Ideas on Europe Blog

Let’s suppose my university likes talking about the future. They might do fancy powerpoint presentations, with artists’ impressions of shiny buildings and other infrastructure, together with charts showing How It’s All Going To Be Great.

Looks wonderful, I might think. But how do we get there, I might also think.

And then it might turn out that between here and there is a period of optimising and belt-tightening, doing better to get more. That kind of thing.

Ah, I might think. And, indeed, oh.

And so it is with Brexit. And no ‘might’ about it, now.

The fine words split on both sides about building a constructive and meaningful relationship post-membership are legion. Last week’s White Paper was simply the latest iteration of this.

In all the argument about whether the White Paper vision can be realised in the face of determined domestic divisions, very little attention has been given to the more practical aspects of getting from here to there, practicalities that will exist whatever ‘there’ turns out to be.

Now, after some discussions with officials and other academics, I feel I understand the matter well enough to have a stab at lying it out for you.

The pitch

This all makes more sense if we work from the end backwards.

The White Paper envisages a series of legal documents, bound by a framework agreement that will encompass a wide range of policy areas. There seems to be a suggestion that this series will not be concluded simultaneously, but rather as they are ready: that makes sense, as a convoy approach might cause big delays for a relatively minor issue.

Moreover, the document also mentions an implementation period, directly in relation to auditing, and indirectly in relation to the famously-unexplainable Facilitated Customs Arrangement (FCA), which will have a phased introduction. However, there’s no more detail available about that implementation period.

Together, these things point to a situation where the end of the Withdrawal Agreement’s transition period at the end of December 2020 will not see the immediate and complete introduction and enforcement of a new end-state.

Instead, there might be some agreements in place – including, presumably, the framework text that contains the management, implementation and infringement architecture – with some of those agreements not being fully operational until a later date.

The questions

Which raises some questions.

The most obvious one is how long will this situation last? When does the end-state actually come into being?

In essence, you have one of two options on this front. Either you define the process by time or by conditions.

The time model (“we’ll have an agreement in place on this date”) is the one we’ve seen so far (on Article 50, and on transition), which offers a clear endpoint and stronger incentives to make progress, especially if interim arrangements lapse at that point.

The conditions-based model (“we’ll have an agreement in place as soon as we can satisfy our basic requirements”) is much less certain on timespan, but does ensure parties’ interests are better protected.

Either way, much would depend on the hierarchy of needs on both sides and the perceived distance of opening positions. However, such disaggregation does point to a period of years, rather than months, to get towards something approaching the end-state.

Of course, part of that will depend on the second key question: what happens in the meantime?

As matters stand, the transition ends in December 2020, and with it the entirety of the current arrangements. As I’ve discussed before, this cliff-edge is much more problematic to resolve than the March 2019 one, for both legal and political reasons.

Again, we have a limited number of options.

The first is to let the transition arrangements lapse and then build up to the end-state from scratch. Some of the EU’s current position on matters such as internal security implicitly use this view, treating the UK as a third country rather than as an ex-member state. Obviously that makes the cliff-edge at the end of 2020 very real, although it might incentivise getting more done sooner, to reduce its effect.

The second is to avoid the cliff-edge and extend the transition arrangements into the implementation period. In effect, you’d be keeping things the same until you knew what they were changing to. This is the principle behind the transition period and means only one adaptation process for operators (and citizens) to undertake.

The third would be to build some kind of new settlement for the implementation period; not nothing, but also no as close as in transition. This phased approach would allow all shapes to mark some progress and to spread the adaptation costs, but with the problem that it requires the most negotiation now to realise.

The problem

None of these options is cost-free and none is simple. And if you think they are, then remember that the Irish dimension is profoundly tied up in all of this too.

But perhaps just as importantly, none is being discussed at this stage.

I have yet to meet anyone who seriously believes that the transition period is long enough to negotiate and ratify a complete end-state agreement between the UK and EU. Likewise, I have yet to meet anyone with a detailed plan for a non-backstop resolution to Northern Ireland.

Amortising the problem across time might be one key way of managing these issues. By holding some parts steady, while focusing on others, it may be possible to break matters down into more manageable and less contentious chunks.

But that comes with challenges of its own; challenges that have barely registered so far in a political landscape that resembles – in the UK at least – nothing so much as the trenches of World War One: muddy, lethal and not getting anywhere fast.

Perhaps the key is to remember that the process will matter as much as the end-state: mutually agreeing a practical operationalisation for the strategy on getting to that deep and special relationship will make it more likely that all sides stick with the programme and get to turn those fine words into something like a reality.

The post Getting to an end-state appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In September 2017, when we took over the position of editors for the JCMS Annual Review, we came in with a vision to address the challenges facing the discipline of EU studies more broadly.

2017 was certainly an eventful year on all aspects of politics, economics and society and represented a critical moment for all of us studying the EU and its politics. This juncture is both exciting and equally daunting in EU history, not least because of the complexity of global challenges, be those addressed at the national, European or transnational levels. One of those grand challenges is precisely the outcome of the process of the departure of the UK from the European Union, following the 2016 EU Referendum.

To solve that puzzle, we invited Prof. Simon Hix (LSE) to deliver the JCMS Annual Review Lecture, addressing the state of play of the UK-EU relations post-Brexit. Prof. Hix was on board immediately and delivered a very engaging lecture at Portcullis House, in the heart of Westminster, where the majority of debates around Brexit take place. The lecture was a public event, attracting audience from all walks of life including practitioners, academics, students and engaged citizens.

In his lecture, which is published as a contribution to the JCMS Annual Review, Prof. Hix addressed the key positions of the UK and the EU in the negotiations one year into the process. Following a game theoretical process of ranking the outcomes of the type of relationship between the UK and the EU, Prof. Hix argued that the basic outcomes have been well-known in terms of a ‘soft’ or a ‘hard’ form of Brexit or a ‘no deal’ outcome. The UK has started to explore the possibilities of a ‘Canada plus plus plus’ agreement and this is certainly reflected in the way that negotiations have proceeded.

Having solved the bargaining game, Prof. Hix concludes that the likely deal between the UK and the EU27 will have the form of a a basic free trade agreement, mainly covering trade in goods with not much on trade in services. Certainly, current events at Chequers confirmed Prof. Hix’s position. In his words, “a basic free trade agreement would not be the end of the process.” The UK will have to negotiate additional agreements with the EU, occasions which are likely to be highly-salient events in domestic politics.

If the UK has to repeatedly fold in its position, then the EU will acquire an even more negative image in the UK, which will make opposition to closer cooperation much stronger. Prof. Hix concluded that in that case, the UK may be stuck with that basic free trade deal for a long time.

• Read the lecture here.
• Listen to an interview with Simon Hix about the lecture here.
• Listen to a recording of the lecture here.

Credit (all photos): Simon Usherwood

 

Dr. Theofanis Exadaktylos

Prof. Roberta Guerrina

Dr. Emanuele Massetti

Co-editors, JCMS Annual Review

University of Surrey

 

 

The post The JCMS Annual Review Lecture 2018 – Prof. Simon Hix on the future UK-EU relationship appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

There are now calls for the EU referendum to be scrapped and run again. It follows the Electoral Commission’s ruling that Vote Leave, the official Brexit campaign group, significantly broke spending limit rules during the referendum.

The group has been fined £61,000 by the electoral watchdog, which has also called for a criminal investigation.

Former Tory minister, Sir Nicholas Soames, said in the Commons today that the referendum, “needs to be blown up and started all over again.”

Senior Conservative MP Sarah Wollaston said there should be a re-run of the vote because, “we cannot have confidence that this referendum was secure”.  She added, “We are talking about deliberate cheating.”

Labour former minister David Lammy called on ministers to declare the referendum result “void”.

He said:

“Can the government declare this referendum void on the basis of the evidence that we’ve been provided by the Electoral Commission, and if not, given this was an advisory referendum by this parliament, can she bring forward the vote in this parliament to declare this referendum void?”

Labour’s Chuka Umunna described the Electoral Commission’s findings as “shocking”, telling MPs the actions of Vote Leave represented an “affront to our democracy”.

He said:

“Given there was a 4% gap between Leave and Remain, and Vote Leave overspent by just under 8%, does the minister agree with me that we cannot say with confidence that this foul play did not impact on the result?”

But the government was not supportive of this view, and Mrs May has already announced this week that another referendum was “out of the question.”

In addition to the fine, the Electoral Commission has referred David Halsall, the “responsible person” for Vote Leave, to the Metropolitan Police for making false declarations of campaign spending.

