The National Interest

Oddsmakers in New York and Las Vegas give Governor Ron DeSantis of Florida a roughly one in four chance of being elected the next president of the United States. Those odds are as good as anybody’s right now. There is growing interest in what a DeSantis presidency might look like. But what are the governor’s public policy priorities? Is there a DeSantis doctrine? I’ll suggest there is, and it seems to have three main components:

1. Politically - govern effectively and win elections.

2. Domestically - preserve traditional freedoms and push back against the woke-industrial complex.

3. Internationally - guard against America’s self-described adversaries overseas.

Politically, the appeal of DeSantis is straightforward: he wins. Not only that, he does so by a large margin, while governing effectively. The governor won re-election in November by a landslide. He defeated his opponent Charlie Crist by almost 20 points. DeSantis won counties and constituencies that are not supposed to vote Republican. Miami-Dade county, typically a Democratic Party stronghold, cast its ballots for the governor. So did Hispanic voters throughout the state. DeSantis has shown he can win over swing constituents. A state once considered purple is now—Democrats worry—lost to them. For conservatives, it’s a promising indicator of what might be accomplished on the national level.

Of course, Republicans will first have to decide whether they want to win elections, govern effectively, and exercise political power on behalf of a conservative agenda. If the answer is no, then Florida’s governor may not be the guy.

Also worth noting is the DeSantis style of governance. By all accounts, he has an appetite for information, combined with skepticism toward the notion that the experts are always right. He pores over data and listens to a range of opinions, then decides for himself. It was exactly this approach that led him to reject the conventional wisdom during the early weeks and months of the pandemic shutdown, and correctly so. Of course, this was viewed as madness by liberal critics at the time. Nevertheless, he persisted, and was vindicated in the end.

DeSantis also revealed a similar administrative proficiency in his response to Hurricane Ian last year. Florida has over 22 million people, and it is an unusually big, diverse state possessing an economy larger than most countries. Governing it successfully is no small task. Proven executive skills from outside of the Beltway will be of interest to American voters in the coming year.

In terms of his domestic policy outlook, perhaps the most striking aspect of the governor’s approach is his willingness to directly take on what might be called the woke-industrial complex. Most conservatives understand that the ideology of left-wing identity politics now serves as a kind of substitute religion for powerful socioeconomic interests in this country. This was not true in Ronald Reagan’s time, but it is now. For that reason, while Reagan was an excellent president, his approach cannot simply be photocopied to face the challenges of today. DeSantis made this point explicitly in a fascinating address to the National Conservativism conference in Miami last September.

As the governor suggested in that address, a baseline conservative American commitment within the economic realm is to free enterprise, individual liberty, and material opportunity for ordinary citizens. Hard work should be rewarded, and self-destructive socialistic schemes avoided. Obviously, DeSantis has no objection to a market economy. As he put it, “I’m not a central planner.” Both his words and his actions as governor indicate his determination to create and safeguard a friendly environment for business entrepreneurship whether big or small. Florida has flourished as a result. It is a point of pride.

Where DeSantis departs from strict libertarians—and this is where you should watch his speech for yourself, rather than relying on hostile journalistic misrepresentations—is in calling out what he correctly identifies as the danger of woke capitalists, and then doing something about it.

As Vivek Ramaswamy argued persuasively in his book Woke, Inc., one of the most disturbing trends in American life during recent years has been the fusion of left-wing identity politics with large chunks of corporate power. Some prominent multinational business, industrial, and financial leaders in this country seem to feel the need to constantly signal their liberal virtue by picking sides in the Left’s never-ending culture war against the rest of us. Moreover, in certain cases, these leaders exercise what amounts to a monopoly, notably in high technology. This is where DeSantis comes in. As he said in his September address: “Corporatism is not free enterprise….They are trying to enforce an orthodoxy on this country.”

The truth is a good many American businessmen, bankers, and industrialists quietly despise this trend toward left-wing identity politics within their own ranks.

Governor DeSantis believes, and evidently is willing to act on the belief, that woke corporate power is a serious threat to traditional American liberties. For example, when a large multinational corporation acts in loose coordination on some controversial public matter alongside a network of social justice activists, Democratic Party politicians, liberal-leaning journalists, politically correct academics, and sympathetic bureaucrats borrowed inside the administrative state, this is not a strictly private matter. It is even less so when that same corporation simultaneously expects subsidies and tax breaks off the public teat. With that in mind, DeSantis has fought and won a series of dustups over a long list of issues including illegal immigration, criminal policing, judicial activism, K through 12 education, Florida’s university system, and gender ideology. The pattern has been the following:

1. The woke-industrial complex demands deference on some controversial issue at the state level inside Florida.

2. DeSantis informs himself on the matter, picks his fights carefully, takes a strong position, and refuses to defer.

3. As it turns out, the majority of Floridians agree with DeSantis. He wins.

4. Rinse and repeat.

Needless to say, this pattern drives woke establishmentarians up the wall. Who does DeSantis think he is! Doesn’t he understand that left-liberal elites get to play referee, even as they lead one team on the field in this country’s two-party system?

Still, the governor persists in standing up to the woke-industrial complex—and winning. His recent successful fight with the College Board over the teaching of African-American history is only the latest example. Should students learn African-American history? Yes, without any doubt. Taxpayer support for aggressively left-wing ideologies foisted on our students under the guise of said history? No.

This is a dramatic victory for a sane, welcome approach to higher education, as opposed to the fanatical nonsense we’ve seen from progressives over the past several years. DeSantis has now proposed that university DEI bureaucracies within the state of Florida should be defunded, allowing them to “wither on the vine.” This is how to do it. He is demonstrating that we need not accept some sort of left-wing Brezhnev doctrine inside the United States when it comes to rolling back woke insanity. Conservatives all around the country have noticed.

In the next installment of this series, I examine the DeSantis doctrine internationally.

Colin Dueck is a Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, and a senior non-resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Hunter Crenian/Shutterstock.com.

Last year was a tumultuous one for the relationship between the United States and its key security partners in the Gulf. Each side was disappointed by the other, and the resulting disagreements spilled out into the public instead of being quietly resolved behind closed doors. Diplomatic differences have resonated politically in all capitals, further limiting the ability of each side to be seen as offering concessions to the other. It’s not difficult to imagine these long-enduring partnerships falling away completely in the coming years through neglect, if not intent. And yet, the circumstances may finally be right to achieve a longstanding objective—designing a system of integrated Gulf defenses that protects mutual national security interests on a sustainable basis. Leaders need to recognize this and take advantage of the opportunity.

During periods like these, it is important to recall the national security interests that have long bound the United States and the Gulf. Those fundamental interests have not changed, and the primary question before policymakers is whether chosen policies serve to secure those interests or undermine them.

The United States has a vital interest in ensuring that no regional adversary has both the capacity and the will to attack the U.S. homeland, Americans abroad, or the key security partners Washington relies on for local intelligence, placement, access, and diplomatic support to advance this and other core interests. This drives U.S. efforts to combat terrorism in the region and to deter adversaries from seeking weapons of mass destruction and otherwise employing destabilizing military capabilities. Today, the Iranian regime checks all the boxes: it’s the world’s most prominent state sponsor of terrorism, it’s pursuing an inherently threatening nuclear program, and—alone among all of the governments in the world—it routinely gives advanced precision weaponry to nonstate actors and directs them to target civilians across borders. The United States and its Gulf partners share a vital national security interest in combating these malign behaviors and have thus worked toward those ends ever since the 1979 revolution allowed the Iranian regime to seize power.

The United States also has a vital interest in the global price of oil, for reasons that span security considerations (oil’s centrality to the functioning of our military), economic considerations (the impact of oil prices on growth and inflation), geopolitical considerations (our partners elsewhere who depend on oil sourced from the Gulf) and political considerations (the impact of gas prices at home and abroad). Despite campaign trail rhetoric about American “energy independence,” once in office, U.S. presidents in both parties discover, to their frustration, that they must care deeply about oil prices, especially when they get too high or too low.

It is also a stubborn fact that the market price of this global commodity remains disproportionately driven by actions taken in the Gulf, especially by Saudi Arabia. This reality is unlikely to change materially for decades to come, even under the most optimistic energy transition scenarios. Given this, the United States long ago decided that protecting the free flow of oil from the Gulf to locations determined by market demand—a historically atypical anti-mercantilist approach—would best protect that core interest. Today, again, the primary threat to this interest is Tehran, which openly threatens—and, indeed, has used—military force against both energy production facilities and the vessels that carry oil out of the Gulf. And, once more, this U.S. policy has aligned with the vital interests of its partners in the region.

While these interests remain constant, both the threats to them and the means to protect them change over time. Thus, U.S. and Gulf policies also need to shift, both in response to and in anticipation of these evolving threats.

The most important change in the regional threat assessment is Iran’s homegrown development of highly capable precision weaponry that can be used to strike targets at a distance with pinpoint accuracy. This is what allowed Tehran to strike Saudi energy infrastructure in 2019 and allowed its proxy to kill innocents at the Abu Dhabi airport in 2022. The inherent value of these weapons was clearly demonstrated when Russia requested Iranian assistance in Ukraine, a remarkable break from Russia’s proud tradition of military self-reliance and a complete reversal of the situation in Syria in 2015, when Russian air power came to the aid of Iranian-backed ground forces. Moreover, these weapons’ precision serves to lower the threshold for their use in the Gulf, as we have already witnessed, thus raising the risk of unintended escalation.

Our partners in the Gulf are also building their own military capabilities. In the past, the United States was required to provide the near entirety of the military forces needed to protect the free flow of energy from the Gulf. Today, and even more so in the years ahead, our local partners will be increasingly capable of sharing this burden. Even more significantly, given the nature of these new weapons systems and the realities imposed by the region’s geography, U.S. partners in the Gulf have begun to appreciate the benefit—indeed the necessity—of launching a more cooperative approach toward defensive measures. For far too long, intra-Gulf rivalries prevented such an approach. But today, there is a growing recognition that each nation cannot unilaterally secure its own airspace and maritime interests. Moreover, the expansion of relations following the Abraham Accords and the transfer of the U.S. military area of responsibility for Israel from U.S. European Command to U.S. Central Command is driving new opportunities for security cooperation within the Gulf and beyond.

Given these dynamics, the door is finally open to build a multilateral, fully integrated air and missile defense system, and to achieve far greater multilateral cooperation within the established maritime security structures. U.S. military planners have long recognized the potential utility of such steps in protecting the above-mentioned national security interests, but the circumstances have not allowed them to proceed. Now they are.

Encouraging initial steps are already being taken at the most senior levels, but there is a very long way to go before the journey is anywhere close to complete. The U.S. Fifth Fleet launched Task Force 59 to integrate unmanned systems over a year ago, and secret talks reportedly took place last March among military leaders from Israel, the United States, and key Arab countries. Little is said publicly on the subject, but USCENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla has indicated that this subject is a priority, and Fifth Fleet commander Vice Adm. Brad Cooper has set a goal of having 100 unmanned surface vessels in the Gulf by this summer, only one-fifth of which will be from the United States. President Joe Biden privately raised the issue of integrated defenses during his trip to Israel and Saudi Arabia in July 2022, and reports have since been published about plans for a future Red Sands Integrated Experimentation Center and hopes for a proposed Middle East Air Defense Alliance. Moreover, the year ended with the Deterring Enemy Forces and Enabling National Defenses Act, driven by a bipartisan, bicameral group of lawmakers, which will provide the necessary funding for such an endeavor.

Of course, none of this progress has been lost on Tehran, which has issued public threats of a “decisive response to the nearest and most accessible targets” should the Gulf agree to “a joint defense pact in the region by the U.S. with [the] participation and hidden management of Zionists.” Of course, such threats are exactly why the United States and its partners should build a system of fully integrated defenses in the Gulf. Getting there will require four fundamental policy decisions.

The first and most critical policy decision is for the United States to commit to a future in which it remains intimately bound to Gulf security. In previous decades, such commitments could be made privately or remain within the purview of military and security professionals. Today, however, the single most important factor in the region, driving decisions by partners and adversaries alike, is the widespread perception of America’s withdrawal from the Gulf. Therefore, the above-mentioned quiet diplomacy on integrated air, missile, and maritime security is now insufficient. A public case needs to be made for a new security relationship between the United States and its Gulf partners, and it must be designed to receive bipartisan support.

Of course, American domestic politics makes doing so a tall order in the wake of an unsatisfying war in Iraq, a failed war in Afghanistan, the enduring resonance of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the involvement of Middle East leaders in U.S. domestic politics, and the continuing public sniping and policy differences between the U.S. and Gulf leaders. Unless these dynamics are reversed, they threaten to eventually turn the region’s expectation of a U.S. withdrawal into a self-fulfilling prophecy. But reversing this perception is nevertheless needed to protect U.S. interests. This cannot be accomplished if American presidents threaten to turn our partners into “pariahs” or openly question whether the United States should protect the free flow of energy.

Leaders in the Gulf also have fundamental policy decisions to make. Thus, the second critical policy decision to be made is a mirror of the first: Gulf leaders must openly commit to a future in which the United States remains their primary—and, in certain aspects, their sole—security partner. This would require them to cease their oft-repeated threats to turn to China or Russia to fill perceived security voids. In some cases, this decision should be relatively straightforward—most obviously for Bahrain, the longtime host of U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters. For others, it remains an open question as to whether such a decision will be taken—especially for Saudi Arabia under its still relatively new leadership. Regional leaders will also need to recognize that such a commitment carries with it the need to ensure that American support remains bipartisan for decades to come. This is undercut every time decisions are made that are widely perceived to be advancing the interests of one American political party over another.

Third, Gulf leaders must make the decision to fully cooperate. If this was an easy task, it would have been accomplished long ago. Of course, the leaders of any state would naturally seek to avoid circumstances, if at all possible, in which they must rely on others to ensure their security. It is far preferable to jealously preserve complete freedom of action rather than allow one’s security to be dependent on any neighbor’s goodwill. Only after unilateral efforts to ensure security have proven inadequate do states typically consider cooperative mechanisms. And states that are in the midst of the heady process of building their own militaries or are led by individuals inexperienced in warfare are most prone to overestimate their own abilities to accomplish missions unilaterally, as we have seen in Yemen.

Compounding these generalities are the specific mistrusts and rivalries that have long kept the Gulf divided. There are many reasons why the Middle East doesn’t possess anything close to Europe’s interlocking matrix of multilateral cooperative mechanisms, and those realities won’t be blithely wished away. Only a few years ago, a much smaller subset of countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council went through years of an ill-conceived and largely ineffectual “Gulf Rift” that saw the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia break ties with Qatar. Given this history, maximalist approaches to security cooperation are doomed to fail. Instead, integrative efforts should initially focus only on a small subset of countries—Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—and only on a narrowly defined set of missions: air and maritime defenses.

And finally, a fourth fundamental policy decision must be made jointly by the United States and its Gulf partners. Working toward integrated defensive capabilities can be slow, dry, technocratic work that typically advances only incrementally and on generational timelines. If this work is left only to well-intentioned security experts, the risk remains high that perceptions will fall behind progress and reasons will be found to delay necessary additional program phases. When militaries look to work together, the typical pattern is first to work through the myriad of matters relating to questions of deconfliction; only after that is successful do the counties begin work to build cooperation. And then, once cooperative mechanisms have been established, governments can begin to consider questions of military integration. And finally, only after selected military capabilities have been integrated are governments interested in exploring the most sensitive subjects of building joint systems that are inherently interdependent.

But this project should begin, not end, with a clarion call for interdependence. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States should declare up front that this is the goal. They will be intentionally designing a future together in which they’re each practically incapable of achieving comprehensive air and maritime security in the Gulf without the others. The military systems being established won’t work for any if they don’t work for all. In doing so, the Gulf states will “lock in” the United States as their security partner, which should remove any remaining concerns about the long-term sustainability of the American regional presence.

The Gulf governments have all found it useful to issue vision documents that clearly outline the intended objectives of their policies. In 2008, both Manama and Abu Dhabi published Economic Vision 2030 plans, and Riyadh issued Saudi Vision 2030 in 2016. These three countries, together with the United States, should together issue a joint “Vision 2040 for Integrated Gulf Security,” laying out an ambitious path ahead toward a fully interdependent system of air and missile defenses and far greater multilateral cooperation within the established maritime security structures. With such a joint vision guiding the way, there will be no more questions about America’s withdrawal and Gulf hedging, and U.S. and partner vital interests will be increasingly secure—on a much more sustainable basis.

Will Wechsler is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, and the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combatting Terrorism.

Image: DVIDS.

