The National Interest

Stephen Silver

Economics,

Should Hollywood really get a bailout to help them during the coronavirus lockdowns?

Movie theaters are back—but moviegoers don’t appear to have returned along with them, in any great number.

America’s major theater chains began reopening in August, with many more opening in time for Labor Day, when Christopher Nolan’s “Tenet” was released theatrically. On Wednesday, AMC Theaters announced another round of reopening in California and Michigan, which means 80% of the chain’s U.S. theaters will be open by the second week in October.

However, just because the theaters are opening doesn’t mean moviegoers feel safe about returning. The theatrical box office has been paltry ever since the reopening began, with “Tenet” leading the box office last week with the low sum of $3.4 million, per Box Office Mojo. The Hollywood studios have responded by pushing most of the year’s major movie releases, including Disney’s “Black Widow,” into 2021.

As a result, a coalition of prominent people and groups associated with the motion picture industry, including actors, directors, producers and the umbrella organizations of the motion picture and theatrical exhibition industries, have written a letter to the leaders of Congress, asking for help. And the letter states that without such help, the industry faces doom.

“Cinemas are an essential industry that represent the best that American talent and creativity have to offer. But now we fear for their future,” the letter states, per The Hollywood Reporter. “Our country cannot afford to lose the social, economic, and cultural value that theaters provide. The moviegoing experience is central to American life. Theaters are great unifiers where our nation’s most talented storytellers showcase their cinematic accomplishments.”

The letter also warns that as many as 69% of small- and medium-sized movie theaters could go under, in the absence of government aid.

The letter was addressed to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and Senate Minority Leader Charles Schumer. Congress, per CNN, is currently in talks with Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin about a new coronavirus aid package, and any help for the movie exhibition industry would likely need to come from such a package.

Those signing the letter include directors Wes Anderson, Judd Apatow, Noah Baumbach, Michael Bay, James Cameron, Sofia Coppola, Alfonso Cuarón, Clint Eastwood, Catherine Hardwicke, Barry Jenkins, Rian Johnson, Richard Linklater, Adam McKay, Jordan Peele, Martin Scorsese, M. Night Shyamalan, and dozens more. Also signing are actor Seth Rogen, James Bond series producer Barbara Broccoli, and the organizations the National Association of Theatre Owners, the Directors Guild of America and the Motion Picture Association.

One thing is notable about the letter: The position the industry has taken is to campaign for the government to help out movie theaters, and not to attempt to persuade moviegoers to support theaters by returning to them.

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Stephen Silver

Politics, Americas

The FBI had warned the social media giant that the accounts had originated from inside that country.

For all of the talk about election interference from Russia, specifically on social media platforms, in 2016, and whether it might be replicated, Twitter has stopped what may be a coordinated effort from a different country.

Twitter’s Safety account on Wednesday said that, acting on a tip from the FBI, it “removed approximately 130 accounts that appeared to originate in Iran. They were attempting to disrupt the public conversation during the first 2020 U.S. Presidential Debate.”

“We identified these accounts quickly, removed them from Twitter, and shared full details with our peers, as standard. They had very low engagement and did not make an impact on the public conversation. Our capacity and speed continue to grow, and we’ll remain vigilant,” the company said.

Twitter also added some photos of the offending tweets, one of which came from an account called “JackQAnon.” Twitter also said that “the accounts and their content will be published in full once our investigation is complete.”

Twitter has said that the accounts “originated in Iran,” although Twitter has not said that the tweets had anything to do with the Iranian government, or any kind of coordinated effort by that government. Twitter did, however, remove more than 4,000 accounts that were indeed “linked to the Iranian government,” CNET reported in 2019. And there’s a chance that the tweets only drew the FBI’s attention due to some such connection.

Yoel Roth, Twitter’s head of site integrity, tweeted that “we’re grateful to the

@FBI for the tip, and are staying vigilant about threats to #Election2020—foreign and domestic.”

The tweets had “low engagement,” according to a tweet by Jason Brodsky of the United Against Nuclear Iran organization, although Brodsky also noted that “there are many accounts from Iranian officials with much higher engagement which should also be on @Twitter’s radar.” And he noted that some of the accounts appeared to be pro-Trump, despite the president’s withdrawal from the Obama-era nuclear deal and generally hostile in posture towards Iran.

This is not the season’s first Twitter controversy involving Iran. On September 1, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei, sent a tweet referencing “the Israelis and filthy Zionist agents of the U.S.,” including “the Jewish member of Trump’s family,” which was presumably a reference to the president’s daughter Ivanka and his son-in-law Jared Kushner. Twitter did not remove the post, and Jonathan Greenblatt, CEO of the Anti-Defamation League, tweeted the same day that Khamenei’s “deeply hateful post clearly violates Twitter’s rules against comments that “dehumanize, degrade or reinforce negative or harmful stereotypes.’”

Following the debate, Greenblatt also sharply criticized President Trump for refusing to condemn the Proud Boys and telling them to “Stand Back and Stand By.” The ADL chief denounced the Proud Boys as “dangerous, violent people who are using these words as a rallying cry.”

Twitter recently said they will roll out a prompt that encourages users to read articles before they tweet them.

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

 

Peter Suciu

Security, Europe

The Su-34 is a very capable aircraft that Moscow is looking to keep flying for years to come.

Earlier this week a Russian Su-34 took part in the first-of-its-kind night-time flight into the lower stratosphere where it destroyed a hypothetical enemy while at supersonic speed. It was a notable accomplishment for the all-weather jet, which is capable of ground, surface and air attacks.

The Sukhoi Su-34 (NATO’s reporting name Fullback) is a two-seat, generation-four-plus multifunctional fighter-bomber that was developed to replace both the Su-24 sweep-wing strike fighter and the Tu-22 bomber. It was developed from the frontline Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jet at the Sukhoi Design Bureau under chief designer Maritosov. The aircraft has seen service in Syria—and it has been regarded as the most technologically advanced Russian Air Force aircraft deployed in the conflict—but it could also be used to defend Russian interests in the Arctic, which highlight the versatility of the aircraft and its abilities to operate in a variety of conditions.

The latest test, involving an aircraft from the aviation division of the Central Military District in the Chelyabinsk Region, further highlights that fact.

“During the training flights Sukhoi Su-34 crews carried out climbs to altitudes of about 15 kilometers, into the lower stratosphere,” the district’s press office told Tass. “Upon achieving supersonic speeds they practiced interception and elimination of a hypothetical enemy. The crews operated totally on their own, without contacting air defense stations on the ground, which made the task more complex.”

An air regiment of the Central Military District completed a program for the rearmament last October, which included the deployment of the Su-34. The last three jets were redeployed to the Chelyabinsk Region to complete a second squadron of the advanced aircraft.

The stratosphere is the second major layer of the earth’s atmosphere and it is where many large commercial aircraft routinely operate as it is where the least amount of turbulence is often found. The stratosphere is very dry with fewer clouds, and that also ensures better fuel economy while there is also less air friction, which can increase the true airspeed (TAS).

Multitask Fighter-Bomber

The Sukhoi Su-34 preformed its first flight on April 13, 1990 but it wasn’t until March, 2014 that it was authorized for service—however it was rumored to have seen combat service during the five day Russo-Georgian War in 2008. The aircraft has a maximum airspeed of 1,400 kilometers per hour near the surface and at high altitudes could reach 1,900 kilometers per hour. It has a range of flight for 4,500 kilometers without refueling.

Its weaponry consists of 30 mm gun GSh-30-1 and twelve weapon stations for air-to-air or air-to-surface missiles of different types, unguided rockets and aerial bombs.

The main task of the Su-34 is to destroy ground, surface and air targets as well as air defense-protected infrastructure. The fighter-bomber is also capable of effectively delivering strikes amid enemy resistance round the clock in good and bad weather and it is armed with a variety of weapons, while it can also be used to conduct air reconnaissance. Because of its combat features it is able to enter into highly maneuverable duels with enemy fighter jets and operate in bomber combat missions independently without the need for escort fighters.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters

Rachel Bucchino

Politics,

Despite anticipations that Senate Republicans will resist an upcoming package, many viewed the meeting as progress towards a potential settlement.

Top congressional lawmakers met Wednesday to negotiate the next coronavirus relief bill, resulting in yet another failed attempt to reach a long-awaited deal and set partisan politics aside.

But this time, there may be a flicker of hope as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin arranged to convene and continue economic relief talks as the ongoing pressure from congressional colleagues linger to reach an agreement.

“Secretary Mnuchin and I had an extensive conversation and we found areas where we are seeking further clarification. Our conversations will continue,” Pelosi said in a statement, following their ninety-minute meeting in her office in the Capitol.

Mnuchin echoed the Speaker’s remarks to reporters before departing from the Capitol saying, “We made a lot of progress over the last few days. We still don’t have an agreement, but we have more work to do. And we’re going to see where we end up.”

Although Pelosi and Mnuchin didn’t reach a deal, the meeting was the first time the two had met since coronavirus negotiations sagged in early August due to the monetary scope of the package and specific provisions within it.

Democrats established a $2.2 trillion proposal—a bill that’s unlikely to become law considering House and Senate Republicans oppose it—to offer a slimmed-down version of the $3.4 trillion Heroes Act passed by the House in May. House Democrats, however, have delayed its vote in hopes that Pelosi and Mnuchin will agree on a heavily bipartisan bill. If the two don’t reach a consensus, Democrats said they’ll proceed with the vote by the end of the week.

The $2.2 trillion package includes almost $500 billion for state and local aid, a continuation of the $600 weekly bonuses for unemployment insurance, another round of stimulus checks, nearly $75 billion for coronavirus testing measures and funds for schools, the U.S. Postal Service, election security and more. It also provides emergency funds to the airline industry to prevent future furloughs, a sector that’s been hit hard due to the discouragement of travel amid the coronavirus pandemic.

Mnuchin’s counter to the big-spending package proposed by Democrats is similar to the roughly $1.5 trillion proposal drafted by the bipartisan Problem Solvers Caucus in the House earlier in September, according to The Washington Post. Pelosi has shown little willingness to shave the $2.2 trillion in spending for the next negotiated package, while Senate Republicans are reluctant to spend more than $1 trillion.  

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) squashed any sense of optimism for a bipartisan agreement before the election, as he said the two sides of the aisle were “very, very far apart.” McConnell failed to rally his colleagues’ support from the Senate in a scaled-down bill a few weeks ago that amounted to less than $1 trillion.

