Agrégateur de flux

The Wall Street Journal reports on how Iran may prevent verification of any nuclear deal with the West
Talks over Iran’s nuclear program have hit a stumbling block a week before a key deadline because Tehran has failed to cooperate with a United Nations probe into whether it tried to build atomic weapons in the past, say people close to the negotiations.The Israel Project has been following this and other developments very closely. In a series of emails it sent out, TIP explained the huge significance of Iran's refusal.

It's important to remember why "possible military dimensions" (PMDs) matter. The label is a bit misleading: it makes it sound like the IAEA is only investigating weaponization work. That's allowed some people to mischaracterize the issue as 'the West is trying to extract a 'mea culpa' from the Iranians to embarrass them' (the NYT had a typical example a few weeks ago, sourced to a former American negotiator who rhetorically asked "is it worth blowing up a potential agreement in the name of forcing a confession?") But that's not it.

PMD disclosure is about baselining all of Iran's nuclear activities - not just its known civilian parts - as a prerequisite for verifying that those activities have been halted under a nuclear deal. Iran has uranium mines; some are civilian and some are military. It has centrifuges; some are operated by civilians and some by IRGC personnel. It has uranium stockpiles; some are maintained by civilians and some by the military. There's no way for future inspectors to verify that Iran has shuttered its mines, stopped its centrifuges, and shipped off its stockpile - for instance - unless the IAEA knows where all the mines and stockpiles are.

No PMDs mean no verification.

Significantly, the Wall Street Journal reports that in response to Iran's refusal, the US is considering backing off on those demands.

Besides undercutting an effective verification of Iran's nuclear program, backtracking by the West at this point creates other dangers:

• Cripples the deal's monitoring regime by allowing Iran to hide facilities where it conducts nuclear work
• Cripples the deal's gamble on a 1 year breakout time by preventing analysts from knowing how far Iranians ever got to a bomb - and what's still on the shelf.
• Shreds the global nonproliferation regime by kneecapping the IAEA
• Undermines US credibility in the Middle East by abandoning the US's decades-old position that Iran has to come clean
• Boosts Iran's regional drive for hegemony by confirming its narrative that it had been persecuted by the West for no reason

Needless to say, backtracking on the requirement of Iranian disclosures represents a major backtrack in Obama's promise that negotiators would get significant concessions on PMD's and verification.

This year at AIPAC Rice assured those in attendance there would be verification at Iran's nuclear sites
"Any deal must ensure frequent and intrusive inspections at Iran’s nuclear sites, including the uranium mills that produce the material fed into Iran’s enrichment and conversion facilities, to create a multilayered transparency regime that provides the international community with the confidence it demands… Any deal must also address the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. And going forward, we will not accept a deal that fails to provide the access we need to ensure that Iran’s program is peaceful"In a 2013 interview, Obama promised to cooperate with Congress if Iran would not provide PMD assurances:
“If Iran comes back and says, we can’t give you assurances that we’re not going to weaponize, if they’re not willing to address some of their capabilities that we know could end up resulting in them having breakout capacity, it’s not going to be hard for us to turn the dials back, strengthen sanctions even further. I’ll work with members of Congress to put even more pressure on Iran”In 2009, Obama guaranteed Iranian transparency:
“Iran is on notice that when we meet with them on Oct. 1, they are going to have to come clean”March 31 is the deadline for reaching a framework for an agreement with Iran.

That is, assuming that deadlines mean anything anymore.

-----
If you found this post interesting or informative, please it below. Thanks!

Technorati Tag: Israel and Iran and Obamna.

Press statement
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Invité le vendredi 27 mars par Michel Field de LCI et par TV5 Monde pour présenter mon dernier livre Osons dire la vérité à l'Afrique, je viens d'être "déprogrammé" par les deux chaînes.L'actualité ne peut être invoquée car, à la fois le message laissé sur mon portable par LCI et le mail envoyé par TV5 Monde, précisent que ces deux entretiens ne sont pas reportés mais purement et simplement annulés. Il s'agit donc clairement d'une nouvelle censure.
Comment riposter à cette censure ?
1)    En visitant mon blog: www.bernard-lugan.com afin de prendre connaissance de mes analyses africaines.
2)    En vous abonnant à la revue mensuelle par PDF L’Afrique Réelle. Tous renseignements sur www.bernard-lugan.com.
3)    En achetant  en librairie le livre Osons dire la vérité à l'Afrique(Le Rocher, mars 2015). Ce livre peut également être commandé à l'Afrique Réelle  BP 45,  42360 Panissières contre un chèque de 28 euros port compris établi à l'ordre de Bernard Lugan. Par mesure de sécurité, tous les envois sont faits en colissimo. Veuillez préciser si vous souhaitez une dédicace.

