Guerre de 14-18 en Serbie : sur les traces d'Archibald Reiss
14-18. La mémoire oubliée des Poilus « jardiniers de Salonique »
14-18 : Miloš Crnjanski, un jeune écrivain dans le tourbillon de la Grande Guerre
Guerre de 14-18 en Serbie : sur les traces d'Archibald Reiss
14-18. La mémoire oubliée des Poilus « jardiniers de Salonique »
14-18 : Miloš Crnjanski, un jeune écrivain dans le tourbillon de la Grande Guerre
17 août 1960. Indépendance du Gabon, ancienne colonie française.
12 février 1961. Élection de Léon Mba à la présidence de la République.
27 novembre 1967. Décès de Léon Mba. Sous la pression de la France, Albert-Bernard Bongo, vice-président, lui succède.
12 mars 1968. Le Parti démocrate gabonais est désigné parti unique.
25 février 1973. Seul candidat, Bongo est élu président avec 99,6 % des suffrages. Converti à l'islam, il devient El Hadj Omar Bongo.
Avril 1990. Rétablissement du pluripartisme.
Mai-juillet 1990. Officiellement destinée à l'évacuation des ressortissants français, l'opération militaire « Requin » permet à Paris de rétablir l'ordre à Libreville après des émeutes insurrectionnelles.
5 décembre 1993. La réélection contestée de Bongo provoque un soulèvement, sévèrement réprimé.
8 juin 2009. Décès d'Omar Bongo.
3 septembre 2009. Élection contestée de M. Ali Bongo Ondimba, fils d'Omar Bongo. Émeutes contre les intérêts français.
13 février 2014. Perquisition dans une villa de Nice appartenant à la famille Bongo dans le cadre de l'enquête sur les biens mal acquis.
31 août 2016. Réélection contestée de M. Bongo. Les manifestations de protestation sont durement réprimées.
République, régime parlementaire
Résultats des dernières élections générales, 8 novembre 2015 :
• LND (Ligue nationale pour la démocratie, social-démocrate) : 60,27 % à la Chambre des nationalités (Chambre haute), 57,95 % à la Chambre des représentants (Chambre basse).
• USDP (Parti de la solidarité et du développement de l'Union, nationaliste) : 4,91 % à la Chambre des nationalités, 6,81 % à la Chambre des représentants.
Président : Htin Kyaw (LND).
IndonésieRépublique, régime présidentiel
Résultats des dernières élections législatives, 9 avril 2014 :
• PDI-P (Parti démocratique indonésien de lutte, social-démocrate) : 18,95 % des voix.
• Golkar (Parti des groupes fonctionnels, libéral-conservateur) : 14,75 %.
• Gerindra (Parti du mouvement de la grande Indonésie, gauche populaire nationaliste) : 11,81 %.
Résultats de la dernière élection présidentielle, 22 juillet 2014 :
• Joko Widodo (PDI-P) : 53,15 %, élu.
• Prabowo Subianto (Gerindra) : 46,85 %.
MalaisieMonarchie fédérale, régime parlementaire
Résultats des dernières élections générales, 5 mai 2013 :
• Barisan Nasional (Front national, national-conservateur) : 50,87 %.
• Pakatan Rakyat (Pacte du peuple, social-démocrate) : 47,38 %.
Premier ministre : Najib Razak (Barisan Nasional).
PhilippinesRépublique, régime présidentiel
Résultats de la dernière élection présidentielle, 9 mai 2016 :
• Rodrigo Duterte (Parti démocratique des Philippines-Pouvoir populaire) : 39,01 %, élu.
• Mar Roxas (Parti libéral) : 23,45 %.
Résultats des dernières élections générales, 9 mai 2016 :
• Parti libéral : 41,73 % à la Chambre des représentants (Chambre basse).
• NPC (Coalition nationaliste populaire, conservatrice) : 17,19 % à la Chambre des représentants.
SingapourRépublique, régime parlementaire
Résultats de la dernière élection présidentielle, 27 août 2011 :
• Tony Tan (indépendant) : 35,2 %, élu.
• Tan Cheng Bock (indépendant) : 34,85 %.
Résultats des dernières élections générales, 11 septembre 2015 :
• PAP (Parti d'action populaire, conservateur) : 69,86 %.
• Parti des travailleurs (social-démocrate) : 12,48 %.
Premier ministre : Lee Hsien Loong (PAP).