“We would like to see another rescue package,” McConnell said, referring to Pelosi’s proposal as “another massive measure that includes such things as health care for illegal immigrants, tax cuts for rich people in New York and California and other things that are totally unrelated to the coronavirus.”

"So I think it's safe to say we're far apart. I think Secretary Mnuchin and the Speaker are continuing to speak but we're very, very far apart," he told reporters.

As the United States surpassed two hundred thousand reported coronavirus deaths and millions of Americans remain unemployed with government aid depleted, Pelosi and Mnuchin face heated pressure to finally compromise and pass the next relief package. The Speaker, in particular, is being weighed down by moderate Democrats who are competing for re-election, as they disrelish being on Capitol Hill and prefer to campaign in their home states.

Some key provisions still in the talks that have stalled reaching an agreement are: whether to include legal liability protections as Republicans want them, but Democrats oppose; Democrats also want massive state and local aid, while Republicans balk at big-spending; and Democrats want a huge price tag, but Senate Republicans remain fiscally conservative.

Congress cooperated in the spring when the coronavirus first struck the United States, passing four bills that accounted for $3 trillion in aid, but Democrats and Republicans have struggled to act in the same manner in recent weeks. Negotiations between top lawmakers crumbled over the summer and ignited just a few days ago.

Despite anticipations that Senate Republicans will resist an upcoming package, many viewed the meeting as progress towards a potential settlement.

“Oh yeah, I think we’re gonna get a deal,” Financial Services Chairwoman Maxine Waters (D-Calif.) said. 

Rachel Bucchino is a reporter at the National Interest. Her work has appeared in The Washington Post, U.S. News & World Report and The Hill.  

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Security, Europe

It looks like the Royal Air Force may have found a way to do so.

Earlier this week the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it had received the third S-400 Triumf missile air defense system regiment, but the question is whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has already made the system ineffective for targeting its aircraft. The S-400 was developed and produced by Almaz-Antey to provide protection from air strikes including cruise, tactical and operational ballistic missiles as well as intermediate-range missiles in a radio-jamming environment.

However, reports have circulated online that the Royal Air Force (RAF) along with the Royal Navy (RN), which have each increased patrols near Russian borders near where the S-400s and older S-300s are currently deployed, and have begun successfully jamming the radar systems. The S-400 and S-300 are designed to operate in conjunction to provide increased effectiveness of the Russian military’s Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).

The EurAsian Times reported that the United Kingdom’s military has scanned the frequencies of the defense system to enable aircraft to identify vulnerabilities in the Russian anti-aircraft platform. If that is true a window could be opened for stealth aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor or F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter to approach Russian airspace at a closer distance without being detected by the powerful radar on the S-400.

The Russian state media site Avia.Pro also suggested that the British military was studying for “holes” in the IADS, and that Russia may need to find a workaround to plug any weaknesses in its air defense platform.

Stealth Hunter or Hype

The S-400 surface-to-air-missile system has been touted as a stealth hunter, and as one of the most advanced long and medium-range surface-to-air missile platforms in use today. It was designed to detect and destroy aircraft as well as the aforementioned cruise and ballistic missiles, but is also capable of eliminating ground-based installations.

The platform, which entered service in 2007, has a range of up to 400 kilometers and its missiles can travel up to six times the speed of sound at heights up to 30 kilometers. The S-400 can also employ 40N6 long-range, hypersonic, surface-to-air missiles that can engage low maneuverable aerodynamic targets.

In theory at least, the S-400 was designed to nullify the stealth technology of fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-35. However, it remains questionable whether the radar can do little more than potentially track the advanced aircraft. In other words, tracking may be possible to some extent but actually targeting is another issue all together.

The fact that the S-400 was designed to track stealth aircraft was a key sticking point in U.S. relations with Turkey, which has sought to adopt the Russian-built platform while also seeking to be a partner in the F-35 stealth fighter jet program. The United States, and other NATO partners, saw this as a serious conflict—one that could potentially give the S-400 designers the extra insight to provide an advantage for the anti-aircraft platform. As a result Turkey was expelled from the F-35 program.

The question now is whether the RAF have truly found a weakness in the S-400 that would enable the F-35 and other stealth aircraft to continue to maintain that stealthy edge.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters

Stephen Silver

Technology, Americas

The roll out of the new technology continues.

Verizon announced this week that on October 1—which is Thursday—they will bring 5G home Internet to a new market, the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. They also announced the arrival of a new router meant to work with the technology.

The addition brings the 5G home service to a seventh market, joining Sacramento, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Indianapolis, and Detroit.

The 5G Home Internet costs $50 per month for Verizon customers and $70 per month for non-Verizon customers. Those signing up will get free YouTube TV for one month and Disney+ for one year, along with a free Stream TV device.

The new deployment coincides with the arrival of a new product, the 5G Internet Gateway, which is described by the company as “a first-to-market MMwave 5G CPE/Router,” which allows for speeds up to 1 Gbps.

“Verizon’s new 5G Internet Gateway is a game-changer for our customers,” Frank Boulben, SVP Consumer Marketing and Products at Verizon, said in the announcement of the new product. “With people spending more time at home during these challenging times, the expansion of 5G Home Internet to new markets with new and improved hardware will provide customers with the flexibility and reliability to enjoy more digital experiences and increased productivity from the comfort of their home.”

When 5G Home Internet was launched, Verizon said that “the first 5G wireless network built to connect your home with ultra-fast internet that’s ready for what comes next. With 5G Home Internet, there are no long-term contracts or additional equipment or installation fees and all taxes and fees are included.”

As for whether home 5G will ever replace Wi-Fi, the consensus among experts is either “no,” or “not yet.”

“While it’s certainly possible that 5G can replace WiFi, there’s a good chance that it won’t,” ActionTec wrote in a 2019 blog post. “5G has too many limitations—like capacity and coverage issues. Plus, 5G and WiFi are better as complements rather that competition.”

Verizon, as of mid-August, was off to an early start in the 5G smartphone wars, at least in the U.S.

Of the 4.1 million 5G-capable phones that had been sold as of mid-July, Verizon was in first place with 2.2 million, followed by AT&T at 629,000, T-Mobile at 501,000 and Sprint at 483,000. Sprint and T-Mobile have since merged, and their combined subscriber total would be second to that of Verizon.

However, the 5G smartphone market is changing by the month, with the arrival of new phones all the time. The Google Pixel 5 was announced this week, and the first 5G-capable iPhones are expected next month.

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

Security, Americas

Improved sensor and communications connectivity will mean that fighter jets and soldiers can better share real-time targeting information.

The Army and the Air Force are planning a series of upcoming joint-service talks for the specific purpose of charting a collaborative, mutually beneficial attack network to better connect air and ground domains to one another in war. 

“We have a concept called Multi-Domain Operation which is our contribution, but it is really a contribution to the Joint All Domain Command and Control fight. What we want to do is come together as a team and take some of the things we are working on and some of the things they are working on and see to make sure that we converge together,” Gen. James McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army, told reporters during the service’s Project Convergence 2020 live fire experiment at Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona.

Simply put, McConville explained that he wanted the Army to join and align with the Air Force’s ongoing JADC2 effort, explaining that some of their service’s transformational technology can bring great tactical benefit to the Air Force, and vice versa. 

“They have a great program going with Joint All Domain Command and Control and we want to be part of that. When you think about the things we provide to the joint fight, such as Long-Range Precision Fires which will enable us to penetrate Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities which the Air Force is concerned about,” he said. 

The mention of Long-Range Precision Fires, and its relevance to the Air Force is quite significant, as the Army is now testing Extended Range Cannon Artillery weapons able to reach 70km and a new Precision Strike Missile that can attack from 500km. The massive distances enabled by these weapons offer Army ground forces new tactical opportunities to attack and destroy enemy air defenses from land. This new ability obviously helps the Air Force as their planes try to close in on hostile areas. 

The Air Force’s JADC2 program, and multi-service connectivity, is specifically cited in a recent essay written by the Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Brown. His “Change or Lose” document calls for greater air-land-sea combat connectivity and challenges the service to fully embrace and execute key changes needed to outpace major power rivals. 

McConville and Brown will have a lot to talk about, because Senior Air Force developers are also moving quickly to facilitate Joint All Domain Command and Control program to better connect sensors and weapons between the services and decrease “sensor to shooter” time. Part of this involves Air Force work on a next-generation battle command technology called Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), a networking-focused effort to link platforms, weapons and sensors to one another across a vast array of “meshed” or interwoven combat nodes. The concept is to connect unmanned systems, platform-mounted sensors, large weapons systems and IT-databases to one another in real-time with increasing speed. This kind of interoperability is, according to Air Force leaders, intended to serve as the foundation for the Air Force’s contribution to JADC2. 

At the moment, some ground, sea and air sensors are what could be called more “stovepiped,” meaning they are separate and less able to share combat-sensitive data in real-time. Addressing this challenge is exactly the kind of “change” the Air Force document is calling for, given that much greater levels of multi-domain networking will be necessary should there be a major-power warfare scenario. Current long-range enemy sensors are increasingly able to span across domains with extended ranges, requiring a need for America to improve its own multi-domain defenses. 

Some of the Army’s emerging programs, McConville said, are specifically engineered to better support the joint fight and enable cross-domain operations between the services. 

“We are going to have Air and Missile Defense Capabilities that they will be very concerned about because it is how they protect their bases. We will combine sensors and shooters together to all be part of the same team,” he added. 

These comments bring the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) network of missile defense radar and weapons nodes. The program, which recently completed several successful tests, is intended to network an entire sphere of otherwise disconnected sensor nodes to establish a continuous target track on incoming enemy weapons. This means sharing data between otherwise disconnected forward-positioned radar systems and massively decreasing the sensor-to-shooter window. With more complete information quickly at their fingertips, commanders will have more time with which to defend against attacks. Drawing upon IBCS-generated connectivity, the Army recently shot down two incoming maneuvering cruise missile targets by connecting its PATRIOT missile radar to a forward operating Sentinel radar to share data. Commanders had more time with which to make key defensive decisions and succeeded in destroying the fast-moving threats with interceptors. 

In fact, the IBCS system has successfully connected with an Air Force F-35 stealth fighter jet, a level of interoperability which was further demonstrated recently during Project Convergence 2020 at Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona.

McConville mentioned expressing enthusiasm about this recent experiment in Yuma through which Army ground soldiers were able to exchange targeting specifics with overhead Marine Corps F-35B jet fighters.

