Ideas on Europe Blog

Third post in our series on the Dutch general elections.

Pillarisation in the Netherlands

Questions on the vital statistics of ‘The Left’ are rising everywhere in the Western World. At least in the Netherlands, it is too early to organise a wake. We may be well known for our liberal and permissive attitude to society (which is not the same as being tolerant, and is more marketing than truth), but the Netherlands has never truly had a left wing revolution, silent or otherwise. In part due to verzuiling (a Dutch form of mild sectarianism along religious and class lines, sometimes called ‘pillarisation’) and the closely related poldermodel (a system of highly proceduralised consensus-building in government), the welfare state and the economy have always been pragmatically constructed.

Although it has been a long time now since the days of verzuiling, the political spectrum never meandered far from that structure. Any changes that occurred since the 1980′s have by-and-large been within the well-known system. New parties would form, but they would adhere to the left-right spectrum (and until the 80′s, the famous ‘pillars’). In fact, the most significant upstart that advocated system-change, D66, has quickly been encapsulated into the spectrum as the epitome of the middle-of-the-road party. D66 is perhaps the most vivid example of the stolid Dutch political establishment that is reluctant to accept change it cannot qualify.

Pim Fortuyn: enjoying an almost saint-like status nowadays.

That ended with Pim Fortuyn. A politician that now has an almost saint-like status in Dutch culture as the man who dared to speak out against the ‘The Hague apparatchiks’. The governments before him had been very successful in fostering economic, social, environmental and cultural progress. The so-called ‘Purple Cabinets‘ (Paars I and II) were a mix of liberal and socialist parties, coming together to form progressive-centrist policies. None of the opposition parties offered any real resistance. How could they? Purple policies were progressive enough for the liberals, social enough for the reds and in the time of secular liberalism, the Christian parties were out anyway.

Pim Fortuyn, who was assassinated in 2002, was the first person to find the cracks in this structure. The complicated and not very successful integration of immigrants into society (mainly guest workers brought in over the post-war decades) played into his hands, as did the fact that the political elite that was enjoying its success too much. Fortuyn formed a perfect storm and created a platform for the angry. His party (the LPF) couldn’t be qualified along the lines of Dutch politics. It was right-wing in foreign and migration policies, but with redistributive policies only seen in the most socialist of programmes. Combined with the promise to let ‘people who had business experience’ run the government, it was the first successful anti-establishment party. For ‘The People’, not just a pillar as with the socialist movement.

From 2001 onward, the traditional left-right divide no longer worked as an analytical tool or even a useful form of political expression. Yet, the system has never recovered from the new idea that parties could actually exist outside of the status quo. In the wake of the rise and fall of the LPF, a number of contenders have emerged, each with a mix of left-wing and right-wing policies. This is best exemplified by the successor of Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party (PVV). With an agenda based on xenophobic screed and anti-elite discourse, the well-spoken former liberal (a scion of former VVD deputy and EU Commissioner Bolkestein) torments both the liberal VVD, and the socialist SP and PvdA. These traditional parties are trying to adapt, incorporating stances heretofore unacceptable to them. The VVD becoming more repressive on law and order, the SP going back to its reactionary socialist roots, and the PvdA still searching for a response.

So what has happened to ‘The Left’?

The truth is that before Fortuyn the old system had led to the adoption of norms in all political parties that would be called ‘Left Wing’ in other countries. The large losses of the Socialist parties is largely due to the fact that they have not been able to find a new cause after most of their policies had been enacted by the 80′s. Even the Christian Democrats advocate a highly organised welfare state, and with ChristenUnie there is even a (moderate) progressive faction. When the old system of Left-Right politics worked, coalitions would be created along familiar lines, even though that sometimes appeared arbitrary. With the crash of that old system of politics, there is no logical flag to rally round for opposition to Wilders and other populists, even though more values are shared. But in effect, almost all other parties condemn the PVV. And although the PVV is ahead in the polls, so are GroenLinks (a Green Party with a liberal streak) and D66 (Progressive Liberals), polar opposites of Wilders.

The Left isn’t dead. In the Netherlands, without ever really coming into power a lot of the traditionally left-wing policies have become an integral part of the political culture. Even with the dissolution of the traditional demarcations by Fortuyn and Wilders, progressive and socialist thought and culture is everywhere in varying degrees. It just can’t be pinned down in the old taxonomy. The current anger at the so-called ‘Progressive Left-Wing Elite’ is therefore mostly a construct of the populists with the objective of giving people something to rage against, based on the old convention of the well-to-do city dwellers that would vote Social Democrats, rather than on something that actually exists. The real questions which the post-election Netherlands will need to ask are therefore: How do we organise our system after the death of the Left-Right spectrum? Will verzuiling eventually be replaced by sectarianism and identity politics?

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Second post on our series on the Dutch general elections.

On Wednesday 15 March, Dutch voters will head to the polls to elect a new parliament and prime minister. And for once, the rest of Europe is very interested, as the question looms whether the leader of the far-right populist Party for Freedom (PVV) Geert Wilders may become head of government after these elections.

In good company in the European Parliament.

Although the Freedom Party’s election programme only consists of one single page with eleven bullet points, it does not fail to shock many. Geert Wilders promises a Dutch exit from the EU, the closure of all mosques, a ban on the Koran, and closed borders for refugees and immigrants from Islamic countries. Just a few months ago, Wilders was convicted by a Dutch court for group defamation and incitement of discrimination after he had stirred up an audience to chant ‘fewer, fewer, fewer Moroccans’. Yet Wilders has headed the election polls for well over a year and is now in a neck-and-neck race with the incumbent Prime Minister Mark Rutte from the Liberal Conservative Party (VVD).

Wilders’ popularity is not new, but has seen some high peaks recently. Indeed, the court conviction seems to have been ‘grist to Wilders’ mill’. It has fuelled the image that he is the only politician with the courage to say what is going ‘wrong’ in the Netherlands. Another important rise in popular support occurred in fall 2015, when the refugee crisis led to heated debates about immigrants taking advantage of the Dutch state and protests about the location of asylum centres. Wilders spoke in parliament about a ‘tsunami’ of asylum seekers, and said that the IS was smuggling thousands of terrorists into Europe.

Broadly speaking, it seems that a large group of Dutch voters feel that their quality of life is threatened by pressure from outside. Such pressures include the presence of Muslims, who are seen as a menace to the culture of gender equality, tolerance and freedom, perceived as ‘typically Dutch’. Moreover, the budget cuts over the course of the economic crisis are seen to have disproportionally hit the ‘hard-working’ Dutch citizen and the pensioners, and thereby threatened their social security. And finally, many do not only see the European Union and ‘Brussels’ as a threat to national culture and sovereignty, but share a widespread perception that the Dutch have paid billions of euros to Eastern and Southern member states in the wake of enlargement and the economic crisis. In this context, Wilders puts the blame on elitist politicians and promises to give ‘our money’ and the Netherlands back to ‘us’.

So the question is: can Wilders ‘win’?

In good company at the German carnival.

Current polls indicate his chances to become the largest party are good. But there are bumps in his road ahead. First, Wilders is a supporter of the presidency of Donald Trump (politico even claims he has ‘invented Trumpism’), but Dutch media have been overwhelmingly negative about Trump’s personality, behaviour and policies ever since he took office. Second, Wilders has caused some fuss in the run-up to the first election debates. He tweeted a fake picture in which the leader of the Liberal Democrats (D66) appeared to stand in a group of protesters demanding ‘sharia for the Netherlands’. He also cancelled two out of four initially scheduled debates, after a television channel adjusted the number of parties invited to participate in the debate and published an interview in which Wilders’ own (estranged) brother severely critiques his ideas. Both Wilders’ support for Trump and his absence from most major debates may diminish potential voters’ sympathy for him personally, which may lead to a shift away from his Party for Freedom, as previous occasions have shown.

But even if the Party for Freedom were to become the biggest group in the Parliament, Wilders’ chances of becoming Prime minister seem very slim. In the Netherlands, the 150 members of the House of Representatives are elected from party lists through proportional representation. The threshold for a party to enter the House is one seat – 0.67% of the votes – so that the percentage of votes roughly determines the percentage of seats won by a party. Moreover, political preferences of Dutch voters have become highly fragmented (as elsewhere in Europe). Altogether, it is likely that almost 15 parties will enter parliament after the elections, and that even even the biggest party in parliament will only assume around 30 seats. In this scenario, Wilders would need to find at least three partners to form a coalition government with a stable majority, but potential coalition partners have already announced that they are unwilling to cooperate with Wilders. This seems to leave him in an isolated position.

The election debates will really take off in the final three weeks before the election. It remains to be seen what the decisive issues will be – likely contenders are the costs and quality of health care and care for the elderly, pensions, defence, European integration (or disintegration), or immigration and asylum. Whether the bumps in Wilders’ road will turn out to be roadblocks remains to be seen.

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The year 2017 is widely seen as hugely important for European politics, with general elections in key European Union member states Germany and the Netherlands – and perhaps even in Italy – and presidential elections in France. Following the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote and the election of President Donald Trump in the United States, populist parties have a real chance of dominating the campaigns in all the aforementioned countries.

The country to kick of this string of elections is the Netherlands. General elections will take place on 15 March of this year and by the looks of it they may result in further fragmentation of the Dutch political landscape. Citizens can choose between no less than 28 parties, from established parties such as the Christian Democratic CDA, the Social Democratic PvdA, and the Liberal VVD, to relative newcomers such as the Party for the Animals, Jesus Lives and, of course, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom.

The Netherlands is one of the key examples of what political scientist Arend Lijphart has called a “consensus democracy”. Consensus democracies are characterised by multi-party systems and proportionate representation, with power being shared between different societal groups. The Dutch political process is shaped by broad agreements, consensus and coalitions, which should accommodate the wishes of political minorities. The period of pillarisation, lasting from approximately 1917 until halfway through the 1960s, represented the apex of Dutch consensus politics. During this period society was divided in four pillars (Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals) which had an impact on almost every aspect of life. Yet, even during the 1960s and 1970s, a period of de-pillarisation and increased polarisation, and later phases of more manifest political competition, a consensual approach has been at the centre of Dutch politics.

