Agrégateur de flux

Für Biodiversität bietet das Kunming-Montreal Globale Rahmenabkommen zusammen mit dem neuen UN-Abkommen zum Schutz der Biodiversität auf Hoher See ein einmaliges Gelegenheitsfenster. Der WBGU empfiehlt das Leitbild eines multifunktionalen Flächenmosaiks: Schutz und Nutzung werden so zusammen gedacht, dass Mehrgewinne für Natur und Mensch entstehen. Deutschland sollte international entschlossen vorangehen und Prozesse zur Umsetzung beider Abkommen aufsetzen, Dialogforen und Vorreiterkoalitionen initiieren sowie eine Bildungs- und Kommunikationsoffensive starten. Biodiversitätsförderung sollte nicht allein aus Steuergeldern finanziert werden, sondern Private einbeziehen, etwa durch die Umwidmung umweltschädlicher Subventionen und durch klare Berichterstattung und Taxonomie. Die Kosten des Nichthandelns sollten verstanden werden. Die Staatengemeinschaft hat sich 2022 auf einen neuen globalen Rahmen für die Biodiversität (GBF) und 2023 auf das Abkommen zum Schutz der Biodiversität auf Hoher See (BBNJ) geeinigt. Dieser politische Konsens spiegelt die wissenschaftlich erwiesene Dringlichkeit von Biodiversitätsschutz und belegt die Kooperationsbereitschaft zu diesem Thema selbst in Jahren angespannter internationaler Beziehungen. Biodiversität ist ein Gemeingut und essenzielle Voraussetzung für eine gesunde Zukunft der Menschen und der Arten, mit denen sie die Erde teilen. Sie ermöglicht Ökosystemleistungen, z. B. die Bereitstellung sauberen Trinkwassers oder die Bestäubung von Nutz- und Wildpflanzen, für deren Sicherung Arten und Ökosysteme angemessen große und vernetzte Flächen brauchen. Der WBGU schlägt vor, die Flächenziele des GBF entsprechend dem Leitbild eines multifunktionalen Flächenmosaiks umzusetzen, in dem Schutz und Nutzung so zusammen gedacht werden, dass Mehrgewinne für Natur und Mensch generiert werden. Dieses Leitbild bietet allen Akteuren Orientierung für biodiversitätsschonendes und -förderndes Verhalten.

Für Biodiversität bietet das Kunming-Montreal Globale Rahmenabkommen zusammen mit dem neuen UN-Abkommen zum Schutz der Biodiversität auf Hoher See ein einmaliges Gelegenheitsfenster. Der WBGU empfiehlt das Leitbild eines multifunktionalen Flächenmosaiks: Schutz und Nutzung werden so zusammen gedacht, dass Mehrgewinne für Natur und Mensch entstehen. Deutschland sollte international entschlossen vorangehen und Prozesse zur Umsetzung beider Abkommen aufsetzen, Dialogforen und Vorreiterkoalitionen initiieren sowie eine Bildungs- und Kommunikationsoffensive starten. Biodiversitätsförderung sollte nicht allein aus Steuergeldern finanziert werden, sondern Private einbeziehen, etwa durch die Umwidmung umweltschädlicher Subventionen und durch klare Berichterstattung und Taxonomie. Die Kosten des Nichthandelns sollten verstanden werden. Die Staatengemeinschaft hat sich 2022 auf einen neuen globalen Rahmen für die Biodiversität (GBF) und 2023 auf das Abkommen zum Schutz der Biodiversität auf Hoher See (BBNJ) geeinigt. Dieser politische Konsens spiegelt die wissenschaftlich erwiesene Dringlichkeit von Biodiversitätsschutz und belegt die Kooperationsbereitschaft zu diesem Thema selbst in Jahren angespannter internationaler Beziehungen. Biodiversität ist ein Gemeingut und essenzielle Voraussetzung für eine gesunde Zukunft der Menschen und der Arten, mit denen sie die Erde teilen. Sie ermöglicht Ökosystemleistungen, z. B. die Bereitstellung sauberen Trinkwassers oder die Bestäubung von Nutz- und Wildpflanzen, für deren Sicherung Arten und Ökosysteme angemessen große und vernetzte Flächen brauchen. Der WBGU schlägt vor, die Flächenziele des GBF entsprechend dem Leitbild eines multifunktionalen Flächenmosaiks umzusetzen, in dem Schutz und Nutzung so zusammen gedacht werden, dass Mehrgewinne für Natur und Mensch generiert werden. Dieses Leitbild bietet allen Akteuren Orientierung für biodiversitätsschonendes und -förderndes Verhalten.