“The fact that the F-35 can speak to the soldiers on the ground and the fact that we have a system that will determine what the best shooter is from multiple sensors is going to make the joint force much more capable,” McConville said. 

Interestingly, McConville finished his remarks with somewhat of a philosophical point, explaining that the entire thrust of the Army’s massive modernization transformation, which of course includes the massive acceleration of attack, is intended to prevent war. 

“It all gets back to deterrence and it all gets back to really peace through strength,” he said. 

Kris Osborn is Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. 

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

Security, Americas

The Chinese telecom industry has close ties to the Chinese government—an entity long-known to make various attempts at espionage using technological infiltration into foreign markets.

The U.S. Federal Communications Commission is proposing to strip forty-five of the seventy-five megahertz of spectrum reserved for a special “safety band” to ensure safe-clear communication between first-responder vehicles, standard passenger vehicles and traffic controls at busy intersections, a move that has many U.S. government officials concerned about the possibility of Chinese technological and economic interference in the United States, given that the idea would move huge portions of the reserved “safety band” to unlicensed wifi operators.

“Losing the spectrum would make the U.S. less safe. The lack of a Safety Band for connected automated vehicles would compromise readiness from inside the U.S.,” a senior U.S. official told the National Interest.

Losing that much spectrum would require substantial modifications to the existing Safety Band and present potentially unintended security risks such as “opening the door to nefarious Chinese technology that was not inserted before,” the official explained.

Chinese interference is of particular concern for a number of specific reasons, not the least of which is the well-known reality that the communist country seeks to expand its global influence and control through investments in technology and regional economic interests.

China’s cyber espionage and efforts to infiltrate the U.S. industry, and technology, in particular, are well known and well documented. Integrating Chinese components and technologies into greater areas of the U.S. economy and telecommunications infrastructure naturally introduces risks of hacking, jamming, interference or other possible nefarious activities. Navigational systems and communications networks could, in the event of a crisis of any kind, be subverted by Chinese intruders seeking to impede U.S. operations. 

Chinese industrial espionage, particularly in the defense sector, is by no means unprecedented. For example, Chinese cyber espionage appears to have informed the reasons why China’s Wing Loong drone very closely resembles America’s MQ-9 Reaper, according to a 2014 commission report known as the 2014 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review.

“U.S. cybersecurity company FireEye in September 2013 exposed an extensive PLA cyber espionage campaign targeting top aerospace and defense firms for information on U.S. drone technology,” the report states.

The 2013 Congressional report cites a 2012 Defense Science Board report which warns against Chinese defense-oriented cyber espionage, expressing concern that DoD might not be “prepared to defend against this threat.” The report goes on to cite the Defense Science Board report’s findings published in a 2013 Washington Post report stating that twenty-four “U.S. weapon system designs the board determined were accessed by (Chinese) cyber intruders.”

The Chinese telecom industry, the official explained, also has very “close ties to the Chinese government,” an entity long-known to make various attempts at espionage using technological infiltration into foreign markets. This can take the form of computer chips built for U.S. technical systems or even weapons, interference, or intrusions into global satellite markets, cyber espionage through commercial information and technology systems or more simple efforts to dominate or take over technical standards allowing for the insertion of Chinese technologies. 

“It is very difficult to make sure you only get secure things into the supply chain. Safety-critical systems are going to be threatened by China and, quite possibly, Chinese economically-driven espionage. This could disrupt U.S. traffic and safety communication. Accidents could happen at an alarming rate, and the loss of the Safety Band would also interfere with military radar test ranges,” the official said.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Daniel Lyons

Politics, Americas

There is a real need to approach Section 230 reform thoughtfully and carefully. Simply unleashing the trial lawyers is neither.

As my AEI colleague Mark Jamison discussed yesterday, there is significant buzz on both ends of the political spectrum to reform Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, the cornerstone of internet law. Last week, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) argued that the best way to stop Big Tech censorship is to weaken Section 230’s protections and unleash the trial lawyers on Silicon Valley; in his words, “let Americans sue!” As a law professor, I should perhaps be excited by the new job opportunities Hawley wishes to create for our graduates. But there are reasons to be skeptical of this move to shift tech oversight from Congress to the courtroom.

Section 230: Shield, not sword

Section 230 provides two important protections for internet-based companies. Section 230(c)(1) offers “posting immunity”: It assures that companies such as Facebook are not held liable for material that their users post online. Section 230(c)(2) also provides “takedown immunity”: It insulates companies from liability for removing user content that the company, in good faith, determines is objectionable. Together, these provisions give internet-based companies near-plenary authority to manage user-generated content, which shaped the social media revolution.

Conservatives like Hawley argue that many companies take advantage of this protection to tilt the political landscape by suppressing right-of-center viewpoints. Many conservative proposals, such as the White House’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) petition, would correct this perceived bias by limiting “takedown immunity.” NTIA would limit the categories of material that could be deemed “objectionable” and would define “good faith” to exclude entities that favor certain viewpoints.

Sue for what?

But limiting a company’s “takedown immunity” would not, by itself, permit aggrieved keyboard warriors to file suit. While Section 230 reform might remove a company’s legal shield, plaintiffs still need a sword. What law is violated by removing user-generated content?

There are a few contenders, but none are particularly strong. One could argue breach of contract: Removing a post violates the agreement between the user and the platform. But all major platforms reserve the right to edit content in their terms of service, making this claim a nonstarter. Others have argued that takedowns violate the user’s free speech rights. But with limited exceptions, the First Amendment prohibits only government interference with speech and does not bind private parties.

Perhaps one could bring an unfair or deceptive conduct claim if a company has promised to be politically neutral. But generally, these claims are difficult to bring, which is why companies rarely invoke “takedown immunity”: A recent review of 500 Section 230 cases by the Internet Association found only 19 involving Section 230(c)(2). (It also explains why Big Tech has little to fear from most proposals to reform takedown immunity.)

Hawley’s proposal: Beating shields into swords

This is where the Hawley bill differs from many other proposals on the right: It modifies posting immunity, not takedown immunity. In order to receive the protection of Section 230(c)(1), large edge providers must promise to design and operate their service in good faith. “Good faith” means “act[ing] with an honest belief and purpose” and “observ[ing] fair dealing standards,” and is violated by “intentionally selective enforcement” of the terms of service, including takedowns. Violation of this promise would allow the affected user to sue for $5000 or actual damages, whichever is more.

Hawley’s bill thus incentivizes companies to give users the sword that has thus far eluded plaintiffs. To receive posting immunity, companies must voluntarily agree to be sued by users who feel targeted for “intentionally selective enforcement” of the company’s terms. Unlike takedown immunity, posting immunity is critically important to modern platforms. Facebook, Twitter, and comment threads would operate differently if the host could be sued for a user’s defamatory speech or conduct. Hawley’s bill thus requires platforms to pick their poison: either allow users to sue for takedowns, or risk liability for user posts.

Setting aside potential constitutionality concerns, this bill represents a field day for trial lawyers. Terms like “honest belief,” “fair dealing,” and “intentionally selective enforcement” are not self-defining and will be litigated. Even if platforms win most cases, the litigation costs eviscerate one of the key benefits of Section 230, which is escaping at the motion to dismiss stage before costly discovery begins. With the possibility of a $5000 payoff for every user who feels slighted, platforms face the prospect of death by a thousand paper cuts.

Perhaps Hawley doesn’t mind. He is no friend of Big Tech and has broken from GOP colleagues on tort reform before. But the tech sector has been a beacon of American strength on the world stage, provoking jealousy from European and Chinese regulators. These companies help connect millions of Americans daily, which is especially valuable during the present pandemic. Dr. Jamison is right about the need to approach Section 230 reform thoughtfully and carefully. Simply unleashing the trial lawyers is neither.

This article first appeared at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Reuters.

William Jeynes

Politics, Asia

Diplomatic vists and new understandings with Japan, India, the UAE and Bahrain are all a part of the plan.

President Trump has taken keen notice of North Korean Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, as well as his “chief underwriter,” China. The dictator’s belligerent and provocative behavior, particularly his development of nuclear weapons, has caused Mr. Trump to develop an international strategy that has largely gone under the radar of the mainstream media. Nevertheless, the strategy is clearly apparent if one chooses to look at the evidence. President Trump has chosen to surround North Korea and China with a ring of nations that over time is likely to develop into a new emerging alliance.

For example, if most Americans were asked which international leader has President Trump met the most times during his administration, most would guess a European or North American leader. However, the answer is actually the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington D.C.-based foreign affairs and public policy think tank, “no foreign leader has ties with Trump than Abe.” In fact, they visited twenty times, had thirty-two phone calls and played five rounds of golf. This is a huge pivot from past decades, when the American commander in chief directed the most attention toward its allies in Europe and North America.

To be sure, Japan’s alarm over Kim Jong-un’s bellicose missile launches have caused the United States and Japan to enhance the closeness of their relationship. Recently, North Korea’s blowing up of the South Korean liaison office effectively ended peace talks with South Korea. Moreover, Kim Yo-Jong’s (Kim Jong-un’s sister) reference to South Korea as an “enemy” only made Japan more aware of the volatility of the Korean peninsula. China’s clandestine behavior along several dimensions that has greatly facilitated its economic rise, has only added a sense of urgency to the United States and Japan seeking greater ties.

During the last few years, President Trump has made similar moves toward establishing a better relationship with India. Granted, there has been a gradual trend toward better relations between the United States and India for roughly fifteen years. However, President Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi have taken note of China’s penetration of the policy-making decisions of various to South Pacific islands, Hong Kong crack downs, and its ongoing border disputes with India.

Therefore, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi have reached what many are calling a “strategic convergence.” President Trump’s visit to India in February, 2020, just before the coronavirus pandemic became such an overriding issue, should be understood in this context. It was indubitably symbolic of the enriched bilateral relationship that has emerged, because the two leaders view the threat of a more aggressive China, radical Islam, and rogue North Korea in similar ways. With this scenario in mind, an increased level of defense cooperation and intelligence sharing seems reasonable. President Trump’s attempt to develop closer strategic ties with India has paid off well. India’s foreign ministry describes the relationship between Trump and Modi as one of “friendship,” “mutual esteem,” and “exceptional warmth.” Those are very strong words that are a tribute to President Trump’s pivot toward surrounding China and the rogue state of North Korea.

The third part of the emerging triad of new emerging alliance are the moderate Arab states including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Although Saudi Arabia and Oman, other Arab moderate states, have not yet formally normalized their relations with Israel, Israel and Saudi Arabia have shared some degree of military intelligence on their common enemy, Iran. Once again, there is a growing cognizance of the threat posed by the capricious nations of North Korea and Iran and that China is their chief “underwriter.”

The Trump policy of “surrounding North Korea and China” appears all the wiser, because of what the Washington Post perceives as South Korea’s “quiet leaning toward Beijing.” The above trends in building stronger Asian and Middle Eastern alliances will likely remain in place no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election. As a result, ultimately, a trend may emerge in which President Trump may well be heralded for his international accomplishments, as much as his domestic ones.

William Jeynes is a Professor at California State University at Long Beach and a Senior Fellow at the Witherspoon Institute at Princeton.

Image: Reuters.

Erik Khzmalyan, Armen Sahakyan

Security, Europe

Washington’s indecisiveness to contain Ankara’s belligerence runs the risk of entrapping the United States in never-ending conflicts that Turkey is facilitating.

With barely any mention of foreign policy, the first 2020 U.S. presidential debate further crystalized the argument that America is dangerously distracted from world affairs. Both the Democratic and GOP party leaders are preoccupied with the upcoming elections that promise to be one of the most contested in U.S. history. This political distraction is made worse by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, shifting much of the national discourse towards domestic affairs.

With thousands dead due to the pandemic, nations across the globe are forced to refocus the often-scarce resources to avert collapsing health care systems. For this reason, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres urged an international ceasefire to instead tackle “the true fight of our lives.”

Meanwhile, NATO-member Turkey is running loose, creating major headaches for Washington. Recent discussions surrounding Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit to Greece regarding the relocation of U.S. strategic assets from Incirlik Air Base to Crete do show some waning patience with Ankara, yet even if realized this may be too little too late. 

Left unchecked, Ankara’s destabilizing rampage threatens to set off the geopolitical ticking bomb stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to North Africa to the greater Near East. 

Having usurped much of the state power following the alleged 2016 coup d’etat attempt, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been trying to realize his neo-Ottoman dreams. 

First, by brazenly accusing the United States of orchestrating the coup, Erdogan has lately intensified his aggressive posturing vis-a-vis Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other pro-Western Arab states with the goal to establish himself as the new legitimate leader of the Sunni world.

Domestically, he used the coup as an excuse to initiate a nationwide elimination of political opponents, shutdown of the media, and arrest of academics and business owners to cement his one-person rule. 

Facing little to no consequences for its meddling in Syria, Libya, and other hotspots, Ankara has now turned its eyes to the South Caucasus. 

Turkey’s unprecedented direct, large-scale military involvement in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict marks the cross of a rubicon. With this tipping of scales in the regional power balance, it remains yet to be seen how chips fall along the nexus of Russian, Turkish, and Iranian interests.  

Azerbaijan’s September 27 large-scale invasion of Artsakh (Armenian historic toponym for Nagorno-Karabakh) in conjunction with Erdogan’s transfer of 4,000 Islamist terrorists from Syria to Azerbaijan as well as Turkey’s use of American-made weaponry including F-16 fighter jets, mark the biggest flareup of the conflict since the signing of trilateral ceasefire agreement in 1994.  

The United States has significant leverage to restrain Turkey. By putting a leash on Erdogan’s rogue adventurism, Washington can deescalate the situation to prevent the conflict from devolving into a total quagmire, which is exactly what Ankara is trying to achieve. 

The growing Washington consensus is that the days of Turkey as a reliable partner willing to bandwagon with the United States are over. Erdogan’s fervent anti-Americanism and overall disdain for the West have de facto turned Turkey into a regional pariah.

Once an alliance of like-minded nations, Ankara has devalued NATO, compelling many to question the raison d'etre of the organization altogether. After all, Turkey has done nothing but complicate America’s counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East, such as by supporting terrorist factions affiliated with ISIS and Al Qaeda. 

Washington’s indecisiveness to contain Ankara’s belligerence runs the risk of entrapping the United States in never-ending conflicts that Turkey is facilitating. 

A good starting point would be parting with illusions that Erdogan’s Turkey will eventually abandon the damaging behavior and become the democratic state that everyone hoped for.  

Having sacrificed the long-term regional stability at the expense of short-term political expediency, Washington has willingly closed its eyes on Ankara’s backslide in human rights, solidification of autocracy, and an ever-apparent divergent foreign policy.

In an increasingly repressive region, America should first and foremost defend Armenia’s vibrant democracy as a beacon of freedom. 

Additionally, the United States should hold Ankara and Baku’s hostile regimes responsible through diplomatic isolation, targeted sanctions, and arms embargo. 

Without facing consequences, the violent aggression perpetuated by these regimes will go unabated, harming U.S. and NATO interests in the region. America must act now.

Erik Khzmalyan is a geopolitical analyst based in Washington, DC. He holds an MA in Statecraft and National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics.

Armen V. Sahakyan serves as the executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America – Western Region.

Image: Reuters.

Seth J. Frantzman

Security,

The Iron Dome system and other aspects of Israel’s unique air-defense system are getting more attention in a world that has more drone and rocket threats and where conflicts and tension are growing from Asia to the Caucuses.

In a historic ceremony, the Israeli Ministry of Defense delivered the first of Israel’s famed Iron Dome batteries to the U.S. Army on Wednesday. The ceremony was conducted in northern Israel as the air-defense system developed by Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems was officially provided to the United States. The system will still need to be flown back to the United States or transported to another U.S. facility in the future.  

Oshkosh trucks, designed to carry the Iron Dome system were flown from the United States to Israel in September on the giant Ukrainian Antonov plane. Israel’s Ministry of Defense said that the Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO), in the Directorate of Defense R&D (DDR&D), of the Israel Ministry of Defense, “delivered the first of two Iron Dome Defense System batteries to the U.S. Army. On this occasion, a symbolic event was held at the Iron Dome production line of defense contractor, Rafael Advanced Systems.” 

Israel’s top brass and executives from Rafael were on hand for the event. Defense Minister Benny Gantz emphasized that the Iron Dome is part of Israel’s unique multi-layered air-defense system. It is the lower tier. The United States has supported Israel’s various air-defense missile systems such as Arrow and David’s Sling for many years. “The Iron Dome system . . . reflects the strength of the Israeli defense establishment. As a result of the effectiveness of this system, many deaths were prevented on the home front of southern Israel, and it has a significant impact on the battlefield. I am proud that this advanced system will also protect U.S. Army troops. This is an extraordinary achievement for both the Ministry of Defense and for Israel’s excellent defense industries,” Gantz said.

Gantz is the leader of Israel’s second-largest political party called Blue and White and a former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. He went to the United States in late September to meet his counterpart, Mark Esper. Israel wants to make sure it maintains its qualitative military edge amid the new deal with the United Arab Emirates. Israel may want new airplanes and helicopters to maintain its capabilities. “Among other things, we discussed procurement and information sharing in the field of technology. The completion of this agreement serves as further proof that the defense alliance [between the United States and Israel], is based on common values and interests, which are stronger than ever,” Gantz said. 

In addition to Gantz, the ceremony included the Minister of Economy, Amir Peretz, Head of the DDR&D, Dr. Dani Gold, Head of the IMDO, Moshe Patel Rafael Chairman, Uzi Landau, and Rafael CEO, Yoav Har-Even. The coronavirus pandemic and Israel’s lockdown appeared to have prevented a high-level U.S. delegation from attending. The Iron Dome battery was unveiled at the ceremony.

The Iron Dome battery has been of interest to the United States for years. It could help fulfill the needs of short-range air-defense, called SHORAD. It would have been helpful in Iraq against the constant attacks by pro-Iranian groups using 107-millimeter rockets. However, procurement processes are slow. Rafael partners with Raytheon in the United States on the Iron Dome system. “The first battery was delivered in record time, and the second battery will be delivered in the near future within the framework of the agreement. These batteries will be employed in the defense of US troops against a variety of ballistic and aerial threats,” Israel’s Ministry of Defense says.

The system has been credited with twenty-four hundred interceptions of enemy threats. Rafael Executive Vice President and Head of Rafael's Air and Missile Defense Division, Pini Yungman noted that the United States and Israel began this Iron Dome relationship with a series of tests and demonstrations in the ‘White Sands’ testing field in the United States. “To date, we have conducted three demonstrations and intercepted targets chosen by the U.S. Army for the Iron Dome system,” Yungman said. 

The Iron Dome system and other aspects of Israel’s unique air-defense system are getting more attention in a world that has more drone and rocket threats and where conflicts and tension are growing from Asia to the Caucuses. Israel’s defense systems are regulated for export by strict guidelines and programs that are linked to U.S. support or joint efforts are particularly sensitive. Recently Czech Republic expressed interest in acquiring Rafael’s Spyder air defense, a system of missiles that is also a short-range air-defense system. Czech also acquired the Israel Aerospace Industries MMR radar that is made by Elta, a subsidiary of IAI. Together the unique radar, missiles and defense systems Israel has put in place makes the country uniquely capable of detecting and defending against missile, drone and other types of threats.

Seth J. Frantzman is a Jerusalem-based journalist who holds a Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis and a writing fellow at Middle East Forum. He is the author of After ISIS: America, Iran and the Struggle for the Middle East (forthcoming Gefen Publishing). Follow him on Twitter at @sfrantzman.

Image: Reuters

Mohammed Ayoob

Security, Europe

There are too many external fingers in this Caucasus pie and unless this fire is doused quickly it has the potential to turn into a major regional conflict.

The latest flare-up in fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces that began in July and escalated in mid-September comes closest to the full-scale conflict that ensued between them in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the Soviet Union was disintegrating. It was centred on Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian enclave situated within the boundaries of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic that formed a part of the Soviet Union from 1922 until 1991 when Azerbaijan declared independence. The conflict was triggered by the attempt on the part of the Armenian leadership in Nagorno-Karabakh to break away from Azerbaijan and join Armenia, which also emerged as an independent state following the Soviet Union’s demise.

The war ended with a ceasefire in May 1994 at the cost of 30,000 dead and hundreds of thousands rendered homeless. It not only left Nagorno-Karabakh as a de facto independent polity ethnically cleansed of its Azerbaijani minority but also additional Azerbaijani territory surrounding the enclave under Armenian control.

Observers attributed the Armenian victory to Russian military support that turned the tide against Azerbaijan. Despite the efforts of the Minsk group chaired by Russia, France and the United States to broker an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, the dispute has continued to fester for a quarter of a century with occasional bursts of limited armed conflict, the most serious before the latest one occurring in 2016.

The Armenian antagonism toward Turks—and Azerbaijanis are Turkic people with close cultural ties to Turkey—runs deep. The mass displacement and death of Armenians in Anatolia during World War I as a consequence of part of the Armenian population siding with Russia intensified anti-Turkish feelings among Armenians. This ethnically based resentment was channelled also against neighbouring Azerbaijani Turks.

This interethnic hostility was exacerbated by Moscow’s policy towards the Caucasus and Central Asia that deliberately aimed at creating tensions between neighbouring ethnic groups in non-Russian, especially Muslim, parts of the USSR. This policy, first developed under Stalin, was aimed at preventing the emergence of coordinated resistance in these regions against Moscow’s heavy-handed rule, including the Russification of the non-Russian population.

Central Asia abounds in examples of this policy. Minority ethnic groups are strewn throughout Central Asian states as a result of incorporation of enclaves of such groups within ethnically defined and denominated states. Nagorno-Karabakh’s inclusion within Azerbaijan was one example of deliberate mixing of hostile ethnicities in the Caucasus with the same goal in mind.

The lid was kept on Armenian–Azerbaijani hostility, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh, as long as both Azerbaijan and Armenia formed part of the Soviet Union. However, with the disintegration of the USSR, interethnic antagonism resurfaced with greater vigour, leading to the war between the two countries that lasted until 1994.

It’s not clear why the conflict has reignited now after having been dormant for more than two decades. There’s speculation that it could have as much to do with internal challenges to both regimes that have prompted them to create nationalist xenophobia to divert the anger of their populations.

Both sides have blamed each other for starting the fighting, which has now spread beyond the Azerbaijani border with Nagorno-Karabakh to the international boundary between the two countries. The president of Azerbaijan and the prime minister of Armenia have rejected suggestions of talks to bring the conflict to a close despite such calls by the United Nations, Russia and the United States.

The conflict has raised concerns about the stability of the South Caucasus region since major pipelines carrying oil and gas to world markets traverse this area. The South Caucasus Pipeline, also known as Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum Pipeline, carries natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas field in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea to Turkey. It runs parallel to the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline that carries oil from the Azeri–Chirag–Deepwater Gunashli field and condensate from Shah Deniz across Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the Ceyhan marine terminal on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Crude oil from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan is also transported via this pipeline.

Equally, if not more, alarming is the danger that if the confrontation escalates it may draw in external powers, Turkey and Russia in particular, that would widen the scope of the conflict. Turkey has traditionally been a staunch supporter of Azerbaijan and condemned Armenia in no uncertain terms for beginning the conflict when fighting broke out in September. Russia considers Armenia a strategic ally, supported it militarily in earlier bouts of fighting with Azerbaijan and is treaty-bound to come to Armenia’s defence if the war spreads beyond Nagorno-Karabakh across the international frontier. But, it also considers Azerbaijan a strategic partner and has supplied arms to Baku. Russia will therefore have a major problem on its hands if the conflict escalates. Moreover, if Russia and Turkey line up on opposite sides of this conflict it will greatly harm Russia’s attempt to woo Turkey away from NATO, especially since the two countries are already supporting opposing camps in Libya and Syria.

Israel and Iran also have stakes in the conflict. Israel is a major supplier of arms to Azerbaijan, and Iran, despite its attempt to appear neutral, has long supported Armenia. Both Iran and Azerbaijan are Shia but Azerbaijan’s irredentist claim after independence on the northern Iranian provinces of East and West Azerbaijan has more than neutralised their religious affinity.

There are too many external fingers in this Caucasus pie and unless this fire is doused quickly it has the potential to turn into a major regional conflict.

Mohammed Ayoob is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University.

This article first appeared at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Reuters.

Michael Peck

Security, Europe

There can be no innovation without experimentation.

Key Point: Experimentation inevitably results in failures.

It's not usual for Russia to admit that its weapons have failed. Especially Russian media, purveyor of glorious stories of space MiGs and interplanetary tanks.

Yet Russia's Sputnik News recently published an article back in 2018 on Russian and Soviet weapons that fizzled.

"For each military vehicle that is accepted into service, there are often roughly ten others that never proved to be either effective or economically viable," Sputnik News tactfully reminded its readers. "However, they are not usually 'born' in vain – some of them are later used for the development of new generations of weapons."

Sputnik News cited five examples:

The Papa-Class Submarine

The K-222 nuclear attack submarine (NATO code name "Papa"), launched in 1969, was considered the world's fastest submarine. It reportedly reached a record speed of 44.7 knots. But only one model was ever built. "The problem with the K-222 was that its hull was built from titanium, which made it exceedingly expensive (it was even known by the nickname the 'Golden Fish')," according to Sputnik News. "Aside from this, the submarine was also very noisy, which stripped it of a key advantage — low detectability." However, the article also claimed that it provided valuable lessons for subsequent Russian subs, such as the Charlie-class. Papa also encouraged the development of more advanced U.S. Navy anti-submarine weapons.

Su-47 Berkut

The Su-47 Berkut fighter (NATO code name "Firkin"), which first took flight in 1997, had distinctive forward-swept wings designed to increase maneuverability, longer range and faster subsonic speed. However, "such a design increased the stress on the wings, requiring much more expensive materials to be used in production," Sputnik News said. "In combination with the slated completion date, 1997, at a time when the Russian economy was highly vulnerable, led to the closure of the project." However, lessons from the project were incorporated into today's cutting-edge Su-57.

The Black Eagle Tank

The Black Eagle tank (Russian designation Object 640), based on the T-80, caused a stir in the West when a few prototypes were unveiled in the late 1990s. In particular, it had a large, unmanned turret while the crew sat in the well-protected hull. If that sounds familiar, it's because that's a prominent feature of Russia's new T-14 Armata tank, which has really caused a stir in the West. Sputnik News blamed the cancellation of the project on "a lack of innovation" with the design. Yet curiously, officials told Russian media in 2009 that the Black Eagle never existed as more than a prototype: "There was no such project...and those 20-year-old pictures show a mock-up of a futuristic tank which remained just a product of someone's imagination."

The Caspian Monster

One of the most distinctive craft in history, the Lun-class ground effect vehicle combined qualities of a conventional aircraft, seaplane and hovercraft. Dubbed the "Caspian Monster" when it was deployed in 1987, the sea-skimming craft—bigger than an airliner—was 243 feet long, sixty-two feet high, had a 144-foot wingspan and a speed of 297 knots. It could carry 100 tons of cargo or even six Moskit anti-ship missiles. However, it proved too expensive and only one was built. Nonetheless, its makers announced in 2015 that they were making a modern version.

The Soviet Slipper

The MiG-105, nicknamed "Lapot" (slipper), was an orbital spaceplane conceived in the 1960s as a Soviet response to the abortive U.S. X-20 Dyna-Soar project. Sidelined and then revived in the 1970s as a counterpart to the U.S. Space Shuttle, the spaceplane was attached to a liquid-fueled booster, which in turn was supposed to be launched in mid-air from a hypersonic jet. However, the craft made only made a few atmospheric test flights. "The project was terminated after a decision was made in favor of the rocket-propelled Buran orbital spaceplane," eulogized Sputnik News. "The ideas behind the MiG-105 haven't been used so far, but maybe one day its hour will come."

Sputnik News is being generous in its epitaphs of weapons that ultimately proved to be expensive flops for the Soviet and Russian economies. Yet the United States is no different. How much of the American taxpayers’ money has been wasted on expensive dead-ends like the B-70 bomber or F-111 fighter?

Communist or capitalist, Russian or American, there is an iron rule: there can be no innovation without experimentation, and experimentation inevitably results in failures.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in 2018.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Kris Osborn

Security, Americas

The Navy and Air Force are looking into fighter jets that can use AI to take down enemy planes.

Key point: Drones could help human pilots fight other planes. Here is how the military is looking at winning by using human-drone pairing.

What if an armed, artificial-intelligence-enabled attack drone detects an enemy fighter jet, uses long-range sensors to confirm the target before attacking with a precision-guided air-to-air missile?

What if an unmanned fighter or advanced drone, operated with various levels of advanced AI-informed algorithms, engaged in fast air-to-air combat maneuvers in a direct dogfight or close-in engagement with a manned enemy fighter?

These questions, which raise substantial tactical, strategic and command and control questions, are fast becoming a near-term reality. 

“Autonomous systems going up against a manned system in some kind of air-to-air engagement . . . is a bold idea,”  Lt. Gen. “Jack” Shanahan, Director, Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, told The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in a special video interview series.

Shanahan explained that, while autonomy now exists in various forms of great operational significance, AI-enabled autonomy brings a new frontier of warfare possibilities now being explored by the Pentagon in greater depth.

“AI-enabled autonomy is where we will see some big capabilities come together,” he said.

Autonomy driven by AI does bring a range of new technical, tactical and strategic implications, such as bringing new paradigms of decisionmaking, problem solving and operations. 

Essentially, platforms driven by advanced AI willl be capable of discerning, processing and analyzing vast amounts of information in near real-time, something which not only speeds up “sensor-to-shooter” time but also enables a much greater range of operational activity without a need for human intervention.

Instead of merely following pre-determined navigational “waypoints” established through GPS, something which has been underway for quite some time, drones and even fighter-jets will be able to receive new input, perform in-flight analytics and then make impactful decisions autonomously.

While humans will retain the requisite measures of command and control, AI can facilitate the ability for an unmanned system to, for instance, quickly adjust flight in response to new sensor information. This could include the processing of force location or navigational data independently or even networking intelligence data between nearby manned platforms, unmanned platforms and human-operated ground command centers.

For instance, a drone or unmanned fighter could be operating in a high-risk area when it comes upon enemy troop formations or terrain configurations of great tactical significance, bounce that new information against a vast and seemingly limitless database of information to perform analytics and make necessary adjustments.

Perhaps the on-board computer can access an intelligence database indicating previously successfully courses of action in these circumstances, analyze information about enemy capabilities, assets and weapons, and inform the unmanned platform regarding the best immediate course of action?  An on-board computer could instantly weigh a host of variables to independently make calculations previously determined by humans.

It certainly could be said that the F-35s well-known “sensor fusion” which organizes otherwise disparate sensor information onto a single screen for the pilot, is an early application of AI.

Emerging or future AI-enabled autonomy will incorporate a vastly superior wealth or range of information, improve processing and analytics, and perform decisionmaking related to a host of complex dynamics without needing humans.

Procedural and analytical functions such as information management and data processing can all be done much more efficiently than humans, all while leaving human cognition in an ultimate controlling role.

The speed of calculations and the increasing pace at which AI-informed systems can acquire, process and analyze new information in real-time are in fact expected to enable unmanned dogfighting, combat maneuvering and tactical decisionmaking.

“We will see small numbers of humans controlling larger numbers of machines. In some cases it will be machine-to-machine with humans in the loop,” Shanahan said.

Of course, at least at the moment, all of this rests upon a fundamental and, as of yet, unchanging premise, namely that ultimate control must remain with humans able to utilize those characteristics unique to human cognition.

“The only failure we will have is a failure of imagination,” Shanahan added.

Kris Osborn is Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Spencer D. Bakich

Diplomacy, Asia

What happens if the bromance between Kim and Trump were to fail? 

By his own reckoning, Donald Trump’s North Korea policy has been a success. U.S.-DPRK relations reached their nadir in the 2017 nuclear crisis, a crisis caused by the failed policies of Trump’s predecessors.  Tensions ran high as he and Kim Jong-un traded personal recriminations (Little Rocket Man vs. mentally deranged U.S. dotard) and threatened each other with obliteration (fire and fury vs. taming with fire).  Yet, the United States and Korea avoided war due to his deft diplomacy, which included flattering letters and three face-to-face meetings. It isn’t really a problem that Kim hasn’t given up any of his nuclear weapons, Trump contends.  As in the real estate business, market conditions aren’t yet right for that kind of liquidation. What’s important is that Trump and Kim now have a deep and meaningful relationship that serves both countries well.

Trump isn’t the first leader to base strategy on personal relationships, but the wise have a backup plan if things go wrong. Should the bond between the two break in a second Trump term, mutual animosity would likely follow as it often does for the jilted.  In that case, Trump will be back to square one, confronting an unpredictable and hostile nuclear power with the capacity to target the American homeland with nuclear weapons.

The development by the North of a nuclear retaliation capacity may induce caution in the Oval Office. However, much depends on Pyongyang’s behavior; the desires of the Kim regime matter greatly. If Kim is content with his position, both domestically and on the peninsula, then his nuclear deterrent will bolster a North Korean strategy aimed at securing the status quo. Under those conditions, U.S.-North Korean relations would be generally stable, even if strained at times. Seeing no need to bear the massive costs associated with regime change, Trump in his second term would probably be content to live and let live. 

Yet, the North’s nuclear arsenal may neither fully remove Kim’s security concerns, nor temper his ambitions. Facing the combined might of the U.S. and South Korean militaries, Kim’s fear of a surprise decapitation strike may make him more belligerent. Alternatively, Kim may be emboldened by his nuclear deterrent and willing to seek to extract concessions from Washington and Seoul by rushing to the brink in the next dispute. In either case, the future of U.S.-North Korean relations would be just as fraught as in the past, but even more deadly as Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal grows and matures.

Greatly concerning would be Trump’s willingness to respond in kind to future North Korean provocations. As my own research shows, Trump failed to understand the basic strategic features of the 2017 nuclear crisis. Most importantly, Trump believed that he, and not Kim, was more resolved to prevail in the crisis—a particularly dangerous misconception given that Washington was threatening war if Pyongyang refused to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Trump failed to realize, moreover, that the threats he was issuing lacked credibility because U.S. signaling was confused and contradictory.  Finally, Trump seemed not to understand that his threats were catalyzing Kim’s resolve to stand firm.  Inflexible and offensively primed, U.S. military doctrine and war plans were ill-suited to sending tacit, behavioral signals of assurance to Pyongyang; a necessity given that Washington was demanding the North’s unilateral disarmament.

War was “much closer than anyone would know,” Trump admitted.  Yet, little has changed in the ensuing three years to alleviate concerns about Trump’s approach to crisis bargaining. Regional stability depends, then, on whether Kim is satisfied with what he has, an admittedly slender reed on which to rest one’s hopes.

Spencer D. Bakich is an associate professor of international studies and the director of the National Security Program at Virginia Military Institute. He is the author of Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars (Chicago 2014).

Image: A suspected missile is fired, in this image released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on March 22, 2020. KCNA/via REUTERS 

W. James Antle III

Politics, Americas

Yet barring polling malpractice worse than 2016’s, Biden remains the favorite less than two months out, thanks in part to the radicals in his party suddenly becoming risk-averse. But it could have been all so different.

If Joe Biden is the next president of the United States, Democrats will owe a debt of gratitude to their primary electorate, especially in South Carolina.

That’s where Democrats began to collectively pull back from nominating a septuagenarian socialist for president, choosing a more conventional Beltway septuagenarian instead. If the party had continued to follow Bernie Sanders into the abyss, it would have been much easier for President Donald Trump to frame this election as a binary choice between two competing visions—one of them radical—rather than a referendum on his own administration.

This was always the conventional wisdom. The Democratic establishment came of age either losing to Ronald Reagan in the 1980s or winning with Bill Clinton in the 1990s, so they instinctively feared a Bernie Sanders nomination. Never Trumpers could not bring themselves to publicly support an overt socialist, so they begged Democrats not to run one in the general election. Republicans licked their chops at the prospect of running against the Vermont senator the president dubbed “Crazy Bernie.”

But it took coronavirus to make the conventional wisdom fully true. For as many risks as a Sanders nomination entailed, running yet another aging establishment Democrat who generated no enthusiasm from the base and whose best days as a campaigner were long behind them was no safe bet. The playbook that Trump used against Hillary Clinton applied with greater ease to Biden, even if the former vice president was much better liked.

If the Democrats were going to beat an incumbent running on peace (or at least as close as we get to peace in an era of forever wars) and prosperity, someone who could out-populist Trump in their critique of the system might have been the better bet. Sanders could turn Trump into a cookie-cutter Republican — that is, the kind that lost Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin for going on thirty years — while rallying progressives and cutting into the president’s white working-class margins simultaneously. Yes, even under this scenario the possibility of a down-ballot blowout for Democrats was higher. But as the president would say, “What the hell do you have to lose?”

The pandemic changed all this. Gone went the economic boom that was always Trump’s strongest case for reelection (most polls show him retaining at least a slim advantage on the economy even now). In its place was a Democratic Party newly desperate to do whatever it took to win. The party’s centrists always felt this way, of course. But the coronavirus convinced progressives to get with the program.

From that point on, everything that happened over the course of the summer seemed to strengthen the case for normalcy, however loosely defined. After a March rally around his presidential leadership, Trump’s coronavirus briefings degenerated into the absurd. The killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis police custody and ensuing racial justice protests had Americans seeking unity. Trump is constitutionally incapable of meeting that need.

None of this is to say that Biden is a candidate without flaws. A gaffe-prone windbag at even the height of his powers, there are reasons to doubt he is fully up to the rigors of the presidency. He certainly seems ill equipped to contain the leftward lurch of the Democratic Party that even a plurality of its own voters rejected. “I think he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades,” former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who is no ideologue, has said of Biden.

But the campaign has unfolded in such a way as to make Biden at best a minor participant. Trump’s flaws, not Biden’s, have taken center stage and Republicans have been unable to do much to alter this dynamic. The debates could potentially be a turning point, of course, but Biden may only have to beat the expectations game, in which case a minimally competent showing will be a resounding victory.

External events still give Trump a chance. Progress on a vaccine is possible, despite the Democrats’ best efforts to turn one into hydroxychloride redux. Time is running out for an economic recovery to solidify, but it is still possible that reopening will look better by the end of October than it did to many in July. The racial justice protests have periodically erupted into lawlessness and violence, a risk Democrats have belatedly sought to address.

Yet barring polling malpractice worse than 2016’s, Biden remains the favorite less than two months out, thanks in part to the radicals in his party suddenly becoming risk-averse.

W. James Antle III is politics editor of the Washington Examiner.

Image: Reuters.

Kyle Mizokami

Security,

Unlike other artillery units the M270 isn’t designed for direct support of ground troops. Rather, MLRS units concentrate on medium- to long-distance threats.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The shift back to big-power warfare once again puts the focus on rocket artillery. As the U.S. Army reorients back towards fighting conventional armies again, massed fires will be back in vogue. ATACMs rockets are even getting the ability to engage moving ships at sea.

Rockets have been a staple of land warfare for centuries, but it wasn’t until the latter half of the twentieth century that they became a permanent addition to the U.S. Army’s arsenal. Ironically, the Army’s program to develop multiple battlefield rocket artillery to fight the Soviet Army drew inspiration for its rockets from Moscow’s wartime “Katyusha” multi-tube rocket launchers.

Battlefield rocket use dates back to thirteenth-century China. Although China is lauded for inventing gunpowder and derided for promptly using it for fireworks the reality is more complicated: China did use them for war, and even invented multiple-tube rocket launchers capable of launching up to one hundred projectiles. Rocket artillery fell out of favor for hundreds of years, but by the mid-1930s the Soviet Army had started to field the first modern rocket artillery units.

Unlike traditional gun artillery, which used a powder charge to propel a shell through a gun tube, an artillery rocket uses a continuously burning rocket motor to travel to target. The upside is that instead of a single gun tube, several tubes can be clustered together and ripple-fired mere seconds apart. As a result, rocket artillery has a faster rate of fire than tube artillery, although reloading takes longer.

The downside to rocket artillery is that rockets are less accurate. Unlike shells, whose impact point can be precisely computed by knowing the power of the powder charge, weight of the projectile and the length of the gun tube, a rocket flies free after exiting the tube, motor still burning. This makes rockets inherently less accurate and more suited to saturation attacks against area targets instead of point targets.

The Soviet Union relied on rocket artillery extensively during World War II, massing large numbers of truck-mounted multiple-rocket launchers such as the BM-13 and BM-8 to provide massed fires. Rocket artillery was extremely easy to manufacture, a critical issue when Soviet manufacturing was struggling to keep up with the war. A BM-13-16 was simply a collection of bracketed steel tubes mounted on a truck, often a Lend-Lease Studebaker, and the resulting vehicle could hurl sixteen eleven-pound high-explosive warheads a distance of 7.3 miles. What Soviet rocket units lacked in accuracy they made up with in the ability to saturate a target area, and the scream of a BM-13 launcher releasing a salvo of rockets was unearthly.

During the early 1970s, the U.S. Army refocused from Vietnam to a land war in Europe. As a result it looked to revamp its artillery capabilities with an emphasis on striking deep behind enemy lines.

The result was the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, or MLRS. The M270 packs twelve 227-millimeter rockets into the a box launcher and can fire all twelve rounds in less than forty seconds. The M270 is based on the chassis of the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. Tracked and highly mobile, it is designed to move into position, fire, and be ready to move to a new firing position in five minutes or less. This “shoot and scoot” tactic minimizes exposure to enemy counterbattery fire, a tactic that uses radar and other techniques to track back enemy rockets and shells in midair, determine the location of the enemy artillery units, and destroy them before they can displace to a new firing position.

Unlike other artillery units the M270 isn’t designed for direct support of ground troops. Rather, MLRS units concentrate on medium- to long-distance threats. Instead of attacking an enemy mechanized regiment on the move, MLRS units engage targets far behind enemy lines such as unit assembly areas, fuel and ammunition depots, and headquarters units. MLRS rocket fire is also ideal for friendly counterbattery fire missions.

Instead of trying to make the M270 more accurate, developer Vought decided to embrace the rocket’s lack of accuracy and maximize its ability to saturate an entire area. Each of the original M26 rockets carried 644 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional munitions (DPICM). The size of a hand grenade, DPICM rounds were ejected from the rocket while in flight, raining hundreds of the bomblets down on the enemy. The rounds were devastatingly effective against not only exposed infantry and soft-skinned targets such as fuel depots, ammunition depots and headquarters units, but were also capable of inflicting damage on tanks and armored vehicles, destroying them or putting them out of action.

The first use of the M270 was in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when the rocket launchers earned the name “grid killers” for the ability of a single M270 to saturate a one-kilometer-by-one-kilometer box grid on a military map. A MLRS battalion has a total of twenty-seven M270s, giving U.S. Army divisions and artillery brigades incredible amounts of firepower.

An alternate munition used by the M270 is ATACMs, or the Army Tactical Missile System. A large, plump rocket, ATACMs takes the place of six rockets in an M270, meaning each vehicle can carry up to two. ATACMs was designed to attack targets even farther behind enemy lines, carrying up to 950 antitank and antipersonnel submunitions up to eighty miles. Later versions had a range of up to 186 miles.

The tendency for unexpended cluster munitions to linger on the battlefield and cause harm to civilians resulted in the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. The convention bans their use and, although the United States is not a signatory, the Pentagon generally holds to the ban. As a result,  MLRS and ATACMs rockets that carried DPICM have been retired or are being updated to a single “unitary” high-explosive warhead.

The M270 was so effective that a lighter, more mobile version, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) was created. HIMARS packs six rockets or a single ATACMs on a five-ton truck. HIMARS has seen action in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Iraq against the Islamic State. The system’s usefulness against high-end threats has also seen it deployed to the Philippines opposite China, and eastern Europe opposite Russia.

The shift back to big-power warfare once again puts the focus on rocket artillery. As the U.S. Army reorients back towards fighting conventional armies again, massed fires will be back in vogue. ATACMs rockets are even getting the ability to engage moving ships at sea. New, improved rockets with GPS guidance can now destroy point targets. While rocket artillery likely won’t replace gun artillery any time soon, the versatility—and now accuracy—that rockets offer will make them critical capabilities for decades to come.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami. This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Wikipedia.

Robert Keatley

Security, Asia

The diverse city that made its residents proudly label themselves as Hong Kongers and which also attracted so many foreigners has been changed enormously, with the worst yet to come.

Each day the grip tightens. Another dissenter is arrested. Legal cases continue against others, with some facing possible life sentences. Strong warnings against renewed political agitation flow from the local government and Beijing. Educators are told to learn the party line. A troublesome election is delayed for a year.

All this has caused the U.S. State Department to issue a new warning to Americans about visiting Hong Kong (and mainland China) due to “a heightened risk of arrest, detention, expulsion or prosecution.”

From the viewpoint of mainland China, the new situation in Hong Kong—its obstreperous city in the south—can seem just fine. The streets are no longer jammed with protesters, sometimes violent, against policies of local and national governments plus the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Newly-arrived Beijing officials have commandeered a thirty-story luxury hotel as offices from which to chastise Hong Kong bureaucrats who don’t follow orders effectively. Chief Executive Carrie Lam has been downgraded to the role of Beijing’s obedient agent, not the leader of an autonomous local government that responds to public opinion. The police have new authority to arrest perceived troublemakers and seek their financiers. Chances of pro-democracy beliefs seeping across the border and infecting the mainland have been diminished.

Yet in a broader context, there have been no true winners; all concerned have lost something, almost certainly with more losses to come.

For the people of Hong Kong, their civil rights have been severely curtailed by Beijing and a supine local administration that mostly ignores their clear preferences. The prized common law legal system that underpins its boast as “Asia’s Global City,” the world’s third-largest financial center, is being eroded. The “one country, two systems” political arrangement which Beijing promised would let Hong Kong people manage their own affairs with “a high degree of autonomy” is in tatters. Their financial and economic future is uncertain for reasons extending far beyond the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. One small example: a recent survey found that nearly 40 percent of American companies in Hong Kong expect to reduce their presence or leave altogether.

But this has been no clear victory for Xi Jinping, China’s maximum leader, and the Communist Party he leads. To be sure, he has quashed mass protests that he found treasonous, but the price has been high. His effort has increased tensions in the fraught American-Chinese relationship—called the world’s most important by both sides—already at its lowest point for decades. Evidence-free claims that American “black hands” fed the Hong Kong unrest has made resolving broad trade, economic and political differences even more difficult; some analysts worry about war, either cold or hot. American sanctions on eleven Hong Kong-based officials and withdrawal of certain trade advantages leave the city’s banks and companies uncertain about how these and future sanctions will affect them. One byproduct: Hong Kong is no longer a conduit for importing American technology that the United States won’t allow Beijing to buy directly. The crackdown has also increased doubts around the Pacific and in Europe about the wisdom of relying closely on China when important matters are at stake.

All this has left Hong Kong people more disaffected than ever, which cannot have been a Beijing goal. Most have long accepted that their city is unavoidably part of the People’s Republic but the vast majority does not want daily life controlled in detail by the mainland’s ruling party and they identify themselves first as “Hong Kongers,” not as citizens of China. A small pro-independence movement did arise, its influence greatly exaggerated by Beijing to justify the harsh crackdown. But desire for an independent Hong Kong, strongest among students worried about their own futures, more accurately reflects widespread anger and frustration about authorities’ refusal to negotiate serious issues, such as investigating alleged police brutality. The true believers in Hong Kong independence might well fit into one of those double-decker trams that crawl through Wanchai.

Yet if all concerned had shown more foresight, tolerance, common sense, and compromise, the worst might have been avoided. The political showdown that eventually brought disruption, intervention and such damage to public life in Hong Kong was not inevitable.

During its 150-year colonial grip, Britain did little to promote electoral politics other than a limited amount during its final years in charge. Yet 1997’s final handover terms decreed that “Hong Kong people” would govern themselves with great autonomy, with only defense and diplomacy reserved for the central government. Legal and economic systems were to remain intact until at least 2047. It set “universal suffrage” as the “eventual” political goal though precise terms were not clarified. Half the members of the Legislative Council (Legco), which has limited powers, were chosen by popular vote and others by mostly pro-Beijing interest groups. An efficient civil service remained in place, with Beijing’s choice—a politically reliable tycoon—as the first Chief Executive to head an executive-driven governing system.

But Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activists had reason to believe that liberalization could come after ten years—in 2007—and assorted talks continued through various channels with limited progress. Finally, in 2014, Beijing made an offer; it would allow the next Chief Executive to be selected by popular vote with “two or three” candidates competing for the post—provided that an election committee dominated by Beijing’s friends approved them. Angry pro-democracy members of Legco voted this down after its pro-government members made a serious tactical mistake; they fled the chamber in hopes of preventing any vote, allowing those who stayed behind to reject the offer 23-8 even though an all-member vote would have passed it.

Rejection proved a grievous error as even a flawed election would have been a vast improvement over having each Chief Executive named by the 1,200 person pro-Beijing committee. American and other diplomats advised pro-democrats to take the deal and seek further gains later—such as having more Legco members chosen by popular vote rather than by interest groups. Even this flawed system would have seen rivals with differing platforms compete for public support. And it would have normalized the concept of having people select their own leaders, something impossible elsewhere in China. Many Hong Kongers were willing but vocal activists demanded more.

This led to the Occupy Central demonstrations, which earned worldwide sympathy for protesters with their yellow umbrellas but nothing tangible. Beijing authorities, angered by rejection of what they considered a generous concession, made no new offers. Yet if the flawed electoral system had been installed, Hong Kong politics could have been more peaceful and tolerable to China, however imperfect.

That dim possibility ended last year when Chief Executive Lam suddenly introduced a sweeping extradition bill that far exceeded what was needed to solve a limited problem. It would let criminal suspects be shipped to many other jurisdictions, including to mainland courts where judges are picked by the ruling party and effective defense is difficult to impossible. Any Hong Kong resident—including foreigners—could then be tried there for allegedly breaking China’s ill-defined criminal laws, such as “making trouble and creating a disturbancem” if Beijing demanded their extradition. The fact that they may have done nothing illegal under Hong Kong law would not matter.

Hong Kong’s bar association and other legal experts warned this gravely eroded the city’s common law system but were ignored. Lam and her pliant enablers went ahead, pushed by Beijing. Huge and increasingly violent demonstrations, and harsh police reprisals, ensued. Youthful demonstrators demanded that the extradition bill be withdrawn, which eventually happened. But they had added four other demands that the government found even more objectionable, including for Lam’s immediate resignation. Many demonstrators were students also motivated by grievances about poor job prospects, costly housing, a widening income gap and an establishment seemingly indifferent to their needs—the combination of the Lam administration, the mainland’s Communist Party and its pliable Hong Kong loyalists, plus local business leaders who consistently echo the Beijing line for their own commercial reasons.

In theory, some demands might have been negotiable in part. But the energetic and youthful crowds had no recognized leaders authorized to speak for them—even if the government side had wanted to talk, which it didn’t. That reflects China’s increased intolerance since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012; the CCP has become more brutal when repressing perceived foes such as Tibetans, Muslim minorities, academic critics and human rights advocates. Thus it had no sympathy for Hong Kong’s young protesters and clearly had lost faith in the local government’s ability to keep order.