ThaïlandeMonarchie, régime militaire
En mai 2014, un coup d'État a renversé la première ministre Yingluck Shinawatra (Peua Thai), élue en 2011. Le 7 août 2016, environ 61 % des électeurs ont voté « oui » lors d'un référendum constitutionnel organisé par la junte au pouvoir, qui promet des élections en 2017.
Premier ministre : général Prayuth Chan-o-cha.
Monsieur Barack Obama laissera derrière lui un paysage politique méconnaissable. Divisés comme jamais, les républicains présentent au scrutin de novembre un homme d'affaires opposé au libre-échange, haï par les caciques du parti mais soutenu par les classes populaires blanches. Lors des primaires démocrates, un sénateur se disant « socialiste » a tenu la dragée haute à la candidate de l'establishment. Que s'est-il passé pour que le pays qui a désigné son premier président noir en 2008 n'ait aujourd'hui d'alternative qu'entre un milliardaire aux propos sulfureux et une fidèle alliée de Wall Street ?
Dans sa dernière livraison, Manière de voir (1) apporte des éléments de réponse à cette question. À commencer par l'analyse des réalignements politiques opérés au sein de chaque camp sur des sujets comme l'immigration, le libre-échange, le salaire minimum ou l'avortement. Mais ce numéro se penche également sur la situation sociale du pays. Avec 5 % de chômage et 2,4 % de croissance, l'économie américaine semble, à première vue, s'être remise de la grande récession de 2008. Pourtant, les inégalités atteignent des niveaux record. Pour les migrants clandestins, les travailleurs pauvres, les victimes de l'incarcération de masse, les résidents des anciennes villes industrielles, la crise reste une réalité bien tangible, expliquant la désillusion qui saisit nombre d'électeurs à l'issue des deux mandats de M. Obama.
Au nombre des déçus, on retrouve évidemment les Afro-Américains. L'élection d'un président noir avait renvoyé au monde l'image d'une Amérique apaisée, débarrassée de ses clivages raciaux. Huit ans plus tard, tandis que les États gouvernés par les républicains multiplient les artifices pour les décourager d'aller voter et que les forces de l'ordre continuent de tuer un Noir tous les trois jours, l'espoir a laissé place à la colère. De Ferguson à Charlotte, de Baton Rouge à Dallas, les manifestations contre les violences policières ont essaimé à travers les États-Unis, donnant naissance au mouvement Black Lives Matter (« Les vies des Noirs comptent »), qui poursuit la longue histoire de la lutte pour l'égalité raciale, tout en réinventant ses formes d'action.
Enfin, l'actuel tumulte américain revêt une dimension géopolitique. Pour la première fois depuis l'entre-deux-guerres, le Parti républicain présente à l'élection présidentielle un candidat hostile aux interventions militaires à l'étranger. Afin de comprendre cette évolution, Manière de voir décrypte la politique étrangère conduite par la Maison Blanche depuis 2008 : de l'intervention en Libye au refus de renverser M. Bachar Al-Assad en Syrie, des bombardements illégaux par drones à l'accord signé avec l'Iran, du rapprochement avec Cuba au refroidissement avec la Russie, peut-on déceler une logique derrière ces choix en apparence contradictoires ?
(1) « Affrontements américains », Manière de voir, no 149, octobre-novembre 2016, 8,50 euros, en kiosques.
Paysan en Chartreuse, Vincent Gilbert réagit à l'article « Éloge de la fermière » (août), extrait du dernier livre de Benoît Duteurtre.
Je rejoins l'auteur sur le constat de la menace de disparition de l'agriculture de montagne. Mais je pense que la principale menace qui pèse sur la ferme de Josette Antoine n'est autre que la mentalité totalement décalée des citadins apprentis campagnards.
Pêle-mêle, je note une confusion entre les termes « pasteurisation » et « stérilisation », entre « élevage hors-sol » (qui est effectivement absurde) et « création d'un bâtiment avec une dalle ».
La référence à cette magnifique agriculture montagnarde née au Moyen Âge semble oublier qu'à l'époque les agriculteurs étaient pour la plupart des serfs travaillant pour un seigneur peu concerné par les droits et la protection sociale de ses « larbins ».