In December 2017, President Donald Trump issued his National Security Strategy (NSS), a landmark document that clarified the state of international relations. It recognized that the world had returned to its natural state of great power competition. In truth, great power competition never left, though the collapse of the Soviet Union had created what seemed like a new liberal order where the traditional tenets of realism no longer applied. The NSS noted that this unreal moment had passed and that “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned.”

President Joe Biden’s NSS, released in November 2022, continued this vision, stating: “the post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next.” Biden’s NSS was dressed up as a contest between democracy and autocracy, but it still contained all the elements of realism, from strengthening America’s defense industrial base and expanding alliances to managing the security aspects of trade and waging new kinds of war.

America’s rivals were clearly identified in Trump’s NSS: “China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. Russia seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders.” China received more attention in the 2017 NSS because it is the stronger of the two rival powers, with an economic base larger than the Soviets ever had. Beijing’s break from Communism after its failure in the Soviet Union set it on a vigorous path of growth. But China was also aided by the naïve actions of American corporations fostered by the nostrums of liberal intellectuals who placed hope above history (which was supposedly ending). As Trump’s NSS observed, “[f]or decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others.”

As to Moscow, the 2017 NSS said, “Russia aims to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide us from our allies and partners,” adding that “the combination of Russian ambition and growing military capabilities creates an unstable frontier in Eurasia, where the risk of conflict due to Russian miscalculation is growing.” We are in the midst of one of those “miscalculations” in Ukraine. As his invasion enters its second year, President Vladimir Putin appears determined to reverse the outcome of the Cold War and reestablish the Soviet Russian empire, whose collapse he believes was the worst tragedy of the twentieth century. 

Trump’s NSS foresaw the danger that Biden is confronting. “Although the menace of Soviet communism is gone, new threats test our will. Russia is using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments. With its invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia demonstrated its willingness to violate the sovereignty of states in the region. Russia continues to intimidate its neighbors with threatening behavior, such as nuclear posturing and the forward deployment of offensive capabilities.” Trump pushed for NATO members to increase their defense spending to the 2 percent of GDP level they had promised President Barack Obama. He took the issue public and got results. In 2019, NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg stated, "I can report on the good progress on burden sharing … European Allies and Canada will have added much more than $100 billion since 2016.”

Trump also authorized the sale of "lethal" military equipment to Ukraine to combat Russian-armed separatists. Though the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 provided for such aid (after Russia had seized Crimea), Obama refused to send weapons to Kyiv, fearing that helping Ukraine defend itself would escalate the conflict. This is the old appeasement view that blames war not on aggression, but on resistance to aggression. Biden initially took an even more pacifist approach to the Russian threat in Europe. As Putin marched his troops around Belarus to test U.S. resolve, Biden assured him that Ukraine was outside the NATO defense perimeter and there would be no military response to Russian aggression. “Unprecedented” sanctions did not deter Moscow any more than they did after Obama declared that Putin’s seizure of Crimea “would not stand.”

The Russian military rolled through the open door, only to be stopped by valiant Ukrainians determined not to lose their freedom to Moscow again. This changed the moral and strategic situation, and the United States and NATO reacted, albeit slowly, to support Kyiv’s resistance. Yet, there are still those who oppose halting aggression in the strategic heart of Europe, and some of them are even in the party of Reagan and Trump. They claim they are “realists,” helping to hijack that term along with left-wing opponents of “imperialism” who want Americans to cease trying to shape the world to its advantage.

Hans J. Morgenthau’s declaration in Politics Among Nations that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” is considered the core of realism. As Morgenthau elaborated, “the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience. It cannot be denied that throughout historic time, regardless of social, economic and political conditions, states have met each other in contests for power.” In this history, he denounced Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policies, which “helped to make the Second World War inevitable, and to bring untold miseries to millions.” Yet, like so many liberal intellectuals, Morgenthau could not face the application of his theory in the real world. He came out against the Vietnam War (and the Cold War of which it was a part) and, in so doing, engaged in “radical rethinking” to redefine realism as abstaining from the “struggle for power.” This is called prudence, caution, or restraint by its proponents, but in the proper understanding of realism as the international struggle for power, it should be called impotence. Morgenthau advised, "Never put yourself in a position from which you cannot retreat without losing face, and from which you cannot advance without great risks." But what passive position does this permit that could have any chance of influencing events?

Rep. Bob Good (R-VA) was one of the “Gang of 20” who delayed Rep. Kevin McCarthy’s (R-CA) election as speaker of the House. He was also one of thirty-five Republicans who joined forty-five Democrats in voting against the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which passed with 350 bipartisan supporters. The NDAA authorized an increase of $80 billion in defense funding and contained a number of specific measures aimed at China and Russia. In his dissent, Good claimed that “we are sending billions of dollars of military equipment and weaponry to Ukraine with no plan or exit strategy.” The congressman knows the plan. Biden’s NSS states that “we will continue to stand with the people of Ukraine as they fight back against Russia’s naked aggression” and will “make Russia’s war on Ukraine a strategic failure.” These are solid, traditional realist objectives. Good’s desire is clearly for an exit strategy without reference to the war’s outcome.

In reaction to such putative conservatives who have gone wobbly on national security policy (and whose minority views are nevertheless spreading on outlets such as Fox and Newsmax), Douglas Murray wrote in National Review: “If you oppose sending American troops around the world, and you oppose arming countries fighting for their own survival, then do you have any remaining foreign policy at all? And if not, for how long do you expect America to remain the dominant power in the world?” In other words, how can you fulfill the proper mission of realism to prevail in great power competition?

And it is a global competition. As NATO’s Stoltenberg recently noted, China is watching the war in Ukraine closely. Chairman Xi Jinping is not happy that the quick victory promised by Putin has failed to materialize. Yet Beijing is testing the resolve of the U.S.-led alliance system not only with intensified military threats against Taiwan and Japan but also with its continued alignment with Moscow. China held joint naval exercises with Russia in September and December, and another is planned for February with the addition of South Africa. Beijing flew a joint “patrol” of strategic bombers with Russia in November that menaced both Japan and South Korea (and the U.S. forces stationed in both countries). China is supplying Russia with computer chips, drones, and other supplies that support Putin’s war effort while buying Russian oil to help finance it. Any wavering of Western resolve that allows Russia to advance in the struggle for power in Europe will have serious repercussions for peace and the balance of power in Asia. That is how the real world works.

William R. Hawkins is a former economics professor who served on the professional staff of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee. He has written widely on international economics and national security issues for both professional and popular publications. 

Image: ID1974/Shutterstock.com.

The United States has gone twenty years without a new presidential doctrine being espoused. While such doctrines—declarations of key foreign policy strategies—are rarely directly declared by a given president, most have been fairly evident to outside observers, as they often represent major shifts in American foreign policy thinking. Generally, doctrines have defined either a single key policy decision a president makes—such as the Carter Doctrine, which declared that the United States would defend the Persian Gulf—or have acted as broad-based prisms through which all foreign policy decisions are made—such as the Nixon Doctrine, which determined the circumstances in which America would aid countries threatened by communism.

Presidential doctrines are not the end-all-be-all of U.S. foreign policy, but they are useful indicators of where America’s metaphorical head is at, especially since they oftentimes cut across ideological lines and are rarely disavowed by succeeding presidents after being declared. As such, when and why different doctrines have been declared have told the story of America’s foreign policy history—as has a lack of declarations.

When the Monroe Doctrine was first declared in the 1820s, announcing to Europe that the Americas were off-limits, no further doctrines were announced for 100 years because none were necessary. But since America became more active abroad in the twentieth century, doctrines have become commonplace: starting with Harry Truman, almost every U.S. president made one. But this nearly unbroken chain ended with George W. Bush. Since the Bush Doctrine, which equated terrorist-financing states with terrorists and approved of preventative war, pre-emptive war, and democracy promotion, no president has announced their own foreign policy doctrine. All three of his successors—Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden—explicitly ran against the Bush Doctrine, but all were ultimately unable to expunge it as none had a clear idea of how to replace it. Obama seemed constantly uncertain and was unable to articulate an Obama Doctrine in an interview for The Atlantic conducted at the end of his administration. The Trump administration, governing during a period of ideological realignment in the GOP, was split between interventionists like John Bolton and Elliot Abrams and the ascendant, internationalism-skeptical national conservatives; as a result, it never settled on a singular Trump Doctrine. At present, the Biden administration also seems uncertain as to what it wants, talking tough on China but declaring them only a competitor, while at the same time trying to be friendly with European states but targeting them with protectionist policies. Biden has talked of seeing the twenty-first century as a war between autocracy and democracy, which could eventually become a Biden Doctrine of sorts, but that view is beset with problems and, in many ways, is just the Bush Doctrine with “terrorism” swapped out for “autocracy.”

The Needs of a New Doctrine

Essentially, America’s foreign policy has been adrift since 2003, clinging to outdated doctrines. This has rendered America utterly unprepared for twenty-first-century threats, primarily the rise of China. But with the 2024 presidential now election beginning in earnest, and Biden acting as a self-declared “transitional” president, presidential candidates on both sides have a unique opportunity to rejuvenate America’s foreign policy with a new doctrine.

Any new doctrine must take a few matters into account. First and foremost, it must redirect attention to America’s national interest. During the Cold War, when the nation needed to be defended against an ideology that could jump borders without a shot fired, an ideologically driven foreign policy framework was more appropriate. But the “ideological” threat that Biden has identified, autocracy, is not a transferrable ideology like Soviet communism was. Nor is Chinese communism, which is in some ways being supplanted with Chinese nationalism—and is likewise non-transferrable.

Second, a new American foreign policy doctrine should also utilize old and existing alliances while reorienting them into being tools of America’s national interest—national interests should not be contorted to serve old alliances, as some would argue is currently happening. While the United States should seriously start focusing more on East Asia, should America totally renege on its treaty commitments and abandon its allies it will likely become impossible to create any meaningful ant-China coalition. Europe, already skeptical of angering China, would at best likely turn neutral, and America abandoning its European allies would guarantee that no smaller East Asian states would trust the word of the United States. The result could be Eurasia falling under China’s thumb (via a Sino-Russian bloc)—a shadow that would ultimately cross the oceans. America would be left attempting to play whack-a-mole with pro-Chinese South American governments.

Third, a new doctrine must be transferrable from administration to administration and be politically tenable to American voters. To win the twenty-first century, America cannot have a foreign policy that vacillates every four to eight years—it must be designed with the long term in mind. Doctrines that have been the most effective at staying relevant have been tied to geographic areas, not to a particular enemy leader or nation (the Truman Doctrine, which called for U.S. support of democracies under threat from communism, was for example clearly targeted at Greece and Turkey—but could be easily extended to include other states).

Finally, any new doctrine must be politically tenable on a domestic level. While presidential elections are rarely won on foreign policy issues, they can be lost on them. Americans will not want to become too withdrawn; the paleoconservative dream of pulling back entirely has never been a majority position. But a policy of going abroad in search of monsters to destroy will certainly wear out its welcome, especially—as we have seen—after two decades of protracted and bloody conflicts.

Monroe+

Merging the two American inclinations—toward pulling back and throwing itself forward—in one doctrine will be a difficult needle to thread. But it can be done by taking into consideration all that America has learned since it came out of its shell, while also going back to its first, and most enduring, presidential doctrine: the Monroe Doctrine.

Call the new doctrine Monroe+. While adding “plus” to well-known brands is currently in vogue in twenty-first-century parlance, it also connotates a further metaphorical and physical meaning. Metaphorically, it takes the original Monroe Doctrine and adds to it, à la Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary. Physically, it represents the geographic focus of the new doctrine; the “plus” addition is simple to understand and can be drawn on a map. When drawn over the Americas, it goes down to South America and across to the tips of Eurasia: Europe and East Asia. The United States should endeavor to keep these marked areas free of governmental anti-Americanism.

The Monroe Doctrine called for the rest of the world to stay out of Central and South American affairs. That is currently under threat, with China increasing its influence in South America. The original doctrine would therefore be a key part of Monroe+. Likewise, the ends of Eurasia staying free of being subsumed by an anti-American bloc—at the moment the most likely candidate being the Sino-Russian bloc, though that can change as time goes on—makes it less likely that America will eventually face a Eurasia united against it, a scenario which has long been the nightmare of American strategic planners.

This doctrine—clear, simple, wedded to national interest while allowing for an idealistic coating—checks every previously mentioned necessity.

For one, it redirects attention on America’s national interest by rejecting any grand global “War on [Ideological Concept].” It does not tie the United States into any sort of world-spanning battle. It simply seeks to protect America from geographic threats and keeps its influence in key geographic areas in case more is needed—both of which should be the main goals of America’s national interest.

It is also transferrable from administration to administration. Much like the Monroe Doctrine of old, Monroe+ could guide America for the rest of the century. Absent ideological threats to the United States like communism, America should prepare to face China, which by all accounts is a traditional rising power: nationalistic, expanding its influence, and gearing up for a potential war. A doctrine like this would prepare the United States properly. Different presidents may add their own tweaks and focus on different aspects of Monroe+, but it would ultimately remain consistent. This also makes it more politically tenable; it is fairly easy to understand why these areas should be kept free of anti-Americanism, and as a result, will not require tenuous political arguments to gain public support. This straightforwardness has another added benefit: by not basing America’s foreign policy around promoting an ideology, such as democracy promotion or a “war on autocracy,” future presidents will not fall into the trap of being rightfully tarred as hypocrites for being necessary allies with autocratic regimes.

Finally, Monroe+ takes advantage of existing alliances instead of simply discarding them. The European Union (EU), which is a close ally of the United States and comprises the vast majority of NATO members, currently holds something akin to vassal-lite status. It has steadily attempted to gain more independence from the United States, but, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, now buys more liquid natural gas from America than it does Russia. This presents America a key advantage: it can utilize Europe’s desire for independence while keeping EU members from straying too far. In a break with the past, the new doctrine would therefore see America urge Europe to develop its own defense infrastructure. NATO could then be transformed into a two-power bloc, composed of the United States and the EU (along with the UK and Norway). The EU could then keep an eye on one end of the Sino-Russian bloc, Russia (with the voraciously anti-Russian Eastern European states ensuring the EU never switches sides), while America finally completes the long-discussed “Pivot to Asia” to keep an eye on the other end. Not only is a more united Europe going to be less susceptible to Chinese influence—keeping that end of Eurasia free of governmental anti-Americanism—but by staying true to older alliances (while forcing them to pick up the slack), it will make it easier for America to build stronger alliances in East Asia.

The name of such a new doctrine ultimately is not important. If a President Ron DeSantis were to declare it in 2025, the “DeSantis Doctrine” would work just as well. “Monroe+” as a name is much less important than what it connotates: a return to America’s earliest foreign policy philosophy, one which served the United States well for 100 years, while at the same time updating it for twenty-first-century threats. America no longer needs to embark upon globe-spanning ideological conflicts. But at the same time, there are threats that must be dealt with. Monroe+ would get America ready to do so.

Anthony J. Constantini is writing his Ph.D. on populism and early American democracy at the University of Vienna in Austria. Previously he received an M.A. in Arms Control and Strategic Studies from St. Petersburg State University, Russia. In 2016 he was the War Room Director for the NRSC.

Image: Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter Burghart/U.S. Navy Flickr.

On February 2, it was revealed by NBC News that the United States was tracking a huge Chinese balloon that traveled over the Aleutian Islands and western Canada, only to hover over 150 Minuteman III ICBM silos deployed around Malmstrom Air Force Base in central Montana for an extended period of time. The Chinese government claimed that the stratospheric balloon was a civilian airship, designed primarily for meteorological and weather research, that was blown off course. But the Pentagon disputed that explanation, saying it intentionally flew over sensitive U.S. military sites. It has since been revealed that the airship entered U.S. airspace on January 28 over Alaska and was spotted over Montana on January 31. The White House reportedly attempted to conceal this unprecedented intrusion of a Chinese military balloon into U.S. airspace from both the U.S. Congress and the public, which weren’t informed about it until it was sighted by the public days later.

This Chinese military airship was more alarming than the previous ones because it loitered over sensitive U.S. nuclear weapon sites. The Pentagon claims that, once the balloon was detected, measures were taken to prevent the balloon from transmitting any intelligence information gleaned from its proximity to the ICBM silos back to China. The Pentagon further revealed that the balloon was maneuverable and capable of changing the direction it was while moving.

