Africa

Credit: Annegret Hilse/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Dec 17 2025 (IPS)

Machines with no conscience are making split-second decisions about who lives and who dies. This isn’t dystopian fiction; it’s today’s reality. In Gaza, algorithms have generated kill lists of up to 37,000 targets.

Autonomous weapons are also being deployed in Ukraine and were on show at a recent military parade in China. States are racing to integrate them in their arsenals, convinced they’ll maintain control. If they’re wrong, the consequences could be catastrophic.

Unlike remotely piloted drones where a human operator pulls the trigger, autonomous weapons make lethal decisions. Once activated, they process sensor data – facial recognition, heat signatures, movement patterns — to identify pre-programmed target profiles and fire automatically when they find a match. They act with no hesitation, no moral reflection and no understanding of the value of human life.

Speed and lack of hesitation give autonomous systems the potential to escalate conflicts rapidly. And because they work on the basis of pattern recognition and statistical probabilities, they bring enormous potential for lethal mistakes.

Israel’s assault on Gaza has offered the first glimpse of AI-assisted genocide. The Israeli military has deployed multiple algorithmic targeting systems: it uses Lavender and The Gospel to identify suspected Hamas militants and generate lists of human targets and infrastructure to bomb, and Where’s Daddy to track targets to kill them when they’re home with their families. Israeli intelligence officials have acknowledged an error rate of around 10 per cent, but simply priced it in, deeming 15 to 20 civilian deaths acceptable for every junior militant the algorithm identifies and over 100 for commanders.

The depersonalisation of violence also creates an accountability void. When an algorithm kills the wrong person, who’s responsible? The programmer? The commanding officer? The politician who authorised deployment? Legal uncertainty is a built-in feature that shields perpetrators from consequences. As decisions about life and death are made by machines, the very idea of responsibility dissolves.

These concerns emerge within a broader context of alarm about AI’s impacts on civic space and human rights. As the technology becomes cheaper, it’s proliferating across domains, from battlefields to border control to policing operations. AI-powered facial recognition technologies are amplifying surveillance capabilities and undermining privacy rights. Biases embedded in algorithms perpetuate exclusion based on gender, race and other characteristics.

As the technology has developed, the international community has spent over a decade discussing autonomous weapons without producing a binding regulation. Since 2013, when states that have adopted the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons agreed to begin discussions, progress has been glacial. The Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems has met regularly since 2017, yet talks have been systematically stalled by major military powers — India, Israel, Russia and the USA — taking advantage of the requirement to reach consensus to systematically block regulation proposals. In September, 42 states delivered a joint statement affirming their readiness to move forward. It was a breakthrough after years of deadlock, but major holdouts maintain their opposition.

To circumvent this obstruction, the UN General Assembly has taken matters into its hands. In December 2023, it adopted Resolution 78/241, its first on autonomous weapons, with 152 states voting in favour. In December 2024, Resolution 79/62 mandated consultations among member states, held in New York in May 2025. These discussions explored ethical dilemmas, human rights implications, security threats and technological risks. The UN Secretary-General, the International Committee of the Red Cross and numerous civil society organisations have called for negotiations to conclude by 2026, given the rapid development of military AI.

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a coalition of over 270 civil society groups from over 70 countries, has led the charge since 2012. Through sustained advocacy and research, the campaign has shaped the debate, advocating for a two-tier approach currently supported by over 120 states. This combines prohibitions on the most dangerous systems — those targeting humans directly, operating without meaningful human control, or whose effects can’t be adequately predicted — with strict regulations on all others. Those systems not banned would be permitted only under stringent restrictions requiring human oversight, predictability and clear accountability, including limits on types of targets, time and location restrictions, mandatory testing and requirements for human supervision with the ability to intervene.

If it’s to meet the deadline, the international community has just a year to conclude a treaty that a decade of talks has been unable to produce. With each passing month, autonomous weapons systems become more sophisticated, more widely deployed and more deeply embedded in military doctrine.

Once autonomous weapons are widespread and the idea that machines decide who lives and who dies becomes normalised, it will be much hard to impose regulations. States must urgently negotiate a treaty that prohibits autonomous weapons systems directly targeting humans or operating without meaningful human control and establishes clear accountability mechanisms for violations. The technology can’t be uninvented, but it can still be controlled.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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Residents travel by boat through flooded streets in Colombo after heavy rains from Cyclonic Storm Ditwah. Credit: UNICEF, Sri Lanka

By the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)
BANGKOK, Thailand, Dec 17 2025 (IPS)

Cyclones Ditwah and Senyar are indications of a shifting disaster riskscape, not anomalies. Both storms broke historical patterns: Ditwah tracked unusually south along Sri Lanka’s coast before looping into the Bay of Bengal, dumping over 375 mm of rain in 24 hours and triggering landslides.

Senyar, only the second cyclone ever recorded in the Strait of Malacca, intensified near the equator and stalled over Sumatra, worsening floods in Aceh and North Sumatra.

The rising human and economic toll

According to the ESCAP Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2025: Rising Heat, Rising Risk, the Asia-Pacific region is entering an era of cascading risks driven by intensifying heat and extreme weather with marine heatwaves and warmer sea surface temperatures fueling this new normal.

Historical low-risk zones like Sri Lanka’s central hills and Thailand’s southern strip are now climate-risk hotspots.

The report projects that in South and South-West Asia alone, average annual flood losses could increase from US$47 billion historically to 57 billion.

Across Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam, the storms of late November 2025 caused more than 1,600 fatalities, left hundreds of people unaccounted for, and affected well over ten million people.

Widespread flooding and landslides displaced 1.2 million people, disrupted essential services and isolated numerous communities, underscoring the scale of the response required and the substantial economic fallout expected

The value of preparedness

While improved early warnings have reduced loss of life compared to past decades, these storms show that disasters are becoming more destructive. Yes, early warnings saved lives—impact-based forecasts triggered mass evacuations and community drills helped families reach safety. But thousands were still stranded.

Alerts arrived, yet on-the-ground implementation was unclear, and some evacuation routes were already flooded. In many cases, social media became the lifeline when official systems fell short.

The trend is clear: technology alone cannot save lives without trust and rehearsed responses. Warnings work only when people know what to do and feel confident acting.

The ESCAP multi-donor Trust Fund for Tsunami, Disaster and Climate Preparedness shows that investing in preparedness pays off many times over. Its 2025–26 call for proposals offers countries a chance to strengthen coastal resilience, integrate science and technology and embed community-led action — before the next storm season tests our readiness.

The lessons we must learn

• Trusted local networks and well-equipped community-led preparedness efforts make alerts meaningful

Early warnings have their limits. In many areas, alerts were issued and hotlines opened, yet fast-rising floods left families stranded, relying on rescue teams and volunteers. These events show that mobility constraints and uneven household preparedness can limit action even when information is available.

Community-led initiatives, such as those championed following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, demonstrate how local knowledge and regular drills improve decision-making. Twenty years later, social cohesion has become a marker of resilience.

For example, the Bangladesh Cyclone Preparedness Programme (with 76,000 volunteers) has sharply reduced cyclone deaths by delivering house-to-house warnings and guiding evacuations.

• Urban growth without risk-informed planning magnifies disaster impacts

Ditwah and Senyar exposed how rapid urban growth without risk-informed planning magnifies disaster impacts. Colombo’s wetlands have shrunk by 40 per cent, while Hat Yai’s drainage was overwhelmed.

Many hard-hit towns in Sumatra were located in known landslide-risk zones, resulting in severe disruptions to hospitals, transport networks and local businesses.

When natural buffers disappear, rainfall that once drained slowly now floods cities within hours. Urban resilience depends on integrating risk into development planning by preserving wetlands, enforcing zoning and investing in drainage and flood defences.