Enfin, le paragraphe sur la possible reprise de l'exploitation par le fils de Josette néglige la réalité du travail quotidien dans une ferme. Certes, les vieux bâtiments sont bucoliques, adorables, poétiques... Mais ils sont inadaptés aux pratiques actuelles de l'agriculture, et ce même pour de petites exploitations agricoles de montagne. Et je ne parle pas là des normes qui semblent vous révulser. Je parle de fonctionnalité, de praticité, de gain de temps et d'économie... de sa santé !
Après la parution de l'enquête de Christelle Gérand « Aix-Marseille, laboratoire de la fusion des universités » (septembre), le président de cette université, M. Yvon Berland, a souhaité apporter son point de vue. En voici les principaux éléments.
Aix-Marseille Université (AMU) ne procède pas d'un pari de gigantisme, mais d'une démarche volontariste visant à décloisonner, constituer et coordonner une masse critique de compétences et d'excellence dans le secteur public. Il y avait des raisons intrinsèques à fusionner les trois anciennes universités, ne serait-ce que l'enjeu de cohérence et de lisibilité en matière de recherche et de formation.
Si AMU avait eu le classement de Shanghaï pour seul horizon, il lui eût fallu alors ne pas intégrer les lettres, langues et sciences humaines, pourtant essentielles aux savoirs, mais dont les publications des enseignants-chercheurs ne sont pas ou peu prises en compte dans ce classement, qui juge de la performance de l'établissement au regard du nombre total d'enseignants-chercheurs.
Vous soupçonnez le président de l'université de clientélisme. Compte tenu de la très large majorité qui soutient sa politique, s'il y avait clientélisme, presque tout le monde serait déjà servi ! Et comment expliquer que des opposants notoires (que vous citez à plaisir) aient également bénéficié de financements ? Le seul critère ayant régi le financement des projets dans le cadre des Initiatives d'excellence (Idex) a été l'expertise internationale indépendante.
Vous contestez des faits pourtant incontestables tels que l'augmentation du régime indemnitaire des personnels administratifs, la réfection des locaux (dont la vétusté ne dépend pas de la fusion) ou encore l'augmentation des dotations en sciences sociales.
Vous critiquez le fait que l'université se préoccupe de l'employabilité de ses étudiants et son dialogue avec le monde socio-économique dans lequel se trouve l'essentiel des emplois. Vous auriez pu souligner le travail d'AMU, qui, au travers de ses accords-cadres avec de grands industriels, mais aussi avec le tissu de PME-PMI locales, facilite l'insertion professionnelle de ses étudiants et contribue à la reconnaissance du diplôme de doctorat dans le monde socio-économique.
Il est triste de voir éreintée de la sorte une université qui travaille, a connu de premiers succès et est déterminée à poursuivre dans la voie qu'elle a choisie, car avoir l'ambition d'être une université de rang mondial n'est absolument pas incompatible avec celle d'être une grande université de service public. C'est le pari que fait chaque jour Aix-Marseille Université.
— L'article « Riposte culturelle au Cachemire » (septembre 2016) évoquait l'absence d'élu musulman ou chrétien. Il fallait comprendre « dans la majorité gouvernementale », et non dans l'ensemble du Parlement.
— La carte accompagnant l'article « Cette France en mal de médecins » (septembre) ne prenait en compte que le nombre de médecins exerçant en libéral. Une carte interactive, plus détaillée, est présentée sur ce site.
— Dans « La Corne de l'Afrique dans l'orbite de la guerre au Yémen » (septembre), une coupe malheureuse a conduit à écrire que des forces arabes pourraient menacer Assab, alors que nous voulions dire que cette base érythréenne pourrait être utilisée par l'aviation égyptienne.
— L'article « “Enchanter la vulgaire réalité” » (septembre) donnait une traduction approximative de la devise de Paris. Fluctuat nec mergitur signifie plutôt « Il est battu par les flots, mais ne coule pas ».
— Dans « Traduire Shakespeare » (septembre), l'auteur faisait référence au mot finlandais sisu, et non situ comme indiqué par erreur.
Fins connaisseurs de la loi de l'offre et de la demande, les économistes Pierre Cahuc et André Zylberberg ont trouvé une méthode pour écumer les plateaux télé et les antennes radio : provoquer la polémique de la rentrée en intitulant subtilement leur livre Le Négationnisme économique. Principale cible de leur brûlot : les économistes hétérodoxes, dont bon nombre figurent parmi les auteurs du Manuel d'économie critique du Monde diplomatique, actuellement en kiosques.
