Agrégateur de flux

Small island states are pointing the way on finding innovative funding.

Face à l’impossibilité de faire parler d’elles dans les grands médias nationaux, sept "petites listes" candidates aux élections européennes ont publié une tribune dans Libération et protesté lundi matin auprès de l’Arcom. Elles pointent l'inégalité de traitement médiatique dont elles se disent victimes, et s'insurgent contre les règles de fonctionnement du scrutin.

Summary: Russia lagged behind the US in submarine technology during the Cold War. To catch up, they developed the Alfa-class (Type 705 Lyra) submarines, combining brute force with advanced technology. These submarines could dive deeper and move faster than their Western counterparts, boasting titanium hulls the U.S. Navy never used. 

-Despite their impressive performance, they were noisy, required extensive maintenance, and were costly.

-Only seven were built.

-NATO responded with advanced torpedoes like the Mark 48 ADCAP. The Alfa-class left a legacy of technological innovation despite their operational challenges.

Alfa-Class: The Soviet Submarine that Pushed Boundaries and Budgets

The Soviet Union began the Cold War well behind the United States in submarine technology. Although the Soviets acquired several of the most advanced German submarine types towards the end of the war, the United States had amassed a wealth of experience in submarine and antisubmarine practice from the Pacific War and the Battle of the Atlantic. Combined with other technological advantages, the United States leapt out to a significant lead in submarine tech (especially nuclear submarines) in the first two decades of the Cold War.

In particular, early Soviet nuclear submarines struggled to compete with the West in stealth and reliability. After the first few designs came to fruition, the Soviets decided to undertake a combination of brute force and extremely risky high technology. The brute-force part meant building a submarine that could move faster and dive deeper than any Western counterpart; the high-tech part meant innovative hull design, reactor design and material manipulation. The result was the Type 705 Lyra (known as Alfa in NATO), a submarine that the West regarded as a profound, if short-lived, threat to its undersea dominance.

How Alfa Was Born

With the Lyra class, the Soviets sought to accomplish two goals. First, they wanted to produce a weapon capable of changing the character of naval warfare in the North Atlantic and the Arctic, a weapon that could threaten the overwhelming surface advantages of the NATO navies. Unlike their Western counterparts, which preferred multirole platforms, the Soviets were fine submarines dedicated to a single mission: the high-speed “interception” of NATO surface squadrons, especially carrier battle groups. Second, they wanted to jumpstart technological development, producing innovations that future submarines would incorporate, if only in piecemeal fashion. An incidental third goal was to force NATO navies to spend money and time adapting to the threat that the Lyras would present.

The Lyra class certainly met the second criterion. Following an interim design (the K-162 “Papa”-class cruise-missile submarine), the Lyras had a titanium hull in order to produce tolerances necessary for high speed and for extreme deep diving. To keep the size of the crew small, the Lyra class employed advanced techniques for automating key systems, a decision which also enhanced the combat reaction speed of the crew, although it made at-sea repairs and maintenance extremely difficult.

To achieve high speed, the Alfas used a remarkably innovative lead-cooled fast reactor design. This allowed a tremendous amount of power in a compact space. However, it also created staggering maintenance problems, few of which could be resolved by the small crew at sea. Indeed, even in port the Soviet Navy struggled to keep the Alfas in service.

Alfa-Class Performance

The Lyras could put up numbers that no class of submarine has matched (apart from the “Papa” SSGN) before or since. Submerged, they could travel at forty-one knots (and could reach that speed with a startling degree of acceleration). They could dive to at least 2,200 feet, far deeper than any NATO submarine of the time, or today.

The speed and diving depth of the Alfa allowed it to evade most contemporary NATO torpedoes, although in combat this would also have made it difficult for the Alfa to move into attack position. Also because of their small size, the Alfas carried a weapons arsenal smaller than most other Soviet boats—a mix of eighteen to twenty-one torpedoes and cruise missiles. Nevertheless, this arsenal could wreak havoc on a NATO group without the means to effectively respond.

The Alfas were not particularly quiet, especially when they approached at high speed. However, their ability to dive deep gave them some stealth capabilities, depending on oceanic conditions. More importantly, they could outrun and outdive most existing NATO weapons, making them very difficult to catch and kill.

Reaction

As with the MiG-25 and other Soviet “super-weapons,” NATO took the threat of the Alfa very seriously. Extant torpedoes and other antisubmarine weapons would struggle to catch the Alfas, or to dive deep enough to destroy them. Whether out of genuine panic, or out of the desire to use the threat of the Alfas to spur innovation and funding, the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy embarked on crash programs to develop sensors that could detect the Alfas, and weapons that could kill them.

