The National Interest

The first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an appropriate time to assess Israel’s policies toward it, chiefly its refusal to sell weapons to Ukraine. The need for this assessment is particularly acute given the close strategic relationship that has emerged between Russia and Iran and the ramifications for U.S.-Israeli relations.

Israel’s sympathies lie squarely with Ukraine. Nevertheless, its response to date has been limited to significant, but not overwhelming, humanitarian aid, including a field hospital, ambulances, protective vests, helmets, food, water purification equipment, and more. Israel has reportedly also provided Ukraine with intelligence information and voted with it in the United Nations. Conversely, Israel has steadfastly rebuffed Ukrainian requests to provide weapons, including defensive ones, such as Iron Dome.

A wounded bear is particularly dangerous and Russia can cause Israel severe harm. We thus believe that Israel’s refusal to sell Ukraine weapons remains appropriate, but that this may change depending on Russia’s actions. For now, we propose a number of semi-military measures that would be of great utility for Ukraine and position Israel firmly within the Western camp but mitigate Russia’s response.

There are seven primary reasons for our caution.

First, Iran has supplied Russia with 1,700 drones, is apparently building a factory in Russia to produce as many as 6,000 more, and may provide it with ballistic missiles. In return, Russia has reportedly agreed to supply Iran with SU-35s fighters, helicopters, and possibly the S-400 air-defense system, warships, submarines, and satellites. Russia and Iran already cooperate in the cyber realm. They also recently signed two agreements designed to promote bilateral economic ties and circumvent international sanctions: a “transportation corridor” from Russia to Iran and out to the Far East; and an alternative mechanism to the global SWIFT system. Israel must avoid measures that may lead to an even closer Russian-Iranian strategic alliance.

Second, Russia and Iran are the two primary players in Syria. At times, Russia has sought to counterbalance Iran’s efforts to expand its influence there, including the build-up of a significant military presence and use of Syria to transfer weapons to Hezbollah. Wartime needs forced Russia to withdraw some forces from Syria, but not the S-400s. If used against Israeli aircraft, Israel’s ability to counter Iran’s buildup would be greatly constrained. So far, Russia has refrained from doing so, but that could change at any time. No less than NATO countries, Israel is on the front lines with Russia today and can find itself at war at any moment with Iran, Hezbollah, and Iranian-supported Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel cannot allow this to happen.

Third, Russia is a party to the nuclear agreement with Iran and ongoing international negotiations. At times, Russia has played a constructive role in this regard, but it has been supportive of Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency recently and can be highly disruptive. A desperate Russia might even provide Iran with concrete assistance for its nuclear program. Israel cannot afford to alienate Russia too much.

Fourth, Israel is not a global power with major weapons stockpiles, does not have the spare capability, and cannot transfer critical systems to Ukraine without endangering its own security. Indeed, it has the minimum number of Iron Dome batteries necessary and a shortage of interceptor missiles. Moreover, as Ukraine’s defense minister indicated, other systems are better suited to its needs, including American ones, which the United States has abjured from supplying so far. What Ukraine really wants is to drag Israel into the conflict on its side. That is understandable, but Israel must weigh its overall interests, not just sentiments.

Fifth, some 15 percent of Israel’s population has roots in the former USSR and 600,000 Jews still live in Russia. Russia has already taken measures designed to demonstrate its ability to stop emigration. The ingathering of the exiles is Israel’s raison d’être.

Sixth, unless the United States changes the policy of partial disengagement from the Middle East pursued by four consecutive presidents, Russia will remain a critical player in the region. In addition to support for Iran, Russia is providing Turkey and Egypt with advanced weapons and nuclear power reactors that could morph into military nuclear programs, has proposed similar deals with the Saudis and others, is an important player in OPEC+ and Libya, and more.

Seventh, France, Germany, Japan, and other leading states have provided only limited aid to Ukraine, belatedly and hesitantly. South Korea has refused to provide any weapons. Even the United States has imposed strict limits on the kinds of weapons it provides, for example, aircraft, missiles, air-defense systems, and until now, tanks. Israel does not have to be at the forefront of this issue. Some question Israel’s commitment to the Western camp because they have high expectations of it; others because they wish to use this issue as part of a broader delegitimization campaign. Most understand that Israel’s strategic circumstances require painful compromises between moral and strategic considerations.

Changes to Israel’s refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine might be warranted if, for example, Russia decided to limit its freedom of aerial maneuver in Syria; supplied certain weapons systems to Iran, e.g. the S-400s; adopted a clearly obstructionist position in the nuclear talks; or provided direct assistance to Iran’s nuclear program. In each case, the details would determine the nature of Israel’s response. Russia must be made to understand that Israel has the ability to significantly harm its interests, if pushed too far.

What Israel should be doing, were it not engulfed in its domestic convulsions, is providing Ukraine with outsized humanitarian assistance. It should send the field hospital back to Ukraine, if necessary, by turning it into an Israel Defense Force (IDF) operation; dispatch IDF search and rescue teams; expand rehabilitation programs for wounded Ukrainians; and complete the transfer of the rocket alert technology promised to Ukraine, all areas in which Israel is a global frontrunner. It should again provide emergency supplies for Ukrainian civilians.

Expanded assistance such as this would be of significant benefit for Ukraine, but likely not lead to an excessive Russian response. All sides understand that there are certain rules to the game.

Chuck Freilich is a senior fellow at the Miryam Institute and was a deputy national security adviser in Israel.

Danny Ayalon, a policy expert at the Miryam Institute, is a former deputy foreign minister of Israel and a former ambassador to the United States.

Both authors are co-hosts of the Miryam Institute’s biweekly podcast, the Israel Defense and Diplomacy Forum (IDDF).

Image: Shutterstock.

When most people hear the word intelligence in a political context, they immediately think of clandestine sources, spies, and secret meetings. Intelligence services still rely on human source intelligence (HUMINT) and intercepted communications (SIGINT). However, in the twenty-first century, open-source intelligence (OSINT) has become indispensable for understanding your adversaries and is often the primary and most valuable source of actionable intelligence. According to a detailed article highlighting the power of OSINT in the Wall Street Journal, “80% of what a U.S. president or military commander needs to know comes from OSINT.”

What then is OSINT, and why is it so important in 2023?

In brief, OSINT is the painstaking gathering and analysis of information from a wide range of open sources for the military, intelligence, police, and business communities. The explosion of social media—from real-time videos to blogs to chat rooms to Twitter and Facebook—has produced unprecedented opportunities for insight into areas and people where HUMINT and SIGINT are not as effective or cost too much while decreasing the risk to human intelligence assets. In addition, the analysis of covert intelligence is informed and sometimes significantly changed by OSINT.

As such, combining OSINT, HUMINT, VISINT (visual intelligence), and SIGINT allows a country’s national and diplomatic security apparatus to pre-emptively act to thwart threats, inform allies, negotiate from the point of strength, and challenge international organizations and non-government organizations with accurate information, especially those with hostile intent.

OSINT’s importance is increasingly recognized, especially in U.S. intelligence circles. The aforementioned Wall Street Journal article quotes Robert Cardillo, a senior intelligence expert, commenting that he “doesn’t worry about the intelligence community going away. I worry about it mattering. Goverment policymakers could rely less on traditional intelligence briefings and more on open-source products, which are generally cheaper and easier to access.” Almost in response to this challenge, former high-ranking U.S. intelligence experts—including a director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a retired Army major general who commanded the Army Intelligence Center, and the former deputy director of national intelligence for analysis—have formed the OSINT Foundation, which is “focused on OSINT's use within the intelligence community to answer questions for national leadership and policymakers because of a recognition that U.S. intelligence doesn’t give it the prominence it deserves.”

The significance of OSINT is not lost on U.S. adversaries either. Consider China: according to William Hannas of Georgetown University, Beijing has an “estimated 100,000 analysts scouring scientific and technical development globally” through open sources. Even in closed societies, the exponential growth of social media has given opposition forces the tools to share information with the outside world. It was the Iranian opposition that first revealed Iran’s advanced nuclear program, after all.

But it is perhaps in the private sphere that OSINT’s effects are being felt most, private intelligence companies may surpass government intelligence agencies in the gathering of actionable intelligence. An intelligence unit of Dow Chemical, using only open-source intelligence, predicted the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 23, 2022: “Supercharged by the Ukraine war, the rise of open-source intelligence, which comprises everything from commercial satellite imagery to social media posts and purchasable databases, poses revolutionary challenges for the Central Intelligence Agency and its sister spy agencies, according to former senior officials who spent decades working in those agencies’ classified spaces.”

Consider as an example of this trend the Israeli research and educational think tank Alma—which one of the authors of this article is the CEO of. The organization studies Syria, Iraq, and Iran while relying almost entirely on OSINT. Its reporting and analysis are used by major media organizations, politicians, and security agencies for reliable information on the threats posed by Hezbollah in Lebanon and other Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq. Alma’s special reports and analysis have unearthed information on a vast array of issues, including the propagation of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Europe to south Florida, Hezbollah’s drug industry in Syria, Iran’s entrenchment in south Damascus, Hamas’ growing presence in Lebanon, the Iranian smuggling of weapons into Beirut and Damascus airports, Russia’s military deployment in Syria, Iranian and Hezbollah espionage and terrorist activity in Scandinavia, details on the Iranian weapons land corridor, analysis of Syria’s air defenses, and documentation on the deployment of advanced Iranian UAVs throughout the Middle East. Hezbollah was so concerned about the accuracy of Alma’s reporting that they threatened the organization by posting its GPS coordinates as a warning.

Yet OSINT is not without some drawbacks, which must be kept in mind.

For one, given the enormous volume of open-source intelligence, professional analysts must somehow separate the wheat from the chaff. Analyzing press briefings, websites, government-supported journals, private commercial imagery from satellites, technical reports, corporate and government databases, first-hand observation, and more, the list of OSINT sources is endless. Information overload is a potential problem that must be navigated. In the past, people tended to believe secret sources produced the most valuable intelligence. Today it is becoming increasingly clear that professional and creative OSINT analysts can draw an excellent picture of reality—but only so long as analysts can condense an enormous amount of information into a presentable and accessible intelligence product.

Next is the problem posed by disinformation. Intelligence communities that rely on the complete range of intelligence sources have long had to stand guard against such, and there is a belief that OSINT can be more challenging for intelligence analysts as there may be a greater risk of such. At the same time though, it is also clear today that every form of intelligence, whether open or secret source, is maybe “infected” by disinformation. Appropriate judgment and careful evaluation are now more important than before.

Finally, leaked classified information that makes its way into open sources presents a double-edged sword: while such information can be helpful to policymakers who were cut out of the classified loop by their security agencies, the problem is that now one’s enemies also know.

No one knows the future of intelligence, but valuing the importance of OSINT, in combination with HUMINT and SIGINT, will give us a fighting chance to inform our leaders with the best information to protect our interests and societies from those who want to do us harm.  

Dr. Eric Mandel is the Director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and briefs members of Congress and their foreign policy experts. He is the Senior Security Editor of the Jerusalem Report and a regular contributor to The Hill. 

Sarit Zehavi is the CEO of Alma Research and Education Center. She is a lieutenant colonel (res.) in the Israel Defense Forces and served for fifteen years as a military intelligence officer.

Image: Shutterstock.

As an unprecedented protest movement quickly spread to dozens of Chinese cities last fall, calling into question Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s authority, the country’s Orwellian surveillance system went into high gear to scrutinize video footage, track phone records, and identify those involved. Yet China’s success in neutralizing these and other threats to the regime rests not on technology developed in Beijing, but in Silicon Valley.

Protests in China are not particularly rare. The number of “public order disturbances” rose tenfold from about 8,700 per year in the 1990s to around 90,000 in the early 2000s, according to Chinese government statistics. Beijing stopped reporting protest data in 2006, although credible studies suggest such figures have hovered near historic highs, with one such study estimating nearly 180,000 protests in 2010 alone. But whereas most Chinese protests involve specific material issues, such as local pay disputes and environmental causes, last December’s demonstrations centered around overturning Xi’s harsh zero-COVID restrictions—with some protestors even calling for Xi’s ouster.

Thousands of people from all parts of society risked their lives to pressure the Chinese government into relaxing mandatory COVID testing requirements, quarantines, and stringent lockdowns. The public anger was understandable: Xi’s pandemic restrictions wrought havoc on China’s public finances and exacerbated many of the structural imbalances that have long plagued Chinese society. The result has been a sharp uptick in urban youth unemployment, a record $1.1 trillion Chinese budget deficit, and a 26 percent drop in land sale revenues—a key driver of local government spending. Spooked by the scale of the demonstrations and the intensity of citizens’ grievances, Xi did the unexpected: he hastily retreated and ordered the rollback of nearly all of China’s pandemic-related restrictions.

Seemingly overnight, China’s protest movement fizzled out, too—but not because Xi relented. Instead, within hours of the first demonstrations, Chinese authorities began knocking on protestors’ doors and demanding to know their whereabouts during the unrest. Many demonstrators received threatening text messages about their participation in “illegal riots,” whereas others were ordered to report to the nearest police station for questioning. Some simply vanished.

China’s successful protest crackdown was no fluke—it was by design. For three decades, China has been developing a complex web of high-tech surveillance systems with ominous names like “Sharp Eyes” and “Golden Shield.” Their first objective was to establish a unified network of spy cameras around the country, many featuring facial recognition software linked to China’s national registry database. These systems were later bolstered by corresponding cloud-based databases and geolocation platforms capable of analyzing terabytes of information generated hourly by Chinese traffic cameras and telecommunications networks, as well as data gleaned by China’s army of internet censors. Under Xi’s leadership, China nearly doubled its annual spending on “public safety” to $210 billion—a figure that exceeds the country’s defense budget.

The beneficiaries of Xi’s surveillance spending spree included Silicon Valley, which explains why U.S. software and equipment from companies such as IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle is deeply embedded throughout China’s police state. Beyond aiding in the development and maintenance of government-controlled systems used to squash last December’s protests, some U.S. firms also actively collaborate with Chinese companies that publicize their links to China’s surveillance apparatus and human rights atrocities.

A typical example of these problematic partnerships is U.S. semiconductor manufacturer Intel’s years-long relationship with Tiandy, a Chinese firm recently blacklisted by Washington for aiding Beijing’s persecution of Uighurs and other minorities in Xinjiang province. Tiandy produces surveillance cameras and networked surveillance systems equipped with facial recognition technology that Chinese authorities have deployed throughout China, including in cities where last month’s protests occurred. The company also sells torture devices known as “tiger chairs” used by Chinese officials to interrogate, sometimes for days, political dissidents. An investigation by tech watchdog IPVM further revealed Tiandy sold its surveillance systems to the sanctioned Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, possibly for use against peaceful protesters there.

Tiandy hardly hid its ties to China’s police state. In fact, the company championed such collaboration in its advertising materials and on its website. Tiandy CEO Dai Lin even hosted meetings with former Deputy Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang Province Wang Junzheng, whom the U.S. government sanctioned for his role in orchestrating China’s Uighur genocide. And yet, Tiandy also maintained a top-tier alliance with Intel, whose processors power Tiandy’s genocide-enabling products. Even worse, IVPM alerted Intel about Tiandy’s activities in 2021 and Intel elected to maintain the partnership, only severing it when Tiandy was added to Washington’s export control list in December.

Intel is not alone, and its links to Tiandy go well beyond any due-diligence snafu. Instead, the company’s approach is broadly representative of Silicon Valley’s culture of compliance in China, where U.S. tech firms often outsource human rights and end-user risk assessments to third-party suppliers, many themselves linked to China’s military-industrial complex. In passing the buck, U.S. multinationals can have it both ways. They can claim to be vetting their supply chains, but also maintain some plausible deniability about what derogatory information may or may not have been shared with them by these third-party entities.

To be fair, most tech sales to Chinese entities are not prohibited by U.S. law, particularly because Washington often issues licenses explicitly permitting such transfers. But, the provision of any technology that optimizes the performance or sustains the day-to-day operations of Chinese entities involved in human rights violations is, at a minimum, ethically problematic. This moral dilemma is compounded further because many U.S. tech firms, including Intel, tout their commitment to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives even as they sell their products and services to autocratic regimes. At the same time, investment research firms, like Morningstar, have acknowledged how gaps in their ESG ratings systems can inadvertently give a free pass to companies linked to China’s censorship and surveillance apparatus.

For instance, it was Cisco that provided the routers and know-how necessary to construct China’s “Great Firewall”—used by Beijing to block Western websites and censor data—even though, since 1994, Chinese leaders have been transparent about using internet gateways to control China’s masses. As recently as 2017, Apple also helped China shore up the firewall by deleting five dozen apps that Chinese citizens could use to circumvent government internet filters.

Just as troubling, Public Security Bureaus in Beijing, as well as Fujian, Guangdong, and Henan provinces, all rely on IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle products to maintain their monitoring and censorship operations, according to public contract documents from as recently as 2020. These products enable, among other things, internet traffic monitoring, as well as facial and license plate recognition. Meanwhile, Microsoft’s Windows operating system is widely used by Chinese police departments, which the U.S. State Department has cited for their “routine, arbitrary, and unlawful interference” in Chinese citizens’ lives.