Biden’s Baffling Response

Despite informing the public that the Chinese balloon did not pose a threat to Americans, the Biden administration responded by canceling Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s planned trip to Beijing indefinitely. For its part, the U.S. Department of Defense scrambled F-22 fighters to intercept the balloon over Montana in case the orders were given to shoot it down with air-to-air missiles. The planes, however, were ordered to stand down. Days later, on February 4,  a U.S. F-22 fighter shot down the balloon using an air-to-air missile off the coast of South Carolina after it had circumnavigated the entire continental United States over the course of a week. The Pentagon reports it is attempting to salvage the remains of the balloon to help determine its true mission, find out what it was carrying, and determine what intelligence it may have relayed to China before it was downed. 

President Joe Biden subsequently stated that he ordered it shot down on February 1 as soon as safely possible. However, in the latest sign that the Biden administration is not serious about defending the United States of America which they have sworn to protect, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley—who infamously told his Chinese equivalent, General Li Zuocheng, that he would warn him if the United Tates were about to attack the People’s Republic of China—and General VanHerck, who serves as the commander of NORAD, reportedly advised Biden not to shoot it down until it had finished circumnavigating the continental United States. Their reported rationale was that it would pose an undue risk of civilian casualties from its debris—even when it was flying above central Montana, one of the least populated areas of the country.

This decision has to be considered a significant win for Beijing on the international stage and a missed opportunity to demonstrate America’s resolve in responding to Chinese threats against our own homeland. China's prestige received a huge boost as Biden made the decision not to shoot down a Chinese airship the size of three school buses while it was flying over the continental United States. If we had sent a U.S. airship over China, Beijing would have most assuredly shot it out of the sky long before it crossed into Chinese airspace. 

Congressional Republicans, led by Sen. Josh Hawley, are understandably calling for an immediate congressional investigation into Biden’s “baffling response” to this Chinese provocation in allowing a massive Chinese military airship to invade U.S. airspace and fly over the American homeland over the course of a one-week period. The Biden administration should have treated this Chinese airship like we would treat a Chinese nuclear bomber attempting to fly over our territory: warning Beijing to turn it around or we would destroy it. Shooting it down over Alaska would have sent a message to Beijing that the United Tates will not tolerate such potentially serious threats in our own airspace any more than they would if we did the same thing to them.

What Could Have the Balloon Done?

While it claimed the balloon did not pose a security threat and recommended Biden not to shoot it down until it was over the Atlantic Ocean, the Pentagon later revealed that the balloon was equipped with “a technology bay” with advanced sensor equipment and an estimated payload of several hundred pounds. This would provide the balloon, or a similar vehicle, with the capability to carry weapons of mass destruction. Such a huge Chinese airship would serve as a useful platform for a super Electromagnetic (EMP) weapon or high-yield nuclear weapon that could have killed tens of millions of Americans. On the less destructive side of things, the balloon could have perhaps carried some kind of jamming device that could potentially interfere with our nuclear command and control systems. The FBI previously identified such a device in Washington DC, believed to be capable of disrupting nuclear launch orders.

In addition, Beijing likely used the balloon to engage in strategic signaling: a warning to the United States not to interfere if a Chinese invasion of Taiwan were may happen later this year. If not, China would not hesitate to strike the U.S. homeland with nuclear and super EMP weapons, which could destroy our great nation.

No one can claim that this sort of threat was unforeseen. In a 2008 report, the Congressional EMP Commission warned that a comprehensive nationwide EMP attack could be conducted on the United States by means of such a stratospheric balloon. Likewise, the American Leadership & Policy Foundation indicated in a 2015 report that such a thing was possible. Paul Bedard explained in a Washington Examiner column:

High-altitude balloons, such as the one China has floated over mountain state military bases this week, are considered a key “delivery platform” for secret nuclear strikes on America’s electric grid, according to intelligence officials. The threat of balloon-launched electromagnetic pulse attacks was warned about by a congressional EMP commission and inside the military several years ago. In a 2015 report for the American Leadership & Policy Foundation, Air Force Maj. David Stuckenberg, one of the nation’s leading EMP experts, wrote extensively about the threat balloons carrying bombs pose to national security. “Using a balloon as a WMD/WME platform could provide adversaries with a pallet of altitudes and payload options with which to maximize offensive effects against the U.S.,” he wrote in the report. “There is nothing to prevent several hundred pounds of weapons material from being delivered to altitude,” he added. On Friday, he told [the Washington Examiner], “China’s recent balloon flyover of the United States is clearly a provocative and aggressive act. It was most likely a type of dry run meant to send a strategic message to the USA. We must not take this for granted.”

China came close to being in a position to pull this off. On February 3, Brigadier General Patrick S. Ryder, the Department of Defense’s press secretary, stated in an official press conference that the balloon was continuing to move eastward and fly over strategic U.S. military bases. He also revealed that it was flying over Missouri at the center of the United States, which is the optimal location to execute a super EMP attack on the U.S. homeland.

The balloon needn’t have carried an EMP weapon to have been effective either. Modern-day nuclear weapons can be easily miniaturized to weigh less than 200 pounds each. In fact, the smallest U.S. tactical nuclear weapons dating from the late 1950s weighed a mere fifty-six pounds. If armed with a nuclear weapon, such an airship could even be used to execute a decapitation strike on Washington DC, taking out America’s top political and military leadership in a single blow. Similarly, if it were armed with a biological weapon such as weaponized anthrax, the balloon could have been utilized to rain anthrax spores over the United States, affecting millions of Americans with a 90 percent kill rate. Yet another possibility is that the balloon could have been carrying a dirty radiological bomb, whose effects could be spread over a populated area.

The Fallout

All of these possibilities provide a compelling rationale for Biden to have ordered the airship shot down as soon as it began flying over the Aleutian islands on January 28, rather than one week later after it had crossed the entire country.

Ironically, the United States and Canada conducted Operation Noble Defender on Jan 15 through 31 to demonstrate the joint abilities of the U.S. and Canadian Air forces to defend our joint airspace. The Chinese balloon crossed over western Canada and Alaska during the last four days of this exercise, effectively highlighting major vulnerabilities in our air defense systems as well as the unwillingness of U.S. political and military leaders to act.

Biden’s failure to act to defend U.S. airspace from what could have potentially been an existential threat is in furtherance of his previous record of seemingly ignoring existential threats and pretending they don’t exist.  Last year, Russia placed its strategic nuclear arsenal on the highest alert level since the end of the Cold War and operationally deployed its multi-warhead Yars road-mobile missiles. Biden did not even bother to increase our nuclear readiness above DEFCON 5, which is our lowest state of readiness. His decision to leave the U.S. nuclear arsenal essentially vulnerable to a Russian nuclear surprise attack stood in marked contrast to previous presidents of both major political parties, who increased our nuclear alert statuses with Russia to show Moscow we were serious about defending America.

As if to add insult to injury, during a press conference held on February 6, White House Press Secretary Karine Jean Pierre stated that the National Security Council had sent out a TikTok to the press corps to explain why they waited seven days to shoot down the Chinese military spy airship. In other words, Biden’s national security council is using a known Chinese surveillance and spy tool to explain why the administration failed to shoot down a Chinese surveillance/spy airship until after it had completed its mission and collected seven days’ worth of sensitive surveillance data.

If anyone had doubts as to whether the Biden administration was at all concerned about U.S. national security in the wake of the Afghanistan debacle, its Ukraine war policy provoking an unnecessary, and likely nuclear, war with Russia, and the recent classified document scandal, then the administration’s decision to give a Chinese nuclear-capable weapon system a free pass across the entire country should dispel them.

A Failure of Leadership

The failure to defend U.S. airspace from a Chinese airship—which had the capability to carry weapons of mass destruction that could kill millions of Americans—signals that the United States would be unlikely to respond militarily to Chinese aggression against Taiwan. After all, if Biden won’t even act to defend our country, why would our nuclear-armed adversaries believe he would be willing to fight a direct war against them?

Biden’s decision also begs the question of how he would respond if the PRC revealed that the airship was, in fact, carrying a high-yield nuclear weapon or super EMP weapon, and threatened to detonate it if the United States attempted to shoot it down. One can only wonder how the president might respond to a potential Chinese blackmail attempt via nuclear-armed balloon; an effort to strong-arm the White House into accepting its demands, up to and including forcing America to take all three legs of its strategic nuclear triad off alert status—in effect destroying the credibility of our strategic nuclear deterrent and our ability to deter future Chinese attacks on the U.S. homeland.

Ultimately, I believe that the most important, game-changing intelligence this Chinese surveillance balloon will end up gathering is testing whether Biden would shoot down a Chinese nuclear-capable weapons platform while it was flying over our country. Sadly, Biden has failed this crucial test of presidential leadership, and in so doing severely damaged America’s credibility.

David T. Pyne, Esq. is a former U.S. Army combat arms and Headquarters staff officer, who was in charge of armaments cooperation with the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas from 2000–2003. He holds M.A. in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He currently serves as Deputy Director of National Operations for the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, and is a contributor to Dr. Peter Pry’s book Blackout Warfare: Attacking The U.S. Electric Power Grid A Revolution In Military Affairs. He also serves as the Editor of “The Real War” newsletter. He may be reached at emptaskforce.ut@gmail.com.

Image: Shutterstock.

The danger of open warfare involving Israel and Iran is increasing. One recent omen was a drone attack, which nearly all observers attributed to Israel, on a military facility in the Iranian city of Isfahan. Israel has been clandestinely conducting lethal offensive operations in Iran for years, but the current increased risk of wider conflict is related to both countries’ politics; extreme and undemocratic features have become especially salient in recent months. The situation could be considered the obverse of democratic peace theory, according to which democracies do not wage war against each other.

Another recent omen is an uptick in Israeli-Palestinian violence, as punctuated by an Israeli raid on a refugee camp in Jenin in the West Bank, leading to the death of ten Palestinians, including a sixty-one-year-old grandmother. Israeli violence against Palestinians unsurprisingly begets Palestinian attempts at retribution, as it did in this case. The spiral of violence between Israelis and Palestinians is spiraling upward. Last year, more than 150 Palestinians died in violent operations by Israeli forces, with about one-fifth that number of Israelis dying from Palestinian violence. Last month, Israelis killed thirty-five Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, making January the deadliest such month in more than a decade.

The connection between Israeli-Palestinian violence and the risk of Israeli-Iranian escalation is twofold. One connection is the perennial Israeli attempt to displace blame and international attention from anything involving Israel by attributing all instability in the Middle East to Iran. This is a major reason for Israel’s stoking of tension and confrontation with Iran, and its rejection and undermining of diplomacy aimed at reducing tensions with Iran. To the extent that the upsurge in bloodshed among Palestinians attracts additional unwanted international attention to the occupation of the West Bank, the Israeli motivation for stoking even more tension with Iran will be all the stronger.

The other connection is that Israel can legitimately point to Iranian support to Palestinian resistance groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, although that support is hardly what drives the resistance. Profiling of Palestinian suicide bombers by Israel’s own security forces has found that the common thread among those who resorted to that extreme form of violent resistance was not religion or any other demographic characteristic, much less any foreign support to a resistance group, but instead that each of the bombers had had someone close to them—a friend or family member—killed by Israel. Nonetheless, Israel will use the Iranian link to the Palestinian groups as a rationale for operations such as the Isfahan attack even though Iran is perpetrating no comparable clandestine attacks inside Israel.

The coming to power of the most extreme right-wing government in Israel’s history amplifies the effects of each of these connections. That extremism, along with various measures that Benjamin Netanyahu’s new government has in train such as an emasculation of the judiciary, has led to increased questioning of Israel’s direction by some of its most prominent traditional supporters, including in the United States. The increased need to divert international and especially American attention from that extremism and to shore up foreign support increases the motivation for Netanyahu to keep returning the subject to Iran and to keep promoting hostility toward Iran—just as he did in his recent joint press conference with U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken.

The far-right composition of Netanyahu’s government also is likely to lead to increased Israeli-Palestinian violence, as a matter both of Israeli provocations and of dashing any Palestinian hopes. One sample of possible provocations was a walk atop what Muslims call the Noble Sanctuary and Jews call the Temple Mount by Public Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who says he intends to do more of the same. It is worth remembering that a similar stroll on that holy site by another prominent Israeli politician, Ariel Sharon, triggered what became known as the Second Intifada, a multi-year wave of violence in which an estimated 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis died.

The dashing of Palestinian hopes involves the determination of this Israeli government, more blatantly and consistently than any other, to prevent Palestinian self-determination. Netanyahu—the closest thing to a moderating influence in this government of extremists—has said as much recently, notwithstanding his earlier lip service to the possibility of a Palestinian state. Bereft of hope for an end to the occupation and apartheid, some Palestinians will see nothing to lose through violent resistance.

On top of this is the government’s encouragement of unofficial violence by Jews against Arabs, especially as perpetrated by West Bank settlers. Netanyahu announced an easing of licensing requirements for owning a firearm, stating that his goal was the arming of “thousands” of Israeli citizens. A foretaste of what West Bank settlers, feeling more empowered than ever with the advent of the far-right government, are likely to do came late last month when settlers made almost 150 attacks against Palestinian residents and their property in a single day.

Whatever the exact nature of the Israeli-Palestinian violence, any upsurge of it plays into the Israeli-Iranian confrontation in the aforementioned ways.

The Iranian end of that confrontation displays some parallel motivations, with a regime that oppresses part of its subject population possibly seeing reasons to heat up external conflict. Especially since the beginning of the current wave of popular protests in Iran, triggered by the death last year of a Kurdish-Iranian woman in official custody, the Tehran regime has shown that it has lost the support of much of its population but has not lost its determination to use whatever means necessary to stay in power. The fall of this regime is not in the cards, but additional violence certainly is.

Most of the officially administered violence is internal to Iran. So far, violence beyond Iran’s borders has been aimed at exiled dissidents—a return to behavior that the Islamic Republic exhibited during its early years. But it is easy to picture Iranian hardliners, beleaguered by the domestic protests, seeing rally-round-the-flag value in an escalated confrontation with Israel. In any event, Iranian leaders will try to respond to Israeli violence against Iran, which is what nearly all past Iranian attempts to hit Israeli targets have been.

Iranian leaders have been given little or no incentive to refrain from any such escalation, considering the sanctions and opprobrium to which their country already is subject. With the Biden administration having continued its predecessor’s failed “maximum pressure” policy toward Iran, Iranian decisionmakers—much like the hopeless Palestinians seeing no end to the Israeli occupation—see themselves as having little or nothing to lose by trying something extraterritorial and violent.

The current situation with Israel and Iran illustrates how hardliners in two adversarial countries can play off each other and in effect become each other’s best allies, while jointly becoming the enemies of peace and stability.

The risk of the United States being dragged into this dangerous situation is significant. Washington has allowed itself to be hitched militarily to an Israeli government that would be happy for the United States to be in the front rank of a war against Iran. The Iranian regime will see little daylight between the United States and Israel. Furthermore, Iran has not closed the books on the Trump administration’s assassination three years ago of one of the most prominent Iranian political and military figures, Qasem Soleimani.

Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a Contributing Editor for this publication.

Image: saeediex / Shutterstock.com

The recent flurry of attacks on Chinese nationals in Afghanistan has raised concerns inside Beijing’s foreign policy circles. Beijing has a self-made reputation for operating on an astute business model. While Beijing is somewhat risk-averse, it does not let values and norms impede its economic interests. Its conduct and policies toward Taliban-ruled Afghanistan mirror this approach. So far, despite facing some obstacles, China has remained committed to cementing its presence in the country to advance its strategic and economic objectives. The future, however, doesn’t look very promising for Beijing.    

Months before the Taliban took Kabul in August 2021, Beijing appeared to have thrown its dice in favor of the insurgents. In July 2021, China hosted a Taliban delegation, which reportedly assured Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi that it would not allow any terrorist group, especially the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), to carry out anti-China activities on Afghan soil. The Taliban did act on their promise, shifting ETIM forces away from the Afghanistan-China border and restricting their activities.  

There are two core aspects to Beijing’s interest in Afghanistan: establishing security in its western frontier by controlling Uyghur separatism and protecting Belt and Road projects in Central Asia and Pakistan. Afghanistan has emerged as a lynchpin for both. Beijing’s twin strategies are now playing out.

First, China has positioned itself as the Taliban’s savior, a true friend that it can rely on when the entire international community has not only washed its hands of Afghanistan but also remained selectively opposed to the Taliban’s policies. While Beijing has yet to give formal political recognition to the Taliban, it operates an embassy in Kabul with a designated ambassador. Moreover, China has allowed a Taliban representative to occupy the Afghan embassy in Beijing. China’s foreign minister has been to Kabul, as have various official delegations. China also hosted the Taliban foreign minister in a meeting of foreign ministers of regional countries in March 2022.