This effort resulted in a few weapons, including the Mark 48 ADCAP torpedo, which can reputedly travel at sixty-three knots. The Royal Navy developed a similar torpedo, dubbed “Spearfish.” The United States also pursued the “Sea Lance” supersonic missile system, designed to deliver a torpedo or nuclear depth charge at ranges of up to one hundred miles. The United States cancelled the Sea Lance program at the end of the Cold War, roughly at the same time that the Lyra class left service.

Problems

The USSR paid dearly for this performance. Nicknamed “golden fish,” the Alfas strained even the massive Soviet submarine building budget. Moreover, they generally proved unreliable in service, requiring expensive and complex maintenance. Soviet ports often lacked the training and equipment necessary to keep the Lyras in working condition. In contrast to most of its other Cold War submarine projects, the USSR built only seven Lyras, one of which was more a prototype than a usable weapon. This first boat was scrapped in 1974, after demonstrating proof of concept.

At the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation struggled to maintain the huge defense establishment of the Soviet Union. Ultra-expensive ships like the Lyras simply didn’t make the cut; they could not perform enough critical missions to justify their maintenance. Accordingly, the Russian Federation retired the Alfas quickly after the end of the Cold War. By the mid-1990s, all of the boats were retired and designated for scrapping.

Legacy of the Alfa-Class

Nevertheless, the Soviets learned a great deal from the Lyra experience, not least that the combination of a series of innovative technologies often results in an unreliable vessel. The Barracuda-class (“Sierra” in NATO) submarines of the early 1980s adopted some of the characteristics of the Alfas, including the titanium hull, while dialing back the performance to levels that allowed a more manageable maintenance profile. The Barracudas operated much more quietly than the Lyras, and could perform a more varied set of missions. The Shchuka class attack submarines (NATO: “Akula”) adopted many of the automation techniques pioneered by the Lyras, allowing them to operate with relatively small crews for their size.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley 

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, teaches at the University of Kentucky. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary: In the mid-1990s, John Leonard attempted to obtain a Harrier jet through Pepsi's promotional campaign by raising $700,000 to buy seven million points.

-Pepsi, claiming it was a joke, refused to deliver the jet, leading to a legal battle that Leonard lost.

-Recently, Liquid Death launched a contest promising a $400,000 Aero L-39C Albatros jet as a prize for in-store purchases, directly challenging Pepsi's past promotion.

-The winner will also receive a year's supply of Liquid Death and other perks.

Pepsi Points Redux: Liquid Death's Bold Fighter Jet Giveaway

A now infamous story – worthy of a movie that hasn't been made yet (although a four-part documentary is available on Netflix) – tells how in the mid-1990s a 23-year-old student raised $700,000 from investors to buy seven million Pepsi points. The goal was to obtain a McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II fighter jet. It was part of a promotion from soft drink maker Pepsi, where for various points consumers could claim a variety of prizes, including t-shirts and sunglasses. But in an ad, the company implied that it would provide the Harrier II for the seven million points!

As CBS News reported in 2015, the ad caught the eye of John Leonard, who read the rules and found that instead of buying a can or bottle of Pepsi to gather the points, each point could be bought for just 10 cents. That resulted in the seven million points costing $700,000, which Leonard raised through investors. Pepsi didn't send the jet (and almost certainly didn't have one available) and responded that it was a joke.

Leonard hired a lawyer and a legal battle ensued, but the case was dismissed. To ensure that others wouldn't try to acquire the jet, Pepsi raised the points needed for the jet from seven million to 700 million – making it far too costly for a student or even a despot to garner enough points!

Now another soft drink maker is running a similar promotion; this time, it actually promises to provide a fighter jet!

The fittingly named Liquid Death began running a contest in May that will give away a $400,000 fighter jet – custom-painted Aero L-39C Albatros has been dubbed "The Dehydrator," reportedly due to the fact the thrust will "relieve you of your bodily fluids and make you empty your stomach."

Instead of gathering points, however, between now and early September, consumers who make an in-store purchase of beverages from the company will be entered into a sweepstake. In addition to the jet, the grand prize winner will receive a year's supply of Liquid Death and a custom flight helmet – while the company has pledged to pick up the sales tax for the plane for the winner.

A few strings are attached, of course.