Infrastructure alone is not enough; it must be designed for extremes. Cities that embed resilience into planning and protect natural systems are better positioned to withstand future storms and safeguard economic activity.

• Regional solidarity and shared solutions can save lives.

The Asia-Pacific region is faced with converging risks, with storms amplifying monsoonal hazards, cascading into mudslides and exacerbated by infrastructure weaknesses. Regional cooperation is no longer optional – it is the foundation for resilience in the most disaster-impacted region of the world.

November 2025 saw 8 countries (including Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand) activate the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters, enabling rapid satellite imagery for emergency planning, proving the value of shared systems (see figure).

As floodwaters surged across the region, participants at the ESCAP Committee on Disaster Risk Reduction reaffirmed their commitment to regional early warning systems and anticipatory action – because hazards do not respect borders.

The Asia-Pacific region’s resilience depends on investing in people and preparedness cultures, regional solidarity, urban planning for extremes, protecting natural buffers and ensuring that last-mile guidance reaches every household.

Building generations and societies equipped to manage rising risks is the smartest investment for a safer future.

Source: ESCAP

IPS UN Bureau

 

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A plan for a brand new road that should boost trade comes at a cost to some farmers.

Mohamed Salah's Liverpool row felt like "humiliation" for Egyptian fans, who are rallying behind their star man before the Africa Cup of Nations begins.

C'est de la coopération militaire à bas bruit, en mode contraint : petit pas, petit calibre, petit feu. Mais la France, sollicitée le dimanche 7 décembre par le gouvernement du Bénin, sur la côte ouest africaine, aux prises avec une tentative de putsch, a admis avoir accordé au régime de Cotonou un appui présenté comme ponctuel et « strictement technique ». Voire un peu plus. Le signe d'un retour vers l'Afrique par la petite porte, après en avoir été chassée ces dernières années ?

- Défense en ligne

The US accuses Rwanda of backing the rebel advance in breach of a deal brokered by President Trump.

Former South Africa women's captain Lusanda Dumke dies after being diagnosed with a rare gastric cancer.

Sahrawi refugees walk near the Awserd Refugee Camp in the Tindouf Province of Algeria. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, India, Dec 16 2025 (IPS)

The global refugee system is entering a period of deep strain. The delivery of protection and assistance is undergoing a transformation due to funding cuts, institutional reforms, and shifting donor priorities.

Against this backdrop, a new Global Synthesis Report titled From the Ground Up highlights the many issues faced by refugees in the Middle East and Africa.

Regional Perspectives on Advancing the Global Compact on Refugees has highlighted a rare, refugee-centered assessment of what is working, what is failing, and what must change. The report draws on regional roundtables held in East Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, followed by a global consultation in Geneva, to feed into the 2025 Global Refugee Forum progress review

According to the report, refugee-led and community-based organizations are increasingly taking on responsibilities, but they are not receiving power, funding, or legal recognition. As international agencies scale back under what is being called the Humanitarian Reset and UN80 reforms, refugees are expected to fill widening gaps without the authority or resources required to do so safely and sustainably.

The East Africa roundtables, held in Kampala with participation from refugee organizations in Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, highlight a region often praised for progressive refugee policies. Countries here host millions displaced by conflict, hunger, and climate stress from South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Laws and regional frameworks promise freedom of movement, inclusion in national systems, and meaningful participation. The lived reality, however, remains uneven.

Education emerged as a central concern. Refugee children are enrolling in schools at higher rates, especially where they have been integrated into government-aided systems. Yet access remains unequal. Refugee students struggle to have prior qualifications recognized.

Many are treated as international students at universities and charged higher fees. Refugee teachers, often qualified and experienced, receive lower pay than nationals or are excluded from formal recognition. Language barriers and lack of psychosocial support further undermine learning outcomes. Refugee-led groups are already stepping in with mentorship, counseling, and bursary support, but they do so with fragile funding and limited reach.

Documentation and freedom of movement form another critical fault line. Uganda is widely cited for its rapid issuance of refugee IDs and settlement-based approach. Kenya and Ethiopia have made progress through new refugee laws and policy reforms. Still, gaps between policy and practice persist. Refugees in urban areas remain undocumented in large numbers. Identity documents often have short validity, forcing repeated renewals.

Travel documents are difficult to obtain, especially in Ethiopia, limiting cross-border movement, livelihoods, and participation in regional or global policy forums. Without documentation, refugees face arrest, harassment, and exclusion from services. For refugee organizations, lack of legal registration means operating in constant uncertainty.

Access to justice, described in the report as one of the least discussed yet most pivotal issues, cuts across all others. Refugees cannot claim rights or seek redress without functioning justice pathways. Language barriers in courts, xenophobic profiling, and lack of legal aid remain common.

Refugee-led organizations already provide mediation, paralegal support, and court accompaniment, often acting as the first point of contact between communities and authorities. Yet their work is rarely formalized or funded at scale.

These findings came alive during a webinar held at the launch of the report, where refugee leaders from different regions spoke directly about their experiences. One participant from East Africa reflected on repeated engagement in international forums. This event was his third such process, following meetings in Uganda and Gambia. He noted that participation was no longer symbolic. Governments and institutions were beginning to listen more closely.

He pointed to concrete differences across countries. In Kenya, refugees do not require exit visas. In Ethiopia, they do. Sharing such comparisons, he argued, helps governments rethink restrictive practices and adapt lessons from neighbors.

From the Middle East and North Africa, the discussion shifted to documentation and access to justice. A Jordan-based lawyer explained that civil documentation is not mere paperwork. It is the foundation of rights and accountability. Without birth registration, children cannot access education.

Without legally recognized marriages, women and children remain unprotected. Many Syrian refugees arrived in Jordan without documents, having lost them during flight or lacking legal awareness. Over time, Jordan introduced measures such as fee waivers, legal aid, and even Sharia courts inside camps like Zaatari to facilitate birth and marriage registration. Civil society groups have provided thousands of consultations and legal representations, bridging gaps between refugees and state systems.

The webinar also highlighted language as a structural barrier. In Jordan, Arabic serves as a common language for Syrians, easing communication. In East Africa, linguistic diversity complicates access to justice and services. Uganda hosts South Sudanese, Sudanese, and Congolese refugees, each with distinct languages, while official processes operate in English and Kiswahili. Governments have made efforts to provide interpretation, but gaps remain, particularly in courts and police interactions.

In Ethiopia, where Amharic dominates official institutions, refugee organizations often rely on founders or leaders who speak the language fluently, limiting broader participation.

As the conversation turned to the future of the humanitarian system, the tone grew more urgent. Participants acknowledged that funding cuts have already halted programs and exposed vulnerabilities. One speaker stressed that legal aid and documentation cannot be seen as optional sectors.

Without sustained support, entire protection systems risk collapse. Empowerment, he argued, goes beyond providing lawyers. It means building refugees’ confidence and capacity to navigate legal systems themselves.

Another participant addressed donors and UN agencies directly. Localization, he said, will fail if refugee organizations are treated only as implementers of predesigned projects. Power must shift alongside responsibility.

Refugee organizations should help design programs, raise resources, and make decisions based on community priorities. Otherwise, localization becomes another layer of outsourcing rather than a genuine transfer of agency.

The speaker’s final intervention starkly highlighted the stakes involved. With funding shrinking and uncertainty growing, refugees may soon have no option but to rely on themselves. Investing in refugee-led organizations, the speaker said, is not a luxury. This represents the final line of hope for refugees on the ground.

The MENA roundtables echo many of these concerns but in a more restrictive political context. Civic space is tighter. Legal recognition for refugee organizations is often impossible or risky. In Jordan, refugees cannot legally register organizations. In Egypt, civil society laws limit advocacy.

