Ideas on Europe Blog

Brexit is both a boon and a bane to the teaching and study of British and European politics. In this piece written with Alex Boyle, a politics student at the University of Liverpool, we set out the five ways in which Brexit is central to the study and teaching of both. 

As a student learning the politics of Europe and the UK and as a teacher trying to keep his lecture notes up to date while writing and editing two books on Brexit, Brexit poses for both of us a mix of difficulties and opportunities in our work. With it set to be the defining issue for Britain and one of the most unique challenges to ever face the EU, understanding Brexit is not something any student or teacher of politics can easily hide from.

Granted, by its very nature the study and teaching of politics is about crises and a topic in a perpetual state of flux. As we all know, politics textbooks have a short shelf life. The often slow process of publishing journal articles means many articles reflect the world and knowledge from a few years before publication. Lecture notes can be adapted, sometimes in response to events on the day. Changing reading lists and course structures, however, require time and sometimes higher approval.

Successfully combining Brexit into the study or teaching of British and European politics depends on keeping five things in mind.

Brexit Means Britain

Whether you’re studying or teaching British politics in the UK or on the other side of the world, understanding Brexit means understanding the contemporary UK. As both Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans agree, the issue of Europe is a defining issue for Britain because it reaches into almost every corner of the country’s political life. As Andrew Gamble argued back i03:

The reason why the issue of Europe has been so persistent and so divisive is that there is a lot at stake. For the future of British politics, there is no more important issue, involving as it does a reassessment of British identity, security and political economy, and a judgement about the relative priority to be given to Europe as opposed to other relationships, particularly those with America. Such choices occur rather rarely but when they do they often trigger political realignments which can constitute major turning points in the life of parties and states.

Learning and teaching the origins of a referendum whose result will have such profound implications and the longer history of the UK’s relationship with Europe is, therefore, a solid foundation for understanding not only Brexit but also the development of the modern British political system. As we discuss further below, Brexit opens up an extensive range of topics in UK politics.

The breadth of Brexit as a topic, therefore, offers students of British and European politics a chance to find that elusive ingredient to scoring a high mark: teaching their teacher something new. Synthesising the many different topics and approaches to Brexit allows both students and teachers a chance to escape the silos that too often structure academia. For the teacher, this is a topic where students can do some of the legwork of drawing in new ideas. Many might think of PhD students as the key here. The inevitable flood of PhD students working on Brexit will indeed fill in many of the gaps. But undergraduates, and not least those from elsewhere in the EU and the wider world, can offer much-needed ideas and reports on what Brexit means elsewhere and in other fields.

The Case Study of Brexit Britain

Brexit adds to Britain’s place as one of the best and most fascinating national case studies for social sciences. Britain’s politics have often made it a go-to place for many teachers and students on a wealth of topics. For pollsters and psephologists the UK’s multiple electoral systems have turned it into an electoral laboratory. Britain’s ongoing constitutional reforms and the resilience of its Westminster majoritarian model fuel endless debates amongst constitutional and legal scholars and those engaged in comparative politics. For those studying political economy the UK’s pursuit of Thatcherism, neoliberalism more broadly and austerity have left it a key case study. Historians and scholars of war and international relations find a country that has gone from being the world’s superpower to one that still delivers (or at least tries to) a military kick and leads the world in soft-power. How Britain has confronted (or not) its religious, racial and security tensions and histories fascinates those in countries around the world who face similar challenges. The very unity and identity of the United Kingdom makes it a must for any student of nationalism. The list is a long one.

Granted, other states have faced many of the same challenges as the UK, and it always pays to be wary of the biases that can arise from the study of the UK. Students and teachers should always ask how comparable the UK’s experiences are to those in the rest of Europe or the world. For example, was Trump’s election ‘Brexit plus, plus, plus’ as he predicted it would be? Was it a reflection of wider trends in European, Western and international politics? Or was it a reflection of a combination factors peculiar to the UK? Nevertheless, the UK still offers a wealth of easily accessible literature, data and examples backed up by a long history of studies that can be drawn on as a starting point. Brexit itself is fast turning into one of the most researched and data rich topics available.

Europe’s Brexit

It would now be unwise to teach or study Brexit or the EU without also trying to understand the other. Brexit already tells us something important about the nature of the EU. It has changed the politics of the continent to which Britain is forever bound and which shapes Britain more than any other part of the world.

That might all sound trite. Yet too often debates in Britain about Brexit are myopic ones based on an assumption that Brexit is about Britain. Some elsewhere in the remaining EU might like to try and ignore the unsettling fact that one of the largest and leading European states voted democratically to quit Europe’s predominant organisation for politics, economics, society and non-traditional security.

What Brexit means for Europe and what a changed EU means for the UK are fast becoming central issues to studying Brexit, the UK and European politics. For those in the UK studying and teaching British and European politics, studying the EU remains a central plank to understanding not just how the rest of the EU works and is responding to and debating Brexit, but how Britain will continue to live with a continent and political union that it is forever closely connected to. For students from elsewhere in Europe Brexit allows them the chance to examine their national debates about Britain as part of debates about a changing EU.

Theorising Brexit

Brexit is testing many of the theories and models we teach and learn in British politics, European studies and many other courses. We can use Brexit to apply such theories as those of structure versus agency or more nuanced theories of international relations such as constructivism versus neoclassical realism. Economists are wrestling with what Brexit means for their theories of how trade works. It has certainly tested models used by pollsters and psephologists to understand how the British people – and voters further afield – vote.

Too often ‘theory’ is a word that bores or scares many students and even some teachers. It can seem abstract, distant or an irrelevant addition thrown in at the start of an essay or journal article in the hope of ticking a box required for a decent mark or publication. This ignores how theoretical approaches can help make sense of the uncertainty and information overload that surrounds Brexit.

It’s very easy as teachers or students to be drawn into the daily and hourly developments of Brexit. Reading and following so many fast-changing developments can leave us feeling weary and without a sense of the bigger picture into which to fit developments. One thing theory can do is help narrow down the focus for our studies. For example, we could use theories of bureaucratic politics to understand how institutions will shape Brexit or constructivism to analyse the ideas that underpin it. We then have the opportunity to assess these theories, models and other new ideas in real-time as Brexit unfolds.

Generation Brexit 

Another example of a theoretically grounded attempt to analyse Brexit is to see this political and social split within British society as a generational phenomenon, as argued by Jackson-Preece and Dunin-Wąsowicz. This generational divide manifested itself again in the 2017 General Election, which proved that young people are an important political constituency and that older generations, including most politicians, have ignored them since the Brexit vote.

The LSE’s recently launched Generation Brexit social media and research project, which explores Brexit from a sociological perspective, can aid the study or teaching of British and European politics in the shadow of Brexit. This trailblazing project is currently crowdsourcing a millennial cohort vision for the future of UK – EU relations. It invites those aged under 35 from across the UK and Europe to debate, decide and draft a policy proposal that will be sent both the United Kingdom and the European Union Parliaments, and the respective negotiating teams.

Generation Brexit translates research findings into impactful and policy-relevant arguments that can be utilised to the study and teaching of Brexit. Unlike other Brexit-related engagement campaigns, this initiative targets millennials in the UK and in Europe alike. The pan-European dimension captures the reality of the Brexit negotiations, their contingency on both UK and EU27 politics. It also underscores the necessity of establishing a mutually beneficial relationship for the future, built on shared ideas from the millennial cohort of current voters, many of whom are teachers students of UK and EU politics.

Crystal Ball Gazing

All teachers and students of British and European politics will have faced questions from friends, family and strangers as to why Brexit happened and what might happen next. Speculation on a topic such as this is to be expected, not least when Brexit could turn out to be what historians term a critical juncture for the UK and the rest of Europe.

Academics are often told to be wary of crystal ball gazing. That can be left to think tanks and the media. It does mean, however, that unexpected developments or ones we wish to avoid can catch us out. Until the Brexit vote happened, contemplating Brexit or the withdrawal of any member state from the EU was something of a taboo topic for many in the field of European politics. It means there has been a scramble to understand and analyse such topics as European disintegration.

That leaves us with a lack of relevant and rigorously research literature. A lot of literature, including some of the journal articles, rushed out in response, will be conjecture. Due to the polarising nature of Brexit, for both students and teachers the task of being able to critically think and analyse this literature will be an important challenge for avoiding the inherent bias in many people’s work.

And what of the future? Is Brexit a here today and gone tomorrow topic? If it turns out to be a critical juncture then generations of students and teachers of British and European politics will examine the topic, to say nothing of living with its consequences. But even if Brexit is reversed, the experience will have been a significant one in the politics of the UK and the EU, and one that will have cast a light on so much of British and European politics.

This post first appeared on the LSE’s Brexit blog.

Dr Tim Oliver is an Associate at LSE IDEAS, a Teaching Fellow at UCL and Director of Research at Brexit Analytics.

Alex Booth is a history and politics graduate, University of Liverpool.

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It might not have been immediately obvious, but we are now into the meat of Article 50.  Even with a first cycle of meetings now done, it has taken a press conference from Michel Barnier to make any impression on the British media, and even then only to comparing notes on whistling.

All of which prompts some reflection on how it’s all going and, in particular, why the EU seems to be bossing it so far.

To be a bit less loose in my language, I’m pointing here to the way in which the Union has managed to get its views on all key decisions to date be accepted by the UK. This includes the use of Article 50, the sequencing and structure of negotiations and the content within that structure. By contrast, there is literally nothing that the UK has clearly shaped.

So why is this?

The simple answer is that the EU has followed good negotiating practice from the start, while the UK appears not to have done so.

This breaks down into a number of basic points.

Most importantly, the EU knows what it wants. This boils down to ensuring that the integrity of the treaties is maintained and that membership is a better deal than non-membership.

From that very simple starting point, it has been able to build up everything that follows, by virtue of having these underlying interests in place. Interests are not the same as positions, which are specific and usually rigidly defined, and are really useful because they leave open options, rather than closing them down.

This matters especially in Article 50, because the UK does not have a similar set of interests: wanting ‘the best possible deal’ is not an interest, but a statement of hope, so long as the notion of ‘best’ is not unpacked. In the face of the UK’s uncertainty, the EU is able to adapt and work around what it finds, as the UK finds it. If you spend some time with the negotiating mandate for the Commission, you’ll see that there’s not actually any particular result that it required, only a set of observations about the consequences of anything the UK might desire. Thus, the mandate notes that the four freedoms of the single market belong together, so it’s all in or all out, but the UK can decide which for itself.

Secondly, the EU has largely separated the people from the problem. It has been very largely indifferent to who sits in the negotiating chair, or in Number 10, or how big anyone’s mandate might be, because instead it has been focused on the specifics of resolving the Article 50 to a satisfactory conclusion for all involved. In this it has been helped by its relatively dominant position, and by not having to work its (multiple) domestic audiences, but the difference in tone is very evident, as underlined by this week’s contributions from Barnier and Johnson.

Rather than loosing time and effort to managing personality clashes (and more on that in a bit), the Commission has been able to gather and manage a lot of detailed discussion, generate options and identify preferred outcomes. Consider here how quickly it came to an evaluation of the UK’s proposal on citizens’ right and how this was presented in terms of the proposal, rather than of the people presenting the proposal.