The U.S. tech sector’s links to the Uighur genocide are even more glaring. For instance, the Chinese entity responsible for constructing the Uighur detention facilities in Xinjiang, Zhongke Fuxing, counts IBM, Intel, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, and Oracle among its trusted partners. For their part, Intel and Nvidia chip’s power the Urumqi Cloud Computing Center in Xinjiang, which, since its inception in 2015, has been cited by Chinese state media for its ties to China’s security apparatus. More specifically, this computer center analyzes peoples’ daily patterns to support China’s so-called predictive policing, in which anyone can be pre-emptively arrested for crimes they have not even committed.

In all, far too many U.S. companies, as well as well-respected U.S. universities like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, have engaged in wide-ranging, unregulated, and often dual-use research with Chinese firms whose business models revolve around furthering repression and undermining freedom. Even when those Chinese companies have been cited by the U.S. or other governments as national security threats, some multinationals look the other way.

Case in point: Amazon Web Services—which maintains billion-dollar contracts with the U.S. Defense Department and intelligence community—hosts streaming services for Hikvision and Dahua, two surveillance firms blacklisted by Washington for supporting China’s Uighur genocide. Both companies are banned from selling their products in the United States. Hikvision, in particular, developed police tools to track protest activities in China, including system-wide alarms that are triggered when crowds “disrupt order in public places.” For its part, Amazon contends that these relationships are in “in full compliance with the law.”

Some U.S. tech giants, like Dell, have signaled plans to draw down their China-based operations amid concerns over Sino-U.S. tensions. But if Amazon’s legalistic retort is any indication, hard-hitting new laws and export control regulations will be needed to compel tech firms to decouple from China’s surveillance state. Indeed, it took an outright ban on the importation of Chinese goods made via forced labor for clothing manufacturers to finally get serious about mapping their distributor networks and shifting supply chains. Similar measures—in which the legal onus falls on tech companies to prove that their third-party vendors are not linked to Chinese law enforcement agencies—should be considered.

That said, the hope of better due diligence in the future will be cold comfort to Chinese citizens arrested for participating in last month’s peaceful protests, including demonstrators identified with the use of Silicon Valley’s latest wares. For America’s tech giants, that’s just business.

Craig Singleton, a former U.S. diplomat, is a senior China fellow at the non-partisan Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Image: Jiraroj Praditcharoenkul/Shutterstock.

What should Ukraine’s long-term future relationship with Europe, and the West in general, look like if and when this terrible war can be brought to a close? It is not too soon to ask this question. Waiting for talks to begin would be imprudent, given the importance of the task. Indeed, planning for the post-World War II international order began well before 1945. This may not be World War II—but the Ukraine conflict is nonetheless a major event in European history. It behooves us to think big and think from first principles when considering how to help end it. 

A stable peace will require a fair deal that allows Ukraine to rebuild its nation with strong ties to the West and strengthen its economy even as it seeks to do so in a way that minimizes the likely Russian counterreaction. Thinking of Ukraine and Turkey together as new members of the European Union by 2030 provides the right strategic objective as we contemplate a new architecture for the region. These are the two largest countries of Europe’s eastern flank, besides Russia itself, and the two that are also most in flux geostrategically. Anchoring them into a broader European order will be important not only for their future security, but for the broader region’s stability as well—whether we think in terms of the West’s coherence and cohesion, or deterrence of Russia, or both. 

One element of such an approach clearly must involve security. As one of us has written elsewhere, a negotiated settlement to the current war requires enough reassurance and security enhancement for Ukraine that Russia will not wind up attacking again in a year or two or three. NATO membership for Ukraine, and binding security guarantees, seem implausible as part of any accord with Russia. But a strong NATO training presence in a future Ukraine, combined with the creation of a new Eurasian security structure that is distinct from NATO and stronger than the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, may provide the right formula. Ukraine would be a founding member of such a structure, along with many or most NATO members. A post-Vladimir Putin and reformed Russia could someday join as well.

However, it is not all about security, as important as that is. Ukraine’s broader place in Europe is crucial to consider, as well. The alternative to thinking about postwar dynamics now is to wait for military conditions to be ripe for political negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow to begin. This strategy of patience may prove too long, too risky, and too costly for all the parties involved, including Europe and the United States. While the West must continue to help Ukraine militarily and economically, it should also incentivize Kyiv to think about postwar stabilization, democracy, and prosperity. A clear path leading to Ukraine’s EU membership—with a generous financial package for postwar reconstruction—is a promising and realistic strategy for the West. 

But this long-term European strategic objective that includes Ukraine in the EU should not shut the door to Turkey. Europe must not turn into a Christian club that excludes a critically important Muslim country that applied to join the club long before Ukraine even emerged as an independent state in 1991. To be sure, Turkey’s autocratic path under Recep Tayyip Erdogan cannot and should not be rewarded. Instead, the EU must chart a course that incentivizes and rewards a post-Erdogan Turkish political context. This scenario may very well emerge after the Turkish elections scheduled for this summer. The recent devastating earthquake in the country has only sharpened the resolve of the Turkish opposition, who blames the Erdogan government for the slow rescue effort, inefficient post-disaster relief, and lax construction standards. According to most polls the opposition—a unified front of six political parties—has a reasonable chance to win. A combination of dismal economic conditions and Erdogan-fatigue among large segments of Turkey’s young and dynamic society is likely to turn a new page in Turkish politics after twenty years under the same ruler. Under a more democratic government and after having welcomed Sweden and Norway as new NATO members, a post-Erdogan Turkey will deserve a second chance with the EU. Given Turkey’s complex—and potentially helpful—role in the Ukraine crisis, this new page in Turkey-EU relations can also help Ankara escape Russia’s strategic and economic orbit. 

Ukraine gained candidate status in the EU shortly after the Russian invasion began. But candidacy is no guarantee for membership, as Turkey, another country that gained such status in 1999 and began accession negotiations in 2005, bitterly knows. Some may object that the EU cannot accept a state with occupied territory. In fact, the EU already has a member with unsettled borders: Cyprus. To Turkey’s dismay, Cyprus gained membership in the union despite voting against a United Nations-sponsored plan that would have united the island. 

Turkey’s own EU accession process is currently on hold for reasons largely related to its autocratic turn. But Cyprus and Greece are also serious impediments. An opposition victory against Erdogan in the upcoming elections could create a narrow window of opportunity on that front too. A recent document outlining the Turkish opposition’s strategic vision underlines the need for diplomatic engagement rather than saber-rattling with Greece. Reviving Ankara’s EU membership process in a post-Erdogan context would provide a rewarding boost to a new Turkish government that seeks diplomatic rather than militaristic solutions to deeply-rooted problems in the Aegean sea and Eastern Mediterranean. 

All this is easier said than done. With Brexit, the EU lost the country that was the most ardent supporter of enlargement. Washington also lost its most valued partner in the EU. In the absence of the United Kingdom, Washington needs to become the champion of EU enlargement. The case to be made to the EU’s Franco-German engine is a convincing one: a path for Ukraine and Turkey to join the club by 2030 will significantly improve peace and stability in Europe. The alternative will be a Ukraine in limbo and a frustrated Ankara continuing to move away from the transatlantic community. Yes, Turkey is already a NATO member, but a highly problematic one. Ankara has purchased missile defense systems from Russia and currently holds Finnish and Swedish membership to NATO hostage. The Biden administration should make the case that a more democratic Turkey after Erdogan will need a European perspective to stay the course. This positive trajectory change in Turkish foreign and domestic politics will certainly be a game-changer for Turkish-Russian relations. 

At the end of the day, only the EU can take decisions about its future. Declaring that EU membership for Ukraine could take “decades,” French president Emmanuel Macron has recently launched the “European Political Community”—a large and toothless initiative bringing together forty-two countries that includes Israel, Georgia, and Armenia. Ukraine and Turkey will need more than inclusion in a large and ineffective pan-European tent with no economic and political benefits. To truly defeat Russian objectives, the EU and the United States need to establish a stronger and much more audacious transatlantic agenda. Anchoring Ukraine and Turkey in the EU by the end of the decade should be at the heart of this strategic vision. 

Michael O’Hanlon holds the Philip Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy at The Brookings Institution and is author of Military History for the Modern Strategist: America’s Major Wars since 1861.

Omer Taspinar is professor at National Defense University and Johns Hopkins/SAIS.

Image: Salma Bashir Motiwala / Shutterstock.com

The past few years have seen a wave of concern over how increasing political and social polarization is negatively affecting the political systems of the United States and other democracies. To clarify, social polarization refers to the growing divide between different social groups, which is often characterized by deep political, ideological, and cultural differences. Rising polarization can lead to increased distrust and even hostility between social groups, to the point where the domestic stability of both developed and developing countries are threatened—particularly in democracies. As people view those on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum as a threat or enemy, the likelihood of justifying violence to “protect their country” or “take it back” from “others” increases. Experts have examined the unfavorable impacts of polarization on several political dynamics, such as civic engagement, social trust, and trust in government.

However, we have a poor understanding of how polarization in society would affect militaries, particularly their performance and relations with their parent governments. After all, military institutions often reflect the characteristics of their societies, so there is little reason to believe militaries are immune to social polarization. Military officers have their own political views, and increasing political partisanship and polarization among the ranks has become worrying, if not detrimental, for national security.

The Military Consequences of Polarization

The first and perhaps the most serious such consequence is the decline of public trust in the military. When people perceive the military as representing one particular ideological view, especially one that is opposed to the views held by a significant segment of the civilian population, a military’s traditional neutral and non-partisan role is eroded, creating a divide between the military and the civilian public. Such a public perception would threaten a military’s ability to maintain the support of a broader population, making it difficult to elicit public support for military-related matters, particularly concerning funding, equipment, or training.

Second, polarization also increases the risk of politicizing the military appointment process. Politicians are incentivized to appoint partisan loyalists in military leadership, since they may not trust other military leaders who disagree with their political beliefs. Moreover, this would also affect the appointment of mid-level officers, since military leaders themselves might prefer working with subordinates who share similar political views, and distrust those who do not.

Beyond the appointment process, polarization could even affect the basic recruitment process in the military. The Turkish military is a prime example of this: polarization among ultranationalist, secularist, and religious communities in Turkey has deepened under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rule over the past two decades, affecting the country’s military as Erdogan divided and dispersed it, taking complete control of what was once an institutional force. One of Erdogan's strongest allies, SADAT, officially a defense consultancy contractor, has been involved in choosing the desired candidates for the Turkish Military Academy (recently rebranded as National Defense University) and determining the list of questions in cadet selection interviews. Instead of questions that measure the qualifications of the candidates, SADAT’s questions are designed to recruit candidates who share their political views. Consider the following example questions: “Should Turkey be governed by democracy or theocracy?” “If both the Chief of the General Staff and the President give you an order at the same time, whose order would you follow?”

Third, social polarization can also impact the battlefield performance of militaries. The breakdown in social trust caused by polarization can be felt across the ranks, making it difficult for militaries to create strong bonds and cohesive units. This can deteriorate morale, and negatively impact soldiers’ performance on the battlefield. Additionally, polarization can make it difficult for militaries to undertake important efforts, such as intelligence gathering. If a military is perceived as closely aligned with one particular social group, or out of touch with certain social groups, it will find it hard to gain trust and cooperation from those groups. This could degrade a military’s ability to gather vital intelligence about an adversary, particularly in a counterinsurgency context where gathering information from locals is critical.

Polarized Military as Menace to Democracy

The dangers of a polarized military are not limited to the military itself—they can spread and even threaten the existence of fundamental democratic values, such as democratic civilian control over the military, that the military should possess non-partisan character, or even the acceptance of political transitions.

Consider for example recent political events in Brazil, where now-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated the incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in an election. Following Bolsonaro’s electoral defeat, a mob of his supporters attacked Brazil’s federal government buildings, including the nation’s Congress. Lula though noted that individuals in the military facilitated these insurrectionists’ storming of government buildings, indicating that polarization between right- and left-wing supporters in Brazil has affected the country’s military.

In addition to active-duty officers, social polarization also influences retired officers. For instance, there is a recent trend of retired U.S. officers adopting partisan positions and weighing in on subjects not related to military expertise. 124 retired generals and admirals released a letter in 2021 advancing a false claim that the presidential vote in 2020 was rigged in Joe Biden’s favor and opined about various domestic issues, such as the construction of a border wall. Retired generals in the United States also sometimes get directly involved in politics by speaking at political party conventions and endorsing political candidates. By involving themselves in these kinds of political activities, officers fail to preserve a military’s non-partisan character.

Polarization can create challenges to another democratic norm: civilian control of the military. If the military is perceived as being more powerful or influential than other institutions in society, the potential for abuse of power or erosion of democratic accountability can manifest. Additionally, if the military is perceived as being more respected or trusted than other institutions, this can produce a sense of entitlement and overconfidence among military leaders, making it harder for civilian leaders to provide effective oversight and guidance. This argument is consistent with professor Peter Erickson’s view that high levels of social polarization, combined with high military prestige, is a dangerous mix.

Overcoming Military Polarization

Despite this gloomy picture, there are also several potential solutions to the problem of polarization.

One solution is for militaries to engage with communities that perceive them as representing a different ideological group. There are several ways to achieve this, including diversifying the pool of recruits by including people from marginalized communities. Doing so can increase contact between people with different worldviews and foster a shared sense of purpose among those from diverse backgrounds, which can help alleviate the adverse effects of polarization.

Moreover, military organizations can partner with local organizations that serve their communities to better understand local needs. This partnership is particularly crucial during times of crisis, such as when militaries provide assistance during natural disasters—especially when marginalized communities are disproportionately affected. By paying special attention to helping these communities in a timely manner, militaries attain trust and break down barriers.

Furthermore, accountability is crucial for strengthening efforts to contain polarization. Not all officers are equally professional, and some may not even be aware of their implicit political biases. To prevent the possibility that such biases might poison the culture of professionalism and accountability in the military, senior leadership must take certain necessary measures, such as offering specialized training and making reporting channels open. Training can help officers become more aware of their implicit biases, foster a culture of open communication, and being able to raise concerns within legal limits against polarizing rhetoric or behaviors can help neutralize the harmful effects of polarization.

Together with the military’s own efforts, civilian leaders must do their bit to hold politicians responsible for their own deeds that could exacerbate a military’s polarization problem. To stop the politicization of uniformed troops or military resources in partisan contexts, the public ought to speak out and advocate for changes to laws on civil-military relations or the educational doctrine of particular militaries. These changes should aim to strictly restrict politicians from taking advantage of the reputation of their militaries for their own political agendas.

Lessons Learned from History

History is the most powerful teacher, and historical examples aptly demonstrate how polarization has led to defeats on the battlefield or undermined a military’s ability to respond to threats. Using these examples to demonstrate the consequences that a military faces, if polarization is left unresolved, might encourage individual military personnel to do their part to fix the issue.

The Ottoman military’s performance during the Balkan Wars (1912 to 1913) is a case in point. The Ottoman defeat in the First Balkan War was attributed to polarization among the officer ranks and the lack of a clear ideological message to unite soldiers.

The Balkan Wars marked the beginning of the Ottoman empire’s final decade. While conscription of non-Muslim males eligible for military service was legal since 1856, it was only enforced after 1909. While some Ottoman elites believed a more inclusive military was necessary to promote Ottomanism and save imperial unity, others believed it would exacerbate the already existing fault lines in the polarized Ottoman forces. The defeat in the Balkan Wars and World War I revealed the political tensions within the Ottoman political and military elite over Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. The wars and the military coup of 1913 led to a de facto military dictatorship by the Committee of Union and Progress’ triumvirate until the end of the empire. Aware of the dangers of a politically polarized military, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the founding father of the nascent Turkish Republic, enforced a strict separation of the officer ranks from politics through legislation and constitutional amendments.

In sum, social polarization can lead to several serious consequences for militaries, such as the decline of public trust, the politicization of appointment and recruitment processes, and the negative impact on battlefield performance. These consequences are particularly worrying in a time of growing political partisanship and polarization in societies, where the military’s neutral and non-partisan role can be threatened, and its ability to maintain public support may be compromised. Furthermore, a polarized military can become a menace to democracy, where its actions may even threaten fundamental democratic values. It is crucial to recognize the impact of social polarization on militaries and take action to mitigate its negative consequences, such as promoting merit-based appointments and curbing civilian politicization of the military. An institution tasked with national security and defense of the nation can’t afford political exploitation of its nonpartisan ethic and constitutional duty. Preserving the institutional identity and shared values of the military calls for resilience and resistance from military leadership, civilian defenders, and a vigilant public.

Mustafa Kirisci is an Assistant Professor of Homeland Security at Desales University. His research interests are terrorism, civil conflict, interstate conflict, and civil-military relations.

Ibrahim Kocaman is an Assistant Professor at the department of security studies and international affairs at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University. His research interests are civil conflict, civil-military relations, interstate conflict, and political economy.

Cagil Albayrak is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Kansas. His research interests are terrorism, political institutions, and civil-military relations.

Image: Shutterstock.