To this day, cabinet-formation as well as day-to-day politics requires coalitions. Collegial cabinets are responsible to and dependent on parliament. As a result, Dutch politicians have also been reluctant to consider the option of minority governments. One of the most prominent exceptions to this rule has been the CDA-VVD government, headed by Prime Minister Mark Rutte, which was dependent on support by Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom. The outgoing government is a coalition of PvdA and VVD, once again with Mark Rutte. This government has had a majority in the main chamber of parliament, the House of Representatives, but required support from other parties to reach a majority in the Senate which needs to approve legislation agreed upon in the House.

Voter turnout has always been quite high in the Netherlands: above 70% since the abolition of compulsory voting in 1970. Yet, as has been the case on other countries, electoral volatility has increased as ideology, class and religion have become less important and party membership decreased. The dominance of the traditional parties has declined since the 1960s and smaller parties, such as D66 (Social Liberals) and GroenLinks (Greens), have come to play a lasting role in Dutch politics. On top of this, new parties have entered the political scene since the early-2000s, typically characterised by more radical views and populist tactics that appeal to dissatisfied voters. Some newcomers, such as Pim Fortuyn’s populist-conservative LPF party, only managed to last a short time. Yet, Geert Wilders has enjoyed more or less continuous success since the mid-2000s.

Dutch coalition and consensus building – no piece of cake!

An extremely low electoral threshold of approximately 0.7% and a system of proportional representation in a single, nation-wide constituency explain why so many parties can achieve parliamentary representation. In addition, party splits and mergers have been numerous due to internal differences – since the 2012 elections, eight Members of Parliament left their party to form six new parliamentary groups, quite a few of which are now standing for election. The high number of parties with parliamentary representation is one of the main disadvantages of proportional representation, as it complicates political decision-making. Coalition governments are based on often very detailed coalition agreements. These agreements are often the result of lengthy negotiations, the longest having taken 208 days – nowhere near the Belgian record of 541 days, but still. The last one took 54 days.

This seems to make it more difficult for opposition parties to influence policymaking. Yet, they do actually have a say, for example in the drafting of legislation in parliamentary committees. Consequently, opposition parties regularly support government legislation. And even while the influence of some new parties has been modest, they may have a more lasting impact on the programmes of established political parties and on political discourse in general. This is due to the fact that throughout Dutch political history established parties often adopted the ideas of new parties. This then is the main draw of a system of proportional representation: it accommodates the views of a variety of groupings in a country that has always been one of relative minorities.

The latest polls suggest that 14 out of 28 parties may actually make it into parliament on 15 March. Polls also suggest a close race between PVV and VVD for the title of biggest party, with each now polling at approximately 17%. CDA, D66 and the Greens are all at 10-11%, followed by PvdA at approximately 8%. As nearly all parties have ruled out a coalition with Geert Wilders, it seems quite likely that the next government will be based on a coalition between 4 or more parties. So, expect to see a lengthy negotiation process in which parties with rather different programmes will have to come to an agreement. In the past Dutch politicians have proven to be able to tackle this challenge. And unless some parties withdraw on their pledges not to work with Geert Wilders, they have to.

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The French take delight in pointing out that they are World Champions in producing political opinion polls (only to shake their heads in disbelief and despair about their own addiction). While the claim to this honorary title may not be corroborated by empirical data, it confirms the impression of saturation that a politically interested individual living in this country is inevitably bound to have at one point. There are not many democracies where you have, in addition to mainstream radio and TV, four full-fledged nation-wide 24/7 news channels, all available on free TV in all households, and all guilty of the deadly sin of poll gluttony.

These days, the avid consumption of all kinds of percentages and rates, figures and trends churned out by large variety of professional survey providers who virtually sit on each other within the small world of the Parisian media-microcosm, has something even more paradoxical than before. For having failed to predict several political results in the past, the polls are viewed with increasing distrust by the public, while in fact they have become more reliable than ever. As Gaël Sliman, long-standing pollster and founder-president of the dynamic newcomer Odoxa, pointed out to me recently, the whole industry has made tremendous progress not only in terms of methodology, but also with regard to sampling: ‘The samples have become much more representative of the population ; not only is there a lot less lying or holding back on the side of respondents, but in addition online paneling reaches the previously hidden groups’. So how does he explain the bad reputation of the surveys and the pollsters behind them? For him, it’s all a question of expectations:

Gaël Sliman, president and co-founder of ODOXA.

‘The French are extraordinarily interested in politics, more than other European populations. And they have extremely high expectations towards all things political. Which necessarily produces excessive disappointment at one point. In an ever more fragmented and unstable political landscape, they want to consult the polls as forecasts. But polls have never predicted the future! And they do so even less today, since the volatility of people’s opinion has increased dramatically’.

He is probably right. Take the presidential election, always held in April/May. The period of crystallization of the vote used to be around early February, when the campaign dynamics started to be clearly visible. This was the case for Hollande in 2012, Sarkozy in 2007, and even Chirac in 2002. Some may argue that in 2002 no one had seen Le Pen coming, but that’s only partly true: one of the pollsters had informed Jospin’s campaign staff about the danger of a perceptible movement, only to be willingly ignored…)

This being said, the reliability/distrust paradox is only one of the French polling paradoxes. Another one is that precisely at the moment where all candidates exhort the public not to trust the polls – which will never be able to capture the mood and the swelling dynamics ‘on-the-ground’, like Fillon repeated over and over again during the primaries campaign, before getting completely out of touch himself with the ‘on-the-ground mood’ once convicted of flagrant nepotism – the survey results are likely to have more influence on the elections than ever.

This paradox is due to both the electoral system and the emergence of the extreme right. Traditionally, as the saying went, the French voted, in accordance with their political ideas, in favour of a candidate at the first round of the presidential election, before voting against the bigger evil in the second round. Today, if three quarters of the population wish to avoid ‘La Présidente’ Marine Le Pen, citizens cannot help but think ‘strategically’ and give their vote to the candidate best placed to be sure to beat her.

Gaël Sliman has doubts about this theory. He believes that polls are ‘just one parameter in the decision-making among many’, though they may have a ‘stronger impact on those who hesitate between two candidates and cannot make up their mind’. One way or another, even those who use the polls to orient their own choice are likely to end up disappointed by the ‘false predictions’ they interpreted into the figures despite better knowledge.

But disappointment on every level is in the genes of the Fifth Republic. The hopelessly binary, antagonistic election campaign induces candidates to engage in promises both they and their electorate know they will be unable to keep. But given the aura of excessive power and prestige of the President, both the candidates and the electorate push each other invariably towards gross exaggeration in both promises and expectations. Once the inebriation with grand schemes is over and hangover sets in, both are set for five years of coexistence between a naked king and, as Gaël Sliman puts it very nicely, ‘a people of frustrated regicides’ (a formula I would have loved to invent myself…).

And as soon as the frustration sets in – at the latest in the autumn of election year – the only thing that brings comfort is the steadily decreasing popularity rates in these damned, beloved polls!

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 13 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

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Meng-Hsuan Chou, Jens Jungblut, Pauline Ravinet, and Martina Vukasovic

In this thematic issue of Policy and Society (all contributions are openly accessible), we highlight the multi-level, multi-actor, and multi-issue (the ‘multi-s’) nature of public policy using the case of higher education policies.

We begin with an overview of how the global shift towards knowledge-based economies and societies has placed ‘knowledge’ at the core of contemporary public policy and policymaking. The governance of knowledge, however, is not a neatly contained policy coordination exercise: it requires collaboration across multiple policy sectors that may have previously experienced very little or less interaction. For example, we can think of a (non-exhaustive) list of relevant policy areas to include, such as higher education, research, trade, foreign policy, development, or migration. In our view, higher education policy coordination is thus permeated with respective sectoral concerns, with discussions taking place across distinct policy arenas, sometimes in silos, both inside and outside of formal government channels.

While the above characterization brings forth the multi-issue aspect competing for attention in higher education policy coordination, we suggest that it also points to the presence of multiple actors: state actors from different ministries or agencies, representatives from universities and businesses, other non-state actors (interest groups, stakeholder organizations), as well as users of such coordinative outputs (concerned parents, students, as well as employers). As regular readers of this blog would recognize: the multi-issue and multi-actor features of higher education policy coordination often result in duplication, competition, inconsistencies, clashing priorities, and even potential bureaucratic and political conflict (Braun, 2008; Peters, 2015)—all symptoms of horizontal policy coordination challenges (Gornitzka, 2010).

We can add to this observation the fact that actors involved in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of higher education policy (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000; Olsen, 1988) often operate, and ‘shop’ for better policy solutions, across several governance levels. While the rise of the regions—both supranational and subnational—in the higher education policy domain has garnered some academic attention (Chou & Ravinet, 2015; Jayasuriya & Robertson, 2010), this multi-level dimension of policy coordination needs to be brought into sharper relief. Indeed, international knowledge policy coordination stretches across many levels, including the macro-regional (e.g. European Union—EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations—ASEAN), the meso-regional (Nordics, Baltics—bilateral or multilateral cooperation among states sharing specific geographical features), sub-regional (also bilateral or multilateral cross-border cooperation between distinct territories of different states), as well as the state/national (in federal systems), sub-national, and organizational levels (see e.g. Piattoni, 2010 concerning multi-level governance in the European context).

In the introduction to this thematic issue, we present an analytical framework that would assist in identifying and studying the multi-issue, multi-actor, and multi-level features of contemporary policymaking and policy coordination. Specifically, we strongly argue that studying policy coordination in today’s higher education sector requires unpacking the three distinct characteristics of this very coordination and addressing them separately from one another as an independent perspective and recognizing their interaction as likely to be responsible for the outcomes observed. In so doing, we call for analysing how the ‘multi-s’ features affect the stability, changes, and evolution of individual and collective higher education policy coordination under observation. In academic practice (i.e. theory-building, research design, and empirical fieldwork), it means that it is essential to pay attention in the following ways when examining individual ‘multi-s’ characteristic:

1. Multi-level characteristic – focus on the antecedents and consequences of distribution or concentration of authority across governance levels;
2. Multi-actor characteristic – acknowledge both the heterogeneity of the ‘state’ and its many composite institutions as well as the involvement of non-state actors (e.g. stakeholder organizations, businesses, consumers) in this policy domain; and
3. Multi-issue characteristic – identify how clashes as well as complementarities between policy sectors and spill-overs move into and away from the policy domain of interest.