And this is the third point: the EU has done lots and lots of preparation. From the morning after the referendum, work was begun to build teams, gather information, find consensus positions with member states and the European Parliament, so that it was more than ready to go by the time the UK got to submitting notification in March. Think on how the Commission has now issued 9 position papers, while the UK has only one. Sure, the Commission hasn’t produced one on the Irish border question, but the overall impression is of directed and focused problem-solving at work. In all this, it has been helped by having enough resource to pursue this work, without having to set up extensive new structures. While Theresa May spent the autumn touring European capitals finding out what might be possible, the EU was building up a head of steam.

This preparation has then fed into owning the agenda. The ideas contained in the very first response to the referendum have been reinforced and elaborated consistently and firmly since, presenting the Article 50 path, and its sequencing, as the only viable and acceptable path to follow. Even the issuing of multiple position papers is a reflection of how it keeps the UK on the back foot, constantly having to respond to the latest output rather than advancing its own ideas first. In the court of public opinion, the UK ends up looking like it’s playing catch-up or being curlish about what’s suggested.

The EU has made the most of this advantage by constructing positions that deal with process before results. The financial liabilities paper is a central exhibit here, as it tries to suggest a way of agreeing a sum, rather than suggesting a sum directly. It might seem obvious, but if everyone can agree on a fair way to do something, then they are much more likely to agree that the outcome is fair, and seen to be fair by others. In this particular case, this matters, because it contains a simple way of drawing out some of the inevitable sting from British reactions, especially from the ‘whistling’ end of the spectrum, for whom any sum is too large. Consider a bit of negotiating ju-jitsu by the Commission to appeal to British fair play: alternatively, think of it as top trolling, after all the fuss David Cameron made about fairness during his renegotiation.

Finally, the Commission has one more card up its sleeve, namely that it is structurally inflexible. You might call this its Uruguay aspect, after its move back in 1992 at the conclusion of a long round on talks for the then GATT, where the Commission claimed (largely sincerely) that it couldn’t give any more ground to the US on agriculture because the French wouldn’t let it.

For GATT, so for Brexit. The mandate might have been largely consensual in its formation, but different member states have different interests in the outcome, so the mandate is something of a balancing act. Both the process of its agreement and its content have already hardened what the Commission might give ground on in the talks. Expect a trip back to Blair House at some point.

But there’s another question underlying all of this: if this is all so obvious, why haven’t the British done the same?

Partly, they have. There is much work in DExEU and other units to build up capacity, plans and positions, most of which has yet to see the light of day.

And that’s because of the first point that I discussed, namely the question of purpose. Reading neither the Lancaster House speech or the White Paper produces any understanding of what the UK wants.

This is a theme I have returned to on several occasions, but the point bears repetition: the referendum campaigns were a pursuit of winning the vote, not having a discussion about the future direction of the country. Unless there is a general understanding of that, then the purpose of being out of the EU is unclear and most necessarily remain so.

Until then the Commission will be able to continue to advance its agenda and preferences, knowing that the UK will struggle to engage or push back, because it simply doesn’t know what it wants or what it needs.

PS – If you want a manual for all this, try this one.

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What is needed to make the Paris Agreement a success? This blog post focuses on one of the most central but underappreciated elements – the periodic reviews of progress.  States must of course make ambitious and credible contributions in the first place.  But if there is no system to ensure that they are monitored and evaluated, the agreement will have very shaky legs.

Article 13 of the Agreement states that the Transparency Mechanism should “provide a clear understanding of climate change action… including clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving Parties’ individual nationally determined contributions… including good practices, priorities, needs and gaps” (p. 27).

Almost all countries have already put forward lists of policies to fulfil their commitments. But how will we know whether all of this will add up to limiting global warming to ‘well below’ two degrees Celsius? Doing this will require concerted efforts in monitoring and evaluating climate action – but how may we best organize these activities across the globe?

Our brand-new paper, published in Evaluation, addresses this very question on how to organize monitoring and evaluation. This issue matters because the European Union and others are already investing significant amounts of resources in climate policy monitoring and evaluation activities, and many different kinds of actors, such as the European Environment Agency, the European Commission, the Court of Auditors and others have become actively involved. Earlier research has already highlighted important shortcomings in climate policy monitoring and evaluation activities. Our paper argues that the organization of these activities is another area that has received far too little attention.

In the paper we argue that there are, in principle, two different axes to think about governing or organizing monitoring and evaluation activities. The first is a distinction between formal, government-driven or funded evaluation and informal, society-driven evaluation. Earlier evaluation scholars have argued that evaluation driven, funded or even conducted by governments may benefit from more detailed knowledge of the policy process, potentially higher levels of resources to conduct evaluations, and perhaps also greater uptake of the findings.

By the same token, governmental actors may be under pressure to ‘look good’ and thus shy away from critically evaluating one’s own policies, particularly the ones that may not be working as envisaged. Thus, more informal, societal actors (such as NGOs, foundations, trade unions and others) may be able to step in and provide a more critical eye, provided that they have the interest and resources to do so.

The second way to view the governance of evaluation runs along centralized and de-centralized approaches. On one hand, evaluation may be organized in a centralized way with clear standards that evaluators use everywhere, and where essentially one evaluation actor (governmental or non-governmental) organizes and potentially funds/conducts evaluation. In other words, resources are pooled in order to conduct evaluation tasks.

An advantage of this approach may be higher levels of comparability given more uniform evaluation standards and potentially higher level of resources. On the other hand, scholars from the polycentric governance tradition[1] would argue that such centralized evaluation systems may be prone to failures (what if one picks the wrong or incomplete standards?) and is often insensitive to the vital contextual factors from which policies emerge and contribute significantly to success or failure. Thus, another way of organizing evaluation may be in a much more de-centralized way with many different kinds of actors involved in evaluation.

Taking these two axes, we created a new typology in our paper that considers them both at the same time in Figure 1. Doing so opens up new combinations and thus ways to think about governing evaluation. We then drew on existing evidence from climate policy monitoring and evaluation in the European Union to assess to what extent we can detect empirical patterns that chime with our typology.

Figure 1 – Source: Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017.

The European Union has been a long-standing leader in efforts to monitor and evaluate climate policies, and there are indeed many ongoing efforts, and certainly challenges, in monitoring climate policies. Looking at these activities from the perspective of our typology shows that we can indeed detect patterns that relate to the four quadrants in the typology in the context of the European Union. The new typology is thus a useful way to comprehend evaluation activities, and we hope that it will open up ways of governing them.

For example, the Monitoring Mechanism for climate policies and measures operated by the European Environment Agency, contains negotiated standards and methods, but once these are set, operates in a fairly hierarchical way. Both the European Commission (formal) and more informal evaluation organizations have endeavoured to create evaluation standards, which could be extended to the climate domain. Last, a meta-analysis[2] of climate policy evaluation in the EU has revealed a vast number of studies that used a range of different standards and methods (à la carte). As states are currently hammering out the details of transparency in the Paris Agreement, they should keep these different options and trade-offs in mind.

What then is necessary in order to implement the Paris Agreement? We argue that part of the answer to this question lies in considering how to build successful and enduring systems to monitor and evaluate ongoing climate policy efforts, and that it crucially matters how to organize these activities. Our paper reveals that there are range of organizational choices and options in the climate policy monitoring and evaluation domain and that different options have implications for the practice and results of evaluation. It is worth thinking carefully about how and who organizes the review processes, in order to generate systems that capture the full extent of knowledge and understanding on our climate policies.

This post has also been published on the INOGOV Blog.

[1] Ostrom, E. (2010). Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change. Global Environmental Change, 20(4), 550-557.

[2] Huitema, D., Jordan, A., Massey, E., Rayner, T., Van Asselt, H., Haug, C., … & Stripple, J. (2011). The evaluation of climate policy: theory and emerging practice in Europe. Policy Sciences, 44(2), 179-198.

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On the eve of Donald Trump’s arrival in Paris,

Mike Ungersma recalls the first visit by an American President

His achievements were many –

• The first President to visit Europe while in office
• The first President with an earned doctorate degree
• The first President to hold press regular conferences
• The first President to win the Nobel Peace Prize

We cannot be certain of how President Trump will be received in the French capital on Friday July 14 – Bastille Day – but we know exactly how Woodrow Wilson was greeted.  From the moment in December of 1918 his party arrived in Brest aboard the former German passenger ship renamed SS George Washington, to his arrival in Paris for the talks at Versailles among the victorious Allies, Wilson had become an international hero.

When the President disembarked at Brest on December 13, he met sunny streets lined with flags and laurel wreaths, listened to the warm drone of Breton bagpipes filling the air, and heard shouts of “Vive Amerique! Vive Wilson!” echoing above the crowd.  Huge numbers of people, many resplendent in their traditional Breton costumes, covered every inch of pavement, every roof, every tree.  Even the lampposts were taken.

Margaret MacMillan, Six Months That Changed the World

The ‘Six Months’ historian Professor Margaret MacMillan refers to represents a time today’s ‘jet age’ politicians would find extraordinary.  After appointing himself and three other members of his Administration official delegates to the Paris gathering, Wilson said he wanted to focus on ‘Big Picture’ ideals at the meeting, and not get bogged down in details.  But bogged down he became, so much so that apart from a brief return to the States from mid-February to mid-March, Wilson stayed in Paris for an amazing six months.

Perhaps no other American President before or since has enjoyed such international popularity.  It arose because of Wilson’s appealing if scholarly idealism and the eloquent and visionary promises he made as he reluctantly led the United States into a war that was to – in his words – “make the world safe for Democracy”.  The hopes and aspirations of literally millions rested on Wilson.  His reticence to become involved was summed up in his insistence that the U.S. was not an ‘ally’ of the British and French in the conflict; it was an ‘associate’.  But once committed, Wilson became an uncompromising and determined statesman who, while regarded dismissively as naive by many European leaders, was seen as a saviour to those who had suffered the ravages of the world’s first global war.

It is worth remembering what had taken place in those awful four years leading up to the peace conference.  Professor MacMillan, whose new book, The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914, is published in August, told a Canadian interviewer:

. . . we still don’t know what to make of it. We’re still horrified by the loss, by the sense that it may have all been a mistake, by the sheer waste, and by what happened afterward. Nothing much was settled, it helped to brutalize European society, to breed ideologies like fascism and Bolshevism, to prepare the way for the horrors that came in the 1920s and 1930s and the Second World War. It’s also a war that created the modern world. It had its greatest impact on Europe, of course, but it shaped Canada and Australia, helped to speed the rise of the United States to superpower status, and redrew the map of much of the world. It was a watershed that remains one of the greatest historical puzzles.

Donald Trump, invited by President Emmanuel Macron to watch as American soldiers parade with their French counterparts down the Champs-Elysées, will in a sense become a ‘bookend’ to his respected predecessor.  One hundred years will have passed by then, commemorating the entry of the U.S. into what Professor MacMillan and many other historians regard as Europe’s first ‘civil war’.  It was an occasion poignantly marked by General John J Pershing’s declaration before the tomb of Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis of LaFayette: “LaFayette, nous sommes ici” –  “LaFayette, we are here”.  Pershing, made commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Force by Wilson, was acknowledging an old debt about to be repaid to the French soldier and statesman who had hugely assisted America in its War of Independence against the British.