Darren Grimes, the head of a separate Brexit youth group called BeLeave – which received a £675,000 donation from Vote leave – has also been referred to the police and fined £20,000 by the Electoral Commission.

Bob Posner, Electoral Commission director of political finance, said that what happened represented “serious breaches of the laws put in place by Parliament to ensure fairness and transparency at elections and referendums.”

Under the rules of the referendum, Vote Leave was supposed to have stuck to a £7m spending limit while campaigning.

But the Electoral Commission ruled that Vote Leave secretly went nearly £500,000 over its limit when it made the undeclared £675,000 donation to Mr Grimes’ BeLeave group.

This comes after the Electoral Commission last May also fined Leave.EU, another pro-Brexit campaign group, the maximum £70,000 for multiple breaches of electoral rules.

The organisation is backed by Nigel Farage and funded by Arron Banks, and played a key role in campaigning for Brexit in the referendum.

The group failed to reveal “at least” £77,380 in its spending following the referendum vote, meaning it exceeded the legal spending limits for the referendum, as laid down by law.

The Electoral Commission has also referred a key figure in Leave.EU’s management team, Liz Bilney, to the Metropolitan Police due to “reasonable grounds to suspect” that criminal offences have occurred.

Both Vote Leave and Leave.EU have strongly denied the allegations.

Last May Mr Posner was also critical of Leave.EU for breaking electoral rules for the referendum.

Mr Posner said then:

“The rules we enforce were put in place by Parliament to ensure transparency and public confidence in our democratic processes. It is therefore disappointing that Leave.EU, a key player in the EU referendum, was unable to abide by these rules.

“Leave.EU exceeded its spending limit and failed to declare its funding and its spending correctly. These are serious offences. The level of fine we have imposed has been constrained by the cap on the Commission’s fines.”

The watchdog found the group had exceeded the spending limit for non-party registered campaigners by at least 10 per cent and said that the unlawful over-spend “may well have been considerably higher”.

A spokeswoman for Scotland Yard told The Independent:

“We can confirm that the Electoral Commission has referred a potential criminal offence under section 123(4) of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.

“This matter will be subject to assessment by officers from the Special Enquiry Team.”

The Electoral Commission’s investigation also uncovered that Leave.EU did not properly report the receipt of three loans from Mr Banks, totalling £6m, with dates around the transaction and the related interest rate incorrectly reported.

Because the EU referendum was advisory only, the safeguards that allow for legally binding elections to be re-run in the event of rule breaches do not apply.

This prompted Jolyon Maugham QC, the director of the Good Law Project, which launched the judicial review that arguably prompted the Electoral Commission into renewing its investigation into Vote Leave spending, to tell The Independent:

“Legally this ruling doesn’t mean anything for the country. Politically, it should be decisive.”

He explained that the referendum was no more than a “glorified opinion poll” in the eyes of the law.

Subsequently, “The normal safeguards that govern elections that give rise to legally binding outcomes were cut out from the referendum. It is unchallengeable. There is no recourse in law. There is no legal mechanism for overturning the result of this referendum.”

Mr Maugham and others, however, argue that the “cheating” and “very substantial” Vote Leave overspending ruled upon by the Electoral Commission should oblige MPs to disregard the referendum result.

Mr Maugham said:

“The referendum should no longer be pretended to provide any mandate for Brexit. It is now up to MPs to do their jobs and ask themselves whether a referendum that took place against a background of Vote Leave cheating can safely be said to represent the will of the people.”

But he also admitted: “If MPs allow cheats to prosper then we don’t have any democracy left, but, ultimately, if that is what they are prepared to do, there is nothing I or any other lawyer can do about it.”

According to ‘The Code of Good Practice on Referendums’ issued by the Venice Commission, if the cap on spending is exceeded in a referendum by a significant amount, “the vote must be annulled.”

The Code, which is a non-binding guideline, was adopted by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission in 2006/2007.

The UK is a member of the Council of Europe and has signed up to the Venice Commission.

Their Code of Good Practice on Referendums states under clause 3.3. on referendum funding:

‘National rules on both public and private funding of political parties and election campaigns must be applicable to referendum campaigns.

‘As in the case of elections, funding must be transparent, particularly when it comes to campaign accounts.

‘In the event of a failure to abide by the statutory requirements, for instance if the cap on spending is exceeded by a significant margin, the vote must be annulled.

‘It should be pointed out that the principle of equality of opportunity applies to public funding; equality should be ensured between a proposal’s supporters and opponents.’

The Code is a guide only, and not legally binding.

However, it’s now becoming clearer by the day that the referendum campaign was seriously flawed.

There was significant overspending by both Vote Leave, and Leave.EU, that broke election law, in addition to allegations of criminality and data breaches.

And on top of all the lies and mistruths that the Leave campaigns had to rely upon to win the referendum, there are allegations of possible interference by Russia.

Anyone who believes in democracy, whether a Leave or Remain supporter, should now be seriously concerned about the validity of the result of the EU referendum of 23 June 2016.

________________________________________________________

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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The post The EU referendum must be annulled appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Pauline Ravinet ad Meng-Hsuan Chou

On 9 and 10 July 2018, Meng-Hsuan Chou (NTU Singapore) hosted three seminars on higher education issues at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Speaking on ‘What does comparative regionalism offer to higher education research?’, Pauline Ravinet (University of Lille) and Meng-Hsuan Chou introduced the concept of ‘higher education regionalism’, a heuristic framework to examine regional cooperation in the higher education policy domain, and empirically compared and analysed two instances of higher education regionalisms (Europe and Southeast Asia). In so doing, this talk engaged with and challenged the diffusion argument common in both European higher education studies and new comparative regionalism. The empirical case comparisons used publicly accessible documents from regional bodies active in higher education policy coordination, and more than 50 semi-structured interviews with key policy actors involved in these developments. Specifically, the empirical application identified and traced the policy ideas of European and Southeast Asia higher education regionalisms, and considered whether the extant models of regional cooperation and knowledge discourse affected their evolution. Their findings revealed that the so-called ‘Bologna Process export thesis’ and the diffusion assumptions of comparative regionalism were too simplistic and somewhat misleading. Indeed, they concluded that an interdependent perspective offered more traction to understanding the emergence and evolution of higher education intra- and inter-regionalisms.

 

Andrea Gideon and Meng-Hsuan Chou

In ‘What is the role of the EU in the global market for higher education and research?’, Andrea Gideon (University of Liverpool) and Meng-Hsuan Chou discussed the influences that the European Union (EU) exerts globally in the areas of research and higher education from political science and legal perspectives. At first glance, it is not obvious that a regional organisation would have any role beyond coordinative support in sensitive policy domains such as higher education and scientific research. However, they described how the EU has been playing a role since the very early years of integration; this role has been expanding since the 1990s with new initiatives being increasingly developed and centralised at the supranational level. They then discussed the emergence of a potential EU model with regards to higher education and research, and considered whether and how this model could be promoted and defended within and beyond the European territorial borders.

 

Jens Jungblut

Presenting on ‘What determines membership in meta-organisations? The case of higher education and the international association of universities’, Jens Jungblut (Stanford University / University of Oslo) identified what determined membership in the International Association of Universities (IAU) – the only global meta-organisation in higher education. Barriers to IAU membership are low and yet, at the same time, not all universities are members. Using multi-level regression analysis on data from the World Higher Education Database, he tested multiple predictors. The findings suggested that younger private institutions from peripheral areas and those with high status ranks were more likely to be IAU members. International offices, membership in regional university associations and international curricula were also strong predictors, which suggest that members are of a particular type—the internationally-oriented university. He concluded that meta-organisational membership is a complex process involving multiple factors, while being conditioned by the degree of fragmentation and stratification in an organisational field.

 

The post Higher education: regional, global and international appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The argument should not be about whether there should be a hard Brexit or a soft Brexit, because Brexit is a fraud and the loss of EU membership for the United Kingdom will mean not only that the country is disconnected from Europe, but also the rest of the world. Likewise it will mean loss of environmental, consumer, and worker protections in the UK, and also loss of the freedom for British citizens to easily travel, live and work in an EU member state. Australia will probably have a far better trade deal with the EU than the UK after Brexit, so why should the UK as a former EU member state on its own get preferential treatment? Brexit is a coup against civilization and the British citizens themselves will lose most of their rights as a result of it.

