health crises, Juan Collado Pérez-Llantada (University of Liverpool) shared his insights into the role EU law can play in regulating antimicrobial resistance through a ‘OneHealth’ approach. He outlined the existing legal framework. But he also emphasised the difficulty inherent to governing this multifaceted and multilevel crisis, visible notably in the lack of action on the environmental spread of AMR and the issues of competence limitation. Another pharmaceuticals-related crisis was discussed by Mark Dayan (Nuffield Trust). He focused on the medicine shortages in the UK and EU, highlighting the global drivers of the crisis in the nature of pharmaceutical markets and recent disruptions caused by COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. He also discussed the UK, EU and Member State responses – including industrial policy approaches and stockpiling.

Finally, the presentations of our two last speakers zoomed out and broadened the geographical scope of analysis even further, putting the EU in a global context. Dr Asha Herten-Crabb (LSE) presented her research on the EU as an emerging global actor. Drawing on critical postcolonial theory, one of the key elements of her research puzzle is to understand how the EU perceives itself and constructs its relationship within the global health architecture in the context of growing decolonisation and anti-West rhetoric. Prof Gabriel Siles-Brügge (University of Bristol) focused the global health crisis represented by non-communicable diseases – and how measures to tackle these were being challenged within the World Trade Organisation’s Technical Barriers to Trade Committee. The crisis in the global trading system has increased interest in such committees amongst the trade officials involved, including within the EU, as they exist outside of the limelight.

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I was fortunate enough to receive a UACES microgrant to help fund a month of conducting PhD fieldwork and research in Spain. I am pleased to say the trip was a success, and I gathered not only crucial archival evidence but also managed to establish key original strands of investigation through such findings, which will prove vital in shaping the argument at the crux of my thesis.

The trip was predominantly centred around making use of a number of Spain’s archivos estatales, however I also managed to integrate attending a conference in my very field of research into the stay, which would not have been possible without this financial backing. The Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid was my main base during the stay, and I used the PARES portal to find relevant archives and document them in relation to my key research questions. I particularly wanted to find out why a particular type of Spanish literature, known as the picaresque, was re-emerging in modern times – most notably in Spain’s postwar period, and here I found ample evidence that the popularity and trend of this type of writing was not only resurfacing, but being used as a tool for political defiance and a guise for the hypocritical bemusement of a generation marred by the depravity and austerity of a Civil War. The Archivo General de la Administración in nearby Alcalá de Henares also archived a return of the picaresque in not only a literary outlet, but through film, proving of its capability to adapt to the times and transcend boundaries. However, one key theme remained – despite European emulations of such work, it remained inherently Spanish. But why?

A breakthrough in my research trip came from my time spent at the Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica in Salamanca, where the knowledgeable staff were able to discuss gaps in my research with me, leading to the discovery of a wealth of resources which could frame Spain’s postwar inwardness in stark contrast to the wider outfacing dynamic of Europe during this watershed period of war and enmity. I also made ample use of the digitalised archive collection to grasp a better understanding of conditions within Spain during this time, and the ties these had with the picaresque as not only a mere literary genus, but also as a watershed way of feeling, thinking and acting; ergo a trait of intrinsicality to the contemporary Spaniard. Following on from this part of my fieldwork, I then travelled to León to attend a conference specifically on the picaresque which was organised by the University of León in conjunction with the academic organisation CELPYC. At this event I was able to not only become familiar with current research being undertaken in my field, but also share my recent findings with like-minded academics, who have asked me to present my research at their upcoming congress in Santander in June 2025.

Sarah Ellis, Department of Languages Cultures and Film, University of Liverpool

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Headaches in the morning

Maybe it’s some kind of Stockholm Syndrome, but since the Tories left office I have not felt the same urge to write about British European policy.

Equally possibly, it might be because I feel a bit broken by another government with a lack of clear purpose in this domain. Labour, like their predecessors, seem to be stuck at the point of realising this whole Europe thing might be a bit more complicated than they thought, so extemporise until they can work it all out some more.

This was brought to a certain head last week for me off the back of some comments I made in an interview. In it, I said:

“The secrecy right now lets others claim he [Starmer] has no plan – or worse, is just looking to make deals where he can.”

Various people have pushed back on this, mostly by reading it as ‘Starmer actually has no plan’. While I’m not quite arguing that, the impression that this is the case seems somewhat self-evident: communication is focused on what won’t happen – free movement of people, membership of Customs Union or Single Market – and on the nebulous ‘reset’.