If, as some argue, President Trump is ill-prepared for the vagaries and intricacies of international diplomacy, none of these shortcomings applied to Wilson.  Well into his second term, Wilson had the mind and manner of an academic and an intellectual.  The author of four scholarly books on American history and government, he already had one war ‘under his belt’ before he faced the consequences of the European conflagration.

Ironically, given President Trump’s insistence on building a “big, beautiful wall” along America’s lengthy border with Mexico, a century earlier Wilson had taken a far more aggressive approach to the United States’ southern neighbour.  He assumed office during the Mexican Revolution, and didn’t like the outcome – the victory of Victoriano Huerta.  Demanding democratic elections to replace what he rather indelicately called a “government of butchers,” Wilson showed no hesitation in interfering with the affairs of Mexico and other regimes in Latin America.  Indeed, when Huerta arrested a handful of U.S. sailors in the port of Tampico, Wilson sent the navy to occupy Veracruz.  War was averted, but there was more to come.

A new threat had arisen from ‘South of the Border’ –  Pancho Villa.  In the turmoil, Huerta had fled the country, and a new leader – Venustiano Carrranza – had taken control.  It was a signal to his subordinate, Villa, to act.  He raided a town in New Mexico, now part of the U.S., killing several Americans.  Wilson reacted with fury, ordering General Pershing – then virtually unknown – to cross the border with 4,000 troops.  It was the beginning of a campaign that would hugely boost Pershing’s profile, lead to more violence, and ultimately to negotiations between the two countries.  As the war in Europe entered its second year, threatening to suck in the U.S., Wilson moved to end the Mexican adventure, recognized Carranza’s government, and turned his attention east, across the Atlantic.[i]  He was about to abandon his policy of neutrality for a crusade.

Pershing’s arrival in Europe turned the tide.  Although he came with only 14,000 troops, their numbers would soon swell to a million, and with them incalculable amounts of American military hardware.  While late to participate in the conflict, the American presence was critical.  Military historian Edward M Coffman:

. . .beginning September 12, 1918, Pershing commanded the U.S. First Army, comprising seven divisions and more than 500,000 men, in the largest offensive operation ever undertaken by United States armed forces. This successful offensive was followed by the Meuse-Argonne offensive, lasting from September 26 to November 11, 1918, during which Pershing commanded more than one million American and French combatants. In these two military operations, Allied forces recovered more than 200 sq mi (488 km2) of French territory from the German army. By the time the Armistice had suspended all combat on November 11, 1918, the American Expeditionary Forces had evolved into a modern, combat-tested army.

Edward M Coffman, The War to End All Wars: American  Military Experience in WWI (1998)

Whatever Wilson brought to the table in Paris, less than a month after the war had ended, it was not a lack of experience.   While President Trump has had his challenge in the form of Vladimir Putin, Wilson faced two wily and well-rehearsed politicians – Britain’s Lloyd George and the French Premier Georges Clemenceau.  Neither were adverse to ‘backroom’ deals.  Moreover, Wilson confronted a staggering array of representatives from virtually every national group in Europe and beyond – and there were dozens.  All expected a hearing from the author of the new doctrine of ‘Self Determination’ – what they saw as a sacred text.  From Arab chieftains to Balkans revolutionaries, and even the man who was to later become Ho Chi Minh – the lobbies of the Versailles Palace were crowded.  All had huge expectations of Wilson. It would not end well.

Wilson had already expressed some doubts – privately.  He realized what awaited him in Paris while still on board the George Washington, steaming toward Brest.  He told George Creel, America’s first propaganda chief, “whether you have not unconsciously spun a net for me from which there is no escape . . .what I seem to see – with all my heart I hope that I am wrong – is a tragedy of disappointment.”  It was to be a prescient remark. Nothing was to go to plan in the talks that followed.

Wilson finally left Paris in the summer of 1918, ill and profoundly disappointed at his own failure. The French and the British had carved up the Middle East, imposed crippling sanctions on a defeated enemy, presented Germany with reparations the country could not meet, retained and strengthened their colonial possessions, all of which set the stage for the tragic drama that was to playout for virtually the remainder of the century.  Few of those who had lobbied the conference achieved anything – leaders of the Arab revolt in the desert, Polish nationalists in Warsaw, rebels in the Greek islands, Koreans trying to shake off Japan’s control – all failed.  And they blamed Wilson.

In his only break from the deliberations in France – his brief return to Washington in February – Wilson knew he was grappling with the flames he himself had ignited.  He told Congress:

Well-defined national aspirations should be satisfied without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world.

In contrast to the present occupant of the White House, Wilson had no hesitancy in admitting to his own ignorance and failings.  The next year he told Congress: “When I gave utterance to those words – all nations had the right to self-determination, I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day.”  In fairness, Wilson cannot be held responsible for the surge of European nationalism – Marx had railed against it more than a half-century before, and, correctly predicted its eventual outcome.  Nor can he be be blamed for the behind-the-scene machinations of the British and the French.  Wilson had unwittingly become the focus of the aspirations of millions.  He – in his idealistic innocence – had given it voice.

And the League of Nations, the other major strand of Woodrow Wilson’s dream?  The League was to be a new and pioneering way of managing the affairs of the world’s nations.  He believed the balance of power did not work.  Nor should there be a vindictive settlement to the war – no retribution, unjust claims, indemnities and fines.  Ironically, there would be all of this but no League of Nations with American participation, Congress saw to that.  Wilson’s fault? He certainly had not brought Congress along, especially his Republican opponents whom he had intentionally slighted even though many supported his goals in Paris.  Meanwhile, his illness worsened – some thought he had suffered a stroke while in Paris – leaving his vision lacking its author and chief supporter.  His wife, Edith, became virtually the de facto President during his long absences as he lay isolated in his sick bed.

Today, in contemplating the legacy of Wilson, the list of the President’s critics is long, some savage in their condemnation.  Sigmund Freud: “. . . the impression of the method of Christian Science applied to politics.”  Or this scathing comment by economist Maynard Keynes, a British adviser at Versailles:

He (Wilson) could not, all in a minute, take in what the rest were saying, size up the situation with a glance, frame a reply, and meet the case by a slight change of ground; and he was liable, therefore, to defeat by the mere swiftness, apprehension, and agility of a Lloyd George. There can seldom have been a statesman of the first rank more incompetent than the President in the agilities of the council chamber.

John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of Peace (1919)

Thursday night, before the annual celebrations to mark France’s most important national holiday, Emmanuel Macron will treat Donald Trump to dinner in what some regard as the finest restaurant in the French capital, the Jules Verne on the second floor of the Eiffel Tower.  As they gaze out from a facility that allows probably the best views of the ‘City of Light’, one wonders if the ‘War to End All Wars’ will even be mentioned.  Certainly the Wilson legacy is unlikely to be a topic.

Let the last word be his, this dreamer, this romantic who became President:

We grow great by dreams. All big men are dreamers. They see things in the soft haze of a spring day or in the red fire of a long winter’s evening. Some of us let these dreams die, but others nourish and protect them; nurse them through bad days till they bring them to the sunshine and light which comes always to those who sincerely hope that their dreams will come true.

[i] This skirmish with Mexico had more than one bizarre result.  Not only did it provide the U.S. Cavalry with one of its last chances for a mounted charge, it also produced the notorious Zimmermann Telegram.  In January of 1917, British cryptographers deciphered a telegram from German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann to the German Minister to Mexico, von Eckhardt, offering United States territory to Mexico in return for joining the German cause. This message helped draw the United States into the war and thus changed the course of history. The telegram had such an impact on American opinion that, according to David Kahn, author of The Codebreakers, “No other single cryptanalysis has had such enormous consequences.” (U.S. National Archives)

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An exclusive look into the details of the Approval In Principle proceedure of the IMF, and its application on the 3rd Greek Financial Assistance Program: “…the options remain limited. Either the IMF will be satisfied with later, more detailed delineation of the debt relief measures and provide financing, or the Eurogroup will be pressured to consider actual implementation of the measures before the end of the program“

The Greek case of the Eurozone crisis from 2010 onwards has, by now, turned into a mutli-series drama. Another installment came in the June 2017 Eurogroup on the second review of the third Greek financial assistance Program. The review has limped on for more than a year since the conclusion of the first one on May 2016 (e.g. intermediate Eurogroup meetings in December 2016, February 2017), primarily because  of the unwillingness of the IMF to provide financing (so far its input in the Program has been only on policy)  unless the following measures were adopted: (1) additional structural adjustment policies with emphasis on tax and pension reform by Greece, and (2) relief for Greek debt (179% GDP in 2016) by the Eurozone member states to make it sustainable.

The bulk of the additional structural adjustment measures were adopted by Greece under Law 4472/2017, and are to be implemented from 2019. In relation to debt relief, while measures had been delineated in the May 2016 Eurogroup meeting, the IMF deemed them largely insufficient. A standoff was  created between the Eurozone and the IMF similar to an Alphonse and Gaston Routine: the IMF would not provided financing unless additional debt relief measures were assumed (or these were further specified), while Eurozone member states, considering the IMF’s participation necessary,  were unwilling to conclude the second review and implement or, at least, further specify the debt relief measures without IMF financing.

The solution reached was the IMF’s Approval-In-Principle (AIP) procedure. AIP was first implemented during the 1980s debt crisis of Latin American countries, when considerable external financing was required (either direct or indirect, e.g. debt relief, etc.) to complement that of the IMF. However, the banking sector refused to provide it until there was an official Program. In turn, the IMF requested that external financing was in place before it agreed on a Program. AIP offered a way to reassure the banks that there would be a Program so that they could provide the necessary external financing, without committing the IMF until this financing was in place. Thos process was first used for Sudan in 1983 and a total 19 times since through the 1980s[1]. While AIP proved a convenient instrument, there were fears of indiscriminate usage raised, which led to the adoption of a set of AIP arrangements by the IMF in 1984:

1. AIP would be limited to Stand-By Arrangements (a relatively short lending arrangement of the IMF) that would become “effective on the date on which the Fund finds that satisfactory arrangements have been made for the financing of the uncovered gap” in a country’s Balance of Payments.

2. A country seeking AIP would not be treated more favorably than a country seeking outright approval of an assistance Program: any prior actions should be completed before AIP approval.

3. AIP should be used “where substantial uncertainties on the financing of a program remain but management is of the view that… (AIP) would assist  the member in reaching an agreement with is creditors.”

4.  AIP would be used in cases where the IMF’s role would be “to give confidence to other creditors…that members concerned are making serious adjustment efforts”

5.  To avoid delays between AIP and the evntual Program a deadline of 30 days for reaching a deal was set. The Executive Board agreed to the 30-day limit as a guideline, but with flexibility around this on a case-by-case basis.

It is clear that, although these guidelines were created under considerably different global conditions and for countries substantially different from Greece, they were retained in the Greek case. The Greek AIP will be followed by a proposal for a precautionary Stand-By Arrangement of a modest amount (reported close to €2 billion). Moreover, AIP was not agreed until Greece had already implemented the structural adjustment measures requested by the IMF, thus avoiding preferential treatment. AIP was also employed to resolve a standoff on external financing between the Eurogroup and the IMF (similar to the deadlock between the banking sector and the IMF during the 1980s), in this way providing assurances that the structural adjustment undertaken by Greece is sufficient. Finally, the IMF, while examining the implementation of a deadline between the AIP and Greek Program financing, remained flexible on how long this would be.