Que leur reprochent MM. Cahuc et Zylberberg ? De contester les résultats d'une discipline qui aurait opéré sa « révolution expérimentale » au point de devenir aussi indiscutable que « la physique, la biologie, la médecine ou la climatologie ». Désormais, les économistes, disent ces deux amoureux de la science, sont capables d'évaluer l'efficacité d'une mesure politique (par exemple, la hausse du smic) ou d'une prestation sociale exactement comme leurs collègues médecins testent les vertus d'un nouveau médicament : en comparant un premier groupe de patients, auquel la molécule est prescrite (dans ce cas, les bénéficiaires d'une mesure), à un second, auquel on administre un placebo (les autres).
Dans les années 1930, les économistes ont contracté un complexe d'infériorité vis-à-vis des sciences « dures », qui ne les a jamais quittés. Chez ces deux-là, la physics envy (1), ou jalousie envers les sciences physiques, confine au caprice de bambin. À ceux qui auraient l'idée saugrenue de reprocher aux économistes de ne pas avoir prévu la crise de 2007-2008, ils rétorquent : « En fait, la science économique n'est pas capable de prévoir un futur très complexe. De la même manière, la médecine est incapable d'anticiper la prochaine grande épidémie. Arrêtez-vous de voir votre médecin parce qu'il ne peut pas prédire si vous aurez un cancer l'année prochaine (2) ? » Certes… Mais, si mon médecin m'a encouragé à fumer les trente dernières années, j'aurai de sérieuses raisons de vouloir changer de praticien. En préconisant énergiquement de déréguler la finance, les économistes dominants ont une grande responsabilité dans les tares du système actuel. Et, contrairement aux physiciens, qui ne peuvent guère modifier la loi de la gravité, les économistes influencent souvent leur objet d'étude…
Même le « Prix Nobel d'économie » 2015 Angus Deaton s'est agacé du scientisme naïf de ses collègues : « [Ce type de test empirique] n'est utile que s'il est combiné avec d'autres méthodes et d'autres disciplines pour découvrir non pas “ce qui marche”, mais pourquoi les choses marchent, à tel moment et à tel endroit (3). » Car les phénomènes sociaux, contrairement aux expériences de laboratoire, ne sont pas reproductibles à l'identique. Ces subtilités donnent raison aux citoyens, de plus en plus nombreux, qui doutent des préconisations des économistes dominants. Faut-il vraiment s'en désoler ?
(1) Cf. Philip Mirowski, « Do economists suffer from physics envy ? », Finnish Economic Papers, vol. 5, no 1, Helsinki, printemps 1992.
(2) Challenges, Paris, 1er septembre 2016.
(3) Le Monde, 12 septembre 2016.
Kevin Lamarque (Associated Press)
There has been a lot of discussion of Hillary Clinton’s e-mails and her handling of classified material—a lot. Press coverage of Clinton has focused on the e-mail issue so much that it is the first thing people mention when pollsters ask about her. The topic is certainly worthy of discussion, but much of it has been misinformed, involving some combination of willful distortion and innocent misunderstanding about some fairly esoteric topics. I would like to take some time to examine some points about Clinton’s e-mails, the government classification system, and the reason why the State Department often does not follow its own rules when it comes to information security. This is not an exercise in excuse making but an effort to understand what has been happening at the State Department and why.
First, some people view FBI director James Comey’s public statement of July 5, 2016, explaining the FBI’s investigation and recommendation regarding Clinton’s handling of classified information, as an attack on Clinton. It is, I believe, more accurately understood as a preemptive defense of the FBI as an institution. So many exaggerated claims and assertions had been made about Clinton’s e-mails in terms of criminal liability that he would have opened his agency to attack if he had simply recommended against prosecution and left it at that.
Thus he went into an unusual degree of detail about the investigation and its thoroughness to prevent charges of bias. Comey said as much toward the end of his statement: “I know there will be intense public debate in the wake of this recommendation, as there was throughout this investigation. What I can assure the American people is that this investigation was done competently, honestly, and independently. No outside influence of any kind was brought to bear.” In a later memo to FBI employees, he stated: “The hard part was whether to offer unprecedented transparency about our thinking. . . . I struggled with that part, but decided the best way to protect the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the American people’s sense of justice was to announce it the way we did—with extraordinary transparency and without any kind of coordination.”