In our view, the ‘multi-s’ framework offers a solid first conceptual step to encapsulate and unravel the complexity observed within contemporary higher education policymaking and coordination. The thematic issue contains eight contributions that bring our observations to life with a range of cases (from higher education appropriations to work-based higher education programmes, stakeholder organizations, standardization, and higher education regionalisms) and developments across multiple countries and geographical areas (from the U.S. to China, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Europe and Southeast Asia).

We invite everyone interested in the increased complexity of governing, producing, and using knowledge in today’s policymaking to consider our framework as a more comprehensive way to gain a greater understanding of both historical and contemporary developments.

Braun, D. (2008). Organising the political coordination of knowledge and innovation policies. Science and Public Policy, 35(4), 227-239. doi:10.3152/030234208×287056

Chou, M.-H., & Ravinet, P. (2015). Governing higher education beyond the state: The rise of ‘Higher education regionalism’. In H. De Boer, D. D. Dill, J. Huisman, & M. Souto-Otero (Eds.), Handbook of Higher Education Policy and Governance (pp. 361-378). London: Palgrave.

Gornitzka, Å. (2010). Bologna in context: A horizontal perspective on the dynamics of governance sites for a Europe of Knowledge. European Journal of Education, 45(4), 535-548.

Gornitzka, Å., & Maassen, P. (2000). Hybrid steering approaches with respect to European higher education. Higher Education Policy, 13(3), 267-285.

Jayasuriya, K., & Robertson, S. L. (2010). Regulatory regionalism and the governance of higher education. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 8(1), 1-6. doi:10.1080/14767720903573993

Olsen, J. P. (1988). Administrative reform and theories of organization. In C. Campbell & B. G. Peters (Eds.), Organizing governance, governing organizations (pp. 233-254). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Peters, B. G. (2015). Pursuing horizontal managment: the politics of public sector coordination. Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

Piattoni, S. (2010). The theory of multi-level governance: conceptual, empirical, and normative challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Taking Tony Judt’s A Grand Illusion? out of the shelf again.

Revisiting a book on the general state and mid-term prospects of the European Union that was only written twenty years ago may turn out to be a very useful exercise. It puts into perspective the achievements and failures of what is a slow and long integration process. And it sheds an interesting, different, light on the present.

Tony Judt’s book A Grand Illusion?, published by Penguin, is a wonderful case in point. It’s a short, but dense essay of 130 pages, based on a series of lectures given in the mid-1990s by this renowned historian, a British citizen living and working in the United States.

Right at the beginning the author lists the three questions he wants to address in his book: ‘What are the prospects for the European Union? If they are not wholly rosy, why is that? And how much does it, in any event, matter whether a united Europe may or may not come about? (p. vii).

In his elaborate response to these questions, Tony Judt takes great care to draw the distinction between what may be considered the desirable outcome of the EU’s development and the possibility of it coming about. The least you can say is that there is a significant gap between the two. Judt remains more than doubtful with regard to the capacity of the Europe of 15 to realise its proclaimed objectives.

This book is written by a ‘Eurosceptic’ in the noblest sense of the word, before it was hi-jacked by the worst representatives of narrow-minded and populist nationalism. Judt sees no contradiction whatsoever in declaring himself at the same time ‘enthusiastically European’ and a ‘Euro-pessimist’. And the two are indeed not mutually exclusive: at the French referendum on the constitutional treaty in 2005, many citizens spoke about their deep disappointment when comparing their ideal of a united Europe with the prospects of the existing EU they were summoned to approve.

And like every self-respecting pessimist, Judt attributes the successes and achievements that European integration had nevertheless known simply to ‘good fortune’, an expression that is recurrent throughout the book and that translates a certain difficulty to explain why on earth Jean Monnet was so successful in his ground-breaking initiative, against all odds, and against the logic of ‘realism’. According to Judt, it is well ‘good fortune’, this ‘midwife of mid-twentieth-century Western European prosperity’ (p. 33), brought in by unique circumstances, that ‘fueled the vehicle of European unity’. Much more so in any case than ‘coal, labor, and dollars’ (p. 41).

As a result, to Judt, the ‘foundation myth of modern Europe  – that the European Community was and remains the kernel of a greater, pan-European prospect’ (p. 41), and the promise that this Europe would be ‘no mere neo-mercantilistic partnership of the rich and famous’ (p. 42) – is just that: a myth, and an empty promise. And he finds it difficult to have trust in this poorly identified object, born of a fortunate geopolitical configuration and both pushed and dominated by ‘separate and distinctive electoral concerns’ in the countries that made it up. (p. 23).

Tony Judt (1948-2010)

Tony Judt’s scepticism – which is always coloured with a good dose of melancholy perhaps due to his family roots in the heart of Mitteleuropa where he also drafted is book – does not allow him in 1995/96 to envisage that the European Union might actually be up to its historical task and overcome the old divisions of the continent. Quite the contrary: since ‘Western Europeans came to have a strong and growing interest in keeping Europe divided’ (p. 43), it seemed clear to him that they would perpetuate the exclusion of the poor cousins to the East. Not only for economic reasons, far from that: Judt sees an entire conceptual fault line running through the continent, when it comes to interpret what ‘Europe’ actually means, a ‘great gulf of uninterest and misunderstanding that separates east and west’ (p. 58).

On this point, as we know in hindsight, his profound scepticism misled him. The EU did integrate Central and Eastern Europe, sometimes even against the economic imperatives and despite serious shortcomings with regard to the rights of minorities or corruption. Where Judt is however more than clear-sighted is in his premonitions of the inevitable decline of the European Welfare State, which in his entire work he never ceased to praise as Europe’s greatest civilizational achievement. His concerns about the increased pressure he saw at work on social solidarity and cohesion all across the continent have been confirmed over the last two decades. And his analysis of both the predictable deepening of social inequality and the effects of demographic change and mass immigration, which he thought would inevitably lead to the resurgence of a reactionary and rancid nationalism, read today like an anticipation of populism triumphant in 2016.

At the end the author wonders whether the European Union had not better admit to itself that the famous ‘ever closer union’ simply is ‘impossible in practice, and (…) therefore perhaps imprudent to promise’ (p. 129). And he ends up a spokesman of neo-protectionist and sovereigntist voices when he concludes that it might well be possible that ‘the old-fashioned nation-state is a better form in which to secure collective loyalties, protect the disadvantaged, enforce a fairer distribution of resources, and compensate for disruptive transnational economic patterns’ (p. 130).

With such a conclusion, the reader is entitled to wonder why the title of the book actually carries a question mark. But even if Tony Judt’s elegant prose constitutes no doubt Europessimism’s finest clothes, it may not be as ‘realistic’ as it wants (and claims) to be.

To start with, it suffers, as Stanley Hoffman pointed out in his review in Foreign Affairs (No. 76, Janvier 1997, p. 139-145), of ‘exaggerations, contradictions and omissions’ that are characteristic to this type of Euroscepticism. According to him, Tony Judt’s book is certainly a remarkable essay, but at the same time a ‘jeremiad too fond of gloom and doom’.

I couldn’t agree more with this friendly criticism. The greatest shortcoming of A Grand Illusion? is no doubt the total lack of consideration for any kind of idealistic motivations in the setting up of the European community. These have, however, never been entirely absent in the difficult process of European integration. To reduce the historical miracle of genuine and deep-reaching reconciliation between France and Germany to a kind of pragmatic negotiation and bargaining, falls a little short of the truth. And reveals quite a bit about the perception the author has not only of international relations in general, but also of human nature. This perception is of course perfectly legitimate, but it only tells half the story.

A fascinating second reading for a book that, twenty years on, makes the reader aware that the coughing engine of the European bus actually still progresses on the bumpy road of integration (even if some passengers prefer to get off). A ride which is certainly never satisfying for Euro-enthusiasts, but a lot smoother than predicted by the Euro-pessimists.

The French version of this post kicked off
the ‘relecture’ series on the Alliance Europa blog.

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Last year, I spent some days in the UN archives in New York to find out more about the topic of my current research on budgeting in the United Nations.

As I am going through the material (hundreds of photos of archive documents), I stumbled over a document that is only incidentally relevant to my research: a summary of a meeting of then-US-President Bill Clinton with then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (who died while I was in New York last year). The meeting took place on 27 September 1993, so in the first year of Clinton’s first term, and the second year of Boutros-Ghalis single term.

This is how the 4-page meeting summary (written by the UN Secretariat and now archived) starts:

Well, starting a meeting that goes on afterwards with topics Somalia, Bosnia, UN reform and the Middle East – this sounds like a classic Bill Clinton, doesn’t it?

I guess today, it would rather be on the Secretary-General of the UN, Antonio Guterres, to make the “hopefully nobody shouts ‘Fire’” joke.

Today, the USA threatened to leave the UN Human Rights Council, which will probably not the last time the Trump administration will start laying actual fire.

But, to be fair to Trump: looking through the archive material on budget politics in the UN during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, this administration and the present Congress would not be the first who try to mess with the United Nations – it’s actually a pretty common patterns coming from the US.

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Tony Blair’s call to spirits to rise up from the deep to throw off Brexit was worthy of Owen Glendower’s faith in his magical powers. So too is the reply that Shakespeare gave Hotspur: ‘Why so can I or so can any man. But will they come when you do call for them?’ Blair’s cosmopolitan audience showed there are people in the City of London welcoming his call to remain in the European Union. But his talk gave no hint of how troops raised in the Square Mile could successfully capture Parliament.

The most straightforward way to repudiate the Brexit referendum result is to call a second referendum in which some who voted to leave would change their minds as signs emerge of the difficulties and uncertainties entailed in de-integrating the UK from the EU. It would require a swing of less than 2.0 percent to turn the minority vote for remaining in the EU into a majority.

For this to happen, Parliament would have to approve another referendum. Remainers could try to emulate the successful campaign of their opponents and seek an MP among the 20 qualified to introduce a Private Member’s bill in this session of Parliament. A mischievous Scottish National Party MP could speak from conviction of remaining in the EU. Defeat of the bill by an overwhelming mass of English MPs would add fuel to the party’s case for Scottish independence.