In Türkiye, registration is technically possible but bureaucratically daunting. Despite this, refugee-led initiatives have multiplied, filling gaps in education, protection, and livelihoods as international actors retreat.

The report warns of a dangerous paradox. Localization is advancing by necessity, not design. International agencies withdraw. Local actors step in. Yet funding, decision-making, and protection remain centralized. Refugee organizations absorb risk without safeguards. Participation is often tokenistic. Refugees are present in meetings but absent from real influence.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Excerpt:

A new global synthesis report and refugee voices from East Africa and the Middle East warn that reductions in humanitarian footprints risks breaking the refugee protection system.

Victor Osimhen is described as a striker "on another level" by team-mate Frank Onyeka ahead of Nigeria's bid to win the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations.

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres addresses the high-level pledging event on the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) 2026. Credit: UN Photo/Mark Garten

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Dec 16 2025 (IPS)

2025 has been an especially turbulent year for humanitarian aid operations as global aid budgets have experienced record declines in funding. As conflicts, environmental disasters, and economic crises intensify and disproportionately impact the world’s most vulnerable communities, the resources available in global emergency funds are falling far short of rapidly growing needs.

For 2026, humanitarian agencies project that even more people may be left without critical support if funding gaps continue to widen. In response, the United Nations (UN) and its partners are urgently calling on the international community to mobilize increased support for its Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) at an annual pledging event to commemorate the fund’s 20th anniversary on December 12.

“The humanitarian system’s tank is running on empty – with millions of lives hanging in the balance,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres. “This is a moment when we are asked to do more and more, with less and less. This is simply unsustainable.”

According to figures from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA ), the UN aims to save 87 million lives next year, which will require approximately USD 23 billion in funding. In addition, the agency seeks to raise about USD 33 billion to support 135 million people across 50 countries through 23 national aid operations, along with six additional operations dedicated to refugees and migrants.

Despite the urgent global need for increased support, funding for humanitarian appeals has faltered more steeply than ever before, with contributions for budgets at the lowest levels recorded in decades. The appeal for 2025, which called for USD 12 billion, reached roughly 25 million less people than the previous year.

OCHA recorded a multitude of immediate consequences around the world– including an exacerbation of the global hunger crisis, increasingly strained health systems to the point of near collapse, the erosion of critical education programs, and a considerable blow to protection services for vulnerable displaced communities facing protracted armed conflicts. In some contexts, it has been increasingly dangerous for aid workers, with more than 320 killed this year amid what officials describe as an “utter disregard for the laws of war”.

“So when we’re needed at full strength, the warning lights are flashing,” said Tom Fletcher, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. “It’s not just a funding gap – it’s an operational emergency. And if the CERF falters, then the world’s emergency service will falter. And the people who rely on us will suffer.”

With resources in desperately short supply, the UN and its partners have been forced to scale back certain lifesaving services to prioritize others, leaving urgent humanitarian crises critically underfunded. Due to these strategic allocations, the UN has been largely unable to assist numerous displaced communities fleeing from conflict in Darfur, Sudan– which has been described as “the epicenter of human suffering.”

“As you’ve heard and as you know, the brutal cuts that we’re experiencing have forced us to make brutal choices, a ruthless triage of human survival,” Fletcher added. “This is what it means when we put power before solidarity and compassion.”

UN officials also underscored the extreme importance of CERF, as the fund has acted as a lifeline for vulnerable communities around the world for decades, delivering over USD 10 billion worth of aid in more than 110 countries since 2006. Through these efforts, CERF has acted as a “rapid and strategic” source of financing that reached struggling civilians before other sources, saving countless lives.

According to Guterres, “in many places, CERF has made the difference between life-saving help and no help at all.” Earlier this year, when humanitarian operations were allowed to resume in the Gaza Strip, CERF helped deliver vital fuel supplies to hospitals, restore water and sanitation systems, and reinforce other essential lifesaving services.

In 2025, CERF invested nearly USD 212 million to sustain relief efforts across underfunded crises. The UN also announced an additional allocation of USD 100 million to meet critical needs—including those of women and girls—in severe crises in Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Haiti, Myanmar, Mozambique, Syria, among others.

To date, CERF has supported millions of people across 30 countries and territories through a total allocation of USD 435 million. These funds have ensured the scale-up of humanitarian efforts in Gaza following the implementation of the ceasefire, and provided critical assistance to those fleeing armed conflict in Darfur.

These efforts by CERF solidify the center of the “humanitarian reset” that the UN foresees for 2026. “And that’s why the Humanitarian Reset matters: not a slogan, but a challenge to us all,” added Fletcher. “A mission, but also a survival strategy for the work we do and for so many people. It’s about being smarter, faster, closer to the communities we serve, more honest about the difficult trade-offs that we face. Making every dollar count for those we serve.”

The UN’s largest individual humanitarian response plan in 2026 will focus on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which requires roughly USD 4.1 billion to assist roughly 3 million people who have experienced catastrophic levels of violence and destruction. Other response efforts will target Sudan—the world’s largest displacement crisis—which requires USD 2.9 billion to assist 20 million people, and Syria, which requires USD 2.8 billion to help 8.6 million people.

With funding for CERF at its lowest projected levels in over a decade, the UN seeks a funding target of USD 1 billion, and will begin appealing to its member states for support. Countries are also being urged to use their influence to bolster protection measures for civilians and humanitarian workers, as well as to reinforce accountability mechanisms for perpetrators of armed violence.

“We have to imagine, even now, in this tough moment for humanitarian funding, what the next 20 years could look like with a fully funded CERF,” said Fletcher. “A fund that makes the UN faster, smarter, more cost-effective, greener, more anticipatory, more inclusive. A fund that amplifies the voices of communities and proves that solidarity still works. Backed by a movement of citizens who believe in that solidarity.”

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Europe’s push to shift asylum procedures to third countries risks outsourcing not only refugees, but also its moral and political responsibility.

By Judith Kohlenberger
VIENNA, Austria, Dec 16 2025 (IPS)

The debate on reforming the European asylum system has gained significant momentum following the agreement reached by EU interior ministers last week. Alongside questions of solidarity and distribution, the possibility of establishing ‘return hubs’ outside the EU was at the heart of the meeting.

Outsourcing asylum procedures – or at least those concerning rejected asylum seekers – has long been a desire of many heads of state and government, and the European Commission now aims to make this possible by creating the necessary legal foundations, for example by scrapping the so-called connection criterion. In future, rejected asylum seekers would therefore no longer need to demonstrate a personal link to the third country to which they are transferred.

Previously, such links included earlier stays or family members living there. Yet the EU remains a long way from concrete implementation.

One reason is the high cost of such outsourcing projects. According to the UK’s National Audit Office, the British Rwanda deal cost the equivalent of more than €800 million, with limited effect: only four asylum seekers were relocated over two years.

Under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the plan was shelved for good due to excessive costs and minimal benefit. And despite the heated migration debate in the United Kingdom, a revival appears unlikely. Denmark faced a similar situation with its own Rwanda plans, which the country put on hold in 2023 due to unfeasibility. And then there is the much-cited Italy–Albania agreement, whose original idea – conducting asylum procedures under Italian law on Albanian soil – was never implemented.

Practical implementation remains doubtful

What third countries gain from allowing such outsourcing on their territory is obvious: money, and even more importantly, political capital. Speaking on a panel at the ‘Time to Decide Europe’ conference organised by the Vienna-based ERSTE Foundation, Albania’s Prime Minister and Socialist Edi Rama stated openly that his small country of just under three million people must join any alliance willing to take it in.