With regard to the Brexit fraud and the lies peddled to the British public during the EU referendum of 2016 – eg: £350 million would go to the NHS per week once the UK leaves the EU – it is worth making a comparision with a dodgy sales company making cold calls to an elderly relative. Your elderly relative or relatives – perhaps your parents or grandparents – are being told by a charismatic salesman, or perhaps grandad has been targeted by a charismatic saleswoman, that they have just won £350,000. The charming sales person says that they are unable to pay your elderly relative the prize money immediately, but will get back to them in the near future. When they get back to your elderly relative they say that the prize money cannot be paid by cheque, but requires not just the grandparent’s sort code and account number, but also the debit card number and the security number on the back of the card.

You have tried to persuade your elderly relative that they have been approached by fraudsters, but granny or grandad just won’t believe you, because they have been blinded to reason by a spiv or dodgy sales person. You realize that once your relative gives their bank card number and security code to the individual at the other end of the phone, instead of receiving a prize payment of £350, 000, they will have their life savings taken out of their bank account. In these circumstances it is your duty to tell your relatives that they have been the victims of of confidence trick.

For Brexiteers the result of the 2016 EU referendum is written in stone: 52 percent of those who voted in the referendum, voted for the UK to leave the EU, therefore according to the Brexiteers the “will of the people must be followed”. But if the people have not made an informed choice, then the result of the referendum cannot be “the will of the people”. When people voted for the UK to leave the European Union it was similar to the elderly relative who gives their bank card details to the fraudster at the other end of the phone line. They believed they would get a prize, but in reality all they would get is loss and misery.

©Jolyon Gumbrell 2018

The post Deconstructing the Brexit fraud appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

More of Britain’s exports and imports go to and come from the EU Single Market than any other area in the world. It’s our most important, most lucrative, most vital international market for transacting business, upon which our country’s wealth depends.

Nearly half of our exports go to the EU Single Market, and just over half of our imports come from the EU Single Market. Nowhere else in the world comes anywhere close to that. Nowhere else in the world can get anywhere close to that.

① Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership so we can trade with the rest of the world. But that’s nonsense.

We trade with the rest of the world now. The EU does not stop us.

② Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership because other areas in the world are growing faster than the EU. But that’s nonsense.

We trade now with faster growing economies. The EU does not stop us.

③ Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership so that we can strike our own trade deals with other countries. But that’s nonsense. 

Through the EU, we benefit from the best trade deals, because the EU as a club of 28 countries has the size, the muscle and the clout to negotiate the best trade deals for its members.

On its own, the UK won’t be able to strike deals anywhere near as good as, let alone better than, the ones we already have now through the EU. It will take us many years to replace excellent EU trade agreements with inferior ones.

④ Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership because we don’t need free movement of goods, services and capital across the EU. But that’s nonsense. 

Easy, borderless, tariff-free trade across our continent is vital for British businesses and British jobs. If we lose frictionless access to our biggest and best customers and suppliers across our continent, our economy will seriously suffer.

⑤ Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership because they particularly don’t like free movement of people. But that’s nonsense. 

Without free movement of people across the EU’s Single Market, our services industry, upon which 80% of the UK’s economy depends, will slump.

Without free movement of people, British businesses will lose easy access to workers across our continent, to do the jobs that Britain simply doesn’t have enough Britons to do.

What’s more, our workers will lose easy access to the world’s biggest and best jobs market. And Britons will lose the right to live in other countries across the EU on preferential terms.

⑥ Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership because they don’t like EU rules that govern trade across the EU. But that’s nonsense. 

Without a common rule book covering safety, quality, guaranteed standards and business practices, chaos would ensue between businesses across our continent. Vital protections of workers and consumers in Europe would be lost. The safety of our continent’s people and environment would be put in jeopardy.

⑦ Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership because they want the UK to make its own laws and rules. But that’s nonsense. 

Most laws for our country are already made in our country.

But rules and laws covering how we transact business across our continent need to be agreed by countries across our continent.

In the EU, the UK has a say and votes on those rules and laws. Outside the EU, we’ll have no say and no votes on those rules and laws, but we’ll still be subject to them, and just as affected by them. 

CONSIDER THIS: The UK currently benefits from two single markets. Our country’s single market. And our continent’s single market. They both operate in the same way and on the same principles.

Free movement of people, goods, services and capital between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland form the basis of our union of the four countries of the United Kingdom. It’s our single market. It’s the glue that keeps us together.

Enabling people, goods, services and money to move without borders or restrictions across the United Kingdom is what makes us a functioning unity. It’s helped to make the UK one of the world’s richest and most successful countries, with common standards, values and history.

Free movement of people, goods, services and capital work together. They cannot be separated without causing discord and disorder across our nation.

Mess with just one of the four freedoms and our union of the UK would come undone. Not only business and employment would be affected, but peace and stability would be put at risk if we could not have the freedom to move, to do business, to trade, to send money, without friction, across and between our four countries of the UK.

It’s the same with EU. The EU functions as a cohesive single market of 28 countries, just as the UK functions as a cohesive single market of four counties. 

The EU Single Market is the glue that keeps European nations together. It has helped to make Europe the richest and most successful continent on the planet, with common standards, values and history.

The UK’s Single Market, and the EU’s Single Market, both represent significant achievements. They work. 

But there’s one vital difference.

Free trade between the four countries of the UK is vital to our smooth functioning as a nation. But doing business with each other doesn’t make the UK significantly richer.

To do that, we need the UK to export our goods and services (and we export far more services than goods).

Doing frictionless trade with other EU countries makes Britain richer. Exports to the EU bring us prosperity. 

If we lose borderless, lowest-cost trade with our most important customers and suppliers right on our doorstop, Britain – and Britons – will be poorer.

Our exports to the rest of Europe bring us wealth. Yes, exports to countries outside the EU also bring us wealth.

We need both. In the EU, we have both.

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• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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Britain needs the EU Single Market

→ Why leave & lose when we can stay & win? – Please shareBRITAIN NEEDS THE EU SINGLE MARKET – VIDEO & ARTICLEBy far, more of Britain’s exports and imports go to and come from the EU Single Market than any other area in the world. It’s our most important, most lucrative, most vital area for transacting business, upon which our country’s wealth depends.Nearly half of our exports go to the EU Single Market, and just over half of our imports come from the EU Single Market. Nowhere else in the world comes anywhere close to that. Nowhere else in the world can get anywhere close to that.① Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership so we can trade with the rest of the world. But that’s nonsense. We trade with the rest of the world now. The EU does not stop us. ② Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership because other areas in the world are growing faster than the EU. But that’s nonsense. We trade now with faster growing economies. The EU does not stop us.③ Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership so that we can strike our own trade deals with other countries. But that’s nonsense. Through the EU, we benefit from the best trade deals, because the EU as a club of 28 countries has the size, the muscle and the clout to negotiate the best trade deals for its members.On its own, the UK won’t be able to strike deals anywhere near as good as, let alone better than, the ones we already have now through the EU. It will take us many years to replace excellent EU trade agreements with inferior ones. ④ Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership because we don’t need free movement of goods, services and capital across the EU. But that’s nonsense. Easy, borderless, tariff-free trade across our continent is vital for British businesses and British jobs. If we lose frictionless access to our biggest and best customers and suppliers across our continent, our economy will seriously suffer. ⑤ Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership because they particularly don’t like free movement of people. But that’s nonsense. Without free movement of people across the EU’s Single Market, our services industry, upon which 80% of the UK’s economy depends, will slump. Without free movement of people, British businesses will lose easy access to workers across our continent, to do the jobs that Britain simply doesn’t have enough Britons to do. What’s more, our workers will lose easy access to the world’s biggest and best jobs market. And Britons will lose the right to live in other countries across the EU on preferential terms. ⑥ Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership because they don’t like EU rules that govern trade across the EU. But that’s nonsense. Without a common rule book covering safety, quality, guaranteed standards and business practices, chaos would ensue between businesses across our continent. Vital protections of workers and consumers in Europe would be lost. The safety of our continent’s people and environment would be put in jeopardy. ⑦ Brexiters claim we should abandon EU membership because they want the UK to make its own laws and rules. But that’s nonsense. Most laws for our country are already made in our country. But rules and laws covering how we transact business across our continent need to be agreed by countries across our continent. In the EU, the UK has a say and votes on those rules and laws. Outside the EU, we’ll have no say and no votes on those rules and laws, but we’ll still be subject to them, and just as affected by them. CONSIDER THIS:The UK currently benefits from two single markets. Our country’s single market. And our continent’s single market. They both operate in the same way and on the same principles.Free movement of people, goods, services and capital between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland form the basis of our union of the four countries of the United Kingdom. It’s our single market. It’s the glue that keeps us together.Enabling people, goods, services and money to move without borders or restrictions across the United Kingdom is what makes us a functioning unity. It’s helped to make the UK one of the world’s richest and most successful countries, with common standards, values and history.Free movement of people, goods, services and capital work together. They cannot be separated without causing discord and disorder across our nation.Mess with just one of the four freedoms and our union of the UK would come undone. Not only business and employment would be affected, but peace and stability would be put at risk if we could not have the freedom to move, to do business, to trade, to send money, without friction, across and between our four countries of the UK.It’s the same with EU. The EU functions as a cohesive single market of 28 countries, just as the UK functions as a cohesive single market of four counties. The EU Single Market is the glue that keeps European nations together. It has helped to make Europe the richest and most successful continent on the planet, with common standards, values and history. The UK’s Single Market, and the EU’s Single Market, both represent significant achievements. They work. But there’s one vital difference.Free trade between the four countries of the UK is vital to our smooth functioning as a nation. But doing business with each other doesn’t make the UK significantly richer. To do that, we need the UK to export our goods and services (and we export far more services than goods).Doing frictionless trade with other EU countries makes Britain richer. Exports to the EU bring us prosperity. If we lose borderless, lowest-cost trade with our most important customers and suppliers right on our doorstop, Britain – and Britons – will be poorer. Our exports to the rest of Europe bring us wealth. Yes, exports to countries outside the EU also bring us wealth. We need both. In the EU, we have both. • Words and video compilation by Jon Danzig. Video by the European Parliament.• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter.twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1017491541949059073********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. Instructions to ensure you get notifications of all our stories:1. Click on the ‘Following’ button under the Reasons2Remain banner2. Change the ‘Default’ setting by clicking ‘See first’.********************************************• Please rate Reasons2Remain out of 5 stars. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Thursday, 12 July 2018