The jet is real and will come with a valid FAA special certification of airworthiness and the contest winner will receive six free months of hanger space outside of Chicago, but after that, it will need to be moved, and the winner will be responsible for any expenses related to owning and operating the aircraft. Should the winner decide he or she doesn't want a plane (are they crazy), they'll receive a cash prize of $250,000 delivered in a briefcase, CNBC.com reported.

Liquid Death's promotion is also taking direct aim at Pepsi.

"We like to poke the bear," Andy Pearson, Liquid Death's vice president of creative, told ADWEEK. "And I've heard that others have had the idea to give away a jet, but no one's ever pulled it off."

It might not be a Harrier II – even as the aircraft is being retired from service – but the Aero L-39 Albatros is still a cool jet. Developed in the former communist Czechoslovakia during the Cold War as a light attack fighter, it is now used a trainer. It has a top speed of 470 mph and produces nearly 3,8000 pounds of thrust so perhaps that year's supply of Liquid Death will come in handy!

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: The B-21 Raider stealth bomber program reported a significant cost overrun of nearly $1.6 billion in Q4 2023 due to higher-than-expected production costs and economic disruptions.

-This has fueled criticism, especially from those advocating for a shift towards drone warfare.

-Despite the challenges, the B-21's advanced stealth technology and unique capabilities in nuclear deterrence and deep-penetration bombing underscore its strategic importance.

-The debate continues on whether the investment in the B-21 is justified given emerging alternatives like drones.

The B-21 Raider stealth bomber has yet to enter production and has mostly avoided controversy. But it experienced a cost overrun in the fourth quarter of 2023.

“Northrop Grumman reported a nearly $1.6 billion pre-tax charge on the B-21 Raider program in the last quarter of 2023,” Defense News reported. “The charge was mainly caused by higher-than-expected production costs and macroeconomic disruptions, company officials said in an earnings call with investors Thursday.”

Naturally, the cost overrun has opened the door for criticism. It offers citable evidence for those who believe the B-21 program is not worth the expense, especially given the predicted rise of drone warfare.

B-21 Raider Money Challenge

The United States is the only country in the world with an operational stealth bomber, the B-2 Spirit. So why replace an aircraft that is already without peer? Well, the B-2’s stealth technology lags behind advances in detection technology, meaning the aircraft is not quite as stealthy as it once was.

The loss of stealth dampens its ability to perform its primary functions: deep-penetration bombing and nuclear deterrence.

The stealth bomber plays an important role in the nuclear triad and in the U.S. bomber rotation. Even with the advent of missile technology, the bomber has unique capabilities. 

First, the stealth bomber offers a manned option. Whereas missiles are launched and essentially forgotten, the bomber has a human onboard that can make real-time decisions as the mission unfolds. It is more flexible and adaptable than a missile. Second, a bomber offers loitering time. A missile launches directly toward its target, kamikaze-style, but a bomber may sustain its presence around the target, extending the targeting window. Finally, a bomber is reusable. A missile is of course a one-and-done weapon. A bomber can be used for decades.

Stealth enhances a bomber’s effectiveness by providing ambiguity and extending the fog of war. It is hard to defend against. So, stealth bomber capabilities are strategically valuable. The question of whether the B-21 is worth the investment really comes down to policy preferences.

The U.S. military is better off with stealth bombers. But how good do we need the U.S. military to be?

Could Drones Get the Job Done?

As written above, bombers offer a manned option. Drones of course would negate the manned benefit of a nuclear-equipped bomber. Granted, many drones are remotely manned, like the entire fleet of Remote Piloted Aircraft in the U.S. Air Force inventory.

But the use of true drones – autonomous aircraft with an artificial intelligence operating system – to run nuclear deterrence missions is unsettling. James Cameron made a film series about something like that, called Terminator. You should check it out if you haven’t already.

And while Terminator is fiction, there’s a word of caution in the narrative that bears respecting.  

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Explanations from insiders range from ignorance to ideology.

Du 6 au 9 juin, les citoyens européens éliront les députés qui siégeront au Parlement européen. Mais quel est leur rôle ?

A congressional hearing on port safety normally wouldn’t get much attention, but coming so soon after the fatal ship accident that killed six and caused the Francis Scott Key bridge in Baltimore, Maryland, to collapse, there was more interest than usual in the topic.

Indeed, the House subcommittees on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation and Transportation and Maritime Security gathered in Miami to discuss “Port Safety, Security, and Infrastructure Investment” just 10 days after the Dali’s allision (when a ship hits a stationary object) in Baltimore harbor.