This includes – and above all – the EU. For Albania, which is an EU candidate country, it therefore makes sense to appear accommodating to a not insignificant member state with which it is also historically closely connected, and to help solve its unpopular ‘migration question’, at least to the extent that refugees arriving in Italy do receive protection, but, in practice, ‘not in my backyard’.

So far, however, this principle has not been put into action due to objections raised by Italian courts. That is also why – and to put the costly asylum camps built in the Albanian towns of Shëngjin and Gjadër (construction and operations are believed to have already cost hundreds of millions of euros) to some use – the European Commission created the option of return hubs, which were formally adopted last week at the meeting of EU ministers.

Italy can therefore repurpose the facilities originally intended for asylum procedures as deportation centres for asylum seekers who were already on Italian territory and whose applications have been legally rejected. Here too, the number of cases remains limited, and it is unclear on what legal basis those transferred there could be held for extended periods to prevent them from re-entering the EU via Montenegro and Bosnia. De facto detention, however, would present yet another legal complication, even if the connection criterion and other EU-law barriers are removed.

Anyone striving for ‘fair burden-sharing’ would have to redistribute towards Europe, not away from it.

There is, therefore, still a long way to go before any concrete return hubs become reality. Not only because, in the usual trilogue process, the European Parliament must also give its approval — and some MEPs, including Birgit Sippel of the Socialists and Democrats group, have already announced their opposition.

But even if a parliamentary majority can be secured, the practical implementation remains doubtful: where are the trustworthy and willing third countries; how can infrastructure be built there; how can respect for human rights standards be monitored and enforced from Europe (which proves difficult even within an EU member state such as Hungary); and how should looming legal disputes be handled?

Among the countries mentioned so far are several that themselves regularly appear among the places of origin of refugees arriving in Europe. Alongside Rwanda, the East African state of Uganda is frequently cited; it already hosts the largest number of refugees from other parts of Africa, especially from Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Like Rwanda, it lies directly next to regional conflict zones; the protection rate for Ugandan nationals in European host countries stands at around 60 per cent.

The country is considered authoritarian — and precisely for that reason, it has an interest in striking an outsourcing deal with EU member states, such as the one it has already concluded with the Netherlands. Such an agreement implicitly acknowledges and legitimises the Ugandan government.

The notorious EU–Turkey Statement of 2016 demonstrated how refugees accommodated in third countries can repeatedly be used as leverage in foreign policy disputes, for example when Prime Minister Erdoğan had them bussed to the Greek border to put pressure on the EU. EU strategists may euphemistically call this ‘migration diplomacy’, but for the layperson, it is simply blackmail.

The example of Uganda illustrates not only how Europe, through deals with third countries, outsources not just refugees but also bargaining power and control; it also reflects the fundamental imbalance in a one-sided debate on externalisation.

Already today, 71 per cent of all refugees find protection in developing and emerging countries, with 66 per cent hosted in neighbouring countries in the Global South or the Middle East and North Africa. Anyone striving for ‘fair burden-sharing’ would therefore have to redistribute towards Europe, not away from it.

Europe’s answer cannot, under any circumstances, be to emulate the Trump administration by resorting to ever-tougher asylum policies.

This leads to the fundamental questions that EU policymakers appear increasingly unwilling to ask, let alone answer: How does Europe want to position itself in future with regard to global refugee protection? How will people in need of protection from persecution – whose numbers are rising in an ever more unstable world – gain access to that protection?

How can the liberal post-war order be preserved, including and especially the Geneva Conventions, which were created in response to the lessons of the two World Wars and the Shoah? How should Europe position itself vis-à-vis an increasingly illiberal, in parts authoritarian United States, which now tends to view Europe more as an adversary than a partner?

A confident response to the new US national security strategy – which claims that migration threatens Europe with ‘civilisational erasure’ – must lie in emphasising Europe’s civilisational achievements since 1945. These include, above all, the prohibition of torture enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights: it applies absolutely, and therefore also to asylum seekers who are obliged to leave and who may not be deported to countries where they risk inhuman treatment. This is precisely where the line between civilisation and barbarism lies.

Furthermore, a united Europe that wants to stand its ground against attacks from former allies must recognise societal diversity as one of its strengths, and acknowledge the indispensable contribution that migrants – from guest workers and refugees to highly skilled expats – have made to Europe’s reconstruction and prosperity.

Europe’s answer cannot, under any circumstances, be to emulate the Trump administration by resorting to ever-tougher asylum policies that effectively validate the American assessment.

For that would indeed amount to an obliteration — an obliteration of the founding idea of a united, open and liberal Europe which, let us not forget, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 and stands for a rules-based order that has ensured decades of peace as well as economic prosperity. In short: for the very life that we are fortunate enough to enjoy day after day, in diversity, security and freedom.

Dr Judith Kohlenberger heads the FORM research institute at WU Vienna and is affiliated with the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, the Jacques Delors Centre Berlin and the Einstein Centre Digital Future. Her book Das Fluchtparadox (The Flight Paradox) was named Austrian Science Book of the Year in 2023 and nominated for the German Non-Fiction Prize. Her most recent publication is Migrationspanik (Migration Panic) (2025).

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS), Brussels, Belgium

IPS UN Bureau

 

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By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Kuhaneetha Bai Kalaicelvan
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Dec 16 2025 (IPS)

The new US National Security Strategy (NSS) repositions the superpower’s role in the world. Hence, foreign policy will be mainly driven by considerations of ‘making America great again’ (MAGA).

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Changing course
The new NSS no longer presumes US world leadership and alliances based on values. It breaks with earlier post-Cold War foreign policy, upsetting those committed to its sovereigntist unipolar world.

Quietly released on December 4, it is certainly not an easily forgettable update of long-established positions, cloaked in obscure bureaucratic and diplomatic parlance.

Mainly drafted under the leadership of ‘neo-con’ Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio, it is already seen as the most significant document of Trump 2.0.

It asserts, “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” Instead, foreign policy should now prioritise advancing US interests.

New priorities
The NSS implies the US will no longer be the world’s policeman. Instead, it will exercise power selectively, prioritising transactional rather than strategic considerations.

It emphasises economic strength as key to national security, rebuilding industrial capacity, securing supply chains and ensuring the US never relies on others for critical materials.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

Even if the Supreme Court overrules the President’s tariffs, the US has already secured many concessions from governments fearful of their likely adverse impacts.

The NSS is ostensibly based on MAGA considerations involving immigration control, hemispheric dominance, and cultural ethno-chauvinism.

Mainstream commentators complain it lacks the supposedly enlightened values underlying foreign policy in the US-dominated world order after the Second World War.

They complain the new NSS is narrow in focus, redefining interests, and sharing power. Its stance and tone are said to be more 19th-century than 21st-century.

Besides pragmatic imperatives, mixed messages may be due to unsatisfactory compromises among rival factions in Trump’s administration.

MAGA foreign policy
Long-term observers see the NSS as unprecedented and blatantly ideological.

White supremacist ideology influences not only national cultural politics but also foreign policy. The NSS unapologetically promotes Judaeo-Christian chauvinism despite the constitutional separation of church from state.

MAGA’s ‘America First’ priority is evident throughout. Border security is crucial as immigration is deemed the primary national security concern.

For Samuel Huntington, immigration threatens the US by making it less WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant).

The NSS blames social and economic breakdown on immigration. Inflows into the Western Hemisphere, not just the US, must be urgently stopped by all available means.

Ironically, the US has long been a nation of immigrants, with relatively more immigrants than any European country. Its non-white numbers are almost equal to whites.

Trump’s neocolonial interpretation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine emphasises the Americas as the new foreign policy priority.

Foreign rivals must not be allowed to acquire strategic assets, ports, mines, or infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly to keep China out.

