Ils étaient des milliers lundi soir dans les rues d'Aranđelovac, de Šabac, de Kraljevo, de Ljig ou de Barajevo. Alors que la Serbie a signé avec l'Union européenne un accord stratégique sur les matières premières essentielles et s'apprête à relancer l'exploitation du lithium, l'heure est à mobilisation citoyenne.
- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Lithium, Serbie, Environnement, Economie, Société, PolitiqueConsternation grows that China will invade Taiwan. Numerous war games predict horrific outcomes. An invasion would be swift and sharp. As the United States did in the first Gulf War, China would likely knock out Taiwanese radar and air/sea defense capabilities first, followed by drops of airborne troops, including the seizure of airfields and ports. An amphibious assault would follow. The possibility of targeted special operations and cyber actions by embedded PLA assets in Taiwan could also not be discounted. Finally, an EMP attack might happen, shutting down communications and air defense batteries.
Despite this, while many consider a Chinese invasion to be inevitable if not imminent, Taiwan is sending a different, less convincing message—evidenced by the fact that it spends less as a percentage of GDP on its defense than the United States (2.6 percent compared to 3 percent). On top of that, Taiwan does not have a strong draft. During the second decade of this century, even as tensions with China grew, Taiwan reduced the term for compulsory conscription from two years to one and then from one year to only four months in 2017. Only since January 2024 has Taipei increased the term again to one year, but that level of commitment still pales when one considers that during the Cold War, the United States, facing no immediate threat of invasion by anyone, maintained a two-year draft. These facts raise the question of whether Taiwan is serious about resisting a Chinese invasion or even if it takes such threats seriously.
Taiwan’s politicians likely realize better than Washington that Taiwanese voters may not be as inclined to make the kind of heavy sacrifices that are necessary to defend their freedom as the Ukrainians, Israelis, Finns, or Swiss. The reality is that Taiwanese public opinion on China largely supports the current status quo, which Beijing also tolerates so long as there is no talk of independence. This state of affairs is consistent with the original framework set out by the United States and China in the 1972 Shanghai Communique. The United States acknowledged that “there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China.” Washington reaffirmed its commitment to the “peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” In a 2024 survey, over 33 percent of Taiwanese said that they would like to extend the current status quo indefinitely, followed by about 28 percent who would like to decide the question of independence at some later date and 21.5 percent who would like to maintain the status quo for now but move gradually toward eventual independence.
Taiwan no doubt carefully follows Chinese military writings on its approach to war. Chinese military thinkers suggest that a full-scale, military-style invasion may not be the first option on Beijing’s playlist. Non-kinetic alternatives receive as much consideration in Chinese military thinking.
Without firing a shot, China is already waging war against Taiwan, and it is winning. Beijing’s present strategy is primarily focused on economic absorption, intimidation, and influence. Their aim is to conquer Taiwan by quiet integration into the Chinese economy while warding off, with military threats if necessary, any Taiwanese political momentum toward a declaration of independence. China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner. The Chinese in Taiwan (but not the indigenous population) share a common language and past with mainland Chinese. Hence, the primary attack strategy will continue to be in the information warfare and trade warfighting domains, where China already excels. Even the term “reunification,” as used by Beijing, should be viewed as just another facet of its misinformation tactics. Historically, Taiwan has never been an integrated part of China.
Beijing also takes maximum advantage of its sway as the world’s largest manufacturing partner to influence other countries not to stand in the way of its Taiwan ambitions. The relationship between Taiwan and the United States ironically provides Beijing an additional, convenient excuse for all manner of intimidation tactics, such as the practice drills it conducted offshore Taiwan that were prompted by a visit to Taipei by former House Speaker Pelosi. China’s varied information war tactics are aimed at ineluctably grinding down resistance to unification, eliminating the need for a real military invasion.
In one particular respect, Taiwan should take a page from Hamas’ playbook to fend off China. It must turn more to political or media angles to neutralize China’s overwhelming military strength. Hamas’ slaughter of over 1200 Israeli civilians, taking others hostage, and engaging in rape and other abuses on October 7, 2023, has been overshadowed by global criticism of Israel’s intense military response to that vicious attack. Despite the IDF’s superiority and tactical successes in Gaza, Jerusalem may well have already lost that war in the court of world opinion thanks to Hamas’ “digital war” response.