Durée de la vidéo : 180'
Vous pouvez télécharger manuellement cette vidéo au format WMV (1.8Gb)

Clause de non-responsabilité : L'interprétation des débats facilite la communication mais ne constitue en aucun cas un enregistrement authentifié des débats. Seuls le discours original ou la traduction écrite révisée du discours original peuvent être considérés authentiques.
Source : © Union européenne, 2015 - PE

As part of its wide-ranging digital single market strategy, the European Commission is considering introducing regulations which would bring about major changes for on-demand video providers like Netflix or Amazon Instant Video.

The Commission Vice-President for the Digital Single Market Andrus Ansip has firmly set his sights on the practice of geo-blocking, claiming it’s unfair that citizens across Europe can’t access the same digital services on equal terms. With the European Commission committed to ambitious legal steps in its digital single market strategy, geo-blocking is close to public enemy number one in the eyes of the EU’s executive branch.

Far too often, consumers find themselves redirected to a national website, or blocked. I know this from my own experience. You probably do as well….In the offline world, this would be called discrimination. In the online world, it happens every day.

Andrus Ansip, European Commission Vice-President for the Digital Single Market

The Commission seems to think that distributors, like these on-demand services, are deliberately signing contracts to distribute content selectively across the EU, then using this as a defence for geo-blocking, by claiming they only have the rights to distribute certain content in certain territories or languages (for example, when Netflix launched in Belgium, you could only watch the massively popular House of Cards if you set your language to English, as they’d sold the French-language rights to another channel).

The Commission, considering this an unacceptable situation for consumers, is actively considering banning arrangements like these, which could leave online services with the simple choice of licensing content for all of Europe, or none of it.

Operators like Hulu and Crave TV, or even Singtel have the advantage of watching the situation play out from the outside, even if they won’t be able to ignore the EU market and its 500 million consumers forever.

And when they do enter, they along with those already present, will likely have to deal with a new European-level law governing the sale of digital content, as the Commission looks to update existing rules on e-commerce and introduce new ones. This could even include forcing content providers to strip back their contract terms, presenting consumers with only the most important ones in an easy-to-read format, instead of the 100+ page agreements we are used to seeing.

As the definitive form of the digital single market plan evolves, all eyes will be on the European Commission ahead of the planned release of the strategy on May 6th.

Tiernan Kenny

M. Mukwege, lauréat du prix Sakharov 2014, a décrit les problèmes politiques en République démocratique du Congo et les difficultés qu'il rencontre dans sa lutte contre les abus sexuels dont sont victimes les femmes et les petits enfants, lors d'un débat jeudi en sous-commission des droits de l'homme. Les députés ont abordé la manière dont l'UE pourrait mieux soutenir le travail de M. Mukwege et certains ont appelé à un système juridiquement contraignant sur le commerce des minéraux de conflit.
Sous-commission "droits de l'homme"

Source : © Union européenne, 2015 - PE

So, to re-cap the past week or so: the two-state solution is (almost) dead (again) after Bibi’s victory in the Israeli elections, the Americans came off the sidelines in Iraq with airstrikes in support of an offensive to re-take Tikrit from ISIS, Yemen’s President has reportedly fled the country and Saudi Arabia has now launched airstrikes against the Houthi rebels, Syria has dismantled 3 chemical weapons sites, Syria stands accused of continuing to use Chlorine weapons, Canada announced that it won’t bother to ask the Syrian government before attacking ISIS, oh and nine British citizens have reportedly entered Syria to work as medics in IS hospitals.

Spot the odd one out. That didn’t stop the nine medics making the front pages, though.

What is the British government to do about British citizens that are willing to travel to Syria and support ISIS? The Guardian called this “a test for British policy” and I agree, but it is a general policy problem that any state whose citizens get involved in irregular conflicts will have to face. I had a good debate on Twitter with Shashank Joshi regarding his argument that this constituted “material support” for terrorism, although the question he was asked was slightly different to its presentation. As I see it, the problem here is that two norms are in direct conflict with one another: the idea that the British citizens shouldn’t support ISIS, and the humanitarian impulse to save lives.