Trump’s NSS prioritises the Western Hemisphere, with Asia second. Africa receives three paragraphs, primarily for its minerals.

Europe is downgraded to third, due to its ostensible immigration-induced civilizational decline. Surprisingly, the NSS urges halting North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion.

China near peer!
The NSS policy on China is widely viewed as unexpectedly restrained. China remains a priority, but is no longer its primary antagonist; it is now a peer competitor.

Now, the US must rebalance its economic relationship with China based on mutually beneficial reciprocity, fairness, and the resurgence of US manufacturing.

The US will continue to work with allies to limit China’s growth and technological progress. However, China is allowed to develop green technologies due to US disinterest.

Meanwhile, US hawks have ensured a military ‘overmatch’ for Taiwan. The NSS emphasises Taiwan’s centrality to Indo-Pacific security and world chip production.

The NSS warns China would gain access to the Second Island Chain if it captured Taiwan, reshaping regional power and threatening vital US trade routes.

With allied support, the US military will seek to contain China within the First Island Chain. However, Taiwan fears US support will wane after TSMC chip production moves to the US.

The NSS expects the ‘Quad’ of the US, Australia, Japan and India to enhance Indo-Pacific security. For Washington, only India can balance China in Asia, and is hence crucial to contain China in the long term.

Regional reordering
The NSS also downgrades the Middle East (ME). Conditions that once made the region important have changed.

The ME’s importance stemmed from its petroleum and Western guilt over Israel. Now, the US has become a significant oil and gas exporter.

Critically, the US strike on Iran in mid-2025 is believed to have set back Tehran’s nuclear programme.

The ME seems unlikely to continue to drive US strategic planning as it has over the last half-century. For the US, the region is now expected to be a major investor.

As US foreign policy is redefined, the world worries. The ME has been downgraded as Latin America has become the new frontline region.

Much has happened in less than a year of Trump 2.0, with little clear or consistent pattern of continuity or change from his first term. But policies have also been quickly reversed or revised.

While the NSS is undoubtedly important and indicative, it would be presumptuous to think it will actually determine policy over the next three years, or even in the very near future.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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A snowy Christmas might be something that fades into a memory in many places if we don't avoid severe climate change. Credit: Shutterstock

By Philippe Benoit
WASHINGTON DC, Dec 15 2025 (IPS)

As each Christmas approaches, one song permeates the airwaves across the United States and elsewhere: White Christmas. According to the Guiness Book of World Records, “White Christmas” is the #1 selling physical single of all times with over 50 million copies sold.

Many know those iconic opening lyrics:

“I’m dreaming of a white Christmas,
Just like the ones I used to know.”

This American holiday classic, written by Irving Berlin and recorded by Bing Crosby in 1942 during the depths of World War II, conveyed in its time the nostalgia of a simpler past and the hope for a better future.

But contexts change and, with them, so can meanings. Today, we face a new and different type of global menace, severe climate change which, according to a recent World Economic Forum report, could result in an additional 14.5 million deaths and $12.5 trillion in economic losses by 2050.

What might soon stand out most about the lyrics of White Christmas is the nostalgia for an earlier period when there was actually snow on the ground in late December, an experience which is now projected to become rarer in many regions because of climate change.

Obviously, not this December 2025 in the United States which is living through the blistering cold of a polar vortex. But other parts of the globe are seeing their warmest December in decades amidst what is set to be the world’s second hottest year on record as atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations driven by greenhouse gas emissions track upwards, altering our climate.

And while there may be Christmas snow on the ground in 2026 or 2027 or 2028, that would, according to current climate predictions, become rarer and rarer over the medium to longer term. A snowy Christmas might be something that fades into a memory in many places if we don’t avoid severe climate change.

As a result, the song White Christmas presently conveys a new message. Those lyrics originally written to invoke a feeling of nostalgia and hope should now be read more literally. “I am dreaming of a white Christmas, just like the ones I used to know” is a warning about the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the aberrations and destruction that severe climate change would cause.

White Christmas, this holiday classic from the past, should today be heard as a clarion call for climate change action.

Philippe Benoit is managing director at Global Infrastructure Advisory Services 2050 specializing in climate change.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

One of the European Parliament’s most important priorities is to ensure all EU policy promotes respect for people’s fundamental freedoms and human rights. Parliament has therefore awarded its Sakharov Prize to individuals and organisations making a remarkable effort to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms since 1988. Previous laureates include Nelson Mandela, Alexei Navalny and Malala Yousafzai.

This year, the Parliament awards its Sakharov Prize to individuals who show great personal courage in defending these freedoms and rights: Andrzej Poczobut of Belarus and Mzia Amaglobeli of Georgia, journalists who have fought for democracy in their respective countries. Both have been imprisoned for standing up for freedom of expression and democratic values. The Sakharov Prize award ceremony takes place during Parliament’s December plenary session.

The award is named in honour of Andrei Sakharov, the eminent Soviet nuclear physicist, dissident, human rights advocate and recipient of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize. Indeed, several of the laureates have gone on to win the Nobel Peace Prize –including María Corina Machado, Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad.

Parliament’s political groups and individual Members (at least 40) nominate the candidates at a joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Development Committee and the Human Rights Subcommittee each September. The Parliament publishes a shortlist of three candidates in October and the Conference of Presidents selects the winner. Parliament then awards the prize at a plenary session at the end of the year. The prize confers an endowment of €50 000 on the winner, and the Sakharov network supports laureates in their efforts to defend their cause. When awarding the Prize, Parliament, through the voice of its President, usually calls for jailed laureates’ release from prison. Parliament also uses all the means in its parliamentary diplomacy toolbox to protect laureates from state repression and to keep human rights defenders’ struggle in the spotlight.

The Sakharov Prize therefore has a long history, featuring many distinguished names in the struggle to protect human rights and freedoms for all. Since 2014, the European Parliamentary Research Service produces a paper on the laureates of each prize, the human rights situation and the Parliament’s position. These papers are available in several EU languages:

A concerning deterioration in the human rights situation In Venezuela and election irregularities under the Maduro regime led to María Corina Machado, leader of Venezuela’s democratic forces, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia winning the 2024 Sakharov Prize. The second time the prize has been awarded to Venezuela’s democratic opposition activists (the first time was in 2017), they represent all Venezuelans both inside and outside the country who are fighting to restore freedom and democracy.

In 2023, following the murder of Jina Mahsa Amini’s by Iran’s security forces for her refusal to wear a hijab, and repression of women’s rights protesters in Iran, Parliament awarded the 2023 Sakharov Prize to Jina Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in Iran in support of the protesters’ aspirations for a free, stable, inclusive and democratic country.

The brave people of Ukraine have fought hard and sacrificed a great deal to protect their country from Russia’s aggression. A number of individuals and organisations were awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize in recognition of their resistance to Russian attack.

Political repression was already intensifying in Russia in 2021. To honour his courageous defence of human rights and democratic freedoms despite severe personal risk and his imprisonment for his anti‑corruption activism and criticism of the Kremlin, Parliament awarded the 2021 Sakharov Prize to opposition leader Alexey Navalny. Parliament strongly condemned Navalny’s murder in 2024 and underlined that the Russian Government and Vladimir Putin should personally bear criminal and political responsibility for the death of their most prominent opponent.

Following contested presidential election in Belarus and a severe crackdown on peaceful protests, Parliament awarded the 2020 Sakharov Prize to the democratic opposition in Belarus, represented by the Coordination Council, in tribute to their courage and determination to resist repression and advance democratic freedoms.

In 2019, in response to escalating repression against Uyghur minorities and civil society activists in China, the Parliament awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize to Uyghur economics professor Ilham Tohti, in recognition of his advocacy for ethnic minority rights and peaceful dialogue. Tohti remains in prison in China, serving a life sentence.