This needs more thought and reflection, because there are several things going on here, all of them consequential and none of them clearly determinant.

First up, we need to be a bit clearer about what we’re/I’m talking about. In the broadest terms, there’s a difference between what we might term a vision, a strategy and a plan.

David Henig’s fine piece speaks to this difference by noting that we know what the UK wants of working with the EU; namely cooperation in any and all areas within the envelope of non-membership of the Customs Union, Single Market or full EU membership. That includes the usual litany of items such as an SPS agreement, fisheries access and security.

That is a plan (or rather, a series of plans); specific and localised actions to take. But it’s not really a strategy or a vision.

The UK has long failed to settle on – or even consciously discuss – its vision for relations with the EU and its predecessors. The point of relations sits uneasily in the wider uncertainties of how the UK wants to position itself in the wider world or of what kind of place it wants to be. You can insert your favourite Dean Acheson quote here [although seeing the other two ascribed to him, it might become my least favourite one].

Below any high-minded vision of who we are and what’s our place in the world, there is strategy, which starts to translate down towards the broad thrust of activity. In this case,  the questions are whether the current red lines are fixed and whether they derive from some higher purpose or instead are a function of party politics of the last few years.

Put differently, there’s nothing wrong with red lines, but you need to be able to understand why they exist and what purpose they serve if you are to defend them and to use them in your negotiations with the EU.

In this, I’m rather old-fashioned in thinking that party politics most usefully stops at the water’s edge and that external relations should speak to the needs of the country as a whole. But your mileage may vary on this.

At present, the defining mechanism seems to be one informed by the imperatives of trying to neutralise a tricky topic in party political terms, while also recognising specific needs and asks, combining to produce the external relations version of the Woolie’s pick and mix: lots of choice, lots of things you’ve never seen before and not the most sustaining of diets.

Secondly, we have to be alive to why people talk about wanting a vision/strategy/plan.

Clearly, the lack of strategy or vision is not for lack of ideas out there. The absence of a more articulated Labour policy has left groups from across the political spectrum to offer programmes and priorities (this is a good place to get some overview).

Because these are typically isolated from the need to attend to the party politics that the government has decided to be hemmed in by, they come with their own visions and strategies.

Right now, a lot of that comes from pro-European voices that take doing (much) more with the EU as A Good Thing. The youth mobility impasse has been a recent rallying point for them, both on what they see as intrinsic merits and on wider signalling or a desire to multiply connections.

Even my own position – that the government needs its own vision and strategy to create a durable relationship with the EU – still comes with an agenda of wanting to avoid big swings in policy.

From the government’s perspective, this is a complication: moving on a specific point risks opening up broader implications for relations just at the point when they seem to wish to hold off such things. Hence, havering on youth mobility despite very broad backing from interested groups and public opinion.

Again, this comes back to the lack of a robust vision and strategy that the government can lean on as justification for what it’s doing.

Finally, we have to separate rhetoric and action.

Just because politicians and pundits talk in a particular way, it doesn’t mean that they follow through on that in their action. In the present case, there is clearly a huge amount of interaction and activity between the UK and EU (again, a good overview here).

Last year’s fun over EV car batteries is a case in point, where lots of work went into avoiding a mutually-damaging situation: exactly the kind of issue that bubbled along in the specialist media, but which would have been a much bigger problem if not addressed.

To that extent, lacking a strategy hasn’t held back a lot of work, on things that need dealing with now.

But working towards any kind of relationship that is robust and resilient requires more than just reactive management of stuff that pops up. As the 2000-2010s showed very vividly, lots of small choices and steps can lead to radical outcomes: ‘not banging on about Europe’ became ‘let’s not talk about it’, leaving others to fill the gap.

—

To pull all this together, Labour’s issue appears to be not that dissimilar to David Cameron in the 2000s: a desire to park the ‘Europe’ issue and deal with other things that needed attention (and don’t cause so much anguish) leaves the field open to others to make their play for agenda-setting, which probably results in outcomes that are ultimately more adverse for the government than would otherwise have been the case.

This points to the need for finding a happier medium between obsessing and ignoring EU relations. Like any other significant part of public policy, there has to be sufficient engagement to follow through on agendas/visions if that is not to become a point of instability.

Knowing what you aim to achieve – and why – would be a helpful start in determining that level. To delay will only reduce options and make it harder to impose order and stability over the relevant activity.