The post Britain needs the EU Single Market – article and video appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

You do what you can, but that doesn’t mean success

At times this week it’s been hard to tell whether the flapping sound one can hear is that of England trying to avoid the build-up of excessive expectations, or of hard Brexiters fanning the flames of their ire.*

Since Friday’s Chequers meeting, numerous individuals have been working themselves up into states of apoplexy about things that have been rather self-evident for many months.

Probably the most emblematic comment came from Maria Caulfield in an interview with her local radio station yesterday, where she announced that a key reason for resigning as Vice-Chair of the Conservatives was that it has become apparent that Chequers was not the final deal, but merely a gambit in the Article 50 negotiations.

Given that no one had pretended otherwise, the biggest question is why this took four days to filter through.

Since I continue to dislike explanations that centre on stupidity, the best argument is that Caulfield’s move was part of a bigger programme of resistance within the party.

My view is that David Davis’ resignation on Monday wasn’t part of that resistance, at least not in the sense of being coordinated. He’d waited over the weekend, to allow many Cabinet colleagues to dip their hands in the blood of the deal, via op-eds and interviews, and his media activity on the day pointed to a desire to limit damage, be positioning himself as unable to support a deal that had Cabinet support.

If he’d really wanted to go to town on this, then he’d have walked down the Chequers driveway on Friday and stuck multiple knives into May, right there.

For Davis, this was probably the last realistic moment from him to step aside on a principled basis, given the apparent direction of travel: the explicit reaffirmation of collective responsibility on Friday was just as important as the text itself.

Once Davis left, Johnson had to make a quick decision about whether to follow. As many noted at the time, he wouldn’t look great whatever he chose (stay and look weak-willed; leave and look opportunistic), but given that his diminished base rests on his triumph in the referendum, departure was always going to be on the cards.

For now, Johnson is keeping his powder dry – either for today’s White Paper, or for a longer-term assault from the backbench later in the year, a la Churchill [sic] – which has meant that immediate scope for further Cabinet resignations is minimal, especially with Fox being brought onside with vague commitments on his department having a purpose.

Indeed, this week has underlined the strength and the weakness of resigning. If you play it right (think Howe), then you can make a huge impact; play it wrong and nothing really happens, except you’re now on the outside.

With Cabinet more locked down, attention moved to other positions of responsibility: this was the point where Caulfield and Ben Bradley moved to hand in their notices. That played to the internal party gallery, but outside has been of minimal interest. Plus, you can only resign once, so this was never going to be a long-term strategy.

Instead, the focus has now moved once more to where the hard Brexit grouping has most power: the chamber.

Last night saw the coordination of Tory and Labour MPs to move amendments to the Customs Bill. The aim is to find language that Labour will find attractive enough to support together with Tory rebels** that would either severely limit or even collapse the Chequers model.

While this approach has the merit of a more substantial base, it runs into several problems.

The first is that Labour might not play ball. The party’s position on whether or not to support the government through Article 50 changes daily, so it would be a foolish politician that sought to put any great stock in any one of those positions.

Secondly, defeat might simply underline the limits to hard Brexiters’ power within the Commons, and even within the Conservatives. Failure on this front of the campaign might risk exposing the ERG as a paper tiger.

And finally, even if successful, the effect of the amendments might be different to that intended. Kate Hoey’s amendment to prohibit any border in the Irish Sea might be meant to stop the backstop arrangements applying across the entire UK, but it also opens a door to a much softer form of Brexit based around an EEA model. Which isn’t what she wants.

All of this is symptomatic of where we now are in the Article 50 process.

The difficult decisions and compromises that have very obviously been needed are now actually starting to be made: that’s why some of the noises off this week have been so heart-felt. May’s approach of ambiguity and vagueness had some value in keeping people on-board, but ultimately it had to see some resolution down to a more fixed and partisan structure, not least because that will be essential in getting to an agreement within Article 50.

Thus today’s White Paper will be essential in that move.

And there is no doubt that we will hear much more flapping in the days to come.

* Flames of Ire will be the name of my death metal band, by the way, when I get around to setting one up.

** Not the same kind of rebels so bitterly castigated by hard Brexiters last time around, when they worked with Labour on amendments to the Withdrawal Bill.

The post It’s coming home to roost appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Every day Brexiters tell us Remainers that we are undermining democracy by campaigning to reverse Brexit.

‘Are you going to campaign until you get the result you want?’ they ask us, with disdain.

‘Yes,’ is our answer. ‘That’s how democracy works.’

Our aim is not to undermine democracy, but to use the democratic process to achieve the change we seek, which is a reversal of Brexit.

What many don’t seem to understand is that any vote in a democracy can be undone by a new vote.

That’s always how our democracy has worked.

In a democracy, no result is permanently binding, as any democratic decision can be undone by a new democratic decision. If that were not the case, it would not be a democracy.

In a democracy, we can campaign for whatever we believe in, even after losing a vote.

That’s always how our democracy has worked.

But we can only ever win if the majority agrees with us at the next democratic opportunity to cast a vote.

That’s always how our democracy has worked.

So, we are campaigning for a new and legitimate democratic opportunity to reconsider our membership of the European Union.

After all, that’s exactly what ardent Eurosceptics campaigned for immediately after the first referendum in 1975, which voted for Britain to remain a member of the European Community.

Eurosceptics didn’t like that result, and wanted to reverse it in a new referendum.

If they could campaign for a new referendum, why can’t we?

It took Eurosceptics 40 years to win their ‘next referendum’. So, some Brexiters say, Remainers will have to wait just as long to get our ‘next referendum’. But that’s not comparing like with like.

The 1975 referendum resulted in an enormous margin of 34.5% for remaining a member of the European Community – a truly decisive result. There was no mass campaign or mainstream call for another referendum for most of the next 40 years of our membership that followed.

But that hasn’t been the same for the 2016 referendum, when the margin for leaving the European Community was a meagre 3.8% – a truly divisive result.

Two years later, we still haven’t left the EU, and voters across the country increasingly believe that Brexit is a mistake. Polls show that around 2,500 Leave voters are changing their minds every day.

And unlike after the 1975 referendum, there is now a mass campaign and mainstream call for another referendum on Brexit, to take place before it actually happens.

A recent poll by Survation showed that 48 per cent of voters want a new referendum on the final Brexit deal, compared with just 25% who disagree.

The poll also indicated that over a third of Leave voters now want another referendum.

There is nothing undemocratic about having a new vote on Brexit when we know the actual details of Brexit. Another vote on Brexit means more democracy, not less.

Why are so many Brexiters apparently wary of a new vote on Brexit? For how long can they rely on a vote that took place over two years ago, and which poll after poll now indicates no longer represents today’s ‘will of the people’?

If the final details of Brexit are so good, and better than our continued membership of the EU, then Britain will surely vote for it. What have Brexiters got to worry about?

But if Brexiters have so little confidence in Brexit that they dare not let ‘the people’ have any further say about it, we should all be suspicious.

Then, we can say, it’s not us, but them, who are undermining democracy.