The question is whether AIP really helped in Greece, Eurozone and IMF reaching an agreement? Here, it seems that it has postponed rather than resolved the problem. Greece has warned that without an agreement on debt relief, the additional structural adjustment measures will not be implemented from 2019. However, the adoption of specific debt relief measures by the Eurogroup requires IMF financing and, in turn, the IMF requires further elaboration of these measures in order to provide this financing. The key element here is the deadline between AIP and eventual IMF financing.

The important point here is the duration between the AIP and IMF financing through the Program. During the 1980s, the 30-day limit was set because of considerable deficiencies in AIP implementation. Since all of the 1980s AIP guidelines were maintained in the case of Greece, it is very likely that a deadline will also be set. However, 30 days seems unlikely, since debt relief for Greece is a politically sensitive issue for Eurozone member states, and especially for Germany with federal elections coming up this September. Concordantly, the Eurogroup in this meeting  also stated that most debt relief measures will be considered after the end of the Greek Program in August 2018.

Taking the above under consideration, if the IMF holds out until then to finance the Greek Program, this would mean duration of one year after AIP, something which that could clearly jeopardize the entire process similarly to the early 1980s. As such, the options remain limited. Either the IMF will be satisfied with later, more detailed delineation of the debt relief measures and provide financing, or the Eurogroup will be pressured to consider actual implementation of the measures before the end of the program. One thing is certain: Even after AIP, this drama series is far from over.

First published in Social Europe on 03.07.2017.

[1] AIP was also used for: Sudan (again) Ecuador, Zaire (twice), Madagascar, Jamaica, Zambia, Côte d’Ivoire (twice), Kenya, Somalia, Chile, Republic of Congo, Mexico, Nigeria, Argentina, Yugoslavia, and Brazil.

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Last week, I snuck in an extra posting, as part of my reflections on a workshop I attended at Sussex on Brexit and euroscepticism. As I mentioned in passing, there were other ideas that floated around my head that day, including this one.

One of the more persistent ideas that I have tried to communicate to people – both academic and non-academic – is that it doesn’t make sense to talk of ‘euroscepticism’: it implies a coherence that simply doesn’t exist, given the vast array of ideologies, motivations and manifestations that are contained therein.

My usual summary of this point is something like: there’s no euroscepticism, only euroscepticisms.

Well, suffice to say that this point is not currently enjoying wide usage, so maybe it’s me and how I express myself.

I had another bash at this last week, when I dipped my toe into popular culture – ok, the popular culture of the late 1960s, but still – to try and reframe the point. I also tried this point on Twitter earlier this week, so I’m now going to have a go and a more fulsome attempt.

The Beatles as the EU

I’m going to assume you’ve heard of The Beatles, so we can avoid an early end to this post. I’ll also assume you have a view on their work and impact.

Now think of the Beatles like the EU. Both represent the emergence and mainstreaming of a new form – of music and political organisation – in the post-war period, both building on elements that existed elsewhere, but never in such a substantial and consequential kind of way. In fusing various traditions and practices, both produce something innovative, albeit with much less screaming and protestations of love in the EU’s case.

To do this is not to attribute affect to either at this stage: like them or not, they matter.

But of course, affect does get applied to both and this is where we encounter diverging paths.

On one path, you can argue that both mark out the future: their invention and creation fundamentally change the nature of what is possible and irresistibly draw in all who follow. Sure, there are people who don’t like them, but no one can ignore them and ultimately everyone will be shaped and conditioned by them.

On the other, you might feel that they’re alright, but they are not all that: they represent just one or the many possible ways of doing things. Maybe they do influence things, but there are other traditions, other practices, that do not lend themselves to musical or political assimilation. In some cases that’s a matter of choice, but in others it’s more a matter of nature, because the basic assumptions underpinned those alternatives start in a radically different place.

The basic difference in positions is thus how one sees others: in the former, any expression of difference is largely one of the squeak of adjustment to the new reality; in the latter, it’s the legitimate expression of another world-view.

So who’s the eurosceptic in the Beatles then?

The thing about seeing the Beatles (or the EU) as the best thing since sliced bread is that one tends to become rather protective: anyone or anything that gets in the way or disrupts them is A Bad Thing.

At which point we say hello to Yoko Ono.

In the Beatles-as-the-future option, Yoko is a wrecker, a destroyer of harmony (on both senses). She comes in, distracts and then removes John from the mix and generally takes the band away from their core mission. One sometimes has the impression that some fans would prefer that the Fab Four had been locked in a room, so they could produce their work, unhindered, for the rest of their days, away from distraction.

But in the Beatles-as-one-possible-path model, Yoko is simply one more influence on a band that has always thrived on meeting and incorporating influences: think of their encounters with mysticism, drugs and their changing personal situations, all of which threw up new classics (and Yellow Submarine).

Moreover, Yoko is not simply a function of John, but a person and an artist in her own right: the Beatles did not call her into existence, but rather found her drawn into their orbit, where she changed them, just they changed her.

And I’d argue that euroscepticism is a bit like Yoko, in this second model.

The large majority of eurosceptics were previously politically active prior to their adoption of euroscepticism, and all eurosceptics have world views that extend beyond the question of European integration. But their interaction with the EU gives a focus and a direction to their political activity. And – just like Yoko – once they step away from the European issue – as is happening in the UK - they still have ideas and interests that they want to pursue.

The problem comes from those who treat eurosceptics like Yoko-the-wrecker: an annoyance, that should just go away or be ignored.

That approach has not worked and will not work, for the simple reason that eurosceptics are invested in their work, just as Yoko was invested in John. The key difference is that Yoko never tried to make the band into graphic artists.

But it does point towards a strategy for the EU, namely seeking to bring eurosceptics back into the debate, to demonstrate good faith in discussing and debating their ideas and seeing what common ground exists. I appreciate this is moving away from the Beatles/Yoko thing, but that’s always the problem of the over-extended metaphor.

So there we go, a different way of thinking about eurosceptics.

If you want to make a case for Ringo-as-eurosceptic, please feel free to write your own post on that one.

The post The ballad of Jean-Claude and Yoko: understanding euroscepticism appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

ICPP 2017. Photo credits: Meng-Hsuan Chou

Martina Vukasovic

The third edition of the International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP) took place 28-30 June 2017, in Singapore, on the premises of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (following the 1st ICPP in Grenoble in 2013 and the 2nd ICPP in Milan in 2015). The conference  included almost 150 thematic panels organized into 18 larger thematic groups, covering conceptual themes related to e.g. policy process theories, governance, comparative policy analysis, implementation, policy design etc., as well as sessions dedicated to specific policy domains (e.g. health and environment).

Apart from this, two roundtables and one keynote speech was organised. The opening roundtable focused on policy-making and state capacity in a globalised world, while the topic of the closing one was policy advisory systems. On the second day of the conference, Christopher Hood gave a keynote speech on austerity and the importance of cross-disciplinary collaboration in understanding contemporary policy-making dynamics. The conference was preceded by a set of courses focusing on theoretical approaches and workshops in which PhD students and young scholars could get feedback on their research projects.

When it comes to higher education, research and innovation, two panels were organized. First, “Analysing knowledge policy coordination for the 21st century” panel included papers on multi-level/multi-actor/multi-issue governance arrangements, transnational higher education in Germany, performance funding in Australia, role of vice-presidents for research in Canada, global excellence/local relevance of higher education, regional policy coordination and convergence and good governance. Second, the “Transnational circulation and multilevel governance reforms” panel focused on comparisons between European (Bologna Process) and Asian (ASEAN) regional integration in higher education, policy transfer and policy dialogues.

The conference also included panels on educational policies, comparative policy analysis, interest groups, complexity in public policy, policy transfer, policy design, policy advise, expertise and evidence, accountability and legitimation, science diplomacy, S&T policy and evaluation, etc. as well as a roundtable on public policy education.

The next ICPP conference will take place in 2019 in Montreal.

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Muslim communities in the UK face integration issues

In the United Kingdom, Muslims should have equal access to opportunities in the labour market and this would greatly contribute to an integrated social atmosphere in the country. The top professions, more often than not, don’t have diversity present and the chances of ethnic minorities, with a Chinese or an Indian background, are far greater in rising to the top than those with a Muslim background, such as for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

The reasons behind this disparity is attributed to poverty and insufficient economic mobility. Integration issues happen because ethnic minorities can be looked upon as a socially excluded diaspora, which experiences issues of poverty, discrimination, culture as well as issues with language in the country. The top jobs, such as those in the media and politics, have a mere 16percent of representation by British Muslims, who are more than sixteen years of age, which is a worrying contrast to the 30percent demonstrated by the British population. British Indians naturally outperform British Whites at the top jobs – the social segregation issues faced by Muslims in Britain, such as poverty because of a no open approach to allowing Muslim practices, whilst employed, makes it a diaspora, with greater integration problems than the British Indian population.

The issues of cultural barriers faced by the Muslim community in the United Kingdom is further getting worse because the media often speaks about British Muslims largely within the topic of extremism. These cultural barriers, such as Muslim women associating motherhood with caring for children, instead of doing that plus earning an income through a job, aside from producing low economic outputs, also exacerbates the social exclusivity problem. In the United Kingdom, gender equality is considered a norm – it’s visible in all areas of life, from getting a job to individuals’ idea of dress codes, so when a culture like that collides with another relatively primitive culture, there will be hard-to-overcome differences.

Furthermore, there is also grave concerns that Sharia Courts (in the United kingdom) are upholding extremist values and permitting wife-beating. Part of this problem lies with the atypical problem with Muslim communities and their observance of patriarchy, which in itself, apart from being an incredibly primitive thing to do, is also the most wrong thing to do because it’s very much in the nature of patriarchy to pluck out societal rights of women.

Muslim communities (in the United Kingdom) should be looked upon as contributors to British culture. There is definitely no pressure over religion, because a majority of the British population are Christians, and both Christianity and Islam have roots in the Middle East. It’s more of a cultural problem, and Muslim communities need to advance from primitive outlooks, to ones which are more beneficial to their circumstances, whilst at the same time, preserving a diversified British culture.

The post The Muslim Question appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

I’ve spent the day down at Sussex, talking euroscepticism and Brexit with a highly-informed group of colleagues. As our debate ranged over a wide terrain (see my live-ish tweeting here), several questions kept recurring, first and foremost of which was whether the UK was a special case, or a potential model of Eurosceptic activists to follow.

As you might expect in an academic setting, opinions differed, although partly this came down to definitions (again, academics).

Unusually, I found myself at one end of that range, arguing that there was a high degree of transferability inherent in Brexit, while others took the view that there was so much that was specific about the case that it rendered any mimicry both theoretically unlikely and practically impossible.

The argument here is that the use of a referendum to secure withdrawal from the EU is simply not an option in other member states, be that due to constitutional constraints or the use of referendums within a polity. Clive Church rightly pointed to Switzerland as an example of how all the advantages that Leave were able to gain in the UK would not apply, from the absence of designated lead groups to the lack of purdah and the citizens’ initiative pathway to holding a vote.