The post Visions, strategies and plans: Deconstructing Labour’s EU policy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Abstract 

This paper examines the European Union’s (EU) approach to artificial intelligence (AI) governance, focusing on the period from the publication of Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (2019) onwards. It explores the EU’s strategy to address its “digital gap” in AI development and adoption. The study employs a theoretical framework synthesizing concepts of AI policy as a “horizontal area” (Niklas and Dencik 2020), “tentative governance” (Kuhlmann and Rip’s 2018), and an “ethics first” approach (Floridi 2018). The analysis reveals and discusses the EU’s distinctive prioritization of ethical considerations in AI development, manifested through substantial public investments and flexible regulatory interventions. 

Introduction and Theoretical Framework 

“Europe’s digital gap”: this is how analysts at the McKinsey Global Institute in 2019 described Europe’s lagging behind global leaders such as the USA in the realm of AI development and adoption. They cautioned that while digitization is essential for the advancement of AI, Europe continues to lag approximately 35% behind the United States; a trend that has not diminished in recent years. More recently, the State of the Digital Decade 2024 report highlights both progress and challenges in Europe’s digital transformation, including in AI adoption. While there has been advancement in areas such as 5G coverage and digital skills, the report notes that the percentage of enterprises using AI increased by a mere 0.4% in 2 years, from 7.6% in 2021 to 8.0% in 2023, significantly below the 75% target for 2030 (see State of the Digital Decade Report, 2024, Annex 2). The analysis emphasizes the need for European Union (EU) countries to strengthen their actions and be more ambitious in achieving the Digital Decade’s goals, in order to ensure EU’s future economic prosperity. 

Europe’s technological divide is not only evident in the slow adoption of AI technologies but also in the stark disparities in AI investment between Europe and global leaders, like North America. A European Commission’s (EC) 2018 report illustrates the severity of this investment disparity, revealing that private AI investments in Europe totalled only €2.4-3.2 billion, compared to a much higher €12.1-18.6 billion in North America. This significant difference in investment underscores Europe’s struggle to foster a competitive AI ecosystem, one capable of stimulating innovation at the same pace as its counterparts. Scholars, such as Mazzucato (2017) caution about the impact of chronic underinvestment in high-risk, early-stage research, emphasizing the importance of public investment in fostering innovation, and warning that underfunding in these critical areas can lead to stagnation in technological advancement and economic growth. In the case of AI this gap is particularly concerning, because the transition from basic research to practical application can be extraordinarily short (Sepp Hochreiter, 2023), and many European enterprises still lag behind global competitors due to challenges in rapidly translating research into practical applications (State of the Digital Decade Report, 2024, Annex 2). 

The persistent digital divide underscores the critical importance of pan-European AI policy initiatives in accelerating AI adoption. To analyse this complex landscape, the present discussion adopts a theoretical framework that synthesizes three key theoretical concepts from existing literature and policy approaches. First of all, this is Niklas and Dencik (2020) theorization of AI policy as a “horizontal area” that spans multiple domains and sectors. The scholars highlight the dual role of state intervention in this process, which encompasses both public funding for research and regulatory oversight for industry. Secondly, Kuhlmann and Rip’s (2018) concept of “tentative governance” refers to flexible and adaptive regulatory approaches needed to address the dynamic and rapidly evolving nature of AI technologies. Thirdly, the “tentative governance” policy concept is extended by drawing upon Floridi’s (2018) guidance about “ethics first” approach to AI development and governance.  

The EU’s regulatory stance distinctively prioritizes ethical considerations in AI development and deployment, a principle firmly established by the 2019 Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, which have laid the foundation for subsequent AI policy frameworks. Thus, the subsequent brief chronological analysis will examine key European AI-related policies and programs from 2019 onwards through these three theoretical lenses, focusing on how these initiatives aim to bridge the digital divide while adhering to principles of responsible and ethical AI development through flexible and adaptive “tentative governance” approaches. 

In accordance with the theoretical guidance about the dual role of state intervention in AI policy, the discussion will first explore public funding as a catalyst for ethical AI innovation, followed by an assessment of key recent EU AI policy interventions. This structure reflects the complementary nature of research funding and regulatory measures in shaping the European AI landscape. 

Public Funding as Catalyst of AI innovation 

In response to the challenge of the “digital gap,” Europe has increasingly relied on public funding and collaborative research initiatives as strategic tools to bridge this divide. Importantly, these funding initiatives integrate the ethics-first approach, ensuring that ethical considerations remain at the forefront of EU’s AI development strategy. 