Nobody knew what Brexit meant in the referendum, and we still don’t know. Not even our government can agree what Brexit means, and this week several Cabinet members resigned because they disagree with the latest proposals for Brexit.

Brexit is not yet agreed. And nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. So, nothing is agreed. Brexit is not yet a done deal.

Only those who are against democracy disagree. And only those who are against the democratic process want us to stop campaigning for what we believe in.

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The resignations of Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, and Brexit Secretary, David Davis, along with other government ministers, show that there is no real consensus on what Brexit means.

There is a jagged oozing fissure right through the Conservative government and party, just as there is across the country, because Brexit is as enigmatic as ever.

And if the politicians, and the country, can’t agree on what Brexit means today, then how could voters have known what it meant in the referendum of over two years ago?

So, here’s the simple truth: Nobody gave ‘informed consent’ for Brexit. They could not have done, because in the 2016 referendum, nobody was sufficiently informed about Brexit.

On the contrary, the country was entirely misinformed.

There was no blueprint, plan, proposal or manifesto for Brexit. Just a lot of fairy-tale claims and promises that have all turned out to be false.

If the details of Brexit had been agreed, we’d have voted on those details on 23 June 2016. But we didn’t have any details.

Over two years later, Theresa May can pretend there is harmony in her Cabinet on the type of Brexit Britain will get, but even as she speaks, it’s all falling apart.

How can anyone claim that the country knew what it was voting for in June 2016 when it’s taken until July 2018 for the government to work out a plan for Brexit?

And then for that plan to result in Cabinet resignations, because that’s not the Brexit they had in mind?

And then for that Brexit plan to be undeliverable – because the plan relies on the EU allowing Britain to break its own rules, which they won’t do. Why should they?

Brexit is entirely undeliverable. It was never anything more than an illusion.

It appealed to people who were fed-up with a host of issues, that had nothing to do with the EU, but it seemed that Brexit was the magic word that could fix everything.

But Brexit won’t fix anything. It will break us apart. It is already.

The government keeps going with their daft Brexit plans because they say that’s the will of the people. They think that’s what Britain wants.

But that’s an illusion too. Britain – and Britons – don’t want this. How could this mess be the will of anyone?

We are witnessing our country being dismantled, destroyed, and our international reputation disintegrated.

Nobody can want this.

Nobody would have voted for this if they had known the truth two years ago.

More and more of us can see that Brexit has no clothes. It stands naked, forlorn and shivering before us, dying and gasping for breath, with nothing to offer the nation but years and decades of misery.

If our political masters are truly interested in ‘the will of the people’ they should have no hesitation in asking us what is our will today.

They dare not because they know our answer would be: bury Brexit now.

We want our country back pre-23 June 2016. It wasn’t so bad after all.

And we want our continent back. Europe is where we belong. At the centre, in the heart of it, and not languishing on the periphery.

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The post It’s time to bury Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

First published by UK in a Changing Europe, 27 June 2018

Downing Street, Westminster, London

In the classic American musical, Guys and Dolls, the cast sang the praises of Nathan Detroit, the man who ran The Oldest Established Floating Crap Game in the City of New York. The game produced winners and losers with one exception: Nathan Detroit was always a winner. As long as, that is, he could keep the crap game going.

Faced with a choice between splitting her Cabinet into winners and losers, Theresa May has sought to keep the Brexit crap game going. She does this by avoiding betting on either a hard or soft Brexit.

The cost of doing so has been a steady reduction in her political capital, which has been spent in buying off her divided Cabinet ministers. This has involved issuing ambiguous statements that each side can then interpret as giving them what they want.

The Prime Minister’s strategy can work if both sides are willing to keep playing the Westminster game, in the hopes that in the end they can walk away with a lion’s share of the Brexit stakes. If she took the dice away now, the stakes would change. With Number 10 at stake, knives would come out for a street fight. Back-stabbing would end and she would face a full-frontal challenge of a confidence vote by Tory MPs.

The Prime Minister cannot emulate Nathan Detroit by keeping her Brexit game going by floating from one side to the other. Nathan Detroit could do so because of the readiness of New York City police to take his weekly pay-off in return for letting him break anti-gambling laws.

Michel Barnier is the opposite of a New York City street-corner cop. His job is to enforce EU laws that put a strict time limit on the current Westminster crap game. Article 50 stipulates that two years after a national government notifies its intention to withdraw, it will cease to be a member-state.

When Theresa May triggered Article 50, March 29 became the date at which the UK ceases to be a member of the European Union. Doing so mollified pro-Brexit Tory MPs distrustful of her position because she had bet her Cabinet post under David Cameron by voting to remain in the EU.

In the months ahead Theresa May will have to wager her political future, not to mention the future of the United Kingdom, by playing by the EU’s rules in the Brexit negotiations. These offer a very limited choice of alternatives. The soft Brexit option, chosen by Norway and Switzerland, would give the UK customs and single-market benefits. However, it would require the UK to make financial contributions to the EU budget and accept EU rules regulating markets and enforced by the European Court of Justice without a voice and vote in deciding what these rules are.

This is consistent with the EU’s political decision that a state that withdraws must suffer a net loss in benefits. Rather than, in Boris Johnson’s word, having its cake and eating it too.
Hard Brexiters denounce EU terms on offer as vassalage. Theresa May has been keeping her Westminster crap game going by proposing measures that the EU has rejected as violating its red-line conditions for relations with non-member states. If no agreement can be reached on post-Brexit relations, the alternative is no deal.

This is acceptable to the EU and to the hardest of hardline Tory Brexiters but no deal is feared by enough Tory MPs to threaten defeat in the House of Commons.
At the beginning of October the EU will play the role of a tough cop. It will blow a whistle warning that the current Westminster crap game will have to end in less than six months time.

At this point, Theresa May will have to stake her political future by betting on one form of Brexit. A soft Brexit choice would keep some of the economic benefits that member states enjoy in exchange for political conditions that the EU will accept. This is sure to start a bloody knife fight with hard Brexiters and only gain parliamentary endorsement if enough MPs think that the conditions are a lesser evil. .

The alternative is no deal. This will scatter MPs, businesses, and foreign residents to look after themselves. The crap game that Theresa May has been playing will be replaced by a kind of Alice in Wonderland Caucus race. But instead of everyone who plays having prizes, everyone involved would have losses, and the finger of blame will point straight at the Prime Minister.

By Professor Richard Rose FBA, Professor of politics at University of Strathclyde.

The post Can Theresa May keep her Brexit crap game going indefinitely? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

maybe ‘train driver’ instead?

Perhaps the most infuriating questions to ask a young child is “what you do what to be, when you grow up?” Well, I found it infuriating, at least.

The question supposed that you knew what the options might – did I even know that ‘social media pundit’* was a thing back then? – and that you cared in any case: why do I need to set a goal now, when I’d rather be getting back to Top of the Pops (more innocent times, certainly)?

This might explain why my kids are currently offering ‘shark investigator’ and ‘ummm’ as their responses, when asked by others.

To generalise massively from this, forward planning is one of those things we know is probably important, but also a drag. That’s as true for politicians as it is for children (insert punchline here).

It’s even more true for organisations, because not only do you have to be bothered, but you also have to organise others to be bothered and then to do something about it. The burden-sharing that organisation brings is partly offset by the motivational aspect, especially when it’s something quite nebulous.

And Brexit is nothing if not nebulous. It requires not only an idea of what you want from a Withdrawal Agreement, but also what you want from a future relationship with the EU, and also what you want the UK to look like as a society and as a member of the international community.

‘Shark investigator’ is sounding a bit more appealing now, right?

None of this is to excuse the chronic inability of the Conservative party to settle on a course of action for Brexit, but rather to provide some context: any governing party would have faced the same difficulties and hard choices.

But as the Cabinet packs their bags for a weekend at Chequers, it’s helpful to consider how Theresa May has decided to tackle this challenge, both generally and specifically.

The first key point is that May’s general mode of making decisions is to keep things tight. As those of you who’ve read Tim Shipman’s excellent volumes All Out War and Fall Out will know, both in the Home Office and Number 10, May has tended to discuss matters with a few key advisors and then tell everyone else what’s happening. The merits and demerits are neither here nor there, but her success in her former role has evidently made it harder to adapt it to her current one.

In particular, May’s relative weight in decision-making is less now than it was pre-Premiership, especially since the 2017 General Election: the weight of the Cabinet sits relatively distinctively away from her own tendencies.

And those tendencies have been a mix of a more instinctive soft Brexit with a pragmatic desire to hold the party together, which points in a harder direction. Given where we are on policy, this suggests that party unity is the priority issue, even if opportunities to soften are pursued regularly. That the EU is also a source of softening provides a degree of cover on this.