Für Biodiversität bietet das Kunming-Montreal Globale Rahmenabkommen zusammen mit dem neuen UN-Abkommen zum Schutz der Biodiversität auf Hoher See ein einmaliges Gelegenheitsfenster. Der WBGU empfiehlt das Leitbild eines multifunktionalen Flächenmosaiks: Schutz und Nutzung werden so zusammen gedacht, dass Mehrgewinne für Natur und Mensch entstehen. Deutschland sollte international entschlossen vorangehen und Prozesse zur Umsetzung beider Abkommen aufsetzen, Dialogforen und Vorreiterkoalitionen initiieren sowie eine Bildungs- und Kommunikationsoffensive starten. Biodiversitätsförderung sollte nicht allein aus Steuergeldern finanziert werden, sondern Private einbeziehen, etwa durch die Umwidmung umweltschädlicher Subventionen und durch klare Berichterstattung und Taxonomie. Die Kosten des Nichthandelns sollten verstanden werden. Die Staatengemeinschaft hat sich 2022 auf einen neuen globalen Rahmen für die Biodiversität (GBF) und 2023 auf das Abkommen zum Schutz der Biodiversität auf Hoher See (BBNJ) geeinigt. Dieser politische Konsens spiegelt die wissenschaftlich erwiesene Dringlichkeit von Biodiversitätsschutz und belegt die Kooperationsbereitschaft zu diesem Thema selbst in Jahren angespannter internationaler Beziehungen. Biodiversität ist ein Gemeingut und essenzielle Voraussetzung für eine gesunde Zukunft der Menschen und der Arten, mit denen sie die Erde teilen. Sie ermöglicht Ökosystemleistungen, z. B. die Bereitstellung sauberen Trinkwassers oder die Bestäubung von Nutz- und Wildpflanzen, für deren Sicherung Arten und Ökosysteme angemessen große und vernetzte Flächen brauchen. Der WBGU schlägt vor, die Flächenziele des GBF entsprechend dem Leitbild eines multifunktionalen Flächenmosaiks umzusetzen, in dem Schutz und Nutzung so zusammen gedacht werden, dass Mehrgewinne für Natur und Mensch generiert werden. Dieses Leitbild bietet allen Akteuren Orientierung für biodiversitätsschonendes und -förderndes Verhalten.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a hallmark of China's global rise. While the BRI has unfolded as a global platform focused on bilateral relations, the Chinese government has also tried to expand links between the BRI and international organizations, notably the United Nations. Available evidence about UN–BRI relations suggests, however, that an initial honeymoon phase with mushrooming projects and public endorsements was followed by a sharp decline in engagement. This article argues that a focus on inter-governor legitimation attempts helps understand the rise and fall of UN–BRI relations. Based on publicly available evidence, internal documentation and stakeholder interviews, it shows how legitimation informed motivations on both sides to invest in UN–BRI relations, and how western opposition subsequently led to UN entities reducing their engagement. Empirically, the article contributes to the literature on China's global role, evolving power relations at the UN, and the proliferation of geopolitically motivated flagship initiatives across UN member states. Conceptually, it speaks to the expanding debate about legitimation in world politics through a more systematic engagement with relational legitimation dynamics. A focus on one-sided or mutual legitimation attempts offers a conceptual tool for analysing how interactions among global governors and their audiences unfold, and how international organizations try (and fail) to strengthen their resilience in light of an increasingly polarized membership.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a hallmark of China's global rise. While the BRI has unfolded as a global platform focused on bilateral relations, the Chinese government has also tried to expand links between the BRI and international organizations, notably the United Nations. Available evidence about UN–BRI relations suggests, however, that an initial honeymoon phase with mushrooming projects and public endorsements was followed by a sharp decline in engagement. This article argues that a focus on inter-governor legitimation attempts helps understand the rise and fall of UN–BRI relations. Based on publicly available evidence, internal documentation and stakeholder interviews, it shows how legitimation informed motivations on both sides to invest in UN–BRI relations, and how western opposition subsequently led to UN entities reducing their engagement. Empirically, the article contributes to the literature on China's global role, evolving power relations at the UN, and the proliferation of geopolitically motivated flagship initiatives across UN member states. Conceptually, it speaks to the expanding debate about legitimation in world politics through a more systematic engagement with relational legitimation dynamics. A focus on one-sided or mutual legitimation attempts offers a conceptual tool for analysing how interactions among global governors and their audiences unfold, and how international organizations try (and fail) to strengthen their resilience in light of an increasingly polarized membership.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a hallmark of China's global rise. While the BRI has unfolded as a global platform focused on bilateral relations, the Chinese government has also tried to expand links between the BRI and international organizations, notably the United Nations. Available evidence about UN–BRI relations suggests, however, that an initial honeymoon phase with mushrooming projects and public endorsements was followed by a sharp decline in engagement. This article argues that a focus on inter-governor legitimation attempts helps understand the rise and fall of UN–BRI relations. Based on publicly available evidence, internal documentation and stakeholder interviews, it shows how legitimation informed motivations on both sides to invest in UN–BRI relations, and how western opposition subsequently led to UN entities reducing their engagement. Empirically, the article contributes to the literature on China's global role, evolving power relations at the UN, and the proliferation of geopolitically motivated flagship initiatives across UN member states. Conceptually, it speaks to the expanding debate about legitimation in world politics through a more systematic engagement with relational legitimation dynamics. A focus on one-sided or mutual legitimation attempts offers a conceptual tool for analysing how interactions among global governors and their audiences unfold, and how international organizations try (and fail) to strengthen their resilience in light of an increasingly polarized membership.