Others pointed to the structure of party politics, the additional complication of Euro-membership, the absence of a strong and critical media, or the framing of European debate within a country as reason to doubt that the success of Leave could be replicated. Indeed, listening to Matthew Elliott speak, almost of the critical junctures that he saw were ones that spoke to the particularities of the British system: Boris Johnson’s role as a spokesman to the middle ground, the Sun’s endorsement, and George Osborne’s punishment budget, to pick just three.

As Nick Startin noted, while last summer saw a massive proliferation of neologisms – Frexit, Dexit, Swexit, etc. – none has caught, because none has triggered a comparable groundswell of action comparable to that found in the UK.

All of this I accept and agree with, but also suggest is beside the point.

Ultimately, we can view Brexit as a relatively empty signifier: it means pretty much what you want it to mean.

However, where it is not empty is in establishing a new potentiality for political action: the potential – indeed, the reality – of leaving the European Union.

I’ve been using the metaphor of an ice-breaker when I talk about this: the UK has broken a new path that was not there previously, which others can chose to follow to. It broke that path with a particular set of tools and circumstances, but others do not have to use those same tools.

Indeed, the key point is precisely that each national situation will be different and will change over time. It will depend on constitutional, institutional, political, social and economic factors, not to mention the role of key individuals (this isn’t meant to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate the profound variability involved).

However, one goes about it, the existence of the UK as an example of a country that has gone through to the same destination provides a validation. In fact, I’d go further and argue that through its example the UK will show both how to and how not to go about leaving: as Article 50 unwinds, so costs and trade-offs will become clearer to observers, suggesting ways to mitigate. No longer will leaving be a theoretical noodling, but a concrete reality.

Of course, in all this there is another question, namely whether any other Eurosceptic movement in the EU wants to leave. Fittingly, with both Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart in the room, there was reflection on the balance of hard and soft euroscepticism. If the UK hard element had managed to reach deep into the mainstream – to use Paul’s idea – then it is important to remember that the hard element is not always present elsewhere.

This matters, because even if exit is now possible, it does not mean that others want to do it. Indeed, the hallmark of euroscepticism elsewhere has been that it seeks reform, rather than rejection.

On this, I am less certain, but I would suggest that one possible effect of Brexit will be to make harder positions more attractive than they have been to date. As we move into a medium-term perspective on Brexit, so the chances that the UK looks successful enough for someone to claim leaving was A Good Thing will increase.

Similarly, if the EU looks to be unable to accommodate reform – in either a usual, mainstream, way or a more radical direction – then the soft option will look less credible. In short, the balance of the perceived chance of success of hard and soft positions might move in the former’s favour.

Of course, this is in the future and, as also came out today, there is more volatility in politics than for quite some time. As such, we should be hesitant about what we think might come.

With that in mind, we really only wait and see whether the Brexit baton is picked up by anyone else.

The post How transferable is the EU referendum and the Brexit experience? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Next week I embark on my new research project examining the impact of Brexit on UK local government. This is obviously quite broad but I’m essentially interested in three things:

• Why was the local dimension largely overlooked in the EU referendum campaign?
• What challenges and opportunities do local authorities believe Brexit presents them with?
• How are local authorities preparing for Brexit (if at all), and how are they trying to influence the process of Brexit and its potential outcomes?

For the moment, the focus is engaging in a pilot study to help refine these broad objectives. But at this stage it helps to explain why this research agenda is worth pursuing.

A lot of academic interest on the subnational dimensions to Brexit has focused on its impact on the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (see this special interest section in the Journal of Contemporary European Research for a flavour). This is for good reason, given the various constitutional and political implications present here, such as debates about Scottish independence, or the role of the border in Northern Ireland. However, for a variety of reasons, the impact of Brexit on the local level has been unfairly overlooked.

The EU has a significant impact on local authorities. The Local Government Association estimates they are directly responsible for the implementation of around 70% of EU legislation and policy. EU rules, such as on procurement and state aid, affect the way they deliver services and operate on a daily basis. Local authorities are the main beneficiary of the EU’s Structural and Investment Funds, from which the UK stood to benefit from £5.3billion between 2014 and 2020. Local authorities are formally recognized in the EU’s institutional structure in the Committee of the Regions. The EU also provides opportunities to engage beyond local territorial limits. Local authorities have taken advantage of these, setting up offices in Brussels to lobby EU institutions (such as Birmingham’s or Cornwall’s), and engaging in transnational networks with other local authorities (such as Eurocities or the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions), providing platforms to access EU funding, influence EU policy and share policy innovation and best practices with European partners.

All of this arguably gives local government the status as the most ‘Europeanized’ part of the British state. And yet we heard relatively little about the local dimension to Brexit during the EU referendum campaign. Over a year since the referendum result, we’re still largely in the dark on what Brexit means for local government. The government’s white paper on the UK’s withdrawal and new partnership with the EU managed only 28 words on the subject, and this is vague at best:

We will also continue to champion devolution to local government and are committed to devolving greater powers to local government where there is economic rationale to do so.

On the ground, local authorities are already trying to get to grips with Brexit and its implications. This includes collectively through organizations such as the Local Government Association, but also several local authorities have taken the initiative to explore the impact of Brexit, its challenges and its opportunities with their local communities. Examples include the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Futures Group, or Bristol’s Brexit Response Group. But a wider lack of attention given to the local level impact of Brexit leaves important questions about the future of local governance in the UK left unanswered. How will local authorities continue to deliver projects which have so far relied on EU funding? Will EU funding to the local level be replaced after the UK leaves the EU. Will local authorities be able to make their voice heard and influence the process or outcome of Brexit? Will powers repatriated from Brussels be devolved to local government, or simply be re-centralized in Whitehall? And how will this affect the communities local authorities serve?

The EU’s impact on local authorities means Brexit matters to them, and Brexit’s wider impact on the UK will inevitably have local level consequences. Investigating the local level impact of Brexit therefore not only tells us how local authorities are adapting, but also sheds light on the ever fraught relationship between local and national politics.

The post The overlooked dimension? Brexit and local governance appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

About a year ago, I attended a meeting in Cambridge, to discuss the aftermath of the EU referendum.

Alongside all the rage and fury of those who felt they had been cheated, one woman asked me specifically about how to mitigate the impact of Brexit on her area of expertise, namely the conservation of rare natural habitats.

About which – specifically – I know nothing.

How I was able to give some advice to her, and it’s the same advice I will give now to all those who feel they have a stake in Brexit and who want their voice to be heard.

Some context here might be useful.

Brexit is huge. It covers and shapes everything right now. Every bit of public policy is affected by, and affects, Brexit. As can been seen in the legislative agenda for the current, long Parliament, there really isn’t anything else of note happening in the UK right now. Even on the EU side, while there is some more bandwidth available, it’s still a very involved and involving process.

Which means several things are happening.

Firstly, very few people have an overview of the entire process. In the UK, they sit in Number 10 and DExEU; in the EU, it’s Task Force 50 and some national chancelleries. Those individuals are exceptionally pressed by demands on their time, because they are the first point for arbitrating between the myriad different pressures for influence.

Secondly, most of the other people involved in the UK are not specialists in the EU, but rather in their area of specialisation.

Finally, as the opening phase of negotiations has shown, positions on either side are not reversibly set.

All of this leads to some logical points of pressure for those seeking to advance their agenda.

For those with issues that are very policy-specific, the most productive way forward is to provide ideas to those involved that marry up the policy-specific aspects with a framework that fits into broad Article 50 objectives. To take the opening case, it might be assumed that nature conservation is not on the radars of the key protagonists in London and Brussels, and that then local officials are caught up with bigger environmental regulation matters. By producing a set of policy recommendations that show those local officials how they can handle the specific issue as part of what they have already said about their plans, the activist might well be able to upload her preferences to that group, who might in turn be trying to upload this to the national negotiating team, who might in turn put it on the table as part of a bigger package.

In short, in a world with a huge pile of issues and specifics, any idea about how to advance is likely to have a good deal of traction.

But it’s possible to go further than this. Most obviously, building links with counterparts in other EU states opens up the possibility of advancing ideas and preferences that already have the buy-in of all local policy communities. Just as the EU makes decisions by working from the technical to the political, so too will Article 50 proceed.

Of course, this does not really work for more cross-cutting agendas, since the people to influence – the main negotiating teams – are under both extreme time pressure and close political scrutiny.

Here the approach might be better described as side-stepping. A head-on assault is unlikely to work, unless one can count on a very strong groundswell of public support, something that has been noticeably absent to date.

Instead, it would be more productive to try to feed the issue in via specific policy areas, in the manner already described.

To take one illustration, rather than pushing for a general, full preservation of citizens’ rights, as some have done, it might be more useful to focus on securing certain key provisions that then force movement in other areas. Thus the UK’s suggestion that five years’ residence will be needed to secure settled status might be a focus, since removing that requirement might also keep more freedom of movement than otherwise might be possible.

And this suggests a final option: the block-buster.

Within Brexit negotiations, there are several highly-problematic issues; ones that have no immediately obvious solution. The Irish border is the most significant one right now.

If one could find a credible solution to this, then potentially that could leverage change in other areas of policy. In the Irish case, that might include moving preferences on free movement, customs checks, identity cards, trade barriers and more. The negotiating parties might be willing to bend on these if they saw it as a price worth paying for the resolution of the other issue.

Of course, the very fact that no-one has come up with such a plan suggests that this is not easily done.

However, the basic strategy for anyone remains simply one of making yourself useful and constructive.

The post How to get what you want from Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Could Europe’s struggle against Islamic terrorists become a guerrilla war?

Mike Ungersma looks for signs.

It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2% active in a striking force, and 98% passively sympathetic.

T E Lawrence,  ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ on guerrilla warfare [1]

In Syria, ISIS appears on the edge of defeat.  Cornered into a warren of narrow streets of Raqqa and Mosul, a few hundred determined fighters carry on, facing certain death.  But in the eyes of tens of thousands of fellow Muslims, it will be a heroic end bringing martyrdom and the promise of eternal life.  Where once thousands fought against the coalition, only a handful remain.  Observers on the ground tell us most have fled.  While no one is sure where, the fear is those who came from Europe may have returned there, battle-hardened and very experienced in the skills of irregular warfare.[2]

They will be going home to communities scattered across Europe and be seen, not as conquerors returning from a war to establish the 21st century’s first caliphate, but as sons and fathers (and a handful of daughters) who answered a particularly powerful and persuasive call – Jihad.  What will be their attitude as they recall their brutal exposure to war, toward their involvement in what many Muslims regard as an ultimate duty: participation in a holy war against infidels.  And crucially, how will they be greeted by their families and friends?

They will find the neighbourhoods they left have grown in size and purpose – almost nations ‘within nations’, especially in Britain, France, Germany and the Benelux countries.  There, despite the efforts of governments and charities to integrate Muslims, despite the countless initiatives to prevent Islamic extremists from spreading their messages, the ‘Islamification’ of dozens of European cities continues a pace.[3]

Sociologists[4] tell us these societies are increasingly unified, territorial and isolated, walled off from outside influence by language, religion and culture.  Subjected to what they regard as discrimination and prejudice, their populations are growing at a rate outstripping their non-Muslim hosts.  Worryingly, they show signs of become almost sovereign entities with their own schools, churches, and even a legal system, Sharia law.  They are as impenetrable from the outside, alien and hostile to European traditions and European history.