Horizon Europe, with its substantial budget of €93.5 billion for 2021-2027 (note that this total includes all areas of research and innovation, not just AI), serves as the centrepiece of this strategy, deliberately committing to “act as a synergetic force across the EU funding programmes.” Within this, a significant portion is allocated to digital technologies, including AI. For instance, the “Digital, Industry and Space” cluster, which encompasses AI research, has been allocated €15.3 billion. Public investment acts supports innovation in critical technologies, while also emphasizing the development of ethically aligned AI systems. For example, Horizon Europe’s Ethics Appraisal Process is designed to ensure compliance with ethical standards throughout EU-funded research projects and now includes a mandatory ethics appraisal procedure for proposals that raise ethical issues. 

This approach is complemented by other initiatives within the European AI ecosystem. The Digital Europe Programme (DIGITAL), while separate from Horizon Europe, synergizes with it by focusing on building strategic digital capacities and deploying digital technologies. DIGITAL has an overall budget exceeding €7.9 billion for 2021-2027. The programmes will collectively invest €1 billion per year in AI, which totals €4 billion over four years (2021-2027). Both Horizon Europe and Digital Europe require ethics review procedures, even though they are more robustly defined within Horizon Europe compared to DIGITAL. This integrated funding strategy aims to establish a seamless continuum of support from foundational research to market deployment, with ethical considerations embedded throughout.  

European initiatives emphasize not only funding for research projects but also support for training and mobility programs. For instance, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, with a budget of €6.6 billion under Horizon Europe, specifically targets researchers in AI and other cutting-edge fields, while also promoting ethical awareness in AI research. Additionally, the European Innovation Council (EIC) has allocated €10.1 billion to promote breakthrough innovations, including AI, from laboratory settings to market products, with a focus on responsible and ethical development.  

Individual member states are also making substantial investments in AI. For example, the German Federal Government (2020) has pledged €3 billion for its AI strategy up to 2025, which includes a strong emphasis on “AI made in Europe” that adheres to European ethical standards. France’s National Strategy for AI (SNIA) had a budget of €1.5 billion in public funds for five years (2018-2022). The second phase of France’s national AI strategy (promulgated in 2021) dedicated a total of €2.22 billion for AI over the next 5 years, of which €1.5 billion in public funding and €506 million in private co-financing, with ethical AI development as a key priority. 

Collectively, the investments discussed in this section represent a substantial commitment to AI advancement. In its Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence Review (2021), the European Commission estimates that the combined public and private investments in AI in Europe could reach €20 billion per year over the next decade. This level of investment represents a significant step towards closing the AI investment gap and fostering a thriving AI ecosystem in Europe that prioritizes ethical considerations. 

Regulatory Interventions 

The ensuing brief overview will discuss key European AI-related policies and programs promulgated since 2019.  

The analytical exposition begins with the publication of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI by the High-Level Expert Group on AI. These guidelines laid the ethical foundation for Europe’s approach to AI development. An emphasis was placed on principles such as human agency, privacy, and non-discrimination, reflecting an “ethics-first” approach to AI governance. This initial step was of great importance in establishing the foundation for future policies. It signalled Europe’s commitment to developing AI systems that not only push technological boundaries but also align with fundamental European values. The guidelines has served as a compass, guiding subsequent regulatory efforts and shaping the European vision of “trustworthy AI.” 

Recognizing that AI development is intrinsically linked to data availability, the EU launched the European Strategy for Data in 2020. This strategy aimed to create a single market for data and envisioned a future where data flows freely within the EU while adhering to strict privacy and data protection rules. Moreover, it sought to democratize AI development by ensuring fair access to data, preventing the concentration of power in the hands of a few large tech companies.  

In 2021, the EU launched the Digital Decade policy program, setting ambitious targets for Europe’s digital transformation by 2030. This program recognized AI as a key technology for achieving these goals and emphasized creating a “secure and performant sustainable digital infrastructure.” The Digital Decade program marked a shift from isolated policies to a more comprehensive vision of Europe’s digital future. It contextualized AI within broader digital transformation goals, highlighting the interconnectedness of various technological advancements and societal changes. 

Proposed in 2021, the AI Act is a landmark legislation that would become the cornerstone of European AI regulation. As analysed by Veale and Zuiderveen (2021), it adopts a risk-based approach, categorizing AI systems based on their potential societal impact and implications for individual rights. This nuanced approach allowed for stringent oversight of high-risk applications while fostering innovation in lower-risk areas. Therefore, the act exemplifies the concept of tentative governance, providing a flexible framework that could adapt to the rapid pace of AI development.  