Despite what some people have suggested, Clinton’s use of a personal e-mail account, in and of itself, was not a violation of the law, nor was it necessarily unusual. Examining the period between 2001 and 2008, before Clinton came to the department, the State Department Office of Inspector General (OIG) “identified more than 90 Department employees who periodically used personal email accounts to conduct official business.” The OIG report—which addressed department-wide practices, not just Secretary Clinton—went on to quote a former department official as saying, “State’s technology is so antiquated that NO ONE uses a State-issued laptop and even high officials routinely end up using their home email accounts to be able to get their work done quickly and effectively.”
According to the OIG report, it was a violation of department policy to use an unauthorized system without seeking official guidance or approval from the department’s Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) and Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), which Clinton did not seek. (The report’s wording implies that the burden was on the secretary to initiate these actions, yet the IRM director was clearly aware of the situation.) Even there, however, the FBI report suggested some ambiguity: “While State policy during Clinton’s tenure required that ‘day-to-day operations [at State] be conducted on [an authorized information system]’ according to the Bureau of Information Security Management there was no restriction on the use of personal email accounts for official business. However, State employees were cautioned about security and records retention concerns regarding the use of personal e-mail. In 2011, a notice to all State employees was sent on Clinton’s behalf, which recommended employees avoid conducting State business from personal e-mail accounts due to information security concerns.” [Emphasis added; insertions and deletions made by FBI.] Was it required or recommended, or were there no restrictions? Apparently it is still hard to say.
The mishandling of classified material is a different matter. That can involve serious violations of the law, and that was the main focus of the FBI investigation. We shall return to that shortly, after reviewing a few intermediary points.
Why Would Clinton Use Her Own Server?The State Department has two e-mail systems, a classified system for classified documents and an unclassified system (@state.gov) for other documents and messages. It is not permitted to transfer documents from the classified system to the unclassified system, and in any event they cannot be transferred without the direct assistance of system administrators.
Clinton regularly used the classified system for classified documents (or, more precisely, she assigned people to do it for her). The controversy arises from her use of a personal server in place of @state.gov and, more particularly, from the occasional use of that server—or any unclassified system—to communicate on classified topics. We will return to that topic below. First, why did she use a personal server?
My own initial assumption was that she wanted to control access to her communications. Clinton has been the target of political attacks for a quarter century, and some of those who attack her are not shy about taking information out of context or distorting it in the process. Thus one might expect her to want to limit access to her communications. Yet this does not seem to have been the case. Rather, just as she has said all along, she said to the FBI that she used the private server as a matter of convenience, and the FBI appears to have accepted this explanation.* The decision seems to be rooted in Clinton’s quite profound lack of expertise in, or curiosity about, information technology. She did not fully comprehend the possible consequences, and—probably because she was the secretary—no one forced her to confront them.
The decision to use a personal server, of course, raised two issues: possible exposure of her communications to hacking by hostile powers (or others) and complications concerning the proper archiving of what the State Department now calls “record emails.” Record e-mails are those that are to be marked for archiving. Not all e-mails are preserved. Department employees are instructed to delete personal e-mails and most “working emails,” which concern day-to-day administrative matters. Employees determine on their own which messages to delete and which to archive.
While Clinton was aware of these issues, they did not cause her concern. With regard to archiving, she simply believed that her e-mails could be found in the archives of the officials with whom she communicated (which undermines my initial theory that she used the private server to prevent access to her communications). This is really not a satisfactory means of record keeping, but then many people underestimate the difficulty of maintaining records, and even if frustrating, it is not designed to prevent record keeping. After all, the FBI did find many of Clinton’s deleted e-mails by looking in the archives of people with whom she corresponded, just as she said they would. (Many of the deleted e-mails that were deemed to be business-related have turned out to be earlier versions of e-mail chains that had already been turned over.) Incidentally, this was the exact opposite of Colin Powell’s practice. According to an e-mail he sent to Clinton in January 2009, he used a personal e-mail account precisely in order to prevent his messages from becoming “an official record and subject to the law” and for that reason advised Clinton to avoid “systems that captured the data.”
As for security, Clinton did not consider it a problem. According to her FBI interview, “CLINTON understood the email system used by her husband’s personal staff had an excellent track record with respect to security and had never been breached.” Although the FBI could not find evidence of any breach of her account, Comey stated that the nature of the technology might have allowed talented hackers to enter without leaving traces (although the FBI did find evidence that another e-mail account on the server had been hacked). On the other hand, David Sanger reported in the New York Times (after 10 paragraphs of how vulnerable Clinton’s private server was) that the Russians had access to the @state.gov e-mail system that she was supposed to be using for more than seven years, from at least 2007 through the end of 2014, so they probably have her e-mails and everyone else’s anyhow.