The venue for the hearing, the Port of Miami, stands out. It’s a site that hopes to grow its market presence and lead in port technology. It has welcomed the world’s largest cruise ship, the Icon of the Seas. And it can service large Neo Panamax container ships – a too-rare feature of American ports. Sadly, the nation’s maritime sector is not as healthy as it needs be.

Americans are increasingly aware that they can no longer assume their store shelves and gas stations will always be stocked. Since COVID lockdowns ended, shipping backlogs have ensued at times due to decisions made in Beijing – recall that Chinese Communist Party’s COVID Zero policy that shuttered the world’s largest ports for weeks. Then the March 2021 grounding of a container ship shut down the Suez Canal, shocking an already reeling global supply chains. That was followed by global grain supply disruptions caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine.

And, since October, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have been rattling shipping and markets reliant on trade that crosses the Suez Canal. Add to this the incident in Baltimore, and to most people it’s clear our prosperity, which relies on maritime trade, isn’t as secure as it once was. 

As a maritime nation we have fallen far. Today no U.S. port ranks in the top 25 nations in cargo handling; China holds eight of those spots. Asia also has the most vibrant maritime sector with the most new commercial shipping entrants – again led by China. The point is not that our ports don’t meet today’s need in general, but a lack of competitiveness has not generated the resiliency we need, nor the vibrancy necessary to modernize – which in turn fails to recruit needed new mariners and the shipyard workers.

A consequence of this malaise is on display in Baltimore Harbor. While investigations and recovery operations are ongoing (and it will be some time until all the facts are known), it’s clear that our nation’s maritime industrial sector hasn’t been treated as the strategic asset it is. One need only look at the limited salvage capacity on hand to reopen the nation’s 10th port. It has taken two months to clear the Dali from blocking the harbor. By contrast, reopening the Suez Canal, when the ultra large container ship Ever Given grounded and wedged itself in the canal, was cleared quicker: six days.

To reverse the tide of our national sea blindness requires a national maritime initiative. If done properly, it would rectify our over-reliance on non-friendly nations to sustain our economy, and ensure safe maritime operations, by:

-Providing an adequate American flagged commercial shipping fleet that can sustain the nation in a crisis.

-Expanding shipbuilding, repair and salvage capacities and associated workforces.

-Hardening our maritime infrastructure and shipping to cyber-attack and material damage.

On the first point, existing approaches are inadequate, and there is little time to act as both infrastructure, ships, and mariners age out of service. Change is needed, but because of the century of market distortions created by the Jones Act, a maritime Hippocratic oath of “do no harm” is required to retain the maritime assets protectionist dependent domestic maritime industrial sector. At the same time, the March 12th petition against unfair Chinese trade practices in the maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors is an opportunity to strengthen U.S. agencies like the Federal Maritime Commission and press America’s case, while rallying international common cause.

Delivering on the second point requires a stronger and globally competitive maritime sector. This would serve as a deterrent to Chinese economic coercion and military adventures, as the nation would be less reliant on Chinese shipping and its ports. This can be done by fostering a revolution in shipping through a new multi-modalism that would recover American competitiveness in this strategic industrial sector. Achieving this, American trade can proceed with greater confidence and resiliency, and better sustain the military.

Lastly, and perhaps most relevant to recent events, legal and regulatory frameworks of the 9/11 era should be revised. With an eye to adjusting to the New Cold War we find ourselves in with China, the Maritime Security Act of 2002, Container Security Initiative and the Proliferation Security Initiative should be updated. We also need to place into law measures of both the 2020 National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan and the recently enacted executive order EO 14116.

The Biden administration failed to act on the 2020 plan until almost four years later with a similar executive order – though not as thorough as the 2020 one. Still we wait. Over three months later, and two months after the Dali allision, there’s no indication that cyber intrusions are even being considered in the ongoing NTSB investigation, according to a preliminary report recently released.

Countermeasures that bolster our maritime sector’s cyber defenses must be de-politicized by being memorialized in law by an act of Congress.

An easy first step in getting the nation underway on a National Maritime Initiative is to update the 1989 National Security Directive 28 on Sealift, with Congress passing enabling legislation. Regaining American maritime competitiveness will not be easy nor cheap, but failing to address the nation’s sea blindness will further place our nation’s economic and national security in the hands of non-friendly parties. 

About the Author: Brent Sadler 

Brent Sadler joined Heritage Foundation after a 26 year Navy career with numerous operational tours on nuclear powered submarines, personal staffs of senior Defense Department leaders, and as a military diplomat in Asia. As a Senior Research Fellow, Brent’s focus is on maritime security and the technologies shaping our future maritime forces, especially the Navy.