Parliament awarded the 2018 Sakharov Prize to Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, imprisoned on politically motivated charges against the backdrop of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Parliament aimed to spotlight Sentsov’s plight and underscore broader concerns about political prisoners and human‑rights abuses in Russian‑controlled territories.

Amid a severe erosion of democratic institutions and repression of political freedoms in Venezuela, the European Parliament awarded the 2017 Sakharov Prize to the Democratic Opposition in Venezuela, notably the National Assembly and political prisoners, in support of their struggle for democratic transition, human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms.

The 2016 Sakharov Prize was awarded to Nadia Murad Basee Taha and Lamiya Aji Bashar to highlight the fate of their people, the Yazidis, one of the communities most affected, in proportion to their total population, by the violence committed by ISIL/Da’esh (or ‘Islamic State’), particularly during the conflict in Syria.

Saudi Arabian blogger, Raif Badawi was awarded the 2015 Sakharov Prize following his arrest and sentence to 10 years in prison, 1 000 lashes and a hefty fine for insulting Islam (his site hosted material criticising senior religious figures and a Saudi university). In his writings, Badawi advocates liberal Islam, freedom of thought and expression, and separation of state and religion.

Europe’s top human rights prize was awarded in 2014 to Dr Denis Mukwege, a gynaecologist from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in recognition for his perseverance and courage in his efforts to help rape survivors. A fervent advocate of women’s rights, Dr Mukwege has received many international awards, but has also been the target of death threats, and even a 2012 assassination attempt.

Any AI-generated content in this text has been reviewed by the author.

More information on the Sakharov Prize and the laureates:

• 30 Years of the Sakharov Prize: The European Parliament upholding freedom of thought
• Sakharov’s legacy on the centenary of his birth
• Laureates of the 2025 Sakharov Prize: Andrzej Poczobut and Mzia Amaglobeli, journalists fighting for democracy in Belarus and Georgia
• Sakharov Prize laureates in difficulty: Facing repression for defending human rights
• Laureates of the 2024 Sakharov Prize: María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, fighting for democracy in Venezuela
• 2023 Sakharov Prize laureate: Jina Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in Iran
• 2022 Sakharov Prize laureate: The brave people of Ukraine
• 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate: Alexey Navalny
• 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate: The democratic opposition in Belarus
• 2019 Sakharov Prize laureate: Ilham Tohti
• Oleg Sentsov: The 2018 Sakharov Prize laureate
• The 2017 Sakharov Prize
• The Yazidis: An ongoing genocide
• The 2015 Sakharov Prize
• Sakharov Prize 2014: Tending the scars of sexual violence in DRCEuropean Parliament Sakharov Prize

Currently, more than half of all countries and areas worldwide have a fertility rate below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Dec 15 2025 (IPS)

Will low fertility rates return to the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman any time soon? A simple answer to this vital demographic question is: unlikely.

A detailed answer about future fertility rates involves the complex interaction of various economic, social, developmental, cultural, and personal factors that influence fertility levels.

Among those factors are economic insecurity, financial pressures, marriage rates, childbearing ages, child mortality levels, contraceptive use, higher education, labor force participation, lifestyle choices, personal goals, concerns about the future, and finding a suitable spouse or partner for family life.

During the recent past, the world’s fertility rate declined significantly from 5.3 births per woman in 1963 to 2.3 births in 2023.

Currently, more than half of all countries and areas worldwide have a fertility rate below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. Among these low fertility countries are the world’s ten largest national economies (Figure 1).

 

Source: United Nations.

 

In contrast to countries with low fertility rates, sub-Saharan African countries have high fertility rates. Together these countries account for about one-third of the world’s current annual births, with that proportion projected to increase to nearly 40% by the mid-century.

Currently, two dozen countries in sub-Saharan Africa have fertility rates of 4 or more births per woman, with half of them having rates of 5 or more births per woman. Some of these countries, such as Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia, have the world’s highest fertility rates at about 6 births per woman (Figure 2).

 

Source: United Nations.

 

In countries with low fertility, many young adults choose to prioritize economic security over starting a family. This shift in priorities reflects the financial burden that comes with household expenses, such as housing, food, transportation, childcare, and education.

The average annual costs of raising a child can vary significantly from country to country because of differences in income, family structures, living expenses, and government subsidies. However, couples generally perceive raising children as a challenging and costly endeavor, given the expenses associated with housing, food, childcare, and education.

Besides the increasing age at which couples are choosing to marry, there has been a global decline in early childbearing. In more developed regions and in many less developed countries, such as China and India, the mean age of childbearing has risen by approximately three years since 1995.

Decreases in teenage pregnancies have also played a role in contributing to low fertility rates in many countries. For example, between 1994 and 2024, the worldwide adolescent birth rate declined from 74 to 38 births per 1,000 females aged 15 to 19 years.

Considering recent global trends and significant economic, social, developmental, cultural, and personal factors, it appears unlikely that today’s low fertility rates will return to the replacement level any time soon

In addition to delaying childbearing, many women are having fewer babies, with a significant number choosing not to have children at all. Although figures vary by region and generation, childlessness levels are rising, with approximately 40% or more of women by age 30 in developed countries remaining childless.

Using contraceptive methods is another significant contributor to low fertility rates. Various contraceptive options are available to prevent unintended pregnancy, including temporary or reversible and permanent methods. Worldwide, about half of women of reproductive age in 2022 were estimated to be using contraceptives, with 90% of them using a modern contraceptive method.

Higher education and increased female labor force participation are two additional factors contributing to low fertility rates. These factors raise the opportunity costs of childbearing, encourage delayed marriage and childbearing, and shift personal life priorities to career and personal development.

Over the past fifty years, the enrollment of women in higher education has increased worldwide. Women currently make up the majority of higher education students in 114 countries, while men out-number women in 57 countries. With respect to earning a bachelor’s degree, women have reached parity with men.

In many low fertility countries, there has a notable rise in the number of women joining the workforce. This trend is clear in more developed nations, where the percentage of economically active women has seen a significant increase in recent times. For instance, in Spain, the proportion of women in the labor force has more than doubled over the last fifty years, growing from around one in four to over half.

Another major factor contributing to low fertility rates is the significant global declines in infant and child mortality. Over the past fifty years, the global infant mortality rate has decreased from approximately 90 deaths per 1,000 births to 27 deaths and the mortality rate of children under age 5 has decreased from 132 deaths per 1,000 live births to 36 deaths.

Because of low fertility rates, many countries are experiencing more deaths than births, resulting in negative rates of population growth. These sustained negative rates of population growth are leading to population decline and demographic ageing.

The governments of many low fertility countries are implementing pro-natalist policies, incentives, and programs to increase birth rates. While these policies and programs may have some success in increasing low fertility rates slightly, historical data show that once a fertility rate drops below the replacement level, particularly to 1.5 births per woman or less, it remains low.

Population projections for countries with low fertility rates do not expect a return to the replacement level in the near future.

The world’s fertility rate is expected to continue declining throughout the 21st century. By 2100, the global fertility rate is projected to be below the replacement level at 1.8 births per woman.

The country population projections made by national governments and international organizations assume that fertility rates will remain below the replacement level. Consequently, many countries are projected to experience population decline by the mid-century (Figure 3).

 

Source: United Nations.

 

In 50 countries and areas, immigration is expected to help reduce the projected population decline caused by low fertility rates. However, without international migration, some countries, like Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are also projected to see a decrease in population by 2050.

While many countries are experiencing a demographic struggle over international migration, the proportions of immigrants in these countries are reaching record highs. In the European Union, for example, the proportion of the foreign-born population is about 14%, a significant increase from 10% in 2010.