For the record, Clinton has stated that it was a mistake to have used her own server. Given the hullabaloo over the decision, it is safe to assume that she is not likely to do this again.
Not All Classified Documents Are Created EqualThe process of classifying and declassifying government documents is complex and highly arbitrary. The rules are vague enough to be open to interpretation, and the incentives generally favor “overclassification.” In other words, permitting the release of information that should have been classified has repercussions; classifying a document that did not require it does not. Thus there is a lot of material that is needlessly classified. Some analysts speak of a disconnect between the classification system and the actual needs of national security.
The arbitrariness of the system has been taken into account by people who deal with it regularly. For example, George Washington University’s National Security Archive, which frequently requests the declassification of old documents for historical purposes, routinely submits multiple requests for the same document in the hope that different officials will declassify different portions. On one occasion, the archive received the beginning and the end of a document from which the entire middle had been redacted. The very next day, in response to a separate request, it received a version of the same document with the middle intact but with the beginning and end removed. Thus within 24 hours the archive had received the entire document. The markings on the two copies indicated that both versions had been reviewed, redacted, and released by the same official.
The current Clinton case presents another example. The notes from Clinton’s FBI interview contain the sentence: “CLINTON believed information should be classified in the case of covert military action, the use of sensitive sources and where sensitive deliberations took place.” The FBI report, which was based in part on the interview and was released as part of the same package, contains virtually the same sentence except that the words “covert military action” have been redacted. Among the redactions from the interview notes, on the other hand, is Clinton’s date of birth.
That said, of course, not everything is overclassified, and the subject is not to be dismissed out of hand. Officially there are three levels of classification as defined by the National Security Act of 1947: Confidential (C), Secret (S), and Top Secret (TS). Bureaucrats often treat Confidential and Secret information in a fairly cavalier manner. This is the sort of thing that you read in the newspaper every day, attributed to a government official who will not give his name because he’s violating the law by giving classified information to a reporter. (Although, to be sure, some unauthorized leaks to the press are actually authorized releases masquerading as unauthorized leaks. Bureaucracy works in strange ways.)
Top Secret information is treated much more seriously. Fred Kaplan has related that when he began a job on Capitol Hill years ago, he was granted access to Confidential and Secret information from the first day, while he was restricted from seeing Top Secret material until his security clearance actually came through. Perhaps because there is only one category that everyone treats so seriously, a number of “unofficial” gradations have been invented within it, degrees of Top Secret, if you will. These include: Special Access Programs (SAP), Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (SCI), and the anatomically challenging EYES ONLY. Incidentally there are two grades of unclassified information as well, both of which may be sent on (authorized) unclassified systems: Unclassified (U) and Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU).**
Various categories of secretiveness can pile up. To take a random example, a 1991 assessment of the 1983 Able Archer war scare*** was marked: TOP SECRET UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON, which roughly translates as: Release Would Cause Exceptionally Grave Damage to National Security; Highly Sensitive Communications Intelligence; Contains Intercepts of Soviet Communications; Warning Notice—Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Consultants; Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator. As of last year, the document is freely available, albeit in redacted form.
*The argument that Clinton must have lied about it being convenient because she was really using multiple devices is false. She used multiple devices over the course of four years, one at a time.
**SBU is a State Department designation. Other agencies, including the FBI, use For Official Use Only (FOUO).
***Yes, there was a war scare in 1983, when the Soviets began to suspect that President Reagan was preparing to launch a nuclear missile strike and went on alert. Don’t feel bad, U.S. intelligence was not aware of it at the time either.
The post Clinton and Why the State Department Doesn’t Follow Its Own Rules (Pt I) appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Inmarsat announced today that its partner Singtel has completed one of Asia’s first commercial installations of Fleet Xpress, its maritime-focused, secure high-speed broadband service. The installation was recently completed on “K” Line Ship Management Singapore’s (“K” Line) 9,600-twenty foot equivalent unit capacity container ship Houston Bridge.