Second, in a continuation of its policy during the previous republican government of focusing on economic investment in Afghanistan, China has shown a willingness to pump money into the country’s mining and energy sectors and lend the expertise necessary to rebuild the country. For the cash-strapped Taliban, this has been a beacon of light. The Islamic Emirate has embraced the prospect of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being extended into Afghanistan, although it is unlikely due to virulent local opposition in Balochistan. On January 5, a Chinese company signed a deal worth over $500 million with the Islamic Emirate to enable oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin in northern Afghanistan, which contains an estimated 87 million barrels worth of crude oil. The deal-signing ceremony took place in the presence of Chinese envoy to Afghanistan Wang Yu and high-ranking Taliban officials, including Abdul Ghani Baradar, the acting deputy prime minister for economic affairs. The agreement is the Islamic Emirate’s first major energy investment contract. Furthermore, China would also like to restart extraction operations at the Mes Aynak copper mine, the contract for which had been awarded in 2008.    

Afghanistan, it appears, has turned into a favorable hunting ground for China, with its natural resources up for grabs. Chinese nationals are believed to be the biggest group of foreign investors in the country. Not surprisingly, Beijing has had a muted reaction to the Taliban’s obscurantist policies on the rights of women and minorities, and its early statements in favor of an inclusive government have fallen silent.

However, China’s somewhat smooth sailing in Afghanistan has been disrupted by the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). On December 12, the group carried out a terrorist attack on a Kabul hotel usually occupied by Chinese businessmen. In September, ISIS-K, through its propaganda magazine, vowed to oppose Chinese “imperialism” in Afghanistan. ISIS-K, whose violent activities have challenged the Taliban’s claim to power over Afghanistan, clearly seeks to expand its influence in Central Asia and attract Uyghur Muslim militants. The group is believed to have expanded into all of Afghanistan’s provinces of Afghanistan, emerging as the Taliban’s principal adversary. This, in turn, poses a serious challenge to Beijing’s aims. Indeed, China now reportedly plans to arm the Taliban with surveillance drones and sophisticated weapons. Beijing has also urged the Islamic Emirate to keep Chinese investors safe.       

As China gets deeply involved in an economically fragile Afghanistan, it is bound to face enormous security challenges that will limit its ambitions. China’s extractive economic model—neglecting the development of infrastructure, governance, and transportation networks—is destined to fail. As the region becomes increasingly radicalized, there will almost certainly be a ripple effect on China’s Uyghur population. ISIS-K’s growing presence in Afghanistan could make China’s interests in the region more vulnerable to attack. Nevertheless, the emerging competition among regional powers invites a new “Great Game” in Afghanistan.

Dr. Shanthie Mariet D'Souza is the Founder and President of Mantraya, a Visiting Faculty at the Naval War College in Goa, India, and a Non-resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute. She has conducted field research in Afghanistan for more than a decade. She can be reached at shanthie.dsouza@mantraya.org or on Twitter @shanmariet.

Image: Roshan Salih/Shutterstock.com.

American officials continue to harangue Middle East leaders, suggesting that economic, trade, and investment ties with China’s technology companies are risking their security ties with the United States. They are being shrugged off.

America’s fundamental challenge is Middle East countries don’t want to choose between the United States or China.  They believe that a bifurcation is possible: engage with China on commercial matters and simultaneously with the US on traditional national security challenges. Emirati senior Diplomatic Advisor Anwar Gargash said recently that “…economic ties can exist separately from [security and political] concerns.”

For Washington, economic security is national security. There is not and cannot be a meaningful distinction. At the Manama Dialogue in Bahrain last November, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl warned that China “pursues ties based solely on its narrow, transactional, commercial, and geopolitical interests, period.”

It’s not that Middle East actors see Beijing as a benign power, offering win-win cooperation and no-strings-attached economic benefits. There’s a long history of extra-regional powers in the Middle East and most know an opportunistic outsider when they see one. But they don’t see China as a threat, or at least not in the same way Washington does.

China is their largest trade partner, a great power with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and a technological giant that has transformed itself from third world to first in a single generation. After several years of warnings from the Trump and Biden administrations, and the case for disengagement with China still no better defined, officials in the region are simply tuning out the United States on the issue.

The US won’t stop pressing these countries over their ties to China, of course. American politics demand it. Letting up would also risk implying that U.S. concerns have diminished. But simply continuing to pressure MENA states is not going to be enough to change MENA countries’ views, behavior, or relationships with China.

Washington needs a new strategy.

The binary construct in which the US is Arab states’ security partner and China is the economic one ignores the substantial roles that US allies and partners play as trade, investment, and contracting partners throughout the Middle East.

The UAE, for example, China is its top trade partner, but India is a close second with Japan third, followed by the United States. Importantly, India and Japan also have problems with China. For Saudi Arabia, China is its biggest export destination; but the United States, UAE, Germany, and India round out the top five.

A smarter approach would be for the US to end the bilateral strategic competition narrative and instead leverage its networks of allies and partners to quickly develop more multilateral coalitions—like the India, Israel, UAE, U.S. grouping (I2U2). This would address the economic and developmental requirements that make China an attractive partner to Middle East countries.

Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and India have all experienced the sharp end of China’s economic statecraft and the raft of problems associated with an embrace of Chinese technology.

Canberra can help cut further into China’s lead on critical minerals. There should be a formalized agreement with Seoul and Taipei as global, non-U.S. alternatives on semiconductors, given Samsung, SK Hynix, and TSMC’s leadership in the field. Tokyo is already leading on 6G and could be brought into Saudi-US agreements for joint cooperation on the topic. And India can be even more of an alternative for production, and consumption, given its population rivals that of China’s.

The knock against the United States is that it makes strident demands not to work with China without offering reasonable alternatives. Fair or not, to have any chance of diminishing the relationship between MENA states and China, viable, alternative markets are the key and US allies can provide them.

These new constructs would not mean the US is giving up its own efforts in these sectors; it would be recognition that it can’t go it alone. Collaboration with allies is the only way to provide Middle East partners sufficient investment and trade alternatives to China in these sectors, while also protecting US national security concerns.

The message from Washington isn’t resonating with Middle East allies right now; it’s time to better partner with U.S. allies and let them do some of the talking. 

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and host of the China-MENA Podcast. He is also an assistant professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a senior fellow in the Geoeconomics Center at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he was the deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East and oversaw the U.S. intelligence community’s efforts on foreign investment.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or any U.S. Government department/agency.

Image: Flickr/State Department.

Over the past century, Central Europe’s political order has seen a pattern of ideological German-Russian love-hate relations. The lands between the two powers, from the Balkans to the Baltics, were alternately controlled by one or the other, usually with shared responsibility. Each time they failed to reach an agreement on power sharing, a political vacuum formed, and world wars broke out. The First World War involved the Balkan vacuum, followed by a Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) vacuum which led to World War II. The Cold War was unleashed when Soviet influence in the region exceeded the acceptable limits of earlier consensuses, while the current war, Russia’s invasion of its neighbor, is clearly the result of the Ukrainian vacuum.

Today we have an unprecedented situation in Europe. With the Russian-German paradigm crumbling for the first time since World War II, the two powers have lost their former political prowess in the region. Russia’s economic influence in Europe has collapsed, while Germany’s unique growth model has dramatically diminished, as has its role as the European Union's main moral authority.

This evolving geopolitical climate is a unique opportunity for the CEE states to create a new, responsible European economic security architecture. But this Eurasian political vacuum also presents an existential threat to the region if it is ultimately filled by a different sort of influence: that of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The Hand of the CCP

Even prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the CCP sought influence in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, or 17+1 bloc. However, Western sanctions on Russia forced Moscow to become dependent on Beijing for exports of dual-use products and materials for use by Russia’s military, including microchips, aluminum oxide, and other raw materials, leading to the Baltic states ending cooperation with Beijing. The future of the Cooperation between China and CEE countries platform has remained uncertain since.

Even without BRI or other formal China/CEE initiatives, close economic ties between Beijing and Central and Eastern Europe present risks to the region, including the export of the CCP’s mercantilist-communist economic model and techno-authoritarianism. China maintains an ability to coerce its CEE trading partners through an asymmetric economic dependence the region continues to have on Chinese imports. Trade is not equitably reciprocated, due to China securing supply chains in its favor and ending its reliance on high-value foreign imports through the CCP’s “dual circulation” economic model.

Beijing has further exploited this economic dependence through its support of the Trans-Asian railway to Poland and the Czech Republic, which ostensibly offers China an attractive, fast-growing trade route and hub for the region. For China, this railway is much more than about trade, however. This 9,500-kilometer route is a potential alternative to Indo-Pacific trade routes. In the event of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, the route may be China’s only way to quickly export goods to the West. By building trade dependencies in the region and penetrating CEE markets considered particularly friendly to the United States, China can create new strategic advantages and drive wedges in Western partnerships.

As such, China’s interest in expanding the historic trade route and developing cooperation in CEE is not surprising. Against the backdrop of geopolitical turmoil in the region, CCP influence, along with Russo-Ukrainian and tensions surrounding Taiwan, may be one of the more serious challenges for the West today.

Enter the Three Seas

The Three Seas Initiative (TSI), an economic and infrastructure development forum consisting of twelve European Union countries in the CEE between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic seas, can help counter autocratic threats from both Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Through regional security structures, military cooperation, and joint infrastructure initiatives, TSI can help the region secure supply chains, realize energy security, and gain independence from PRC investment, as well as develop a new regional security architecture to respond to future geopolitical challenges.

Investment in the CEE is particularly needed as TSI member governments continue to face economic pressures due to inflation, the Russo-Ukraine War, and a slow recovery from coronavirus pandemic lockdowns. Regional governments cannot be expected to finance regional infrastructure development, nor can G7 countries like the United States or the United Kingdom be relied upon for investment when their priority is funding Ukraine’s military aid.

Once a political solution is reached, ending hostilities between Moscow and Kyiv, priority will shift from aiding Ukraine militarily to assisting the country’s reconstruction. The Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (TSIIF), which helps finance transportation, energy, and digital infrastructure projects, should play a significant role in not only re-building Ukraine, but also ensuring the entire CEE region’s economy remains insusceptible to leverage from Russia, China, or other such actors. The TSIIF should seek investments from private equity, pension funds seeking to diversify investments from uncertain equity markets, and wealthy Indo-Pacific partners which have not been impacted by the regional volatility from the war and which have significant foreign currency reserves. The TSI also should work with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to further expand the Blue Dot Network (BDN) into CEE, and help attract more private investment through the certification of infrastructure projects by BDN members America, Australia, and Japan.

Today, most Western countries aiding Ukraine do so through border crossings in Poland or Romania, but most activities are carried out independently by each individual country. NATO and the European Union are, of course, engaged in providing support to Ukraine, but even they do not undertake broad-based coordination. By using the TSI to coordinate not only logistics but to partner on Ukraine’s transformation into a prosperous Western democracy, CEE can build a broad architecture resistant to further CCP infiltration in the region.

Tomasz Wróblewski is the chief executive officer of the Warsaw Enterprise Institute.

Darren Spinck is an associate research fellow with the Henry Jackson Society.

Image: Tomasz Makowski/Shutterstock.com.

The U.S. Department of Energy has awarded a $200 million grant to electric vehicle battery manufacturer Microvast as part of its effort to promote green energy. But there’s a problem.

Ostensibly headquartered in Texas, Microvast actually manufactures most of its products and does the bulk of its business in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Houston office exists mainly to facilitate the receipt of “green energy” government subsidies.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration is willing to go along with this poorly disguised ruse. The myopic pursuit of cheap renewable energy sources is clearly more important to the administration than preventing American taxpayer dollars from going to the PRC, which will pocket them while simultaneously cornering an energy sector on which the United States may well become dependent, as Microvast may well be just the tip of this iceberg.

Biden’s Energy Department maintains that Microvast is really an American company and that the grants will help disentangle the company from Chinese supply chains and encourage the development of new technologies in the United States. But a simple Google search reveals that in 2017, chinabuses.org referred to Microvast as “the leading battery manufacturer in China.”

When Microvast was formed in 2006, a subsidiary entity (Microvast Power Systems) was simultaneously incorporated in Huzhou, China. Wu Yang, Microvast’s chairman and CEO, was previously CEO of the Chinese water purification entity OMEX in Shanghai. More than two-thirds of the company’s revenue is generated in China, where more than 80 percent of its assets are located. Microvast’s own SEC filings lay out the risk to its manufacturing assets in China. In addition, any company with such significant Chinese exposure is subject to Beijing’s policies that mandate technology transfers to the state.

Surely, the Biden administration knows Microvast is a PRC front. But it appears to consider it imperative to transition American energy to renewables and recognizes that domestically produced components are too expensive to be practical. The administration thus views the long-term risks of doing business with companies like Microvast as acceptable collateral damage.

Not everyone agrees. The Microvast grant (among others) has rightly attracted Congressional attention, and Energy Secretary Jennifer Grandholm’s upcoming annual budget testimony will be an excellent opportunity to question her on the topic. But, clearly, Congress must do more than simply ask questions.

Microvast received the grant under the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. While the law urges the Energy Department to focus on actual U.S. companies, Congress needs to make the prohibition against giving grants to Chinese entities explicit. Doing so should be a top priority for the 118th Congress.

If companies like Microvast wish to receive U.S. government contracts and subsidies, they should divest Chinese entanglements and submit a clean bill of health to the Energy Department before they receive the funding. The Biden administration should not be in the business of trying to tempt the company away from China with handouts, no matter how desperately it desires cheap lithium batteries. If the Department of Energy cannot do this on its own initiative, as appears to be the case, Congress should require it to certify that no recipients of grants or subsidies have any ties to the PRC.

This needs to happen now because Microvast is hardly an isolated case. Vast sums authorized under both the infrastructure package and the so-called Inflation Reduction Act continue to flow through the Energy Department and other federal agencies. Microvast may well be just a minor actor in a massive Chinese operation to both subvert these funds and control the renewable energy sources the Biden administration is determined to impose on the United States, in effect transforming America from a global energy superpower into a supplicant to the PRC.

Indeed, the whole premise that the nation must switch over to less reliable renewable energy (and become more dependent on China) to combat climate change should now be called into question. Grandholm has announced that the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has made a material breakthrough on nuclear fusion technology. This advancement opens up the possibility of a new energy source that creates no emissions or toxic waste and requires a much smaller footprint than fossil fuels.

Bringing fusion to the scale necessary for it to be a significant clean energy source will take decades. But we would do far better to focus on developing this technology in conjunction with our allies, especially the United Kingdom, while we fuel our immediate future with our own increasingly clean fossil fuels and existing nuclear fission technology. Such a strategy could continue to lower emissions, allow us to retain energy reliability, and avoid leaving our energy security at the mercy of the PRC and its subsidiaries, starting with Microvast.

Victoria Coates is a senior research fellow specializing in national security and international affairs at The Heritage Foundation.

Image: Flickr/White House.

The Swiss writer Max Fritsch called his play Biedermann and the Fire Raisers (1958) “a didactic play without a lesson.” The main character, Gottlieb Biedermann, is an upright citizen and hair tonic merchant. Two ill-intentioned vagrants wheedle their way into his home, store gasoline in the attic and Biedermann even provides them with the matches to burn the house down. When confronted with solid evidence of the arsonists’ intentions, Gottlieb Biedermann finds every excuse not to take action. “All I want is some peace and quiet, not more.” He argues, “If I report those two guys to the police, I’ll make them my enemies. What good will that do me? On the other hand, if I go up there and invite them to dinner, then we’ll be friends.”

On an eerily similar note, the German weekly magazine, Stern, has accused Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, of being an “arsonist” and stirring up trouble not only in Turkey but also in Syria and Germany in an attempt to stay in power. The United States is faced with a dilemma similar to Biedermann’s with regard to Turkey and a planned $20 billion arms package, including forty F-16 fighter jets and seventy-nine upgrade kits. On the one hand, the United States needs to keep on good terms with Turkey because of its NATO membership and key strategic position in the Middle East. On the other, how far is it prepared to tolerate Turkey’s growing human rights abuses and incendiary behavior in the neighborhood?

In the recent hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on countering Russian aggression in Ukraine, Senator Jeanne Shaheen raised the issue of Turkey’s continued failure to ratify Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession agreement. She explained that she and a number of her colleagues were opposed to the F-16 deal unless Turkey ratified the agreement. Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland agreed Congress was more likely to look favorably on the deal after ratification.

What Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlet Cavusoglu has stated are two separate issues seems to have degenerated into a quid pro quo deal. After the Senate hearing, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel denied this was the case. In addition, he emphasized the Biden administration’s support for Turkey as an important NATO ally in providing what Victoria Nuland called “security enhancements.”