One stumbling block to a referendum is the wording of the question. Tony Blair’s call favours the proposition that the United Kingdom should remain a member of the European Union; the Conservative majority favours the opposite. Like the historic Glendower, Blair is ignoring the strength of the troops massed against him in Parliament. In any event, the Government can claim that the courts have given MPs a voice. Earlier in February almost 500 MPs voted to go ahead with withdrawal, including a majority of Labour as well as Tory members.

In a sense, Blair is correct in stating that both the referendum and parliamentary votes have been taken ‘without knowledge of the true terms of Brexit’. These can only become known in autumn 2018, when UK and EU negotiators publish joint recommendations about the rules that should govern the post-Brexit relations between UK and the EU when it officially cases to be a member before Easter 2019. Once these terms are known, Remainers could promote a referendum about whether the terms should be accepted. The government would again reject such a demand on the grounds that a parliamentary vote is sufficient to authorise acceptance.

Theresa May has left open whether the government would recommend accepting a deal with the EU or endorse its rejection if its terms were a bad deal. Conservative MPs critical of the only deal on offer would want to hold the Prime Minister to her pledge that exit with no deal is better than accepting a bad deal. At present, a majority of MPs would prefer to vote for whatever deal was available rather than no deal. In the House of Lords, where the government lacks a majority, a majority of peers would undoubtedly endorse whatever an elected government negotiated and the Commons approved.

Blairite MPs could offer an amendment asking the government to return to Brussels to withdraw its notification of withdrawal. Such a strategy assumes that the EU would allow the UK to rescind its notification of withdrawal. The EU has made it clear that, like pro-Brexit Tory MPs, it wants an end to years of uncertainty about whether Britain is in or out of Europe. Labour MPs would face the awkward choice of voting for the government’s deal as a lesser evil or casting a negative vote that would not lead to better terms but to a complete break with the EU.

In practice, the only way to undo the referendum vote is to have a House of Commons with a majority of MPs in favour of British membership in the EU. If Blair issued a call for a general election before withdrawal is a fact, he would need the votes of 433 MPs for a ballot, or dozens of Conservative and SNP MPs to combine with Labour to form a new government with Jeremy Corbyn as Prime Minister. If Hotspur were a bookmarker, he would offer odds of more than a million to one against this. Once a new House of Commons is elected in 2020, there will be five years for MPs to review the consequences of what Parliament and people have voted for and decide to apply to become an EU member state.

Instead of issuing a call which is  certain to get a parliamentary response only from Lord Mandelson, Tony Blair could achieve more if he tried to work his magic on the devils that are in the details of Brexit and will affect the state of Britain in the world once it no longer belongs to the European Union. For example, he could return to a cause he once advocated when shadow minister for employment a quarter century ago: the need to improve state education and vocational training so that British workers and enterprises can compete better in an increasingly competitive world.

The post Does Tony Blair have an answer to Shakespeare’s Hotspur? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Ask not whether the European Union is a federation or not, ask what Europe can teach us about the very concept of federation!

In a nutshell, this is one of my major take-homes from a particularly enriching seminar held in Nantes on 17 February at the Chair of European Philosophy of Alliance Europa. Olivier Beaud, constitutional lawyer at the University of Paris (Panthéon-Assas) and one of France’s best-known theorists of the State, discussed his ‘Theory of Federation’ with Julien Barroche from Inalco and Sciences Po Paris.

Olivier Beaud declared himself absolutely not convinced by the eternal ‘sui generis’ categorisation of the European Union. The widespread use of this comfortable conceptual no man’s land is no doubt due to a certain intellectual laziness (and the desire to keep the poisonous ‘F’-word out of the debate). It keeps the researcher from thinking the idea of federation to the end. Julien Barroche agreed: he called the ‘sui generis’ model a ‘conceptual imprisonment by retroactive rationalisation’.

Oliver Beaud took things even further: for him, the well-known dichotomy between ‘federal state’ and ‘confederation of states’ is yet another ‘obstacle to thought’. The real antagonism lies between ‘federation’ and ‘state’, the former standing for a dualism of structures, the latter for unicity (almost like the difference between stereo and mono :-).

If a federation is a ‘union between states that decide to unify in order to become something else’, a state that enters a federation ceases to be a state strictu sensu. The entities formely known as states do not disappear – they are the creators of a new judicial being, an association in which they remain present and on whose development they maintain an influence.

According to Olivier Beaud, our vision has been blurred by the nomenclature of international law, which has imposed the exclusive domination of the (nation-)state as actor. But this vision is nothing short of an ‘excessive simplification’, because it keeps federations and their specificities out of the radar.

Julien Barroche and Olivier Beaud, welcomed by Arnauld Leclerc from the Chair of European Philosophy.

Of course, the European Union is, despite a series of federative elements, an incomplete federation. Its most striking paradox is that, as federation, it was created on the basis of concerns for security and prosperity with regard to the exterior – Julien Barroche quoted Raymond Aron for whom a federation is ‘resolutely decided to defend its identity towards the exterior’ – while it is exactly this unicity towards exterior threats that is both needed and lacking on the European level.

Taking the historical evolution of the United States of America as a benchmark for how federations behave, Olivier Beaud noted that Europe has not known the same centralising shift from federation to State that the US underwent under the pressure of successive wars. Neither is it capable and willing to ensure, especially with regard to current dramatic infringements on democracy in Hungary and Poland, the minimum homogeneity of political regimes within its federation.

He finished  – of course! – with a thought on Brexit.

In a federation, unilateral secession is by definition illicit. And until the introduction of article 50 in the Treaty of Lisbonne, it was not foreseen in the EU either. Article 50, however, was conceived as an element of compensation during negotiations, as an option permanently available to member state, thus bringing the incomplete European federation one step further back, in the direction of becoming merely an international organisation.

There was another lovely conceptual take-away in waiting at the end of this dense and inspiring seminar. It was offered by Jean-Marc Ferry, who holds the chair in European philosophy in Nantes. In his concluding reflection, he suggested to think about the incompatibility between federation and sovereignty in a different, differentiated light. In reference to the concepts of negative and positive liberty developed by several philosophers from Friedrich Wilhelm to Isaiah Berlin, he proposed the concepts of negative and positive sovereignty, the former being exemplified in Brexit as the kind of (fake) sovereignty that is still available to member-states, while the latter, as capacity to act and take control of one’s destiny, is the one which a member-state has definitely lost when entering the federation and which can only be recovered and enacted collectively.

Given the sheer quality of the debate, I was not surprised to see that among the public no one was looking at their computer screens or smartphone displays (a welcome change from what has become the norm of academic events). A refreshing, good old 20th-century colloquium with an audience of two dozen people actually listening with concentration and attention, and no doubt walking out with the feeling of being more intelligent than when they entered the room two hours earlier. If in addition you can take away thoughts on your TGV home that you know will enrich your teaching and research, you have a brief, satisfying glimpse of what academic life might be.

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Conventional wisdom is that opposition parties perform well and gain ground in by-elections while governing parties don’t. In Stoke Central, Labour managed to retain their seat, albeit with a reduced majority. The Conservative’s win in Copeland, however, was nothing short of a disaster for Labour in a constituency they have consistently held since the 1980s. It is the first by-election gain by a governing party since 1982.

There has been a temptation since the EU referendum to view subsequent electoral contests primarily through the lens of Brexit. Brexit, it is argued, is the new divide in British politics. Voters are aligned to remain or leave. There are remain constituencies and there are leave constituencies. This narrative was present in coverage in the run up to yesterday’s by-elections – to some extent in Copeland and to a large extent in Stoke. Media coverage was keen to highlight that both constituencies voted leave in the referendum. With around 70% voting for ‘leave’ in June’s EU referendum, Stoke attained the status of “the Brexit capital of Britain”, making it a prime target for the new UKIP leader Paul Nuttall, keen to reach out to disaffected Labour voters. Candidates were initially assessed not on their broader appeal to the local electorate, but whether they supported remain or leave in the referendum, whether they would respect the result of the referendum and so on. It’s a narrative that worked well with the Richmond by-election in December 2016, but cannot be applied so readily to yesterday’s by-elections.

Brexit no doubt played a role yesterday, but the result in Stoke in particular challenges the simplistic narrative that constituencies and voters can be neatly divided into “remain” and “leave”. Instead, questions can be raised about a range of other possible factors which have played a role.

For example, what impact has the popularity of party leaders had? Labour’s problems arguably run much deeper than its current leadership, but Jeremy Corbyn is by no means a popular leader. In the latest YouGov poll only 15% think he is best for Prime Minister, compared to 49% for Theresa May. Following her election last night, the Conservative victor Trudy Harrison was explicitly clear in attributing her success in what had been a long-term Labour seat to the fact that voters in Copeland simply felt that “Jeremy Corbyn doesn’t represent them”. This was despite the future of the local NHS hospital being one of the key issues locally, something Labour traditionally should have been able to capitalize on.

What about the quality of the candidates themselves? In Stoke, both Snell and Nuttall were the focus of significant media attention. Snell received significant criticism following the revelation of his less than squeaky clean social media history. And Nuttall too for his claims about Hillsborough and his potential breach of electoral law by failing to list his actual address on the nomination forms. Snell was able to draw on his local connections to Stoke, while Nuttall was never going to be able to shift his status as an opportunistic parachute candidate.

What about the local campaigns? The Conservatives put a lot of effort into the on-the-ground campaign to win Copeland, and it clearly paid off. Labour similarly had a heavy presence on the ground in Stoke, while UKIP’s efforts there were hardly a model for an efficient party campaign machinery in action. Again, Nuttall’s failure to list his correct address on his nomination form, along with his absence from some local hustings events are illustrations of this.

And what about the issues that resonate with local people (all politics is local after all)? Much has been made of the importance of the nuclear industry as a major employer in Copeland. To what extent did the current Labour leadership’s perceived ambivalence and lack of commitment to nuclear play on voters’ minds there? In Stoke, despite the high leave vote in June’s referendum, Brexit barely got a mention in the local campaign. Rather the performance of the local hospital, the future of other local public services and a general dissatisfaction with Westminster politics were key issues on the doorstep. This was even recognized by UKIP, and Nuttall was keen to point out in hustings (those that he attended) that Brexit wasn’t the most important issue at stake in the by-election.