Asociaţia "Forumul Judecătorilor din România"
Közösségi jogi elvek
Jogállamiság: az uniós jog nem írja elő, hogy a bírák és ügyészek szakmai egyesületei számára jogot kell biztosítani az ügyészek kinevezésével kapcsolatos határozatok vitatására

Ryanair kontra Bizottság
Állami támogatás
The General Court of the European Union annuls the decision of the Commission to approve restructuring aid for charter airline Condor

Izuzquiza és társai kontra Parlament
Intézményi jog
Transparency: the European Parliament must give access, in the interests of public scrutiny, to information relating to a Member of the European Parliament who has been convicted in a court of law

While the prospect of reduced military spending has provoked strong reactions and commitments from both sides of Britain's political divide, the reduction in the intelligence budget, the drastic scale of which Intelligence Online revealed (IO, 19/03/24), is causing a certain

The Italian company DEAS (Difesa e Analisi Sistemi) is gradually establishing itself as the Italian Ministry of Defence's cyber defence

While the biggest spenders in the Gulf space race, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have shown few loyalties

During his week-long visit to the United States at the end of April, his first since his election in October

New court documents in a case brought against the credit rating agency Egan-Jones by two of its former executives, reveal

Austin - Josh Chandler and Kyeson Utley join forces as private investigatorsTexan cyber intelligence firm SpookyGood and Californian investigator Justice

Lithuanian campaign to fight violence against women, French platform to empower young people, and German visual journalism on Europe are winners of the 2024 prize.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

On 24 March 2024, presidential elections were held in Senegal, with opposition politician Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye, who was 43 at the time, emerging as the winner. On 2 April 2024, he was sworn in as the fifth President of the Republic of Senegal. This event may mark a turning point in the country’s recent history. It once again demonstrates Senegal’s special position in the overall political context of the West Africa/Sahel region, in which military coups have increasingly taken place in recent years. This election runs counter to the current trend of increasing autocracy – at a global level too. During the three years prior to the election, Senegal suffered a deep political crisis that tested the constitutional state to its limits. Although the state institutions demonstrated their stability and resilience during this period and the achievements of democracy and the rule of law were able to be secured for the time being, due in large part to the country’s strong civil society, weaknesses became apparent during this crisis in connection with the judiciary, freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Security forces used violence to stifle protests and demonstrations by parts of the population against what they saw as the illegal arrest and imprisonment of opposition politicians. Dozens of people died and several hundreds were injured as a result of these measures. Well over a thousand people were imprisoned without a proper trial. Up until ten days before his election as president, Faye himself was still in prison under these conditions. This makes it all the more remarkable that – and how – Senegal managed to overcome this crisis. The present article examines the political, social and constitutional factors that led to what now looks set to be a positive outcome of this conflict. The crisis, which has been overcome for the time being, and the new president’s programme suggest that Senegal, too, is following a trend observed for some years now in the West Africa/Sahel region involving a redefinition of the state and of its duties, powers and services – and is doing so by democratically sound means. Faye and his partners have been battling the long-established political class. They promised their voters fundamental reforms of the state institutions and a rationalisation and streamlining of the public administration. Moreover, they vowed to take resolute steps to fight corruption, clientelism and embezzlement of public finances, goods and resources, which have all been increasing considerably in recent years. The unambiguous election result has given them a clear mandate to do so. The inauguration of President Faye will also partly alter the balance of power within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In the years ahead, there will be further shifts towards a younger generation of political elites in various countries in the region. In future, Germany and the European Union will need to pay greater attention to the fact that the African states are placing more emphasis on their own cultural identity and are increasingly asserting their own sovereignty in political discourse.