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Lundi, le premier ministre devra faire face à deux motions de censure déposées par les Insoumis et le Rassemblement national.

Summary: The U.S. Army's new M10 Booker, designed to support mechanized brigades, resembles a miniaturized M1 Abrams but with a 105mm cannon and lighter armor.

-Unlike the Abrams, the Booker can be quickly deployed via C-17 transport planes without disassembly.

-It aims to enhance mobility and protection for light infantry units, despite not being classified as a light tank.

-Critics argue the Booker may struggle in modern combat scenarios like Ukraine, where light tanks have been ineffective against powerful Russian anti-tank weapons.

M10 Booker: The Future of U.S. Army's Mechanized Brigades

The US Army has a new 'tank'…but don’t you dare call it a tank. And it’s something more than an armored personnel carrier. In fact, like most tanks, the new tank, designated the M10 Booker, does not carry personnel other than the crew at all. What’s more, the Booker appears to be a miniaturized version of the M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT). 

According to the US Army the Booker will “add firepower and maneuverability to the Army’s mechanized brigades.”

Its smaller size does not mean it will not pack a punch. The size of the Booker simply helps to keep maintenance costs down (in terms of maintenance costs, size really does matter). Possessing a 105mm cannon (compared to the Abrams’ 120 mm cannon), with lighter armor than the Abrams, the Booker is not just like its older, bigger brother. 

However, the Army is quite pleased with the product and hopeful about its effectiveness in future combat missions.

That, by the way, should give most readers pause. The M10 Booker, unlike the Abrams, was designed to easily fit onto a C-17 Globemaster III transport plane without having to be disassembled. The Abrams can certainly fit on a C-17. Unfortunately, the M1 Abrams is so large only one can fit on a massive C-17 and it must be partly disassembled to fit. The Booker, on the other hand, can fit two units to a C-17 and can be easily rolled-on-and-rolled-off the aircraft intact.

Nonetheless, what should we make of the M10 Booker? Does it make sense to acquire this new 'tank' with so many other budgetary demands coming out of the U.S. military these days? 

What Role is the M10 Booker Filling? 

The specific purpose of this non-tank-tank is to support light infantry units that are in the midst of combat operations. Rather than having to wait for an M1 Abrams to be reassembled back at an airbase and then deployed to the frontline to support infantry on the move, the M10 Booker can move quickly to targets on the front. The point with these systems would be to ensure mobility while protecting light infantry forces.  

The Army’s leadership has insisted that the M10 Booker is not a “light tank,” as some in the press have described it. US Army General Glenn Dean explained to the Military Times that the M10 Booker is not a light tank because “the historical use of light tanks has been to perform reconnaissance functions. This is not a reconnaissance vehicle. It’s not actually a mission match [for a light tank].”

But, as Davis Winkie of the Military Times opined, “Stop gaslighting us. It’s a damn tank.”

A more interesting query would be to find out what kind of a tank it is. Obviously, it is not an MBT on the order of the M1 Abrams. And the level of armor, plus the fact that it is not designed to do recon missions, indicates that this vehicle is not, in fact, a light tank. It’s more akin to a medium tank. The M551 Sheridan was the Cold War equivalent to the M10 Booker (although the Army classified that vehicle as a light tank). Although, the Sheridans could be parachuted into combat. But as one former Army tanker I chatted with recently claimed, “The Booker is light enough that they’ll probably be able to parachute it into combat eventually.” 

The Army says that the first M10 Booker was scheduled to be deployed by the Army in February of this year. Each unit costs around $12 million, roughly half the cost of the M1 Abrams tank. The Army has spent a total of $257 million on the M10 Booker program. 

The real question is, though, will it be effective in protecting infantry? 

What is a Tank?

The Army says that they incorporated many lessons learned from the battlefields in Ukraine. Well, one of the lessons learned should have been that light tanks are not very effective in the kind of combat that is occurring in Ukraine. While antiquated, the French flooded the Ukrainian Army with their AMX-10RC light tanks. All these platforms did was get a lot of good Ukrainians killed. They were deemed “unsuitable” for combat by the Ukrainians. Basically, Russian anti-tank weapons and more powerful Russian tanks kept blasting through the French light tanks.

The Booker tanks, like all light or light, or in this case, “medium” tanks (to keep the nitpickers in the Army’s leadership happy) appear to be missing the fundamental point about tanks. The entire purpose is to get firepower to the frontlines and punch through enemy formations. An 105mm gun and light armor will not achieve this, no matter how new or fancy the M10 Booker appears to be. Yes, it is a tank. No, it is not the kind of tank that one fighting a modern war against a near-peer rival would need. 