The key problem with any assessment is the same as most arguments about foreign fighters: we don’t really know what they’re up to except via scraps of information and rumours spread via twitter/instagram/the internet. As I see it, however, there are three ways that they could be involved (as medics): as a standard fighter with some medical expertise, as a dedicated medic working in a battlefield role, as a medic working in a hospital or similar facility. The first case is the easiest – even under international humanitarian law medical personnel can carry a light weapon for personal protection but lose the protection of their status if they act like standard personnel. The second is perhaps the trickiest issue. A battlefield medic would be providing material support, but at the same time, although medical personnel are integral to the conduct of military operations, they are commonly protected from attack precisely because international humanitarian law seeks to preserve the ability for medical personnel to tend to the sick and wounded while fighting rages. Even though debate rages about what constitutes “direct participation in hostilities” in non-international armed conflicts, this concept doesn’t include medical aid. Fundamentally, in international law there isn’t anything to prevent a person from pulling wounded people from a battlefield or tending to their wounds.

There is little doubt in my mind that the British government could figure out an argument for making it illegal to go to Syria and provide medical support for ISIS, even though this will be fundamentally a British law for British citizens. The question is, do we want to be seen to criminalise the humanitarian impulse? Will nine medical students really make much of a difference? In terms of narrative it seems a needless own-goal. If these students did go to Syria to heal people instead of kill them, the best thing the British government could do is ignore them and focus on something more important. Throw a dart at a map of the middle east, and it’ll probably land on something that should be a priority.

Van is, meg nincs is egy fontos tanú Nyemcov meggyilkolásának ügyében

Read more...

Tovább bővül a Gombold újra! Közép-Európa tehetségkutató pályázói köre: idén a visegrádi négyek országain túl Szerbia és Horvátország divattervezői is indulhatnak a versenyen.  A Design Terminál immár ötödik alkalommal hirdeti meg a Gombold újra! Közép-Európa öltözéktervezői pályázatot azzal a céllal, hogy a kreatív iparágak területén erősítse a regionális együttműködést, és hogy a feltörekvő közép-európai tervezők a nemzetközi divatipar látóterébe is bekerüljenek.

Kapcsolódó hírek:  Lengyel lett Közép-Európa legjobb tervezője Budapest néhány napra Közép-Európa divatfővárosa lehet

tovább

Defence IQ recently spoke with Italian Army Colonel Marco Stoccuto, who has been serving as the PSYOPS Section Head at NATO Joint Forces Command for the past year. Stoccuto updates us on how lessons from Afghanistan and Libya are impacting the way in which the community is strategising its

A szódavíz fogyasztási szokásokat vizsgálva a világon elfogyasztott teljes mennyiség alapján a SodaStream szénsavas vizeit fogyasztják a legtöbben, ezzel a világ első számú szódavíz márkájává lépett elő – derül ki az italgyártó iparág egyik vezető kutatóintézete, a Canadean legfrissebb felméréséből. A kutatásnak azért is van kiemelt jelentősége, mert rámutat arra, hogy van igény az előrecsomagolt, hosszasan palackban tárolt PET palackos üdítők alternatívái iránt. Csak a SodaStream használói kb 500 millió PET palackkal csökkentik a világ hulladék termelését, így megóvják a környezetet a gyártással és szállítmányozással járó természeti hatásoktól.  

tovább

Etude Institut Choiseul / Havas Worldwide Paris :

« Financer la croissance africaine en 2015-2020. Perceptions des investisseurs internationaux »

 

L’Institut Choiseul et Havas Worlwide Paris s’associent pour créer Havas Horizons, une offre nouvelle et inédite au service des entreprises et des institutions souhaitant développer leur activité dans les pays émergents.

Retrouvez ici les résultats de la première étude consacrée au financement de la croissance africaine dont les résultats ont été présentées lors de la conférence débat du mardi 24 mars en présence de :

- Jean-Marie Bockel, Sénateur du Haut-Rhin, Ancien ministre, Auteur du rapport parlementaire « L’Afrique est notre avenir »,

- Olivier Canuel, Directeur Afrique et Moyen-Orient de Gras Savoye,

- Vincent Le Guennou, Co-fondateur, Managing Director et co-CEO d’Emerging Capital Partners (ECP),

- Jean-Michel Severino, Gérant d’Investisseurs et Partenaires (I&P) et Ancien Directeur général de l’Agence française de développement (AFD).