By Dominik P. Jankowski and Maksymilian Czuperski
The transatlantic community faces threats on multiple fronts, rendering NATO as essential as it has ever been. Because of these changing regional security dynamics, the Alliance should consider some additional reforms to its internal structure and capacities, so that it can achieve necessary readiness. There is still much to ponder. On the road from the 2016 Warsaw Summit to the 2017 Brussels Summit, the Alliance should embrace six core approaches—a new strategic “six-pack”—in order to strengthen the process of NATO’s long-term strategic adaptation.
First, NATO should become a key platform for a new transatlantic grand bargain. The ongoing presidential race in the United States has once again revealed growing criticisms of NATO in some American political circles, especially among supporters of Donald Trump. A new transatlantic bargain should lead to more fair and balanced burden sharing, both in terms of devoting necessary financial resources as well as investing in the right capabilities. Following the decisions of the Warsaw Summit, the Alliance will, in fact, need additional heavier high-end capabilities. A NATO Defense Planning Pledge—which would not replace the NATO Defense Investment Pledge, but concentrate more on a desired military output—could become a starting point for a renewed transatlantic bond.
Second, NATO needs a clear political-military strategy to counter the Russian “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) systems. Even if A2/AD is by no means a new concept, it poses a formidable challenge to the political and military credibility of NATO, as it restricts the freedom to maneuver. Therefore, it should be considered an aggressive posture. In fact, Russia has harnessed an array of stand-off weapons—including air defense, coastal defense, cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missile platforms, and naval and submarine forces, as well as electronic and cyber warfare—which can turn areas falling within their range into strategically and operationally isolated “bubbles”.
Third, in an A2/AD and hybrid environment the Alliance needs a renewed and more ambitious exercises policy. NATO drills should not only provide assurance to Allies, but also serve as an element of a deterrence policy. An updated approach to exercises should not only include visibility, high-end capabilities and large-scale formations, but also be employed in a non-permissive environment on the eastern, northern and southern flanks. In short, what NATO needs are regular drills of the Follow on Forces in A2/AD “bubbles”.
Fourth, NATO needs additional robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, which are a fundamental requirement for effective situational awareness, strategic foresight, and early warning. In response to the current threats and challenges, NATO should consider employing a Regional Intelligence Analysis Centre (RIAC) on its eastern flank, which would supplement the work done by the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC). An additional ISR presence in the region, e.g. an AGS forward-operating location in Poland, would also support the planning and execution of current and future activities on the eastern flank.
Fifth, the Alliance needs a reviewed NATO Command Structure (NCS) that should be better suited to deliver on the collective defense tasks. Current regional security dynamics have challenged some assumptions on which the NCS was based, showing that its connectivity with the NATO Force Structure is not sufficient. Moreover, the Warsaw Summit decisions on strengthened deterrence and defense posture added new requirements for the existing NCS.
Sixth, NATO’s actions require a fully integrated approach to strategic communications (StratCom). The Russian pressure to redefine our values has now reached the stage of undermining the coherence of Euro-Atlantic communication. In the fog of misinformation NATO might be well prepared for classical cyber challenges, but the Russian-Ukrainian conflict shows that it also needs to be prepared for information war when the events are seamlessly melded with cyber, kinetic and electronic warfare operations. In fact, NATO’s activities should be enhanced by a creation of special StratCom departments throughout the Alliance member states to rapidly gather evidence, analyze and respond to disinformation campaigns.
As Europe confronts the prospect of future Russian aggression, terror, and domestic upheaval, NATO must remain a primary security guarantor on the continent. In fact, there is no viable alternative to NATO. But new security challenges cannot be borne by the Alliance of decades past. Indeed, NATO’s military adaption should be continued The Alliance must emphasize what is required of it, like intelligence, strategic communications and effective coordination and command, to confront these threats to transatlantic security. By developing a strategic “six-pack” NATO will stay on the right path and draw credible red lines that can keep Russian adventurism in check.
Dominik P. Jankowski is Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Maksymilian Czuperski is Strategic Communications Advisor Europe and Special Assistant to the President of the Atlantic Council.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the institutions they represent.
This article was originally published by The National Interest.
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Jean-Claude Juncker’s 2016 State of the European Union address was clear in its analysis: the EU is at a critical juncture and has to become more effective to regain its credibility. But the solution needs more work. Crucially, it needs political will. And it needs an understanding of past failures – not least those that have inflicted harm on Cyprus since 2013.
The Commission President gave his address three months after the UK backed Brexit. Traditional British Euroscepticism and issues such as migration were big factors in the result, but so too were the structural weaknesses of the EU.