Yes, certain areas voted predominately to leave, and others to remain. But yesterday’s by-elections show us the picture is far more complex than this simple characterization would have us believe. Leave vs. remain becomes rather more murky when you throw in the dynamics of party competition, for example. For those of us that study politics, this reaffirms the complexity of electoral contests, and the need to consider a range of local and national factors that have the potential to influence voter behaviour and the outcome of elections. Brexit and the proportion of leave/remain voters in any given area may be one of a number of explanatory factors explaining electoral outcomes, but it is important not to lose sight of local context.

The post Yesterday’s by-elections weren’t all about Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This year’s Munich Security Conference took place under the theme ‘Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?’ and hoped to steer the direction of politicians and policy-makers into facing the wave of fake news and fake facts. Originally, the purpose of the Munich Security Conference is for senior politicians, diplomats and military experts to discuss current issues in the field of security and defence. The agenda sounded promising, especially for those interested in the future of the Atlantic Alliance, politics of the West and EU-US relations. If you looked for discussions on pressing and highly important security and defence issues, you were in the wrong place.

Speeches and roundtable discussions by the representatives of the most powerful states reflected the same blah-blah as every year. It was the first performance by the newly formed US administration represented by a delegation around Vice-President Michael Richard Pence, Secretary of Defence James Mattis and Senator John McCain. All three US representatives stressed the importance of NATO, the United States’ commitment to collective defence and to the transatlantic partnership. Mattis criticised the European allies for the lack of commitment terms of defence spending and Pence especially demanded an increased contribution by France, Germany and Italy.

As a reaction, German minister of defence, Ursula von der Leyen, called for a more ‘responsibly minded America’ and demanded that Europe should not always rely on the United States, instead it should be responsible for itself in these times of uncertainty. Newly appointed Sigmar Gabriel – it seems on behalf of the European allies – proclaimed that ‘we must not leave Europe to those who want to destroy it’.

While these speeches and calls sound all too promising and appealing in times of uncertainty, populism and increasing crises in and around Europe, these talks have not changed. And, what are the results? It is the same procedure as every year. It is the same rhetoric and the same lack of concrete measures and actions.

What the main criticism here is that, while the Munich Security Conference is supposed to be a forum to discuss and find solutions of crises and conflicts, the most pressing ones have been neglected and pushed towards the end of the agenda. The main talks circulated around new US administration under Donald Trump – despite his absence – and how ‘obsolete’ NATO might be. More urgent security issues have not been touched upon, such as, above all, how to deal with the increasing authoritarian style of government in Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the next crises lurking in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, and how to actually solve still ongoing crises and conflicts in Eastern Europe (Ukraine and Russia), the Middle East (Iraq, Syria) as well as in North and Sub-Saharan Africa (migration, migration, human rights violations).

In addition, there was not much talk about the future of the relations of the West with Russia, which is severely needed to tackle some of these issues. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov called NATO an institution of the Cold War era and demanded a post-West world order because he sees the West as outdated. It is time for NATO to finally get hands on, and get to grips with the increased aggression by Russia and thus to ‘rethink Russia’.

Almost all speakers called for unity and cohesion, but, as finally vocalised by Anne Applebaum in her article for the Washington Post, what has been forgotten was ‘that one of the gravest dangers facing the Western alliance is the president of the United States’. So, one thing that the Munich Security Conference has shown, however, is how representatives of the current US administration have to carry the can for what their president is not capable of: doing politics.

Then, what to make of all of this? Europe needs to rethink itself. It is slowly realising that the United States as a reliant partner in foreign, security and defence policy is slowly ceasing under the current administration. NATO is not ‘obsolete’, although it is obviously an institution from the Cold War era. Thanks to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s realistic assessment, NATO needs to adopt not only to the external security environment and the current security challenges, but also to the internal changes and (security) challenges. Increased defence spending is one thing, but willingness, ideological commitment to the alliance’s core values and actually taking action to address there threats and challenges is another.

It is about time to go beyond all this rhetoric and to deal with the current security challenges and threats that North America and Europe are facing.

Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters is a PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant at the University of Kent and a Visiting Scholar at KU Leuven.

The post What lessons learned from the Munich Security Conference? by Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

To whom it may concern

This is to certify that Ms Theresa May successfully passed the admission exam of the ‘Higher Management and Governance’ executive education programme, generally known as ‘HMG’, in July 2013.

At the end of her first semester, during which her performance was evaluated through continuous assessment, she has now submitted her final semester exam, consisting of a research paper on the topic ‘The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union’. She also has successfully completed her practical assignment of pushing a ‘Notification of Withdrawal‘Notification of withdrawal through parliament in a simulation exercise of democratic procedures. Her second semester is due to start on March 9 with a study trip to Brussels where she is expected to present this notification to a panel of peers.

Please find below her full semester grades and selected comments on her performance. Each grade is an average calculated from the assessment of the professors participating in the jury. Please note that HMG programme only employs renowned experts based in the United Kingdom.

Honi soit qui mal y pense!

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I’ve been looking back at my posts from last summer, when things Brexit-y were in much more obvious flux. this was triggered by last week’s post on the looming Article 50 notification, which reminded me that I’d sketched out some options.

Briefly re-stated, these suggested that the UK would aim for either close or distant relations with the EU in the initial post-membership phase and then in the longer-term relationship: thus, you could have a ‘Norway’ (close, then close), ‘reverse accession’ (close, then distant), ‘abyss’ (distant, then close) and ‘hard’ (distant, then distant) path.

Clearly, debate has moved on since then, but the ‘abyss‘ option is worth revisiting, for reasons that will be fairly obvious.

The basic conceit is that the government would push hard for a distant relationship, only then to row back hard, having seen how perilous that route is in practice. The benign version would be a genuine change of heart – ‘we must think of the national interest’-type rhetoric – while the more cynical might consider it possible that the government always had this in mind, but it was the only way to build public support for what looks like a reversal of policy.

As regular readers will know, I incline in general to cynicism, but the past 8 months as surely the clearest ever example of cock-up over conspiracy. If there is someone in Whitehall or Westminster with a masterplan for all this, then it is the equal of any paperback thriller, and about as likely.

This, sadly, should be no comfort to any of us: there has been a palpable sense of ‘making it up as we go along’ in the corridors of power, strengthened by the repeated failures to demonstrate even the minimal level of intent needed to conduct negotiations with the EU27.

So if the abyss option is to be used, it will be because it looks like the best course of action at the time. This raises two basic questions: why would that happen, and what would be the effect?

Inasmuch as the government does know what it wants from Brexit, the direction is currently set for something between ‘reverse accession’ and ‘hard’ Brexit: no to free movement, but trying to keep as much as possible of the rest. Rhetorically, Theresa May has placed herself firmly in this position, accepting no advice and encouraging no debate beyond her very immediate circle. The unwavering opposition to any amendment of her ‘plan’ is a strong part of this: firm, if futile, resistance to the Millar case; parliamentary manoeuvring to avoid amendments to the EU(NOW) Bill.

The upshot is that May has made it very hard indeed to move away from her position, vague though it might be. As a result, it would need something of very great weight to move her.

Logically, that great weight would be an economic collapse, something at least in the order of 2007-8 and possibly even more. This means a need for dramatic visuals of shuttered factories, sharply rising inflation and unemployment, stark collapses in the exchange rate: moreover, it needs to be clearly linked to Brexit.

Ironically, the dithering caused by David Cameron’s abrupt departure in June makes this all much less likely. The hiatus has not only given economic agents time to start lying plans and make adjustments, it has also changed public opinion. The failure of the Leave vote to result in the economic calamities forecast by Remain campaigners has given many voters the impression that Brexit won’t (maybe even can’t) be so bad, economically speaking. Yes, the UK hasn’t actually changed anything about its status in the EU, but that is to miss the point: many people don’t see it that way. Put differently, ‘Project fear’ only works if people buy the fear: otherwise, it’s all a bit Wizard of Oz.

As a result, even if economic disaster did loom, it might not actually have the effect outlined above. Instead, it might simply encourage a ‘more of the same’ attitude: it’s only hurting because we haven’t yet followed through. Politically, the advantage of taking that view is that it’s unknowable, and that if things do go belly-up, then one can always argue that it was because we didn’t make the right choices earlier on. Unsatisfactory perhaps, but probably more attractive an option than having to eat humble pie as you scramble to rebuild links with the EU.

And this is the second element: the EU would probably be willing to accept a contrite UK, returning to the table to ask for more. Quite aside from the political and personal satisfactions of seeing the EU model be vindicated by the UK’s return, such a development would be a positive one for EU exporters and EU security (both narrowly and broadly). Practically, if this all happened relatively quickly, then the legislative gap would be minimal and things could be put together at some speed.

But to put all of this down on paper/screen simply highlights how much more unlikely the abyss option has become. If it ever had a chance, then that chance looks to have been spent somewhere between May’s election as party leader and the non-amendment of the EU(NOW) Bill in the Commons.

This matters, because it points once again to the central importance of the opening of Article 50 negotiations and the initial ask that will come with that. This will be the central determinant of the path of Brexit, which is why May has held on to control of it so very firmly. The big question now is whether she knows what to do with the power she now holds.

The post What about the abyss? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

For a paper I am writing in the context of my research on EU leaks, I looked at all disciplinary proceedings against leakers in the European Commission from 2006 to 2015, as documented in the annual reports of the IODC, its internal investigation office.

Here’s the data that I extracted from IODC’s annual reports (uploaded here) that I received through a freedom of information request to the Commission:

The types of cases vary and several concern information leaked in the context of tender procedures, so not the typical political leaks that many of you may have in mind when you hear the term.

In fact, the first mention of the term “leaking” in the IDOC reports can be found in  2012. The EU’s staff regulation (Article 17) call the offense “unauthorised disclosure“; in the latest report this is covered under the headline “failure to comply with rules on confidentiality“, even though in the narrative of the report this is called “leaking“.

What does leaking involve? Here some quotes from the different reports:

• 2009: “ Providing information obtained in the line of duty to a national news organisation in exchange for payment” (p. 8)
• 2011: “An official was dismissed and his pension rights reduced to the minimum subsistence level for 20 years […] for having received gifts and other favours of considerable value from various stakeholders in the industrial sector in which he exercised his duties. This same official had regularly provided these entitities, outside of the Commission, with confidential information or information which had not been made public” (p.6)
• 2015: “An official who leaked an internal draft policy document to an external industry stakeholder and incorporated their comments into the document without consulting his line management was temporarily downgraded” (p.8)

It was surprising  how few cases seem to be followed up in disciplinary procedures, given that this an official offense under the staff regulation and given how many there are. I’ve discussed leaks in EU politics in this recent paper and in my doctoral thesis.