Ultimately, that has tended to make May conflict-averse to a degree. Whereas her more general model has been to decide-and-stick, on Brexit issues she has hedged her language from her first days in office, to avoid having to collapse ambiguities and compromises that have enabled the party to stick with the programme.

All of which suggests that Chequers will not be a big break-through moment for the process.

It’s important to note here that one key strategy that May has employed in her management has been to avoid some issues (typically the more pressing ones), and focused on others. The customs arrangements is a case in point: it can only ever be a small part of a future deal, but it has occupied minds in London for many months, apparently much more than the question of the Irish dimension.

As I’ve discussed before, this is partly because customs has become a proxy for other battles about hard-/softness, but also it’s because by resolving a position on customs (which is less ‘high politics’ than borders) it is then possible to work backwards to a position on, well, borders. The fundamental interlinkage between domains in Brexit means that decisions in any one part can and will shape decisions elsewhere: that’s one reason why progress has been so hard, as those linkages become clearer and doubts are sown.

However, even if Chequers can produce a consensus around a model for customs, that will not immediately resolve the Irish dimension, which is now the very large elephant in the room: unless and until that can be addressed, there will be no customs arrangements of any kind, because there won’t be a Withdrawal Agreement or a political declaration on the future relationship.

That everyone knows this suggests one of two things.

Either London thinks that Brussels (and Dublin) is biddable on the Irish dimension, despite absolutely no objective evidence to support this: it is a hill the Commission and European Council appear fully prepared to die on.

The alternative is that there is a move to reframe the issue, in part by using the customs debate.

A recurring theme that is emerging from the debate within the Tories is that none of the exciting options can be ready for the end of 2020. That means there’s a gap between then and the implementation of whatever model it is, and no one is making a very hard bid on what that gap should look like.

Put differently, Tories seem to be arguing about the long future rather than the near one: they’ll accept some form of high alignment in return for political commitment to future jam. Given the generally low levels of trust in the political class, and the rifeness of backstabbing, this seems rather optimistic to me, but then I’m just the dad of someone who wants to be a ‘shark investigator’.

This might work, but as so often with the British debate, it’s an idea that’s driven much more by a concern about domestic politics than by an understanding of how the EU works.

If Chequers is to be a credible step forward, then it has to work not only for Tory ministers, but also the country as a whole and for the EU. Manage that and maybe we’ll all have grown up a bit.

 

*For any senior management reading this, this is internet slang for “high impact academic with world-leading research”. Trust me.

The post The Conservative mode of making Brexit decisions appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Ten days after the win for Leave in the EU referendum, Remainers were in a state of shock. And we still are.

On 3 July 2016, I published an article called, ‘What next?’

I wrote then:

‘Nobody knows what will happen next, not even those who so strongly campaigned for Brexit.

‘We now know they didn’t – and don’t – have a plan, except to leave the European Union, but precisely on what terms, nobody seems to have a clue.’

And the shameful thing is that we still don’t have a clue. Some two years after the referendum result, nobody knows what Brexit means.

During the referendum, nobody knew, let alone discussed:

How a borderless border on the island of Ireland could be achieved after Brexit.

How our car manufacturers, over half of whose exports go to the EU, will be able to continue to have frictionless access to the Single Market, especially as up to 90% of car parts needed to make our cars come from the rest of Europe.

What would be the status after Brexit of citizens living here from the rest of the EU, and our citizens living in the rest of the EU.

The fact that without a free trade agreement with the EU, our imported food, most of which comes from the EU, would cost more.

Which other countries the UK would be able to establish free trade agreements with, since after Brexit all our existing trade agreements with the rest of the world would have to be torn up.

None of the voters knew the answers in the referendum, and we still don’t know.

Not even our government ministers today can agree with each other how these issues (and thousands of others) will be resolved.

So, how could the voting public have known in the referendum?

The fact is that voters did not know what they were voting for in the referendum.

We still don’t know what Brexit means. When we do know, let’s vote on that (for the very first time).

In the meantime, here’s my article published on 3 July 2016 – ten days after the referendum.

WHAT NEXT? The unexpected has happened: Leave won, and now everything is uncertain.

Suddenly, the country and our futures have been plunged into the dark. Nobody knows what will happen next, not even those who so strongly campaigned for Brexit.

We now know they didn’t – and don’t – have a plan, except to leave the European Union, but precisely on what terms, nobody seems to have a clue.

The government and the opposition are torn apart.

We now have no one effectively running the country. Politicians are betraying each other in a scramble to lead us, but to where we simply have no notion.

The country is also torn apart.

What else could be expected from such a wafer thin majority for the ‘Leave’ win? Scotland and Northern Ireland don’t want to leave the European Union; nor do important cities such as London, Cambridge and Norwich.

Many other towns and cities voted half in, and half out.

The referendum wasn’t even legally binding. It was meant only as advisory, with Parliament taking the final decision.

But what will be Parliament’s decision? We don’t know, except to say that given a free vote, Parliament would overwhelmingly opt for Britain to remain in the EU.

It’s only just over a week after the Brexit decision and the country is in turmoil, with uncertainty and confusion set to be on the agenda for years to come.

It will take several years to extricate the country from the EU in what looks to be a messy, uncomfortable and complicated divorce.

And it could take many more years for Britain to stabilise and find the way ahead.

Negotiating new trading agreements with over 50 countries will take considerable time; so will amending our laws of the past 40 years that are intrinsically connected to our membership of the EU.

It will be a long time before we will have any measure of whether the years of upheaval now facing the country will eventually give us any prize worth having. Many reading this may not live long enough to see the outcome.

If Parliament had meant for the Referendum result to be binding, they would surely have raised the threshold for changing the status quo.

After all, a two-thirds majority is usually required for constitutional changes in many countries across the world.

A motion in our Parliament calling for an early General Election requires a two-thirds majority to be successful – and the calculation is based on two-thirds of all MPs, whether they vote or not.

On that basis, the Referendum result fell far short.

Many of those who voted ‘Leave’ have now changed their minds; they have expressed shock and bewilderment at the crisis the Brexit vote has triggered.

Many are now angry, in the growing realisation, that the claims and promises made by the ‘Leave’ campaign were entirely untrue and completely undeliverable.

Yesterday over 50,000 people marched in London to express their protest at the Brexit decision. And over 4 million people have signed a petition requesting another referendum.

But there are also many who remain resolute that Brexit is the right route for Britain, and they relish ‘getting back their country’ and ‘taking control’.

Others of us are still mystified as to what that really means – we miss the country we now seem to have lost, and we fear for who now is going to take control.

Anything could happen next.

There could be an early General Election if Parliament so deems it. The LibDems have pledged to make staying in the EU, or re-joining, their manifesto promise. Would that make any difference?

Parliament might vote against the Referendum decision – but what would that do to peace in our country?

The Referendum result might be legally challenged.

Scotland might attempt to leave the UK so that it can re-join the EU.

 There might be another referendum in a few years on whether we actually accept the EU divorce settlement or, on reflection, prefer to remain a member.

Or we might all have to buckle down and accept that we are on an unstoppable course to Brexit, regardless of the fact that around half of those who voted (maybe more now), and a majority of our Parliamentarians, don’t want that to happen.

Over the past three months at Reasons2Remain, a team of hard-working, highly-dedicated volunteers have produced a series of articles and graphics giving rational and reasoned arguments for Britain to stay in the EU. (See our illustrated portfolio.)

I’d like to warmly thank everyone for their generous support and help for this Community page, which I know from many readers comments has been highly regarded and appreciated.

There now needs to be a short period of reflection whilst we take stock and decide what next with our campaign.

________________________________________________________

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It was 90 years ago, on 2 July 1928, that women in Britain finally achieved equal voting rights with men. But it took almost 100 years of losing vote after vote before women won the right to vote.

Every day Brexiters tell Remainers, ‘You lost the referendum. That’s the end of the matter. Give up! Get over it!’

But in a democracy, losing a vote is never the end of the matter.

If women had given up the first time they lost a vote to get a vote, women would never have got a vote.

In Switzerland, women only got the vote in 1971.

In the UK, all women over 21 got the vote on 2 July 1928 – but only after many decades of campaigning.

If you lose a vote, you don’t just give up. You pick yourself up, and campaign to win the next vote, or the next vote, or the next vote, until hopefully you win.

Losing a vote is never a reason to stop campaigning for what you believe in.

In a democracy, losing a vote doesn’t mean losing the battle. You carry on. That’s how democracy works, because democracy is a journey, and not a one-off destination.