The arrest of a “global terrorist” and financial supporter of Hezbollah in Romania on February 24 exemplifies the lengths the Lebanese militant group will go to insulate itself from U.S. sanctions. According to an indictment from the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York, Mohammad Ibrahim Bazzi, a fifty-eight-year-old Lebanese and Belgian citizen, conspired to “secretly move hundreds of thousands of dollars from the United States to Lebanon” and “provide continued financial assistance to Hizballah,” a designated foreign terrorist organization. Bazzi, who was himself declared a Specially Designed Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in 2018, is now awaiting extradition to the United States alongside another Lebanese citizen, Talal Chahine, for participation in the same crimes.

Bazzi and Chahine’s offenses reach far beyond Romania and the United States. As described in the OFAC designation, Bazzi has generated millions of dollars for Hezbollah from business activities in Belgium, Gambia, Lebanon, and Iraq, among other locations. Further, as a “key Hizballah financier,” he maintains ties to other material supporters of Hezbollah and OFAC-designated and sanctioned SDGTs, as well as the Central Bank of Iran.

The Iran angle is particularly interesting, as Hezbollah has been known to receive the bulk of its funding (and weapons) from the Islamic Republic of Iran. As Iran’s foremost proxy which has carried out Iranian-backed operations in Syria and Yemen and against Israel, the ties between the two are extensive. Hezbollah has grown so powerful due to Iranian largess that it has often been called a “state within a state,” and has leveraged its capabilities to exert considerable political influence over Lebanon’s domestic and foreign policies.

Yet Hezbollah has also faced various financial constraints over the past two decades, including those brought on by Iran’s deteriorating economy, international financial sanctions, political competition in Lebanon, and combat operations in Syria. These pressures created an impetus for Iran and Hezbollah to get creative. Just this last week, for example, Israel announced the discovery of a gold smuggling operation between Iran and Venezuela, in which the former’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force would smuggle Venezuelan gold to Iran, sell it for a profit, and transfer the funds to Hezbollah.

This revelation should not be surprising. Hezbollah has worked assiduously to establish a presence in Latin America, especially in the notorious tri-border area between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, where a significant number of Lebanese immigrants live. As described by Matthew Levitt, a former senior official at the Treasury Department and a counterterrorism expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in his 2013 book, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, Hezbollah not only built formal and informal support networks in this area, including sleeper cells, but engaged in drug trafficking and “every financial crime in the book” to generate funds.

Hezbollah has established similar transnational criminal networks in Europe, Africa, and even the United States, providing it with sources of funding that are entirely independent of Iran. This has made cracking down on the group an arduous task for U.S. and international law enforcement.

This brings us back to Bazzi and Chahine. Despite being described as “the most senior catch in the top tier” of Hezbollah’s Business Affairs Component, the organizational structure that undergirds the group’s international enterprises, it is far from a death blow. Indeed, countering Hezbollah, which in addition to controlling a worldwide criminal network also commands a large political following in Lebanon, requires friends of a free and democratic Lebanon to play the long game.

To be sure, one way in which the United States has sought to support Lebanese democracy and Lebanese alternatives to Hezbollah is by supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). According to the U.S. State Department, the United States has invested over $3 billion into the LAF since 2006 as a means of supporting Lebanon’s institutions, strengthening its sovereignty, securing its borders, and countering internal threats and terrorists.

Unfortunately, Lebanon’s economic emergency and political dysfunction are straining the LAF to the breaking point. Al-Monitor reported in late February that desertions are rising as the country’s currency has collapsed by more than 98 percent over the past three years. Lebanese security chiefs are warning of their declining ability to secure the country at the same time that Lebanese citizens and police are “storming” banks to access their own money and violent clashes are occurring in the country’s largest Palestinian refugee camp.

Whether a solution to these problems can be found is difficult to say, but Lebanon’s long-standing political deadlock suggests that the situation will further worsen before it improves. The country has failed to elect a new president since its former president, Michel Aoun, left office last October, leaving it in the hands of a caretaker government. This constitutional crisis is only one more problem upon a mountain of challenges that the Lebanese must summit before their situation improves. In this light, the arrest of two senior Hezbollah financiers is laudable, but ultimately a sideshow for the Lebanese people, whose country stands on the edge of a precipice.

Adam Lammon is a former executive editor at The National Interest and an analyst of Middle Eastern affairs based in Washington, DC. The opinions expressed in this article are his own.

Image: Crop Media/Shutterstock.

The Melian Dialogue is among the most heavily analyzed sections in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. Athens wanted to take Melos, a small island, as a subject of their empire. The Athenians sent envoys to negotiate with the Melians, who had no true means of resisting a superpower like Athens unless their allies, the Spartans, chose to once again fight a long, bloody war on their behalf.

Unlike Melos, which never received Spartan aid and whose population was ultimately annihilated, Ukraine has received an endless supply of military aid from Western countries. Russian leaders regularly warn that the West’s military support of Ukraine could lead to a full-fledged war between NATO and Russia. After all, the truth of the matter is that American and other NATO members’ weapons are being sent to Ukraine in order to kill Russian soldiers.

Furthermore, while the Melian Dialogue certainly consisted of a lot of talking, there was hardly any true negotiation. Each party maintained unconditional positions that were paradoxical to one another, making any meaningful progress impossible. The same can be said with Russia and Ukraine; each party refuses to even come to the negotiating table until the other agrees to unacceptable demands. To avoid a Melian ending in Ukraine, one or both parties will have to modify their conditions. To avoid a worse ending, NATO should consider the following questions. Was it prudent for Sparta not to intervene in Melos, or should they have risked another massive war with Athens over the island? Should Melos have surrendered? As the war in Ukraine rages on, and peace talks have yet to commence, it’s long past time we ask ourselves if helping Kyiv regain control of eastern Ukraine is worth the risks, and if there isn’t another way forward.

The Athenian envoys opened the dialogue by acknowledging that they were brought only before the rulers of Melos, or “the Few,” because the people,“the Many,” would quickly agree to the Athenians’ demands and inferred that the Few knew this to be true. The Melians stated that though they would take part in a dialogue, there was hardly any serious discussion to be had. They understood that the Athenians had made up their minds and intended to turn Melos into their subject, which the Melians refused to consider. Herein lies the key problem that persists throughout the entire dialogue: each side maintained unconditional positions that were paradoxical to one another. The unconditional Athenian position was that Melos would become a subject of the Athenian empire, the only question being whether they would secure it through Melian submission or war. The unconditional Melian position was that they would not become a subject of the Athenian empire, the only question being whether they would achieve that through persuasion or war. The only outcome that both parties were willing to accept was also the one they both wanted to avoid. Does this sound familiar?

Kyiv has offered a ten-point peace proposal to the Russians, which includes the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and the restoration of pre-war borders. It should come as no surprise that Russia declined Kyiv’s proposal. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has urged Ukraine to accept the “new realities” and that if they don’t, “no kind of progress is possible.” Among these “new realities” include the annexed regions of eastern Ukraine being part of the Russian Federation. Referendums were held in each of these regions, and though they all allegedly voted to join the Russian Federation, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, along with most of the Western world, has denounced these referendums as “shams” with “no legal value.”

Like the Athenians and Melians, Russia and Ukraine each maintain paradoxical, unconditional positions. The party being aggressed has every right to resist. That said, if either of these countries eventually become serious about ending the war for the sake of preventing further loss of life and destruction, there will have to be peace talks, and concessions will have to be made. Short of that, the only alternative is for one side to military defeat the other, which would lead to a far worse outcome for the loser.

The Athenians, like the Russians today, encouraged the Melians to accept the reality before them. They dismissed all arguments grounded in the abstract, such as the importance of hope. The Melians spoke of “the fortune of war” and stated that “to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect.” The Athenians responded coldly, referring to hope as “danger’s comforter,” and said that when reality is too harsh to accept, people “turn to the invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to their destruction.” Ukraine is in a similar position, but unlike the Melians, they have been fed reasons to be hopeful by Western governments. Melos received no support from their allies, whereas Ukraine has received foreign military aid since the beginning of the war. This has been noticeably beneficial to the Ukrainians. As of November 2022, Ukraine has reclaimed over 50 of percent the land captured by Russia, though Russian forces still control roughly 15 to 20 percent of the country. Even with most NATO members agreeing to supply Ukraine with tanks, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated that dozens of tanks will hardly make a difference, given the fact that Russia has thousands of them. Despite the quantity being insufficient, those tanks do provide a real benefit to the Ukrainian military, according to Zelenskyy. “They do only one very important thing—they motivate our soldiers to fight for their own values. Because they show that the whole world is with you.” In short, the West has supplied Ukrainians with hope.

The Melians cited the prospect of a Spartan intervention as a stronger argument against Athenian aggression. They claimed that the Spartans would intervene, “if only for very shame…”. Again, the Athenians struck them down, saying that danger is something “the Spartans generally court as little as possible.” One might not think of the United States as a nation that courts danger infrequently, given their long history of foreign interventions. But in the post-World War II era, the United States has exclusively fought against relatively minor powers. Major powers, which make up most of the United States’ greatest adversaries, tend to be off limits, and rightfully so. Not because America would lose a conventional war against a major power, but because of one key factor: nuclear weapons. In this regard, Americans are like the Spartans, who generally court danger as little as possible.

After going back and forth several more times over the prospect of a Spartan intervention, the Athenians suggested that the Few should seek advice from others before it’s too late. Before leaving, they told the Melians to make their final decision carefully, as it was a choice between “prosperity or ruin.”

The Few never changed their minds, they never sought advice from others and war ensued. The Melians held out for roughly a year before finally surrendering, at which point every man in Melos was executed, the women and children were sold into slavery, and Athenian colonists settled Melos for themselves. The Many were annihilated because of a decision made by a small group of individuals. To prefer death over the loss of sovereignty is noble. Subjecting an entire city to that decision is probably poor governance. If the Many had any say in this dialogue, would they have made the same decision, or would they have preferred to live as subjects of the Athenian empire? For the war in Ukraine to end through peace talks instead of a more Melian fate, either Russia or Ukraine will have to change their unconditional demands. 

There are only two possible outcomes for Ukraine. Either most of Ukraine will remain under Kyiv’s control, or all of Ukraine will be reduced to rubble, its leadership overthrown, and the entire country will potentially face annexation. The first outcome relies on peace talks taking place before the Ukrainian military is outright defeated. Those peace talks would probably include Kyiv surrendering its eastern territory to Russia. The second outcome is virtually guaranteed if Ukraine is defeated before agreeing to a peace treaty that involves forfeiting territory it hasn’t had real control of since 2014 anyway. This is true even with a continued supply of Western military equipment.

Readers will note that excluded from these two options is the outcome that most hope for: Ukraine defeating the Russian military and regaining control of the entire country. Those in the West who promote this outcome are feeding Ukrainians with what we know to be “danger’s comforter.” The longer the West provides Ukraine with military aid, the longer Ukrainians will be deluded in the face of greater dangers than those they already face.

Ending the war through a peace treaty, even an unideal one, is an objectively better outcome than the logical conclusion of its current course. Each new round of military equipment sent to Ukraine is more advanced than the last. The first batch of American aid included anti-armor and antiaircraft munitions. Roughly a year later, NATO countries have provided Ukraine with Patriot missile systems and are in the process of supplying them with tanks as well. Meanwhile, the Russians are becoming increasingly angry with Western governments, cutting diplomatic ties, exiting treaties, and occasionally threatening nuclear war. Is helping Kyiv regain control over the eastern territory worth that risk? Alternatively, Western governments could instantly eliminate that risk by ceasing its military aid. That would, of course, expedite Ukraine’s inevitable defeat and hurt the pride of Western leaders. Was the pride of the Few, or their value of sovereignty, worth the lives of Melos’ populace? And is there a lesson to be learned from the Spartans’ decision not to intervene?

Michael Guy is a political writer, activist, and campaign worker with a master’s degree in political science with a focus on political theory and American politics.

Image: Shutterstock.

One year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the ugliness of humanity is fully on display. But instead of working to stop the war immediately, major powers in the world are directly or indirectly prolonging this man-made tragedy.

In total, as of the time of writing, the United States has committed more than $27.4 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the current administration, and more than $26.7 billion since the beginning of Russia’s brutal invasion on February 24, 2022. President Joe Biden himself announced another half a billion dollars in military aid to Ukraine during his February 20 surprise visit to Kyiv. “To meet Ukraine’s evolving battlefield requirements, the United States will continue to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with key capabilities,” the U.S. Department of Defense declared when announcing the additional security aid. When appearing alongside Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv, Biden proudly stated that, “Together, we’ve committed nearly 700 tanks and thousands of armored vehicles. 1,000 artillery systems, more than 2 million rounds of artillery ammunition, more than 50 advanced launch rocket systems, anti-ship and air defense systems, all to defend Ukraine.”

At the same time, Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida said his country would be pledging another $5.5 billion in assistance, because of “strong concern that Ukraine may be tomorrow’s East Asia.” 

Supporting Ukraine in its resistance against Russian invasion is the right thing to do. But is this the only thing the United States can do? Have the United States and other powers tried to end the war? Why has our society become so tolerant of this bloody war?

China, another major global power—which is reportedly considering supplying Russia with drones and artillery equipment—released its “Global Security Initiative Concept Paper” a few days before the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion. In this document, China touts the concept of “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security,” and reiterates its commitments “to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries” and “to taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously.”

This is a paradoxical position: the first commitment appears to be supporting Ukraine, while the second supports Russia. Without specific, actionable measures to implement this supposed global security initiative, the document sounds hollow. 

Yet the contradictory position may be the point, since the same dire situation that exists in Ukraine also exists in the Taiwan Strait. It’s in everyone’s interest not to turn Taiwan into another Ukraine. Yet the United States and China seem to be heading towards the exact same kind of showdown.

Depending on who you ask, a U.S.-China war over Taiwan could break out in 2049, 2035, 2027, or as soon as 2025—with that last one being based on the “gut feelings” of General Mike Minihan of the U.S. Air Mobility Command.

And how is the United States preparing for this potential scenario? By arming Taiwan.

Washington has never ceased arms sales to Taiwan after it switched official recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, which is consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Jimmy Carter, states that the United States “shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.”

In recent years, the United States has sharply increased security and military support for Taiwan while China becomes more assertive. For instance, the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, included in the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), authorizes appropriations for military grant assistance for Taiwan up to $2 billion per year from 2023 through 2027.

This so-called “porcupine strategy” is aimed at arming Taiwan so much that China would think twice before it launches an attack on Taiwan. The question is, with the People’s Liberation Army’s own modernization and Xi Jinping’s historical mission of realizing the “Chinese dream,” which includes China’s unification with Taiwan, will the porcupine strategy work? Or is it counterproductive, since Washington’s efforts to beef up Taiwan’s defense will only harden Beijing’s resolve to be better prepared for an eventual conflict?

U.S. diplomats and scholars used to be the most consistent and loudest supporters of cross-Taiwan Strait dialogue. Nowadays, nobody in Washington is promoting dialogue; everyone is busy predicting when the war with China will start—it is automatically presumed that such an outcome is a foregone conclusion.

The U.S. government tended to be vague about its long-term goal in Taiwan, and it was believed that Washington did not care about a particular outcome of cross-strait relations so long as the process is peaceful. Today, the United States does not seem to support cross-strait unification anymore, even if it is achieved peacefully. Indeed, Taiwan has become a more valuable strategic asset for both Washington and Beijing as U.S.-China rivalry intensifies.

As Washington continues to arm Taiwan and as Beijing ramps up military and diplomatic pressures on Taiwan, a U.S.-China military conflict seems highly likely.

No one benefits from wars, except greedy arms dealers. As great powers, the United States and China should ask themselves: what have we done to end or prevent wars?

Zhiqun Zhu is a professor of international relations and political science at Bucknell University in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. He has written extensively on U.S.-China relations and East Asian political economy.

Image: Shutterstock.

Newly re-elected Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and high-level Israeli ministers have recently met with multiple U.S. delegations led by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on January 19, CIA director Bill Burns shortly after, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken between January 30-31. The litany of meetings marks the first early engagements between the partner countries under Israel’s new government, coming at a truly unique moment for Israel and Palestine in which a perfect confluence of hardline views and groups could erupt into a regionally destabilizing conflict.

The historic election of the most far-right government in Israeli history following Israeli parliamentary elections in November has dominated the media cycle for months, in no small part because Netanyahu’s coalition consists of ultranationalist and ultraorthodox parties operated by openly racist and xenophobic fascists. The most notable non-Likud parties and individuals in this new coalition include Religious Zionism, run by Bezalel Smotrich; Otzma Yehudit, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir; Shas, led by Aryeh Deri; and United Torah Judaism, led by Yitzchak Goldknopf.

Netanyahu’s Likud is the largest party in the Israeli Knesset (the Israeli parliament) with thirty-two seats. It is also the furthest left political entity in the coalition, raising eyebrows given that the party is very conservative. Major cabinet-level positions were given to each of the party leaders in the coalition, including Smotrich as minister of finance and Ben Gvir as minister for national security. Specifically, Smotrich will control the Finance Ministry for two years while also serving as a minister in the Ministry of Defense, overseeing West Bank settlements. Ben Gvir will oversee police forces across Israel and the West Bank.