The reason could be what Ryan Heath deducted from my thesis:

“ you would need to stop so-called inter-service consultations between departments if you want to stop leaks. That would, if nothing else, have negative effects on policy-making.”

In other words, leaking is in the DNA of the Commission.

I will argue in my paper that leaking it is part of the Commission’s regular bureaucratic politics. Preventing leaks more forcefully would either mean to reduce the number of internal consultations, to undermine relations with the press or stakeholders, or to undermine strategic leaking that those in political position use to influence the outcome of politics in ways that please them.

Past research has shown that leaking often happens from the top, so those on top of the Commission probably have most to fear from a strict anti-leaking policy. But you’ll see the full argument in my final paper once it is published.

In the meantime: Do you have something to tell me about how leaks are prevented in the Commission? Did you observe a change in how leaks are prevented or encouraged inside the Commission in recent years? Get in touch under ronny.patz@gsi.lmu.de for any hints. I will also be in Brussels for some time in mid-March, so I’m happy to meet up for further insights!

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Political science, probably like many other social sciences, seems stuck in an age that many of our students have never lived, and will never live. They live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and of problems that are far beyond local borders in a world dominated by thinking within borders. In this age, it is time to work together on a global scale and to develop the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) for political science to be able to keep up with the social and technological developments of the coming years.

The political science LHC is one where large-scale collaboration of people of diverse backgrounds,  use of new technologies, and fast and open science come together to understand and provide ideas for a world that is evolving so fast that our local political systems and global institutions cannot follow suit unless political science evolves at the speed of society and technology.

Why the political science LHC?

The World Wide Web is here because academics wanted to collaborate to build humanity’s largest machine – the LHC – to study the universe’s smallest particles. This machine is revolutionizing our understanding of physics, advancing engineering to levels unknown a few decades ago, and showing how seemingly outlandish theoretical physics can be tested when a large group of people collaborates to construct and run an outlandish machine while having another large group of people that can make sense of unprecedented amounts of data.

At the same time, as a ‘by-product’, the LHC led to the creation of the internet that we know today and that is changing societies beyond recognition. Technology-driven solutions are what is shaping today’s political and social reality.

In comparison to the 21st century science around the LHC, my discipline – political science or social science at large – feels stuck in the middle of the 20th century, with little glimpses to 21st century ideas because some of my colleagues have started to leave the borders of narrow ideological institutions, beyond the established working groups in professional associations of political science – national or international – and beyond the boundaries of faculties that still educate students like they used to do when Google, WeChat and the Ethiopian space program did not yet exist.

Faculty today does not mean, in many instance, collaboration at the scale of technological advancement. It mostly means turf war. The same seems true for professional associations.

The established political theorist does not trust the quantitative methods postdoc because she prefers numbers over meaning. The political systems PhD does not want to collaborate with the international relations professor because of some obscure epistemological difference in world view that has been breeding over the last 100 years. And the Canadian ethnographic researcher studying a local community and its politics in The Gambia never meets the IR ethnographer from Vietnam who walks through the halls of UNESCO to study the weird global culture of diplomatic politics.

At the same time, technology developed in the California in a political and social spirit of innovation is copied and perfected in China because of a combination of national policy and local industry development. The radical political shift towards renewable energy paid by German tax payers is partly responsible for revolutionizing the global distribution of solar and wind power allowing for new energy policies and much less costly political decisions.

The historical evolution of nations and borders usually credited to the Peace of Westphalia is still the most powerful idea dominating most politics around the globe while AI-enabled automatic translation and cross-border migration are reframing how many people perceive, shape or resist a world in which cultural differences and the value of nation states are shape-shifting beyond comprehension. This is why the political system of ISIS is influencing security policy across Western political systems. This is why the ‘Panama Leaks‘ story could combine global financial flows, morally corrupt individuals from around the world, international journalistic cooperation and political reactions at national and international scale.

The LHC of political science takes all this together and combines it into a connected research programmes linking the smallest socio-political dynamics with politics on a global scale.

Knowing the complex and conflictuous political history of our planet; knowing the path dependency created by ideas, languages and institutions and the disruptive changes that still happen from time to time; knowing how human beings are both rational and irrational, biologically programmed and socially shaped; and observing the massive technological and related socio-economic changes of the past century, in particular the the advent of AI, one of the questions that we need to answer could be:

Is it possible to advance at the current speed of technological evolution without losing the ability to shape humanity’s destiny through collective human decision-making that we think of in terms of traditional politics?

You may ask: What does AI have to do with all of that?

My answer is simple: We are probably approaching a time when AIs know better about our individual, cultural and political preferences than politicians have ever known in the history of our political systems. Depending on the reach of AI(s), they will be able to analyse and deduct from individual interests and collective dynamics reaching from local, culturally close groups to the aggregated global system of humanity, beyond comparable abilities designed into traditional political institutions.

There are two options coming out of this for future political systems:

There may be those political systems in which traditional politics makes use of this knowledge and policy recommendations generated by AI to shape our collective destiny (or destinies). The others will be systems where the AI(s) take(s) over because we may collectively trust these all-encompassing new technologies more than the bounded rationality and limited knowledge of human representatives.

Knowing this, the question is: Can we even shape where all this is going, for example sending people’s ambassadors to global companies who design AIs like Denmark? Is a culturally divided but technologically interdependent humanity even able to organize meaningful collective action that is successful enough to influence how AIs shape the planet? Or is it even unnecessary to try this because AI-system as the new political systems will represent our collective will anyhow?

Will we give the nuclear launch codes to our AIs and let them decide to start global wars like we give AIs the power to decide on drone strikes? Will we, in the future, elect the best decision-making machine to lead our global institutions, simulating all possible decisions to agree on the best possible option for all humans, all cultures, all technologies?

To answer these questions, we need to build a new type of political/social science research organization, one like CERN for physics, but adapted to the knowledge and social realities of 2017 and the years to come.

We need to be fast and we need to work against the old social system of academic knowledge generation – build up reputation for 20 years, become a professor and then pass on your existing knowledge and decide over what get’s published and what doesn’t until you die.

Instead, we need people with various skills, from theory to practice, from big data to micro-ethnography, from introvert analysts to extrovert talkers, from those who are creative to generate knowledge to those who are creative to communicate it audio-visually, from the experienced researchers who know how to run effective research operations to new researcher who know how to run new technologies.

We need to include people of all cultures, genders and social background,  embedded both in local and in global society, because we need to be as good as the present and future AI(s) – or we need to be able to make intelligent use of AI – in understanding what’s going on in our socieites, helping to shape future technological advancement so that it reflects human and humanity’s interests. To answer these questions, we need a collective exercise and theorise within and beyond existing schools of thought, do empirical research within and beyond existing borders, go for data analysis at the scale of AI far beyond human capabilities and at the scale of intersubjective human understanding.

And we need open science. Knowledge production may remain complex and long-term but the results have to circulate fast. Intermediate findings have to be immediately discussed and  knowledge about arcane developments at one end of the world are made accessible in fast and meaningful ways to researchers at the other end of the world. Only open social science will be able to keep up with the speed of technological evolution.

This all may sound a little over the top, but seeing how slow and how disconnected  from technological advancement most of the social sciences seem to work today, I’m convinced that our generation needs to change this. Either we start building the political science equivalent – or social science equivalent, if you want – to the LHC now or we may miss to jump on a train that is accelerating fast.

This probably needs big money. We don’t need these large sums to pay exorbitant salaries to a few self-declared academic leaders but we will need it because we have to be many and we need to work together in new way. This probably means using both public and private funding, or combining resources from both worlds as borders between the two are anyway disappearing where global-scale corporations compete alongside global-scale public organizations.

We need those funds because we have to invest in technology adapted to the requirements of a social science that works on a global scale, that collaborates beyond disciplinary borders and that can stand up to the AI revolution that is on our doorsteps. This means communication   between well equipped research facilities around the world, combining languages, social science disciplines and local and global knowledge.

We need translation technology that works so that insights from minority languages can be injected into global research questions, and vice versa. We need data analysis facilities that can run calculations at the scale of planetary humanity while we need ethics ombudspersons around the world who can ensure that research respects cultural differences while new knowledge is generated.

We need to pay for new people to join the research endeavour regularly and to make everybody learn and adapt, simply because technology will be advancing faster than ever before. And we need money to ensure that those working with us can still live social lives, take timeout to get children, to care for their parents and friends, to take creative timeouts, to return to their local communities or global societies not to lose touch while working on a big research endeavour, short: being what makes humanity while going with the times.

Thus, it’s time to start constructing the social science CERN and build the political science LHC, turning our current academic system and its social scientists towards those who are already shaping the future of our planet. If we want it or not, those working on technology beyond our imagination, in China, in the USA or wherever else, they are already rushing ahead. Only when social science works with them or at least understands what is going on can we design political systems that keep up with where technology will be in 5, 10, or 50 years.

This essay is a experimental, summarizing ideas that aren’t fully thought through but that have grown over my time inside and outside political science as a profession. Feel free to discuss and to contradict. And if you are already building the social science CERN, I’d be happy to know about it and eventually join.

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The Malta Declaration, on the external dimension of migration, was adopted by the members of the European Council at an informal EU Summit in Valetta on Friday 3 February 2017. Its adoption represents the continuation of a ‘one-eyed’ security-oriented strategy which impedes a more holistic vision of EU migration law and policy.

A silver bullet?

Daily tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea, the ‘refugee crisis’ and the growing terrorist threat have created a sense of political emergency that has reinforced member states’ focus on border management and return policies. The security-orientated approach to migration issues is not new but has gained increasing traction. The main objective now is to ‘stem the migrant flows’.

In this context, the results of the EU-Turkey deal have been lauded as providing vindication for the methods used to pursue that objective. Thanks to financial support from the EU, as well as certain other inducements such as visa liberalisation, the Turkish authorities have agreed to improve their border management. Together with the closure of the Western Balkan route and the reintroduction of internal border checks in the Schengen area, the EU-Turkey Statement helped to decrease the number of arrivals to the EU via the Eastern Mediterranean.