In 2022, the EU introduced the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. While not AI-specific, these acts played a crucial role in shaping the regulatory environment for AI technologies in Europe. They set rules for online platforms and digital markets, indirectly influencing the development and deployment of AI technologies. These acts demonstrate tentative governance through their layered approach to regulation, with different rules applying to different sizes and types of digital platforms, allowing for adaptability as the digital landscape evolves. 

Running parallel to these regulatory efforts is Horizon Europe, the EU’s key research and innovation program for 2021-2027. While not exclusively focused on AI, Horizon Europe provides significant funding for AI research and development, fostering collaboration between academia, industry, and the public sector. Horizon Europe embodies tentative governance through its adaptive funding mechanisms and focus areas, which can be adjusted to address emerging AI challenges and opportunities. 

As seen from this brief exposition, from the ethical guidelines of 2019 to the risk-based approach of the AI Act and the adaptive research funding of Horizon Europe, there is a consistent pattern of flexible, adaptive governance strategies, which prioritise ethical considerations. These strategies allow the EU to navigate the complex and uncertain landscape of AI development while maintaining a balance between technological innovation and ethical considerations.  

Conclusions 

The EU must proactively harness the potential of AI to prevent becoming merely a consumer of solutions developed elsewhere and to capitalize on the transformative opportunities this technology presents. The EU’s approach to AI governance combines increased public funding with increasingly more flexible and adaptive regulatory frameworks. It aims not only to close the AI gap with global leaders but to establish Europe as a pioneer in human-centric, trustworthy AI that balances innovation with ethical considerations and societal needs.

The post The European Union’s AI Governance Agenda: Ethical Investment and Flexible Regulatory Approaches appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

But there is no single human on earth who knows all this knowledge, nor any group of humans who could assimilate or understand it all, not even the tiniest fraction of it.

Artificial intelligence, however, is on track not only to eventually assimilate all knowledge ever gathered by humans, but also to understand it, analyse it, and uncover new knowledge yet to be discovered by humanity.

Professor Geoffrey Hinton, known as the “Godfather of AI” and who recently won the Nobel Prize for Physics, recently said that in future AI will always win any argument with a human because AI will be vastly more intelligent and knowledgeable than any human or humans.

That of course represents both an opportunity and a threat to all Homo sapiens.

Already, AI knowledge and intelligence have made dramatic strides in rapid time, with more enormous developments anticipated soon.

With that in mind, I asked AI (Chat GPT 4o) to write a hypothetical essay imagining, “What would Europe be like today if the EU never existed?”

It produced a 1,200-word article in just five seconds, which I am publishing below.

I could not have written it better, and certainly not in five seconds. (I now feel redundant!)

• EUROPE WITHOUT THE EU? – written by Artificial Intelligence

The European Union (EU), born out of the ashes of two devastating world wars, has reshaped the continent’s political, economic, and cultural landscape over the last seven decades.

Imagining Europe today without the EU requires rethinking the history of post-war integration, cooperation, and peace, all of which are tied closely to the Union’s existence.

This hypothetical essay explores the possible political, economic, and social outcomes of a Europe where the EU never came into being. Such a scenario likely would have featured more nationalist tensions, economic fragmentation, and weakened global influence.

• Political Fragmentation and Rising Nationalism

One of the EU’s greatest achievements has been maintaining peace among European nations, especially between historical rivals such as France and Germany.

Without the EU, it is possible that Europe’s political landscape would have remained far more fragmented, and nationalist sentiments, which have historically fueled conflict, might have taken a stronger hold.

The post-war period was a fragile time, and without the push for cooperation through institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the European Economic Community (EEC), the continent might have experienced ongoing territorial disputes and rivalries.

In this scenario, the absence of the EU would have likely led to a weaker and less coordinated approach to political crises.

European countries might have formed smaller, more regional alliances based on shared interests or historical ties, such as between France and the Benelux countries or between Scandinavian nations.

However, without the overarching EU framework, these alliances could have been less stable and more prone to collapse in the face of diplomatic challenges or economic downturns.

Moreover, individual countries might have pursued more inward-looking policies, potentially leading to heightened xenophobia, ethnic tensions, and populist movements, especially in response to crises like migration.