Part of the problem is that the acquisition system in the United States Department of Defense is completely broken. It’s untethered from reality and reflects political preferences rather than battlefield needs. Infantry needs to be mobile, and they need maneuverable vehicles supporting them. But they also need tanks—which is what the M10 Booker is, no matter how hard the Army wants to say otherwise—that can pack a wallop and that won’t be blasted to smithereens because of weak armor and a small gun.

The Booker tank is the wrong vehicle for the wrong kind of war.

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

by Dr Moritz Rehm, Prof. Dr. Martin Schröder, and Prof. Dr. Georg Wenzelburger (Saarland University)

The enduring romanticized notion that border regions serve as the quintessential embodiment of European identity has long captured our collective imagination. However, recent scholarly inquiry challenges this assumption, suggesting that the emotional attachment to Europe among individuals residing in border regions is not significantly different from those living inland.

Led by Professor Georg Wenzelburger, Martin Schröder, and post-doctoral researcher Moritz Rehm, our study recently published in JCMS delves into the prevalent belief that proximity to borders inherently fosters a stronger sense of European belonging. Contrary to popular belief and political claims, our findings, drawn from comprehensive data collected from over 25,000 individuals via Germany’s Socio-Economic Panel, reveal a surprising lack of disparity in attachment to Europe between residents of border and inland regions.

In scrutinizing potential explanations for this unexpected revelation, we explored various factors including education, income, duration of residency in border regions, and actual cross-border experiences such as commuting. While our study confirms the commonly held view that individuals with higher education, income levels, and international experience tend to exhibit greater attachment to Europe, it also shows that neither the educated nor the affluent, nor those with cross-border experiences, display heightened European attachment simply by residing in border regions compared to their counterparts in inland areas.

Rather than perpetuating an overly optimistic portrayal of border regions as natural hubs of European identity, our study urges a reevaluation of prevailing assumptions. While we do not outright dismiss the potential influence of border regions on European attachment, we propose a nuanced understanding. Border regions may indeed serve as focal points for European integration, intensifying the “experience of Europe” compared to inland regions. However, they may also be arenas of heightened conflict where national differences manifest more acutely, potentially leading to detachment from Europe among residents who directly witness the challenges of cross-national connections. Thus, border regions may simultaneously foster cooperation and conflict across borders, resulting in a net neutral effect on European attachment overall.

As policymakers continue to invest substantial resources in promoting cross-border cooperation, our study underscores the importance of adopting evidence-based approaches. Our data unequivocally indicates that border regions are not inherently foster greater European attachment. This insight is crucial for shaping informed policies that accurately reflect the dynamics of European identity formation.

Dr. Moritz Rehm is a postdoc at the Department of European Social Research at Saarland University. His research is focused on the political economy of European integration as well as on financial assistance in the European Union. He studied at the College of Europe in Bruges and holds a doctorate in political science from the University of Luxembourg.

 

Prof. Dr. Martin Schröder is professor of sociology at Saarland University, Germany. He did his doctorate at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne and studied at Sciences Po Paris. He was a postdoc at Harvard University and a Visiting Professor at Sciences Po Paris. He is currently in what explains a European identity.

 

Stt

Georg Wenzelburger is a political scientist and holds the Chair of Comparative European Politics at Saarland University. His research is centred on the comparative study of public policies with a focus on Western Europe. Recent work has focussed on the politics of law and order, welfare state reforms, digital politics and insecurity and has been published in academic journals such as the British Journal of Political Science, the European Journal of Political Research, the Journal of European Public Policy or West European Politics.

The post Debunking the Myth: Exploring the Role of Border Regions in European Identity Formation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Summary: India is reducing its dependence on Russian arms due to Russia’s diminished export capacity amid the Russo-Ukraine War.

-This shift may benefit the U.S., with which India is strengthening defense ties.

-However, India must balance this with maintaining good relations with Russia to avoid pushing Moscow closer to China.

-India aims to bolster domestic production and has sought arms deals with the U.S. and France, while still relying on Russian oil.

India Reduces Reliance on Russian Arms Amidst Ukraine War Impact

India is cutting its dependence on Russian arms sales. The move away from Moscow comes as Russia’s capacity to export arms is reduced on account of the Russo-Ukraine War. 

But India will be forced to maintain cordial relations with Russia, lest it push the Kremlin’s leader, President Vladimir Putin, toward India’s greatest rival, China. 