In a result-driven world that cares little for costs and effects, the EU-Turkey Statement is perceived as being a silver bullet that could be transferred to that other major entrance point of maritime migration: the central Mediterranean route. As Donald Tusk stated after a meeting with the prime minister of Libya: ‘We have discussed the example of our cooperation with Turkey and other countries in this part of the region. Now it is time to close down the route from Libya to Italy’.

Unworkable and difficult

However, replicating the EU-Turkey Statement with Libya is unworkable. Unlike Turkey, the Libyan ‘Government of National Accord’ which the EU is cooperating with, does not have full control over its territory. Unlike Turkey, Libya cannot be offered inducements such as accession talks or visa liberalisation. And finally, as the amount of financial support that Libya could receive is far below that which has been accepted by Turkey, Libya may well decide to increase its asking price.

In addition, the EU may find that solely focusing on migration management issues in its relations with African countries will be difficult. While third countries may need political and financial support, helping the EU with better managing migration flows may not be in their interest. Most African states do not want to keep their young and unemployed generation at home. Locking them into the country would in the end lead to further irregular migration. Hence, more options like legal migration, resettlement solutions, external processing and actions to limit push factors have to be included in the discussions.

Overcoming a hypocritical policy

The declaration does not go that far. It attempts to convince citizens that strong border management and return policies will help to stem migrant flows and will disrupt the business model of smugglers. This is hypocritical and highly questionable. One reliable option to destroy smuggler networks resides in the ability to offer migrants the opportunity to move legally, and therefore safely, to the EU. As long as EU governments refuse to address this policy imbalance, they will contribute to the existence of criminal enterprises.

One complementary way of dealing with the issue would be in external processing. Such a mechanism under an EU perspective is threefold. First, to examine asylum claims in a third country. Second, to resettle people whose right to asylum has been recognised in the EU. Third, to (voluntary) return migrants to their country of origin. An implicit reference to this is made in the declaration where leaders agree to seek ‘to ensure adequate reception capacities and conditions in Libya for migrants, together with the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM)’. While this reference is minimal, it shows that discussions are at least underway. But discussions are not enough if they do not lead to acceptable and fair solutions.

Ahead of the Malta summit, the IOM and the UNHCR have indicated that establishing extra-territorial processing of asylum seekers in Libya and in North Africa is not appropriate at this time. The implementation of such a mechanism requires that a series of conditions have to be met, including a stabilised political situation in Libya and the establishment of adequate reception capacities and conditions for migrants. Whatever the political priorities are, turning external processing facilities into closed and militarised centres will in no way be an acceptable answer. The process must consider the rights of migrants and refugees and be based on the full involvement of the UNHCR and the IOM.

There is no silver bullet solution for the challenges ahead. Instead, the EU must develop policies that look beyond the immediate political climate and produce a concrete set of proposals that are capable of addressing migration with a holistic and all-encompassing approach. The spirit that guided the Union’s founding fathers in 1957, a spirit grounded in hope, tolerance and freedom should inspire modern EU leaders to take bold decisions in order to fully respond to the challenges posed by migration to the EU. The 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaty could be just the occasion where the Union could make a serious effort to reconnect with that founding spirit in the context of migration. Unfortunately, for now, the Malta Declaration provides a stark warning that the EU is in danger of becoming a blind king.

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Bonjour! And warm greetings from the University of Nantes, where the office of “Alliance Europa” is hosted. Alliance Europa is a new and – as we hope: innovative – regional consortium in European Studies. Initiated and supported by the authorities of the Pays-de-la-Loire, it brings together the researchers of 19 laboratories or centres based in higher education institutions between Le Mans, Angers and Nantes, in a common “Institute of European and Global Studies”. The new institute wishes to encourage interdisciplinary projects between its partner institutions, and both streamline and internationalise the rich offer in European Studies programmes and degrees provided by the different institutions of higher education across the region.

But Alliance Europa wants to be more than that. It was created in 2015-16 against the backdrop of a Europe in crisis, facing many political, societal and cultural challenges under the pressure of the globalisation process. More than ever, it is necessary to quit the Ivory Tower, join the debate, and build bridges between academic research and civil society.

Against this backdrop, Alliance Europa has launched “The Factory of European Ideas” (La fabrique des idées européennes), a laboratory of social innovation which has the vocation to be a “project nursery” where academics, civil society and socio-economic actors can join to test new ideas, from one-off events to larger associative initiatives. The first projects are under way – they concern cultural and pedagogical European projects, but also the association “European Migration Law”.

For the time being, Alliance Europa communicates mainly in French, on its website, on Facebook or Twitter. But thanks to “Ideas on Europe”, this is changing today. This blog will allow us to share a selection of articles previously published in French on the Alliance Europa multiblog named “L’Europe en jeu !” The first one is already scheduled for this week.

Stay tuned and feel free to get in touch!

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What if the good old ‘scarecrow’ effect did not work anymore? What if Marine Le Pen managed to break the famous ‘glass ceiling’ of the French electoral system, which has kept her out of governmental responsibility so far? What if voters were no longer willing to rally around a ‘front républicain’ between round 1 and 2 of the elections?

These are questions that would have sounded purely hypothetical some months ago. But are they still?

True, the French electoral system and institutional framework have always been the best allies of those for whom the vision of a triumphant Le Pen family member in the Elysée is nothing short of a Republican nightmare. History seems to be reassuring: at both the 2002 presidential election and successive legislative and regional elections, the time between the two rounds has always proved sufficient to form an ad-hoc coalition behind the remaining opponent. And simple maths also provide comforting evidence. It is difficult to imagine Marine Le Pen double the absolute number of voters between round one and two.

Yes, she does have an extremely stable base of 25% of the electorate, but there is little risk that ‘MLP’, as she is referred to in Twitter initials (while on her posters she prefers to drop the family name altogether), will obtain a surprise score that will put the pollsters to shame. As a matter of fact, now that publicly coming out as an FN sympathiser is no longer taboo, the polls concerning voting intentions are actually more reliable than they used to be. How exactly she could manage to attract the massive and unprecedented transfer of voters from all sides that she needs in order to win the final face-off remains unclear.

So it’s all about keeping calm and carrying on? The traditional politicians from the left and right – a species that has not realised yet it is under the threat of extinction – still want to capitalise on the scarecrow effect. François Fillon, for instance, is now desperate enough to warn his compatriots that in the case of his elimination in round one, the vast majority of his voters would turn towards Le Pen, if only to avoid Macron. And at the PS headquarters in Rue Solférino, Jean-Christophe Cambadélis pretends to see the writing on the walls of Donald Trump’s surprise victory in order to motivate the Socialist troops or what’s left of them. It all sounds like hollow scaremongering because it is too obvious they do not believe what they’re saying. Nothing but a kind of French ‘Project Fear’, and we know how efficient the English one was.

But can the nightmare really be ruled out? In a campaign where nothing is stable except the voting intentions for Marine Le Pen, where every further little scandal (not to mention strange rumours of all kinds) invariably seem to play into her hand, where an entire ‘internet army’ (brilliantly investigated by Nicholas Vinocur) is at MLP’s service, no scenario should be excluded. The very system that has always kept the Front National out of power will continue to work in its interest: with no governmental responsibility despite massive electoral backing the FN has not suffered any loss of credibility in its anti-establishment posture and will continue, all throughout the campaign, to capitalise on its comfortable status of sole untested alternative. That’s a unique selling point, providing a solid basis for an unexpected last-minute swing that could be due to the big unknown variable of these elections, the degree of ‘fed-upism’ of French citizens that may result in a shockwave of irrepressible ‘kick-outism’. With a little bit of imagination, you can already hear the electorate prepare the lamp-posts for the great hanging: ‘Ah, ça ira, ça ira, ça ira! Les aristocrates à la lanterne!’

The international press in shock: Le Pen elected President! (extract from ‘La Présidente’).

François Durpaire, for one, has no trouble at all seeing ‘La Présidente’ behind her desk in the Elysée. A historian and rather well-spoken television pundit on American politics – he’s a co-author of the French edition of ‘The United States for Dummies’ – Durpaire anticipated her victory in 2015, together with the illustrator Farid Boudjellal, in a remarkable graphic novel. In its highly realistic black-and-white aesthetics, and visibly based on thorough documentation, ‘La Présidente’ imagines a post-2017 France in the tradition of Orwellian dystopia. The book displays particular lucidity in depicting how self-referential media loops may create a hysterical sound cloud that eventually erupts in perfectly irrational voting behaviour (rings a bell? or two?). Despite a somewhat disappointing ending that indulged in the same kind of conspiracy theory on which populism itself flourishes, the book and its authors well deserved their success, with 120,000 copies sold.

In 2016, Durpaire and Boudjellal, published a sequel named ‘Totalitaire’ and set in a 2022 France that I would most likely have left in the meantime. While the graphics are just as brilliant, the scenario has some flaws, but overall the authors deserve praise for effectively highlighting the sheer fragility of democracy in an age obsessed with identity and security.

Reading these two graphic novels makes you hastily draw your wish list for 2017:
May the old scarecrow effect have kept at least some of its relevance!
May the ‘glass ceiling’ of the French electoral system prove more resilient than one might fear!
And may the French themselves be collectively smart enough to resist the temptation of hanging their entire political aristocracy at the lamp-posts just to relieve this itchy feeling of disgust.

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 12 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

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We find ourselves at the end of the phoney war. Probably.

With only a few weeks left until Theresa May’s self-imposed deadline for Article 50 notification, the most striking thing as one looks around is the almost-complete absence of interest in the issue.

In the UK, this might partly be understood by the wait on the House of Lords to complete their approval of the legislation. However, despite the government’s expectation that this will result in amendments and thus ‘ping pong’ with the House of Commons, which in turn might mean missing the end-March deadline, there is scarcely a whisper of discontent.

In the EU27, there is little more than continuing preparation for the coming negotiations, as the reports pile up (most recently from the French Senate) and the checklists grow.

Indeed, the most notable intervention of recent weeks has come from Tomas Prouza, Czech State Secretary for European Affairs. He spoke at an event I attended last week in Prague, with a speech that was mainly noted in the UK as accusing May of lying about the impact of EU immigrants on the UK. Sitting in the audience, that wasn’t my take-home.