Or as the American civil rights advocate, William H. Hastie said:

‘Democracy is a process, not a static condition.’

Just look at the long journey through the ‘democratic process’ that was endured to achieve women’s suffrage in Britain:

1832 – Mary Smith presents the first petition for women’s suffrage to Parliament. But in the same year, the Great Reform Act confirms the exclusion of women from the vote.

1866 – The MP John Stuart Mill presents a petition for women’s suffrage to the Commons. It fails. Consequently, suffrage societies are started in Edinburgh, London and Manchester.

1867 – A Second Reform Bill petition from women is presented to Parliament by John Stuart Mill but it fails. The National Society for Women’s Suffrage is formed.

1881 – The Isle of Man grants votes to women.

 1884 – An amendment to the Third Reform Bill, to include women in the vote, is rejected.

1897 – The National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) is established, with over 20 societies across the country.

1903 – Emmeline Pankhurst, frustrated by the slow tactics of the NUWSS, forms the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) with her daughters Sylvia and Christabel.

 1905 – Militant campaigning begins. Christabel Pankhurst and Annie Kenney are arrested and imprisoned. “Deeds, not words” and “Votes for women” are the new campaign slogans.

 1906 – The Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and 400 of 670 MPs are in favour women’s suffrage. WSPU members are arrested and imprisoned. A daily newspaper coins the term “suffragette”.

1907 – The NUWSS organises a London march and more than 3,000 women take part. The WFL starts a paper called The Vote.

1908 – Around half a million suffragette activists attend a mass rally in Hyde Park. But the Liberal Prime Minister Herbert Asquith does not respond. So the protestors smash windows in Downing Street, using stones with written messages tied to them. Some protesters chain themselves to the railings.

1909 – The start of hunger strikes and forced-feeding. Scottish WSPU member Marion Wallace Dunlop becomes the first hunger striker. More and more militant WSPU members are imprisoned.

 1910 – The Conciliation Bill, which would give women the vote, succeeds in the Commons but Prime Minster, Herbert Asquith, doesn’t carry it through.

The WSPU starts protests, including those called “Black Friday” in which many women are hurt, some permanently and later fatally. There are allegations against the police of sexual abuse whilst women are in custody.

1911 – A new Conciliation Bill that would give women the vote passes, but is stalled by the general election.

1912 – The Parliamentary Franchise (Women) Bill is introduced and defeated by 222 votes to 208. In protest, there is a mass window-smashing campaign.

1913 – A ruling by the Commons Speaker destroys hopes of an amendment to include women in the Reform Bill. There are bomb and arson campaigns.

More arrests lead to the passing of the “Cat and Mouse” Act, under which hunger strikers are temporarily released but then rearrested to prevent them from dying in police custody.

Also in this year, Emily Wilding Davison, was arrested nine times and force-fed 49 times. She decides to draw attention to the suffrage cause and disrupt the Derby by stepping in front of the King’s horse Anmer.

Emily dies four days later of a skull fracture and other injuries. Her funeral is attended by thousands of women. Tens of thousands lined the streets of London as her coffin passed by.

1914 – Violent protests escalate. Suffragettes try to force their way into Buckingham Palace to petition the King.

1917 – The Electoral Reform Bill passes in the Commons. It gives votes to certain women only: those aged over 30, and those over 21 who own their own house or those married to householders.

 1918 – The Representation of the People Act is passed, allowing men over 21 and women over 30 to vote.

1919 – The first female MP, Nancy Astor, enters the Commons.

 1928 – Amendment of the Representation of the People Act entitles everyone over the age of 21 – men and women – to vote.

Women lost vote after vote to get a vote. But they didn’t give up.

Remain lost the 2016 referendum. We won’t give up.

Just before the EU referendum, Nigel Farage said that if the result was 52%-48%, it would mean ‘unfinished business’. He meant if the result was 52% for Remain.

As it turned out, it was just under 52% for Leave. But on this occasion, Farage was right.

This is unfinished business. It isn’t the end of the matter.

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Translation studies is increasingly expanding its disciplinary range. A volume I am editing together with my colleague Kayvan Tahmasebian, the Routledge Handbook of Translation and Activism, seeks to facilitate this expansion. This volume, which will be included in Routledge’s exciting series of handbooks on translation, will survey the state-of-the-art within translation studies, while opening the field to new domains of inquiry. We are particularly eager to include more contributions relating to the politics of language (in EU and other contexts). Scholars working on refugee rights, court interpretation, and other areas where translation advances social justice, are welcome to contribute.

Please see the CfP below and get in touch if you’d like to contribute!

CfP: Routledge Handbook of Translation and Activism

Rebecca Gould (University of Birmingham) and Kayvan Tahmasebian are seeking additional contributions to the Routledge Handbook of Translation and Activism. Confirmed contributions range across the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Although all regional foci are welcome, we particularly welcome contributions focusing on Central Asia, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and the Americas. In addition to translation studies and literary studies, we welcome contributions from anthropology, political science, and law; our focus is on translation in the broadest sense, and includes oral interpretation. Contributions from scholars, translators, writers, and creative practitioners are encouraged. We are particularly eager for contributions on political theory (Marx, Gramsci, Walter Benjamin, Fanon) in relation to translation and activism, as well as those addressing the following themes:

* Translators as activists

* Translators’ contributions to activism across multilingual divides

* Translating activist and political texts

* Translators as interpreters for refugees and in other immigration contexts

* Translation and political change in premodern, modern, and postmodern contexts (including the ‘Abbasid translation movement, the Mughal translation movement, the Soviet construction of world literature, etc.)

* Life-stories and insights from your experiences and struggles as a translator

* Manifestos for enabling activist agendas and social transformation within translation as a profession and translation studies as an academic discipline

* Case studies that reveal the relation between aesthetics and politics in a translational context

* Translation and revolution (in Cuba, the Soviet Union, Iran, Egypt, etc.; see the work of Mona Baker, Translating Dissent)

* Translation and Eurocentrism/overcoming racism/class-based prejudice and other social hierarchies.

* Other themes inspired by your reflections on translating and your work and life as a translator and scholar of texts in languages other than your native tongue.

Chapters (6000-8000 words) will ideally be completed by 2018 or early 2019 (and then entered into the peer-review process), with abstracts due during the summer of 2018. Please write to globalliterarytheory@gmail.com if you are interested in contributing. Although we will consider all proposals until the end of September please contact us as soon as you decide you are interested in contributing in order to discuss the focus of your contribution and to avoid overlap.

Contact Email:
globalliterarytheory@gmail.com

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Doctors have voted overwhelmingly to ‘oppose Brexit as a whole’ following a vote at the AGM of the British Medical Association, the trade union and professional association for doctors and medical students in the UK.

The medics said that leaving the EU is ‘bad for Britain’s health’ and endorsed a new public vote on the final Brexit deal.

The motion called on the BMA to ‘publicly announce that it is concerned that Brexit poses a major threat to the NHS and the nation’s health’, while supporting ‘open border arrangements with free movement of healthcare and medical research staff’.

Until now the BMA has adopted a neutral stance on Brexit. But after today’s debate, some 76% of representatives voted to remain in the single market, and 91% supported free movement of healthcare workers and research staff.

Following the vote, it will be BMA policy to ‘support the idea of the public having a final say on the Brexit deal, now that more is known regarding the potential impact of Brexit’.

The Royal College of Nursing and the Royal College of Midwives have already backed calls for the public to have a final say on Brexit.

Dr William Sapwell, who proposed the motion, said:

“The fact is that the government is woefully underprepared to ensure the United Kingdom’s health and wellbeing is secure in time for the self-imposed deadline of 29 March 2019. Brexit is bad for Britain’s health.

“Let’s put that on the side of a big red bus and once we have made that clear, the public should vote on the deal.”

He added that 7-10% of doctors working in the NHS are from the European Economic Area, and 40% of those have plans to leave “because of uncertainty about their immigration status and negative attitudes towards EU workers.”

Dr Sapwell told the conference said that many people were changing their minds about Brexit as the implications of the move became better known. He said:

“If a democracy can’t change its mind then it ceases to be a democracy, and isn’t it right that, as doctors, we inform the debate? After all, we believe in fully informed consent.”

Reasons2Remain has been running a poster campaign asserting that ‘informed consent’ was never given for Brexit, as the electorate was misinformed.

Dr David Strain said that 20% of NHS research and development funding came from European drug companies and a further 23% from European small enterprises.

“If we lose our parity with the European Clinical Trials Directive that money may disappear,” he said.