Taipei, with support from Washington, should fashion the same kind of approach to deter invasion. Beijing must be made to understand that a bloody attack would create unacceptable diplomatic and economic consequences, seriously compromising its domestic economy and raising internal dissent while simultaneously destroying its global standing and trade relations. An effective information warfare campaign is as immediate a necessity for Taipei as is a heightened arms buildup. If Hamas can pull off success over Israel, then Taiwan should be capable of developing an equally effective digital war strategy for itself.
China, unfortunately, has already proven itself quite adept at winning that type of war so far. Nowhere has the product of its successful approach been better demonstrated than in the United Nations. Beijing marshals regular support for its policy on Taiwan in the UN General Assembly and UN agencies, skillfully out-maneuvering Washington and its Western allies. Beijing has successfully courted a voting coalition of countries that cooperate with it to deny Taiwan’s participation in various UN institutions. According to the Carnegie Endowment, China claims that “over 180 countries accept its ‘one China principle.’”
Outside the UN environment, China has also built new frameworks for exercising influence, particularly with the Global South. It helped to establish the BRICS+, a significant new geopolitical bloc that covers 45 percent of the world’s population. Members include Brazil, India, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Russia, the UAE, Ethiopia, and China. The June 2024 BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration called for major United Nations reforms, including in the Security Council, where Global South countries (except China) remain shut out as permanent members. BRICS is a powerful new coalition that will only help provide Beijing with more cover for its expansionist ambitions in Taiwan and elsewhere. Thailand and Malaysia have just announced that they intend to join BRICS, as well.
If Taipei is to win its current war, then Washington and its allies must develop digital strategies that lay bare China’s imperialistic ambitions for outright annexation of Taiwan. If Taipei and Western friends do not, then the quote often attributed to Sun Tzu will have been proven correct: “If one party is at war with another, and the other party does not realize it is at war, the party who knows it is at war almost always has the advantage and usually wins.”
Brigadier General Rob Spalding retired from the Air Force after twenty-six years. He served as Chief China strategist for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as the defense attaché to the US Embassy in Beijing. He also served on the National Security Council at the White House as Senior Director for Strategic Planning. General Spalding is the author of Stealth War and War without Rules. He is currently the CEO of SEMPRE, a resilient 5G secure communications and hybrid cloud company.
Ramon Marks is a retired New York international lawyer and Vice Chair of Business Executives for National Security. The views expressed here are strictly those of the authors.
Image: DLeng / Shutterstock.com.
Summary and Key Points: Germany's Technik Museum Sinsheim is set to showcase a retired German U-Boat, U17, joining its impressive collection of over 3,000 exhibits, including a Concorde and a Soviet-era Tupolev Tu-144.
-The U17, a Type 206 submarine, operated from 1973 until 2010 and undertook a challenging journey from the port of Hamburg to the museum, involving river transport and a 30-mile overland trip. This journey required careful navigation through narrow streets and under bridges, highlighting the logistical efforts involved.
-The U17's relocation adds another layer of historical significance to the museum, which also features the largest collection of Formula One race cars in Europe.
How A German Submarine Is Making a 'Move'Germany's Technik Museum Sinsheim is already home to more than 3,000 exhibits including a former France Concorde and a Soviet-era Tupolev Tu-144 supersonic aircraft, the largest collection of Formula One race cars in Europe, and numerous military tanks. The museum will soon have a retired German U-Boat on display – which is all the more noteworthy because of where the Technik Museum Sinsheim is located.
The facility, in Baden-Württemberg, is about an hour and a half south of Frankfurt, and more than six hours from the port of Hamburg, which presented challenges in getting U-Boat U17 to the museum. The 350-tonne German Navy submarine, operated from 1973 until 2010, has slowly been making its final journey to the museum via rivers and roads.
After being moved on barge, on July 13, the submarine was put on a 30-axle low-loader and carefully driven to its new home, the museum announced in a post on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.
While submarines can easily travel under the water – which obviously they are designed to do – there were "logistical challenges" that came with it being driven the 50 km (30 miles) on land, namely that it was too large to fit under several bridges. The 295-foot-long and 33-foot-tall boat had to be put on its side and then set upright again to squeeze through some of the narrow streets on the route to the museum.