 

var hupso_services_t=new Array("Twitter","Facebook","Google Plus","Linkedin");var hupso_background_t="#EAF4FF";var hupso_border_t="#66CCFF";var hupso_toolbar_size_t="medium";var hupso_image_folder_url = "";var hupso_title_t="Financer la croissance africaine";

The Algerian government is under increasing pressure, stemming from political and social turmoil in the south of the country. This comes amidst mounting terrorist threats and economic concerns due to low oil prices. The south holds the majority of the country’s oil and gas reserves and is key for Algeria’s security. The area’s wealth and size (it accounts for more than 80 per cent of the national territory) have contributed enormously to Algeria’s economic standing and geostrategic clout.  According to International Monetary Fund 2011 data, hydrocarbons account for over 69 per cent of public revenues and 36 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product.

The vast south was politically and administratively attached to the rest of the country after Algerian independence in 1962. Then the priority was not to foster economic and social integration with the north, but to control and exploit the south’s extensive natural resources. For nearly 50 years, the area worked as a strategic redoubt and a hydrocarbon lifeline underpinning the regime. But after the 2011 Arab uprisings, a host of social imbalances and unresolved ethnic tensions began to affect stability there, alongside an outburst of terrorist attacks.

Three major attacks in less than one year brought Algeria’s south into the eye of the storm: a suicide attack in Tamanrasset in March 2012; an attack against the Algerian National Gendarmerie regional command centre in the town of Ouargla in June 2012; and the dramatic January 2013 terrorist attack at the In Amenas natural gas plant in the southeast Algeria, which was a serious blow to the country’s seemingly invulnerable energy installations.

The Arab uprisings were one of the catalysts of the south’s political ‘awakening’. Protests against social exclusion and high unemployment broke out as early as 2011, and grew in intensity in 2013. Social frustration and tension, caused by the widening gap between citizens’ expectations and the state’s incapacity or unwillingness to deliver, exacerbated feelings of perceived injustice and inequality with regard to the north. The south’s sparse population and its geographical distance from the capital Algiers very much limited the movement of people and social interaction between the Arab and Berber north and the Tuareg and black south, also reducing the latter’s political influence in the halls of power.

Many see protests, sit-ins and riots as the only means to seek and get redress from the state, which exploited Southern resources but invested very little in the region. The formation of various movements and pressure groups unconnected to traditional parties and tribal leaders elevated the plight of the unemployed and low-wage workers in the south into the limelight. Several civic associations began to mobilise, demanding their constituencies’ share from the oil bonanza. The National Committee for the Rights of the Unemployed created in February 2011, for example, garnered much media attention when it mobilised thousands of protesters in Ouargla in 2013. Similar demonstrations also took place in other southern cities like Laghouat and El-Oued, whereby protesters accused the state and national and multinational companies of discriminating against locals when hiring – while thousands of jobs are created in the hydrocarbon industry each year, they are scooped up by migrants from the north, particularly from Algiers, Oran and Constantine.

Social inequality and bad governance are the central themes of the protests. Demonstrations against corruption, perceived manipulation of social housing and public services, and unequal treatment have become a common fixture in much of the south. In early 2015, new demonstrations broke out over environmental concerns about shale gas extraction. In one occasion, as many as 30,000 protesters reportedly took to the streets in the impoverished town of In-Salah, located in the heart of the Sahara Desert.

This fragile social context can become an incubator of security risks. Some, especially the disaffected youth, are already gravitating towards criminal and smuggling networks long established in Algeria’s south and its periphery. The growing spread and interconnectedness of these networks, increasingly enmeshed into drugs trade, stolen cars, illicit cigarette trafficking, weapons smuggling and counterfeit money and goods, are a source of major concern for Algeria, which also fears cross-pollination with extremist actors roaming the Algerian and Sahelian deserts.

So far, protests have been kept under control through cooptation and/ or repression strategies. If social turmoil is not contained, however, there is also a risk that ethnic and sectarian tensions grow more violent. In August 2013, inter-communal clashes erupted in the town of Bordj Badji Mokhtar, on the border with northern Mali, leaving 15 dead. The incident exposed the deep rifts between Tuareg Idnan and Arab Berabiche, raising concerns among tribal leaders and the government alike. In December 2013, the city of Ghardaïa was also enveloped in sectarian violence. Since then, bloody clashes between the Chaamba Arabs (present in most of Algeria’s south) and the Mozabite Berbers of the Muslim Ibadi sect (an insular group with its own system of values, codes of conduct and rules), have occurred intermittently.