With these Jihadi now back on their streets, back in their mosques answering questions and relating their exploits to the admiring young and naive, the question that must be high on the agenda of Europe’s counter-terrorism experts is: Do they pose a new and more dangerous threat? Unthinkable as it may seem, might these emerging Muslim ‘nations’ soon gain a new attribute: a dedicated, determined and experienced army of Jihadi to protect them from us?  Will they become Islam’s promised ‘soldiers of the God’ to protect their mothers and sisters from insults and derision, shield their fathers and elders from taunts and threats by ultra-right extremists, and guard their mosques and holy places from further attack?  In short, are these former ISIS fighters a vanguard of a larger, more organised and trained guerrilla force that could carry terrorism to a frightening new level in Europe?

The situation is unprecedented, though anticipated two decades ago by the American historian Samuel P. Huntington in his controversial The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order:

Islam’s borders are bloody and so are its innards. The fundamental problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilisation whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.[5]

Nor is the future – given increasing Muslim settlement in Europe – much brighter. French politicians and intellectual, Pierre Lallouche:

History, proximity and poverty insure that France and Europe are destined to be over-whelmed by people from the failed societies of the south.  Europe’s past was white and Judeo-Christian.  The future is not.[6]

Huntington and Lallouche were writing as the 20th century drew to a close.  Since then, the situation has clearly worsened.  Should the terrorism Europe has already suffered become even more intense and more frequent – that is, show signs of being organised and directed – the response could be ugly.  Periodic vigilante attacks aimed at Muslims and mosques, could escalate to a systematic effort by the state to bring both sides under control.  Armed troops now routinely deployed in France and Belgium, could become an everyday sight in every European country, including Britain. Is the imposition of martial law, cloaked in the disguise of ‘aiding the police’ next?

Something has to give it seems.  Robert Verkaik, author of The Making of a Terrorist, wrote recently in the London Guardian, that Scotland Yard and MI5 share a database of 23,000 jihadist “subjects of interest”.  Of these, 3,000 are seen as posing a serious threat, and another 500 are given “the highest priority.”  In addition, there have been 8,000 referrals to the ‘Prevent’ anti-extremism programme.  He concludes: The security services are “drowning” in the sheer volume of intelligence and suspects.[7]

Furthermore, the jihadis know how to play the game – with cynicism.  To waste the time of the police and counter-terrorism authorities, they behave provocatively, “knowing that they’ll come under surveillance, but remain just on the right side of the law so as to ‘suck up’ resources”.[8]

Already the calls for action are becoming increasingly shrill: In his opening line to The Strange Death of Europe, Douglas Murray,  associate director of the Henry Jackson Society and associate editor of The Spectator, writes: “Europe is committing suicide, decadent and godless, and rendered helpless by our relativism, we have become easy prey for a resurgent Islam.”  As the few remaining committed Christians stare at the ‘bare, ruined choirs’, that have become bingo halls or social centres, Islam flourishes in every European country.

And, many argue, from the million Syrians accepted in Germany to the unstoppable flow of ‘refugees’ across the Mediterranean, we have brought this on ourselves. Rod Little, reviewing Murray’s book in the Sunday Times notes that opponents of mass immigration have always been dismissed as racist.  “But the Strange Death of Europe, he writes,  mordantly exposes many of the familiar canards that we have been fed on the subject – such as the claim that immigration brings great economic benefits, or that Britain has always been a nation of immigrants.

One of those presumptions was undermined last year when Dame Louise Casey published her controversial study into social integration of immigrants, and found “high levels of social and economic isolation in some places, and cultural and religious practices in communities that are not only holding some of our citizens back, but run contrary to British values and sometimes our laws.” The report, commissioned by former Prime Minister David Cameron, also found that “by faith, the Muslim population has the highest number and proportion of people aged 16 and over who cannot speak English well or at all.[9]

Or take the recent words of Sara Khan, a British Muslim and CEO of Inspire, an independent non-governmental organisation working to counter extremism and gender inequality.  Writing in the London Evening Standard, she says

The response after every Islamist attack is the same: politicians claim the perpetrators don’t represent the Muslim community – as if such a unified body even exists.  The reality is that the terrorists do represent a certain group of Muslims in the UK – one that promotes a supremacist, intolerant, anti-Western Islam on campuses, at community events and on line.[10]

In the event of a drastic escalation in violence – terrorism and an inevitable state-sponsored response – the result would be an asymmetric war terrorists could be certain of losing – the odds are too great, overwhelming even.  But the price all would pay, Muslims and everyone else, would be very high indeed.  At that level, repression of the terrorist threat would mean historic restrictions and unprecedented sacrifices of freedoms Europeans have taken for granted for decades.

Make no mistake, ISIS veterans are returning to our streets and neighbourhoods, and they are unlikely to respond to initiatives such as Britain’s ‘Prevent’ and other such initiatives. Young  Muslims may be beyond persuading.  Instead and predictably, the returning ‘warriors’ and those they can convince, will feel there is a score to be settled.  Defeated in Syria, their dreams of a new world-dominating caliphate in shatters, the life-changing experience of seeing death of friends and comrades up-close, in a word – ignominy. Everywhere and at every opportunity – they will want to get even.  ‘Post Traumatic Stress’ takes on a fearful meaning for these young men and women who were willing to give their lives for their beliefs.  Are they still willing to make this sacrifice?

Perhaps this is the real tragedy surrounding the awful, shocking, heart-rendering events of Paris, Nice, Berlin, Brussels, Manchester, and on and on.  The distorted and grotesquely displaced idealism of young Muslims.  A dilemma made more profound because there seems to be no answer, no solution.  There is an inevitability about it that haunts everyone.

Roger Kimball, editor of The New Criterion, has characterised the response of Western elites to the terrorist outrages as a combination of sentimentality and apology, what he calls a “Kumbaya sentimentality”. Now, however, he senses a new feeling:

We have certainly heard a reprise of that tired song in the immediate aftermath of the Manchester massacre.  But we have also heard some refreshingly discordant, refreshingly adult notes.  There is anger in that descant, justified anger.  There is also the burgeoning awareness that the culture under threat, whatever its faults, is very much worth preserving.  That dual reality – a newfound awareness fired by anger – may yet rescue us from our more hapless selves.

[1] T. E. Lawrence, On guerrilla warfare, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th edition (1929) Accessed on-line

[2] “ISIS: Up to 5,000 jihadists could be in Europe after returning from terror training camps abroad.” independent.co.uk, February 20, 2016

[3] “5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe”, The Pew Research Center, July 19, 2016 Accessed on-line

[4] Can mostly Christian countries integrate Muslims? This new book shows what must be done.” The Washington Post, December 1, 2015

[5] The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel P. Huntington, 1996

[6] Quoted in Strangers at the Gate, Judith Miller, New York Times Magazine, September 15, 1991

[7] Robert Verkaik, quoted in The Week, London, 17 June 2017, p 23

[8] Ibid, from an article by Dipesh Gadher in the Sunday Times

[9] “Segregation at ‘worrying levels’ in parts of Britain”, Dame Louise Casey warns, BBC, 5 December 2016

[10] London Evening Standard, Tuesday 6 June 2017.

The post Ultimate Jihad? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

18 June: finally, the last visit to the polling station.

Ever since I started to talk to the French about their political system and listened to their perceptions of what was going wrong in the Fifth Republic – a little more than three decades now – I had this impression, unbacked by any robust statistical evidence, of a quite large majority at the centre of the political spectrum that found no adequate representation in the institutions.

Of course, I also bumped into people from the extremes: heavily leftist teachers for whom communism had never been discredited and who explained to me that the GDR was the better Germany; or football fans who esteemed that the ‘Black-Blanc-Beur’ World Champions of 1998 were ‘not really French’.

But there also was this longing, shared across a wide range of middle-class people of different sensitivities and levels of education, for a national assembly, in which ‘common sense’ and ‘collective purpose’ would overcome an entrenched left-right divide that was felt to be overblown by both artificial rhetoric tradition and the electoral system. The one single most-hated feature of political life, beyond the ritual disgust with the priviledges and the famous disconnectedness of the political elite, was ‘systematic opposition’, leading to fake indignation at each and every measure of the government and obstructionism by principle. If only the ‘reasonable’ people of the left and right could get their act together and form a coalition of those willing to serve the nation rather than their own career! Alas, French political culture would never allow for a compromise-seeking ‘grosse Koalition’ of German inspiration.

And then, the miracle happened.

Last Sunday’s 2nd round of the legislative elections has virtually flooded the French Parliament with ‘reasonable’, ‘common sense’ people, eager to follow Emmanuel Macron in his historical demolition of the sterile rhetoric postures and ready to introduce a new manner of bridging existing ideological divides for the sake of the common interest of all.  If this is a minority, as Mélenchon and Le Pen were quick to assert – both because of the high abstention rate and their respective claim to be the only true representative of ‘the people’ – it’s a very impressive one. In its diversity of profiles, it’s a ‘très grande coalition’ in its own right. They might as well spell it with a ‘K’.

And it is a first step on the way to fulfil the presidential promise of achieving a ‘renewal in faces and practices’ that was so often repeated over these long campaigns. Two thirds of the 577 faces in the Parliament are totally new, at the same time pushing the feminisation of the Assemblée to an unprecedented level of 38%.

As for the ‘new practices’,we will have to wait and see. For the time being, the government seems decided to practice what they preach: within a few days only no less than four ministers of Edouard Philippe’s first cabinet have been nudged out for affairs that smelt too much of these ‘old habits’ that citizens are simply no longer willing to tolerate.

At the moment of writing, the astonishing coherence between what is clearly turning into a ‘strong and stable leadership’ in the best sense of the word and the endearing enthusiasm of these fresh French politicians of a totally new type is nurturing a kind of hope and confidence that seemed totally out of reach in the kingdom of ‘declinism’. How long will it last? Not everybody is in love with Macronia: opposition, both in the streets and at the edges of the Assemblée’s hemicycle, is likely to be loud, virulent, and nasty. The forthcoming battle for labour law reform will see a fair share of fear-mongering and class-struggle, which may make the Russian hacker attack of April seem like the ‘good old days’.

Anonymous – probably a French voter in June 2017.

So let’s enjoy the moment while it lasts. We, the people, are too exhausted anyway by this long and incredibly tense election marathon. Being a citizen is a rather hard job in this country. If it was only about walking to the polling station on four election Sundays (plus several primaries)! All these endless TV debates you have to watch, all the articles and interviews you have to digest. All the nerve-wracking cliffhangers, twists and rebounds of this fascinating drama – it’s just too much. Whatever bad losers may be tempted to say, the record low turnout of 45% last Sunday, compared with the very high interest for politics that was sustained over all these months, is simply due to election fatigue. Especially as the first round had provided the certitude that the die was cast, the majority for Macron was sure, and the citizenship job had been done to the satisfaction of her Majesty the Fifth Republic.

So where does that leave us at the end of the 25th and last post of this blog’s election marathon? More puzzled than ever about the Fifth Republic. The past months has confirmed every grudge I held against her. The hyper-personalisation of the presidential regime is not good for French democracy. The constitution remains both contradictory and vague in parts. The sequence of the different elections is far from ideal. The electoral system is not fair.