Similarly, in the United States, the foreign-born proportion is at a record high of nearly 16%, several times greater than the low of 5% in 1970. Additionally, in Canada, the foreign-born proportion has risen to a record high of close to a quarter of its population, surpassing the previous record of 22% in 1921. Australia also has a significant foreign-born population, especially recently from India and China, reaching close to a third of its population, substantially higher than the 24% in 2004.

Along with population declines, coupled in many instances with increased immigration, countries are also experiencing demographic ageing. The once youthful populations of the recent past are now being replaced by much older populations with increasing proportions of these individuals in retirement. Once again, as with population decline, the projected populations of many countries by the middle of the century would be older without international migration (Figure 4).

 

Source: United Nations.

 

In summary, considering recent global trends and significant economic, social, developmental, cultural, and personal factors, it appears unlikely that today’s low fertility rates will return to the replacement level any time soon.

As a result, ongoing low fertility rates are leading to population decline, demographic ageing, and, in many instances, the politically contentious issue of increased levels of the foreign-born population. Instead of hoping for a return to the demographics of the recent past, countries need to recognize the probable future demographics and confront the many challenges that arise from them.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population matters.

Benin arrive at the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations in Morocco looking to turn 2026 World Cup qualification heartbreak into a memorable continental campaign.

By Reylynne Dela Paz
MANILA, Philippines, Dec 15 2025 (IPS)

A global crackdown on civic freedoms is intensifying – and women are on the frontlines of the attack. CIVICUS’s 2025 People Power Under Attack report analyses the extent to which freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly are being respected or violated. The report reveals that people in 83 countries now live in conditions where their freedoms are routinely denied, compared to 67 in 2020. In 2020, 13 per cent of the world’s population lived in countries where civic freedoms were broadly respected; now it’s more like 7 per cent. Among the most documented violations in 2025 were detention of human rights defenders, journalists and protesters, and women human rights defenders (WHRDs) were among the most affected.

Reylynne Dela Paz

Women human rights defenders in the spotlight

WHRDs are women and girls, in all their diversity, working on any human rights issue, and those who promote women’s and girls’ rights and gender justice. They include people in civil society who might not self-identify as human rights defenders and those who work in fields such as environmental activism, humanitarian response, journalism and peacebuilding.

WHRDs are at a higher risk of being discriminated against and abused not only for what they do, but also because of who they are. By virtue of their gender identity, they challenge societal norms and patriarchal structures. The 2025 People Power Under Attack report, for example, documents numerous examples of online intimidation and threats against women journalists, both because of their journalistic work and because they’re women.

Attacks against women and girls in general and WHRDs in particular are increasingly being fuelled by rising authoritarian rule, fundamentalism and populism. Governments, politicians and non-state groups are taking more confident and strident anti-rights actions, fuelling an environment where repression and violence against WHRDs is not only possible but celebrated.

Anti-rights networks, led by populist politicians and fundamentalist religious groups, are engaging in coordinated, sustained and increasingly influential work to stigmatise campaigns for women’s rights and gender justice and those involved in them. They spread the idea that gender justice and those who strive for it threaten children’s welfare, families, religious beliefs, national security and traditional and cultural norms. They’re manipulating public narratives and weaponising disinformation to gain public support.

This has given rise to decreased support for HIV prevention projects, queer movements, sexual, reproductive health and rights initiatives, women’s and girls’ participation in decision-making spaces and any human rights effort led by women, including those on climate and environmental justice, disability, Indigenous rights and peace and security.

CIVICUS’s Stand As My Witness Campaign, which calls for the release of unjustly detained human rights defenders, shows how brutal the current context is for WHRDs. It documents stories of violent arrests, inhumane treatment and other cruel actions against women who have dedicated their lives to pursuing justice and resisting repressive governments. WHRDs Pakhshan Azizi, Sharifeh Mohammadi and Verisheh Moradi are facing death sentences in Iran. Narges Mohammadi, an Iranian human rights activist and journalist who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2023, has also been imprisoned repeatedly for her work.

Other WHRDs who have been arbitrarily arrested include Chow Hang-Tung from Hong Kong, who advocated for the protection and promotion of labour rights and the rights of persecuted human rights defenders in mainland China, Marfa Rabkova, coordinator of Viasna Center for Human Rights’ network of volunteers in Belarus, Kenia Hernandez, coordinator of Zapata Vive, a peasant movement that defends land rights in Mexico, and Hoda Abdel Moneim, a human rights lawyer from Egypt.

I know a mother who helped farmers learn about their rights but was falsely accused of illegally possessing firearms. She was dragged from her house carrying her newborn child. I recall an old woman who has spent her days helping empower Indigenous people but who was harshly arrested and denied medical treatment while in jail, a trans woman who joined a protest and was arrested for no other reason than being a trans protester, and a girl activist who was harassed online for sharing her thoughts against child marriage.

Beyond commemoration

These few painful stories represent only a fraction of reality. The problem is systemic. The world is dominated by cowardly rulers who draw confidence and power from dominant systems of patriarchy and support from anti-rights networks. The restriction of freedoms online and offline make it more difficult and dangerous to hold those in power accountable.

The intensifying repression of civic space, as documented in People Power Under Attack, demands coordinated and sustained action to defend and support the work of activists, human rights defenders and journalists. Increasing threats against WHRDs demand a proactive response to dismantle the gender discriminatory norms and patriarchal rules that underpin and enable human rights violations.

There’s a great need for intersectional protection mechanisms and gender transformative responses from national, regional and international human rights institutions. It’s time for policies that protect human rights defenders but also recognise the distinct needs and lived experiences of WHRDs in all their diversity.

Multilateral institutions should hold member states to account for the international commitments they have made. Regional and global intergovernmental institutions should invest in closely monitoring the situation of WHRDs and in protecting them, and hold perpetrators accountable for abuses. There should be increased investment and coordinated efforts to promote gender justice as part of human rights and respond to the disinformation and false narratives being spread online by governments and the private sector.

The Sustainable Development Goals, backed by all states when they were agreed in 2015, recognise gender equality as a fundamental part of achieving sustainable development, yet little effort has gone into ensuring the people who strive for this are safe and able to work. Women and girls play a vital role in the pursuit of peace and justice, but they increasingly suffer. They don’t need to be merely recognised and remembered: they need to be protected and supported in the face of growing attacks.

Reylynne Dela Paz is Advocacy Lead at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

 

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Alicia Villamizar presents the findings of the Second Academic Report on Climate Change. Credit: Margaret López/IPS

By Margaret López
CARACAS, Dec 15 2025 (IPS)

A group of 55 researchers gathered and analyzed 1,260 bibliographic references to compile the Second Academic Report on Climate Change in Venezuela. Their final conclusion is that more local studies are still needed to record the direct impacts across different Venezuelan regions and, in particular, to provide data to design the adaptation plans necessary to address climate change.

“Vulnerability varies greatly across the country. If an adaptation policy is to be defined, it cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach. Adaptation is tailor-made, which is why local data is so important,” warned Alicia Villamizar, general coordinator of the research carried out by the Academy of Physical, Mathematical and Natural Sciences (Acfiman), in an interview with IPS.

The review of scientific papers, university research, books, global reports, and specialized databases on the impacts of climate change took four full years.

This research involved professionals from 25 different institutions, including the Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV) and Universidad Simón Bolívar (USB). It was presented at the Palace of Academies in early December.

The researchers highlighted the lack of historical and recent data on changes in temperature, precipitation, and sea level rise at the local level, three key elements for understanding climate change in the country.