Ethnic and social tensions are particularly dangerous for Algeria because they erode loyalty to the central state. In February 2014, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal spoke of a plot to destabilise Algeria’s social cohesion and territorial integrity, articulating deep-rooted fears that social tensions and external threats might exacerbate latent ethnic divisions and even activate separatist tendencies. He blamed small nefarious groups for instigating violence and sowing divisions between communities.

The south of Algeria is no longer a buffer periphery whose principal value lies in its massive natural resources. Maintaining stability in the region is vital for national security and regime survival. It is both a security and a political challenge. The traditional mix of cooptation and repression to manage dissent in the south is showing signs of strain. Plus, the dramatic slide in oil prices will make it difficult for Algeria to stem political grievances through financial largesse. Addressing political and social problems in the south should be a high priority. Failure to do so would undermine an effective response to the growing threat posed by terrorist and criminal networks.

Anouar Boukhars is associate fellow at FRIDE and a non-resident scholar in the Middle East Programme of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Photo credit: Gwenael Piaser_CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Bonn, 25 March 2015. The Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) signed by the three Eastern Nile countries (Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan) on 23 March 2015 in Khartoum has sparked much controversy among experts and commentators in Egypt. Some consider it a breakthrough between Egypt and Ethiopia after four years of tensions. Others opine that Egypt is bound to lose from this declaration, because it does not include a clear reference to Egypt’s historical rights in the Nile waters and does not ensure any reduction of the huge storage capacity of the GERD. The declaration is a positive step towards reaching a compromise on the largest dam project in an upstream Nile country. However, only the translation of this declaration into balanced technical agreements can build the missing trust between Egypt and Ethiopia and pave the way for sharing the dam’s benefits and reducing its potential negative impacts on downstream countries. A realistic compromise on a complex dilemma The Declaration cannot be evaluated without taking into account the current political context and the historical relations in the Nile basin. During the last decade the balance of power in the Nile basin has been changing in favor of Ethiopia. After decades of Egyptian domination, Ethiopia has managed to combine the hydrological advantage of its position as an upstream country that controls 86 % of the Nile waters and the economic advantage of sustained economic growth. This comes at a time when Egypt, which depends on the Nile for more than 90 % of its water needs, is struggling to sustain its economy after four years of instability. Trapped by its domestic political instability and economic challenges, Egypt was forced to accept the GERD as a fact on the ground. Although the International Panel of Experts that examined the dam recommended conducting more comprehensive studies on the impact of the project on downstream countries, Ethiopia has rejected freezing the construction of the dam until these studies are finalized. Historical mistrust and threats of using force by both sides have raised tensions and brought a halt to technical negotiations. In this context, the Declaration is a realistic compromise on a complex historical dilemma and a true reflection of the current balance of power. On its positive side, the declaration states that the three countries will cooperate to implement the recommendations of the International Panel of Experts, and to reach an agreement on the guidelines of filling and operating the dam. It sets a timeframe of 15 fifteen months from the start of preparing the required studies on the dam for the conclusion of this agreement. Ethiopia is committed, according to the declaration, to take the necessary steps to avoid causing a significant harm to Egypt and Sudan, to mitigate this harm in case it happens, and to discuss compensation “whenever convenient”. However, the Declaration includes no reference to historical agreements or to Egypt’s acquired share in the Nile waters. Furthermore, it did not commit Ethiopia to reconsider the size of the dam and the 74  billion cubic meters storage capacity of the reservoir, a size that several experts considered as technically unnecessary and economically irrational.
What next Much effort and good will is needed to build trust between the three Eastern Nile countries, in particular between Egypt and Ethiopia. The implementation of the recommendations of the international consultancy firm, which will conduct the required studies on the dam, and the resulting technical agreements that will be reached in light of the Declaration will be a necessary step in this direction. Any financial support for the project by international donors and organizations should remain conditional on this implementation. Only these technical agreements and the political will to implement them will determine if the GERD will provide a new example of win-win projects on shared rivers or a quest for development in one riparian state at the expense of others.

Rawia Tawfik is currently Guest Researcher at the German Development Institut / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) and Lecturer at Cairo University.