But without all these flaws and shortcomings, would the encouraging outcome of the marathon have been possible at all? In the very first post of the series, dated 1st November 2016, I prepared for a rather sad journey, ‘with no providential saviour in store and hardly any light at the end of the democratic tunnel’.

Ever since I have been living in this country, I was never more pleased to have been told wrong in such a flagrant manner.

This is the last post of the French 2017 election marathon.
All twenty-five posts can be found here.
This blog should be back after the summer break,
enlarging the perspective again to European integration issues.
Thanks for having accompanied me on the journey!

The post France 2017: La grande coalition appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

I know that I should be writing about the fall-out of the General Election and the impact on Article 50 talks, but until we get a bit further down the line on this – specifically to a Conservative-DUP agreement – it doesn’t seem to be worth the effort. It’s like last year, and the year before, where every day throws up a new surprise and twist, rendering previous comment/analysis wrong. Let’s take this as me agreeing with Jonathan Dean’s fine piece.

If you really want some thoughts, then check out my Twitter feed (here, here and here) or the new Diet of Brussels episodes (here and here). And consider if agreeing with Jonathan is the same as changing my behaviour.

Instead, I’m going to focus on one of those hardy perennials of Brussels, mobile phone roaming.

Today marks the end of charges on roaming across the EEA: your data/minutes allowance is good in your home country and all the other countries involved, with no additional cost for their use (although you still pay extra for international calls).

It’s the classic good-news story and one that the EU has been able to wheel out for many, many years. Doing useful things for people and standing up to big business.

But it also exposes the limitations of the EU, both politically and organisationally, and offers an insight into how things work in practice.

There is a long and convoluted background to today’s change: for the bare bones you can read the Wikipedia page, or for a bit more juice you can look at Ryan Heath’s insider look in Politico. In essence, this has been over a decade of the Commission – or rather, bits of the Commission – pushing to trim back roaming charges in the face of stiff opposition from mobile phone companies, some member states and even the public (most memorably with the farcical press release (and U-turn) last summer on limits).

As with so many areas of policy, the Commission is limited in how fast it can move legislative elements through the system: primarily this is because of the need to work with member states and the European Parliament, but it also comes from the internal divisions within the organisation, all the while floating in a sea of lobbyists. In this case, the approach was to start on the most egregious cases of over-charging, before slowly tightening the noose on roaming charges.

This is the same kind of pattern seen with eurozone governance reform, or CAP payments, or environmental standards: gradual policy moves, over long periods, often not achieving much more than a vague approximation of single and unified rules.

You can see this in many ways, but thinking of our current situation there are three perspectives that stand out.

The first sees this as a bad thing, because it slows us down. Barriers between member states, differences in regulation, additional costs to citizens: all these are detrimental to ‘making Europe work’, freeing it up to achieve its full potential, economically and socially and politically. If only the EU could push things through more quickly – compress the delay in getting to where we are obviously heading – then we’d be the better for it, as we spend less time transitioning and more time in the new situation.

The second sees this as a bad thing, because it’s inexorable. Yes, the EU takes ages to do things, but it does them in the end, rolling over the hard-fought opposition of other interests. The Commission can afford to be patient, because it knows member state governments come and go and market situations change, but ultimately it will have its way, right or wrong. Maybe its intentions are sincerely-held, but that almost doesn’t matter, as it acts more like a dog with a bone, rather than a knight on a white charger.

The third sees this as a good thing, because it marks a democraticisation of the EU. The checks and balances between institutions and member states, the input of civil society and economic interests, the gradualism: all these mark a maturing democratic system, where no one part of the system has unlimited power.

No one of these three views is intrinsically right, but when we look at the EU, we might do well to consider that all three have popular currency in different parts of the Union. If you’re only hearing one of these, then maybe you need to move outside of your bubble. And today’s as good as any to check this.

The post Roaming wild: A parable for the EU today appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In calling the election, Theresa May rejected Alice’s belief in politics as a game in which all should have prizes. She saw the election and Brexit negotiations as processes in which she would win and others would lose. Her opponents foresaw an outcome in which all would be losers: the Brexiteers because the prize they claimed was not a unicorn but a turkey, and the Remainers because the effect of a hard Brexit would be far worse than they predicted.

The election result creates the prospect of an Alice-in-Wonderland outcome in which all may have prizes. People wanting to leave the European Union have seen the return to Downing Street of a prime minister committed to Brexit. More than four-fifths of the popular vote went to MPs elected on manifestos pledged to respect the referendum result, the position of Labour as well as the Tories.

They make up more than nine-tenths of the new House of Commons. Half of all voters would like Brexit to happen as soon as possible and another quarter, after voting to remain last year, now give their resigned consent. According to an election day poll of actual voters, only 28 per cent would like to see Brexit abandoned if at all possible.

Having given the EU notification of the decision to withdraw from the EU by 30 March 2019, it is now virtually impossible for the UK to withdraw its withdrawal. Nor is there a desire in Brussels to see its most awkward and unstable member remain. Postponing the date of withdrawal would require the unanimous consent of 27 member states. It would also require a majority vote of the British Parliament to reject the referendum result.

The failure of Theresa May to secure a parliamentary majority is a major victory for opponents of a hard Brexit. UKIP, the only party that campaigned with an unambiguous commitment to a hard Brexit, won just 1.8 per cent of the vote and no seats.

More than 53 per cent of the UK vote went to parties favouring some form of soft Brexit, that is, an agreement offering the prize of keeping a significant number of benefits of EU association in exchange for contributing to the EU’s budget and accepting absence from deliberations in which decisions are made affecting the UK. Having endorsed remaining in the EU less than a year ago, Theresa May can hardly assert that there are no features of EU membership worth retaining.

The terms of Brexit, whatever they are, will require endorsement by a majority in the House of Commons and a majority in the House of Lords, where the swing vote is in the hands of cross-bench peers. In a House of Commons of 650 members, there are a total of 315 Labour, SNP, Liberal Democrat, Plaid Cymru and Green MPs elected on manifestos that endorsed some form of soft Brexit. Collectively, these parties won a larger share of the total vote, 53 per cent, than was cast for leaving the EU in last year’s referendum.

Instead of being assured of parliamentary support for whatever she decides Brexit means, Theresa May will have to negotiate with MPs, including dozens of Tories who voted remain in the EU referendum. Tory voters are also divided in their views about the EU. Lord Ashcroft’s election day poll found that two-thirds favoured Brexit and one-third favoured remain. Those favouring the EU contributed twice as many votes to the party’s narrow lead over Labour as did former UKIP voters.

If upwards of a dozen of Tory MPs reject hard Brexit conditions there will be no majority in the Commons. While the Lords lacks the authority of election, its members can collectively claim more knowledge of relations with Europe than any team of frontbench spokespersons.

The election outcome has created new opportunities for a soft Brexit. Theresa May’s red line conditions set out in indelible ink have been replaced by question marks in pink water colour. The mad game of political croquet that is about to commence could produce a win-win settlement. Brexiters would gain a prize denied to Enoch Powell and Tony Benn, namely the UK Parliament no longer being bound to accept the authority of Brussels. Those who want an association agreement with the EU can use their newly gained parliamentary strength to win substantive prizes too.

To bring about a settlement will require British politicians to stop playing winner-take-all games and prepare for compromise as soon as discussions start with the EU later this month. The EU has re-affirmed the three issues that must be settled before talks about access to the single market can commence.

They are the post-Brexit status of EU citizens in the UK and of British citizens living in the single market; the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland; and the size of the divorce bill that Britain should pay to cover existing commitments to the EU budget.

Ironically, the election has achieved a prize goal of Brexiters – returning control of British government to Parliament–but not in a way that was expected, weakening the authority of Downing Street. A new Prime Minister would not change the arithmetic of Parliament. Its assent to any Brexit measure is subject to approval by MPs who were not elected to support a Tory government.

Key players in parliament are no longer hardline Brexiters but people who can craft soft Brexit measures that can attract cross-party support. Step forward Labour spokesperson Keir Starmer and Liberal Democrat Vince Cable–and don’t turn your back on members of the House of Lords such as Peter Mandelson.

The post Voters endorse an Alice-in-wonderland Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In October 2015, I gave a speech to international journalists in Germany called, ‘Newspaper lies can cost lives.’ Less than a year later, Britain voted for Brexit, with one of the main reasons cited as ‘too many migrants’. How did such a fear and dislike of migrants develop? Newspaper lies played an enormous role. Video; 14 minutes:

Click here to view the embedded video.

The post How newspaper lies led to Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It’s time to take your good old Max Weber out of the shelf again. His definitions of sources of authority are as pertinent as they have ever been. What did he write about ‘charisma’ again? ‘The exemplary character of an individual person’, ‘endowed with specifically exceptional qualities’, and by whom ‘new normative patterns are revealed’ to his/her ‘recognisers’.

In a country whose citizens are completely exhausted by what I dubbed already last autumn the ‘election marathon’, Emmanuel Macron’s charisma and promise of renewal has been the only unbroken mobilising force that made people walk to the polling stations yesterday. More than half of them decided it was no longer worth it. Even the reliable old rule according to which high abstention invariably benefits the extremes is made obsolete by En marche!

It was the Fifth Republic’s logic in full splendour: charismatic authority precedes what Weber named ‘rational-legal authority’. The only election that really counts is the excessively personalised choice of the new President, who is then bestowed with a parliament whose only reason of being seems to be the docile confirmation of the new monarch’s wishes. The one sentence that was to be heard across the entire country over the last five weeks was a compliant ‘We need to give the new president a majority’ or, in its simpler version: ‘Give him a chance’. Which, subliminally, corresponds almost to an anxious ‘Give ourselves a (last) chance’.

It’s ‘de Gaulle 2.0’ or ‘1958 reloaded’! Made possible by the 2001 calendar reform that changed the sequence of votes, placing the legislative elections in mid-June, one month after the presidential vote. The original intention had been to avoid systematic dissolutions of parliament (like the ones decided by Mitterrand in 1981 and 1988). But the Macron effect boils down to the dissolution of the entire party spectrum!

At first sight, the month between the entry of the new President and the first round of the legislative elections does not seem a long time. But that is to underestimate the sheer awe that follows the enthronement of the new monarch. While the time is too short for messing anything up or making major strategic mistakes, there is more than enough time to take a firm grip on the symbolic attributes of power, dress up in the gown of greatness at international summits, set up a promising new team that gets to work, launch first reforms and announce an agenda. In other words: simply act as if the follow-up elections were a pure formality and treat all other parties as if they already were ‘the opposition’.

As a result, the very same party leaders who had been serious contenders for supreme reign just a few weeks ago, are reduced to humbly asking citizens ‘not to give the President too much power’. Not exactly the most mobilising campaign manifesto. And a counter-productive one with that, especially when uttered by those who over the two previous mandates precisely had ‘too much power’ and did nothing substantial with it.

Those among the French who found the energy to overcome election fatigue and actually went to vote yesterday have decided that Emmanuel Macron was to have as much power as possible. In each single one of the seven districts of our nicely mainstream Western Département of Maine-et-Loire, the En marche! candidate finished first and will no doubt end up elected next Sunday. The large majority of them totally unknown some weeks ago: a retired senior emergency nurse, a 35-year old female infantry officer, a 36-year old mechanics engineer, to name but three examples of all those newcomers who never had run an election campaign in their lives. They all benefited from the Charisma bonus.