As TheDrive reported, the straight shot would have been to take it on the Autobahn – cutting the distance down to 30 km (19 miles). However, the slightly longer route was chosen as it was more accessible for the U17.
"We have brought a fascinating exhibit to us in a large team in a spectacular transport," said project manager Michael Einkörn, a former submariner who will also give expert tours of the retired U-Boat at its new home.
The U17 was one of 18 Type 206 U-Boats designed to operate in the shallow Baltic Sea and constructed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) for the Bundesmarine between 1969 and 1975. Though not employed in combat, the Type 206 boats are noteworthy for remaining in service for nearly four decades, longer than any other U-Boat.
Moreover, in 2001, the German Type 206 U24 was deployed to JTFEX 01-2 naval exercises in the Caribbean Sea and managed to break through all the security around the USS Enterprise (CVN-65). The submarine fired green flares and took photographs of the U.S. Navy's flattop, essentially "sinking it."
All have been retired from service with the modern Deutsche Marine, while two remain active with the Colombian Navy.
Slow Roll for German U-boatWhen operational, the U17 was powered by two 4-stroke MTU 600-horsepower diesel-electric engines, and had a cruising speed of 10 knots surfaced and 17 knots submerged. For its final journey on the land, it moved far slower, taking nearly four weeks to travel the final distance to the museum.
The total cost of the move was estimated at around 2 million euros ($2.17 million), which was financed via donations. Even as the U17 has completed its trek, it will still be a year before it is on display. The submarine will be refurbished and painted, while it is on track to be on display next summer. The hardest part was simply getting it to the Technik Museum Sinsheim.
Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
All images are Creative Commons.
In part one of this series, I suggested that political parties in most Western democracies are realigning along the schism of Court versus Country. This new division does not replace but instead cuts across the familiar cleavage of Left versus Right. That leaves four distinct factions in play: Court Conservatives, Court Progressives, Country Conservatives, and Country Progressives. The shifting alliances and tensions between these four factions play out differently in each nation. However, one consistent pattern is that rural, non-college-educated, and working-class voters are drifting away from Progressive factions toward Country Conservatives. This pattern is reshaping party politics throughout the Western world.
In the case of recent U.S. political realignments, the basic facts of the past decade are familiar to American readers. The big question is how to interpret those facts. Progressives, academics, the mainstream press, European leftists, and Democratic Party leaders agree that what we’re seeing inside America is a resurgence of a 1930s-style fascist dictatorship. They’re mistaken. Viewed in a more reasonable, fair-minded way, with appropriate comparisons to other Western nations along with other periods in American history, I believe what we’re seeing is a reworking of U.S. party politics along the lines of Court versus Country. And this realignment is playing out within the United States in a distinctly American fashion.
On the Republican side of the aisle, Court Conservatives have spent the past eight years in a state of deep internal division. Some have worked in a businesslike manner to pursue common policy objectives with Trump and his supporters. At the other end of the Court Conservative spectrum, a few have torn up their party affiliation and defected to the Democrats. Then, there is every position in between. These internal divisions have left America’s Court Conservatives, by historical standards, in an unusually weak position. First, their leaders failed to put forward a viable third-party candidate in 2016. Then, they failed to challenge Trump in either the 2020 or 2024 primaries successfully. Each new failure has only advertised Court Conservative weakness in today’s GOP.
Internal divisions among American Court Conservatives have been frustrating to Country Conservatives as well as to Court Progressives. Each faction feels that old-school Reagan-Bush Republicans ought, in principle, to side with them. Politically, however, these internal divisions have empowered other factions even while setting a limit on their total appeal. Donald Trump’s GOP, it seems, can count on some, but never total support from Court Conservatives. Similarly, Biden’s Democrats can always count on at least a few Court Conservatives to say nice things about them on TV.
Court Conservative disunity has not prevented Trump from going from one surprise win to the next. This is not because Trump has magical powers. It’s because anti-establishment right-leaning populists have rallied to him over time with unmatched enthusiasm. In the United States, Country Conservatives have greater numerical, institutional, and historical advantages than in any other Western nation. They’re not a majority of American voters, but they do form a plurality, and within today’s GOP, they far outnumber any other faction. In November 2016, Trump demonstrated that contrary to conventional wisdom, he could squeeze out an Electoral College majority with strong support from Country Conservatives and not much else. Democrats made a mistake by completely writing off these voters. It appears they’re making the same mistake again.