India’s pivot away from Russia is a significant blow for Putin’s regime. India is the world’s biggest arms importer, and in an effort to compensate, India will likely turn to the United States, one of Russia’s chief rivals. 

“We are not likely to sign any major military deal with Russia,” Nandan Unnikrishnan of the New Delhi think tank Observer Research Foundation said, Reuters reported. “That would be a red line for Washington.”

The United States will hope to pick up a portion of the business India withholds from Russia. India purchased more than $60 billion of weapons from Russia over the last two decades alone.

Russia recognizes the importance of the Indian partnership and has maintained pressure on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government. Russia has recently solicited India to buy Kamov helicopters, Sukhoi jets, and MiG jets. Modi has resisted, however, focusing instead on increasing domestic production with the aid of Western technology.

“Such efforts would better fit Modi’s ‘Make in India’ programme to encourage domestic manufacturing, as he makes a rare bid for a third term in general elections,” according to Reuters. “India expects to spend nearly $100 billion on defence orders over the next decade.”

In addition to purchases from the United States, India has courted France for fighter jet purchases. India also has designs on co-building submarines with a European nation.

Pivoting Toward the United States

The United States has been working to strengthen ties in the Indo-Pacific in an effort to counter China’s rise. As such, India is of outsized strategic importance to the United States. And India, bitter rivals of China, is similarly interested in protecting against Chinese President Xi Jinping’s increasingly assertive and increasingly capable military.

Collaboration between the U.S. and India on weapons sales and development has already begun. In 2023, the two nations signed a deal for General Electric to produce jet engines in India for use with Indian-made fighter jets. The deal represents the first time the U.S. will allow its jet engines to be made abroad with a non-ally.

Further collaboration is expected in “areas ranging from air combat to intelligence,” Reuters reported. 

Walking a Fine Line with Russia

Although India intends to strengthen ties with the United States, it must simultaneously avoid alienating Russia – easier said than done, given the rivalry between Washington and Moscow.

While India seeks arms imports from another source, the country still counts on Russia for oil.  

India needs to maintain oil purchases from Russia to “keep [Russia] as far away as possible from China,” Unnikrishnan told Reuters.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

In dieser Notiz für die Medien werden die geplanten Briefings und praktische Unterstützung für Medienschaffende, die vom 6.-9. Juni über die Europawahl berichten, näher erläutert.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2024 - EP

Ez a médiatájékoztató ismerteti a június 6-9-i európai parlamenti választásokról tudósító újságírók számára elérhető tájékoztatókat és gyakorlati segítséget.

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2024 - EP

Summary: The Nimitz-class supercarrier USS George Washington (CVN-73) will soon replace USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) as the U.S. Navy's forward-deployed aircraft carrier. This will be the fourth Navy vessel named after the founding father. The most notable namesake was USS George Washington (SSBN-598), the first ballistic missile submarine. Originally an attack submarine, it was modified to carry Polaris missiles and became a key component of the U.S. nuclear triad, conducting numerous deterrent patrols during the Cold War.

USS George Washington: From SSBN Ballistic Missile Pioneer to Forward-Deployed Carrier

The Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier USS George Washington (CVN-73) will soon serve as the U.S. Navy's forward-deployed aircraft carrier, relieving her sister warship USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) in the role. 

CVN-73, the sixth Nimitz-class carrier, is the fourth Navy vessel named to honor the founding father. Previous holders of the name include an 18th-century frigate and a converted German ocean liner seized by the U.S. during the First World War.

But it was the third vessel named for the nation's first president that left the most important mark on the history of the Navy.

Meet the First Ballistic Missile Carrier

USS George Washington (SSBN-598) was the first ballistic missile carrier in the U.S. Navy, but she was not a purpose-built SSBN. Originally laid down as the nuclear-powered fast attack submarine USS Scorpion (SSN-589), construction was halted and the boat was cut in half, with a 39.6 meter (130 foot) missile compartment added to accommodate the Polaris ballistic missile.

The Federation of American Scientists described the submarine’s impact: "With its entry into service in December 1959 the United States instantly gained the most powerful deterrent force imaginable – a stealth platform with enormous nuclear firepower."

SSBN-598 emerged from the Electric Boat Company yards in June 1960 as the lead boat of a new class of ballistic missile submarines. It sailed to Cape Canaveral, Florida, to be armed with two UGM-27 Polaris two-stage, solid-propellant missiles. The nuclear-powered boat proceeded to the U.S. Atlantic Missile Test Range with officials from the Polaris Submarine program, and on July 20, 1960, it completed the first Polaris missile launch from a submerged submarine.