The joyful Macron revolution, staged in strange simultaneousness to the UK’s sad self-demolition, raises some not so joyful questions. Is that then what we are left with in our 2017 late modernity: does the functioning of democracy really depend on the emergence of a charismatic leader who surfs on his ‘specifically exceptional qualities’, as Weber had it, and obtains full rational-legal authority in the wake of his surge? Does it really all depend on leadership or the absence of it? On the (quite accidental) availability of outstanding talent and human resources? On good luck?

Emmanuel Macron and his government will be very closely observed for the manner in which they will push their labour market reform against the opposition that is likely to form in the streets rather than in Parliament; they will be tested on their credibility when it comes to the new political ethics they promised; they will be scrutinised by their peers on the European scene. What I am most curious to see, however, is whether he will keep his promise to reform the electoral code and introduce proportional voting against the deeply engrained French aversion to governmental instability and coalition building. Reforming, for the sake of just representation of political minorities (including unpleasant extremes), the very system that provided him with an unprecedented majority – now that would, in Weberian phrasing, certainly ‘reveal new normative patterns’ in French politics. And a new and different kind of charisma.

This is post # 24 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: The Charisma Bonus appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Early this month I had the fortune to attend the biannual conference of the European Studies Association (EUSA) in Miami. As always, and as it could not be otherwise, I attended as many panels on the European Monetary Union as I could. I also discussed the future of the Euro with a number of colleagues over dinners, lunches and breakfasts. Yes, I admit it, I am a Euro freak. But there are not so many opportunities to discuss this topic with American or America-based scholars, so one needs to make the most of it.

One of the things that I noticed from the previous EUSA conference two years ago in Boston is that the mood on the Euro has changed.

Our Anglo-American colleagues are less gloomy on the single currency, although they are still quite sceptical. Matthias Matthijs is one of them. He showed figures indicating how trust in the democratic system has collapsed over the past years in the Mediterranean countries and claimed that this was due to the Euro straightjacket and the imposition of austerity by Brussels.

Those who follow my publications (or my Twitter account) know that this causality does not convince me. Rather, my sense is that disenchantment with democracy in these countries has more to do with internal factors, mainly corruption and the lack of meritocracy and job opportunities for the young. This is at least the case in Spain, and it is likely to be valid also for Portugal and Greece. In Italy the story might be closer to what Matthijs describes. But yet again, here I believe this is more due to the fact that Italian leaders blame the Euro, Germany and Brussels for Italy’s ills instead of tackling the real problems of their country.

As a matter of fact, the comparison between Italy and Spain demonstrates that the Euro is not an anti-growth device, as sometimes argued. The external circumstances are roughly the same for both countries. Both are in the monetary union and both are told by Brussels that they need to reduce their deficits to shrink their public debt. Both have benefited from the ultra-loose monetary policy of the European Central Bank and the drop of oil prices. But Spain is growing for the third year in a row at more than 3%, while Italy is stuck below 1%. This in itself shows that the Euro does not impede high growth rates. The Baltic countries and Ireland are other examples that contradict this thesis.

Not many have noticed but the fact is that in 2016 the Eurozone had a higher growth rate than the US! This explains why the overall sentiment in the Old Continent, but also in the US has shifted. Those US based scholars that predicted a Euro break-up at the previous EUSA conference in Boston in 2015, admit now that they had underestimated the political will prevalent both in the South and the North of the monetary union to stick together. A sentiment that has only increased after the Brexit vote and the arrival of Donald Trump to the White House.

As Daniela Schwarzer from the German foreign-policy think-tank DGAP explained in a roundtable we had on why the Euro is still so popular, if one looks at the economic side of EMU, one can flirt with the idea of a break-up, but once you analyse the historical and political trajectory of the single currency, then the possibility of an implosion becomes less likely.

Waltraud Schelke, Matthias Matthijs, Vivien Schmidt, Kathleen McNamara and Erik Jones in a panel on the legitimacy deficit of the EU.

However, this does not mean that the Euro is a robust and consolidated construction yet. The good thing about the EUSA conferences is that there are always representatives from the European Central Bank and this year there were some from the ESM (the European Stability Mechanism). Some of them (certainly not all) were complacent, saying that EMU only needs a couple of minor reforms to be sustainably. This is too overoptimistic. There is a reason why Emmanuel Macron is asking for a Eurozone budget to increase investments, a finance minister, and a Eurozone parliament. As I have explained elsewhere, monetary unions do not survive without political unions to underpin them and the earlier European leaders understand that, the better.

Of course, this also means that the analysis on the future of the euro at EUSA conferences will continue to be divided between those who believe that fiscal and political integration is feasible, and likely, and those who don’t. And it happens that the former tend to live and work inside the Eurozone , and the latter look at it from the outside. Only time will tell whether the “insiders” base their analysis on wishful thinking or whether they are closer to the truth than the “outsiders”.

The post Change of mood on the Euro. Even at EUSA 2017! appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

And so the latest disruption to the process of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU draws to a close. Much like the delay in Article 50 notification before it, this General Election has achieved little, except to underline that the British political system still hasn’t got its head around the entire matter.

While there will be countless pieces exploring what the results mean for Brexit, the basic message is going to be that they don’t mean much. If the Tories are returned, then there is no sign of any plan beyond the banalities that litter the White Paper: If Labour pull a surprise victory out of the bag, then they look no more able to fashion a coherent set of objectives. Only in the event of a hung Parliament, where the SNP and LibDems hold the balance of power, might something come of it all, but even then one hesitates at the thought of the media onslaught that would ensue.

Underlining all of this confusion is the passionately held belief that Brexit shouldn’t be the key debating ground for this election. Certainly, May called it on the basis of needing a strong mandate, but the real focus has been on the character of the leaders: if there was a visible policy, there is was social care that has stuck out. There is something of a sense that Brexit is important, but there’s nothing to be gained by talking about, as it’s a giant bear-trap, and one that many voters lack interest in.

Thus we end up where we left off, in April at the start of this election: with confused policies and confused politicians.

And the clock ticks down all the while.

If there is a winner from all this, then it is the EU. It has been able to work on its positions, fleshing out ideas without direct challenge from the UK, building consensus for the Commission team.

Neither side gains from a non-deal, but the onus is much more clearly on the UK to secure a package, so the ability to pull something together as the EU has done can only be to its advantage. As I have suggested before, May is best understood as someone who recognises that a deal on EU terms is coming down the line, so it makes sense to gather as much political capital as possible in anticipation of the storm. Sadly, that approach looks much less viable today.

There is a certain calmness in the EU’s actions. Part of that comes from the necessity of patience in an organisation that often takes a very long time to make any decision. But it also reflects the strong negotiating position that it holds in these talks: there have not been the tensions between the EU27 that many – including myself – anticipated, and all of the likely outcomes are ones that the EU can live with. Either the UK abandons leaving, or it agrees to an EU-designed deal, or it falls out without a deal: the first two axiomatically work for the EU, while the final path at least looks not to contaminate the rest of the EU.

In short, this general election has been a distraction: as we head to 19 June and the start of substantive negotiations, that will become even more apparent.

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On 25 May 2017, NATO leaders met in Brussels to celebrate the opening the new headquarters in Boulevard Léopold III. The location of the new headquarters is historically very significant: during construction four unexploded bombs from both the First and Second World Wars were found underneath. This should serve as an excellent reminder for what NATO stands.

While the official opening ceremony was a good occasion for the heads of state and government to come together, one issue – or rather, the presence of one person – surpassed the significance of the meeting: it was the first visit to Brussels by the 45th President of the United States of America, Donald J. Trump. Prior to the NATO meeting, much debate surrounded his visit. The stakes were high, because NATO has to face international disagreements and challenges as well as external threat that require urgent responses. As Sophia Besch, Research Fellow at CER, has outlined the task for the European allies was to contain Trump and to convince him about their efforts and contributions to NATO. On the other hand, Jeremy Shapiro, Research Director at ECFR, gave a more sober outlook for the meeting: ‘Trump will give an ordinary speech, make various extravagant promises, and the meeting will pass with neither incident nor substance.’

Besides the opening ceremony, the thematic focus centred around the issue of burden-sharing among NATO allies. Already during previous meetings with allies, Trump emphasised that European countries owe his country vast amounts for paying for European security. In one of his Tweet storms, he summarised his claim after the meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in April 2017: ‘Germany owes vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defence it provides to Germany’. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO allies already agreed on the target of 2 percent of GDP towards NATO defence. However, this target is not only far from realistic and appropriate for some nations. It could also spur new suspicions, especially in Europe. If one imagines that Germany met this target any time soon, as of current, 2 percent of its GDP would amount to $75 billion (€67 billion, £58 billion). Surely, some of its neighbours would become worried.

In addition, this approach to burden sharing does not reflect the actual needs to make the Alliance more flexible, responsive and overall more secure. It is acknowledged that a contribution to collective defence is vital for its survival. But the 2 percent goal does not measure well the actual needs. Instead, it is suggested that a more accurate measure of both burden and risk sharing is required. The more worrying problem is not how to meet this target, but how the money is spent. For a robust and capable Alliance, its members should focus on acquiring capabilities reflecting the current security environment, i.e. one that requires tools and capabilities that respond to cyber threats and hybrid warfare. Further, they should focus on creating deployable militaries that can contribute effectively to NATO’s major operations. Lastly, allies’ contributions to burden sharing should take into account a country’s overall contribution to international and Euro-Atlantic security, i.e. its participation in non-NATO security and defence frameworks.

The outcome of the NATO meeting last month the recommitment of the allies to the 2 percent target as well as the decision to join the counter-terrorism coalition against Daesh. NATO leaders agreed on an action plan enabling states to participate in the fight against terrorism through the coordination of training and capacity building. Yet, as stressed by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, this would not translate into engagement in combat operations.

Despite the importance of the meeting and the allies’ recommitments, NATO leaders neglected one pressing issue. How will they deal with one of their members – Turkey? Prior to the meeting in May, clashes between Turkey and other allies, most outspokenly with Germany as well as Austria, which is one of NATO’s partners through the Partnership for Peace programme, have troubled internal politics within the Alliance. Since the slash over campaign visits by Turkish officials in the light of Turkey’s referendum, German-Turksih relations have been tense. Then, for the second time within one year, Turkey has denied German officials access to the air base in Incirlik. These internal troubles and scuffles indicate the incoherence and diminished trust among members. Though both Germany and France voiced complaints over Turkey’s recent behaviour during the meeting, these have not received much attention and have been pushed into the shadow of Trump’s limelight appearance.

It has long been argued that NATO is only a defence alliance. Yet, with its transformations in the last three decades, it has become a truly political organisation as well. In this regard, NATO has to step up and improve its internal coherence alongside its defence capabilities. Only in a joint and collective fashion it is able to face its external threats and security challenges. It is therefore at stake and in the hands of NATO leaders as well as the Alliance as a whole to come together and revive common interests and values. This is far more significant and pressing than to denigrating and pointing fingers at each other as well as more important than shining light on those allies whose current policies and statements have been vague, ambiguous and not very trustworthy.

Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters is a PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant at the University of Kent and a Visiting Scholar at KU Leuven.

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