Ultimately, the ministry assignments are striking considering the conflict of interests at play. This includes Smotrich’s plans to shift governing responsibilities from the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) Civil Administration under the Defense Ministry to “relevant ministries” and thus civilian control—a “de facto annexation” of Palestinian land as it would apply Israeli civil law instead of military rule to the occupied territories. Smotrich’s Finance Ministry would likely be one governing entity gaining powers over the West Bank in this regard, as he desires full control of development in Area C (60 percent of the West Bank) to advance Israeli settler colony construction. Importantly, Smotrich lives in the historic settlement of Kedumim, half of which falls under Area C.

This plan was partially operationalized on February 23, when a number of responsibilities under the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and the Civil Administration, the two Defense Ministry agencies in charge of civilian affairs in Area C of the West Bank where Israel has full security and civilian control, were transferred to Smotrich. To avoid political backlash, the power transfer is defined as within the Defense Ministry, where Smotrich is a minister. Ultimately, power over the West Bank will be split between Smotrich, Defense Minister Yoav Galant, and Netanyahu—setting up a power struggle. More importantly, Smotrich will now have supposed final say on enforcement of illegal settlement construction.

Each of these leaders, as well as their parties broadly, openly support repressive policies that advance Israeli apartheid over Palestinians specifically and non-Jewish minorities generally. This includes settlement expansion (including legalizing illegal outposts in occupied Palestine on February 12), expanding policing of Palestinian-majority communities, loosening policies allowing for police to fire on civilians, outlawing the Palestinian flag, and broadening the interior minister’s ability to revoke citizenship for a lack of “loyalty” to the state of Israel. Each of these policies is used to decrease the power of Palestinians to resist the occupation and further harden the alternative legal regime under which they live.

Ultimately, the combination of fascistic politicians, coupled with the guaranteed deepening of Israeli apartheid against Palestinians in both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)—not to mention the attempted annexation of Palestinian land through settlement expansion, recognition, and legal reforms—is certain to spell disaster for Palestine, Israel, and the broader region. Indeed, the advent of Israel’s new government comes amidst the perfect storm of adjacent issues.

This includes the rapidly decaying influence of and support for the Palestinian Authority (PA), which governs parts of the West Bank. Aging PA president Mahmoud Abbas, alongside most of the PA leadership under his Fatah Movement, is widely viewed as ineffectual and out of touch—for good reason. PA cooperation with Israel has regularly produced terrible outcomes for Palestinians, often in the form of Ramallah’s brutal repression of the Palestinian street itself. Many Palestinians view the PA as an arm of the Israeli government, especially given its own brutal tactics against the Palestinian people.

Due to its loss of legitimacy, the PA is ceding ground to new armed groups across the OPT, not limited to the Iran-backed Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, alongside newer groups like the Lion’s Den. Palestinian Youth are particularly prominent in new militant groups in the West Bank and carry widespread support—a sign that Palestinians have lost faith in peaceful engagement with Israel. This is best represented by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research’s (PCPSR) latest polling of Palestinians in the West Bank, which found that 40 percent of individuals now support “waging an armed struggle” against the occupation.

This is a long-running and unsurprising trend. Israel has forced millions of Palestinians into both poverty and increasingly smaller communities over the decades while supporting settler efforts to swallow up OPT land, such as mob attacks on Palestinian communities. Consecutive Israeli governments have ignored the clear need for peace talks with the Palestinian leadership, cynically opting to slowly creep over Palestinian land and ethnically cleanse entire communities, in no small part because it is politically popular in Israel. Masafer Yatta, near Hebron, offers one of a litany of examples of this strategy. Indeed, the Israeli far-right appears dead set on expanding Israeli territory to force Palestinians out of their communities. Smotrich’s statements, claiming he has “no interest” in the PA’s existence, is the personification of a broader reality in which the West Bank is entirely annexed—a leading cause of Palestinian upheaval today. Israeli efforts to cut PA funding, led by Smotrich, only worsen destabilization.

Thus, the perfect storm presents itself. One of the core sources of regional instability—namely the fight for Palestinian statehood—is reaching an apex moment in which hardline stances in Israel and Palestine are resulting in exceedingly violent incidents. Much of this falls on Israel’s refusal to negotiate with the Palestinians given domestic political realities and the perception that it can bypass concessions through efforts to expand the Abraham Accords, which connected Israel to multiple Arab governments in 2020 through so-called “peace deals.”

This, coupled with overt military repression that has particularly worsened in the last year, evidenced by a marked increase in West Bank raids since last year, has forced many Palestinians to view violence as their only option. To be sure, increasingly repressive tactics are the norm of both moderate and right-wing Israeli governments for years, especially following the deadliest year for Palestinians on record (2022). Unfortunately, the new government’s makeup and rhetoric prove that it will continue to push Palestinians beyond the breaking point. Recent violence in the West Bank during the U.S. delegation visits, including the worst Israeli raid in a decade, and, subsequently, the worst Palestinian attack on Israelis in fifteen years are the results.

Without exceedingly careful diplomacy by world leaders—namely, the United States—a new and major conflict will erupt between Israelis and Palestinians that could transcend the OPT into Israeli communities. This was already witnessed during the 2021 Gaza War, which for the first time saw intracommunal violence across Israel as Hamas and the IDF rained bombs on each other for weeks. Simply put, it is not outlandish, albeit incredibly saddening, that 2023 faces the very real risk of a third Intifada should the new Israeli government push Palestinians to the breaking point. PCPSR’s research suggests that many think this is already occurring, with 61 percent of Palestinians and 65 percent of Israeli Jews agreeing an intifada has already started.

Recent U.S. delegations to Israel suggest that important conversations focused on stabilizing the situation are occurring. However, Netanyahu’s word is highly contentious given the far-right’s hold over him due to his ongoing corruption trial. Ultimately, Netanyahu needs his coalition partners to push through judicial reforms that will save his political career. His decision to create a coalition with fascists already suggests he is compromised on this front and beholden to their interests. Thus, his comments about stability and the status quo should ring hollow, let alone any expectation that he can keep his cabinet in check. This is particularly true given the recent conflict within his cabinet following the destruction of the illegal Or Hachaim outpost in the West Bank, in which Gallant and Smotrich clashed over the closing of the settler outpost. Israel’s brutal Nablus raid on February 22, mere hours after promising to cease West Bank raids in exchange for the PA’s removal of a highly critical United Nations Security Council resolution against Israel, further proves this reality. The brutality that occurred during the Huwara pogroms, at nearly the same time as meetings in Jordan between Palestinian, Israeli, American, and other regional delegations, only adds insult to injury.

Washington must recognize the moment. The Biden administration has attempted to play “quiet diplomacy” with Israel in the hopes of avoiding a rupture, but this strategy was always doomed to fail. Any approach that utilizes increasingly toothless peace and security rhetoric without a political process, which Israel and the United States continue to say is not viable, is doomed to lead to violence as Palestinians face daily raids, deaths, poverty, and no state. Hoping that an outbreak of additional (and worse) violence does not occur even as the U.S. government does its utmost to defend Israel and the current status quo will neither support U.S. interests nor aid in peace and stability. It will only leave the region a powder keg set to ignite at any moment.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: abu adel - photo / Shutterstock.com

U.S. president Joe Biden paid a surprise visit to Ukrainian president Volodymir Zelenskyy in Kyiv on February 20, 2023. Speaking together at the Mariinsky Palace, Zelenskyy said, “Right now, in Ukraine, the destiny of the international order based […] is decided.” He rightly emphasized that “a common, joint task for all the countries” is their defense of the rules-based international order. From Kyiv to Taipei, and from Warsaw to Tokyo, we are entering a new geopolitical stage that encompasses both terrestrial Eurasia and the maritime Indo-Pacific.

Although Russia’s war in Ukraine gravely threatens the international order, the most acute international security problem emanates from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The October 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy, for instance, pointed to the PRC as “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order.” Half a world away, Japan’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, spelled out the threats associated with “historical changes in power balances.”

During the 2010s, the “Indo-Pacific” emerged as a geography of strategies, a commensurate response awakened by a gnawing sense of systemic unpredictability. Democratic powers—what we term Indo-Pacific lynchpins—have begun conducting flanking maneuvers to counter China’s revisionism. The Quadrilateral (Quad) cooperation of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States―an informal grouping of the lynchpin Indo-Pacific states―stands in China’s way and erodes its political momentum.

The Quad’s collective actions may have borne fruit, but questions hang over its capacity to build a larger coalition. It certainly does not yet dominate the Indo-Pacific “great game,” but rather assures, importantly, the meaningful balance of power. What the Communist leadership in Beijing may not yet realize is that these Indo-Pacific strategies have now entered a new stage which, in part, have stemmed directly from the Zeitenwende of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Of course, Chinese policymakers are aware of the meaning and implications of the “Indo-Pacific”—a vast region stretching from the eastern shores of Africa across the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia and ending in the eastern Pacific. Essentially, it is a geographized political reality, one that encapsulates the gravity generated by political realities. Yet, the Indo-Pacific is also a lodestar, a guiding normative geostrategy, and it is in this sense that China and its rivals in the Quad fully understand it.

Nevertheless, it engenders very different words and actions from the competitors. This vast area has, therefore, become the geographic “ground zero” of China’s attempts to revise the international order and others to protect it. Accordingly, proponents of the latter, led by the Quad states, often couch their words and actions by referencing the term “Indo-Pacific.” China does not.

These Indo-Pacific ideations espouse what we call a “principled regionalism,” one based on the values and norms of international law. In particular, the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept, first advanced by Japan, has become the inspirational source of narrative and response for the Quad’s members. This conceptual framework, because it speaks directly to the national security concerns of Indo-Pacific states, has engendered the quartet’s vigorous dynamism.

Since 2021, for example, the Quad has held several foreign ministers and summit meetings, underscoring its substantial stake in world affairs. In May last year, Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida welcomed his Quad peers, Anthony Albanese, Narendra Modi, and Joe Biden in Tokyo. The four leaders reaffirmed the Quad-led international cooperation and partnership ranging from maritime domain awareness, fellowship, coronavirus relief, climate change, critical technologies, cybersecurity, and space exploration to infrastructure. But the unspoken aim—the elephant in the room—remained China.

In part to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)―President Xi Jinping’s flagship whole-of-government program―significant resources have been made available to national bodies such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation or the Japan Bank of International Cooperation. These are being used for a variety of projects across the Indo-Pacific. Contrary to the China-led BRI, the quality infrastructure and investments provided in the name of the Indo-Pacific respect local priorities and debt-managing capacities.

In terms of security cooperation, when the Quad states conduct naval drills, among themselves or with varying partners, the stage setting is the Indo-Pacific, whether to the west of India in the Arabian Sea or the Philippine Sea. Security and defense cooperation, led by the individual Quad members or in concert with other like-minded states, are also flourishing across the Indo-Pacific.

All is not rosy in the Indo-Pacific, however. The ongoing U.S.-China competition occurs in a highly fragmented, multipolar world. Many states in the political South increasingly claim autonomy vis-à-vis both Washington and Beijing, and equidistance, whether in Southeast Asia or the Arab Middle East, is a familiar posture. As such, alignment competition has become a subject laden with implications for the outcome of great power competition. Engaging with numerous “middle players” and building a wider coalition of states thus remains critical for the Quad members if they wish to build a collaborative and highly robust Pax Indo-Pacifica.

Looking at the big picture of global alignment, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drastically changed the strategic landscape and added much-needed clarity to Indo-Pacific strategies and perspectives. These cataclysmic shifts were also engendered by China’s domestic difficulties laid bare during the coronavirus pandemic. This, more than anything else, contradicts the conventional, albeit deeply flawed views of China’s unstoppable “rising” power. Let us be specific.

Traditionally, European leaders have not considered the threat of China as their problem. When the European Union (EU) issued its Indo-Pacific strategy in September 2021, the EU’s approach to the PRC was still influenced by an equidistance mindset between Washington and Beijing. Apart from its emphasis on normativity, Brussels’ posture was rather similar to that of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Even after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Strategic Concept released by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in June 2022 did not go so far as to regard China as “the most significant and direct threat” in the way Russia was.

Yet, a sea change is occurring. The United Kingdom had already moved from its pro-China stance to taking a hard line as early as 2020. Some states in Central and Eastern Europe have also distanced themselves from China in favor of Taiwan. A chorus of European leaders began voicing their concerns about authoritarian China as did NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, when he visited Tokyo and Seoul in January 2023.

Nevertheless, states taking a hardline against China like Lithuania are the minority within the EU. Germany, which maintains huge business interests in China, maintains an equivocal stance. Like Germany’s shift in support for Ukraine against Russia, we assess an increasingly harsh stance on China by European governments, in turn, will result in their favor of the Quad’s initiatives, projecting a “Euro-Indo-Pacific” or “Atlantic-Pacific” dynamism.

The Ukrainian War also clarified the Quad’s operational scope. India’s alliance with Russia and refusal to condemn Moscow’s territorial aggression were problematic vis-à-vis the Quad’s emphasis on universal norms. However, India’s actions by no means fatally undermined the Quad. Instead, New Delhi led the charge, perhaps inadvertently, to ensure that the four-member grouping remains focused on China, not Russia. Although some may lament India’s pro-Russia stance, crisis scenarios in the Indo-Pacific can now be envisaged more realistically.

For these reasons, and the inherent limitations of the informal Quad, the United States, and Japan, along with Australia, must explore other architecture to address warfare scenarios in East Asia, in which Russia siding with China is plausible. With this “Quad Minus” situation in mind, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the AUKUS alliance of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the G7, and other relevant partnerships must be considered to effectively counter Chinese attacks.

This does not mean, however, that India is not needed. On the contrary, India’s participation is indispensable for any Indo-Pacific grand strategies. Delhi’s political, economic, and military leverage along with its geography on China’s southern flank is essential for the Quad’s efforts to deter China. In addition, India’s inclusive and all-directional Indo-Pacific strategy has been put to good effect by Delhi to encourage broader support from non-Western states for the Indo-Pacific.

All these elements, however, may not be as disruptive as the shift coming from China itself. In contrast to the trajectory of Indo-Pacific cooperation, China has encountered strong headwinds. China’s appetite for territory in its near abroad has resulted in something of a backlash from its neighbors, who have tightened their guard. China’s rapid over-expansion of its BRI has resulted in a number of intractable problems: unpayable and insoluble debts, environmental degradation, project failures, corruption, and local resentment. What can be termed “BRIgret” has surfaced among recipient governments. The BRI’s current stagnation, exemplified by decreases in funding from Beijing, contrasts starkly with China’s ascendancy on the world stage in the 2010s.

China’s structural, domestic challenges have grown and tarnished its cherished “Chinese Dream.” The country has entered a period of demographic decline and economic stagnation. Although the PRC was supposed to supersede the United States by the end of the 2020s, this prospect is unlikely. As China’s decline comes into view, it is unclear whether it can marshal enough power and influence to challenge U.S. primacy.

Yet because of this, as Hal Brands and Michael Beckley warn, China may become even more recklessly aggressive. Russia’s aberrant war in Ukraine and subsequent setbacks, for example, have raised the bar higher for China’s eventual invasion of Taiwan. Even here, however, Beijing has strategically and politically miscalculated. Xi, fed reports that overestimate Chinese power and grandeur, has given himself (and China) a deadline to absorb Taiwan. By painting himself into a corner, Xi is damned if he does invade and damned if he does not.

Given this situation, the Quad must carefully exploit China’s weakening conditions in their favor. The good news is that this entails doing more of the same: advocating the rules-based international order as a system that benefits all the countries in the world. In doing so, sympathizers of the international status quo will increase, and the Quad members will be able to strengthen their engagement with these non-aligned middle players. The United States and Japan can also seek European moral and political support for their cause.

The War in Ukraine, nonetheless, shattered this rosy picture of coalition building and showed its limits. Instead, voting at the United Nations and support for West-led sanctions demonstrated who the “core players” were in defending the international order. The U.S-led international responses to the PRC’s bellicosity will probably witness core players sticking together and many states in the political South remaining neutral.

Despite its pessimistic landscape, Russia’s war helped better simulate an eventual armed conflict provoked by China, most probably in the East China Sea theater around Taiwan. The recent U.S. agreement with the Philippines also demonstrated how a former fence-sitter could wisely come to the side of the Indo-Pacific coalition. Along with Japan’s emboldened defense posture, this agreement is another step onto the new stage of Indo-Pacific strategies. The circle is tightening around China.

The world is in crisis, engendered by Russia’s bald aggression. But this has strengthened the case for defending the rules-based international order. What happened to Ukraine must not be repeated in the Indo-Pacific by China. This region must be kept free from coercion and predation. With the benefit of clearer perspectives, the United States, Japan, and other like-minded partners must boldly enter the new Indo-Pacific stage by joining forces to keep their region free and open. The future of this century very much depends on these next steps.

Kei Hakata is a professor at Seikei University in Tokyo. Brendon J. Cannon is an assistant professor of international security at Khalifa University in Abu Dhabi. Both Cannon and Hakata are the editors of Indo-Pacific Strategies: Navigating Geopolitics at the Dawn of a New Age.

Image: U.S. Navy Flickr.

The nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote On War, which remains a leading work of military theory down the present. However, he wrote far more: to date, parts of his writings have yet to be translated into English, even if scholars are working to change that. One of his untranslated works is a short history of a Russian war in Ukraine. Clausewitz’s analysis of this eighteenth-century war gives lessons that strategists studying the current conflict in Ukraine would do well to heed. His commentary draws parallels between eighteenth-century Russian practices and the present, and allows us to see continuities in Russia’s aims.