Problems abound. Terrorism haunts the EU. European citizens are paying the price of upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa and the lack of policies to enhance stability and development in those regions. The EU has failed to adopt policies to face the socioeconomic problems afflicting the Union. There is high unemployment, social exclusion, increasing inequality and a mood of uncertainty.
Addressing the chronic eurozone crisis is a key starting point in addressing the problems. Juncker said that the Commission ‘will address how to strengthen and reform our economic and monetary union’ and underlined ‘the need to implement the Stability and Growth Pact with common sense’.
“Uniform policies have limits; now, nation states need to be able to address their own challenges”
Implicitly, there is an admission of the huge mess created by austerity policies. These policies cannot be sustained without further strains in the eurozone and the EU as a whole. Participation in the eurozone makes it difficult for a country to pursue discretionary policies to address a serious recession, as it has to stick to a balanced budget. This deepens the crisis, with further spending cuts and increased taxes. In effect, we have a set of automatic destabilisers that, when taken in conjunction with a tight monetary policy, lead to a vicious deflationary cycle. For the eurozone to function there must be a system of fiscal support from the centre, a philosophy that is currently missing.
This explains the Commission President’s wish to stress the importance of solidarity – ‘the glue that keeps our Union together’. But here too, the Union has failed. Italy has recently received support to address its banking crisis (about €400bn in non-performing loans), but no “bail-in” was required – as was the case, with devastating results, in Cyprus in March 2013. Obviously, this is a case of double standards. According to Spain’s former foreign minister of Spain, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, the EU acted myopically in not helping Cyprus address its crisis; on the contrary, the policies dictated by the EU deepened the crisis.
The decisions of the Eurogroup in March 2013 were influenced by other considerations as well: the timing of the German elections, containment of the Russian presence in Cyprus, and using the island as both a testing ground for future crises and an example to other, larger, more troublesome countries. Cyprus did not deserve this treatment, and the handling of the crisis caused other problems – for example, Germany is seen as hegemonic, and the Troika faces legitimacy problems as its economic philosophy (both in theory and practice) appears to lack reason and sensitivity.
Cyprus shares these problems with others, not least Greece, where socioeconomic conditions remain harsh. Unemployment approaches 30% despite the fact that thousands of Greeks have emigrated, there is a huge fiscal cliff, and deflation and decreasing salaries and pensions are creating suffocating conditions leading to unprecedented poverty levels. Greece is facing the depression of the century.
“The EU acted myopically in not helping Cyprus address its crisis; on the contrary, the policies dictated by the EU deepened the crisis.”
The experiences of Cyprus and Greece, especially given the endogenous structural problems of these two countries, highlight how the Troika’s recipes have worsened the situation, undermined social cohesion and jeopardised the geopolitical interests of the EU. Such attitudes and practices are related to the Union’s current malaise. There is a huge “solidarity deficit”, with deep institutional, structural and cultural differences between the member states. Equally, uniform policies have limits; now, nation states need to be able to address their own challenges.
Of course, Cyprus’s difficulties are not merely financial. In his speech, Juncker called for a solution to division of the island, offering the EU’s support. There is the “two communities” dimension to this problem, but the international and geostrategic aspects are even more important. Turkey’s role is overwhelming – and the EU has to acknowledge that Turkey occupies European territory. A solution of the Cyprus problem based on ethnocommunal pillars would probably lead to frustration and even destabilisation. Instead, Cyprus will have a better future with an integrationalist, federal model. The EU could encourage such an approach (even though this may entail evolutionary processes), and highlight that it maintains a substantive role in global affairs.
We should remember that when Cyprus embarked on accession negotiations it was the country with the highest levels of enthusiasm for the EU. Obviously there were high expectations, generally linked to the stated “value system” of the EU. But more than 12 years after Cyprus’s accession to the Union and almost nine years after adoption of the euro, Cypriots are increasingly Eurosceptic. This is despite the efforts of the government and the Troika to describe Cyprus as a success story. The reality is that Cyprus is a success story only when compared to Greece.
Cyprus aside, we must also acknowledge that there is widespread uncertainly about the future of the EU. Various leaders, technocrats, academics and analysts – as well as citizens – fear that the Union faces an existentialist dilemma. We need more than rhetoric to understand and address the EU’s problems. And we need both solidarity and flexibility.
IMAGE CREDIT: FomaA/Bigstock.com
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