Instead, Prouza seemed more interested in underlining the point that May has still to set out anything like a comprehensive negotiating position for Article 50: in his words, the White Paper did nothing except state that “Theresa May’s speech means Theresa May’s speech” and a broad hope that everyone could get along well in future.

In short, Prouza was making the basic observation that the Czech government – and the EU27 – have paid (and do pay) attention to what is happening in the UK and are factoring it into their calculations: there is no hermetic sealing off of British political debate from the outside world. That such a thing has to be said betrays both the state of the UK’s discussion on Article 50 and the self-image of the country.

The biggest unknown in the process right now is how much May has adequately laid the groundwork for starting negotiations. That includes knowing what the EU7 are likely to ask for and who she can work on to help her achieve her objectives. As the Prague conference noted several times, the UK has traditionally been very good at divide-and-rule in the EU, with a series of partnerships on different issues with other member states. At the same time, Prouza did note that in all the like-minded groups, much work has done into sorting out who will pick up the UK’s role, so much disinvestment in relations with the British has already taken place. And in a context of departure on uncertain terms, what can the UK offer that will be of interest to others?

More crucially, the British government has still to articulate what it wants. Even the concession that it will not seek to break the four freedoms seems to have sunk without much trace, largely because the EU27 have been so adamant that this was never going to be an option: the UK is simply falling into line, not giving anything up. Beyond that, the government is still parroting the line about finding innovative solutions to membership of the customs union, without any idea of how that might work.

All of this does not bode well.

The end-March deadline still looks questionable, both on the British side and for the EU27, who are still deep in a pile of other problems that require their attention. Even if May has decided that notification in or around the EU’s 60th anniversary celebrations, or even participation at that event in Rome, is a bad way to kick things off, March remains a terrible time, between the resumption of the annual refugee traffic across the Mediterranean, an uneasy Russia and a US administration that looks ever-less in control, not to mention the persistent need for Eurozone reform, and a big bunch of important national elections.

The mistake not to be made, however, is to assume that this helps the UK get a better deal. Further delay on an already-much-delayed notification will win no friends and gain no advantage. Likewise, the UK needs to recognise that the time that has already gone has been used by the EU27 to settle many points of difference among them, leaving the latter better-placed to shape both the process and the content of negotiations.

As such, the view from Prague is the same as it is from other capitals: don’t think you can mess us about. as Prouza commented, the Czechs have many links with the UK, but they also have them with other EU states and right now, ‘club membership has more benefits.’

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Introduction

The Government of the United Kingdom (UK) has announced that it will trigger the procedure for withdrawal from the European Union (EU or Union) in March this year. As part of this process, the UK is likely to leave the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), reclaim its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and resume international activity as a single State for the purposes of exercising rights and responsibilities as a flag, coastal, port and market State. Consequently, it will take its own decisions in international fisheries fora and bilateral negotiations, including for the purposes of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing control. This blog post discusses what the UK’s withdrawal from the EU may mean for the fight against IUU fishing, and related fisheries control policies that have so far been shared between the UK and the other States in the Union.[1]

Background to the Legislation for IUU Fishing Control in the European Union

Council Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 (the IUU Regulation) was adopted by the European Council on 29 Sept 2008, and came into force in January 2010, alongside implementing Commission Regulation 1010/2009.[2] The IUU Regulation and its complementing legislation establish a legal and institutional framework for cooperation in the fight against IUU fishing. They articulated a set of administrative and operational controls across the Member States of the EU, through which non-EU States with regulatory authority over fishing activities are engaged in respect of detected IUU fishing activity.

Axiomatic to the regulatory framework of the IUU Regulation is State compliance with all applicable international fishery conservation laws, and regional conservation and management measures. The IUU Regulation primarily concerns IUU controls on imports of non-excluded seafood products from outside the EU,[3] as well as re-exports. Failure to observe international obligations in respect of flag, coastal or market State responsibilities may prompt warnings,[4] and under certain circumstances also trade suspensions. The IUU Regulation is based on the premise of mutuality in cooperation among Member States as well as third countries, which is underpinned by information exchange and verification processes.[5]

The IUU Regulation and the UK

As a member State of the European Union, the UK responded to the adoption of the IUU Regulation by adapting its domestic legal, operational and administrative framework in support of the shared regulatory objective to control IUU trade. DEFRA contributed to the development of operational systems, regulatory structures, training and the strengthening of communications with the Commission and with the other Member States of the Union. DEFRA and SeaFish published information on the main provisions of the Regulation, and its implementation in the United Kingdom. Regulatory adjustments were made under the powers conferred by section 2(2) of, and paragraph 1A(f) of Schedule 2 to, the European Communities Act 1972, and section 30(2) of the Fisheries Act 1981 for the implementation of the Regulations by way of the Sea Fishing (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing) Order 2009.[6] UK businesses, particularly importers and retailers, have invested considerable effort in adapting to the requirements of the IUU Regulation, and arguably have an interest in the maintenance of IUU controls as a domestic policy.

UK Withdrawal from the EU and IUU fishing control

Given its full integration in the regulatory arrangements that underpin IUU control in the Union, and the high rate of importations recorded by UK authorities, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU will not be consequence-free. Some of the effects of its withdrawal are likely to be potentially damaging for both parties, and detrimental to the objectives of the IUU Regulation.

Among the regulatory processes that appear less vulnerable to the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU are catch certification arrangements. The flexibility of the regime is evidenced by existing agreements between the EU and non-member States, including New Zealand, the United States and Norway. These arrangements recognise the similarity of domestic regulatory approaches for the purposes of certification, agency interaction, and record keeping.[7] The UK’s integration in the regulatory fabric of the EU in all aspects of IUU fishing control to date suggests that certification arrangements are likely to be perpetuated. There may, however, be loss of coherence between the arrangements if there is no parallel reflection of planned future improvements.

Other cooperative arrangements under the IUU Regulation may be more vulnerable to the negative consequences of the UK’s exit. Among these, the removal of the UK from the internal administrative web of cooperation that supports the operational dimension of the IUU Regulation. This includes intelligence-sharing arrangements concerning IUU risk and verification data under Chapter IV of the IUU Regulation, which establishes the Community Alert System. The sharing of methodologies is essential to avoid misreporting and discourage port-hopping, one of the most important factors in the perpetuation of IUU fishing practices. Inter-agency cooperation and risk assessment systems are key for controls to be effective, and for enabling learning and adaptive growth and resilience against the highly dynamic nature of IUU fishing capture and ensuing transport and processing practices.

Responses to Confirmed IUU Fishing Activity 

The European Commission has adopted a high profile policy of warning third countries that it suspects as being non-cooperating for the purposes of IUU fishing control. The yellow and red carding system follows a formal process of approval that may culminate in the adoption of restrictive measures, including the possibility of trade suspensions, under Article 38 of the IUU Regulation. Once the UK leaves the EU, it will no longer engage in the participatory processes whereby carding decisions are taken, and resulting restrictions will not involve the UK market. This is likely to weaken the reach of some of the measures, as these commonly depend on scale and homogeneity for effectiveness, such as  restrictions in the provision of services to third country IUU listed vessels.[8]  Although there is likely to be loss of coherence in sanctioning approaches, some vessel black lists should persist, insofar as they concern regional fishery organisations of which the UK becomes a party. Lastly, the risk of deregulation in the UK, if ultimately realised, would accentuate discrepancies in market controls.

The IUU Regulation and Shared Stock Management

Upon exit, UK exports to the EU will be subject to the controls and conditions of the IUU Regulation.[9] Regular EU importation processes have been built on a certification strategy that is currently shared by the UK, and should not need major adjustment. International legal obligations exist for both parties in respect of the conservation and cooperative management of shared and straddling stocks under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, and other applicable global and regional treaties. Potential breaches are in principle relevant for the operationalisation of the IUU Regulation, although only in respect of stock intended for exportation to the EU.

Conclusion

The UK’s departure from the Union has the potential to be detrimental to IUU fishing control policies, given the UK’s prominence as an import market. The overall loss of EU market size, impoverishment of intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and loss of integrity in the articulation of responses to IUU fishing, may erode the efficiency of the system, and cause it to lose global impact in some cases. For the UK, there may be a loss of resilience and opportunity for adaptation to IUU threats, resulting from the withdrawal from EU cooperation, data-sharing and training networks. In order to minimise negative impacts, and given that currently there are no fundamental differences in the IUU control mechanisms in place in the UK and the rest of the Union, the perpetuation of harmonised administrative and operational arrangements should, where possible, be maintained.

There is a risk that the current success of the EU’s approach to IUU fishing control may be unnecessarily damaged, especially if there is loss of good will as a consequence of frictions in shared or straddling stock management negotiations. The IUU Regulation is a flagship tool in the EU’s continuing external fisheries policy, and one of which the UK has been a strong supporter. Maximising the integrity and resilience of the processes it has helped create is essential for the success of IUU fishing control worldwide. The continuing observance of applicable international conservation and cooperation commitments by both parties will be essential to ensure the perpetuation of its success.

Mercedes Rosello, February 2017.

[1] This blog post is a considered opinion by the author only, and has not been written or published for the provision of legal advice.

[2] Later additions include Regulation 86/2010, updating the list of excluded products.

[3] Article 8.2 of the IUU Regulation states: ‘fishery products’ mean any products which fall under Chapter 03 and Tariff headings 1604 and 1605 of the Combined Nomenclature established by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (1), with the exception of the products listed in Annex I (…).

[4] Article 31.3 of the IUU Regulation.

[5] See Preamble paragraph 38, and Article 12.4 of the IUU Regulation.

[6] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/3391/pdfs/uksi_20093391_en.pdf. The Order implemented sanctions under Regulation 2847/93, later repealed by Regulation 1224/2009 (the Control Regulation). In Scotland, similar arrangements were made through the Sea Fishing (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing) (Scotland) Order 2013.

[7] Specimen catch certificates and provision for the development of assistance and data exchange processes are set out in Regulation 86/2010.

[8] See Articles 4.2, 5.2 and 6.1(b) of the IUU Regulation.

[9] Article 31.4(a) of the IUU Regulation.

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