Why Cabinet Wars Matter

But can reading an analysis of a limited conflict fought by men in laced coats and powdered wigs really inform our view of war in the twenty-first century? It can, and it should. Why?

First, Western and Russian commentators like Franz-Stefan Gady, James Lacey, and Valery Alekseev have claimed that Kabinettskriege, or cabinet wars, can provide a window into warfare in the 2010s and 2020s. Lacey has argued: 

In any future great power war, it might be helpful to think of objectives such as Taiwan or the Baltics as small territories that are in one camp but are coveted by another great power, like provinces in an 18th-century cabinet war. One side is willing to fight to keep the province (state) within its sphere, while the other side is willing to fight to take it. Neither great state, however, is willing to see itself destroyed or its internal political order overthrown to attain its objective.

Second, these wars are worth studying because they left a significant formative impact on Clausewitz and his most famous book. There are almost as many references to eighteenth-century commanders like Frederick the Great, Daun, and Lacy in On War as there are to Napoleon himself. While acknowledging that the French Revolution had radically changed warfare, Clausewitz still believed the military past could inform future doctrine.

Third, understanding this history matters, as I have argued elsewhere, because Russian president Vladimir Putin is obsessed with it. He views his war as an imperial project, where he is reenacting the conquests of Russian leaders like Peter and Catherine the Great.

So What Does Clausewitz Tell Us?

Years before he would write On War, a younger Clausewitz examined the Russo-Turkish War of 1736–1739 and sketched out a brief description of the four-year-long conflict. At first glance, Clausewitz’s interest in this war might seem odd: why would a Prussian officer concern himself with an Eastern European war that ended over sixty years earlier? In fact, many Prussian officers, including Clausewitz’s principal source of information on the war, Christoph Hermann von Manstein, served alongside the Russians in this war as advisors and volunteers. Wilhelm August von Steuben, the father of the “American” Baron von Steuben, was one of them.

In this war, the Russian Empire, ruler Empress Anna and her ministers, sought, as Putin would 278 years later, to conquer and occupy the Crimean Peninsula. The local inhabitants of Crimea, the Tatars, received military support from a great power of the time, the Ottoman Empire. Much like the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this war began with vast Russian overconfidence: the Russian commander, Field Marshall Burkhard Christoph von Münnich, asserted that Azov and Crimea would fall in the first year, and that by 1739, that even Constantinople would be under Russian control. What actually followed was four years of indecisive conflict, with repeated Russian invasions, setbacks, withdrawals, and new invasions. By the time the dust settled in 1739, neither side had achieved their goals, and the Russians’ Austrian allies were forced to cede major territorial concessions.

Clausewitz turned to this conflict while studying at the Berlin Kriegsakademie. Sometime around 1801, connected to his studies, Clausewitz wrote a short history of the war. Historian Peter Paret has argued that this text was merely an exercise in narrative history writing, “little more than [an] outline.” Although the narrative is short and follows the major events of the conflict, Clausewitz does provide a number of interpretations, particularly of the first two years of the war. These interpretations, combined with Clausewitz’s brief comments on this conflict in On War, provide notable parallels to the current conflict. 

Much like Western observers trying to discern Putin’s motives, Clausewitz was unsure of the true Russian goals in the war. He asserts, “It is uncertain whether the Empress Anna… wanted to conquer Crimea, or just to devastate it… the latter made but little political sense.” Despite this judgment, Clausewitz returns to the theme of devastation again and again in the text, showing that the various Russian armies, put the enemy territory, “under fire and sword,” “destroy[ed] these areas,” waged, “a campaign of raiding,” and “devastate[d] the peninsula.” Clausewitz eventually concluded that these measures were essentially “preventative… namely as a means of distracting and hindering the [Crimeans] so they could not,” take more decisive military action. Modern Russian tactics, such as the strike campaign against the Ukrainian power grid, have confused modern commentators, but experts such as Justin Bronk and Michael Kofman assert they have a similar goal: depleting Ukraine’s stocks of air defense missiles. In other words, in both the 1730s and 2020s, Russia has used devastation against civilian targets to cause chaos, diluting the effectiveness of their enemy’s military response. 

Clausewitz was also surprised by the lack of logistical readiness on the part of the eighteenth-century Russian army. He noted that in their first campaign the Russians, “suffered from a lack of water,” that they, were “weakened by disease,” and that, “provisions for the whole campaign were not carried along.” The following year of 1737, they suffered 24,000 losses, “mostly caused by disease and the lack of supplies.” In 1738, “Lack of food, many diseases, [and] massive losses of [pack] animals…caused this campaign to end without results.” In a section specifically analyzing logistical shortfalls, Clausewitz asserted: 

There was never a lack of fodder for animals because of the nature of the terrain, but there was often a lack of food. The army was forced to steal herds of sheep from the Tatars, subsisting from the local area. Firewood and water were most wanted. 

Clausewitz showed that in three of the four years of conflict, logistical problems handicapped the Russian effort, and made lasting gains unattainable. Once again, there are parallels to the present. Experts on the current war in Ukraine argue that Russia has been significantly hindered by its logistical shortcomings. Indeed, some noted this before the war. Though Münnich and the Russians eventually overcame this logistical failure, it cost the Russians manpower in the opening campaigns of the war. 

Clausewitz was critical of the heavy losses the Russians suffered for comparatively little gain. In the first year, he asserted that Russian losses were, “quite expensive for the campaign,” and in the following year, notes that the 50,000 Russian losses were, “far too much for the conquest of a fortress that had to be evacuated… in the next year.” He concluded that the Russians callously succeeded, “at the cost of many thousands of their own men,” and that such losses, “seem[ed] cruel.” It is possible that the Russians lost as many as 200,000 men in this conflict. When adjusted for changes in the Russian population between the eighteenth century and the present, that is equivalent to over 2 million in today’s population. In the eighteenth century, large losses had little impact on the Russian strategy. Russia ended the war when their allies, the Austrians, stopped fighting, and even gained a small amount of territory. Today, journalists seem explicitly focused on the body count, which may or may not impact the immediate duration of the war. 

Finally, Clausewitz noted the importance of the “Ukraine Line” in the 1736 war, providing Russian forces a fortified border to withdraw behind, rearm, and reconstitute. In this period, the Russian state constructed extensive fortified positions to protect its southern border. These included the Belgorod and Izium lines of the late seventeenth century and the modernized Ukraine Line of 1731. To man this border, the Russians created a secondary army of 30,000 reservists or Ukrainian Land Militia (ukrainskiy landmilitskiy). These men defended a line of fortified positions that measured just under 300 kilometers. The threat of raids from Crimea convinced men to serve in this force. Important fortified positions on the line include placenames that are well-known today: Izium and Bakhmut. Clausewitz noted that each fall, Russian troops would return to their defensive lines, but each spring, they would launch a new invasion with more manpower than they had the previous year. Today, nuclear deterrence provides the Russian forces with a modern “Ukraine Line.” With the threat of atomic weapons, Russian forces are able to withdraw from campaigns that are failing, reconstitute, and redeploy to other portions of Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have noted that there are more Russian forces currently deployed than were massed last year at the start of the invasion.

History Lessons

For all of the failings of the Russian war in 1736–1739, historians disagree about the war’s legacy. My own mentor, Christopher Duffy, focused on the heavy losses incurred for little gains in this war. In contrast, the leading scholar of this war, Brian L. Davies, has concerningly noted that the Russian army learned much from the failures of the initial campaigns and modernized their doctrines during wartime, overcoming their logistical problems. For Davies, this was a war where Russians could take heavy losses, rebuild their forces, and remain dangerous in the post-war environment.

Clausewitz’s short treatise on a seemingly obscure conflict in eighteenth-century Russian history imparts lessons for strategists today. First, even in ages that focus on the rules of engagement and laws of war, enemy forces might target civilians in order to distract their opponents and shape the situation to their advantage. Second, logistical problems can hinder a force more than enemy action. Third, the center of gravity may not be military casualties; heavy enemy losses do not always equate victory. Fourth, creating a situation where your home territory is defended from attack enables withdrawal, reconstitution, and redeployment.

Like Clausewitz at the turn of the nineteenth century, we should be willing to listen to the lessons of wars that might initially seem foreign or quaint. 

Alexander S. Burns is a visiting assistant professor at the Franciscan University of Steubenville, studying the American Continental army’s connection to European militaries. His edited volume, The Changing Face of Old Regime Warfare: Essays in Honour of Christopher Duffy, was published in 2022. You can follow him @KKriegeBlog.

Image: Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg/The David Rumsey Map Collection​.

Two years ago, on February 29, 2020, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation representing the United States, signed a deal with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Chief of Taliban’s Political Office in Doha representing the Taliban, to end the twenty-year U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. Since the signing, pundits and foreign policy practitioners from all sides have widely criticized the deal for its flawed language and unnecessary concessions. One needs little legal background or foreign policy expertise to identify these flaws—a mere glance at its contents and it almost appears as if its terms were primarily dictated by the Taliban at the time. Indeed, on the day of the signing, the Taliban celebrated their victory by marching with their flag from their political office to the Sheraton Hotel, where the two parties inked the agreement in front of international observers. That march was a harbinger of things to come, culminating with the Taliban’s complete takeover of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021.

Despite the deal’s deep flaws, the Biden administration should still insist that the remaining parts of the deal be implemented; namely, intra-Afghan negotiations and the termination of support for foreign terrorist groups. Implementing these provisions could eventually lead to the formation of an “inclusive” Afghan government that could guarantee basic human rights and women’s rights in Afghanistan. Such a government would be able to attain recognition from the international community and begin the difficult process of Afghanistan’s post-war reconstruction, serving the long-term interests of both the United States and Afghanistan. 

The Flaws of the Deal

The 2020 agreement has six primary flaws.

First, the whole concept of the United States directly negotiating, and eventually signing, a deal with the Taliban—a non-state actor under U.S. and UN sanctions, and led by internationally designated terrorists—was not a good look for Washington. The United States can certainly engage with non-state actors around the world, but only tactically to achieve its immediate, and short-term objectives. Getting into public negotiations such as those in Doha, and eventually signing a deal with the Taliban that indirectly legitimized them and elevated their status from non-state to a state actor, proved to be inimical to both U.S. and Afghan interests.

Second, throughout the text of the deal—which was negotiated without the participation of the Afghan government—the turn-of-phrase “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which the U.S. doesn’t recognize as a State but is known as the Taliban” appears repeatedly, but there is not a single reference to the “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” which the U.S. did recognize as a State. There was a missed opportunity to mention the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the prisoner’s exchange clause—itself deeply problematic, but the deal instead refers to the “prisoners from the other side.” These textual errors represented wins for the Taliban, who never wanted to hear, see, or talk about the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This wholesale disregard for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was deeply demoralizing for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The subsequent, sudden collapse of government and the rapid victory of the Taliban in August 2021 arguably derived in some part from that demoralization.

Third, it was not wise to include the prisoner exchange in the U.S.-Taliban deal as a trust-building measure. That should have been the first item on the agenda at the intra-Afghan negotiations, since the relevant prisoners were being held under the jurisdiction of the Afghan government. The inclusion of the prisoner exchange in the deal unnecessarily caused many months of challenging and at times difficult moments in the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Taliban prioritized the releases and may have engaged substantively in intra-Afghan negotiations to achieve them. Instead, the Taliban got an exponential win, as the insurgents received their prisoners and the Ghani administration’s relations with Washington grew deeply strained. The United States put pressure on the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to release the Taliban prisoners for the sake of implementing the deal, reinforcing the Taliban’s narrative that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was nothing but a U.S. puppet.

Fourth, the language that made Taliban accountable for passports and visas, while they were not in control of issuing such documents, sent a crushingly disheartening signal to various elements of the society, including the ANDSF, who interpreted it as an indication the United States no longer stood by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and instead considered the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan state. No number of references to an “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”—which the United States doesn’t recognize as a state but is known as the “Taliban”—could alter that interpretation. 

Fifth, the text of the deal was a surprise to Afghans (many in the U.S. government) and troop-contributing NATO allies, who only obtained a copy mere days before the signing and saw that the deal contained references to withdrawing “all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel.” These non-military elements were not supposed to be on the negotiating table. If the Taliban wanted the U.S. combat forces to withdraw, and if Washington and its allies were willing to withdraw their combat forces, then that should have sealed the deal. Including these non-military elements meant that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and especially the ANDSF, were on their own, which only further demoralized the Afghan forces, especially the Air Force, as they were fully dependent on contractors. 

Sixth, there is no verification mechanism for the United States to hold the Taliban accountable on their counter-terrorism commitments, especially their cutting of ties with Al Qaeda. The deal rests solely on the Taliban’s verbal commitments to instruct their commanders to avoid cooperation with Al Qaeda. Any questions about the Taliban’s commitment to uphold this portion of the agreement were answered when the U.S. operatives unilaterally found and eliminated Al Qaeda leader Aiman Al-Zawahiri in a Taliban safehouse in Kabul. 

And Yet…

Despite its many flaws, the deal did contain valuable elements, especially the repeated references to the initiation of the intra-Afghan negotiations, which was to lead to the establishment of a “Post-settlement Afghan Islamic Government.” The United States and the rest of the international community should continue to insist that the Taliban honor and implement this important provision of the agreement.

Insisting on implementation of the promises made in the 2020 U.S.-Taliban Deal—especially the formation of an inclusive Afghan government and the termination of assistance and sanctuary to foreign terrorist groups—should be the firm basis for U.S. and international engagement with the Taliban. Any move toward diplomatic recognition or reconstruction assistance should be based on this concept. 

The plight of the 40 million Afghans, especially women and girls, as well as the sacrifices of countless Afghans, Americans, and Western allies and their families demand that we do more to bring real peace to Afghanistan. The investments of blood and treasure have the potential to pay dividends so long as the United States seeks to encourage real progress. 

Such progress can be achieved by completing the implementation of the 2020 Deal; the United States and its Western allies should help jump-start a UN role in catalyzing the intra-Afghan negotiations between the Taliban and all of the Afghan factions; including the women, and youth, that could lead to the establishment of an inclusive Afghan government.

Such a broadly represented government, which would include the Taliban, can then agree on establishing a verifiable on-the-ground mechanism to monitor and detect terrorist threats. Such a government could then be recognized by the international community and could facilitate the re-opening of the diplomatic outposts necessary to engage directly with the Afghan population. This would lay the basis for helping the new government with technical, economic, and security assistance needed to deliver basic services to the people of Afghanistan, and build a stable and sustainable future. 

Sadiq Amini is a program manager at ORF America, overseeing external relations and outreach. He was previously a political assistant at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and worked at Afghanistan’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations. The views expressed here are strictly his own.

Image: Leonid Altman/Shutterstock.

In 2022, the United States and Egypt marked the centennial of their diplomatic relations. As Secretary of State Antony Blinken wrapped up his fourth visit to the Middle East in late January 2023, with stops in Egypt, Israel, and the West Bank, he acknowledged the strong U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership and Egypt’s contributions to regional stability and international security. He also emphasized ongoing bilateral cooperation and defense ties. President Joe Biden had previously highlighted Egypt as a key partner in the U.S.-led global climate agenda during his visit to Sharm El-Sheikh for COP27 last November.

Given Egypt’s significance, it is important that the U.S. Government align with its National Security Strategy, which places priority on “making sure [U.S. partners] can defend themselves against foreign threats,” all while fostering human rights and human security. This includes supporting Egypt with U.S. military aid for defense security, as well as economic aid directed to human security, through both government-to-government partnerships and people-to-people ties.

Egypt a key pillar in U.S. regional security architecture

Egypt has been an integral part of the United States’ Middle East security policy since Cairo signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. The inclusion of Israel and Egypt, a former Soviet ally, in the U.S. camp required both countries to feel militarily secure in relation to one other and against new emerging threats. This resulted in the provision of U.S. military aid to both countries. It is important for the U.S. Congress to consider the long-standing U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian trilateral relationship before making future decisions to halt U.S. military aid to Egypt.

The Congress should also recognize that U.S. military aid enables Egypt to receive U.S.-made arms through what is essentially store credit, making it more of a subsidy to the domestic U.S. defense industry than a gratuity to Egypt. Every year, Congress allocates $1.3 billion in military assistance to Egypt. However, the funds never reach Egypt directly. Instead, they are transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and then to a trust fund at the Treasury, finally being distributed to U.S. military contractors who manufacture the tanks and fighter jets that are ultimately delivered to Egypt. This gives the United States oversight over the way funds are dispersed. Thus, it is important for Congress to consider U.S. military aid as a means of maintaining regional peace and security, as well as an economic driver for the domestic U.S. defense industry, rather than a significant financial burden on the U.S. budget. 

Criticism of U.S. Military Aid to Egypt

Egypt has been criticized for its choice of military equipment requests, especially tanks and F-16 fighter jets, with some experts saying back in 2013 that the tanks are not well-suited for the types of threats facing Egypt, such as terrorism and border security in the Sinai Peninsula. Legitimate questions were asked of the Egyptian military: What is the military’s objective? What do you see as the real threat? Some scholars exclaimed at the time that, “There’s no conceivable scenario in which they’d need all those tanks short of an alien invasion.”