However, Jeanne Shaheen and twenty-six other senators confirmed the transactional nature of the deal by informing President Joe Biden they are not prepared to greenlight the sale until Turkey agrees to Sweden and Finland’s accession.

Turkish columnist Burak Bekdil, who is also a Turkey correspondent for Defense News, has in a trenchant analysis undermined the illusion that Turkey under Erdogan is a dependable NATO ally in the struggle against Russia. On the contrary, Bekdil concludes: “The Erdoğan-Putin bond has two main pillars. One is pragmatism: They both strategically, politically, and economically benefit. The other is ideological: They both hate the West.”

Clifford Smith from the Middle East Forum believes Erdogan’s reluctance to endorse Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership is a refusal to “stay bribed,” but the truth lies elsewhere. Senator Shaheen’s assessment that domestic politics play a major role is correct, but a further dimension has been added after ta Koran burning stunt in Stockholm.

When Turkey invaded and occupied the Kurdish enclave of Afrin in northwestern Syria in 2018, Erdogan had hit upon a surefire winner, as nearly 90 percent of Turkey’s citizens supported the incursion. Carnegie Europe’s Francesco Sicardi has, in a study of how Syria changed Turkey’s foreign policy, shown how four military operations in Syria have improved Erdogan’s approval ratings.

Russian economist Sergei Gurlev has written of a similar pattern in Putin’s Russia. When Russia’s GDP growth slowed to almost zero and Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings dropped. According to Gurlev, Putin decided to address an economic problem with a non-economic solution, the annexation of Crimea, which boosted his popularity.

For this reason, Erdogan is seeking Russia’s permission for a new cross-border operation against the U.S.-backed Kurdish YPG militia in Syria. He has also signaled a rapprochement with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.

Likewise, Erdogan’s initial objection to Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership was that they housed terrorist organizations, which was quickly elevated by his foreign policy advisor and spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin, to “a matter of national security” for Turkey.

Now, Erdogan has found a new card to play, the religious card, which is guaranteed to have popular appeal. As a young man, Erdogan was president of the Istanbul youth group of the National Salvation Party, founded by Necmettin Erbakan, the father of political Islam in Turkey, which was closed in the 1980 military coup.

When Erbakan later opened the Welfare Party (RP), which became the Turkish parliament’s largest, Erdogan was RP’s mayor of Istanbul, where he famously declared in 1997, “Democracy is not our aim. It is the vehicle.”

The following year the RP was dissolved by the Constitutional Court for being a “centre of activities contrary to the principles of secularism.” Erdogan was also sent to prison for four months “for using religion to incite hatred” after quoting a nationalist poem from 1912 (“The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers”).

Erdogan has made it clear to Sweden, “If you do not show respect to the religious beliefs of the Republic of Türkiye or Muslims, you will not receive any support for NATO [membership] from us.” Consequently, Finland may have to go it alone if Turkey blocks Sweden’s accession.

The outrage provoked by the incident in Stockholm has caused the U.S. government to issue a travel warning about possible retaliatory attacks by terrorists in Turkey. In return, the Turkish foreign ministry has warned its citizens against possible Islamophobic, xenophobic, and racist attacks in the United States and Europe.

In Max Fritsch’s play there is a Greek chorus of firemen who warn: “Wise is man and able to ward off most perils if, sharp of mind and alert, he heeds signs of coming disaster in time.”

Robert Ellis is an international advisor at the Research Institute for European and American Studies in Athens.

Image: Drop of Light/Shutterstock.

Recently, among Central Asian countries, it has become a trend to create a “new Stan” after the countries’ so-called founding fathers. For instance, before starting his second term in 2021, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan announced his “New Uzbekistan Strategy” to considerably change the regime and political structure of the country after the first president of the country, Islam Karimov. The administration of Kazakh president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev adopted a similar approach in 2022. In response to political unrest that took place in January of that year, Tokayev proposed a new set of full-scale reforms in the country. In his address to the nation on March 16, he stressed that it is not the following “abstract ideas” but a vision to transform the country into a “New Kazakhstan.” Are these reforms capable of creating new versions of these countries? If the answer is yes, how do these leaders transform their visions into reality?

Upon close examination of these proposed reforms, it could be argued that they represent an approach to modernizing society and state primarily derived from the early Russian economic policy of Russian president Vladimir Putin, in which Moscow focused on the simplification of opening up businesses, tax reforms, reduced government intervention in markets, etc. However, the true genesis of these reform packages is traced back to the Washington Consensus policy prescriptions developed by the IMF, World Bank, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury following the end of the Cold War. By modifying certain aspects of these prescriptions, the current economic reforms of both countries are consistent with the SLIP (Stabilization, Liberalization, Institution Building, and Privatization) Agenda reform packages.

Kazakhstan’s model closely mirrors that of Uzbekistan, with an emphasis on achieving economic growth through inflows of foreign capital and developing small and medium-sized businesses in the country, while also focusing on improving living conditions. In other words, the intention is to create an economy that works for people and a government that is “fair” and “just.” However, this may appear to be an ambitious goal for Kazakhstan, as it is not the first reform effort by Tokayev. A “New Kazakhstan” is a practical response to previous mismanagement of governmental affairs and the unsettled socio-economic environment of the country; Tokayev understands the realities of his country after “Bloody January.” Symbolically, a referendum and constitutional amendments signify that he is determined in his vision for transformation.

Who Follows What? Reform Packages of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan

Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan possess nearly identical institutional and economic models and have passed similar reform efforts addressing the judiciary, state government, human rights, and business development, according to Aziza Umarova, a Research Fellow at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

In his first year as president, Mirziyoyev proclaimed his state program for 2017, “A Year of Dialogue with People and Human Interests,” which would involve citizens in policymaking by hearing their voices on pressing issues of the country. By the same token, as soon as he took office, Tokayev established the National Council of Public Trust and proposed a model of a “hearing state.” Each initiative would play an intermediary role between the government and society by promoting dialogue among the public, political parties, and civil society.

But the idea of building a “new” nation began in 2021, when Mirziyoyev kicked off his presidential campaign with the notion of establishing “New Uzbekistan.” Soon after winning his second term, he introduced the “Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022–2026.” This five-year program is a continuation of his first presidential program, the Strategy of Actions for 2017-–2021. As for Tokayev and Kazakhstan, in his address to the nation, he outlined five areas of reforms for “New” Kazakhstan: economic policy, the development of the real estate sector, strategic investment in the country’s future, resetting public administration, and improving law and order.

After carefully Tokayev’s proposals, it is evident that it takes significant attributes from the “Development Strategy” and “Strategy of Actions for Uzbekistan” developed by Mirziyoyev. This is not surprising, as both countries’ economic development model heavily depends on fossil fuel energy resources, agriculture, foreign direct investment, the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the digitalization of the economy. 

Kazakhstan’s Economic Reforms: To What Extent Does It Differ?

Kazakhstan’s new economic reforms are the first steps to modernizing the country’s economy by relying on the instruments of a free market, including antimonopoly policies, comprehensive tax reforms, and supporting businesses by creating favorable conditions. Tokayev aims to build an economy in which responsibilities are shared between businesses and government to address complex social challenges. Businesses, in turn, will benefit from these reforms, such as via legislative change in entrepreneurial and business activities and elimination of administrative burdens. Through this process, the government intends to involve businesses in social infrastructure, building facilities to reduce excessive shortages. It is also clear that the new economic policy functions on the basis of market mechanisms by adding a number of social elements, such as honest taxation, and invoking social responsibility. To add to this, a “Council of Domestic Entrepreneurs” will be founded to support socio-economic reforms. Tokayev himself promoted the three principal elements of the new economic policy: the inviolability of private property, investment climate, and fair competition.

Any economic reform in a market economy requires legal and institutional support and, more importantly, the existence of political transparency and a stable political system in a country. The government should take into consideration institution-building and legal reforms to increase its credibility. In the early 1990s, similar reforms were introduced to reduce public sector engagement in the economy. However, there are a plethora of quasi-public institutions in Kazakhstan—about 6,500 organizations are operating in this sector. Being cognizant of these problems, the country’s prime minister asserted an urgent need to reform the legal frameworks surrounding taxation, budget, and business management. Support of domestic businesses requires a vast amount of credit resources, which is currently a problem. Reforms in the banking system are necessary to finance small and medium-sized enterprises, though most banks in the country have accumulated excess liquidity over the past years. Unfortunately, this excess amount has not been effectively injected into the economy—it instead actually suffers from about $42 billion in underfunding for small and medium businesses. To attract foreign funds, political stability will be necessary; already European experts have stressed the need to ensure stability in the country after last January’s events in order to rebuild investors’ trust and propagate the realization of these reforms.

The most notable aspect of these reforms is the pivotal role of trade. Step by step, the country’s new economic policy tries to modernize the trade policy through collaborative work with foreign countries like China, India, the United Arab Emirates, and so on via appointing special advisors on trade from those countries.  Certain features of these policies, such as liberalization and continuation of the privatization process, could be completed quickly. However, both countries have to overcome their classical conundrum—“moving from exhortation to implementation” by providing a solid promotion for the effective functioning of market institutions. Once in 2019, Tokayev stated he would not allow the recurrence of unfortunate events like the massive arms depot blast in Arys. Unfortunately, it was followed by a second military warehouse explosion in Taraz (2021) and Dungan-Kazakh ethnic clashes (2020), not to mention Bloody January last year.

Recommendations

Given the similar growth models of both countries, Kazakhstan should strengthen its socio-economic and political relations with Uzbekistan in the future in order to avoid repeating the mistakes made by its “twin.” For instance, due to the dramatic increase in lending in Uzbekistan since 2016, the banking sector of the Uzbek economy has been affected by excessive amounts of non-performing loans, and the impact of lending growth has risked asset-quality trends in the banking sector. Additionally, through comprehensive economic reforms implemented by the Uzbek government, the country has managed to develop its economy, with an average annual growth of 5.2 percent between 2016 and 2021, while Kazakhstan only has half of that, standing at 2.6 percent. Having nearly similar socio-economic problems, the Uzbek economic growth model under Mirziyoyev could improve by adopting the best practices of its neighbor.

Furthermore, due to geographical proximity, trade and economic interaction would mutually benefit both countries—strengthening cooperation in energy, logistics, and environmental protection. More importantly, there should be no competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but rather cooperation for growth and development, and supporting each other in solving regional conflicts and “new age” issues such as environment, cybercrime, etc. Considering their mutual energy sector dependence on Russia, both states should bring about structural reform in their energy supply management and green energy sources through bilateral cooperation. Recently, both countries took down Moscow’s offer of the foundation of a trilateral gas union, which will benefit them in the long run as it significantly reduces Moscow’s influence in the region.

As the future economic condition of the region is uncertain, both countries should be wary of their relationship with Russia, whether social or economic, as to avoid being imposed sanctions on by the West, as their relations could be regarded as giving assistance as third parties in evading sanctions. It is crucial for both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to be aware of the potential risks and benefits of their growing economic connections with Russia.

Sardor Allayarov is a Research Assistant at Centre for Analysis, Reporting and Monitoring, located in Bratislava, Slovakia. He is a former Research Intern at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Budapest, Hungary.

Image: Khikmatilla Ubaydullaev/Shutterstock.

The most significant development during Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent trip to Israel and the West Bank had nothing to do with his visit. Blinken’s low-key suggestions for diffusing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians signify the rapidly shrinking U.S. diplomatic footprint on what was for many years a key component of U.S. policy in the region.

Far more newsworthy and historically significant was the publication by an obscure Israeli ministry of the annual population increase of the settler population in the more than 200 settlements in the West Bank.

The report by the Ministry of the Interior’s Population Registry notes that Israel’s settler population has grown to more than 500,000 in the West Bank proper and more than 200,000 in the settlements of annexed East Jerusalem.

Quantifying the continued, inexorable increase in Israel's settlement population continues a trend as old as the occupation itself. For more than half a century, no matter which Israeli government—left, right, or center—has wielded power, Israel’s settlement population and the number of Israeli settlements have increased. In the ongoing contest between the Israelis and Palestinians over control and sovereignty, there is no better barometer of Israel's success and the concurrent dangers not only to the prospect of Palestinian sovereignty, once considered the key to regional stability, but also to the health of Israel’s own democracy.

The ministry document portrays a settlement enterprise that is growing consistently throughout the West Bank. This includes those settlements in areas of East Jerusalem, formally annexed by Israel, with a population of more than 200,000, and the ring of large settlement areas around Jerusalem comprising so-called “Greater Jerusalem.” The population increase includes settlements in the sparsely populated Jordan Valley as well as those in the highlands of Judea and Samaria, home to the current finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich. Smotrich was born in a Golan Heights settlement and still resides in the heartland of the Block of the Faithful settlement movement, which has been at the vanguard of attempts to “grab and settle” throughout the West Bank for the last half-century.

In addition to the growth of these formal, authorized settlements, so-called illegal settlements and outposts initially established without formal government approval over the last twenty-five years continue to increase in number and population. It should be no small matter that successive Israeli governments have committed to dismantling these outposts without practical effect. Indeed, U.S. administrations have long ceased to even ask, let alone demand, that Israel keep such commitments made to Washington.

Over the last fifty years, there has been only one meaningful (if fleeting) obstacle to the increase in Israel’s settlement population: the violence that accompanied the second intifada between 2000 and 2005.

The insecurity produced by the Palestinian uprising, however, merely reduced the annual increase in the settlement population. In contrast, diplomacy sponsored by the United States—beginning with the 1977 “autonomy talks” and continuing throughout the long moribund Oslo process that commenced in 1992—failed to constrain, and arguably facilitated, the increase. Indeed, an objective assessment of this era can only conclude that one of the key objectives of the diplomatic processes of the last generation was the extraordinary increase in settlements and settlers.

The Biden administration’s current engagement in Palestine continues to be based on the assumption the Palestinian security services must deliver the goods to Israel, and protect its settlers and soldiers, without any prospect of the basic payoff long awaited by the Palestinians: independence, sovereignty, and the retreat of the Israel Defense Forces and settlers to a recognized border. If the Oslo Accords at their very best hinted at such an outcome, it has been clear since Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002 that there is no real prospect of any significant Israeli security or settlement retreat in the West Bank, and that diplomatic efforts led by the United States to confront this reality and transform occupation into independence and sovereignty have failed.

The United States, including the current administration, long ago surrendered to the inexorable increase in Israeli settlements. No serious diplomacy between the parties has been conducted since the George W. Bush administration, and it has been more than a decade since the Americans even considered a diplomatic effort to freeze, let alone reverse, the growth of settlements.

In the absence of such a “diplomatic horizon” based on the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, inventive diplomats have come up with a series of quick fixes in an effort to maintain the fiction of diplomatic progress and U.S. engagement. At best, these efforts treat the less desirable symptoms of continuing occupation—notably Palestinian opposition to Israel’s territorial fait accompli—rather than confronting the cause, at the heart of which is Israel’s long-practiced effort to create “facts on the ground.” So, for example, U.S. engagement is now focused on yet another West Bank security plan, which, yet again, aims to square the circle of mobilizing popular Palestinian support for institutions—security and otherwise—that have woefully failed to protect Palestinians, and their political patrimony, from what they see as a major political, economic, and oftentimes personal threat: settlers and settlements.

Geoffrey Aronson is a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute and a former advisor to the EU and others on regional political and security issues.

Image: Paparazzza/Shutterstock.com.

The recent thaw in relations between Australia and China may not come as a surprise to those who have been closely monitoring the two nations' interactions. Some had speculated that a change in Australia's policy toward China would occur under the leadership of Labor Party leader Anthony Albanese, who succeeded Scott Morrison as prime minister and is known for his more flexible approach to China. However, the shift in Australia-China relations over the past year cannot be attributed solely to a change in leadership.

The Early Policy Shift

For over a decade, leaders from Australia's Labor Party have generally adopted a more flexible approach towards China, recognizing the importance of engagement for the nation's interests in areas such as trade, national security, and climate change. This approach has appeared in the foreign policies of former Labor leaders Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, and Albanese is no exception. Upon assuming office, one of Albanese's top priorities was to reshape Australia's policy towards China, moving away from Morrison's hawkish stance.