The ebullient Republican convention this summer was a clear demonstration of how Country Conservatives now dominate the GOP. Compared to eight years ago, few gestures were made toward the traditional Republican establishment. On the contrary, Trump doubled down by picking J.D. Vance as his running mate. Vance is unmistakably Country in this sense. His views on foreign policy, trade, immigration, and domestic economic policy are populist rather than Court-approved. Trump’s fist-shaking defiance right after the narrow attempt on his life only bolstered his status as a folk hero in the minds of his many supporters. That pugnacious reaction to danger is an instinct that Country Conservatives understand very well.
The Democratic Party, which in living memory possessed great strength among Country Conservatives, has long since pivoted toward Court Progressives for leadership, funding, votes, and ideas. The party has often been successful in winning elections by coopting Country Progressives while fending off the GOP. Four years ago, for example, Bernie Sanders energized left-wing populists, then dutifully led them into line behind the party’s Court nominee, Joe Biden.
Until recently, the conventional wisdom among Court Progressives was that they would defeat the GOP so long as it nominated Donald Trump. Our progressive superiors, therefore, made certain to hunt Trump through America’s court system and mockingly called on Republican voters to nominate him, even while backing MAGA candidates in Republican primaries—for example, in Michigan’s third congressional district during the 2022 campaign season. This was a strange move to make against figures simultaneously described as existential threats to democracy. In any case, it all backfired spectacularly. Court Party attempts to hobble Trump while boosting the MAGA wing of the party only made him stronger, ensuring his nomination and likely his election.
This summer, Court Progressives finally broke into deep division. This wasn’t because of any ideological split. Rather, it’s because the entire Democratic coalition was demoralized by the visibly decrepit condition of its leader, Joe Biden. Last week, Court Progressives solved that problem by engineering Biden’s removal and facilitating the succession of Vice President Kamala Harris. From a strictly professional perspective, one must admire their ruthless efficiency in doing whatever they must to survive. But their underlying problem is the same, with Harris at the top, and perhaps even worse than it was a few months ago.
Democrats have answered the immediate challenge of physical fitness for the nation’s highest office. Consequently, they’re experiencing a kind of sugar high, with a lot of help from the press. But Biden was never unpopular simply because of his age. He was unpopular because of his overly left-wing, demonstrably incompetent approach to one pressing U.S. policy challenge after another. Harris now inherits that unpopularity, and rightly so. She also has one major disadvantage, which Biden did not possess. Unlike Biden, Harris is one hundred percent politically correct. She is entirely a product of the twenty-first-century Court Progressive movement. Unlike Biden, she has no feel whatsoever for Rust Belt working-class voters that Democrats need to win back from Trump. Indeed, she may very well scramble the Electoral College map to the benefit of Republicans.
Harris and the Democrats also have another serious problem, one they and the legacy media prefer not to discuss. A significant percentage of Country Progressives have given up on today’s Democratic Party as hopelessly beholden to the nation’s Court establishment. They can see that Harris is an establishment figure par excellence. A good number of these left-leaning populists will, therefore, vote for third-party candidates, including Robert Kennedy Jr., Cornel West, and Jill Stein. Those candidates, combined, now poll around 8 percent. In a hard-fought race, that’s no small number, and it hurts the Democratic Party more than it does the GOP.
Still, the Democrats’ selection of Kamala Harris is an excellent indication of where the party stands now. As even liberal media outlets admitted not so long ago, Harris is disturbingly incompetent and (until recently) widely disliked within the party. Yet Court Progressives refuse to consider any other candidate. They refuse because they are captive to left-wing identity politics, and to pass over Harris would break that captivity. For this reason, among others, the Democrats will likely lose to Donald Trump in November. And I have to say, after the past eight years, they’ve really got it coming.
Colin Dueck is a professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Image: Jonah Elkowitz / Shutterstock.com.
Growing North-South tensions are impeding global climate cooperation and hampering Germany’s search for reliable partners. Brazil is a key actor with the potential to alleviate tensions: it sees itself as a bridge-builder and will host the Climate Change Conference in 2025 (COP30). Under their new Partnership for a Socially Just and Ecological Transformation, Germany and Brazil should work to strengthen confidence in the climate negotiations, and more generally to promote effective North-South cooperation.