But contrary to these assessments a decade ago, Egypt’s military strength served as a deterrent in a high-threat perception region. Turkey has been Egypt’s main perceived threat. Turkey’s military adventurism in Syria and encroachments on Libya raised red flags for Egypt regarding its western border. U.S. military advisers in Cairo had advised back in 2013 against further acquisitions of tanks or F-16s, as they deemed that Egypt already had more than it needs. However, the Egyptian military foresaw these weapons as crucial for their security. Following protocol, the United States decides which weapons to send to Egypt “in consultation with our partners’ own determination of their strategic and force structure requirements.”

The recent conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the value of tanks and F-16s as a deterrent. Supreme Allied Commander of Europe Christopher G. Cavoli recently stated two key facts: 1) Hard power is a reality; and 2) kinetic effects matter. “If the other guy shows up with the tank, you better have a tank,” he said. Egypt possesses 4,664 tanks, while Turkey has 2,229. In June 2020, speaking during an inspection visit to Sidi Barrani air force base on the Libyan border, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi declared the Libyan city of Sirte and Jufra airbase as a “red line.” Egypt’s possession of tanks has been a deterrent to Turkey’s encroachments onto Libya, leading to a ceasefire in that country.

Human Rights, Foreign Threats, and Homeland Security

Despite the historical and strategic importance of the U.S. military aid to Egypt, there have been further criticisms of the aid in recent years. Some argue that the aid is provided without sufficient considerations for human rights by the Egyptian government. Additionally, there have also been criticisms of the aid for being too focused on military equipment and not enough on other areas such as economic development and civil society.

The United States Government rightfully takes into account the human rights record of countries receiving aid as it charts its policies. While the assessment of human rights in Egypt has been a topic of detailed discussion, it is equally important to consider both foreign threats and homeland security when assessing criteria for providing military aid to U.S. strategic partners.

In the past decade, Egypt perceived the Turkey-Qatar alliance that formed around the Arab uprisings of 2011 as its primary foreign threat. Turkey pursued hegemonic and expansionist pan-Islamist policies throughout the region. In response, Egypt categorized the Muslim Brotherhood, which Turkey backed, as a transnational terrorist organization, not a domestic political faction. The Egyptian government detained and jailed numerous members and/or affiliates of the transnational group it banned and treated them as agents operating on behalf of foreign enemy states within the scope of informational warfare. Egypt’s human rights file worsened in response to these regional circumstances over the past decade. 

However, with improvements in state-to-state relations between Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, on one hand, and Turkey and Qatar, on the other, following Al Ula Declaration in 2021, there is now room for the Egyptian government to treat Muslim Brotherhood members as individuals, i.e. not as a threatening transnational collective backed by foreign enemy states. Sisi and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan shook hands in Qatar during the 2022 World Cup, making a significant step toward normalization between the two regional rivals. 

The recent changes in the region’s political landscape have opened up opportunities for the release and pardoning of numerous political prisoners. In light of this, U.S. State Department officials have recognized the “improvement” of human rights in Egypt, marked by the release of hundreds of individuals from Egyptian prisons over the past two years. To encourage further releases, the newly elected Congress should be cognizant of this progress.

Besides the Muslim Brotherhood prisoners, Blinken was asked about the case of Alaa Abdel Fattah during his trip to Egypt. Blinken confirmed that he discussed individual cases with Egyptian officials but stated that the actions of the government are its own prerogatives. It is important to note that Abdel Fattah is not an Islamist but an anarchist who has a history of advocating for the collapse of the armed forces and police in Egypt. The United States should advocate for the individual human rights of Abdel Fattah and others, while acknowledging that promoting ideas that pose a security threat to a regional partner would be a risk.

Impact of Cutting Aid

Withholding military aid to Egypt also has negative impacts on Egypt’s ability to defend itself against foreign threats and support U.S. interests in regional security and stability. In 2013, the Obama administration’s decision to withhold the delivery of Apache helicopters that the Egyptian government had already paid for hindered Egypt’s ability to fight against transnational terrorist factions who flocked to Northern Sinai. The hold was eventually lifted in 2015, but it’s worth noting that these attempts to reduce military aid or postpone the delivery of fully-paid-for U.S. military equipment were perceived by the Egyptian public as acting against Egypt’s national security interests. This negatively influenced the Egyptian people’s perception of the United States, jeopardizing the two countries’ strategic partnership. 

Future attempts to cut or withhold military aid to Egypt may push Egyptians to seek new arms suppliers. This can lead to further diversification away from U.S. arms and toward other countries such as France and Germany, or even Russia and China. Egypt has indeed purchased French Mistrals, German submarines, and sought Russian and Chinese military equipment. It’s important to consider the potential consequences of losing leverage with Cairo before making changes to the current U.S. military assistance or Foreign Military Sales deals.

Conclusion

In summary, it is advantageous for the United States to maintain its military aid to Egypt without implementing slight reductions that may not influence Egypt’s policies on homeland security or defense against foreign threats. These cuts may even increase the “rally around the flag” effect among Egyptians and strengthen their relationship with their government. The Biden administration recognizes this scenario, as demonstrated in its National Security Strategy, which considers the external threats perceived by the United States’ regional partners. 

Also relevant to economic aid is Egypt’s successful hosting of COP27, which, for the first time, included a breakthrough agreement on a new “Loss and Damage” fund for vulnerable countries. COP27 further solidified the partnership between the United States and Egypt on climate issues. Biden’s speech acknowledged the climate crisis as a question of “human security, economic security, environmental security, and national security.” There is a shared outlook and vocabulary between the United States and Egypt regarding the concept of human security that can be capitalized upon. The $500 million package announced by the United States, the EU, and Germany to finance Egypt’s transition to clean energy, and the $150 million deal enabling Egypt to serve as a hub for African countries’ climate resilience activities, demonstrate the strong future of U.S.-Egypt bilateral relations, especially in civilian economic aid. Finally, this type of civilian economic cooperation should be inclusive of entrepreneurial Egyptian youth and private sector investors as this deepens people-to-people relations and positively impact the Egyptian people’s economic security.

The new Congress is likely to understand these issues. This can pave the way for a deeper U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership on defense and security matters, all while placing the discourse on both human rights and human security in its important and proper context.

Dr. Marwa Maziad is Visiting Assistant Professor of comparative civil-military relations at the Department of Government and Politics and the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies at the University of Maryland. She is an Affiliate Scholar with the Middle East Institute’s Strategic Foresight Initiative. @marwamaziad

Image: Photo Spirit / Shutterstock.com

Editor's note: This article originally stated that Congress withheld the delivery of Apache helicopters to Egypt in 2013. It was the Obama administration, not Congress. We regret the error.

For years, Iran’s rockets, missiles, and drones have terrorized the Middle East and, more recently, Ukraine. With its recent attacks on multiple Iranian military interests, including reportedly targeting a meeting of Iranians and Syrians to discuss drone manufacturing on February 19, Israel appears to be the only country consistently and proactively countering Tehran’s threats to regional and global security. The United States should be encouraging, supporting, and joining Israel in taking strong action to prevent Iran from carrying out terrorism and advancing its nuclear program.

Israeli drone attacks struck three Iranian targets between January 28-30: an Iranian military facility in Isfahan overnight on January 28, a convoy of six Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked trucks reportedly carrying Iranian weapons along the Syria-Iraq border on January 29, and Iranian-backed militia leaders in Syria on January 30.

These attacks continue Israel’s strategy to directly confront, roll back, and deter Iran’s military expansionism. Since Israel began its “campaign between the wars” in 2015, it has launched airstrikes to degrade the capabilities of Iran and its partner militias and prevent Tehran from proliferating precision weaponry. Under former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Israel adopted the “octopus doctrine” of imposing costs directly on the Iranian head in addition to the regime’s proxy tentacles across the Middle East.

Over the last eight years, the visible results of Israel’s approach amount to over 400 airstrikes against Iran’s regionwide military expansion, including 350 in Syria, over fifty in Lebanon, four in Iran, and one in Iraq, according to data compiled by JINSA.

The United States, in contrast, has been far more subdued in confronting Iran. In the two years since President Joe Biden took office, there have been eighty attacks on U.S. troops or contractors in Iraq and Syria, with Iranian-backed groups firing over 230 projectiles, including 170 rockets and sixty drones, according to JINSA’s Iran Projectile Tracker, which we compile. Yet, the Biden administration has launched only three rounds of airstrikes on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria.

Despite its important and consequential “maximum pressure” campaign to cripple the Islamic Republic economically, the Trump administration was not much more aggressive militarily than its successor. The exception to this is the January 2020 strike that killed IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and Kataib Hezbollah commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, which significantly undermined Iran’s terror network. Regular U.S. strikes against those who seek to imminently harm U.S. interests, like Soleimani and Muhandis, would serve as a powerful deterrent and means of reducing Iranian capabilities.

Though both the United States and Israel have warned repeatedly over the years that Iranian weapons pose threats, only Israel regularly and preemptively damages Iran’s ability to develop, manufacture, and proliferate these weapons.

Israel’s latest reported actions are more evidence of its value as a security partner. While Washington and Kyiv have pressured Jerusalem to provide weapons to Ukraine, Israel is the only country now hindering the flow of deadly drones into Russia’s hands. Meanwhile, U.S. officials have admitted that they have not stopped the transfer of Iranian drones to Russia while European countries allow the same Iranian terror airlines that deliver drones to Russia to use European airports.

With America focused on helping Ukraine to defeat Russian forces, the Biden administration should use tools beyond sanctions and diplomacy, including military force and covert action, to disrupt Iran’s lethal support to Russia.

Working with Israel, the United States should publicly adopt a policy similar to Israel’s octopus doctrine to deter and thwart Iranian attacks and weapons proliferation by using consistent, preemptive military force. This should complement a larger shift toward a “Plan B” Iran policy—including closer coordination with Israel—in light of the clear failure of the Biden administration’s good-faith, but ultimately counterproductive, open-ended nuclear diplomacy with Iran that only further undermines U.S. deterrence in the eyes of Tehran.

Fortunately, the United States can build on recent diplomatic and military coordination with Israel, including last month’s large-scale Juniper Oak exercise, to improve and broadcast both joint readiness and Israel’s ability to operate independently. The Biden administration should expedite the delivery of KC-46A aircraft refueling tankers to Israel that would be critical should it become necessary for Israel to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Pentagon should also replenish its war reserve stockpile in Israel, known as WRSA-I, which has become obsolete. However,  now that the United States has transferred artillery from WRSA-I to Ukraine, there is open space to preposition the precision-guided munitions that Israel would need in a full-scale war with Iran and Hezbollah.

With Iran reportedly threatening to retaliate by targeting ships with ties to Israel, as it did in 2021 when Israel allegedly sabotaged Tehran’s attempts to smuggle oil to Syria, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command should also push for Israel to be included in the Combined Maritime Forces, which focuses on freedom of navigation, counterpiracy, counter-narcotics, and other illicit activities.

The United States should be closely partnering with Israel to degrade Iranian capabilities more broadly. Israel has developed a model for directly combating Iranian aggression that America should firmly endorse.

VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.) is a member of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) Eastern Mediterranean and Abraham Accords policy projects. He served as Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command and previously served as commander of U.S. Naval Central Command/U.S. 5th Fleet/Combined Maritime Forces.

Andrew Ghalili and Ari Cicurel are Senior Policy Analysts at the JINSA.

Image: BeAvPhoto / Shutterstock.com

Much has been said and written about the National Conservative (NatCon) movement on the political Right that supposedly stands in opposition to the pro-Big Business and globalist orientation of the Republican Party establishment. More specifically, this movement has positioned itself against the twin intellectual forces that have dominated the political conservative movement in recent decades: a neoconservative and interventionist foreign policy and a libertarian-leaning pro-free market approach to economic affairs.

Most of the focus on this insurgent group of intellectuals has been on their traditional conservative positions on social and cultural issues, the rejection of the so-called “globalist elites” and their allies in Silicon Valley, their hardline stance on immigration, their support for industrial policy and growing government intervention in the economy, and of course—and more significantly—their seeming association with former President Donald Trump. Hence why the terms “National Conservatism” and “Trumpism” have been used interchangeably.

Less attention has been paid to the movement’s foreign policy platform—although occasionally it has been argued and lamented in the mainstream media that NatCons or Trumpists have embraced an anti-interventionist or “isolationist” agenda that echoes the Republican Party’s mid-twentieth century Old Right, led by the legendary Senator Robert Taft, that resisted American entry to World War II and later to the Cold War.

In fact, there has never been a clear statement of a national conservative foreign policy by any of its nominal spokespeople, ranging from the militant Zionist and pro-Likud Israeli philosopher Yoram Hazony to Fox News’s enfant terrible Tucker Carlson. There is a simple reason for this: NatCons don’t agree on major global affairs. Consider the aforementioned individuals: Hazony hopes that the United States will bomb Iran to the Stone Age and expresses sympathy to Ukraine, whereas Carlson supports a nuclear deal with Tehran but lambasts American aid to Kyiv. That Trump opposed the nuclear deal with Iran while bromance-ing with Russia’s Vladimir Putin—although it should be noted that, as president, he approved selling arms to Ukraine—and revoked his predecessor’s nuclear deal with Iran only highlights the difficulties in defining the NatCon foreign policy agenda.

More recently, the notion that the GOP has come under the influence of the Trumpist and supposedly “isolationist” wing of the party has been highlighted by the media as impacting party policy—see how Kevin McCarthy, the new Speaker of the House, insisted that his party won’t give the Biden administration a “blank check” when it comes to U.S. aid to Ukraine.

 McCarthy’s comments seemed to reflect the supposedly growing opposition among Republicans to continuing U.S. assistance to Ukraine, as demonstrated by the ten Republican House members who co-sponsored a resolution calling for an end to such. This position was supported by some Republicans in the Senate, including Senator Josh Hawley, a self-proclaimed NatCon, and Senator Rand Paul, a long-time conservative libertarian.

Hawley has stated that U.S. support for Ukraine “has to stop”, but to describe his foreign policy approach as isolationist or just anti-interventionist is frankly ridiculous.

Like other NatCons and Trumpists, as well as many neoconservatives and traditional Republicans, Hawley has effectively called for launching a new Cold War against China, starting with the decoupling of the American and Chinese economies and strengthening the U.S. defense budget to the stratosphere to prepare for a possible military confrontation with Beijing over the future of Taiwan and other key issues.

In fact, the main reason that Hawley supports reducing aid to Ukraine is because he believes that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, unlike China’s militarist policies in the Pacific, doesn’t threaten America’s core national interests, and that the preoccupation with Ukraine only diverts U.S. attention and resources from the coming war with China. “We have a lot of military power on our side,” Hawley said in a recent address. “But it isn’t deployed where it should be, and the world is about to face the consequences.”

Yet though clear on China, Hawley and other Trumpists have never provided a coherent explanation of what the role of the United States should play in Europe; notwithstanding all his America First bravado, former President Trump did not take steps to military disengage from the Atlantic and called on other NATO members to increase their contribution to the alliance. That President Joe Biden has proven to be more aggressive than his predecessor in his approach to China challenges the notion the political Right has to energize the American people to confront Beijing.

At times it seems that some NatCons fantasize about some sort of an alliance between the United States and Russia—as well as with their favorite European authoritarian leader, Hungary’s Viktor Orban—as part of devising a common Western strategy against China. But such an idea doesn’t make a lot of sense given that Russia is trying to strengthen its military ties with China and Hungary is bending the knee to Beijing. Hosting China’s foreign policy chief, Wang Yi, in Budapest, Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Szijjarto lauded China and offered his support for China’s Ukraine-Russia peace proposal.

Another and more serious contradiction in the NatCon foreign policy agenda is that many NatCons, despite nominally being anti-interventionist, reject the nuclear deal with Iran and regard political Islam—and in some cases Muslims in general—as a threat to America and the West. Many of these individuals, like former Trump aide Steve Bannon, are also allied with the most militant political forces in Israel that, like Hazony and others, reject any deal with Palestinians and would like to see the United States and Israel prepare for a military confrontation with Iran—something that would inevitably lead to more U.S. interventions in the Middle East that NatCons so often decry.

It’s true that NatCons have broadly opposed neoconservative plans to remake and democratize the Middle East and, more broadly, much of the world. This is, perhaps, a reflection of what foreign policy thinker Walter Russel Mead referred to as the “Jacksonian” impulse in American foreign policy, with its emphasis on the need to use American military power to protect U.S. interests. But at this point in time, the foreign policy agenda embraced by Republican Party leaders, including Senate Republicans, is Hamiltonian and certainly not Jeffersonian.

But much of what the NatCons support on China or other issues doesn’t necessarily reflect consideration of core U.S. national interests—unless such are defined by the need to have a strong national government whose role is to protect American businesses and workers from foreign intervention, and assumes that a rising and prosperous China is by definition a threat to such.

Certainly, the “populist” NatCons have yet to ask the American people whether they are willing to pay the high costs—military, economic, social—of a new Cold War, and whether they are willing to fight a potential hot war to support the independence of Taiwan.