Despite his strong position on national security and human rights issues, Albanese's government has adopted a more flexible approach in its dealings with China, seeking dialogue to rekindle bilateral cooperation on key issues. This change in foreign policy has made the revival of Australia-China relations more feasible than under the previous leadership. China, too, has played a role in the turnaround of relations. In January 2022, China appointed Xiao Qian, a former ambassador to Indonesia known for his professional communication style and moderate tone, as its new ambassador to Australia. The move of sending a “non-wolf-warrior” diplomat was seen as a signal of China's willingness to repair relations with Australia and modify its aggressive diplomatic approach. Since Xiao took office, he has been vocal about restoring Australia-China relations. For example, in an event held at the University of Technology Sydney’s Australia-China Relations Institute, Xiao stated, “These are the areas where we should continue to conduct constructive dialogue, to minimize the differences if possible, and to enlarge our common grounds if possible.”

In addition, the congratulatory message sent by Chinese premier Li Keqiang to Albanese after the election was another significant indication of China's desire to improve relations. In his statement, Li said that “China stands ready to work with Australia to learn from the past, look to the future and push forward the sound and stable development of a bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership by adhering to the principles of mutual respect and win-win results.” This message, along with previous statements from China's top diplomat in Australia, signaled a new tone in China's policy towards Australia and created a favorable condition for the Albanese government's future efforts to repair relations with China.

The policy change on both sides engendered a more favorable environment for engagement, particularly in the latter half of 2022 and early 2023, laying the groundwork for a potential improvement of Australia-China relations.

Unfreezing Diplomatic Engagement

With a more conducive atmosphere for engagement, Australia and China began to boost their high-level diplomatic interactions. In June 2022, Australian defense minister Richard Marles met his Chinese counterpart, Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. This marked the first high-level contact between the two nations in three years, signaling improved relations between Australia and China.

At the time, few believed that such engagement meant significant progress had been made in Australia-China relations, as several core disagreements on security, trade, and human rights remained unresolved. Yet, as it was the first high-level contact between the two countries in three years and came just three weeks after the inauguration of the Albanese government, it signaled meaningful progress in unfreezing bilateral relations, especially in light of the ongoing geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific region as well as the disputes between the two countries. This swift diplomatic arrangement also demonstrated a shared willingness to restart diplomatic dialogue.

Although there are still contentious disagreements between Australia and China, Canberra’s largest trade partner, efforts to improve relations have continued. Following a defense ministerial meeting in Singapore, Albanese aimed to seize the momentum to further thaw ties. In an interview with ABC News, Albanese emphasized the importance of dialogue with China. "Common sense tells us that, despite our differences, we need to maintain open lines of communication with our largest trading partner. I look forward to continued engagement between ministers of our respective governments,” said Albanese.

Albanese's positive message was later echoed by a top Chinese diplomat. In July 2022, Australian foreign minister Penny Wong met with her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, on the sidelines of the G20 foreign ministerial meeting in Indonesia. This marked the first meeting of the two countries' foreign ministers since 2019. During the meeting, Wang said, “China is ready to re-examine, re-calibrate, and reinvigorate bilateral ties in the spirit of mutual respect and work towards restoring relations to a positive trajectory.” This sentiment was further echoed in November 2022 when Wang Yi had a positive exchange on a phone call with Wong ahead of multiple international events. It is highly likely that the call was to ensure a positive diplomatic atmosphere ahead of the Albanese-Xi meeting at the G20 leaders’ summit.

The following week, Australia-China relations achieved a major diplomatic breakthrough. Chinese premier Li and Albanese met on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Cambodia, marking the highest-level dialogue between the two nations before the upcoming leaders’ meeting. More critically, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Albanese on the sideline of the G20 summit a few days after Li’s meeting with Albanese, marking the first leader-level dialogue between the two countries in three years. Not only did the meeting signify the stabilization of Australia-China relations, but it also set a positive trajectory for future developments.

Indeed, diplomatic engagement between Australia and China became more frequent in the months following the Albanese-Xi meeting. The second defense ministerial meeting of the year took place ahead of the ASEAN defense ministers meeting in Cambodia, shortly after the Albanese-Xi meeting. About a month after the Alabnese-Xi meeting, Wong's visit to Beijing marked a crucial step forward for Australia-China relations, as it led to the resumption of the Foreign and Strategic Dialogue, which had been suspended in 2018. The joint statement of the dialogue affirmed that "the two sides agreed to maintain high-level engagement and to commence or restart dialogue" in areas ranging from trade to climate change, signaling a renewed commitment to bilateral cooperation.

After Wong's visit to Beijing, further signs of improvement in Australia-China relations began to emerge. In January 2023, Assistant Trade Minister Tim Ayres met with China's vice minister of commerce, Wang Shouwen, on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, where they agreed to hold a virtual meeting of top trade officials in the coming weeks. This development is particularly significant, as trade has been a major source of contention in bilateral relations in recent years. Additionally, the public health agencies of the two countries also held a virtual dialogue in advance of the meeting of trade officials in Davos. This sequence of events may indicate that China-Australia relations are on a path toward a new era.

Disparate Strategic Considerations

For Australia, one of the main motives for improving ties with China is resolving trade disputes to revamp the Australian economy. Such trade disputes have cost billions of dollars in losses across a range of Australian industries, including wine, coal, lobster, and beef. Rather than taking the subject matter to the inefficient international trade framework, Albanese has preferred to address this issue bilaterally. He has vowed to eliminate trade impediments to Australian products and is willing to fix trade ties with China.

Despite the Albanese government’s requests for tariffs to be removed, progress on this front was slow until July 2022, when there were discussions on ending the ban on coal exports to China. This development, along with others, suggested that Albanese's diplomatic approach was bearing fruit. For example, bans on Australian products such as coal have gradually been removed in recent months, and tariffs on other Australian products are also expected to be removed. Additionally, a trade minister meeting is scheduled to take place in the coming weeks, providing a chance for both sides to engage in trade-related issues.

Aside from trade, a stabilized relationship with China provides opportunities for the Albanese government to refine cooperation with China on the key areas of education, tourism, and climate change. In the field of education, for example, China’s large population can provide Australia with massive numbers of talent and funds. The number of Chinese students in Australian higher education has decreased for two years in a row. Yet the stable relationship between the two nations with the easing pandemic restrictions of both countries is expected to attract many Chinese students this year. Similarly, improving Australia-China relations can boost Australia's economy by attracting more Chinese tourists this year.

Perhaps most importantly, a positive relationship with China, coupled with regular dialogue, can help manage competition between the two nations and ensure that it does not escalate into unnecessary conflict. The defense minister meeting in Singapore in June 2022 proved this point. The meeting allowed both sides to frankly discuss pressing issues, such as the dangerous interception of an Australian aircraft by a Chinese fighter jet. This could lower the risk of misjudgments in critical times, preventing conflicts from occurring.

China, on the other hand, has different strategic considerations. Firstly, as a key security and economic actor in the Indo-Pacific region, Australia is a critical regional ally of the United States. If China insists on its aggressive diplomatic approach toward Australia, it will only push Australia toward the camp of the United States, making the “anti-China club” stronger. In contrast, by mitigating tensions with Australia, China can prevent the anti-China coalition from growing.

Secondly, China seeks to improve its ties with Australia as part of its major effort to boost its global image, moving away from its “wolf-warrior” diplomacy. This shift is aimed at repairing damaged relationships and enhancing cooperation with key actors, including Australia, South Korea, and several European countries.

Lastly, China's domestic challenges, including a decline in economic growth, a deteriorating demographic outlook, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, have compelled Beijing to shift its policy priorities inward. In this context, China has mitigated tensions with many regional players in order to avoid creating additional problems abroad. This will allow China to address its pressing domestic issues and sustain its national development, particularly its economy. Moreover, by stabilizing relations with Australia and other nations, China has constructed a favorable environment to re-engage with the global community and reinvigorate its economy through bilateral economic initiatives.

Overall, it is certain that Australia-China relations are much more stable than a year ago. This trend will likely be sustained in the first half of 2023 as both sides continue to engage and seek to address controversial issues. However, many existing disputes over security, human rights, and ideological issues remain unaddressed. To that end, it will not be surprising if these disagreements challenge Australia-China ties in the future.

Ray Weichieh Wang is a freelance analyst and contributor for several media outlets, focusing on diplomacy and politics in the Indo-Pacific. His research interests center on international relations in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. His pieces have appeared in The National Interest, The Diplomat, The News Lens, among other outlets. Wang holds a BS degree in Diplomacy and International Relations from Tamkang University.

Image: Kaliva / Shutterstock.com.

Vladimir Putin’s speech to mark the annexation of four Ukrainian regions was rich in history and hyperbole. However, the Russian leader leveled an accusation at the West it struggles to convincingly dismiss:

“It was the so-called West that trampled on the principle of the inviolability of borders, and now it is deciding, at its own discretion, who has the right to self-determination and who does not.”

For those with long-enough memories, this refers to Kosovo. When the ethnic-Albanian leadership of the Serbian province unilaterally declared independence in 2008, most of the West immediately recognized it as a state (overall, slightly less than half of UN member states have done so, with several reversing their decisions). The UN Charter, which guarantees the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its members, was simply ignored. For Putin, his salami slicing of other nations begins with Kosovo: it has been repeatedly cited as precedent in recognizing or annexing South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, and now the latest regions in eastern and southern Ukraine.

This is not to point to a false equivalence between the West and Russia. It only highlights the former’s once circumstantial approach to principles it now proclaims sacrosanct in Ukraine. In the age of Western interventionism following the Cold War, the principle of territorial integrity has never been applied consistently. Instead, it has been contingent on friendship: whether the West prefers those behind attempted secession, or those from whom they are trying to break away. Unfortunately, that inconsistency has denuded international law of its authority, creating a world where unilateral declarations of border changes become permissible.

Speaking from Experience

As president of Serbia at the time of Kosovo’s attempted secession, I stated that the West’s actions “annuls international law, tramples upon justice and enthrones injustice.” That it set a dangerous precedent was reiterated by various world leaders, including some in the West who worried of its destabilizing effects on international relations. Ominously, already in 2008 Putin warned that the West did not grasp the extent of its consequences: the recognition of Kosovo was “a two-ended stick and the second end will come back and hit them in the face.”

Some Western politicians argued Kosovo was a sui generis case: it set no precedent for others who aspired to independence because it was unique. However, on what grounds was never made clear.

It didn’t pass the sniff-test. Within a matter of months, Russia would recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, secessionist regions in Georgia that had declared independence more than 15 years beforehand. Then-President Dmitry Medvedev would write in the Financial Times: “We argued consistently that it would be impossible, after that [the recognition of Kosovo], to tell the Abkhazians and Ossetians (and dozens of other groups around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo Albanians was not good for them.” Russia both criticized the decision, then also used it as a precedent. The double standard could now be used by anyone.

Little in principle separated the three secessionist regions. In fact, much in context connected them: Abkhazia, Kosovo, and South Ossetia had been autonomous regions within socialist republics inside communist blocs; all had their autonomy stripped from them upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; all had proclaimed independence on the basis that it protected the ethnic minority—Russians and Albanians, respectively—from the parent state. The main difference lay in those doing the recognizing: Russia on one side, the United States and almost all its NATO allies on the other.

For Kosovo, the West would argue the ghost of the Western Balkans wars from the 1990s changed everything. Yet in 2008, Kosovo Albanians faced no existential pressures. The Serbian leadership had grappled with its history, apologized for war crimes committed at Srebrenica, Bosnia, and Vukovar, Croatia, and fulfilled all obligations towards the Hague Tribunal, established by the UN to prosecute crimes committed during conflicts in the Balkans. Our government was on a liberal and pro-European trajectory. We were a fully-fledged democracy. A deal for extensive and full Kosovo autonomy within the Serbian state was on the table. Even the then British ambassador told the UN Security Council that “it is not ideal for Kosovo to become independent without the consent of Serbia and without consensus in this (Security) Council.”

There was, however, one difference: the Kosovo Albanians knew they had the full support of the United States, which had intervened on their side in the 1990s in a war while Serbia was ruled by Slobodan Milosevic—so, before the restoration of Serbia’s democracy. This emboldened their leadership to shun compromise and reject Serbian offers of full autonomy.

None of this means Putin’s claims today of a neo-Nazi genocide against ethnic Russians are true, or that thousand-year-old histories should be the basis for borders, or that the referendums to join Russia in the four Ukrainian regions are justified. What it does mean, however, is that it is the West that opened the door through which Putin would step through.

Perhaps more damaging was a by-product of the episode. Kosovo not only revealed the West thought there should be one set of international rules for themselves, and another for everyone else; it also led to an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that would weaken the cornerstone of the international legal architecture—territorial integrity. Its destabilizing effects are only beginning to percolate through the international order. The story behind its formation deserves to be better understood.

The Wisdom behind International Law

International law is by nature conservative. Borders are not perfect. But when the UN Charter was written in the ashes of the Second World War, a new member-state’s imperfect lines were to be recognized, because that member-state committed to recognizing all others. On admittance, those lines bound a nation’s territorial integrity—the lynchpin of the new order. UN states were codified as being the fundamental units of international relations and dispute resolution, rather than bonds of ethnicity.

Leaders recognized that tweaking at the edges would cause the edifice to collapse. Any violation was to be condemned because, if permitted, it would weaken the entire system. That is why, whenever a dispute arose over borders, the UN Security Council would favor territorial integrity.

The preference for the imperfect over the alternative would be underlined in the coming decades. As independence movements swept Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, liberation leaders were left with a dilemma. The continent was home to the world’s least sympathetic borders. Its straight lines spoke to colonialists armed with pencils, rulers, and unreliable maps in Europe, rather than the realities of geography, religion, and ethnicity on the ground. The newly independent nations met in Cairo in 1964 under the Organization for African Unity to resolve the problem of their fabricated borders. They signed an agreement that, whilst recognizing that “border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension,” they nonetheless pledged to “respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.” They too recognized the alternative—redrawing the map—would unleash chaos.

Territorial integrity was the crowning principle of the post-World War II era. However, the UN charter also enshrined what has become a misunderstood principle: the right to self-determination. But it only granted a right to an independent state in cases of colonization or foreign military occupation should it result in an independent state. Specifically, this referred to foreign holdings, not territories within a state. It did not grant ethnic minorities the right to secede. Nevertheless, the Kosovo Albanians, and many other secessionist groups, would declare independence on the grounds of self-determination.

The Error of the ICJ

In February 2008, after the West rushed to recognize Kosovo, my government asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion. First, we needed a referral from the UN General Assembly. Many in the West initially opposed the proposal, but after pressure from other nations that criticized the blocking of a legal and peaceful path to resolution, most would end up abstaining from the vote on the UN resolution. Still, the United States and Albania would be amongst the mere six UN member-states that would vote against referring the case to the ICJ. Presumably it was preferable to be seen as obstructing peaceful resolution, rather than to have an advisory opinion.

Conclusively referred to by the General Assembly, Western lobbying of ICJ judges then began in earnest. Fortunately for those governments, the legitimacy of an international court is different to national sovereign jurisdiction. In the former, it rests on the voluntary political buy-in by individual nations; in the latter, citizens are—at least in principle—automatically bound by state law.

The United States and others let it be known that if Kosovo’s declaration were ruled illegal, it would simply ignore the opinion. A rejection of an advisory ruling by the most powerful countries on Earth would have punctured the court’s credibility, permitting others to equally ignore its conclusions.

The ICJ had been here before. It had been plunged into irrelevance for nearly two decades after a ruling in 1966 on South West Africa, now Namibia, that was widely seen as upholding colonialism. In its immediate aftermath, the supposed world court would end up hearing maritime disputes referred by mostly European nations. It only recovered credibility with the developing world after a series of later decisions that held up justice against powerful nations.

Yet the wholesale dismissal of an opinion on Kosovo by the West threatened to be even more damaging. The judges therefore had a thin line upon which to tread: a need to apply the tenets of international law, but also to bring the international community with it.

The conclusion in the Kosovo case was narrow and, in my opinion, wrong. It failed to give a meaningful answer to the question. It ruled that the declaration of independence itself (the document, not what it said) did not violate international law—as if this were an issue of free speech. Whether the act of secession was in accordance with international law was left entirely unaddressed. Nor did the court’s conclusion express an opinion on whether Kosovo’s recognition by third parties was contrary to international law. It stated:

“The Court does not consider that it is necessary to address such issues as whether or not the declaration has led to the creation of a State.”

This may have satisfied the West. But as a dissenting judge would write, it was clearly inadequate: “the unilateral declaration of independence … was not intended to be without effect. … It was the beginning of a process aimed at separating Kosovo from the State to which it belongs and creating a new State.”