They also reported the lack of scientific studies on the risk assessment of heat waves, droughts, and forest fires for different climate scenarios in Venezuela. Nor did they identify any recent research on the genetic improvement of crops to safeguard the country’s food security following changes in national temperature.

Corals Affected by High Temperatures

Among the findings of the report that are noteworthy is that Venezuela’s average temperature increased by 0.22°C per decade between 1980 and 2015.

The southern part of Lake Maracaibo (Zulia), the Paraguaná Peninsula (Falcón), and the western plains (Apure, Barinas, and Portuguesa), all located in western Venezuela, were the areas most affected by this temperature increase, which provides evidence of climate change.

Estrella Villamizar, coordinator of the first chapter of the report and researcher at the Institute of Zoology and Tropical Ecology at the UCV, highlighted the impact that this temperature increase had on Venezuelan coral reefs.

“There is not a single coral reef that has not been affected,” said Estrella Villamizar, a specialist in the study of marine ecosystems, during the public presentation of the results in Caracas.

Higher sea temperatures are another factor that has allowed the rapid expansion of the soft coral Unomia stolonifera in Venezuelan waters. This invasive species arrived from the Indian Ocean to the coasts of Anzoátegui and Sucre in eastern Venezuela and also to the waters of Aragua in the center of the country.

It is estimated that half of the seabed of Mochima National Park (Anzoátegui) is already covered with this soft coral, according to a report by the civil association Unomia Project.

The death of native corals in this area is a consequence of the colonization of this invasive species, which has been favored by climate change conditions. The rapid expansion of Unomia stolonifera also affects starfish, sponges, and marine worms.

More Economic Risks

The research also highlighted that climate change contributed to a reduction of between 0.97 percent and 1.30 percent in the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) between 2010 and 2020, partly due to rising temperatures and increased rainfall.

Venezuela faced, for example, more than 20 flooding events between 2000 and 2019. The most direct consequences of these floods resulted in economic losses valued at more than USD 1 billion.

The GDP projection, in fact, is that Venezuela will lose another 10 points by 2030, due to rising sea levels that threaten port infrastructure, fishing activities, and tourism.

“The substantial value of this Second Academic Report is that it offers invaluable information for those who make decisions on city and national issues,” said agricultural engineer Joaquín Benítez, who participated in the project as a researcher on the sustainable development chapter, in an interview with IPS.

The main challenge with climate change in Venezuela, not surprisingly, is to get more attention from the government. The country still does not have a national law on climate change, a national climate strategy, or a national plan for climate change mitigation and adaptation.

That is why Alicia Villamizar repeated during the presentation that her goal is for this scientific report “not to remain confined to academia,” but rather to serve as a catalyst for more local scientific research and to strengthen the institutional muscle in charge of directing climate adaptation in Venezuela.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Digitalization is transforming how we learn, work and participate in civic life. UNDP is supporting countries seeking to ensure that digital systems empower people and uphold their rights. Credit: UNDP Trinidad and Tobago

By Daria Asmolova, Arindrajit Basu and Roqaya Dhaif
UNITED NATIONS, Dec 15 2025 (IPS)

Within a generation, digital systems have changed much of how we learn, work and participate in civic life, especially in more connected regions. This shift is unfolding at different speeds in developing countries, but the direction of travel is unmistakable.

The question countries face today isn’t whether digital development should happen, but how to ensure that digital systems empower individuals and communities, upholding everyone’s rights.

As countries deepen their digital transitions, ensuring that rights protections keep pace becomes a shared challenge. UNDP’s Digital Rights Dashboard (DRD) is designed to help clarify that landscape and serves as an essential first step toward deeper inquiry and action on protecting human rights in a digital world.

Why the Digital Rights Dashboard?

UNDP’s Digital Development Compass and Digital Readiness Assessment already help countries understand where they stand in their digital journey. Yet one critical dimension needed sharper focus: how countries are set up to protect human rights in the digital space.

The DRD fills that gap by examining four essential rights online: freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of assembly and association, equality and non-discrimination, and privacy. It also explores cross-cutting factors like connectivity and rule of law, the foundations that make all online rights possible.

The DRD provides a structured framework for assessing the policies, regulations, and enabling environments that shape digital rights across over 140 countries. It does not rank or evaluate countries. Instead, it serves as a catalyst for dialogue among governments, civil society, international organizations, and development partners to identify gaps and work together on solutions.

The DRD follows the methodology of the Digital Development Compass, one requirement of which is data coverage of at least 135 countries, the most challenging constraint. Comprehensive data on digital rights remains limited, making it difficult to fully capture how well environments are structured to protect rights in practice.

To address this fragmentation of data, we developed the Digital Rights Foundations database as an additional data source for the DRD. Another challenge is that legal and policy frameworks do not always reflect realities on the ground.

For example, the existence of a data protection law or hate speech regulation does not guarantee enforcement; laws may be unevenly applied, and important processes such as public consultations and participatory policy design often fall outside what indicators can capture.
For these reasons, we recommend using the DRD as an entry point, a tool that highlights where deeper national analysis and dialogue are needed, rather than a definitive assessment of digital rights protections.

What we learned from five pilot countries

To test its practical application and assess how well it could guide rights-based digital development conversations in diverse contexts, UNDP piloted the DRD in Colombia, Lebanon, Mauritania, North Macedonia, and Samoa. The findings illustrate the importance of country-driven digital rights dialogues.

Colombia—strong frameworks, evolving needs

The DRD reflects that Colombia has ratified key international conventions and established legislation to protect digital rights, including a data protection law. Yet consultations revealed areas where legislation—such as intelligence-related surveillance—could be further aligned with international human rights standards.

A strong multi-stakeholder approach to rights-based digital development emerged as a promising pathway. For example, civil society efforts to counter hate speech and UNDP’s support to digitalize justice services demonstrate how digital tools can strengthen equality and safety, particularly in conflict-affected regions.

Samoa—building rights into digitalization from the start

While still in the early stages of its rights-based digital development journey, Samoa is proactively engaging stakeholders to shape inclusive data governance and cybersecurity policies. Samoa is also integrating technology into its programmes to protect human rights, including the right to equality and non-discrimination.

Partnerships with organizations like the Samoa Victim’s Support Group, supported by UNDP, show how digital platforms (helplines, secure communication channels) can advance the right to equality and non-discrimination by protecting the rights of vulnerable groups, particularly women and survivors of domestic violence.

Lebanon—protecting digital rights amid crisis

Lebanon’s experience highlights the difficulties of upholding digital rights during conflict, where disruptions to connectivity and freedom of expression are impacted. Yet, safeguarding the foundations of digital rights can also bolster resilience to crisis, as it enables individuals and communities to maximize the opportunities of the digital space.

UNDP collaborated with the National Anti-Corruption Committee to implement its recent legislation on access to information by incorporating digital tools. This illustrates how transparency and the right to information, core elements of freedom of expression, can strengthen accountability even in fragile settings.

Moving forward: a starting point for collective action

Across all five pilot countries, one lesson was clear: rights-based digital development strengthens institutions, empowers communities, and builds trust in digital systems. The DRD has limitations, and more robust data will be needed as the field evolves, but it creates a shared understanding of where protections are strong and where gaps persist.

The pilots also show that countries and stakeholders do not need perfect metrics before taking action. By combining the DRD’s insights with national expertise, human rights reporting, and civil society perspectives, governments can begin shaping digital development that respects and protects human rights both online and offline.

Daria Asmolova is Digital Specialist, UNDP; Arindrajit Basu is Digital Rights Researcher, UNDP; &
Roqaya Dhaif is Human Rights Policy Specialist, UNDP

Source: UNDP

IPS UN Bureau

 

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A two-decade old legal judgement should mean they are benefitting but they say they remain poor.