Without clear support from the American people for such an ambitious and costly foreign policy agenda, the NatCons may end up looking very much like the reviled neoconservatives: a bunch of intellectuals seeking to drive the American people to new military adventures in Asia and the Middle East in the name of advancing their own fantasies.

Dr. Leon Hadar, a contributing editor at The National Interest, has taught international relations at American University and was a research fellow with the Cato Institute. A former UN correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, he currently covers Washington for the Business Times of Singapore and is a columnist/blogger with Israel’s Haaretz.

Image: National Conservatism Conference.

With the announcement that ninety-eight-year-old former President Jimmy Carter would not seek added medical care but would live out the rest of his life under hospice care, the outpouring of sentiment, from pundits and the public alike, focused on his stellar post-presidency overcoming his failed one-term presidency. The media understandably highlighted his Nobel Prize for post-presidential peace efforts in the Middle East, his active promotion of Habitat for Humanity to build housing for those in need, and his founding of the Carter Center, which focuses on human rights, conflict prevention, election monitoring, and international public health. Yet it is now time for analysts and the American people to reassess his presidency.

The tendency of historians, political scientists, and pundits is to be biased against one-term presidents from the get-go. After all, the voters rejected them. But many one-term presidents, including the much-maligned Carter, were good presidents. Admittedly when Carter first took office with no experience at the national level, he was almost too honest for Washington. He initially failed to get his way with Congress, because he refused to horse-trade pork projects for his legislative agenda. However, as his term progressed, his growing experience made him more effective in the office.

Carter was rejected for a second term largely because he was unable to extricate the hostages held in Iran during the Iranian Revolution and because of economic stagflation—a combination of inflation and slow economic growth that occurred in the late 1970s—occurred during his watch. However, such criticism of Carter on foreign policy and economic policy is sorely misplaced.y

In the wake of the two-decade disaster of unnecessary and costly U.S. military intervention in the war in Southeast Asia (58,000 U.S. lives, millions of Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian lives, and tens of billions of dollars), Carter decided it was time to run a more restrained foreign policy. Carter avoided getting entangled in the Somali-Ethiopian war in the Horn of Africa and other non-strategic brushfire wars in the developing world. He wisely returned the canal zone to Panama, brokered the Camp David Accords for Middle East peace, and completed Richard Nixon’s effort for better relations with China. As part of that less interventionist foreign policy, instead of attacking Iran when hostages were seized in the U.S. embassy there, he, putting the lives of the hostages over macho posturing, first tried to negotiate their release and when that failed, he tried a military rescue; this operation failed because of mechanical failure of the military mission. Carter was then blamed for letting the military readiness deteriorate, when perhaps the obvious presidents to blame were Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard Nixon, who exhausted the U.S. military by entangling it in a failing quagmire in Southeast Asia from 1954 to 1973. 

The aftermath of the war in Southeast Asia, his predecessors’ expansive monetary policies, and the Iranian Revolution of 1978 and 1979, which spiked world oil prices, contributed heavily to both high inflation and a sluggish U.S. economy during Carter’s term. Initially, Carter bore some blame for high inflation because he appointed G. William Miller as chairman of the Federal Reserve, who, in only a little over a year in the job, exacerbated inflation by increasing the U.S. money supply. However, Carter then replaced him in August 1979 with Paul A. Volcker, who, in a “monetarist experiment,” dramatically tightened the screws on the money supply, thus inducing an economic slowdown that would doom Carter’s re-election chances. Volcker, unlike Miller, realized that inflation was a bigger problem than slow economic growth and successfully bled it out of the economy. Volcker’s monetarist policies—much more than Ronald Reagan’s 1981 supply-side tax cut, which produced staggering budget deficits and soaring national debt without commensurate budget cuts—led to the “Reagan prosperity” of the 1980s (in fact, Reagan increased taxes in most years of his eight-year presidency, thus making is net tax reduction as an annualized percentage of GDP less than any other post-Truman Republican president). Although post-Truman presidents that reduced annualizing federal spending as a portion of GDP have been rare (only Bill Clinton and Dwight Eisenhower), of the ten other presidents during that time, Carter had the second-best record by this measure of fiscal austerity while reducing the annualized debt as a portion of GDP (in contrast to Reagan). Most people think that the economy was a total disaster during the Carter administration, but he was tied for fourth place in annualized GDP growth among post-Truman presidents.

In short, after a stretch of progressive presidents from John F. Kennedy through Richard Nixon (although a Republican, policy-wise he was a lefty), despite his party affiliation, Carter was the first in a series of conservative presidents since Calvin Coolidge. Carter cut capital gains taxes in 1978 and deregulated the banking, telecommunications, energy (oil and natural gas), and transportation (trucking, railroad, and airline) industries. He also began the post-Vietnam increases in defense spending after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Reagan continued Carter’s deregulation and defense spending increases—although Reagan usually only reduced enforcement of regulations (future presidents could and did resume such enforcement), whereas Carter usually changed the underlying laws upon which agency regulations were based, making deregulation more permanent.

Carter also preached personal responsibility, argued for local responsibility, proposed reducing farm subsidies, and wanted to reform welfare because he believed government welfare programs eroded the family and the work ethic. Finally, because he was a budget hawk who correctly prioritized cutting inflation over reducing unemployment, he resisted not only the policy wish list of labor unions and other Democratic interest groups but also a large fiscal stimulus that would have helped his chances of re-election. Carter was largely principled to the end of his presidency.

Ivan Eland is a senior fellow with the Independent Institute and author of Recarving Rushmore: Ranking the Presidents on Peace, Prosperity, and Liberty.

Image: Joseph Sohm/Shutterstock.

Deterrence is the art of convincing the other side that starting a war would not be worth the cost. The United States wants to deter China from invading Taiwan, but it would desire to do so without starting a new Cold War. However, amazingly little thought seems to have been given to that problem by American military or civilian strategic thinkers. The generals and admirals seem more concerned with hyping the military threat from Beijing to increase their share of the budget, and many civilians seem intent on not appearing too belligerent. We need to ask ourselves if we want a Cold War approach to China or if we want to nudge Beijing into a less confrontational position regarding Taiwan and the West more broadly.

Some in the West believe that China's Xi Jinping wants to “reunify” Taiwan to cement his legacy as a leader who could do what Mao could not. If that is the case, only Xi knows for sure. If that is not the case, there are two reasons for Beijing to try to take Taiwan by force. 

A second motivation could be the emergence of a major economic or political crisis, which might encourage Xi or a potential successor to go to war to distract from domestic woes. The third would be a Taiwanese declaration of independence, which is a red flag that no mainland leader could ignore. It is American policy to discourage the Taiwanese from this course, as normal deterrence might not work in the heat of the moment. That is dangerous because sovereignty issues are particularly virulent in East Asia.

However, in the first two cases, American deterrence can be a strong disincentive for China to attack Taiwan. The challenge for the United States is to frame that deterrent to show that it doesn’t want war but will fight and win if one starts.

If China does decide to invade Taiwan, it will probably try to place an exclusion zone around it as the British did with the Falklands in 1982. This would limit the war to the immediate area around the island, allowing Beijing to conduct trade as usual elsewhere in the world. If the United States wants to create real deterrence, its leaders must make it clear that such a ploy will not work and that any war would be a major regional conflict with a total blockade of China assured. That would put the Chinese in a position where a conflict would exacerbate rather than alleviate any domestic crisis that might cause the Chinese Communist Party to contemplate a martial adventure.

The means of accomplishing such a blockade would be military, primarily naval, but the effects would be economically disastrous to China, which has an export-driven economy. A year-long blockade would cost China hundreds of billions of dollars in exports to the United States alone. Moreover, a blockade would put over $2 trillion in economic activity in jeopardy. Since most of that trade goes by sea, a blockade would be a catastrophe for China.

The temptation to keep wars limited and manageable is seductive for American political leaders, but the approach seldom works well politically or militarily. It doomed Harry Truman's hopes for a successful presidency during the Korean War. The tacit American bipartisan approach to keeping the war in Vietnam limited allowed the North Vietnamese to gauge American responses carefully. Through an adroit combination of escalation and negotiation, the Communist regime in the north was able to emasculate the overwhelming American military potential to a manageable degree, allowing Hanoi to wait out the will of the American people to continue what appeared to be a hopeless struggle. Hanoi recognized the self-imposed constraints that the Americans were operating under and deftly exploited them.

Similarly, in Afghanistan, the Taliban came to understand that the United States viewed the war against them as a sideshow in its "Global War on Terror". After several years, the Islamic fundamentalists realized that they could wait the Americans out. In addition, war paid. Poppies and help from the Pakistanis, who were opposed to any strong, U.S.-supported government in Kabul, helped the Taliban finance their long-term efforts. Again, limited goals and the lack of a full commitment doomed Washington's war efforts.

The United States has the capability to conduct a blockade with attack submarines and airpower. Such an economic war would certainly hurt the United States, but it would devastate China in the long run. That is the essence of deterrence.

The United States could start building a credible deterrent posture by re-starting the Naval War College Global War Game (GWG) series. There is good evidence that the GWG series got the attention of Soviet planners during the Cold War and convinced them that the United States was serious about its intention and ability to bring the Soviet Union economically and militarily to its knees through aggressive sea and land action. The games did not threaten the Soviet Union directly because they always postulated a Soviet-initiated conflict.

Such a series of games might convince the Chinese that we can make them pay an unacceptably heavy price for attacking Taiwan. They might also help debunk some ill-conceived American concepts regarding war with China, such as the Marine Corps' current Force Design 2030 approach. So far, this notion has only been tested in Marine Corps service-specific war games of dubious quality and rigor, but the Marines have made serious force structure decisions based on them. Such notions warrant a thorough joint and interagency examination.

No one wants a Sino-American war over Taiwan, but the best way to persuade Beijing not to start one is to convince it that an attack will be too costly.

Gary Anderson was the Director of Marine Corps Wargaming and Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. He led the Red Teaming effort that predicted that there would be an insurgency in Iraq in 2003, and became a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Image: Cpl. Djalma Vuong-De Ramos/U.S. Navy Flickr.

As the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) becomes more contentious and distrustful, differences between the two countries over the current state and future status of Taiwan—always a source of tension—are becoming more pronounced, and the stakes more elevated. The island is in serious danger of becoming a source of zero-sum strategic competition between Beijing and Washington—a significance it has never possessed in the past. 

For nearly fifty years, Beijing and Washington have successfully avoided the transformation of Taiwan into a focal point of strategic competition and a potential trigger of war. This has been made possible largely because of a tacit, but nonetheless clear, understanding reached between the two nations at the time of normalization and diplomatic recognition. 

This understanding exchanged Washington’s official recognition of the PRC (and derecognition of the Republic of China, or ROC) as the sole legitimate government of China and its “acknowledgment” of the PRC’s position that Taiwan is a part of China. China, in exchange, replaced its stress on forcefully “liberating” Taiwan with a new policy of peaceful unification as a top priority. 

The U.S. side of this understanding constitutes the core of its One China Policy, while Chinese leaders have repeated their position in official statements since the 1970s.

Although Beijing does not accept some aspects of the U.S. One China Policy—e.g., that Washington only “acknowledges” that Taiwan is part of China and holds that the legal status of Taiwan remains undefined—it has, until recently, taken it as a credible statement of a U.S. commitment to refrain from supporting Taiwan if it were to seek sovereignty or permanent separation from mainland China. This has given Beijing the opportunity to focus on reunifying peacefully with the island while sustaining deterrence against possible attempts to violate the understanding. 

To be clear, Beijing has never disavowed the possibility of using force to reunify with Taiwan as a last resort. So too does the process for achieving peaceful unification and the specific features of that end–state (beyond vague descriptions of the “one country, two systems” formula) remain largely undefined. Nonetheless, the United States has seen China’s commitment to peaceful unification as sufficiently credible to justify upholding its One China Policy and limiting its military assistance to Taiwan, albeit in the context of continued arms sales to the island.

Maintaining the viability of this U.S.-China understanding requires the upholding of specific types of behavior. Most importantly, Washington’s scope of relations with Taiwan must remain limited to the unofficial level, defined in ways that are readily understood and accepted, especially by Beijing. In addition, Washington’s resistance to any unilateral effort by Taipei to permanently separate Taiwan from China must remain credible. 

Equally important, to maintain the viability of the One China policy, the United States must continue to reject efforts to treat Taiwan as a full-fledged security ally—e.g., by holding military exercises with Taiwan’s forces, deploying U.S. combat forces to the island, or bringing Taiwan within the U.S. defense network now being built along the Asian littoral. Violations of these behaviors, regardless of whether U.S. officials rhetorically continue to espouse fealty to the One China Policy, directly undermine the U.S.-China understanding; it increases the possibility of a very dangerous conflict over Taiwan, which Washington wants to avoid. 

Similarly, Beijing’s commitment to peaceful unification with Taiwan must also remain credible. This implies continued efforts to engage Taipei in cross-strait talks, to strengthen cross-strait economic, cultural, and social ties, and to avoid acquiring major amphibious or other military capabilities or making deployments that would logically convey preparations for attacking Taiwan.

Unfortunately, the commitments of both the United States and China to the above features, which maintained stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades, have been eroding for several years. This erosion process began in the 1990s, if not earlier, but has accelerated significantly over the past decade with the intensification of competition between Beijing and Washington. 

Although both sides are to blame for this process, the United States is arguably the most dangerous driver of potential conflict. This is because Beijing’s red line is much more easily crossed than Washington’s. For China, the risks and costs of resorting to force to seek control over Taiwan are certain and remain extremely high, while an increasing number of American observers believe that eviscerating or even abrogating the One China policy is a necessary and acceptable risk to deter Beijing.

There is little doubt about the consequences of a Chinese decision to attack Taiwan. Numerous war simulations, Track Two crisis management discussions, and detailed assessments of military capabilities on all sides clearly show that a war over the island would result in a pyrrhic victory, regardless of which side prevails.

Despite the U.S. need to maintain strategic ambiguity as to whether and when it might aid Taiwan in a conflict with Beijing, it is virtually certain that U.S. forces would be deployed to defend the island if China were to attack it without provocation, thus ensuring a major conflict. As a result, Taiwan would suffer enormous physical and economic damage, which would guarantee a deep level of enmity between Taiwan and China for generations. Loss of lives would likely number in the tens of thousands, if not more. China’s economic and diplomatic relations with the United States, Japan, and other major countries would collapse, triggering a major regional and global recession. And military capabilities on all sides would of course be degraded severely through the loss or expenditure of numerous aircraft, ships, missiles, and other weaponry and logistics facilities. Finally, any major war would risk nuclear conflict if one or both sides were to miscalculate.

Xi Jinping has placed significant emphasis on achieving progress toward unification. However, seeking to make progress toward unification and actually moving decisively to achieve unification are two very different things. Despite its increasing reliance on military intimidation, Beijing’s calculus for the actual use of force remains heavily political, not military; it is centered on whether or not Washington entirely abrogates its One China Policy and opts for the permanent separation of Taiwan from China.

Such a U.S. move would back Beijing into a corner and compel it to take the huge risk of using force, either to compel Washington to reverse course or to attempt to resolve the Taiwan problem once and for all. And it would almost certainly do this even if the United States enjoyed a superior military capability, given the extremely high, nationalist stakes involved in China “losing” Taiwan. China is far more motivated to achieve unification through indirect pressure and enticements, as long as Washington does not close off that option by abandoning its One China policy.

The United States weighs different considerations when it contemplates moves that undermine its bilateral understanding with Beijing. Instead of eroding the One China Policy, Washington sees itself as engaging mainly in prudent increases in military deterrence and signals of resolve and support for Taiwan, undertaken without any threat of direct military action and in compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act. However, these have included many actions that clearly undermine the U.S. commitment to conduct only commercial, cultural, and other unofficial relations with Taiwan.

Some of these actions include: using official, governmental types of nomenclature or symbols to describe U.S. offices or maps relevant to Taiwan; sending very senior government officials and military officers to the island; receiving senior Taiwan officials in U.S. government offices in Washington; shrugging off the optics of Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan when she was Speaker of the House, which gave the impression of an official visit; attempting to discourage countries from switching their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC; dispatching U.S. military trainers to Taiwan; placing increasing emphasis on the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances (both intended to justify close defense relations with and to reassure Taiwan) in descriptions of US. policy regarding Taiwan; remarks by a senior U.S. defense official describing Taiwan as a critical strategic node in the U.S. defense posture in Asia; statements by President Joe Biden that the United States will definitely defend Taiwan militarily if China attacks, and that Taiwan alone will determine whether or not the island becomes independent; and an effort by former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, when in office, to lift all limits on relations with Taiwan short of re-establishing formal state-to-state diplomatic relations with the island.

In addition to all these moves, countless numbers of former U.S. officials, members of Congress, defense analysts, and policy experts have advocated a wide range of actions that, if implemented, would severely undermine the One China Policy and, in some cases, clearly violate the understanding with Beijing.