Although the missile was unarmed, it was a historic moment that was confirmed in a message from the boat's captain, Commander James Osborn, to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. It read, "Polaris from out of the deep to target. Perfect."

A second missile was launched an hour later, traveling 1,770 km (1,100 miles) down the firing range, where it struck the target area. The tests were duplicated two weeks later before USS George Washington traveled to Charleston to take on board her full load of 16 Polaris missiles. After receiving those missiles, the single submarine carried ordnance that was more powerful than all the bombs dropped during the entire Second World War.

A Component of the Nuclear Triad

SSBN-598 completed her first armed patrol after 66 days on January 21, 1961. It marked the beginning of her service as part of the U.S. nuclear triad. Beginning later that year, the submarine conducted an untold number of classified deterrent patrols near the Soviet coastline, rotating with two crews. Within just a handful of years, USS George Washington had traveled more than 100,000 miles.

The warship received an overhaul in 1965 and remained in service for another 20 years. While she was the first submarine to carry a nuclear-armed ballistic missile, it should be noted that the boat's motto was "First in Peace."

The third vessel named to honor the Revolutionary War general and the nation's first president was decommissioned in January 1985. Only her conning tower was saved, and it is now on display at the Submarine Force Museum in Groton, Connecticut.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: The Italian Navy's flagship aircraft carrier, ITS Cavour, has departed for its first Indo-Pacific deployment, including visits to Australia and Japan.

-It marks the first port call by the Italian flagship to Japan. The deployment will involve joint training exercises with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) on operating the F-35B Lightning II fighters.

-Italy's carrier has three F-35Bs, with more expected to join.

-The JMSDF is also preparing its Izumo-class ships for F-35B operations, enhancing Japan's naval capabilities against China's expansion.

Italian Flagship Carrier Training With F-35s in Japan

Italy and Japan were allied in both world wars, and today remain key partners. That fact was on display on Saturday as the Italian Navy's flagship aircraft carrier ITS Cavour departed her home port of Taranto in southern Italy for her first deployment to the Indo-Pacific. The flattop, which was commissioned in 2008 and can carry a dozen rotary aircraft or eight fixed-wing fighters, is scheduled to visit Australia and then will head to Japan in August.

It will mark the first-ever port call by the Italian flagship to Japan, and the most recent deployment of a European aircraft carrier to the region, following those of the UK and France.

Last July, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) announced that it would conduct training exercises with the Italian Navy on the operation of the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lighting II, the short/vertical takeoff and landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. The Italian Navy currently operates the fifth-generation multirole stealth fighter.

In early 2021, the Italian carrier took part in training exercises with the United States Navy from Naval Air Station Patuxent River (NAS Pax River), Maryland. Italy is a Level II partner on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, with the Italian Air Force first taking delivery of the Lightning II in 2016, while the Italian Navy received its first F-35Bs in 2020. The Italian sea service has three of a planned 15 now in service, and it is likely all of those aircraft will accompany ITS Cavour on her Indo-Pacific deployment.

Moreover, while in the waters of Japan, it is likely the flight deck could get a bit more crowded. The JMSDF currently expects to receive its first batch of F-35Bs this year, in advance of carrier operations.

Joint Carrier Operations Helping Both Nations

Both Tokyo and Rome will likely welcome any joint operations involving the F-35B. The Italian would likely see how its carrier can operate with additional aircraft from the flight deck of its flagship, while the JMSDF is seeing its two Izumo-class helicopters being converted to true aircraft carriers that can operate the Lightning II.

Both JS Izumo and JS Kaga have been undergoing major modifications that will allow the 800-foot (248-meter) long vessels to become the first carriers operated by the island nation since the Second World War. In August 2013, Japanese officials announced that the two helicopter destroyers would be modified for use in national defense – notably to confront China's naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific.

As previously reported, the Japanese military confirmed that the Izumo-class was designed with the possibility of operating such fixed-wing aircraft. Yet, that fact was not made public as Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which was adopted after World War II, prohibited Japan from possessing offensive military weapons including aircraft carriers.

Japan is now turning to an old and faithful ally to help it prepare for carrier operations again.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

This media advisory outlines the briefings and practical assistance available to journalists covering the 6-9 June European elections.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This media advisory outlines the briefings and practical assistance available to journalists covering the 6-9 June European elections.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Find here information on electoral rules, poll opening and closing times and candidates for the 2024 European election in EU member states, as well as useful figures.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Find here information on electoral rules, poll opening and closing times and candidates for the 2024 European election in EU member states, as well as useful figures.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP