The National Interest

Sebastien Roblin

Security, Middle East

But could Tehran hit one?

Here's What You Need To Remember: The IRGC’s short-range ASBMs are situated in a confined theater (the Persian Gulf) in which they would have plentiful opportunities to detect and attack vessels.  Furthermore, the ASBMs attack from a different vector than the far more common sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles also deployed in the region.  A saturation attack by many missiles at once, launched from different angles, and including multiple types of weapons, could potentially overwhelm defenses to deadly effect.

In 2009, it became clear that China had developed a mobile medium-range ballistic missile called the DF-21D designed to sink ships over 900 miles away.  This then-nascent technical achievement gave rise to a still-ongoing debate over the survivability of the U.S.’s nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, as the DF-21D outranged the strike planes serving on carrier decks.  This further compelled the U.S. Navy to introduce anti-ballistic missile capability to its destroyers and cruisers in the form of the SM-3 missile.

Ballistic missiles travel in an arcing trajectory to maximize range and velocity, sometimes even exiting the Earth’s atmosphere before plunging down towards their targets at unthinkably fast speeds—in the DF-21’s case, up to ten times the speed of sound.  However, until a decade ago there were no operational anti-ship ballistic missiles (though one was developed by the Soviet Union, but did not enter service) because it’s a lot easier to program a ballistic missile to hit a city or military base, than to have one strike a small, moving target—ie, a ship.

However, just two years later Iran announced it too had already developed an anti-ship ballistic missile.  Tehran is infamous for habitually exaggerating or fabricating claims about its military technology—but in 2013 footage of an apparently successful missile test was released, and by 2014 U.S. intelligence briefings confirmed the missile’s deployment.

The missile, which has the rather on-the-nose name Khalij Fars (“Persian Gulf”), is derivative of Iran’s domestically developed Fateh-110 short-ranged ballistic missile.  The truck-born Fateh-110 series can be fired on short notice because it uses solid fuel; by contrast, liquid-fuel rockets require days to gas up.

The Persian Gulf missile ostensibly uses an electro-optical/infrared seeker to allow it to slam its 1,433-pound warhead home into a moving naval target, though this isn’t absolutely confirmed  because Iran covered the seeker in photos.  An Iranian article claims that in a 2013 test, the missile struck a moving naval target with eight-meters of accuracy (recording here).  A 2014 CSIS assessment concludes that the rocket on average will fall within a few dozen meters of the target, and that the Khalij Fars has likely entered service with operational IRGCN units.

However, the Khalij Fars has one-quarter the DF-21’s range at 190 to 220 miles, and relatedly doesn’t fly as high or fast, with a lower maximum speed of Mach 3 as it plunges towards its target.  Thus the Khalij Fars would likely prove easier to intercept with defensive missiles.

Like Chinese ASBMs, the Khalij Fars would also require external reconnaissance assets to provide initial target-cueing for its inertial guidance system (GPS guidance may also be installed in some variants).  As U.S. surface warships can cruise at a brisk 30 knots (35 miles per hour) making sure the carrier remains within the ‘target box’ of the missile, which can only make limited (though precise) course adjustments during its EO-guided descent, would prove a challenge.  The ships in a carrier task force would likely detect the launch of the Persian Gulf missile and respond with evasive maneuvers to exit the target box.  Thus, multiple missiles might be required to ‘box in’ the target.

However, the Khalij Far’s limitations are significantly mitigated by the fact that the Persian Gulf is quite narrow: only 35 miles across at the straits of Hormuz, to a maximum of 220 miles.  Thus, massing the mobile launchers within strike range may not prove as difficult as would ordinarily be the case.  As the missile achieves a peak speed of 38 miles per minute, the early warning time might also be limited compared to a longer-range (but harder to intercept) missile.

Likewise, it would be easier to locate and cue targeting data for a ship in the Persian Gulf than the open vastness of the Pacific Ocean.  The Iranian Navy and IRGC Navy operate a wide variety of surveillance assets ranging from motor boats, semi-submersible craft, and U.S.-built CH-53 and SH-3 helicopters to drones, bizarre Bavar-2 ground-effect vehicles and ground-based search radars.   

In 2014, Iran also unveiled a a faster (Mach 4) anti-radiation variant of the Khalij Fars called the Hormuz-1 and -2 designed to home-in on land- and sea-based radars respectively—possibly the world’s first anti-radiation ballistic missiles. An anti-radiation missile turns a warship’s greatest defensive advantage—it’s powerful radars—into a vulnerability by homing in on it for guidance.  A ship can de-activate its radar to break the lock, but then leave itself exposed to other threats.

The Hormuz missiles share with the new longer-range Zolfaghar variant of the Fateh-110 a new mobile two-rail launcher. This could help an anti-ship missile battery launch more missiles in a short time frame, over-saturating defenses. Furthermore, experience in the 1991 Gulf War suggests that truck-mounted ballistic missiles can be surprisingly difficult to hunt down even when benefitting from air superiority.

You can see an apparently successful Hormuz test in this video.

In August 2018, Iran announced development of a Fateh-Mobin (“Bright Conqueror”) variant of Fateh-110 with an infrared-seeker for terminal guidance, and claimed radar-evasive features—though such features were not evident to visual inspection.  The Mobin’s seeker apparently gives it anti-ship as well as ground attack capabilities.

Two months later in October 2018, the IRGC Aerospace Force’s commander General Amir Ali Hajizadeh claimed in a speech that Iran had developed a new guided ASBM with 700 kilometer (434 miles) strike range—expanding potential targeting across the Gulf of Oman.  No name was specified, though Iran’s newer Zolfaghar SRBM (an improved Fateh-110) has the same range, so it’s possible he was referring to an anti-ship Zolfaghar variant.

U.S. surface warships nonetheless benefit from formidable multi-layered Aegis air-defense systems, some components of which are designed to tackle more challenging missile threats than the Khalij Fars; furthermore, U.S. carriers always deploy as part of mutually-supporting task forces.

However, the IRGC’s short-range ASBMs are situated in a confined theater (the Persian Gulf) in which they would have plentiful opportunities to detect and attack vessels.  Furthermore, the ASBMs attack from a different vector than the far more common sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles also deployed in the region.  A saturation attack by many missiles at once, launched from different angles, and including multiple types of weapons, could potentially overwhelm defenses to deadly effect.

Given the volume of valuable commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, Tehran is investing in improving its ASBMs—and publicizing that effort to the world—as a means to build conventional military deterrence in a context of rising tensions with Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared earlier in October 2019.

Image: Reuters.

Sebastien Roblin

Security, Asia

To this day, the Vikrant’s combat operations in the Bay of Bengal remain the only carrier-based combat operations undertaken by an Asian state since World War II

Here's What You Need To Remember: By 1971, war clouds were again on the horizon between India and Pakistan due to Islamabad’s brutal repression of East Pakistan. This prompted millions of refugees to flee into India, prompting New Delhi to begin supporting insurgent supporting independence of the region from West Pakistan.

In the wake of the commissioning of China’s second aircraft carrier, it’s worth remembering that the People’s Republic of China is actually only the third Asian state to operate its own aircraft carrier. The first was Japan, which after a long hiatus following its World War II misadventures, is only just getting back into carrier operations.

Meanwhile, not only has the Indian Navy operated the powerful vessels for nearly sixty years, it also used them effectively in a map-changing war in 1971.

Back in 1957, New Delhi purchased the British Royal Navy’s Hercules, a Hermes-class light fleet carrier that was 75 percent complete when her construction was frozen in May 1946.

Hercules was towed to Belfast, Northern Ireland, where shipbuilder Harland and Wolff completed her in a configuration modernized for jet fighter operations with an angled flight deck and steam catapults. She was finally commissioned as the Vikrant (“Courageous”) in Indian Navy service on March 4, 1961.

As a light carrier, Vikrant was considerably smaller compared to her contemporaries, measuring only 210 meters long and displacing 17,600 tons. But her limited deck space was fine, as the Indian Navy was also busy building its naval air arm from scratch, procuring the first of 66 Hawker Sea Hawk jet fighters—mostly second-hand British and German aircraft—as well as 17 tubby piston-engine Breguet Alize anti-submarine aircraft.

After receiving training in the UK, an Indian Sea Hawk pilot performed the service’s first carrier landing on May 18, 1961. However, Vikrant subsequently sat out a 1965 conflict with Pakistan as she was undergoing a refit.

Conflict in the Bay of Bengal

By 1971, war clouds were again on the horizon between India and Pakistan due to Islamabad’s brutal repression of East Pakistan. This prompted millions of refugees to flee into India, prompting New Delhi to begin supporting insurgent supporting independence of the region from West Pakistan.

By late 1971, the government of Indra Ghandi was set on supporting Bengali revolutionaries seeking to eject the Pakistani military entirely.

Though only three of Vikrant’s four boilers were functioning, limiting her maximum speed to just 17 knots, naval command insisted she must participate in the coming conflict, lest a second no-show deal a blow to the Navy’s morale.

The Vikrant’s role was to maintain a naval blockade of East Pakistan—preventing the Pakistani Army from dispatching reinforcements or evacuating by sea. Once the ground campaign began—a lightning campaign in which helicopters and amphibious tanks were used to leap-frog across Bangladesh’s many rivers—the Vikrant’s air wing would focus on hammering Pakistani naval assets and port facilities.

The air wing’s main combat strength came from INAS 300 “White Tiger” squadron, equipped with eighteen Sea Hawk fighter bombers. With a maximum speed of 600 miles per hour, these would have been outclassed had they encountered the handful of F-86 Sabre’s the Pakistani Air Force had deployed to East Pakistan, but their true potential lay as stable ground-attack platforms armed with four 20-millimeter Hispano cannons, and up to four 500-pound bombs or sixteen 5” rockets.

The lumpy three-ma Alize patrol planes of INAS 310 “Cobra” Squadron were foremost designed to search for submarines using air-dropped sonobuoys and surface-search radar (to catch subs that were surfaced or snorkeling to recharge batteries) and then sink them with depth charges and homing torpedoes. However, they also could be adapted to a more conventional attack role carrying 68-millimeter rockets and bombs. 

The Alizes could fly long distances with their range of 1,000 miles, but would take a while doing so: though there maximum speed was 290 miles per hour, they frequently cruised at only half that. Their radars proved useful for maintaining the blockade by monitoring shipping traffic in lengthy patrols.

A third unit, INAS 321 “Angels” Squadron, operated Alouette III helicopters in the search-and-rescue and resupply role.

Ghazi Hunts Vikrant; Vikrant Hunts Ghazi

The Pakistani Navy concluded a lack of facilities and geographic vulnerability made it impractical to deploy major warships to East Pakistan, so its presence there was limited to squadron of four gunboats as well as smaller armed boats capable of navigating Bangladesh’s many rivers. Thus, the major naval battles of Indo-Pakistani war were fought on India’s western flank. 

However, the Pakistani Navy had one joker up its sleeve: the submarine PNS Ghazi, a former U.S. Tench-class submarine from World War II. Pakistan hoped that a lucky torpedo or two from Ghazi might sink Vikant, turning its losing hand in the Bay of Bengal into a winning one—or at least constrain Vikrant’s operations.

The Indian Navy was also aware of Ghazi’s presence in the sector and made sinking her a priority.

The website Mission Vikrant 71 collects numerous fascinating anecdotes that convey the experience of the sailors and aviators onboard the Vikrant—including one account by pilot Richard Clarke describing Indian anti-submarine operations.

On the second day of the war on December 4, the Vikrat was cruising off the Andaman islands when her lookouts reported spotting a periscope. Clarke scrambled his Alize into the sky loaded with depth charges and headed towards a “distinct ripple.” He released the depth charges on target and was received by jubilant crew upon landing on deck. 

But Clarke recalled that upon being summoned for debriefing, “I very sheepishly had to tell the Fleet Commander that there in fact there was no submarine in the crystal clear blue waters below the ripple when I flew over it. But I realized this only seconds before the depth charges exploded”

In fact, on December 3 Ghazi failed to locate Vikrant and instead moved to deploy mines at the entrance of Visakhapatnam port, the site of the Indian naval HQ. Around midnight on December 3-4 mysterious circumstances caused the submarine to sink with the loss of all 92 aboard.

Whether this was a result of depth charges launched by the Indian destroyer Rajput, a collision with the sea floor while attempting to dodge those depth charges, or due to a mishap during minelaying remains controversial.

Either way, the sinking left Vikrant with a free hand. Starting December 4, her Sea Hawks and Alizes flew nearly 300 sorties hammering Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar and Khulna, sinking numerous small ships and setting fuel stores on fire. One tanker in Chittagong was blasted into three segments.

The carrier also used electronic warfare to locate Pakistani gun boats and dispatch air strikes to sink them.

The carrier-based warplanes encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire, and often returned pocked with shrapnel and bullet holes—though none were lost in the fourteen-day war.

As the Indian Navy began dispatching small amphibious landing forces to cut off retreating Pakistani troops, it also needed intelligence to determine appropriate landing zones. Therefore, Alizes also flew low and slow photo reconnaissance missions with a crewmember using a hand operated F24 camera to obtain the necessary information to plan the landing operations

Cut off from reinforcements, with riverine assets largely sunk from the air (and even one occasion, by amphibious tanks), and unable to evacuate by sea, Pakistani army forces in East Pakistan surrendered on December 16, resulting in the creation of present-day Bangladesh. 

Afterwards, according to 300 squadron officer Gurnham Singh, when one of the carrier’s Alouette helicopters was dispatched ashore on a resupply mission—pilots from 300 squadron requested the chopper crew return with some war booty: spicy Chittagong pickles. This wish was granted when the chopper returned bearing 30 kilos of the spicy pickles plus paratha flat breads.

To this day, the Vikrant’s combat operations in the Bay of Bengal remain the only carrier-based combat operations undertaken by an Asian state since World War II.

Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. This article first appeared earlier this year.

Image: Wikipedia.

Charlie Gao

Technology, Americas

The Glock 46 stands as a stark counterpoint to those who say the company cannot innovate.

Here's What You Need To Remember: For all its advanced features, the Glock 46 has only been adopted by one agency, the state police of Saxony-Anhalt, replacing SIG P225s. Other recent Glock adopters appear to have opted for more traditional Glocks. However, for future contracts, the innovative Glock 46 could be Glock’s answer to an increasingly competitive polymer pistol market.

Glock GmbH is criticized by some for being one of the least innovative companies in the gun industry. The basic design of a Glock pistol has changed very little from the original Generation 1 Glock: the majority of changes through the generations are slight changes to the trigger layout and the addition of rails and other ergonomic features. This has led some to say that Glock cannot innovate.

However, the Glock 46 stands as a stark counterpoint to those who say so. Utilizing a rotating barrel system and a redesigned striker system, the Glock 46 is a total rethinking of the Glock design, different in almost every way.

The rotating barrel likely makes the Glock 46 softer shooting than its tilting barrel counterparts. Other pistols with rotating barrels, such as Beretta’s Px4, Grand Power’s K100, and Archon/Arsenal’s Stryk B all are known for their pleasant recoil. It also provides some accuracy benefits. Glock’s approach to the rotating barrel appears to address some concerns leveled at other pistols with rotating barrels, which can be difficult to field strip. Glock’s barrel appears to put two camming pins on the barrel itself, as opposed to the Px4 which places a camming surface on the barrel itself. The change in the placement of the rotating parts could make the Glock 46’s field strip simpler than some of its rotating barrel competition.

The striker is also significantly redesigned, with a new backplate on the rear of the slide. Apparently, the striker can be removed from the pistol by rotating a lever on the back plate and pulling the mechanism out, eliminating the need to drop the striker by pulling the trigger when disassembling the pistol. As many of Glock’s competitors (including the H&K VP9 and Sig P320) have advertised their ability to disassemble without pulling the trigger, Glock finally appears to have caught up and revised one of their pistols to do the same.

The Glock 46 also features a manual safety, likely to fulfill departmental requirements, and a revised grip. The safety is likely optional, as early prototypes of the Glock 46 were shown without it. The 46 has a significantly extended beavertail, which probably eliminates complaints of “Glock bite” that some shooters experience with other Glock pistols. The backstrap system is similarly revised to work with the new beavertail.

For all its advanced features, the Glock 46 has only been adopted by one agency, the state police of Saxony-Anhalt, replacing SIG P225s. Other recent Glock adopters appear to have opted for more traditional Glocks. However, for future contracts, the innovative Glock 46 could be Glock’s answer to an increasingly competitive polymer pistol market.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national security issues. This article first appeared earlier this year,

Image: Creative Commons

Kyle Mizokami

History, Middle East

The F-15I was made for the IDF and this special version performed well.

Key Point: Even today, Israel loves its F-15I fighter jets. These vaunted aircraft have fought in many battles and won.

One of the fighter jets most associated with Israel is the F-15 Eagle. The first F-15 touched down in Israel in 1976 and the jet has served continuously—and without defeat—since. In 1998, the Israeli Air Force introduced a new version of the jet, one designed for air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. The Ra’am (Thunder) serves as the long-range striking arm of the Israeli Air Force, complementing the new F-35I Adir fighter to ensure Israeli air superiority now and into the foreseeable future.

This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

The earliest versions of the McDonnell Douglas (today Boeing) F-15 Eagle were pure air-to-air fighters. Large twin-engine, single-seat fighters, they featured a bubble canopy for excellent visibility, a powerful APG-63 radar, a combat load of four AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided missiles and four AIM-9 Sidewinder infrared-guided missiles, and an M61 Gatling gun. The two Pratt & Whitney F100 engines gave the F-15 such an impressive power-to-weight ratio that the new jet could easily accelerate straight up.

The F-15 was large and versatile enough that engineers considered a multirole version, one that took advantage of the F-15’s power, range, and size to carry air-to-ground weapons. This led to the development of the F-15E Strike Eagle, which entered service with the U.S. Air Force in 1989 and promptly saw service in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 

The Strike Eagle’s performance in the Gulf War stirred Israeli interest. The Gulf War had not exactly gone as planned for Tel Aviv, which had been bombarded by Scud missiles launched by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Israel acquiesced to U.S. pressure not to retaliate, but even if it had decided to do so it lacked the long-range aircraft and reconnaissance assets necessary to hunt Scud launchers in Western Iraq. Saddam Hussein remained in power after the war to eject his army from Kuwait, ensuring that Iraq would remain a threat to Israel. Meanwhile, Iran was in the early stages of its nuclear weapons program. A long-range fighter would be a necessary weapon for deterring, or failing that destroying, threats from the east. 

An Israeli Strike Eagle would go a long way toward fixing the Israeli Air Force’s shortcomings. The F-15E’s conformal fuel tanks would add range the range necessary to attack long-range targets. The dual air-to-air/air-to-ground capability meant an F-15E could self-escort if necessary. (In 1981, Israeli F-15s escorted F-16s tasked to destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak, enlarging the air group and the need for aerial refueling and other support.) A single plane that could do it all, that the Israel Air Force already knew very well, was an intriguing option. 

Israel selected the F-15I, or Ra’am, in May 1994 with an initial agreement to buy twenty-one aircraft (known as Peace Fox V) with a further option for four more (Peace Fox VI.) The order was increased to twenty-five aircraft in 1995. The F-15 had already served in the Israeli Air Force for fifteen years, and Israeli engineers had plenty of ideas on how to improve on the platform. Israeli Aerospace Industries worked with manufacturer Boeing (which had since purchased McDonnell Douglas) to contribute many of the aircraft’s avionics. 

The F-15I hosted a number of indigenous features. The aircraft had an Israeli-made central computer, GPS/inertial guidance system, and an Elbit display and sight helmet (DASH). The airplanes were delivered with electronic warfare systems built into the F-15E, instead of using the Israeli Elisra SPS-2110 Integrated Electronic Warfare System. 

The F-15I could carry all the weapons Israeli F-15As carried and then some. The Ra’am initially carried AIM-9L Sidewinder and Python infrared-guided short-range missiles, but time has narrowed that down to the Python. The fighter also carried both the older AIM-7 Sparrow and newer AIM-120 AMRAAM radar-guided medium-range missile. 

The F-15I’s twin engines and large airframe mean can carry up to 18,000 pounds of fuel and munitions. The Israeli Air Force originally described the jet’s ordnance load as thirty-six Rockeye cluster bombs or six Maverick air-to-ground missiles. Today, the F-15I’s air-to-ground munitions set has expanded to include Paveway laser-guided bombs, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) satellite-guided bombs, BLU-109 “bunker-buster” bombs, the SPICE precision-guided bomb, and AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles. 

The first F-15I arrived in Israel in 1997, with new aircraft arriving at about once a month until the order was fulfilled in 1999. The aircraft served continuously over the past twenty years, not only in training exercises but anti-terrorism operations, the 2006 Lebanon War, the Gaza War, Operation Pillar of Defense, and Operation Cast Lead. The F-15Is were also heavily involved in Israeli planning to strike Iranian nuclear facilities had Iran, a strike headed off by the signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the West.

The IAF’s adoption of the F-35I “Adir” fighter did not dampen the country’s enthusiasm for the F-15. The IAF still calls the aircraft its “strategic aircraft,” with the head of the Air Force stating, “At the end of the day, when we want to reach far distances with few aircraft many arms - the F-15I wins.” 

In 2016, Israel announced the start of an upgrade program meant to keep the F-15I relevant, including a new active, electronically-scanned array radar and updated avionics. In 2018, the IAF was reportedly torn between purchasing F-15I and F-35 fighters, leaning towards the former over the latter. If Israel purchases more F-15s, it will almost certainly end up flying the platform for the better part of a century. That’s a ringing endorsement for a warplane first flown in the early 1970s.

Kyle Mizokami is a writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he co-founded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch.

This first appeared earlier this year and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Charlie Gao

Technology,

The Glock 43 marked a significant change in Glock’s product line when it was released.

Here's What You Need To Remember: With its extended grip, proven Glock operating action, and slim profile the Glock 43X remains one of the best choices for those looking for a concealed carry pistol on the current market. Glocks are some of the most popular pistols in the world for a reason: they just work.

The Glock 43 marked a significant change in Glock’s product line when it was released. Featuring a single-stack magazine instead of Glock’s usual double stack, the 43 aimed to be more concealable than Glock’s earlier subcompacts, like the Glock 26. The earlier subcompacts were often criticized for being too thick, as they were practically the same thickness as the full-size models to accommodate the same magazines as larger Glock models.

But the switch to single stack meant that Glock had to make an entirely new frame and slide, a significant investment for a single pistol. With the Glock 43X, Glock appears to be building a full family of single-stack pistols based on the Glock 43.

Like Glock’s other “Crossover” models (indicated by the X), the Glock 43X features a longer grip compared to the slide length. This was first tested with the Glock 19X, which paired a full-length Glock 17 grip with a shorter Glock 19 frame and dust cover. As there wasn’t a “full size” single-stack Glock when the 43X was made, the Glock 43X just features a longer grip meant to accommodate a full hand grip, compared to the original Glock 43 which features a short grip that may require a magazine extension for the pinky.

Interestingly, the 43X on its initial release featured only a PVD-coated stainless steel slide, breaking from Glock’s tradition of using a black Tenifer or nDLC coating on their slide. Glock’s decision to do this is uncertain, however, the 43X is a rather atypical model already in their product line being a Crossover, so the stainless slide is probably another aspect meant to make it even more distinctive. However, all black 43Xs were released in July, so the initial stainless 43X slide release could have been a marketing move.

Shooting wise, the 43X is just another Glock. Being released in 2019, it’s a fifth-generation Glock and thus benefits from the improved trigger and marksman barrel characteristic of the fifth-gen. Most reviewers appear to appreciate the improved shootability the longer Crossover grip brings, along with the increased ten-round capacity in the mag.

However, the Glock 43X may face stiff competition in the subcompact market from other recently released subcompacts. Sig Sauer, Inc. has the P365 line with a thirteen round capacity. Springfield Armory’s Hellcat is also competing in the subcompact market and features optic cuts standard on all pistols. The P365 has optic cuts as an optional upgrade on the P365XL model.

Glock has its own optic-ready models with the MOS system, but the only MOS Glocks are double-stack models as the MOS optic cut has only been engineered for wide slides. While some third-party manufacturers are already offering to mill Glock 43 slides for optics, Glock has not yet made a factory optics cut for the Glock 43 or any of its derivatives, which could hurt its competitiveness versus competing models.

However, with its extended grip, proven Glock operating action, and slim profile the Glock 43X remains one of the best choices for those looking for a concealed carry pistol on the current market. Glocks are some of the most popular pistols in the world for a reason: they just work.

Charlie Gao studied Political and Computer Science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national security issues. This article first appeared last year.

Image: Reddit.

James Jay Carafano, Ana Quintana

Women,

The United States now has a cabinet-level strategy to help women in underprivileged countries before conflicts, during the violence, and in the peace-building process.

Three years ago this week, the United States became a world leader in women’s empowerment. That’s when, in one of President Donald Trump’s first official acts in office, the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act was signed into law.

The United States now has a cabinet-level strategy to help women in underprivileged countries before conflicts, during the violence, and in the peace-building process. Yes, WPS is international in scope, but it is not some vanity nation-building exercise. Strict criteria determine when to engage and where. Activities are undertaken only in countries where it will advance U.S. national security interests.

The United States is the first—and so far only—country with such a law on its books. Yet waiting for other nations or international organizations to lead on this issue was not an option. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a women’s peace and security resolution in 2000. Twenty years and nine additional frivolous resolutions later, no UNSC member other than the United States has yet to translate the resolutions’ words into law, much less action. 

Women’s empowerment is not a “feminist issue” or a “wedge issue” of gender politics. Conservatives understand the unique value of women in families and communities and why it should be tied to foreign policy. 

Complementing the security portion of their women’s agenda, is the administration’s hallmark Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Initiative (WGDP). Through funding from United States and private sector sources, this initiative aims to economically empower 50 million women by 2025. Historically, U.S. assistance has often been channeled to ineffective non-governmental organizations or corrupt governments. This initiative by-passes those middlemen and bureaucracies, sending funds directly to dynamic, grassroots change-makers and allowing them to generate prosperity via free markets. 

Women’s empowerment should not be viewed as a charitable contribution. Supporting them is based on a calculated, U.S. interests-driven assessment. Investing in their futures can prevent the rise of repressive regimes and extremist organizations. 

How? As the primary caregivers, women are the first to see warning signs of radicalism and impending violence. If a problem or conflict does break out, women have historically been the first to speak out. 

Need an example? When Al Qaeda terrorists occupied Timbuktu in Mali, local women rallied against the militants and their imposition of sharia law. After the terrorists ravaged and left the African city, women became politically engaged to prevent their return. 

Closer to home, Mexico has found that replacing police officers with women was found to reduce corruption and increase action against drug cartels. 

From these examples, we can see that WPS, implemented wisely, has the potential to be a low- investment, high-yield tool for advancing U.S. interests. As the old maxim tells us, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. And promoting stability before conflicts emerge means keeping peace keepers and troops at home. 

Of course, not every country is on board with such initiatives. Nations like the People’s Republic of China and the theocracy in Iran are dead set on challenging this agenda, and Beijing and their ideological allies are successfully co-opting the UN system to advance their destructive ideology. 

China, Cuba, and Russia will once again win seats on the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) this year. Like wolves in sheeps’ clothing, they don the cloak of UN legitimacy while violating human rights (up-to and including genocide against the Uighurs) and launching illegal military campaigns. Clearly, it is past time to get the UN back in order.

In the meanwhile, expect the current administration to continue leading the free world on women’s empowerment. Inconsequential forums and toothless resolutions are no measure of success. Vulnerable women and the American taxpayer deserve meaningful action and tangible, positive outcomes. 

U.S. public diplomacy and civil society efforts are now making a difference. They have overcome legal barriers to women’s participation in the Colombia peace processes. They are staunching radicalization in countries like Nigeria. Their in-the-field programs in Burma, Somalia and Venezuela are strengthening women’s abilities to rebuild their countries. 

This kind of foreign policy is long overdue. 

A Heritage Foundation vice president, James Jay Carafano directs the think tank’s research on matters of national security and foreign relations. Ana Quintana is a senior policy analyst in Heritage’s Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies.

Charlie Gao

Security,

The Glock 19 is one of the most popular guns on the planet.

Here's What You Need To Remember: While all of these trends cannot be solely attributed to the Glock 19, it’s probably fair to attribute some responsibility to it. As the “gold standard” of what a modern pistol should be, most firearm designers are acutely aware of what it does well and what it does poorly.

The Glock 19 is one of the most popular guns on the planet. Police, militaries, and paramilitaries on almost every continent carry them daily. As a result, the Glock 19’s design has heavily influenced designers at competing firms. Here are some ways the Glock 19 has been influential on the firearms market.

1. Size:

While originally billed as a “compact” handgun, the Glock 19 managed to fit 15 rounds into a package that was lighter and smaller than most full-size duty handguns at the time. As a result, many departments bought them as standard-issue handguns, cutting down on the weight and bulk of their sidearms. The proliferation of the Glock 19 as a standard-issue gun made its form factor the standard worldwide. Most new pistols are designed to be as similar sized as possible to the Glock 19, as the longer barrel and grip of older duty pistols have been largely made redundant.

This can be seen in CZ releasing the P-10C, the “Compact” version of their P-10 pistol as the initial version, releasing the full-sized P-10F only a few years later. Similar trends can be seen in the sizing of the Walther PPQ and PPS pistols, as well as Beretta’s APX.

2. Light Rails:

While the Glock 19 is excellent in most aspects, one possible weakness is its semi-proprietary “Glock rail” used to mount weapon lights. While most Picatinny-compatible flashlights will fit on the Glock rail, the single cross slot limits the options when it comes to moving lights forward and back on the rail. As a result, most of Glock’s competitors use a standard Picatinny-spec three-slot rail to offer more flexibility and compatibility than the Glock 19. Even custom frames like the Polymer80 frame for the Glock 19 ditch the Glock rail for a standard three-shot Picatinny.

In this specific case, the Glock 19 was more influential in showing what not to do than what to do, but influential nonetheless. While proprietary rails were popular in the 1990s, they are all but gone today. 

3. Sights:

In another example of “what not to do”, Glocks have long been infamous for the plastic sights that they ship with from the factory. The stock plastic sights on the Glock, while clear and readable enough, are known for subpar durability, easily wearing down if one carries or uses the gun a lot. While Glock offers metal sights from the factory for serious contracts, plenty of guns still ship without them.

This has also driven plenty of Glock competitors to ship only with metal sights from the factory as an option as a way to one-up the Glock.

While all of these trends cannot be solely attributed to the Glock 19, it’s probably fair to attribute some responsibility to it. As the “gold standard” of what a modern pistol should be, most firearm designers are acutely aware of what it does well and what it does poorly.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This article first appeared last year.

Image: Reddit.

Nikola Zečević

Religion,

The Orthodox Church in Montenegro has already played a crucial role in two turning political points in the contemporary history of the small Mediterranean country.

The parliamentary elections in Montenegro brought the first and historic change last month. The Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) has ruled continuously since the first post-communist elections (1990) while going through various phases of ideological transformations and adjustments. Despite frequent and serious accusations of corruption, kleptocracy, the effect of the captured state, etc. it had the open support of Western countries. Its leader, Milo Djukanovic, achieved a convincing victory (53.9 percent of the vote) in the first round of the 2018 presidential election, which gave him confidence to proclaim a renewal of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church as one of the main principles in the new DPS party program.

A religious organization under such name already operates in Montenegro, at least since 1993. However, it is not canonical, has a low number of members, and is officially unrecognized in the Orthodox world. On the other hand, the Orthodox Church in Montenegro, or OCM (a part of the Serbian Orthodox Church since 1920), is the only canonical Orthodox Church in the country and one of the most popular institutions among Montenegrin citizens. Before 1920 it was independent and de facto autocephalous.

However, at the end of 2019, the government of Montenegro initiated the adoption of the Law on Freedom of Religion or Beliefs and the Legal Status of Religious Communities, with the aim of (re)nationalization of the OCM’s property, through administrative procedures instead of court proceedings. In this way. DPS wanted to subordinate the OCM to the state and force its dignitaries to enter the process of restoring autocephaly and separate from the Serbian Orthodox Church, following the example of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine (whose autocephaly was partially recognized in 2019). Djukanovic even stated on several occasions that if OCM refused to be a part of such a solution, a new church “for Orthodox Montenegrins” would be formed. However, OCM rejected such ideas and started protests (in the form of religious processions called Litiyás) against the disputed law, assessing it as unconstitutional and discriminatory. Tens of thousands of people of different political preferences had consistently protested against the controversial law every week, since the beginning of 2020 until the escalation of the coronavirus pandemic, after which public gatherings were banned.

Nevertheless, the negotiations between the government and the church on amending and enforcing the law began in March. However, after the first meeting, the government postponed the continuation of negotiations for four months. This caused strong dissatisfaction within the church, which demanded the withdrawal or amendment of the disputed law. In that sense, the OCM’s Metropolitan Amfilohije publicly invited the citizens not to vote for the ruling parties in the upcoming elections, announcing the continuation of the Litiyás. Following this statement, unofficial opinion polls showed a dramatic change and a sharp drop of DPS in ratings. The government soon initiated the resumption of negotiations with OCM in July, offering significant concessions, including amending of the disputed articles but asked the OCM only to register in accordance with the new law. The church rejected this offer, arguing that its contemporary registration would mean the loss of its historical and legal continuity.

One week before the elections, Metropolitan Amfilohije addressed the public again and called on all Montenegrin citizens to go to the polls and vote against the ruling parties. The OCM justified its open interference in the electoral process with the example of the 1948 election in Italy, when the Roman Catholic Church openly supported Christian Democrats versus the left-wing coalition. Although all public opinion polls, before Metropolitan’s statement, which showed that the turnout in the elections would be between 66 and 68 percent, something unexpected happened: as many as 76 percent of voters went to the polls on August 30.

The DPS won 35 percent, and its “traditional coalition partners” close to 14 percent of the vote. However, the three opposition coalitions (For the Future of Montenegro, Peace is Our Nation, Black on White) won over 50 percent of the vote, which secured them a narrow majority in parliament.

The head of the coalition is a pro-Western and Christian Democratic oriented professor named Zdravko Krivokapic, who is also a new majority’s candidate for the prime minister. However, the backbone of this group is mostly pro-Serbian, conservative coalition Democratic Front. Although its member, the Movement for Changes, has formed a separate parliamentary club, with a pro-NATO and pro-EU platform, the two remaining constituents of the coalition (New Serb Democracy and Democratic People’s Party) are openly Russophilic and strongly influenced by the Serbian president Aleksandar Vucic. For these reasons, their leaders are targeted as undesirable in sensitive positions in the government, especially in defense and security departments.

The Peace is Our Nation coalition is led by the pro-European and catch-all party, Democratic Montenegro. Its leader, Aleksa Becic, was recently elected as a speaker of the Montenegrin parliament. The Black on White coalition is led by the pro-European and green party United Reform Action (URA) and its progressive leader Dritan Abazovic. The leaders of the three coalitions signed a promising agreement that Montenegro will not change its foreign policy principles, including its pro-EU and pro-NATO orientation. They also called for minority parties (mostly Bosniak and Albanian) to enter the new government.

On the other hand, the Democratic Party of Socialists, although responsible for Montenegro's long-standing pro-Western course, has produced a number of serious affairs related to political corruption. DPS also showed overt unwillingness for electoral and judicial reforms. That is why Freedom House has recently marked Montenegro as a “Hybrid Regime” for the first time since 2003. The conflict with the church, as the most influential religious institution in the country, dealt a final blow to the DPS.

The Orthodox Church in Montenegro has already played a crucial role in two turning political points in the contemporary history of the small Mediterranean country. In 1997, OCM supported the pro-Western-oriented Djukanovic against the pro-Milosevic-oriented candidate Momir Bulatovic, which significantly contributed to Djukanovic's victory. Also, in the time of the Montenegrin independence referendum (2006), despite its preference for preserving a state union with Serbia, the OCM was neutral and did not interfere.

Its leader Metropolitan Amfilohije, in spite of his anti-NATO discourse and occasional EU-skepticism, supported the aforementioned agreement between the leaders of the three coalitions on the pro-EU and pro-NATO orientation of the future government. It is interesting to mention that, as a moderate ecumenist and erstwhile Greek student, he played a crucial role for the Serbian Orthodox Church regarding taking part in the Pan-Orthodox Council of Crete (2016), which was strongly opposed by the Russian Orthodox Church. Although his statements are usually harsh and controversial, he recently showed an enviable dose of pragmatism and openness to cooperation with Western political factors.

Finally, it should be emphasized that secularism is one of the basic principles of modern civilization, which can be threatened by both the state and the church. OCM indeed previously questioned the secular order of the society, (but only declaratively) through interference in the political issues, most often through the criticism of foreign policy of the government. On the other hand, the (former) ruling elite seriously violated the principle of secularism by announcing the formation of a new Orthodox church and by trying to nationalize the church property with a controversial law, which, at the same time, ultimately relativized one of the basic human rights: the right to property.

And so, this backlash occurred.

Nikola Zečević is a teaching fellow at the University of Donja Gorica in Podgorica, Montenegro.

Image: Reuters.

Stephen Silver

Technology,

Sure, the pandemic has many relooking what sorts of media they pay for. A new report breaks down where those trends could head.

Subscription TV revenue, from cable and satellite, was $94.2 billion last year. But the pandemic, as has been widely reported, has seen cord-cutting trends escalate quickly. A new report says that decline is likely to continue.

According to a new report from PriceWaterhouseCoopers, called U.S. Edition: Entertainment & Media Outlook 2020‑2024, revenues from subscription TV will drop by 2.9 percent compound annual growth rate through 2024, when they are seen at $81.4 billion.

This will happen, the report said, due to “wide acceptance and demand for SVOD platforms as well as competition from vMVPD offerings.”

The news wasn’t all bad for pay TV, as the firm says the U.S. remains the biggest market in the world for pay TV by far, and that the rate of decline in pay TV “will likely lessen towards the end of the forecast period.”

Also, there’s a chance cable could get better.

“Traditional pay-TV providers will focus on optimizing programming as a lever to increase video profitability, as well as continued investments in personalization, aggregation, speed and the best-possible digital experience,” the report said.

In its other findings, the PriceWaterhouseCoopers report looked at entertainment and media, how they’ve been affected by the coronavirus pandemic, and how they might recover. 

Overall, the firm sees the entertainment and media industries pulling in $2 trillion in revenue in 2020, a drop from $2.1 trillion in 2019. But that number is seen increasing to $2.2 trillion in 2021 and hitting $2.5 trillion by 2024. 

Also, even before the pandemic, PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that revenue for overall subscription video-on-demand (SVOD, or subscription streaming services like Netflix) overtook that of the movie box office in 2019. The gap increased, of course, with movie theaters closed for much of 2021, but it’s still seen widening in future years, with revenues from SVOD doubling those of the box office by 2024. 

“As recently as 2015, box office revenues were three times those of the SVOD (subscription video on demand) sector. Having caught up with the box office sector in 2019, SVOD is now projected to surge away in the coming five years, reaching twice the size of the box office in 2024,” the report said.

The report also predicted that the sorts of industries that have been decimated by the pandemic- movie theaters, live music venues and trade shows—will “struggle to regain their footing in the coming years,” and aren’t expected to reach pre-pandemic levels until “at least” 2024. 

“In effect, people cocooned in their residences set about constructing their own bundles of content by purchasing or subscribing to all-you-can-eat packages of video, music, content, exercise and experiences,” the report said of consumer behavior during the pandemic. 

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for the National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Sebastien Roblin

Security, Middle East

And the consequences of that near clash are still playing out.

Here's What You Need To Remember: These acts are Tehran’s way of signaling it can and will retaliate if the United States maintains its economic vice. Iran couldn’t “win” a war versus the United States—Iran’s annual defense budget costs roughly the same as a single U.S. aircraft carrier—but it could cause losses in amounting to tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in disrupted trade, and a terrible toll in human lives, not just drones and damaged tanker hulls.

By most accounts, the United States and Iran came within minutes of armed conflict with each other on June 20, 2019.

Around 4:30 AM that morning, a U.S. Navy RQ-4N Global Hawk spy drone flying a routine circuit over international airspace in the Persian Gulf was shot down by an Iranian Ra’ad surface-to-air missile system.

Later that day, U.S. forces were ostensibly “ten minutes” away from striking three Iranian bases likely with air- and sea-launched missiles when President Donald Trump changed his mind and canceled the attack. He later cited concerns that killing an estimated 150 Iranians over the loss of an unmanned drone was a disproportionate response.

Since the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from a nuclear deal with Iran in May 2018, it has waged a “maximum pressure campaign” on Tehran through economic sanctions. Iran had been complying with the JCPOA nuclear deal, which sharply restricted its nuclear technologies and opened sites to foreign inspectors in exchange for allowing Western companies access to the Iranian market. However, the deal’s critics complained the JCPOA did not regulate Iran’s rapidly improving ballistic missile capabilities nor address Iran’s involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, and support for Hezbollah.

For one year, Tehran continued adhering to the JCPOA. However, the destabilizing effects of the new sanctions proved intolerable.

Iran’s oil exports have diminished to one-fifth their previous level, from 2.5 million barrels per day to 500,000. The sanctions also scared away most European investment, even though European signatories to the nuclear deal still adhere to the JCPOA. This has resulted in a devastating recession, with Iran’s economy shrinking 4-6 percent and Iranian citizens being affected by 40-60 percent inflation, and unemployment projected to rise from 12 to 26 percent.

But though the sanctions imposed by Washington inflicted the intended damage, they succeeded only in angering, not cowing, Iran’s leaders. 

Just as the United States’s stark political divisions arguably were decisive in Trump’s withdrawal from the Obama-era JCPOA, Iran’s competing power centers were divided over the agreement. Those supporting limited compromises with West have been made to look foolish, giving ammunition to the hardline religious factions and their Revolutionary Guard Corps paramilitaries.

Thus, Tehran is now retaliating with a “maximum pressure” campaign of its own. Iran cannot use sanctions to punish America, but it can inflict economic pain by threatening the valuable shipping lanes running from Persian Gulf ports, through the straits of Hormuz, and into the Gulf of Oman.

During the Cold War, Soviet premier Nikita Kruschev famously said “[West] Berlin is the testicle of the West. When I want the West to scream, I squeeze on Berlin.” The Persian Gulf is Iran’s West Berlin.

One-third of all the world’s oil passes through Hormuz. Both the Gulf and the Straits are quite narrow—only twenty-one miles at the latter’s narrowest point—and shallow, with only one or two viable transit lanes through which large tankers can pass at parts. The north-eastern half of the Gulf coast is Iranian territory, meaning Iranian units can stage fast boats and long-range missile batteries for attacks at any point along that roughly 1,000-mile coastline. 

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy has trained to launch hit-and-run attacks on both military and commercial shipping using swarms of fast, expendable motor boats, naval mines, and long-range anti-ship missiles. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran also used oil platforms, islands and even converted tankers to stage forces for attacks.

Iran’s regular (“Artesh”) Navy includes over two dozen small mini-submarines and divers equipped with swimmer-delivery vehicles (SDVs) well suited to hiding in the noisy, shallow crags of the Gulf to launch surprise torpedo attacks or deploy mines in key shipping lanes.

Consider, then, the sequence of events since May 2019.

On May 12, four merchant ships anchored off the Gulf of Oman by the United Arab Emirates were sabotaged with limpet mines. Investigators noted the precision with which they were laid suggested elite combat divers.

Then on June 13, another two tankers—the Norwegian Front Altair and the Japanese Kokuka Courageous—experienced fiery blasts within minutes of each other at 3 AM. Iranian vessels rescued most of their crews and fired a man-portable anti-aircraft missile (that missed) at a U.S. MQ-9 drone observing the scene. The crew of an IRGCN patrol boat was also filmed removing an unexploded limpet mine from the side of the Kokuka Courageous.

Iran clearly had both the means (it’s specialized naval forces) and motive (retaliating against the maximum pressure campaign) for the attacks, the precise and nigh-simultaneous execution of which seem calculated to signal Iranian authorship, while maintaining a veneer of deniability for propaganda purposes. 

On June 17, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced Iran would recommence enriching higher-grade uranium in violation of the nuclear deal.

Three days later, the Revolutionary Guard Corps shot down the U.S. Navy drone—possibly without Rouhani’s approval. Iranian and American accounts disagree as to whether the drone had violated Iranian airspace, but bear in mind the slow, conspicuous and expensive RQ-4 is not designed to overfly hostile airspace. 

These acts are Tehran’s way of signaling it can and will retaliate if the United States maintains its economic vice. Iran couldn’t “win” a war versus the United States—Iran’s annual defense budget costs roughly the same as a single U.S. aircraft carrier—but it could cause losses in amounting to tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in disrupted trade, and a terrible toll in human lives, not just drones and damaged tanker hulls.

Some anti-Iranian ideologues like National Security Advisor John Bolton, and like-minded national leaders in Israel and Saudi Arabia, have believed the high costs of a war are worth paying to suppress Iran’s nuclear research program. (Conveniently for America’s allies, that cost would be born foremost by the United States.) Those who see war with Iran as desirable and “winnable” may hope Iran’s escalation will “gift” America with a causus belli.

But what would a U.S. “victory” in such a war even look like? The Pentagon certainly has no appetite for an invasion and occupation of Iran, which has twice the population of Iraq. A prolonged air war—the more likely outcome—could kill thousands, and deplete stocks of expensive standoff-range missiles, without necessarily succeeding at destroying Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile technologies in their hardened underground shelters. 

Meanwhile, Iran would retaliate with asymmetric warfare across the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and potentially beyond. Nor could the United States necessarily control the duration of the war. Remember, Iran pressed on with the Iran-Iraq war for six more bloody years after it had mostly expelled invading Iraqi troops. 

Washington instinctively wishes to punish Iran so as not to reward its aggressive tactics. For example, after canceling the air strikes, the Trump ordered a cyber attack on Iran’s missile systems, and on June 24 placed new sanctions on Supreme Leader Ali Khameini. Rouhani responded by describing Trump as “mentally retarded” and announced plans to abrogate additional provisions of the JCPOA, while his foreign minister stated this marked “the permanent closure of the path of diplomacy.”

Trying to one-up the Iranians in tit-for-tat aggravations—one cyber attack, downed drone, imposed sanction and broken treaty obligation at time—is a losing game. Tehran is simply unlikely to respond constructively to threats of “obliteration.”

If America wants Iran to change its behavior, it will have to re-establish ruptured lines of communication and re-create genuine incentives for diplomacy, rather than leading with threats of war and crushing sanctions. After all, the danger of devastating and messy regional war already underpins Iran’s own deterrence-based security strategy in the Persian Gulf—and games of chicken where neither side de-escalates end badly for everyone involved.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

This article first appeared last year. It is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikipedia.

Sebastien Roblin

Security,

Referring back to the Battle of Britain can reveal a limitation of this strategy.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Stealth technology is more effective at a distance. Although there are a number of methods to detect stealth fighters at long range, they generally don’t permit weapons to lock on to them.

In Len Deighton’s book Fighter, he describes the tactics used by the outnumbered English fighter pilots defending against German Luftwaffe bombers in the Battle of Britain:

The professional fighter pilot gained height as quickly as he was permitted, and treasured possession of that benefit. He hoped always to spot the enemy before they spotted him and hurried to the sun side of them to keep himself invisible. He needed superior speed, so he positioned himself for a diving attack, and he would choose a victim at the very rear of the enemy formation so that he did not have to fly through their gunfire. He would hope to kill on that first dive. If he failed, the dedicated professional would flee rather than face an alerted enemy.

Deighton’s point was that the best British pilots used hit-and-run tactics emphasizing surprise and speed in order to minimize losses, rather than dogfighting at length with enemies after those advantages were spent. These tactics permitted small numbers of British fighters to tackle the aerial armadas of the German Luftwaffe.

Obviously, technology has changed dramatically since 1940. While contemporary fighters can now go more than five times as fast as the Spitfires and Messerschmitt fighters of the Battle of Britain, two new technologies promise to make hit-and-run tactics more effective: stealth technology and long-range air-to-air missiles.

Stealth and Its Limits

While virtually any plane can be equipped to fire long-range missiles, stealth airframes are built using radar-absorbent materials and engineered precisely to minimize reflection of radar waves. This constrains their load-carrying abilities, as external weapons or drop tanks could increase their visibility on radar. The United States fields two stealth fighters, the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II.

Stealth planes are properly described as “Low Observable” aircraft. They are not actually undetectable, but are very hard to spot on radar. Let’s review the limits on stealth technology, and how fighter doctrine may evolve around them.

Stealth aircraft are optimized to be difficult to observe on the precise X-Band radars used on modern fighters: while some radars have better resolutions than others, most will only be able to track a stealth fighter at shorter distances. An F-22 is claimed to have the radar cross section of 0.0001 square meters in certain aspect—the same as that of a marble.

Low-bandwidth radars are more effective at detecting stealth aircraft. These are typically used by ground installations and ships, but also found on specialized aerial platforms such as the E-2D. However, they come with a major limitation: they can reveal only the general location of a stealth fighter and are too imprecise to be used to target missiles—though they can indicate to an X-Band radar where to look.

Infra-Red Search-and Track (IRST) systems offer another means of detecting stealth aircraft, but their range is generally limited. The latest IRST system on the SU-35 has extended the range up to 50 kilometers, whereas its radar has detection range of up to 200 kilometers. Just like low-band radar, IRST doesn’t give a precise track and can’t be used to lock on weapons. Stealth fighters include features designed to minimize heat signature, but they are far from completely effective.

Of course, a stealth fighter can be seen within visual range, and is vulnerable to heat-seeking missiles.

To recap: stealth technology is more effective at a distance. Although there are a number of methods to detect stealth fighters at long range, they generally don’t permit weapons to lock on to them.

In return, nothing prevents the stealth aircraft from firing at its opponents.

Enter the beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile.

Long Range Air-to-Air Missiles

Around the late 1990s, a new generation of long-range radar-guided air-to-air missiles entered service, notably the AIM-120 AMRAAM and the Russian R-77. These could hit targets over 50 kilometers away. (The earlier AIM-54 Phoenix boasted even longer range but was very expensive). In subsequent decades, the range has continued to increase to well over 100 kilometers, and new types such as the European MBDA Meteor and the Chinese PL-15 continue to push the envelope of speed and range.

The current AIM-120D has a theoretical maximum range of 160 kilometers; although in practice firing range will likely be much shorter for reasons soon discussed.

As long-range missiles are radar-guided, stealth fighters are not particularly vulnerable to them. The same cannot be said for non-stealth aircraft. An F-15 or Su-35 may attempt to avoid missiles with evasive maneuvers and counter measures—but doing so will disrupt whatever they are doing, and an opponent is likely to fire more than one missile.

One factor that is difficult to calculate is how likely long-range missiles are to hit. Extrapolating from past usage of radar-guided missiles is problematic, both because missile technology has advanced considerably since its inception (early radar-guided Sparrow missiles had a less than 10 percent kill probability in the Vietnam War), and the conflicts in which radar-guided missiles have been more successful (Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Gulf War) involved poorly trained opponents lacking effective countermeasures.

It’s safe to say that long-range missiles will have lower hit rates than short-range missiles like the AIM-9 Sidewinder and the Russian R-73—modern versions of which have chalked up a roughly seventy percent probability of kill.

Attrition and High Value Targets

Third- or fourth-generation fighters seeking to engage stealth aircraft in combat must close within short range so that their targeting systems are effective, all while dodging volleys of deadly missiles. As the stealth fighters themselves are difficult to track, they can disengage to avoid entering the short-range envelope in relative security.

It’s a difficult advantage to overcome.

But referring back to the Battle of Britain can reveal a limitation of this strategy. The British hit-and-run attacks succeeded in inflicting deadly attrition on German bombers over time until they were forced to call off the air offensive. But they rarely prevented the German formations from hitting their targets. The German simply had too many aircraft.

At first, this was a problem: the Germans relentlessly pounded British airfields, degrading the Royal Air Force’s ability to fight in the air. But then the Germans switched to bombing civilian targets in London. While this inflicted many civilian casualties, the raids did not degrade the RAF’s ability to fight back. The British fighters could sustain their advantageous rate of attrition versus the German Luftwaffe until the latter was forced to tap out.

So what happens if the other side attacks with superior numbers a target that must be defended?

An F-22 has a combat radius of some five hundred miles on internal fuel. The F-35 can fly 875 miles when loaded for air-to-air combat. Now consider the thousands of kilometers lying between U.S. bases in the Pacific and Europe and various potential conflict zones. To operate over those distances, stealth fighters would require aerial refueling from tanker aircraft. If fighting a well-equipped opponent, carrier-based aircraft would also likely be distant from the warzone, as carriers are at risk if they approach too close to ground-based anti-shipping missile batteries and aircraft.

American fighters would also likely be supported by AWACS airborne radar and command and control platforms, notably the E-2 Hawkeye and E-3 Sentry. The tankers and the AWACS aircraft are basically lumbering airliner-sized planes crammed full of fuel and electronic equipment respectively.

Let’s consider what would happen when American fighters encounter a much larger force of fighters based on the coast. The American fighters could fire their long-range AIM-120D missiles from more than one hundred kilometers away—four from each F-35 and six on the F-22. Soaring at Mach 4—twice the maximum speed of the aircraft that launched it—an AIM-120 can traverse eighty kilometers in one minute.

The radar-warning receivers on their targets would light up as they detect the incoming attack. The further away the target, the more time it has to evade the missile. Therefore, BVR missiles may be fired at well below their maximum range to ensure a higher probability of a kill, particularly when engaging maneuverable fighter aircraft.

Most opposing aircraft would not be able to shoot back at the stealth planes, though they might have a general idea of their position if they are supported by low-band radar or good infrared sensors. They could close on the American fighters, hoping to enter the envelope in which their sensors are effective.

What if the U.S. fighters close to short range after expending their long-range armaments, rather than prudently disengaging? If both sides are closing upon each other at maximum speed at high altitude, the distance between them would diminish at a rate of 60-80 kilometers a minute. Even if the AIM-120s were fired at maximum range, the opposing aircraft could close that distance in one or two minutes.

In short-range engagements, surprise, pilot training and flight performance will determine the victor.

The F-22 is a superb dogfighter. The F-35… not so much, though it has its defenders. Both aircraft can carry two Sidewinder missiles and fire shells from their onboard cannons.

However, their opponents would be able to spot the American fighters as they enter visual range thanks to the Mark One human eyeball, as well as infrared and electro-optical sensors—and even radars, which are effective against stealth aircraft at short ranges. The stealth fighters could be targeted with heat-seeking missiles, more of which could be carried by the non-stealth aircraft. If the opponents retain a significant numerical advantage, than within-visual range combat could be quite risky.

But why would stealth fighters risk engaging in short range in the first place?

Stealth Fighters Don’t Swim

The Rand Corporation’s Pacific Vision wargame simulating a conflict with China in 2008 found that even in a favorable scenario for the United States—half of U.S. missiles hit at long range and the none of their opponent’s do—a force of U.S. fighters outnumbered roughly three to one would be overwhelmed after firing off all its missiles. The less-maneuverable F-35s fared poorly in the ensuing dogfight. But in the end, nearly all of the U.S. fighters were lost.

Why? The hostile aircraft didn’t have trouble detecting the tankers supporting the U.S. forces. Unlike the F-22s and F-35s, tankers have neither the speed nor stealth to evade a determined attack.

If the tankers get shot down, it doesn’t just force the U.S. fighters to abandon the fight. It could force them to crash into the ocean, without enough fuel to make it back to base. In effect, a tanker would be a high-value target that U.S. air-superiority fighters would need to defend to the last.

A similar problem exists while defending an aircraft carrier from attack. Unlike the resilient city of London in the Battle of Britain, a carrier is a vulnerable and militarily consequential target that must be defended at all costs. A lost carrier consigns its fighters to the ocean as well.

A final consideration is that opponents may field limited number of their own stealth fighters, such as the J-20 or the Sukhoi T-50. Even a small number of stealth fighters would be effective at sneaking into the range of the tankers and AWACs aircraft and taking them out before the U.S. aircraft could evade or retaliate. Very long-range missiles such as the R-37 and the PL-13 could also assist in the anti-tanker mission.

The Psychological Factor

There are limitations to the “overwhelm with numbers” strategy.

In ground warfare, consider what would likely happen if an attacking infantry unit were to sustain 33 percent casualties attacking an objective. More often than not, the attackers would halt their advance, if not beat an outright retreat. Not only do fear and stress from incoming fire and casualties cause soldiers to abandon an attack, but disorganization and confusion set in as communication becomes frantic and links in the chain of command are eliminated.

The RAND wargame results hinged on ten surviving pilots shooting down the U.S. tankers after sixty-two of their compatriots were shot down. How coolheaded and rational would these pilots remain while their unit suffered 86 percent casualties?

Air warfare does have different psychological and physical dynamics than ground warfare. There are historical incidents in which aerial units pressed home attacks despite sustaining very heavy casualties, even up to 100 percent. However, there are also instances in which aerial attackers aborted in disorder after taking losses.

Implementing a swarm attack would also be no simple matter. Concentrating large numbers of aircraft would be a logistical challenge. They would also need to attack a target that would force American fighters to engage in such adverse circumstances.

Solutions?

How can U.S. doctrine adapt to this challenging scenario?

Already, many theorists believe that carriers would be forced to remain far away from hostile shores. The survivability of airbases in the event of a mass surface-to-surface missile attack is also open to question. One possibility is that no large-scale air battles would materialize.

The two key limitations are logistical: lack of internal fuel to operate without support, and insufficient missiles to tackle superior numbers. For the time being, there is no obvious fix to the fuel problem: the latest U.S. fighters, the F-22 and F-35, are simply going to depend on tankers. Some suggest that the Navy should deploy light-weight low-observable drones from carriers that could potentially operate further afield.

What about increasing missile capacity?

The U.S. military is a big proponent of networked warfare. In theory, if one airplane detects an enemy, it could pass on that data to friendly ships and aircraft—and through Cooperative Engagement Ability, even potentially allow those friendlies to shoot at that target from far away. One potential tactic is to use a vanguard of stealthy fighters to identify incoming enemy aircraft and send targeting data to ships or non-stealth fighters, which can carry heavier weapons loads. The F-35’s excellent sensors and datalinks could make it effective in this role.

There is even an idea being kicked around to mount large numbers of missiles on a B-1 or B-52, which would be fired off hundreds of kilometers away from the battle. Of course, such an “arsenal plane” would be vulnerable if enemy fighters broke through the accompanying line of F-22s and F-35s. The tactic would likely require even longer-range missiles than the U.S. currently employs.

Ultimately, hit-and-run tactics leaning on BVR and stealth technology may be quite effective in securing air superiority. However, they won’t suffice to overcome constraints of fuel and weapons supply in scenarios that involve distant and more numerous opponents attacking high-value targets.

Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This piece was first featured in 2016 and is being republished due to reader's interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Ari Cicurel

Security, Middle East

Even as the United States focuses more on the Asia-Pacific and Eastern Europe, it should provide its Middle East partners with alternatives to Chinese and Russian military hardware and investment.

America’s role in the world and its relations with China and Russia took center stage at the Vice-Presidential debate. The candidates hit on the broad threats these countries pose to U.S. national security, but ignored their growing military and nonmilitary influence in the Middle East. Washington can compete with this predatory influence by providing its partners with coveted American financial investments and military hardware.

Even before Trump’s term in office, Moscow began leveraging its involvement in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars to become a significant regional player. Beyond saving Bashar al-Assad, Russia used its presence in Syria to counter U.S. support for rebels and push the narrative that the United States cannot act with impunity. Russian weapons sales have also helped it grow relations with the Gulf States, Iraq, and Egypt, both of which receive billions of dollars in military support from the United States every year.

Meanwhile, China’s strategy is to build political, economic, and military power through investments in the region’s critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. China seeks to steal intellectual property through covert hacking and espionage. More overt actions include construction projects at critical civilian infrastructure, including a terminal at Israel’s Haifa Port, and coercive investments in companies that develop technologies with both commercial and military uses, like semiconductors, drones, satellites, and even gaming software. Beijing directs how Chinese companies invest abroad so that it can steal these capabilities and provide them to its own military. China also established its first overseas naval port in Djibouti near U.S. facilities. These moves are all part of the Belt and Road Initiative to force foreign markets—and, therefore, economic and political influence—back to China.

While these threats are potent, neither Russia nor China is seeking to copy the size of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Instead, they look for pragmatic ways to maximize influence and capabilities that they can use on the global stage. Keeping their goals limited allows both to claim easier successes and play both sides of regional conflicts.

Middle Eastern countries also have an interest in playing great-power nations against one another to achieve better deals. For example, Russia and Turkey, a U.S. NATO ally, are on opposite sides of the Syrian and Libyan conflicts, but Moscow still sells arms to Ankara. Likewise, Russia and China have political and economic relations with both Israel and Iran, perhaps the region’s most heated rivalry.

Indeed, great-power competition in the Middle East exists in parallel to growing aggression by Iran. Moscow and Beijing are Iran’s biggest protectors globally and often veto harmful resolutions at the UN Security Council. This summer, a leaked draft of a $400 billion trade and military agreement between Beijing and Tehran would dent the Trump administration’s campaign of economic sanctions against Iran.

Going forward, America should neither chase Russia nor China’s advancements in the Middle East with an expanded military presence nor retrench from the region as proponents of ending “endless wars” would demand. Some critics claim America’s regional posture is unnecessary because Russia’s military adventures could bog them down, much as the United States has been for the past two decades. Others bemoan China’s ability to free ride on America securing economic markets.

These points are worth keeping in mind. However, they do not change the current fact that a U.S. presence is still necessary to check Iranian aggression, fight terrorism, and ensure the free flow of energy and commerce through highly trafficked international waterways.

Instead, U.S. policy should maintain its strong presence on bases throughout the Middle East while improving its reliable partners’ capacity to take greater responsibility for regional security.

To deter aggression, U.S. partners need advanced military capabilities they can use in coordination with U.S. forces.

Israel has repeatedly proved itself to be America’s most capable regional partner through hundreds of successful attacks on Iran and its proxies. The United States should help Israel procure the precision-guided munitions and advanced aircraft, such as additional F-35s, it needs to conduct these attacks, deter future aggression, and prepare for looming conflict with Iran. Currently, the United States provides Israel military aid in even annual increments based on the Obama administration’s Memorandum of Understanding to provide $38 billion over ten years. Frontloading this aid so Israel has more access to funds upfront would enable it to purchase these crucial systems earlier without adding any cost to the American taxpayer.

At the same time, U.S. leadership should build on the ground-breaking Israel-UAE and Israel-Bahrain normalization deals to better integrate the region’s political, economic, and security networks. As Israel and the Gulf States negotiate additional agreements, Congress should expand funding for projects that benefit regional economies and drive critical supply chains away from Chinese and Russian investment. For example, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) began operations in 2019. It can provide funding without the strong-arm demands and risks of intellectual property theft from Chinese and Russian investment.

Even as the United States focuses more on the Asia-Pacific and Eastern Europe, it should provide its Middle East partners with alternatives to Chinese and Russian military hardware and investment. America’s challenge is to encourage nations to partner with it over China and Russia without unsympathetically trampling over their particular needs or prematurely forcing them to pick sides. Striking this balance will be crucial.

 Ari Cicurel (@AriCicurel) is a senior policy analyst at JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy.

Image: Reuters

Warfare History Network

History, Europe

Königsberg, the German cruiser, made history during the Nazi invasion of Norway.

Key Point: The Königsberg was the first naval vessel in history to be sunk by air attack during wartime.

When the German invasion of Norway was set in motion on April 9, 1940, much of the planning for the event had been done on a shoestring. Adolf Hitler, in fact, had given General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst only five hours to put together a coordinated scheme for victory.

Falkenhorst, nevertheless, accepted the assignment, admitted that he “had no idea what Norway was like,” and purchased a Baedeker travel guide to assist in orienting his forces. The general envisioned a coordinated attack by land, sea, and air even though such a concerted military campaign was unprecedented. Despite the difficulties, however, the invasion was successful—but at serious cost to the German Navy.

Three Direct Hits

Operation Weserübung (Weser Exercise), which had been named for a river which runs through Germany and empties into the North Sea, was initiated with confidence, but soon the issue was in doubt. The heavy cruiser Blücher was sunk in Oslofjord by Norwegian shore batteries, the light cruiser Karlsruhe was sent to the bottom near Kristiansand, and the light cruiser Königsberg was sunk during the capture of the port city of Bergen. In addition, the battlecruiser Gneisenau and the cruiser Lützow were heavily damaged, at least a dozen destroyers had been sunk or damaged, and as many as 14 supply vessels had been lost.

Aside from the fact that the losses were severe, the sinking of the Königsberg is worth more than passing mention. The light cruiser was the initial warship of three sisters including Karlsruhe and Köln. Displacing 6,000 tons, her keel was laid in 1926. Main armament consisted of nine 5.9-inch guns mounted in three turrets, while secondary armament consisted of a complement of six 88mm, eight 37mm, and four 20mm weapons primarily intended for antiaircraft defense.

In company with the Köln, the Königsberg supported the landing of German troops at Bergen on the morning of April 9. Accurate fire from the Kvarvan Battery at the mouth of the harbor scored at least three hits and damaged the Königsberg’s engines, damage control capability, and auxiliary power. Water mains that supplied firefighting equipment were crippled. Once Bergen was in German hands, the damaged cruiser was tied up alongside the Skoltegrund Mole inside the harbor.

Raided by the RAF

British reconnaissance flights photographed two German cruisers at Bergen, and Royal Air Force Bomber Command launched unsuccessful attacks by 24 Vickers Wellington and Handley Page Hamp- den bombers late in the day. Dropping nearly three dozen 500-pound bombs, these aircraft failed to score a hit. When darkness fell, the Köln made good its escape. The battered Königsberg remained.

Lieutenant Commander Geoffrey Hare of the Royal Navy observed for himself the tempting targets at Bergen and persuaded the commander of HMS Sparrowhawk, as the Royal Navy’s air station at Hatston was known, to authorize a strike by Blackburn Skua dive-bombers of the Fleet Air Arm. A total of 16 Skuas, 11 from No. 803 Squadron and five from No. 800 Squadron, took to the air to attack a target at the extreme limit of the aircraft’s range.

At 5:15 am on April 10, the mission commenced. Two hours later, the single German cruiser moored in the harbor was set upon by the Skuas, the first wave diving out of the sun at a 60-degree angle from 8,000 feet. At least three 500-pound bombs, released from altitudes of 1,500 to 3,000 feet, found their marks amidships and ignited raging fires. The attackers sustained minimal damage from light antiaircraft fire, and the ship began to settle by the bow. One Skua of No. 803 Squadron was reported to have spun in during the return flight, its pilot and wireless operator/gunner both killed.

The First Naval Vessel in History to be Sunk by Air

Accounts vary as to the length of time the Königsberg remained afloat, some reporting that the ship sank within the hour and others that her crew waged a heroic three-hour fight to save her. Regardless, the ship was wrecked. Eighteen sailors were dead and 23 wounded during the attack. The Germans actually noted that as many as six British bombs had struck their target. Later raised from the mud of Bergen harbor, the Königsberg was never returned to service. Its hulk was broken up for scrap by the Norwegians in 1947.

A pair of noteworthy postscripts surround the sinking of the Königsberg. Although the Royal Navy had officially downplayed the role of dive-bombing as an effective offensive tactic, it was in fact the Skua that made the action memorable. Fleet Air Arm dive-bombers had accomplished their mission, and the Königsberg was the first naval vessel in history to be sunk by air attack during wartime.

This article first appeared on the Warfare History Network.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Warfare History Network

History, Atlantic

Frederic John Walker turned the tables on the German U-boat menace.

On this writer’s desk sits a small, pewter mug, dented and somewhat bat-tered. It is neatly engraved, and the lettering reads: “Wardroom H.M.S. Harrier, presented by Q.N. 20 Course June 1956. ‘Tally Ho Pounce.’” The little mug is a souvenir of one of the endless series of tactical exercises the Royal Navy runs year in, year out. This endless and exacting practice is one of the reasons nobody knows more about, among other operations, anti-submarine warfare than the men who serve under the White Ensign. Such expertise comes of hard practice and long tradition, and it owes much to a single storied British captain, the man, many say, who had more to do with destroying Hitler’s U-boat menace than any other single officer. His name was Frederic John Walker.

Walker, inevitably called Johnny, was a professional naval officer who began his maritime education at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, when he had just turned 14. He served at sea during the First World War, and afterward became deeply interested in a new area of naval warfare, the battle against submarines. In spite of repeated assignments to the big ships of the navy between the wars, he kept his interest in anti-submarine tactics and in 1937, as a commander, he was assigned as experimental commander at the Anti-Submarine School at Portland, where he worked on anti-submarine tactics and weaponry.

There is some indication that Walker’s uninspiring assignments between the wars produced some less-than-glowing reports by his seniors, and even that he was due for early retirement as the clouds of World War II loomed on the horizon. In view of his astonishing achievements at sea during the war, it may well be that what his seniors saw before the war was an outspoken officer bored and frustrated in a series of, to him, meaningless assignments. For once Walker came into his own at sea during the war, his record was nothing short of spectacular. He was not only promoted to captain but also awarded extra time-in-grade to make up for whatever delay in promotion his earlier reports may have cost him.

With the outbreak of World War II and the German U-boat offensive, the Royal Navy, committed all over the world, had far too few escort vessels both to protect the vital Atlantic convoys and to screen the heavy ships of the fleet. In the first three months of war, the German submarine service sank more than 400,000 tons of merchant shipping, losing only nine boats of its own. In June 1940, alone, as the Royal Navy lost more escort vessels lifting the British Expeditionary Force from the beaches of Dunkirk, the U-boats sank almost 600,000 tons more. At that rate, or anything close to it, the merchant fleet would be destroyed in time, and Britain would be starved out of the war.

Walker got his chance at last in the fall of 1941, when he was appointed to the command of the 1,200-ton Bittern-class sloop HMS Stork, and to the leadership of 36th Escort Group. Walker was a driver, as most good commanders are, and his crews and captains trained exhaustively ashore at first. His commanders learned his system of command during an attack, based on pre-arranged codes designed to catch a U-boat in the ship’s asdic (sonar) and hold it there. “Buttercup astern,” for example, told the ships of the group precisely what maneuver to execute and the direction in which to do it. With experience, Walker’s captains could almost read his mind, and operations were carried out with a minimum of terse messages between ships.

Again and again, Walker rehearsed his ships in various patterns of attack. The group would have particular success with what they called the “creeping attack,” a technique for dealing with a U-boat which had dived deep to escape the hunters. One ship, usually the senior commander on the scene, would trail the submarine by 1,500–2,000 yards, keeping contact by asdic. (the British term for sonar, asdic, is somewhat ponderously derived from Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee). A second warship would then move very slowly over the submarine without using her own asdic, directed by the first ship. On order, she would drop a preordained depth charge pattern, then go to high speed and clear the area. The directing ship would close in right behind her, dropping her own preset pattern.

The creeping attack insured that the first assault would come without warning because the enemy would not pick up the asdic of the first ship right above her. The U-boat skipper would know he was under attack only when the first depth charges exploded around him and would have no time to take evasive action.

When there were enough escorts present, the senior officer might order a variation called the “plaster attack.” In this similar technique, three escorts cruised slowly over the submarine in line abreast, directed by a fourth vessel behind them. The three then attacked together on order, the middle ship centered over the quarry. A sudden sharp turn by the submarine, either right or left, would bring the boat directly under more depth charges.

Officers and asdic operators trained on the attack trainer, a simulator that would duplicate the conditions they would encounter at sea. The all-important depth charge crews drilled with their awkward 500-pound charges ashore until they could meet Walker’s exacting standard. They had 10 seconds to reload after dropping the last round of charges, a colossal task on dry land, let alone on a pitching deck in a heavy sea. Gun crews were expected to get off six rounds within 30 seconds of acquiring the target.

Before December was out, Walker and his little ships were at sea, covering homeward-bound convoy HG76, consisting of 31 freighters and a fleet auxiliary bound for England out of Gibraltar. Besides his own Stork, Walker’s escort group included the older sloop Deptford and seven Flower-class corvettes: Marigold, Rhododendron, Convolulus, Penstemon, Gardenia, Vetch, and Samphire. In addition, for part of the way the escorts would be reinforced by three destroyers, including the ex-U.S. Navy four-stacker Stanley—and out ahead of the convoy were four more destroyers temporarily detached from Force H, based at Gibraltar.

The Royal Navy corvette deserves a mention here, for these little warships were the backbone of the convoy escorts, particularly early in the war. They carried depth charges, a single four-inch gun, a two-pounder antiaircraft cannon, when one was available, and an assortment of machine guns, some of them World War I-vintage Lewis guns. Later versions got a couple of 20mm Oerlikon antiaircraft guns as well.

Like other escort vessels, many were later fitted with the hedgehog spigot mortar, an ingenious device developed in 1941 by the British office aptly named the Department of Miscellaneous Weapons Development. The hedgehog was a simple device: a divided box filled with 24 missiles that looked like oversized rifle grenades. As the warship charged down on an asdic contact ahead, the hedgehog threw salvos of bombs filled with Torpex high explosive some 250 yards forward of the ship. They had no preset pistols to fire them as depth charges did; they would explode on contact at any depth.

The Cruel Sea Told of the Rough Life Aboard a Corvette

Originally designed as coastal escort vessels, the corvettes could manage no more than 16 knots flat out. They were tiny vessels of shallow draft and short length, and therefore given to rolling and pitching horribly in any kind of sea. They were “wet” as well, sailor’s language for any ship that took heavy seas on board when the going got rough. As with other escorts, privacy was almost nonexistent, sleep sparse and interrupted, and other comforts rare. Seizing an apparently quiet moment for a wash, Walker’s executive officer, Lieutenant J. Filleul, ran to action stations, as a newspaper told the tale, “with his shirt in one hand and his trousers in the other.”

Life aboard a corvette was especially spartan and rough. That exacting, draining duty was superbly described in Nicholas Montsarrat’s The Cruel Sea, a tale of life on the corvette Compass Rose. The little ships were quick to construct, however, and helped fill the desperate need for escort vessels. Altogether, more than 200 Flower-class corvettes were built.

In retrospect, the battle that developed around convoy HG76 would prove to be, in Winston Churchill’s words, the “end of the beginning” of the U-boats’ domination of the Atlantic trade routes. It would mark the advent of new tactics for the defenders of the convoys. The passage north past Spain and Portugal, skirting the deadly Bay of Biscay, was bound to be contested. Axis agents could watch the convoy forming up at Gibraltar, and long-range Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft out of France could shadow the convoy all the way, calling in packs of submarines as the convoy worked its way north.

The Focke-Wulf 200C Kondor was the Luftwaffe’s primary maritime reconnaissance and bombing aircraft, with a substantial range of about 2,300 miles. The Kondor carried a cannon in one top turret, a machine gun in a second, and more guns in her waist and in a peculiar cylindrical bomb bay set a little off center to starboard in her belly. During the long trip north, Walker and his captains could count on the regular presence of relays of these four-engined shadows.

Thus far, the concept of convoy protection had been, of necessity, essentially what it was in the latter days of World War I: defensive in nature, a perimeter of escorts shielding the precious merchantmen, trying to keep attacking submarines away from the relatively slow and vulnerable cargo ships and tankers. On this voyage, however, Captain Walker was to employ his own revolutionary notions of offensive protection, sending his warships ranging far out from the convoy to strike shadowing U-boats before they could engage.

And on this trip he had the invaluable support of the little escort carrier Audacity and her tiny complement of four Martlet (Grumman Wildcat) fighters. Audacity was a no-frills conversion from the captured German cargo ship Hannover, primitive by later standards, without either hanger or elevator or any substantial antiaircraft armament. The first of many Royal Navy escort carriers, she would make only three voyages before she was lost; but while she lasted she was an enormous help to the hard-pressed surface escorts. At last, a convoy in mid-ocean could have its own eyes and talons in the sky. On this trip little Audacity would conclusively prove the great value of escort carriers.

Many more would follow her, in both the Royal and the United States navies. Most of the British escort carriers were built in American shipyards and were far more sophisticated than Audacity. She was a pioneer in the anti-submarine warfare business nevertheless. Even though her fighters could not carry depth charges, they were still invaluable in spotting lurking U-boats long before they could reach attack positions; they at last gave the convoy the means to drive off or shoot down shadowing German planes. On a single voyage, Audacity’s fighters would destroy six of the Luftwaffe’s big aircraft. And even if a U-boat were not sunk after being spotted by carrier aircraft, once they or the warships of the escort drove the submarine under, she reverted to her glacial underwater speed and lost the surface speed required to quickly close with the convoy.

On December 14, the day of sailing from Gibraltar, the surface vessels drew first blood. Working some 30 miles off Cape St. Vincent at the southwest tip of Portugal, the destroyer HMAS Nestor of the Force H contingent depth-charged and sank U-127 with all hands. Walker concluded, correctly, that the Germans knew the convoy was at sea and that other U-boats would sail to intercept. There was no hurrying the progress of the convoy, a massive block of merchantmen sailing in parallel columns. The convoy could move no faster than the speed of its slowest ship while the U-boats closed in, sailing on the surface in darkness.

On the following night, a Swordfish biplane flying out of Gibraltar located still another submarine and drove it under. So far, so good, but by this time another 10 U-boats were moving to intercept HG76, and the convoy had seen a shadowing Focke-Wolf 200 Kondor. Walker and his commanders knew they were in for a fight. It began in earnest on the morning of the 17th, when his escorts charged after a submarine spotted from the air more than 20 miles from the convoy. In the ensuing action, corvette HMS Penstemon damaged U-131 and drove her under and away from the convoy.

And as U-131 crept back toward the convoy, she was spotted on the surface by Stork and three other escorts. This time the British ships were helped by a fighter from Audacity, which dove to strafe the U-boat. Hit by machine-gun fire from the submarine, the Martlet crashed, but the guns of Walker’s escorts, shooting at the extreme range of seven miles, hit U-131 eight times. The U-boat’s captain called it quits, opened his boat’s sea-cocks, and got most of his crew off. The British ships picked up the body of the Martlet’s pilot and 55 survivors from the U-boat.

The following night, the 18th, would be the ultimate test of Walker’s theories: a close-in protective escort group stayed close to the merchantmen, while Walker’s hunters ranged far out from the convoy. Again the hunter-killer group detected a shadowing U-boat, and Exmoor, Stanley, Blankney, and Deptford blasted U-434 to the surface. The British collected her captain, Korvetten-Kapitaen Heyda, and his entire crew but two before U-434 went down for the last time.

“Either You Leave the Boat or I do. I Take no Further Responsibility.”

Later in the next afternoon, however, Walker’s ships suffered their first loss. U-574 torpedoed HMS Stanley, which blew up, a monstrous flash of flame ripping through the gloom hundreds of feet high. There were few survivors. Stork and her consorts went after the killer and got their revenge less than an hour later, closing in to hammer the submarine with precise depth-charge attacks. As damage mounted in the submarine, the captain and his engineering officer, responsible for the trim of the boat, argued bitterly over whether to surrender. Finally the engineer settled the matter. “Either you leave the boat or I do. I take no further responsibility.”

Leaking, her electric motors out of action, an electric fire flickering in her control room, the submarine blew her tanks and surfaced. Walker in Stork charged down on U-574, chasing his quarry in a series of concentric circles, each vessel trying to turn inside the other. When Stork got too close to the U-boat for the sloop’s main guns to bear, Walker at last rammed the U-boat, shoving U-574 onto her side. As Stork ground on across the submarine’s hull, Walker dropped a 10-round salvo of depth charges on shallow setting and the submarine was finished. Walker’s ships fished 28 British and 18 German survivors from the water; they did not include either the U-boat’s captain or his engineering officer. Walker commented later: “I was surprised to find later by the plot that Stork had turned three complete circles … I kept the U-boat illuminated with ‘Snowflakes’ which were quite invaluable in this unusual action … some rounds of four-inch were fired from the forward mountings until the guns could not be sufficiently depressed, after which the guns’ crews were reduced to shaking fists and roaring curses at an enemy who several times seemed to be a matter of a few feet away rather than yards….”

Meanwhile, a merchantman, SS Annavore, had been torpedoed, and more Focke-Wulfs had appeared. Audacity’s Martlets would shoot down four of the Kondors in spite of the big planes’ four defensive turrets. One fighter pilot, Sub-Lieutenant J.W. Sleigh, pressed his head-on attack so closely that he grazed the falling Kondor and returned to Audacity with part of the German’s radio antenna wire wrapped around the tail of his Martlet.

But more U-boats of the gathering pack still remained around the convoy, and Walker was left with only four ships after some of his escorts ran low on fuel and had to turn for home. One of Audacity’s fighters jumped two U-boats stopped side by side, one with a hole visible in its hull. A plank had been laid down as a gangway between the two, and crewmen were crossing it. The Martlet pilot attacked with machine guns, his only weapon, raking both boats and shooting men off the plank.

Both U-boats dived and disappeared, but four more submarines were sighted, and Walker correctly concluded, “The net of U-boats round us seemed at this stage to be growing uncomfortably close in spite of Audacity’s heroic efforts to keep them at arm’s length.

Stork herself was now limited to only about 10 knots, for the ramming of U-574 had damaged her bow and torn away the dome that shielded her asdic. At about 10 o’clock on the night of the 21st, a Norwegian merchantman was torpedoed. Worse was to come, for just then the other merchantmen, following standing orders, fired “snowflake” flares, designed to expose a U-boat working close to the convoy or within its columns. In this case, however, exposed by the glare of the snowflakes, Audacity was hit a few minutes later by three torpedoes from U-751. She sank quickly, and her survivors were picked up by the escorts, which continued to harry the shadowing U-boats.

And on the 21st, the group scored again: depth charges from HMS Deptford caught U-567 and sank her without a trace. Her skipper, who died with her and her whole crew, was the famous Kapitaenleutenant Engelbert Endrass, one of the Kriegsmarine’s few remaining ace skippers. A second boat, U-67, also took a terrible pounding from 41 depth charges from Rhododendron and Deptford.

The next night, Walker ordered three changes of course by the convoy and staged a mock battle to lure the shadowing enemy away from the convoy’s new courses. The deception worked and, on the 23rd, now covered by Coastal Command aircraft and a couple of fresh destroyers, the convoy made port. Walker was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his victory and had the deep satisfaction of knowing that his tactics had worked. The Merchant Navy knew it too, and the commodore of the convoy signaled Walker: “On behalf of the convoy deepest congratulations and many thanks.”

During the last of the fighting on this run, Walker showed his understanding of the terrible pressures under which his men, especially his captains, worked constantly. During the night Deptford, hot on the trail of a suspected submarine, went in to ram and found her target was not a U-boat, but Stork. Adroit ship handling minimized the collision, but the damage was still considerable. Walker did not reprimand his captain and showed his own sense of humor when another ship signaled him at daylight. “What have they done to your nose?” It was an allusion to the bow damaged in ramming U-574, and Walker replied, “That’s nothing. You should see what they have done to my arse.”

Not only were his escorts sinking U-boats, but his wide-ranging hunters made it much harder for a U-boat to run on the surface, even at night. Since sailing submerged vastly reduced the speed at which a submarine could close the convoy, Walker’s boldness kept many U-boats out beyond torpedo range. On at least two occasions during the war, his ships sank enemy boats as far as 40 miles from the convoy Walker was covering. Although anything approaching total victory over the Kriegsmarine was still many dreary months away, this battle was at least a draw for the convoy escorts and maybe something of a victory.

Attack Always; Never Let the Enemy Pause to Take a Breath; Whatever the Odds, Attack.

Johnny Walker was a deeply religious, genial man with a quiet sense of humor, but he was also a demanding leader who left no doubt as to who was in command. Nor did his operating instructions leave any question about the purpose of his tactics: “Our object is to kill, and all officers must fully develop the spirit of vicious offensive. No matter how many convoys we may shepherd through in safety, we shall have failed unless we slaughter U-boats. All energies must be bent to this end.”

Walker was the embodiment of the Royal Navy’s aggressive philosophy: attack always; never let the enemy pause to take a breath; whatever the odds, attack. One of his officers summed up Walker’s character: “[H]e showed me the type of person it takes to win wars, he was absolutely dedicated to seeking and destroying U-boats. He spent most of the time on the bridge walking up and down, he had a special coir mat provided to deaden any sound he made so that he could hear the asdic … He slept very little, sometimes only two hours a night….”

Walker took only a few days leave and hurried back to duty. Throughout his meteoric career in World War II, this dedicated, driven officer pushed himself far beyond any reasonable physical boundaries. Returning quickly to 36th Group, he sailed temporarily in the sloop HMS Pelican, later shifting back to Stork after dockyard repair of the damage caused when she rammed U-574. The 36th Group got another three, and maybe four, more submarines before an unwise Admiralty assigned Walker to a shore job in Liverpool.

Walker was not at all happy sailing a desk and steadily bombarded his seniors with repeated requests to return to sea. Walker knew where he belonged, out along the far-flung convoy routes hunting the German enemy. The Battle of the Atlantic was fast approaching crisis proportions. The Allies were losing merchant ships faster than they could be replaced, and the Royal Navy had fewer than half the escort vessels it estimated it needed to keep the supply lines to Britain open and functioning.

The magnitude of the commerce war is mind-boggling. The U-boats sent some 15 million tons of Allied shipping to the bottom during the war. The cost to the Kriegsmarine was 781 boats. In the course of the war, almost 30,000 U-boat personnel went down with their boats, a loss of about 75 percent of all of Germany’s submariners.

At last, in February 1943, the Admiralty relented, and Walker became captain of HMS Starling, a modern Glasgow-built sloop. Walker asked for as many as possible of his old crew from Stork, and he got almost half of them. He then took command of a new organization called 2nd Support Group, at first two sloops and seven little Flower-class corvettes, and took his new pack of hunters to sea.

Walker’s greatest success came after he persuaded Sir Max Horton, commander-in-chief of the Western Approaches, that the most efficient sub-killing machine would be a special hunting group of six first-line sloops. They would carry the most modern equipment and weaponry and operate with a roving commission, without responsibility for close-in protection of any convoy. Impressed by Walker’s record thus far, Admiral Horton agreed, and Walker got his wish. By the end of the third week in May 1943, he was at sea with his own sloop, HMS Starling, and her sister ships Wild Goose, Wren, Woodpecker, Cygnet, and Kite. Under his command, 2nd Support Group would become the most successful U-boat hunters of either world war, the model for every anti-submarine operation to follow.

All of Walker’s little ships were modified Black Swan-class sloops. They were 283 feet long, displacing either 1,300 or 1,350 tons (Woodpecker, Wren, and Wild Goose were a little smaller than their sisters). They could do between 19 and 20 knots, a bit faster than the original Black Swans, their sisters in the convoy escort business. While the sloops could not muster the speed of a fleet destroyer, their engines were much more efficient, giving them tremendous endurance at sea. If their top speed was only about half that of a destroyer, they could hold that speed on about a tenth of the destroyer’s horsepower, at an enormous saving in fuel. They mounted three turrets, each with a pair of four-inch guns, plus six double-mounts of 20mm antiaircraft guns. Equipped with asdic and radar, they carried a large load of depth charges and hedgehogs.

As he had with his previous group, Walker made certain his captains knew precisely what the group’s mission was. As one officer put it later, Walker told them, “Our sole job was to sink U-boats … and there followed a short list of evolutions that we had got to be able to do very quickly and accurately at any time of the day or night, in any weather, and in which no sort of excuse for failure would be accepted….”

Walker also lectured “in praise of the ram as a weapon of precision,” and laid out a few rules for depth-charge attacks. Walker’s whole emphasis was on simplicity and precision of technique and brevity of orders.

In June 1943, veteran submarine captain Gunter Poser made the mistake of sending a long radio message back to Germany within range of Walker’s radio direction-finding equipment. Poser’s boat, U-202, was returning from her ninth operational mission, coming back from dropping five German spies on Long Island. The 2nd Group homed in on the German’s signal, and Poser dived when he saw the sloops charging down on him. By that time, however, Starling’s asdic had picked up U-202 and the hunt was on, Walker directing it from a specially built platform on his bridge, wearing white shorts and a cricket shirt.

The first depth-charge attack, 86 charges, drove U-202 far under, and Poser kept on going, getting his groaning boat down as far as 800 feet. British asdic operators on the surface could hear the rush of high-pressure air on the U-boat as she corrected her trim after British attacks. At that depth her hull was close to rupturing, but at least he was safe from the British depth charges, which could not be rigged to fire as deep as Poser had gone. Walker drew the right conclusions. “No doubt about it. She’s gone deeper than I thought possible….” He smiled: “Well, long wait ahead. Let’s have some sandwiches sent up. We will sit it out. I estimate this chap will surface at midnight. Either his air or batteries will give out by then.”

As the Crew Abandoned Ship, Poser Turned His Own Pistol on Himself

And so it was. At just about midnight Poser’s air was nearly exhausted and he ordered his boat to the surface. As she broke water, her gun crews ran to man their weapons, and Poser went to full speed, hoping to run from the waiting sloops in the darkness. Walker was ready, however, and gave the order to fire star shell, tearing the cloak of blackness from his quarry. All six sloops pounded U-202 with shellfire, and a crimson gleam behind the conning tower announced a hit from one of the four-inch guns. Starling charged down on the damaged U-boat, intending to ram. As she got closer, however, Walker could see that the submarine was too battered to submerge, and so he swung his sloop and ran down the side of Poser’s boat, sluiced its decks with machine-gun fire, and dropped a pattern of shallow set depth charges.

It was over for U-202 and Kapitaen-Leutnant Poser. Poser shouted to his men to abandon ship, but he did not join them. He turned his own pistol on himself and stayed with his boat on her trip to the bottom. The hunt had taken 16 hours, and for another 14 hours Starling’s doctor, Surgeon-Lieutenant Fraser, operated on badly wounded German U-boat crewmen.

On the same trip, Walker’s group got two more U-boats, U-449 and tanker-boat U-119. A depth-charge pattern forced U-119 to surface in the midst of a ring of British escorts, all the ships banging away and shells whistling in all directions as the submarine began to dive again. Starling was on her before she could clear the surface and smashed into U-119, rolling her over and grinding across her hull. As Starling cleared the submarine, she fired a shallow pattern of depth charges and U-119 was gone, leaving only debris, including body parts.

Walker now transferred to Wild Goose, leaving Commander Wemyss of Wild Goose to take crippled Starling home. In July, the group was back at sea, hunting the 150 submarines Admiral Karl Dönitz had sent against the Atlantic convoys. Increasingly, long-range RAF and USAAF aircraft and Royal Navy surface vessels hunted together on the routes from German Biscay bases to the Atlantic. The Kreigsmarine was heavily arming its boats with antiaircraft weapons and sending them across the bay on the surface in groups. When Allied aircraft could not penetrate the antiaircraft and attack, they called for surface vessels and circled, waiting for help. If the U-boats dived, the aircraft could close in once the antiaircraft weapons were no longer manned. If the U-boats successfully submerged, the aircraft marked the spot for the surface vessels.

On the 29th, a British aircraft reported three U-boats on the surface, and the group steamed hard down the bearing the aircraft had given. Soon they had visual contact, and, according to legend, Walker could not resist hoisting the signal for “General Chase.” The story goes that this signal had been flown only twice before in the long history of the Royal Navy, by Sir Francis Drake when he pursued the Spanish Armada down the English Channel in 1688, and by Lord Horatio Nelson when he smashed the French Navy at Trafalgar in 1805.

One U-boat was depth-charged and sunk by a Royal Australian Air Force Sunderland flying boat. Other aircraft, including an American B-24 Liberator, joined the attack, and an RAF Halifax bomber mortally wounded a second submarine. Standing on his bridge as the surface ships closed in, Walker waved his hat, cheering on his Starling. She and her sisters opened fire at four miles, and their gunnery was superb. The U-boat dived, but Walker’s group closed in with depth charges and sank her. The success was part of a spectacular run of victories over the U-boats in the Bay of Biscay, nine boats sighted and seven of them sunk in just a few days.

Walker and his group returned to Liverpool in high spirits. In port, however, bad news waited for Walker. His son, Sub-Lieutenant John Timothy Ryder Walker, had been lost with his submarine in the Mediterranean. Walker’s wife Eileen was waiting to see him in this moment of agony, and the story goes that Walker’s officers formed a defensive line, for a time keeping the couple sequestered from all sorts of people who had urgent business with Walker. Always concerned with those he commanded, however, Captain and Mrs. Walker insisted on attending, the very next night, a wardroom dinner with Walker’s officers and their wives.

From this time on, Walker became even more than the professional naval officer fighting his country’s enemies; now he had a personal score to settle as well. Back at sea, he and his group hammered the U-boats stalking the merchantmen of the vital convoys. One of them, U-264, fired a “Gnat” homing torpedo at Starling, but a sharp-eyed British lookout saw the track of the Gnat as it raced toward the sound of the sloop’s screws. Walker ordered a hard turn to port, and then, as the Gnat closed in, Starling dropped a shallow set pattern of depth charges. The roar of the exploding charges was immediately followed by a second roar as the shock of the charges detonated the torpedo before it reach Starling. Walker immediately ordered a plaster attack on U-264, and within five minutes the group was rewarded by a gigantic air bubble and a litter of floating debris, including human body parts.

This voyage ended in another triumphal entry into Liverpool harbor, for U-264 was only the first of a record six submarines sunk by the group in just two weeks. The group entered harbor in line-ahead, Starling leading, her PA system playing the group’s theme song, A-hunting We Will Go, Admiral Horton and the First Lord of the Admiralty, standing on a destroyer’s bridge, met the group as they entered harbor, and the docks were lined with cheering civilians, sailors and WRENs.

An officer serving under Walker in the sloop HMS Wren wrote much later of his admiration for Walker’s leadership. On one occasion, chasing down a U-boat sighted by an aircraft, Walker’s ships had 60 miles to go to reach the scene. “In the three hours we took to get there the U-Boat, submerged, could have gone up to 18 miles in any direction, he worked out where the U-Boat captain would go and headed for it … and his calculations were spot on … [h]e dropped a pattern of depth charges and the U-Boat surfaced in his wake … all of us opened fire … Walker then decided to ram, which he did, turning the U-Boat over and dropping a shallow pattern as he went over it.”

By the autumn of 1943, it had become apparent to Dönitz and his staff that the U-boat offensive had misfired. Out of 2,468 merchantmen crossing the Atlantic, the Germans had sunk only nine, and Allied surface ships and aircraft had destroyed 25 U-boats in the same period. The Germans were losing the convoy war, but their most implacable opponent, Johnny Walker, was wearing out.

“Cease Firing. Gosh, What a Lovely Battle”

In March 1944, the group sailed to cover a large convoy traveling the terrible northern route to Russia. Among the ships in convoy was USS Milwaukee, sent as a gift to the Russian navy. The Group sank two more U-boats during the voyage, and Milwaukee made Murmansk safely. On May 5, on the way back and carrying the American crew of Milwaukee, the convoy heard that the American destroyer Donnell had been torpedoed and sunk some 200 miles away. Walker turned his group toward the site of the sinking, and two days later made contact. For 15 and a half hours, Walker stalked U-473 over 20 miles of rough sea, his ships dodging Gnats fired by their quarry. And then as U-473 ran out of air and was forced to surface, his sloops tore her apart with gunfire and sent her down. Walker briefly signaled his ships, “Cease firing. Gosh, what a lovely battle,” and turned his command for Liverpool.

It had been another highly successful voyage, but on top of all the other months of exhaustion, lack of sleep, and the crushing cares of command, the war at sea was destroying Johnny Walker. His wife was horrified by his haggard appearance. By rights her husband should have been sent ashore for a real rest, perhaps even hospitalized. But duty is a jealous goddess, and Walker knew that he had never been more needed than he was as the summer of 1944 approached. In May 1944, just five merchantmen had been sunk by U-boats. The Germans had lost 22 boats, and Dönitz had pulled most of his remaining vessels out of the north Atlantic. The Allies were plainly winning the convoy war, but there was a huge and urgent job waiting closer to home.

For the long-awaited invasion of Festung Europa was imminent, and the Navy knew its success hinged on keeping open the sea lanes across the Channel. If the U-boat fleet could interdict that steady stream of reinforcements and supplies, a lot of good men would die for nothing, and the liberation of Europe would be long delayed. And the Navy knew the Germans would come; Dönitz would throw every boat he had into the effort to cut the invasion forces off from their base in England. The supreme commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, said flatly that he had to have two weeks of absolute control of cross-Channel traffic if the invasion was to have any real chance of success. In the event, on June 6, the Germans would send 76 U-boats from Biscay ports against the Normandy landings.

Walker knew where his duty lay, and tired as he was, he saw the invasion as a double opportunity. “Eisenhower wants two weeks,” he said. “He’ll not only get it, but this is our chance to smash the U-boats for all time.” And so, on June 6, 1944, when the invasion armada loomed out of the predawn darkness off the Normandy beaches, Walker was there. This time he controlled no fewer than 40 ships. In the first three crucial days of the invasion, his flotilla put in at least 36 attacks on U-boat contacts. His ships sank eight submarines and damaged a number of others. Allied aircraft got another six, and the Germans pulled their surviving boats back to regroup.

But they came again, as the Navy knew they would, into a weeklong non-stop melee between Allied surface vessels and aircraft above, and the enemy below. Walker and his captains and the rest of the antisubmarine forces won that brawl, but it was the last straw for Walker’s health. When Starling put into a British port to rearm and refuel, exhausted crew members caught at least a few hours of sleep, but Walker could not. He used the time to plan and reorganize and attend meetings ashore. Then it was back into the fray again, and again without rest.

In the end, the U-boats of the Kriegsmarine took such a battering that they were never again the formidable threat they had once been. But this last effort also killed their most dangerous and unforgiving enemy. For Walker was plainly ill and getting worse. His face and body were skeletal, and his officers noticed that he hesitated trying to find words for a signal or an order. Now, however, he could at last spend a little time at home and perhaps give his wasted, exhausted body a chance to mend.

There was much to rejoice at for the Walkers. Not only had Walker won his long battle, but he was to be made a Knight Commander of the Bath by King George VI, he had won a total of four DSOs, and he was slated for promotion to admiral rank. The afternoon after Walker at last came home, he and his wife went to see the film Madame Curie. Afterward, Walker told his wife that he did not feel well. He was dizzy, he said, and had a sort of humming sound in his head. He grew quickly worse and worse, and at last was hospitalized. At first the doctors were confident. It was, they told his wife, only a matter of his terrible exhaustion. Rest should do the trick.

But it wouldn’t. About midnight on July 9, 1944, Johnny Walker died. The medics called the cause cerebral thrombosis, but it was generally believed that Walker had given his country and his Navy all he had for far too long. He had simply died of exhaustion, or, some might say, of dedication.

The 2nd Escort Support Group would continue to serve, now under the capable leadership of Commander D.E.G. Wemyss, who had been Walker’s executive and right arm. Before the war was finally history, the Group sank at least 23 U-boats, perhaps more, and certainly damaged many others. Starling herself was in on the kill of 14 German submarines, a record unmatched by any other single ship of any nation in any war.

Today a statue of Johnny Walker stands on the Pier Head, Liverpool. He is looking out across the River Mersey, and displayed on the far bank is one of his old enemies, U-534. After his funeral in Liverpool Cathedral, the remains of the man himself were placed on board HMS Hesperus and buried at sea, the sea he loved and defended. What he did abides, however, a permanent monument to courage and devotion.

Speaking at Walker’s funeral, Sir Max Horton, his old boss, perfectly described Walker’s legacy to the Royal Navy, to the Merchant Navy, and to the people of Britain: “In the days when the waters had well nigh overwhelmed us, our brother, apprehending the creative power in man, set himself to conquer the malice of the enemy. In our hour of need he was a doughty protector of them that sailed the seas in our behalf. His heart and mind extended and expanded to the utmost tiring of his body, even unto death; that he might discover and operate the means for saving our ships from the treacherous foes.”

But the tribute Walker would have liked best came from one of his ship’s company. When Loch Killin blew a U-boat to the surface and captured her entire crew, a watching Starling sailor exclaimed, “I bet the Old Man’s rubbing his hands up there.”

He probably was.

Author Robert Barr Smith is a retired U.S. Army colonel and a professor of law at the University of Oklahoma Law Center in Norman.

James Holmes

Security, Asia

It is a terrible strategy that at least would take too long to work.

Key point: Blockades take a lot of time, resources, and determination. If Washington wanted to increase pressure on North Korea it has other ways.

Donald J. Trump adores splashy gestures. On the other hand, the president displays little enthusiasm for launching new military adventures. Suppose his administration decided to go big in response to a North Korean ballistic-missile test, rather than content itself with humdrum peacetime deterrence. And suppose Washington blanched at ground combat. How to satisfy both the impulses goading it into action and those urging restraint?

Well, it could impose a naval blockade to halt shipping bound to or from North Korean seaports—squeezing the hermit kingdom’s seaborne imports and exports while confining its navy to its moorings. Is the U.S. Navy up to enforcing a blockade? Yes—but Washington must not regard a maritime quarantine as a cheap, quick, or painless alternative to land warfare. Just the opposite. It would be expensive, time-consuming, and resource-intensive.

Nor would success be a sure thing.

First, the navy would incur both direct and opportunity costs—especially if allies such as the South Korean Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force declined to supply ships to help squelch shipping. A squadron sufficiently numerous and powerful to apprehend blockade runners would have to linger off each North Korean seaport for the duration of the quarantine. Each squadron would need regular refueling and resupply, as well as relief by replacement ships to allow for upkeep and crew rest.

Multiply the bare number of ships required for sentry duty by two and you have some idea of the direct costs of an offshore strategy. Some 50-70 ships comprise the Japan-based U.S. Seventh Fleet, which would presumably spearhead cordon operations. Subtract submarines from that total and divide the remainder by two and the magnitude of the challenge before the Seventh Fleet becomes plain. The direct costs appear bearable but burdensome.

That leaves aside the opportunity costs. A vessel monitoring North Korean traffic is a vessel not taking a direct hand in great-power competition, the administration’s and the Pentagon’s stated strategic priority. It is not training for peer fleet-on-fleet combat or honing interoperability with allied forces. It is not transiting the Taiwan Strait to tweak China. It is not working with partners in the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean. It is a sentinel, mostly static and tethered to a minuscule patrol ground.

Second, a blockade would not be a one-on-one brawl between the United States against North Korea. A blockade is an act of war under international law, and Washington would be prosecuting that act of war in part along the Korean west coast—at Beijing’s maritime door. Chinese Communist Party leaders are acutely conscious that the Korean Peninsula overshadows the sea route into the Bohai Sea, home to one of China’s coastal economic hubs as well as the gateway from the Yellow Sea to China’s capital city.

U.S. naval operations in China’s near seas and skies always rankle with Chinese Communist prelates. In 2010, for instance, Beijing pitched a fit over planned U.S.-South Korean maneuvers in the Yellow Sea—prompting the Obama administration to relocate the exercises to less contentious waters. And those were mere peacetime maneuvers, not open war. Entanglement between a U.S.-North Korea blockade and already fraught U.S.-China relations is a sure bet.

Third, alliance diplomacy would come into play in all likelihood. Think about it. The closest American territory to the Korean Peninsula is Guam, some 2,000 miles from Korean coasts. It would verge on impossible to sustain a blockade from a base that remote from the quarantine zone. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy would be forced to stage the effort from Japanese or South Korean seaports. Hence Tokyo and Seoul would get in a say in whether or how the venture unfolded.

The allies might contribute ships. Overt participation would be more likely in the case of South Korea’s navy than Japan’s, considering imperial Japan’s vexed past with Korea. Images of Japanese warships lurking offshore to intercept Korean vessels might conjure up ill will in the region. Pacifist-minded Japanese might object as well. Both capitals could impose conditions on what U.S. flotillas based in their harbors could do, so as to avoid entrapment in potential American misadventures.

In short, there’s more to blockading North Korea than ordering the fleet into action. A fair amount of politicking vis-à-vis allies, friends, and prospective antagonists would be a must.

And lastly, success is far from preordained. Sea-power historian and theorist Julian Corbett teaches that, far from settling wars in an afternoon, naval warfare can garner victory only through a process of “gradual exhaustion.” A navy chips away at a seaborne foe’s mercantile fleet, throttling the flow of goods and raw materials merchantman by merchantman rather than halting it in one decisive blow. A strategy that works bit by bit tries the patience of the government and society that set it in motion.

It also tries the patience of one’s own business interests, as well as friendly countries that might see their own seagoing commerce impeded. A blockade of North Korea, then, will demand not just naval resources but time, painstaking diplomacy, and goodwill. The latter two are in short supply in Northeast Asia just now, with the United States and China locked in a trade war and allies Japan and South Korea perennially at odds with each other.

Will blockading fleets take to Asian seas? Maybe. But if so, they will prevail through a slow grind rather than a masterstroke.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and the author of A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy, out this month. The views voiced here are his alone. This appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Economics,

Ok, so this is no OLED, but it can do the job.

If you’ve been in the market lately for a top-notch 4K HDTV, you might have run across offerings that were in the thousands of dollars.  

That might have made you take a couple of steps backward, but if you can stop only focusing on big-name brands like Sony, Samsung, and LG, what you’ll find is that there are indeed wonderful budget-friendly options out there.  

If you’re willing to think a bit outside the box, then take a hard look at TCL’s fifty-inch 4 Series 4K Roku TV, which is currently retailing for $280 on Amazon, which is a hefty savings of 42 percent.  

As the little brother of the Chinese tech giant’s highly regarded 5 and 6 Series 4K HDTVs, the 4 Series often gets lost in the shuffle during conversations about today’s top 4K panels. But know that despite the ridiculously low price point, this set can hold its own against other comparable panels that cost hundreds more.  

Boasting a minimalist and elegant design, the 4 Series packs enough punch for those who love action movies and graphics-intensive video games from PlayStation and Xbox. The panel does an outstanding job supporting the must-have HDR 10 and features low input lag and great response and processing time.  

The contrast ratio, black levels, and uniformity are also considered above average, but be aware that this set, like most non-OLED panels, does fall short in terms of wide-angle viewing.  

One of the best aspects is the built-in Roku TV, which, along with Android TV and LG’s webOS, is considered an elite option among all smart TV platforms out on the market right now—and to top it off, it’s basically free with the TV. 

Roku flaunts an incredibly intuitive and user-friendly interface, making it a breeze to quickly find what you want to watch for family movie nights. Toggling between your apps and devices is also a snap, as you don’t have to physically deal with all of the buttons and switches of separate devices. 

The streaming offerings on Roku are plentiful (likely more content than you can possibly handle), giving you simple access to just about every app available, including the usual favorites Netflix, YouTube, Amazon Prime Video, and Hulu. Also know that since the apps are built-in, you can get to them faster and more easily than via an external streamer.  

As for the sound, you really should think about whether you want to upgrade. The 4 Series comes with two 8W speakers that do support Dolby Digital Plus, but that setup might only work in smaller spaces. If you desire a more immersive, bass-driven audio experience, getting yourself a decent soundbar will probably help immensely.  

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.  

Image: TCL.

Stephen Silver

Technology,

Billions and billions of dollars will be spent on new smartphones, that seems certain.

Next week is a huge one for the widespread adoption of 5G, with Apple scheduled to unveil its first-ever 5G iPhones, with the “Hi, Speed” event that’s scheduled for next Tuesday. This follows a year in which most major smartphone manufacturers have made the move to offering 5G devices, and carriers have rolled out the technology, to varying degrees.

According to new numbers released this week by Strategy Analytics, the 5G market will post major growth this year- a 1,300 percent gain, in fact, to 250 million units around the world. And that’s only with the 5G iPhones on the market for the last part of the year.

“The 5G category is the main engine of smartphone growth today and for the next decade,” Ville-Petteri Ukonaho, the associate director at Strategy Analytics, said in the release. “The 5G category is the fastest-growing part of the smartphone industry today, but there remain several challenges. Many 5G smartphone models are too expensive, most 5G carrier networks are incomplete, while multiple waves of coronavirus are causing consumer fatigue in Western markets like the US and Europe.”

The 250 million number is compared to just 18.2 million in 2019. And while Strategy Analytics did not release a forecast for beyond 2020, that number will presumably grow in future years.

Strategy Analytics added that China and the United States are the top markets for 5G, and that “Apple iPhone, Huawei, and Samsung are the top-three brands that together will capture two-thirds of all 5G smartphone sales globally this year.” This is despite Apple not releasing its phones until the fall, and Huawei being unavailable in the United States.

Another survey this week, though, shows just how much confusion there is about 5G technology. 

A Global Wireless Solutions survey finds that 49 percent of iPhone users believe that they already own a 5G device, when—since the first 5G iPhone is yet to be introduced—none of them actually do. 

Meanwhile, 29 percent of overall smartphone users “are unsure whether their phone is capable of accessing 5G,” while that’s even the case of nearly a quarter of those who bought their smartphones this year.

In addition, GWS asked users when they expect to see “meaningful 5G benefits,” and over 50 percent answered either “sometime this year” or “sometime next year.” About 4 percent answered, “not in my lifetime.” 

“Wireless carriers and mobile device manufacturers have made important 5G investments, but our survey demonstrates that market education is still required to help consumers better understand how 5G can impact their lives in a positive and meaningful way,”  Paul Carter, Founder and CEO at GWS, said in the release of the survey.

“But given the fact that 64% of consumers plan to buy a smartphone between now and the end of 2021, there is clearly an opportunity for 5G to drive enthusiasm for new products and services—assuming consumers better understand the benefits of the next-generation wireless technology.”

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for the National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Security,

Simply put, the carrier has to adapt for the changing world of the twenty-first century to remain relevant. Otherwise it risks sailing off into the sunset like the battleship or worse being an expensive target in a future conflict.

The last “battleship battle” has gone down in history as a one-sided slaughter when the United States Navy destroyed the Imperial Japanese Navy’s battleship Kirishima during the Battle of the Surigao Strait on October 25, 1944. As part of the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf, that particular engagement marked the last battleship-to-battleship in history and was one of only such fights between the capital warships in the entire Pacific campaign of the Second World War.

While the battleship’s role in navies around the world for another fifty years, and it wasn’t until Operation Desert Storm in 1991 that marked the last time that U.S. Navy battleships fired their guns in anger when the USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin conducted standard naval artillery support.

One hundred years ago the battleship ruled the wave—but World War II proved what Gen. Billy Mitchell and other aviation supporters already knew: that the aircraft carrier would be the future. The United States had been a pioneer in naval aviation when a flight deck was erected on the forecastle of the cruiser USS Birmingham (CL-2), but the Royal Navy’s HMS Furious was the first warship to be refitted to operate as a carrier. The Japanese would subsequently launch the Hōshō, the first purpose-built aircraft carrier.

For one hundred years the carriers have gotten larger and more powerful—and are arguably far from obsolete.

Yet, there are reasons to question the long-term future of aircraft carriers. Interesting Engineering addressed the issue this month, highlighting the time and cost to build carriers. During World War II, the United States went from having just a handful of carriers to save the day during the Battle of Midway, to literally having a massive fleet of the flattops by war’s end.

It is not hyperbole to state that the U.S. Navy had more carriers than it knew what to do with—but today it still maintains eleven supercarriers, with talk of keeping some of the aging carriers around a bit longer than expected. The reasoning is that it takes a massive amount of time to build a carrier—upwards to five or six years but that is only to the commissioning. Sea trials take an additional two to three years. The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) took eight years to build. 

Anti-Ship Weapons 

With the introduction of new warships, military thinkers sought ways of both protecting their ships but also ways to sink their enemy’s vessels. The battleship proved especially vulnerable to new weapons notably from the airplane—as the Royal Navy found out in the most horrific way in December 1941 when HMS Prince of Wales was sunk.

During the Cold War, the great threat to U.S. Navy carriers had been Soviet submarines, but today the aircraft carrier could face even more powerful threats including so-called carrier-killer missiles and nuclear-tipped torpedoes. Such weapons could mean that carriers would need to operate far from enemy waters and increasingly far from enemy territory.

That could seriously limit a carrier’s effectiveness given the combat range of aircraft.

The Future Carrier 

The carrier likely won’t go away, but it may need to evolve to stay relevant. This could include a shift away from the massive supercarriers of the U.S. Navy and a move to smaller amphibious assault ships that can operate with short vertical takeoff and landing (SVTOL) aircraft such as the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter.

Additionally, unmanned drones could be developed to operate from these smaller flattops. They would have the added benefit of being cheaper to build and can stay in the air for extended periods, Interesting Engineer noted. Moreover, unmanned aircraft don’t require added time in pilot training—and could address the military’s pilot shortage.

The carrier may evolve in other ways, and perhaps we could see a reconsideration of submersible aircraft carriers, which could surface to deploy those unmanned drones and then dive to avoid being targeted by an enemy’s hypersonic missiles.

Simply put, the carrier has to adapt for the changing world of the twenty-first century to remain relevant. Otherwise it risks sailing off into the sunset like the battleship or worse being an expensive target in a future conflict.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Kyle Mizokami

Security,

Upon his capture, Saddam Hussein was carrying one.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Federal firearms laws regulating automatic weapons, for the most part, keep the Glock 18 out of civilian hands, although a handful of guns exist in the hands of shooting ranges and private collectors. The fully automatic pistol is available for police and government purchase in the United States but without the benefit of frequent, expensive training it’s difficult for even the largest police departments to justify the cost.

In December 2003, soldiers of the U.S. Special Operations Command captured the Ace of Spades himself, Saddam Hussein. The former Iraqi president, on the run since the capture of Baghdad, had appeared in a deck of playing cards with the profiles of other fugitive war criminals and naturally was the top card. Hussein, bedraggled and bereft, was armed with one of the rarest of handguns: the Glock 18, the full auto Glock.

In February 1980 the Austrian Army issued a requirement for a new handgun. Gaston Glock, a knifemaker who made knives and bayonets for the army, decided to try his hand at the gun manufacturing business. After buying and trying many types of existing handguns, consulting with firearm specialists to see what they would like in a handgun, and a presumably a great deal of trial and error, Glock’s first pistol, the Glock 17, won the army contract for twenty thousand pistols.

Glock’s handgun design, an early adopter of the use of polymers to reduce weight, made the pistol relatively lightweight and easy to carry. The seventeen round detachable box magazine was much larger than most handguns of the time. Recoil from the nine millimeter ammunition was quite manageable. An emphasis on mechanical reliability made the Glock 17 an attractive choice for police and special operations units that used handguns as their duty pistol, especially in offensive roles.

In the mid-nineteen eighties Austria’s counterrorism unit Einsatzkommando Cobra, part of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, approached Glock and asked if the company could create a full auto version of the Glock 17. The company was successful and named the gun Glock 18, due to its similarity to the original gun but obvious differences. Technically the Glock 18 is a machine pistol, or a pistol-sized weapon capable of fully automatic fire.

The Glock 18 is dimensionally very similar to the Glock 17, with only a handful of differences. One difference is the presence of a turret-shaped selector switch on the right rear side of the slide. Turned clockwise up, the Glock fires in semi-automatic mode, and each pull of the trigger fires a single round. In this mode the Glock 18 is indistinguishable from the Glock 17 in operation.

Turning the selector switch counterclockwise down, on the other hand, turns the Glock 18 into a fully automatic weapon with a rate of fire nearing Germany’s fearsome MG42 machine gun. In fully automatic mode the Glock 18 has a rate of fire of 1,200 rounds per minute.

While the Glock 17’s recoil is very manageable, a rate of fire for 1,200 rounds a minute was something else entirely. Early Glock 18s had ported barrels that vented gunpowder gases in a direction to counteract barrel climb. However, this increased overall pistol length and created a situation where the gas ports could catch on clothing while being drawn—not a great feature for undercover work. The Glock 18 also includes an optional wire frame shoulder stock to aid in accuracy.

A later version, the Glock 18C, has a two inch cut in the top of the slide to expose the barrel. Cut into the barrel are four chevron-shaped cuts designed to vent gases upward, countering the upward barrel rise when firing fully automatic. As a result the 18C has fewer surfaces to obstruct drawing, and at first glance doesn’t look any different than a semi automatic Glock.

The Glock 18 accepts typical Glock magazines, from ten to seventeen rounds, but a handgun with a rate of fire of 1,200 rounds a minute can empty a standard pistol magazine in a blink of an eye. In order to help feed the Glock 18’s voracious appetite the company released thirty-three round magazines. These longer magazines extend far past the magazine well, making the gun difficult to conceal but double available firepower.

Federal firearms laws regulating automatic weapons, for the most part, keep the Glock 18 out of civilian hands, although a handful of guns exist in the hands of shooting ranges and private collectors. The fully automatic pistol is available for police and government purchase in the United States but without the benefit of frequent, expensive training it’s difficult for even the largest police departments to justify the cost. This specialized weapon may be fun to shoot, but it has little practical value outside of units such as EKO Cobra. For the foreseeable future, the Glock 18 will remain a rarity that roars at 1,200 rounds a minute.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami. This article first appeared last year.

Image: Reddit.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Technology,

If you’re in the market for a no-frills budget HDTV option that just gets the job done for your bedroom, den, or kitchen, make sure to take a long hard look at this outstanding offering.

Expectations are indeed running high for the fast-approaching Amazon Prime Day, which is set to run for two days on October 13 and 14.

During this annual deal event, members of Amazon’s Prime subscription program will receive access to “over one million deals across every category,” including toys, electronics, and apparel, according to the company.

But if you just can’t wait that long, there are plenty of pre-Prime Day deals to take advantage of right now—one being the thirty-two-inch Toshiba Fire TV, which is retailing for a ridiculous sum of $120, a mammoth savings of 33 percent.

If you’re in the market for a no-frills budget HDTV option that just gets the job done for your bedroom, den, or kitchen, make sure to take a long hard look at this outstanding offering.

Sure, it doesn’t have the same VIP ring to it as an LG OLED or a Samsung QLED, but this particular set is definitely no slouch when it comes to pure value, and it can really hold its own compared to other bargain-bin finds.

Despite the ultra-friendly price tag, you’ll likely be pleasantly surprised by what you’ll be receiving. No, this panel won’t come close to matching up with the much more expensive OLED and QLED sets, but this HDTV will silently chug along to show you the news, weather reports, late-night talk shows, and the latest movies hiccup-free.

What really jumps out at you is the clever tie-up that Toshiba has forged with e-commerce giant Amazon. If you’re already a big fan of Amazon Alexa, there’s no reason why you wouldn’t enjoy owning this set. Now with the highly regarded Amazon Fire TV and Alexa under its panels, it really has become that much more of a go-to option for budget-conscious consumers.

There is a mic built into the handy remote control, and with Alexa handling all communication between you and the TV, it’s like having an Echo or an Echo Dot without actually paying for one (knocking off $40 to $100 from the overall price of the TV). It can also control smart-home devices, get sports scores and weather forecasts, and answer all kinds of general questions.

Know that Fire TV is fully capable of giving you simple access to all of your favorite apps like Netflix, Hulu, and Disney+, as well as obviously Amazon Prime Video. Similar to Roku TV, Amazon’s streaming content choices are seemingly endless.

Be aware that the 12W speaker output is understandably lackluster, though it could be passable for smaller spaces. If you do desire a more immersive, bass-driven audio experience, getting yourself a decent soundbar will help out immensely.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.