Consequently, the ICJ advisory opinion at once justified nothing and everything. It opened the space for diametrically opposed interpretations. The Kosovo Albanians, having achieved recognition from UN member states upon its declaration, had not been found to violate international law. Yet in not confirming Kosovo’s statehood, we in Serbia—and those that did not recognize Kosovo—felt the principle of territorial integrity still applied: the self-proclaimed state was an illegal entity. In reality, nothing had been resolved.

Moreover, it sent a signal to the rest of the world: independence movements could now proclaim independence risk-free, leapfrogging the national jurisdictions that bound them, with recourse to an advisory opinion in international law. Statehood was to be reliant on others’ recognition, rather than being situated, as in the past, within international law. Th e UN member-states were free to make up their own minds on whether to support them—and would do so based on who their allies were. In other words, on political—not legal—grounds. The same question the ICJ avoided answering in the case of Kosovo now stares at them from the trenches of Ukraine.

No right to secession, nor the necessary conditions for it, had been established by the ICJ’s advisory opinion. Rather, a muddling precedent had been drawn into the architecture of international law. Contained within were the seeds of instability. Cross the Black Sea from Ukraine, and its damaging effects are today visible in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus.

Failure in the South Caucasus

On 14 September 2022, the guns fell silent in the South Caucasus. Yet another ceasefire had been agreed to Europe’s longest running conflict. Nearly 300 Armenians and Azerbaijanis had died in the flare up, the most significant since the Second Karabakh War came to an end on November 10, 2020.

The conflict over Karabakh has been intractable. The region was once an autonomous province within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the ethnic Armenian leadership of the province declared independence in 1991, setting off a war between neighbors Armenia and Azerbaijan. The result would leave the former in control of around one-fifth of the latter’s territory. In 1994, following a ceasefire that ended the First Karabakh War, it then became one of many post-Soviet frozen conflicts—alongside Transnistria in Moldova, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. In 2020, the dispute heated back up: a short conflict (the Second Karabakh War) saw Azerbaijan recapturing back much—though not all—of its territory.

At the beginning of the conflict, international law appeared unambiguously to be on Azerbaijan’s side. In 1993, four separate UN Security Council resolutions, which are legally binding, would reiterate that the Armenian “occupying forces” should withdraw. Each would be ignored by the Armenians, who at first rested their case in ancient history, backtracking on their commitment to the UN Charter. Having only recently joined the UN along with Azerbaijan, as freshly independent countries, they had agreed that Soviet-drawn borders would form each other’s territorial integrity.

However, when Kosovo’s claim to statehood was not rejected by the ICJ, Armenian separatists then presumed the law to be on their side. The West’s assertion that it was sui generis fell on deaf ears: “That (ICJ) decision has an extremely important legal, political, and moral significance and sets a precedent that cannot be confined to Kosovo,” the unrecognized government of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic stated.

Like in the case of Kosovo, Azerbaijani offers for autonomy status were rejected by the Armenians, who now believed their right to self-determination would lead to their recognition as a state—eventually. Western partners did not help. Beginning to draw from temporary “facts on the ground” as a given, its commitment to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan waned.

In 2008, a UN General Assembly resolution was passed that reaffirmed “support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan” and demanded the “immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.” The United States and France voted against it. Many other Western powers abstained.

Proclaimed absolute in Ukraine and irrelevant in Serbia, the cornerstone principle of territorial integrity was now perceived to be ambiguous in Azerbaijan. Such inconsistency cannot be cited on the grounds of vast differences in space and time. They all happened in a thirty-year arc across the post-communist world. Everything, it seemed, was permissible. Nothing was principled.

Negotiations to diplomatically resolve the conflict dragged on meaninglessly. Pent up frustrations would spill over into the 2020 Second Karabakh War. That is partially a result of Kosovo: the Armenian leadership felt legitimized to hold out until its independence claim could be recognized; Azerbaijan felt its territorial integrity was the trump card. Without a shared common understanding of international law, the space for compromise did not overlap. With the peace process at a dead end, flexions of force became the only way to change the status quo. Two years after the Second Karabakh War in 2020, no peace settlement has yet been signed and the situation at the un-delineated international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains uncertain.

The Coming Disorder

Western territorial integrity fudges are becoming unstuck. In the immediate post-Cold War unipolar world, inconsistency was perhaps tenable. Global order and its stability were underwritten by U.S. might and supremacy. Allies were backed over principles because nobody had the cleft to challenge the West.

Today, the world is multipolar. Smaller countries coalesce around various centers of power based on their interests if it suits them. Whilst America is still the preeminent power, its relative authority has waned. In hindsight, past American (and Western) disregard for territorial integrity and international law looks short-sighted. With growing geopolitical tensions, such consensual rules are needed more than ever to temper power struggles. The conflict over Kosovo was never about one small Serbian province—it was about the challenge it represented to a post-World War II peace founded on territorial integrity. In trampling the principle, the West lost its moral authority.

Western appeals to principles of territorial integrity now hold diminished sway outside of its own backyard. When Russia officially annexed Crimea, a United Nations General Assembly resolution was tabled that affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and rejected the validity of the referendum Putin claimed he was only honoring. The results? 100 votes for, 11 votes against, 58 abstentions, and 24 absent.

Whilst it may have passed, many UN member-states clearly felt they had little to gain in upholding a system of mutual protection if others did not play by the rules. A similar vote was brought in October 2022 demanding Moscow reverse course of its “attempted illegal annexation” of the four Ukrainian provinces. Though there was improvement on the Crimea resolution, more than one-fifth of countries still voted against it or abstained—even after extensive Western lobbying. It is hardly the diplomatic victory that was proclaimed: compare it to a UN General Assembly resolution that passed in 1974 affirming the territorial integrity of Cyprus following the invasion of the North by Turkey: 117 votes for, 0 votes against, 0 abstentions.

The Kosovo precedent and the subsequent ICJ ruling not only has implications for the international community; it has also given license to any group that wants to secede. With global instability on the rise, this will become increasingly dangerous.

The coronavirus pandemic, Russia’s invasion, and Western sanctions have profoundly shaken the global economy. Coupled with the growing devastation of climate change, the world faces a prolonged crisis. Against such headwinds, the center will struggle to hold. Marginal or disenfranchised groups are more likely to grow disaffected and agitate against their authorities. Secession attempts will become more common. States will likely turn more inwards at the precise moment when we need global cooperation.

Ultimately, secessionism or annexation are regressive answers to the question of multi-ethnic states. If we are to return some semblance of stability to our increasingly fractious and decentralized world, we must return to the principle of territorial integrity.

Of course, there is a simple solution. The Western states could roll back their recognition of Kosovo, reaffirming that the principle of territorial integrity applies across time and all contexts. This may not stop the likes of Putin, but it would remove his justification for illegal land grabs whilst dampening dormant secessionist forces around the world that will feed on future instability. Yet though practically straightforward, and its benefits self-evident, a Western mea culpa is as likely as Russia voting to affirm the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Boris Tadić served two consecutive terms as Serbia’s first democratically elected president (2004–2012).

Earlier this month, I had the privilege of participating in the conversations held in the various lounges and side events connected to the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. One topic was on everyone’s lips, from the official sessions at the Congress Center to the late-hour conversations at Hotel Europe’s Piano Bar: decoupling between the United States and China. This decoupling can be described using the metaphor of Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities. In the classic book, the two cities of Paris and London are depicted as vastly different from one another, yet connected through the tumultuous events of the French Revolution. Similarly, the United States and China, closely interconnected through trade and investment only several years ago, are now moving in separate directions as tensions rise and their relationship becomes increasingly fraught. Chinese vice premier Liu He warned against the “Cold War mindset” at Davos, but he failed to convince the world that Beijing is back. Just the title of this year’s gathering, “Cooperation in a fragmented world,” spoke volumes about the state of play in global affairs.

Just as the French Revolution in 1789 created a divide between Paris and London, trade tensions and geopolitical disputes between the United States and China are resulting in the decoupling of the two of the world’s largest economies. This global divide is defined by a growing sense of mistrust between the two economic engines of global trade.

The Bretton Woods system, established in the ruins of a world left devastated by World War II, was a set of international monetary arrangements that aimed to promote economic stability and growth by linking national currencies to the U.S. dollar and fixing exchange rates. In a multipolar world, the Bretton Woods system faces several challenges, including

• U.S. dollar dependency: The system is heavily dependent on the stability of the U.S. dollar, and fluctuations or disorderly devaluations in its value could have major impacts on other currencies and the global economy.

• Limited adaptability: The fixed exchange rate regime can’t easily adjust to changes in the global economy and will often lead to imbalances and trade conflicts.

• Unequal economic growth: The Bretton Woods system was designed for a world dominated by two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In a multipolar world with multiple centers of power, such a system will struggle to accommodate diverse levels and systems of economic growth and development.

• Increased monetary competition: The rise of China and Russia’s pullout from the global financial system, together with increased monetary competition, has made it more difficult for the United States to maintain its dominant position in the global monetary system.

• Inadequate response to crises: The system has been criticized for its inability to respond effectively to economic shocks and crises, such as the oil crisis of the 1970s.

The systemic challenges faced by the Bretton Woods institutions in a multipolar world have contributed to its gradual decline and calls for a shift toward a new diverse and inclusive global monetary system, in which the various regions can come together to agree on a common playbook and rules of engagement. With the old order on the retreat, the new order is yet to take its final form, but we are beginning to see signs of the shape of things to come.

The reluctance of developing countries to accept the “Washington consensus” can be seen as a rejection of the old system and its shortcomings. The economic paradigms that have dominated the post-World War II era are no longer seen as relevant or effective in a rapidly changing and highly volatile multipolar world, and developing countries are seeking new ways to promote stability and growth that take into account their unique challenges and needs.

Where the World Islands Come Into Play

The notorious Russian political analyst Alexander Dugin has coined a theory of world geography known as the theory of World Islands. It is based on the idea that the world can be divided into several distinct cultural and political spheres, or "islands," each with its own unique characteristics and history. According to Dugin, these islands have distinct cultural and political identities and are defined by the way they relate to each other and to the world at large.

Dugin, sometimes described as the ideological mastermind behind Putin’s Russia, has argued that these islands will be organized into a hierarchy, with the West at the top and other regions, such as Russia, China, and the Islamic world, lower down. Dugin argues that the world is undergoing a profound transformation, with the rise of new powers and the decline of the West, and that this shift will have major implications for the future of the world. He believes that the world is moving away from a unipolar order dominated by the West and toward a multipolar order in which the various world islands will have greater autonomy and influence.

Currently, we are seeing several world islands appearing, with the United States leading the united West, although occasional cracks in the transatlantic bond are emerging over trade issues and protectionist policies on both sides of the Atlantic. Russia was kicked out of the Western financial system and has been forced to develop its own system or integrate its payment systems with China’s. Africa remains largely a question mark, with one of the panelists at the Davos Africa House reminding the audience that it is still more difficult for most Africans to visit neighboring countries than it is for foreigners. We see similar islands, or varying standards, emerging in the sphere of digital technologies.

The Future Is Both Digital and Backed by Real Assets

Fintech, or financial technology, may play a significant role in shaping the form and structure of the future global monetary system. The innovative use of technology through collaborative investment and finance platforms has the potential to reach populations that have been excluded from traditional financial services and to increase access to financial services for areas that haven’t benefited from being part of the Washington Consensus. Fintech solutions often use digital infrastructure and low-cost operating models to provide financial services at lower costs, making them accessible to a wider range of customers. Fintech has also opened up new forms of finance, such as crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending, allowing everyone to become their own banker. The recent crash of cryptocurrencies has revealed the weakness of fintech solutions that aren’t backed by real assets.

Thus, it is crucial that the new global monetary system be backed by real assets, as such a system can provide greater stability and build confidence in high-volatility environments. Stability has become the new alpha that investors are seeking. Real assets are tangible items such as gold or real estate that have intrinsic value and are not subject to the same fluctuations and uncertainties as other forms of currency. Currencies backed by real assets are seen as more trustworthy and reliable, as their value is directly linked to the value of the underlying assets. Digital assets backed by real assets can also provide a powerful hedge against inflation. As the global economy is looking for more real asset-based solutions, the question then becomes: how do we bring the fragmented world together to discuss the common rules of the game, and where should such a meeting take place?

Will Bretton Woods 2.0 Be Based In the Gulf?

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are a natural choice to bring nations together in a multipolar world to discuss the future of the global monetary system. This is due to their role as bridge builders and their diplomatic efforts to become platforms for conversation around the future direction of global development and leadership, signified by the recent Dubai Expo 2020 and the 2022 FIFA World Cup held in Qatar, together with the United Arab Emirates’ upcoming chairmanship of the COP28 climate conference.

The GCC countries have a long history of serving as intermediaries between nations and have established the region as a hub for economic, political, and cultural exchange. Strategically located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the GCC states have significant geopolitical influence in the wider region, making the Gulf well-suited to serve as a future platform for international collaboration and cooperation. The GCC countries have strong diplomatic ties with nations around the world and have a reputation for serving as neutral intermediaries in conflicts and disputes. While Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called neutrality ‘immoral’ in the light of the war in Ukraine, the reality of our world is that when the war ends—and all wars eventually end—there will be a Ukraine and there will be a Russia, and they will have to learn to live with each other again.

Even the fragmented world needs its meeting places. During World War II, there was the Bank for International Settlements, where the warring parties could still come together to discuss both outstanding commercial issues and the future of the global order after the war. Similarly, the Gulf is uniquely positioned to bring the parts of the world that are not talking to each other back together and map out the architecture of the future global monetary system.

Ville Korpela is Executive Director at Impact Innovation Institute. He is also a member of the Councilors Program at the Atlantic Council.

Image: Drop of Light/Shutterstock.com.

Once upon a time, the leaders of a mighty military power, which was the successor to a great historic empire that had lost much of its territories after the end of an international war, were concerned that political instability and a regime change in a nearby country that had once been one of its provinces could threaten its ethnic brethren that resided in that lost domain. Further, these leaders feared that a rival historic power with ties to the country’s other ethnic group would exploit the situation to attain a military presence there.

So, in violation of international law, the ex-empire deployed its troops into the country and invaded part of its territory under the pretext of saving its compatriots and defending its core interests.

After occupying more than one-third of that country’s territory, the military power declared that territory to be an autonomous region, and later as an independent state. This move for all practical purposes divided that country, and it wasn’t recognized by members of the international community, including the power’s leading allies.

That “independent state” has survived for close to half a century, as repeated diplomatic efforts to bring the two parts of the country together have failed. The illegal occupation, coupled with human rights violations, has ignited criticism, while the unoccupied part of the country has developed into a modern and prosperous liberal democratic state.

Bottom line is that the status quo has remained intact and in line with the interests of all the players involved. And notwithstanding its illegal occupation of the territory, the nation-state that continues to dream about re-establishing its old empire has emerged as a major regional and global player that maintains diplomatic ties with all members of the international community.

Of course, the aforementioned aggressor country is not Russia, and the situation described is not the Russian occupation of Ukraine and the events leading to it. Instead, it is the story of the island of Cyprus, which has been divided since 1974 when Turkey invaded in response to a Greek-backed military coup. Certainly, the prospects for a possible diplomatic deal on the island are remote; for all practical purposes, Turkey’s occupation has been accepted as part of the status quo in Cyprus and the region.

That reality allows all the players involved to place Cyprus’ territorial division at the bottom of the global agenda. This is in stark contrast to, say, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, which continues to stir international tension, and is more like the independence of Kosovo that permits everyone, including those who don’t recognize that state, to live with it.

But while Ukraine isn’t exactly “like Cyprus,” and there are some major differences between Russia’s invasion of its neighbor and Turkey’s occupation of a Mediterranean island, there are intriguing similarities that raise the possibility of a solution along similar lines. Under such a plan, Ukraine remains divided between a Russian-controlled autonomous territory and an independent and prosperous Western-oriented Ukraine.

To recall, Cyprus, which was once part of the Ottoman Empire before it was taken by the British following a post-World War I settlement, experienced growing violence between its Greek and Turkish communities after winning independence in 1950. Relations further deteriorated throughout the 1960s, and intercommunal violence became more common. Then, in July 1974, a Greek military regime instigated a military coup in Cyprus with the intention of uniting the island with Greece, or “Enosis,” provoking a Turkish invasion. Turkish leaders justified their country’s invasion and initial occupation of 3 percent of the island as part of an attempt to protect its Turkish minority, which constituted 20 percent of the population.

After ensuing peace talks between the two communities failed to lead to a peace agreement, the Turks expanded their occupation to 36 percent of the island. That resulted in the de facto partition of Cyprus with a United Nations buffer zone—known as the Green Line—separating Cyprus from the Turkish-occupied areas in the north which absorbed many of the Turks that were displaced from the south.