• Economic Instability and Trade Barriers

The EU has been instrumental in fostering economic cooperation, trade, and development across Europe.

Without it, Europe’s economy would likely be more fragmented, with less integrated markets and higher barriers to trade.

The Single Market, which allows goods, services, capital, and people to move freely across borders, would not exist, resulting in numerous customs checks, tariffs, and different regulatory standards between countries.

The economic powerhouses of Europe, like Germany and France, may have dominated trade agreements, potentially sidelining smaller nations.

Southern and Eastern European countries, which have benefitted enormously from EU development funds, might have struggled to modernise their economies and infrastructure without access to this financial support.

Regions that are today economically aligned with stronger economies through EU mechanisms would be left more vulnerable to recessions and financial crises.

Moreover, the absence of the euro would likely result in a patchwork of national currencies, which would be subject to frequent fluctuations and speculative attacks. Exchange rate instability could cause market volatility, hampering investment and long-term growth across the continent.

Countries that might have otherwise adopted the euro would remain vulnerable to currency crises, similar to what some European nations experienced in the early 1990s before deeper monetary integration began.

• Weakening of European Global Influence

Today, the EU stands as one of the world’s largest economic blocs and an influential political entity in global affairs.

Without the EU, Europe’s ability to project influence on the world stage would likely be diminished. Individually, European countries, even major players like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, would have less leverage in global institutions such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The EU’s collective bargaining power has allowed it to negotiate favourable trade agreements with other major economies, such as the United States, China, and Japan.

Without this united front, European nations would have to rely on their individual negotiating power, which would vary significantly between large and small countries.

Smaller nations, in particular, would struggle to secure favourable terms in bilateral agreements with economic giants like the US and China.

Additionally, the EU’s strong stance on environmental protection and human rights would be much weaker without its existence.

Many of the region’s most progressive policies on climate change and digital privacy, for instance, have come from the EU’s ability to implement regulations that transcend national boundaries.

A Europe without the EU could mean less ambitious climate goals and fragmented environmental policies, hindering global efforts to combat climate change.

• Social and Cultural Divide

The EU has also played a significant role in promoting cultural exchange, education, and the free movement of people, which has fostered a greater sense of European identity.

Programs such as Erasmus, which allow students to study abroad in different European countries, have enriched lives and increased understanding between cultures.

Without the EU, the free movement of people would likely be restricted, making it harder for Europeans to work, study, or live in other countries.

A Europe without the EU might have maintained stricter immigration controls, not only between EU members but also between other European countries, such as those in the Balkans or Eastern Europe.

This could lead to fewer cultural exchanges and less intermixing of ideas and traditions across borders. Countries would be more inward-looking and nationalistic, which could deepen cultural divides and reduce the cohesion that the EU has sought to foster.

Furthermore, the EU has been at the forefront of human rights and democratic values, pushing countries to improve their governance in exchange for membership or access to its market.

In a scenario where the EU never existed, there would be less incentive for countries in Eastern Europe, for example, to embrace democratic reforms after the fall of the Soviet Union.

This could lead to more authoritarian regimes in Europe and potentially a rollback of the democratic principles that have flourished since the end of the Cold War.

• Security Concerns and Fragmented Defence

One of the EU’s most significant, if sometimes underappreciated, roles is its contributions to collective security.

Through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its coordination with NATO, the EU has helped maintain peace and stability in Europe. Without the EU, defence cooperation between European nations would be less integrated, potentially making Europe more vulnerable to external threats.

The continent would likely rely more heavily on NATO, but the absence of EU-led initiatives for crisis management and peacekeeping could lead to a weaker, more disjointed response to security challenges.

Without the EU, European nations might have pursued more individualistic defence policies, which could have strained relations between countries, leading to a less secure and less cooperative region.

Countries in Eastern Europe, which today benefit from EU support in facing pressure from Russia, might have faced greater vulnerability without the backing of a united Europe.

• Conclusion

A Europe without the European Union would likely be a more divided, unstable, and economically fragmented region.

Without the EU’s framework for political and economic integration, European nations might have struggled to maintain peace, coordinate on global issues, and compete in the global economy. Fragmentation, both political and economic, could have deepened, making the continent more susceptible to internal tensions and external threats.

While it is impossible to predict every outcome in this hypothetical scenario, the EU’s contributions to peace, prosperity, and cooperation are undeniable.

Without the EU, Europe today might resemble the fractured and conflict-prone continent of the early 20th century, rather than the relatively peaceful and prosperous one we know today.

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