Beijing’s solution: a new National Security Law imposed on Hong Kong that clearly violates the city’s de facto constitution which outlines its supposed autonomy, known as the Basic Law. In extremely vague terms the security law outlaws sedition, separatism, collusion with foreigners, and other items; its imprecision allows authorities to arrest almost anyone who says or does something they find offensive, and perhaps ship them across the border for prosecution—with life terms a possibility. It allows those Beijing officials housed in that former hotel to ignore Hong Kong laws they find restrictive; warrant-free searches and arrests are now possible, for example. Once admired as a haven for free speech and a free press, new restrictions are taking hold; some foreign journalists have been forced to leave, for example. Already scores of leading dissenters, including outspoken publisher Jimmy Lai, have been booked and accused of foreign collusion. More than 9,000 others have also been arrested. Beijing postponed September’s scheduled Legco elections for a year—a clear violation of the Basic Law—with a dozen pro-democracy members told they cannot seek re-election.

China did not need to act so harshly. Hong Kong did have a serious law and order problem but posed no threat to the nation’s security despite claims to the contrary. In any case, the crackdown reflects Xi’s determination to squelch any deviation from his “China dream” of what modern China should be. One obvious byproduct: gone forever are Beijing’s fading hopes that Taiwan might someday join the mainland under some form of “one country, two systems”—one reason former leader Deng Xiaoping invented it decades ago.

The most recent opinion poll shows a 60 percent disapproval of this harsh law but the administration is undeterred. Carrie Lam plans to spend the next year or two “rectifying mistakes”—such as teaching students and their parents to think better of the Chinese regime and ruling party under a new “patriotic” education plan, perhaps replicating a mainland program of the early 1990s.

All this leaves Hong Kong changed permanently. Life there probably will remain less restrictive than elsewhere in China for some time but with freedoms steadily eroded. As the legal system withers, foreign companies will find it less attractive as a base for Chinese or regional operations. Yet Hong Kong will remain useful for prosperous mainlanders, despite its diminished role in the national economy. It’s the favorite place for Chinese companies to place new share issues, while many rich mainlanders park their vast wealth—obtained legally or otherwise—in local real estate or shell companies that route their cash abroad. However, many of Hong Kong’s best and brightest plan to emigrate; Britain has said it would welcome up to three million of them if Beijing will let them go. But a dozen protesters who tried to flee to Taiwan by speedboat were seized by the Chinese coast guard before they got far. They now face prosecution.

Much has been lost and will never return. The diverse city that made its residents proudly label themselves as Hong Kongers and which also attracted so many foreigners has been changed enormously, with the worst yet to come.

Robert Keatley is a former editor of the Asian Wall Street Journal and the South China Morning Post, both of Hong Kong.

Image: Reuters.

Eric Shiraev, Konstantin Khudoley

Security, Eurasia

Russian leaders continue to believe their country belongs to the global decisionmaking club and relentlessly backs the idea of a new “concert” of great powers.

Experienced chess players can calculate positions on the board seven, ten, and even more moves ahead. It certainly takes time and practice to develop such a skill. Yet even the most talented player still faces a problem: you do not know how the opponent would respond. Assessing various probabilities of the opponent’s moves and then picking the best options for answers is a daunting task.

Foreign policy is not a game, but the chess analogy works here well: despite the uncertainty of unknown factors and sudden changes, most foreign governments tend to act rather predictably based on a certain “policy climate”—that is, most accepted views embraced by decisionmakers and their advisers. Can we predict Russia’s behavior judging the current policy climate in Moscow?

This is almost a sure bet that no matter which administration occupies the White House after January 2021 would have to anticipate little change in Russian domestic politics at that time and in the foreseeable future. No new influential political group or popular movement would challenge the existing political climate related to foreign policy and there will be no swift changes in Russia’s strategic vision of the world. What are the key components of this vision?

First, Moscow elites continue to believe that the Western political system has been in decline and this descent is only deepening now. The global financial crisis of 2008, the following long economic slowdown, the Euro crisis of 2015, Brexit, and the economic and political consequences of the 2020 pandemic—all these are used by Russian commentators as the evidence that the West is losing its dominant position in the world economy and finances.

A majority Russian business, political, and intellectual elites today are apparently comfortable with a model of state capitalism that has already been established in their country. In this model, the free market is accepted, yet the central government makes interventions any time and any way it wishes—all for the sake of the stability of the system. Professor Sergey Karaganov, a leading specialist at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, openly declares that the state authoritarian model of capitalism is certainly more effective than the liberal democratic one. Although some experts like Alexander Vorobyov of the Russian Academy of Sciences warn that the belief in the superiority of state capitalism simply echoes the position of their Chinese counterparts, few in Russia today have concerns about China’s models dominating Russian economy and finances in the future. On the contrary, most in Russia look forward to the mutual economic, military, and cultural cooperation of both countries. China has already become a major economic and political partner of Moscow and both sides have agreed on a “strategic partnership.”

Next, there is a widespread expectation in Russia that the confrontation between the United States and China will be a major theme in international politics. The world is likely to come out of the pandemic crisis with significant losses in most social and economic areas. However, the emerging gap between the two leading economies—the United States and China—on the one hand, and all others, on the other, should noticeably increase. These will be a different “cold war.” If during the Cold War the arms race was a major point of contention, then now the new playing fields will be the economy and cyberspace. Ideology will play a role, too. It will mostly be a dilemma about which economic and political model will win the hearts and minds globally: the Chinese model or the American one. The preferences of most Russian experts are with the former.

Russian-American relations are unlikely to change for the better any time soon either. Russian commentators believe that the United States is going through a serious domestic crisis, from which it will emerge seriously weakened. Some even see that the very foundation of the U.S. government and its political institutions is under threat, which is something that Americans won’t be able to address. According to Dmitry Evstafiev, a professor at the Higher School of Economics, Americans, unlike Russians, do not have a certain cultural and spiritual “core” or stamina—rooted in the experiences of World War II—to overcome crises of such magnitude.

America, in the eyes of Russian commentators, not Russia, does not want to improve its relationship with the Eurasian country. Two reasons exist for this. First, there has been a decades-long American strategy, inherited from the Cold War, to “keep Russia down” by all means. Brought up in the atmosphere of Russophobia, several generations of “hawks” in the American government keep a carte blanche to do anything to hurt Russia and its people. The second reason is political and pleases both ends of the political spectrum in Washington. The American Right, in Moscow’s view, has a visceral negative reaction to Russia’s growing competitiveness and assertiveness. The Left, on the other hand, is obsessed with Moscow’s dismal human-rights record. As a result, showing “softness” toward Russia is a liability for any politician in America’s current political climate. Moreover, as far as the argument goes, the Trump administration—long before the pandemic and the riots in several American cities—was using Russia as the default “bogeyman” to distract the public from domestic problems. Many news outlets and experts on Russia share the blame for spreading the anti-Russian mantra, which is as ill-informed as it is ideologically biased toward anything Russian.  

It is clear, based on what is being reported, that Moscow’s elites believe that little will change in Washington after the presidential elections in November. Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs urges Russia to move away from the U.S.-focused foreign policy. Still, it appears that for weeks the overall tone of comments tended to be more supportive of Trump. Although Trump has been a preferred choice among most experts in Russia, Natalia Tsvetkova, a professor at Saint Petersburg State University, predicts that even if Trump remains in power, his support in Russia should drop due to the fact that there have been no positive changes in U.S.-Russia relations. On the other hand, Moscow is concerned that Joe Biden will likely support a new round of tough sanctions against Russia, which Oleg Deripaska, one of the Russian oligarchs has already predicted to be the “sanctions from hell.” There is an expectation that if Biden is elected, then he would do next to nothing to change the toxic legacy of Trump’s foreign policy. Biden’s foreign policy team still remembers the humiliation it suffered following its unsuccessful attempt at “resetting” U.S.-Russian relations under the Obama administration.  

Russian leaders would like to continue negotiations with Washington on arms control and the extension of The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. At the same time, they are not ready to do any serious concessions. Some commentators consider that Trump’s attempts to meet with Putin this fall will pursue the publicity goal only. Others suggest that any negotiations will make sense only after the elections in November.

The anti-Western sentiment of public opinion that was noticeable in 2014-16—sparked by the negative reaction of the West to Russia’s actions in Ukraine—has been gradually declining. Many people, especially outside Moscow, are tired of confrontation with the West. At the same time, there is a stable and strong belief in Russian establishment and society that cooperation with the United States is unlikely to benefit Russia. Maksim Sokolov from the Novosti Agency, a media network, summarized an opinion of the majority that under any presidential administration Washington would continue its attempts to weaken Russia’s economy so that Russia has no choice but to pivot closer to Iran and China. This is not desirable, “but we have no choice,” concludes Sokolov.

Russian leaders continue to believe their country belongs to the global decisionmaking club and relentlessly backs the idea of a new “concert” of great powers. Moscow desires a stable role in global summits, conflict settlements, and global institutions. At the same time, Russians see the need for them to fill the vacuum created by American inaction or withdrawal from some regions, such as in the Middle East. Russian politicians hope that America’s isolationism under Trump (or an expected “soft” approach under Biden), should contribute to Russia’s growing prestige as a global power under Putin’s leadership. Russia will continue resisting the existing world order; Moscow will attempt to lead. According to pro-Kremlin expert Sergey Kurginyan, it is Russia that will lead the way “out of the deadlock.” It will pursue new alliances with countries—regardless of their political systems—that agree with Russia’s foreign policy, with its strategic goals, and that support their implementation. In the future, Russia will seek to expand partnership in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and in the Pacific region.

Russian politicians still consider the post-Soviet space as the sphere of their interest and influence. Any political instability in those regions are viewed as a threat to Russia. That is why, according to Evgeny Treshchenkov at Saint Petersburg State University, the political crisis in Belarus may cause another “hot spot” in Europe.

A careful look at the chessboard shows the positions of both sides. Although all the future moves are impossible to predict, a few such moves are expected. It is almost a consensus in Russia that in the immediate post-pandemic world, nobody should expect any improvement in relations between the United States and Russia. The chess game continues.  

Dr. Eric Shiraev is a political psychologist from George Mason University, USA, and a head of a lab reputational politics. He is author of International Relations (Oxford), Russian Government and Politics (Macmillan), and Russian Foreign Policy (Macmillan).

Dr. Konstantin Khudoley is a Professor of International Relations at St. Petersburg State University (Russia) and author of several books, including Russian Foreign Policy (Macmillan).