For example, since leaving office Pompeo has openly advocated for the United States to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign, independent nation—a move that would almost certainly lead to an armed crisis if not outright war. Defense analysts such as Elbridge Colby argue that, given its supposedly critical strategic location, Taiwan must be brought within the U.S. defense perimeter. And some serving U.S. military officers want to re-establish elements of the U.S.-ROC mutual security treaty which Washington terminated in 1980, one year after normalizing relations with Beijing. Members of Congress have described Taiwan as a front line in the defense of Guam, Hawaii, and the continental United States, advocating extensive joint military exercises with Taiwan and the deployment of combat forces to the island. Meanwhile, analysts have stoked tensions by predicting a near-imminent war over Taiwan.

Supposedly justified under the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act or simply seen as a necessary “push–back” against China, many U.S. observers perceive these actions as much less dangerous than many Chinese would perceive a decision by China to launch a military assault on Taiwan. Beijing views these U.S. actions as clear steps toward ending the One China Policy and making Taiwan a full-fledged security ally. Rather than acting as a deterrent, these U.S. actions have strengthened the argument in China for doubling down on its own forms of military deterrence, such as increased military forays and exercises around Taiwan, the firing of ballistic and cruise missiles near the island, and a significant increase in China’s nuclear inventory. All in all, then, the momentum behind breaking the understanding that has kept the peace in the Taiwan Strait for nearly fifty years is stronger on the U.S. side.

Some observers call for China to begin breaking this vicious cycle by unilaterally reducing its military displays near Taiwan, thus giving the United States a strong reason to reverse its de facto weakening of the One China Policy. However, the steady, seemingly unstoppable erosion of that policy and the many supporters of such actions both in and out of the U.S. government strongly suggest that such a response is unlikely. Few even admit that the policy is being hollowed out. China might, therefore, reasonably believe that if they reduce their military pressure on Taiwan, the United States will respond to China’s perceived weakness by further hollowing out its One China Policy.

The only logical solution to this problem is for Washington and Beijing to explicitly agree on a set of reciprocal, credible reassurance measures that will breathe life back into their original understanding regarding Taiwan. To keep the peace across the Taiwan Strait, there is no viable alternative to exchanging clear, credible assurances of U.S. limits on relations with Taiwan and its implacable opposition to any unilateral move toward Taiwan independence, with China reciprocating by reiterating assurances that it rejects any timeline for unification and will end its military exercises near the island of Taiwan. Reaching this sort of agreement should be at the center of any senior-level Sino-U.S. dialogues.

Michael D. Swaine is director of the Quincy Institute’s East Asia program.

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German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s February 2023 visit to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile is something that the Biden administration could learn from. Germany, one of the world’s oldest and most competitive auto hubs, is deeply concerned about gaining and maintaining access to lithium, a key component in batteries used to power electric vehicles (EVs). Without lithium, there will be serious problems in making the batteries used to power EVs. There is not much lithium in Europe, but around 60 percent of the world’s total supply is in three countries often referred to as the “lithium triangle”; Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile. National security also factors high for Germany, which is seeking to diversify its energy sourcing away from Russia. And it faces another geopolitical risk: the country that has the most access to the world’s lithium is China, which also happens to currently make 79 percent of lithium-ion batteries, handles half of the world’s lithium refining, and has its own rapidly expanding EV industry. For Germany’s Scholz, a trip to Argentina and Chile is worth the visit. Can the same be said of U.S. President Joe Biden?

It is worth briefly reviewing Chancellor Scholz’s visit. He met with the leaders of Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, with the stated intention of helping his country’s companies develop stronger business ties with Latin America. German companies have traditionally been active in the region, especially in the automotive industry and more recently with renewable energy. Germany is one of the top 10 trade partners of the three countries of the 2023 visit and a major foreign direct investor. 

While considerable attention was given during the Scholz visit to Brazil to the revitalization of the European Union-Mercosur trade deal, which languished due to discord with Brazil’s Bolsonaro government, lithium loomed large in talks with Argentina and Chile. Considering that the automotive sector plays a large role in the German economy, securing lithium sources for EV batteries has taken on a sense of urgency in Berlin.

Bolivian Troubles

German companies have made early attempts to access the lithium triangle through Bolivia. According to the U.S. Geological Service, Bolivia sits on the largest reserves at 21 million tons, followed by Argentina with 19 million tons and then Chile with 9.8 million tons. While Argentina and Chile have lithium sectors that are up and exporting, backed by a cadre of foreign companies and expertise, Bolivia’s lithium has largely remained in the ground. Under President Evo Morales (2006–2019) efforts were made to launch the sector, but the strategy was constructed around a poorly-run state company (now called Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos, or YLB). Complicating matters, Bolivia was generally perceived as non-investor friendly, with the Morales government presiding over an earlier nationalization of the gas industry. However, over time it was understood that lithium could become a new export for the country, though the preference remained that YLB would partner with foreign investors, creating a state-dominated sector that operates everything from salts-to-battery materials. Under such a scheme, Bolivia would move from being just an extractor of lithium to exporting adding value-added goods. 

In 2018, Bolivia negotiated two joint venture deals—one with Germany’s ACI Systems to produce lithium hydroxide and another with China’s Xinjiang TBEA to produce lithium from two salt flats. The deal was greeted with considerable excitement in Germany, with the country’s then Economy Minister Peter Altmaier stating, “Germany should become a leading location for battery cell production. A large part of production costs are linked to raw materials. German industry is therefore well advised to secure its needs for lithium early in order to avoid falling behind and slipping into dependency.” 

German excitement over the deal, however, quickly soured when Bolivian protests erupted in 2019 over local demands for higher royalties for the country. Confronted with a nationalist backlash, Morales canceled the contracts. Morales was soon ousted (partially due to his resistance to his wish to extend his presidential tenure beyond the constitutionally-mandated fourteen years). It was also rumored that control over lithium reserves was the real reason for Morales’ forced exit, which was said to have been done with the support of Western governments and Tesla owner Elon Musk.

Bolivia’s interest in accessing foreign help in the lithium sector resumed under the government of President Luis Arce (elected in 2020), who has stated that he wants to make his country “the world capital of lithium.” His objective is for Bolivia to supply 40 percent of global lithium by 2030. A new bidding process to launch the lithium business was initiated in 2022, with a number of foreign companies participating—including three Chinese firms (in a consortium called CBC standing for CATL, Brunp, and CMOC), U.S.-based EnergyX, Russia’s Uranium One, and Lilac Solutions (backed by German automaker BMW and Bill Gates’ Breakthrough Energy Ventures). CATL is the world’s largest maker of batteries, Brunp is majority-owned by CATL and is a recycling technology company, and CMOC is the largest molybdenum miner in the world and a major force in tungsten, cobalt, niobium, and copper production. 

In late January 2023, Bolivia signed a deal with the Chinese CBC to develop the country’s lithium deposits. YLB estimates that lithium will begin export in 2025. As part of the deal, the CBC will undertake the construction of “infrastructure, highways, and necessary conditions to jumpstart the plants.” The deal received a mixed reaction among the public and foreign parties. It was said that China got the deal because it offered an infrastructure overhaul and that the Chinese government actively promoted the deal with a left-leaning Bolivian government that has often harbored anti-U.S. sentiment.

What Berlin Wants

Considering the high political risk in Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile have greater appeal for German companies. Although China is active in both nations, companies from other countries have set up shop, including entities from Australia, Canada, South Korea, and the United States. Despite ongoing political froth, there is a broad consensus in Argentina that lithium is open for business, though environmental challenges exist. Chile has a more structured system and is awaiting government plans to possibly create a state company. 

In Argentina and Chile Scholz made three important points.

First, Germany wants to advance its energy transition away from fossil fuels to cleaner energy, which means greater use of lithium batteries for EVs and other technological goods and public utilities. Buenos Aires and Santiago are imports of Berlin’s new energy map. 

Second, Germany wants to make certain that it secures the right energy sources so end its dependency on Russian fossil fuel and reduce Chinese leverage in lithium batteries. For Germany, the Russo-Ukraine War that erupted in February 2022 has been highly disruptive, as it upended its considerable dependence on Russia for oil, natural gas, and coal. In addition, the shutdown of the country’s nuclear industry and slower-than-expected alternative fuel programs left the Scholz government scrambling to secure new sources of energy, with the Chancellor and other high-ranking officials visiting a number of Middle Eastern and African countries to secure supplies of natural gas and oil. 

Third, Germany is very open to the idea of allowing local value being added to the production process. In Buenos Aires, he stated, “The question is: Can one not move the processing of these materials, which creates thousands of jobs, to those countries where these materials come from?” A country does not have to have a free trade agreement with Germany to develop the trade in lithium and/or batteries, which is the U.S. policy under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) passed in 2022. Under the IRA, it will be much easier to export Chilean lithium to the United States than for Argentina to do so. However, the United States, like Germany, faces limitations on its supply of lithium, as well as considerable environmental hurdles (the Biden administration has killed several recent mining deals related to clean energy).

German Lessons

As Chancellor Scholz met with Argentina’s President Alberto Fernandez in Buenos Aires and later his Chilean counterpart Gabriel Boric in Santiago, thought must have been given as to when was the last time a U.S. president ventured into these countries to help generate business and uphold national energy security. President Donald Trump was the last U.S. leader to visit Argentina in 2018, attending the G20 meeting. President Barack Obama was the last U.S. leader to visit Chile in 2011. No U.S. president has visited Bolivia, and Washington has lacked an ambassador in La Paz since 2008, with its business being conducted by the chargé d’affaires. Germany has an ambassador in each country; so does China.

The main lesson from Scholz’s trip to the lithium triangle is quite elementary: if you want to play, you have to show up. This is something that President Joe Biden and his foreign policy and energy teams need to think harder about. 

Dr. Scott B. MacDonald is the Chief Economist for Smith’s Research & Gradings, a Fellow with the Caribbean Policy Consortium, and a Research fellow with Global Americans. Prior to those positions, he worked for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Credit Suisse, Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, KWR International, and Mitsubishi Corporation. His most recent book is The New Cold War, China and the Caribbean (Palgrave Macmillan 2022).

Image: Shutterstock.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s suspension of the New START Treaty on February 21. New START is the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between Russia and the United States. The treaty limits the size of both arsenals to 1,550 nuclear warheads deployed on 700 strategic delivery systems—a combination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers. It also provides a verification procedure that allows officials from each country to inspect nuclear sites in the other.

While Russia has not officially withdrawn from the treaty, its suspension likely foreshadows the treaty’s demise. Future expansion of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is possible. However, the immediate concern is a resumption of nuclear testing. Russian president Vladimir Putin mentioned the possibility of testing in his announcement, directing Rosatom—Russia’s state-run nuclear energy company—to begin preparations for testing.

This testing will have two goals. First, Russia will use nuclear tests as a tool of coercive diplomacy. Tests will be timed to coincide with events of political or military importance. These tests could occur ahead of new offensives in Ukraine or an expansion of Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure. Beyond Ukraine, nuclear testing could precede efforts to destabilize other Russian neighbors, such as the potential plot to overthrow the Moldovan government.

These nuclear tests would serve as signals that Russia is willing to use its arsenal in the event of U.S. or NATO operations against Russia. In the case of Russian military operations—whether the current operation in Ukraine or future operations elsewhere—these tests could be part of a Russian strategy to prevent the escalation of a local conflict to a regional conflict. This escalation management is a central feature of Russian military doctrine. Experts have claimed that nuclear weapons are important tools for escalation management, although there is debate about how these weapons may be used or not used.

Russia already engages in nuclear signaling for these purposes. Putin and other Russian leaders have used nuclear threats repeatedly during and before the war in Ukraine. Nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons were deployed to Kaliningrad and Syria—where they would be within range of NATO capitals in Western Europe and the Mediterranean—in the weeks preceding the invasion. Nuclear testing would add another means for coercive nuclear signaling.

This strategy would not be uniquely Russian. North Korea also pairs nuclear testing with political objectives. North Korean tests often coincide with joint U.S.-South Korean military drills, the inauguration of new U.S. or South Korean presidents, or important events in U.S. relations with South Korea, Japan, or China.

The second goal of renewed nuclear testing is to improve Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Russia is currently engaged in a major nuclear modernization program. This modernization impacts all three legs of Russia’s nuclear triad and includes both upgrades to existing capabilities—such as developing the Sarmat ICBM or the Borei-A SSBN—and novel systems such as the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.

Both Russia and the United States have developed new warheads and delivery systems without detonating a nuclear weapon over the past few decades. Computer modeling has allowed both countries to design and evaluate new weapons. American nuclear maintenance and modernization through the Department of Energy’s Stockpile Stewardship Program have been a success. Officials expect to rely on Stockpile Stewardship rather than test detonations for the foreseeable future.

Russia’s military maintenance and modernization programs have not been as reliable as their American counterparts. Russia has experienced repeated military failures in Ukraine, despite a comprehensive and costly conventional modernization program following another shockingly poor performance during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Reports of corruption and ineptitude in Russia’s defense industry and military have surfaced, alleging that much of Russia’s investment in conventional modernization went into the pockets of various elites instead of into new and better equipment.

The failure of Russia’s conventional modernization has led to speculation about the state of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. The corruption and ineptitude of Russia’s defense industrial and military leadership may degrade the reliability of Russian weapons. Testing may allow Russian leaders to confirm the capabilities of new systems better than computer modeling, assuaging fears of an unreliable nuclear deterrent. Testing also shows adversaries that these weapons will work, improving the deterrent abilities of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.

If testing is to occur, it will most likely happen at Novaya Zemlya. The Arctic archipelago is heavily militarized and was one of the Soviet Union’s main nuclear testing sites. Tsar Bomba, the largest nuclear device designed and detonated, was tested there.

Russia has increased the development of military infrastructure and capabilities in its far north, including Novaya Zemlya, over the past several years. The region is perceived as critical to Russian security, and the resumption of nuclear testing would increase its strategic value to Moscow. This could lead to further militarization of the Russian Arctic. 

Increasing Arctic militarization would have significant strategic consequences for other Arctic powers, all of whom are current or aspiring NATO members. Russia has expanded its claims to the Arctic seafloor over the past few years, bringing its territorial claims into greater contact with those of Canada and Norway. Russia and Norway are also engaged in tense relations along their land and maritime Arctic borders. These disputes have become increasingly militarized. Increasing Russian military assets in the Arctic would exacerbate these disputes and increase the insecurity of other Arctic states, including the United States. 

While I would argue the impending death of New START is likely, it is not guaranteed. The United States should attempt to revive Russian participation in the deal. But it is unlikely that efforts will be successful, especially without concessions that are unacceptable to the United States and its allies.

Given the likely failure of diplomatic overtures to Moscow, the United States and NATO must be ready to deal with the resumption of Russian nuclear testing. American nuclear testing is probably not necessary. However, improving defenses in the Arctic—a region the United States has deprioritized—is. In addition to developing its own capabilities, the United States must work with critical Arctic partners such as Canada, Norway, and Denmark. Non-Arctic NATO members such as the United Kingdom and France should also engage with Arctic allies and ensure that their naval forces can contribute to enhancing Arctic security.

This also increases the urgency of adding Sweden and Finland to NATO. Both countries are Arctic powers. Both add significant military capabilities to the alliance in a region of vulnerability. They also have the means and geography to provide important intelligence on Russian activity on or near Novaya Zemlya.

Russia’s suspension of New START participation is the latest in a sequence of events leading to the likely death of the treaty. Russia publically suspended U.S. inspections of Russian sites in August and withdrew from the treaty’s bilateral consultative commission meeting in Cairo in December. On-site verification inspections have been on indefinite hiatus since 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Why is Russia taking this step now? The likely reason is that the cost of withdrawal has decreased for Russia while the benefits of testing have become increasingly important. Russia will need to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons to deter either an adversary’s aggression against Russia or an international intervention to support Ukraine. 

Meanwhile, unilateral suspension of or withdrawal from the treaty would likely bring significant condemnation from international actors. Supporters of greater arms control would call for increasing Russia’s isolation. This could harm Russia’s trade and relations with its European neighbors. 

This potential harm has already happened. Russia’s isolation from these states has grown significantly over the course of the war, and trade—especially in oil and gas—has plummeted with Europe. Much of this trade has shifted to China and India, with the potential for future trade growth with both Beijing and New Delhi. Neither has strong support for arms control agreements. China has resisted efforts to bring it into an arms control regime and has interests in expanding its own arsenal. It has also built an increasingly close partnership with Russia. 

India, meanwhile, has been an outspoken critic of the global arms control and nonproliferation regime since its inception in the 1960s. India may also benefit economically from new nuclear testing. Advancements in nuclear weapons technology could spill over into Russia’s civilian nuclear sector, which has been an important partner for India’s small but growing nuclear energy industry.

The death of New START is likely upon us. In its wake is the increasing potential for a new era of Russian nuclear testing. This testing will increase the effectiveness of Russian nuclear weapons, become a tool for coercive diplomacy, and lead to greater militarization in the Arctic. Russia may also expand its nuclear arsenal. But the strategic and political impacts of doing so will likely be less than the impacts of nuclear testing. The United States has a large stockpile of non-deployed nuclear weapons that could match Russian nuclear expansion for some time. And this expansion will be limited by financial and resource constraints, especially as conventional losses increase the cost of replacing materiel.

Spenser A. Warren is a Ph.D. candidate studying political science at Indiana University Bloomington. His dissertation explores the sources of Russian nuclear modernization, and his broader research program focuses on nuclear politics, Russian foreign policy, and Transatlantic security.

Image: Shutterstock.