On 24 March 2024, presidential elections were held in Senegal, with opposition politician Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye, who was 43 at the time, emerging as the winner. On 2 April 2024, he was sworn in as the fifth President of the Republic of Senegal. This event may mark a turning point in the country’s recent history. It once again demonstrates Senegal’s special position in the overall political context of the West Africa/Sahel region, in which military coups have increasingly taken place in recent years. This election runs counter to the current trend of increasing autocracy – at a global level too. During the three years prior to the election, Senegal suffered a deep political crisis that tested the constitutional state to its limits. Although the state institutions demonstrated their stability and resilience during this period and the achievements of democracy and the rule of law were able to be secured for the time being, due in large part to the country’s strong civil society, weaknesses became apparent during this crisis in connection with the judiciary, freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Security forces used violence to stifle protests and demonstrations by parts of the population against what they saw as the illegal arrest and imprisonment of opposition politicians. Dozens of people died and several hundreds were injured as a result of these measures. Well over a thousand people were imprisoned without a proper trial. Up until ten days before his election as president, Faye himself was still in prison under these conditions. This makes it all the more remarkable that – and how – Senegal managed to overcome this crisis. The present article examines the political, social and constitutional factors that led to what now looks set to be a positive outcome of this conflict. The crisis, which has been overcome for the time being, and the new president’s programme suggest that Senegal, too, is following a trend observed for some years now in the West Africa/Sahel region involving a redefinition of the state and of its duties, powers and services – and is doing so by democratically sound means. Faye and his partners have been battling the long-established political class. They promised their voters fundamental reforms of the state institutions and a rationalisation and streamlining of the public administration. Moreover, they vowed to take resolute steps to fight corruption, clientelism and embezzlement of public finances, goods and resources, which have all been increasing considerably in recent years. The unambiguous election result has given them a clear mandate to do so. The inauguration of President Faye will also partly alter the balance of power within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In the years ahead, there will be further shifts towards a younger generation of political elites in various countries in the region. In future, Germany and the European Union will need to pay greater attention to the fact that the African states are placing more emphasis on their own cultural identity and are increasingly asserting their own sovereignty in political discourse.

On 24 March 2024, presidential elections were held in Senegal, with opposition politician Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye, who was 43 at the time, emerging as the winner. On 2 April 2024, he was sworn in as the fifth President of the Republic of Senegal. This event may mark a turning point in the country’s recent history. It once again demonstrates Senegal’s special position in the overall political context of the West Africa/Sahel region, in which military coups have increasingly taken place in recent years. This election runs counter to the current trend of increasing autocracy – at a global level too. During the three years prior to the election, Senegal suffered a deep political crisis that tested the constitutional state to its limits. Although the state institutions demonstrated their stability and resilience during this period and the achievements of democracy and the rule of law were able to be secured for the time being, due in large part to the country’s strong civil society, weaknesses became apparent during this crisis in connection with the judiciary, freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Security forces used violence to stifle protests and demonstrations by parts of the population against what they saw as the illegal arrest and imprisonment of opposition politicians. Dozens of people died and several hundreds were injured as a result of these measures. Well over a thousand people were imprisoned without a proper trial. Up until ten days before his election as president, Faye himself was still in prison under these conditions. This makes it all the more remarkable that – and how – Senegal managed to overcome this crisis. The present article examines the political, social and constitutional factors that led to what now looks set to be a positive outcome of this conflict. The crisis, which has been overcome for the time being, and the new president’s programme suggest that Senegal, too, is following a trend observed for some years now in the West Africa/Sahel region involving a redefinition of the state and of its duties, powers and services – and is doing so by democratically sound means. Faye and his partners have been battling the long-established political class. They promised their voters fundamental reforms of the state institutions and a rationalisation and streamlining of the public administration. Moreover, they vowed to take resolute steps to fight corruption, clientelism and embezzlement of public finances, goods and resources, which have all been increasing considerably in recent years. The unambiguous election result has given them a clear mandate to do so. The inauguration of President Faye will also partly alter the balance of power within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In the years ahead, there will be further shifts towards a younger generation of political elites in various countries in the region. In future, Germany and the European Union will need to pay greater attention to the fact that the African states are placing more emphasis on their own cultural identity and are increasingly asserting their own sovereignty in political discourse.