In 1983, the de facto Turkish Cypriot Administration declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—not to be confused with the Republic of Cyprus. There the government, backed by the United States and the European Union, which Nicosia joined in 2004, transformed itself into a prosperous economy. Nicosia still regards the northern part of the country as Turkish-occupied territory and supports the idea of negotiations aimed to bring the country together. Meanwhile, the northern part has been settled by Turkish immigrants and has gradually become a province of Turkey.

In this context, the United States and the EU, which publicly insist that Russia should vacate Crimea and the other Ukrainian areas that it has illegally occupied, seem to have no major problem turning the Turkish occupation of Cyprus into a marginal international issue; in fact, Turkey remains an important member of NATO and Ankara has conducted negotiations with Brussels over joining the EU, even as its forces have occupied Cyprus.

One of the main reasons that the status quo on the island has lasted for so many years is the reluctance of Nicosia and Athens to challenge the Turkish occupation through the use of military force. It seems that the leaders in Nicosia have made their cost-benefit analysis and decided that the benefits of becoming a thriving Western society and ally of the United States and the EU outweigh the costs of confronting Ankara. 

From that perspective, Ukraine’s leaders in Kyiv may reach a point where the costs of continuing the war with Russia in order to liberate Crimea and other Russian-occupied territories would be perceived as outweighing the benefits of a cease-fire that would provide for the reconstruction of Ukraine and permit its future accession to the EU and NATO.

That shouldn't prevent Kyiv from continuing to challenge the illegal Russian occupation of Ukraine and calling for the return of those territories to Ukraine’s control at some point in the future.

Of course, a deal that accepts the current status quo in Ukraine would not satisfy everyone, but it would allow the United States and the EU to rebuild Ukraine and help it join the West. Further, it would assist the West in restoring ties with Moscow and finding ways to ensure that Russia becomes part of a new and peaceful postwar balance of power in Europe.

Dr. Leon Hadar, a contributing editor at The National Interest, has taught international relations at American University and was a research fellow with the Cato Institute. A former UN correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, he currently covers Washington for the Business Times of Singapore and is a columnist/blogger with Israel’s Haaretz (Hebrew).

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Beijing makes no secret that it wants China’s yuan to replace the dollar as the world’s premier reserve currency. During his recent trip to the Middle East, President Xi Jinping tried to advance that objective. In promoting trade relations with oil-rich nations, especially Saudi Arabia, he went out of his way to announce that oil contracts would settle in yuan and not, as usual, in dollars. Much of China’s Belt and Road scheme also aims to elevate the yuan to international status. Someday Beijing might succeed. The yuan might overtake the dollar. Stranger things have happened. If it does, it will take a very long time, and will require a lot of change in China. For now, though, China’s yuan lacks all the attributes required of a global reserve.

At the top of the list is widespread acceptance. The dollar may not have the dominance it once enjoyed in the late 1940s and the 1950s, but it is accepted for transactions much more widely than the yuan. Many other currencies are also accepted more widely than the yuan. According to the non-partisan Congressional Research Service, China’s yuan features in some 2 percent of global import and export contracts. That is well up for five or ten years ago, but still well short of the dollar, which accounts for some 75 percent of world trade contracts and settlements, whether an American is involved or not. Euros, Japan’s yen, and Britain’s pound sterling fall far short of the dollar’s use but still play a greater role than the yuan.

Nor does the yuan fare much better as a vehicle for currency trading. In 2022, according to the Bank for International Settlements, some 7 percent of global currency trading occurred in yuan. China’s currency has received an extra fillip recently because Western sanctions against Russia have made Chinese links valuable to anyone who wanted to buy or sell in Russia. At the present, elevated level, the yuan has surpassed both the Canadian and the Australian dollar in this regard, as well as the Swiss franc. But even with this year’s special jump, the yuan falls far short of the amount of currency trading done in the euro, the yen, or sterling. And it is well behind the dollar, which dominates some 90 percent of all global currency trading.

Preferences by central banks to hold each currency in reserve approach this matter from a different perspective. The yuan clearly is not preferred. Some 70 central banks do hold yuan in reserve, a much greater number than a few years ago, but still, according to the International Monetary Fund, these holdings amount to only a bit over 2 percent of the global total. That figure falls short of the euro, for instance, which amounts to some 20.6 percent of global central bank reserves, or even the yen, which amounts to 5.8 percent. The yuan’s role certainly falls far short of the dollar, which amounts to about 59 percent of these reserves. As should be apparent from these trading proportions, the dollar, on strictly practical grounds, should have a higher proportion of central bank reserves than it does. Diplomacy and politics explain this difference.

Perhaps the greatest of the yuan’s inadequacies concerns China’s own financial system. For a currency to serve as the global reserve, it must have liquid, active financial markets denominated in it. These markets must offer all who must hold the global reserve currency—importers, exporters, currency traders, international banks, and central banks—a wide range of investment options for their holdings: liquid short-term deposits, for instance, longer-term bonds, stocks, options, futures, forward contracts, and the like. Those financial markets must offer people the ability to trade in and out of such investments quickly and easily. Dollar-based markets—in the United States and elsewhere—offer an abundance of such support. China does not.

A sense of this difference emerges from a comparison of the relative size of financial markets in the United States and China. U.S. equity markets amount to about 33 percent of all global stocks, whereas China’s stock market equals slightly less than 8 percent of the global total. In bonds, the figures are respectively 39 percent and 17 percent. Vast as these differences are, they do not capture the still wider difference in the sorts of investment and trading vehicles that are offered in dollar-based markets but are limited or non-existent in yuan-based markets. Far from offering liquid, easily accessed markets for yuan-based investments, China still distinguishes between domestic and foreign uses of its currency. It controls flows of money into and out of the country. It has limited trading in futures and forward contracts, including those directly concerned with currency.

Some yuan enthusiasts have pointed to the advent of a digital yuan as the key to that currency’s future dominance. It will, these enthusiasts claim, enable the yuan to acquire a global reach denied to the dollar until it, too, acquires a digital version. While it is true that the People’s Bank of China issues a digital version of its currency, and that the Federal Reserve does not issue a digital dollar, that in no way limits the dollar’s digital global reach. On the contrary, well-established networks of wire transfers, credit cards, debit cards, and ATMs, along with payment services such as Venmo, PayPal, and Zelle, have long enabled exchanges across the globe, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. A tourist from Omaha, Nebraska, can use an ATM card from a local Omaha bank just about anywhere on Earth to digitally authorize an instantaneous currency transaction between his or her local bank account and the currency of the nation he or she is visiting. The digital yuan lacks any such support, or any other similar financial support.

As China’s economy grows, the yuan will gain traction as a portion of global trade, currency trading, and even reserves held by the world’s central banks. It will, however, take a long time to challenge the dollar, especially now that China’s economy and trade will likely grow at a slower pace than they did previously. What is more, the undeniable affection for control exhibited by the country’s leadership makes it doubtful that China will ever permit the open, flexible financial markets needed to support a global reserve currency. Unless China changes dramatically, it is more likely that some other currency or system will replace the dollar before the yuan has a chance, though nothing is presently on the horizon. Far from making the required changes, it is not even apparent that Xi or the Chinese Communist Party is aware of what is needed.

Milton Ezrati is a contributing editor at The National Interest, an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Human Capital at the University at Buffalo (SUNY), and chief economist for Vested, the New York-based communications firm. His latest books are Thirty Tomorrows: The Next Three Decades of Globalization, Demographics, and How We Will Live and Bite-Sized Investing.

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With overwhelming bipartisan support and his infamous sharpie in hand, former President Donald Trump made Ronald Reagan’s dreams a reality. Nearly four decades after the Cold War-era president called for the weaponization of space, the Trump administration created the first new military branch since 1947: the United States Space Force (USSF).

The USSF’s inception expanded on Washington’s existing and persisting goals to expand U.S. influence in space. Since 2017, NASA and the State Department have worked to recruit signees to the Artemis Accords, a seven-page document outlining Washington’s vision for space governance. While typical Washington partners—including Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates—were quick to join as founding members, the twenty-one country list of signees is notably missing Russia and China as terrestrial rivalries threaten to go interstellar.

In an effort formally initialized under the uniquely space-forward Trump presidency, Washington is trying to call dibs on writing the rules in space, eager to create a model that mirrors America’s terrestrial geopolitical and commercial preeminence. But Russia and China aren’t going to sit idle, and, according to some, Moscow and Beijing—not Washington—are leading the charge.

In the last two years, China and Russia expanded their in-orbit assets by 70 percent following their already impressive three-fold increase in space presence from 2015 to 2018. While large swaths of this growth have—thus far—been civilian-led, the same technologies that achieve scientific goals could also achieve military goals. But even those more peaceful commercial endeavors make Washington nervous, and rightfully so. The prospect of losing out on a $1.4 trillion industry risks undercutting U.S. dominance, both in space and on earth. If the quest for geopolitical clout wasn’t going to force confrontation, economic interests will.

Beijing and Moscow understand this, so they’ve been preparing. The core of this conversation is satellites, the backbone of U.S. command and control and prime targets of preliminary strikes preceding a broader conflict. As early as 2007, China was bolstering its ability to take out satellites in low earth orbit (LEO), where over 80 percent of the world’s satellites are located. Chinese defense academics haven’t been vague about the purpose of these ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) systems, frequently arguing that they could be used to “blind and deafen the enemy” by targeting the communication, navigation, and early warning systems that help protect Washington from attacks. Putin, not one to let Russia lag behind, reminded the world of Moscow’s space abilities by testing one of its ASAT systems on an inactive Russian satellite. That satellite is now some 1,500 pieces of space debris.

These ground-based capabilities, however, only scratch the surface, as Russia and China work to take out U.S. satellites with “on-orbit” technology “via jamming, cyberspace, [and] directed-energy weapons,” or lasers. Russia, for example, has proved it can now launch ASAT missiles from satellites. Exciting, right?

As Beijing and Moscow push the needle on offensive space capabilities, Washington has started to grapple with whether it should pursue space-based missile defense systems. For fear that the ability to reliably intercept missiles would undermine the stabilizing theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD), these capabilities have been put on the back burner as State Department and Department of Defense officials heed the warnings of domestic critics. At least for now, that is.

Navigating arms races on earth is difficult and dangerous enough, but this trend towards militarization in space carries heightened risks as countries face minimal restrictions from credible, widely agreed-upon international institutions and norms. While the half-century-old Outer Space Treaty (OST) calls for peaceful space exploration and the UN Moon Agreement of 1979 limits inequitable commercial exploitation of space resources, the OST lacks actionable detail, and the UN failed to get the United States, Russia, and China on board. Even though the Artemis Accords are relatively benign in substance and just a series of bilateral agreements, a “revolutionary” U.S.-centric model has deterred even some of Washington’s closest partners—Germany, France, and others—from joining on.

And to be sure, the United States is not exactly a benevolent actor. Trump was clear that “space is a war-fighting domain, just like the land, air, and sea,” and the Biden administration gave permanence to this policy as it backed the USSF’s creation with “full support.” So, yes, Washington is not some space arbitrator, but that's to be expected. As threats from its near-peer rivals abound, the United States has to be able to protect itself and threaten its adversaries. It's too late for pacifism.

At the very least, Washington must support a concerted effort to reduce its vulnerability and create redundancies. Historically, America has relied on large satellites that accomplish many different goals. Though logistically simpler, this “all-eggs-in-one-basket” architecture increases the potential damage done by a single attack. But now, the Pentagon is pursuing a redesign of its space presence to deploy thousands of satellites—what it is calling constellations—in LEO to create system resilience that ensures Washington is able to fight, no matter how unexpected or successful a preliminary strike is. While the immediate development and deployment of space-based missile defense might be a step too far, Washington must also take steps to explore direct counters—preferably defensive, though maybe offensive—to Russia and China’s growing militarized space presence.

The goal of efficacious space capabilities isn’t to win an arms race; it's to make sure what happens in space stays in space. Paired with careful diplomacy and the expansion of a space-specific rules-based order, advancements in U.S. space capacity both deter and inhibit adversarial adventurism, limiting the scope of potential confrontation.

But if the United States lacks first-class diplomatic, strategic, and technological space infrastructure, a future president, faced with a space-based attack on significant U.S. military or commercial assets, may be pressured to expand the conflict horizon and take terrestrial action. Developing a wide array of measures helps ensure no U.S. president has to make an all-or-nothing decision.

Kendall Carll is an undergraduate at Harvard studying History and Government. His interests are primarily in grand strategy, great power competition, East Asia, and weapons of mass destruction.

Image: DVIDS.

Last month, the Yemen War Powers Resolution (YWPR), which, if passed, would have ended direct U.S. military involvement in Saudi Arabia’s war against the Houthis in Yemen, was withdrawn from an impending Senate vote by its sponsor, Sen. Bernie Sanders (D-VT). This move came after President Joe Biden and his administration promised to veto the resolution if it passed and urged other senators to vote against the bill. While the resolution has likely not seen its last bit of daylight, this was another major setback in the effort to terminate U.S. involvement in a conflict that has produced one of the most devastating and least discussed humanitarian crises of our time. The war has brought immense suffering to the Yemeni people, with civilian casualties, diseases, internal displacement, and famine ravaging the populace.

Ending U.S. involvement in this conflict has garnered bipartisan support in Congress over the years despite various failed attempts to pass forms of a YWPR. The movement has hit many roadblocks, such as several vetoes of legislation by President Donald Trump, but has also seen some recent success, with Biden shifting some policies held by his predecessors, vowing to stop supporting offensive Saudi military operations and moving the Houthis off the terrorist designation list. However, these shifts have largely failed to address the key issues that have kept this conflict and all associated atrocities in motion. The United States has remained Saudi Arabia’s primary arms supplier, and many U.S.-made planes and weapons used in offensive operations by the coalition receive maintenance and support from the U.S. military and U.S. contractors well after Biden’s pledge to cease such support. The Biden administration justified its decision to lobby against the current iteration of the YWPR by claiming that the situation on the ground has changed, as a UN truce had managed to reduce violence for much of 2022 and keep Saudi airstrikes at bay—even after the truce ended in October. The administration worries that passing the YWPR would harm the peace process by reducing Saudi Arabia’s position at the negotiating table, while critics of the move argue that this leaves the door open for Saudi Arabia to open a new bombing campaign with U.S. assistance.

This decision has also appeared to be a serious reversal by Biden and several of his key foreign policy officials. Top confidants, such as national security advisor Jake Sullivan, signed letters to Trump supporting previous iterations of the YWPR, and Biden promised to make Saudi Arabia a pariah in his presidential campaign. The move to block the YWPR seems to be the latest instance of a major shift in the administration's attitude towards the Saudis, which has garnered much attention since Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia this past July, which was marked by Biden’s failure to secure increased oil output by the Saudis and the rest of OPEC+. The administration blocking the resolution thus looks to be another effort to appease the Saudis, preceded by a recommendation from the administration to grant Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) immunity in a lawsuit by the fiancée of Jamal Khashoggi, as well as sustained weapons sales. Meanwhile, MBS recently hosted Chinese president Xi Jinping and signed several investment deals with Beijing. This was the latest move to increase bonds between Saudi Arabia and China, and it is apparent that this developing relationship, compared to a perceived fraying of U.S.-Saudi ties, is causing concern in Washington.

While it is true that such developments could cause significant changes to U.S. policy in the Middle East, the possible outcomes do not justify an alarmist reaction that includes appeasement, further facilitating catastrophes such as the war in Yemen. The United States has the capability to invest in alternative energy sources, including domestic oil production. A Saudi shift towards China would also motivate the United States to define its relationship more clearly with Saudi Arabia, unraveling itself from the often frustrating and contradictory status of quasi-alliance, which constrains U.S. policy flexibility in the region. Attempts to sway states away from their natural interests rarely lead to success, and it is reasonable to assert that the largest global oil exporter seeking closer relations with their biggest buyer is a natural development, especially since the Saudi economy is almost entirely reliant on oil exports. Additionally, China’s budding interest in Saudi Arabia will be complicated by its established affiliation with Iran.

The war in Yemen has been a disaster, and desperate and unnecessary attempts to prevent Saudi Arabia from pursuing alternative relationships are no reason for the United States to continue aiding in the destruction by providing direct military assistance. A resolution that seeks to curb that potential is worth the possible disruption of longstanding policy, especially when that policy is counterproductive to U.S. interests and more beneficial alternatives exist.

Chad Kunkle is a Recipient of a B.S. and M.S. in International Affairs from Florida State University and a former intern at the Hudson Institute.

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