Dr John Chisholm, of the BMA’s medical ethics committee, told delegates Brexit was “a disastrous act of national self-harm”. He said the EU was better for the NHS, public health, research, science, universities, access to pharmaceuticals and international cooperation in research. He said:

“We need to speak out about the damage Brexit will do to our patients and to healthcare professionals.”

Dr Chandra Kanneganti, who sits on the BMA GP Committee, added, “We oppose what’s happening and we want a good deal to be part of the European Union because we appreciate the enormous contribution of the European healthcare workforce, who work in the NHS everyday.

“That’s the main reason we support this motion and I think we showed a strong message today as well, that the doctors across the NHS support our European colleagues.”

Dr Paul Williams, a GP and the Labour MP for Stockton South, told the Guardian that support for the motion was “a sign of the growing momentum behind the people’s vote campaign”.

He said nobody voting in the EU referendum wanted to harm the NHS but that Brexit was already causing severe problems in staff recruitment and retention.

Dr Williams added:

“Instead of the £350m a week for the NHS we were promised by the Brexiters, we have had cuts and closures as the NHS loses staff and struggles with budgets that are limited by the Brexit economic squeeze.

“If Brexit actually happens, it seems certain it will only make things worse – with new drug treatments, investment in research and sustainable funding all under threat.”

Responding to the BMA declaring support for the people to have the final say on the Brexit deal, Liberal Democrats Brexit Spokesperson Tom Brake said:

“The BMA’s decision to back a final say on the deal demonstrates the extent to which Brexit threatens our health service.

“With EU nurses and doctors leaving the UK, and an alarming 87% drop in the number of nurses and midwives joining the register from the EU, we are already witnessing the disastrous impact of Brexit on our overstretched health workforce.

“The NHS is our nation’s most treasured institution and it must be protected at all costs. The Tories are not only making a mess of Brexit but are now damaging the NHS. The Liberal Democrats are the only party offering a final say on the deal and an exit from Brexit.”

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The recent wave of government-sponsored referendums in Europe should be read in light of the upsurge of populist movements, argues Cecilia Sottilotta. Based on her recent article in JCER, she analyses the way in which the governments of Greece, Britain, Hungary and Italy strategically used referendums between 2015-2016, and debunks the political risk calculations. 

The Union Jack waves in front of Big Ben © Melinda Nagy / Adobe Stock

Greece in 2015, Britain, Hungary and Italy in 2016: government-sponsored referendums seem to be ubiquitous in today’s European politics.

This phenomenon is not particularly new in itself, as governments  have  often  used  referendums as tools to achieve specific political goals  in  both  democratic  and  non-democratic  regimes. What is new about the recent wave of government-sponsored referendums in Europe is that they have taken place in a polarised political climate characterised by an upsurge of populist parties.

Greece

During the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, Greece was in the eye of the hurricane. On 27 June 2015, after five months of fruitless negotiations with the country’s creditors, recently elected Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras called a consultative referendum, asking the Greek people ‘to rule on the blackmailing ultimatum’ imposed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund – the so-called ‘Troika’.

Once it found itself cornered during the financial bailout negotiations, the Greek government tried to strengthen its hand, performing a political risk calculation where the expected payoff would have been a stronger mandate to negotiate more favourable terms with the Troika. However, while the government’s calculation about the domestic dimension of the referendum was correct, and the 5 July vote undeniably reinforced the Prime Minister in his anti-austerity stance, the calculation about the ‘external’ effects of the referendum was not equally accurate. In fact, the position of the other negotiators was hardened rather than softened, in the face of the Greek government’s tactic.

The UK

In the case of the 23 June 2016 referendum held in the UK, the calculation behind Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron’s decision to offer an EU membership referendum was multifaceted. First and foremost, the promise of an in/out EU plebiscite was directly aimed at attracting the votes of UK Independence Party (UKIP) supporters in the 2015 general election.

Second, Cameron tried to make the looming referendum a bargaining chip with the EU, and the spectre of Brexit a ‘credible threat’, to extract concessions from his European counterparts in his renegotiation of the terms of Britain’s EU membership. Third, holding the referendum and placing himself at the head of the ‘Remain’ campaign were also ways for the Prime Minister to attempt to maintain his party’s and cabinet’s unity. The tensions and discontent within the Conservative party were epitomised by the defection of two Tory MPs to UKIP in 2014 and their subsequent returns to Westminster in by-elections, as well as by backbench rebellions.

Hungary

In  the wake of the 2015 ‘migrant crisis’,  the Council of the European Union approved a plan by qualified majority to gradually relocate 120,000 refugees from frontline member states Italy and Greece to other member states. The Hungarian government, led by right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, defiantly opposed the relocation plan and eventually succeeded in removing Hungary de facto from the scheme. Nevertheless, on 24 February 2016, Orbán called a referendum on the ‘compulsory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary’.

From the government’s standpoint, the obvious political gain, hypothetically, from a favourable outcome in the referendum – that was, a victory of the ‘No’ vote with a turnout exceeding 50 per cent of the electorate – would have been a strengthening of the ruling party’s position both domestically (vis-à-vis the radical right Jobbik party) and on the EU stage. On the other hand, the likelihood of a negative outcome was low, considering the relatively high level of anti-immigration sentiment in Hungary and the remarkable campaign efforts put in place by the government. The most likely worst-case scenario for the government was instead the possibility, which in fact did materialise, that the minimum 50 per cent turnout threshold would not be reached.

Italy

In February 2014, former Florence Mayor Matteo Renzi was appointed as Italy’s prime minister and formed a new government whose agenda hinged on structural reforms, including a new electoral law and new constitutional architecture. Nevertheless, the final text of the constitutional reform bill did not obtain the two-thirds majority necessary to avoid the possibility of a confirmatory referendum. A request to hold such a referendum in 2016 was filed not only by opposition MPs, but also majority MPs, confirming Renzi’s intention, expressed on multiple occasions, to submit the reform to a popular vote in any case.

Adopting an attitude reminiscent of de Gaulle’s plebiscitary understanding of referendums, Renzi repeatedly vowed that he would resign and abandon politics for good if the constitutional reform was rejected, effectively turning the referendum into a plebiscite on his administration as a whole. A victory for the ‘Yes’ vote would have consolidated Renzi’s leadership of the divided Democratic Party. It would have also represented a formidable political victory for the ruling coalition over the populist Five Star Movement, whose attacks against the ‘establishment’ embodied by the Renzi government typically rested on the claim that it lacked popular legitimacy. On the other hand, it was clear from the beginning that a negative outcome would have cost Renzi his premiership – a scenario which eventually materialised, after 59.1 per cent of participating voters rejected the government-sponsored constitutional reform on a 68.5 per cent turnout.

Referendums in European States

Different as these countries and their political systems are, the attempts by their executives to use referendums strategically indeed bear some similarities – the most striking of which is the ubiquitous involvement of anti-establishment parties and the role of populism as a discursive frame. In fact, the 2015 referendum in Greece was brought about by the leader of the anti-establishment ruling party. In Britain, Hungary and Italy, the ruling mainstream parties instead adjusted their positions to cater to voters supporting anti-establishment parties. Against the backdrop of increasing distrust in mainstream political parties and the recent trend toward populist decision-making in EU member states, the interplay between anti-establishment politics and resorting to referendums in consolidated democracies deserves more attention by scholars and policymakers.

This article is based on the author’s article in the Journal of Contemporary European Studies (JCER) Vol 13 No 4. 

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, JCER or UACES.

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Shortlink for this article: http://bit.ly/2lBCHxE

Cecilia Sottilotta | @csottilotta
American University of Rome (AUR)

Cecilia Emma Sottilotta is Assistant Professor of International Relations and Global Politics at the American University of Rome (AUR). Her research interests span themes such as political risk, including security issues, state-MNEs relations, trade, regionalism and development, and the current and future dynamics of European fiscal and monetary integration.

 

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The reality of Brexit is now sinking in fast.

But here’s the oddest thing. The UK government is negotiating to leave the EU, just so they can negotiate another arrangement with the EU to give us as much as possible of what we’ve already got, but on considerably inferior terms.

If we don’t get what we want (i.e. the EU benefits we desperately want back after we’ve left), the government has said it will crash out of the EU without any agreement, plunging Britain into deep economic crisis.

Does it make any sense? No, it doesn’t.

The EU is the world’s largest free trade area. As a member, we receive huge benefits worth enormously more than the net annual membership fee of £7.1 billion a year.

As a member, we enjoy free, frictionless trade with our biggest trading partner by far, right on our doorstep, where almost half of our exports go to and over half of our imports come from. Nowhere else in the world comes close to that.

The UK government is desperate to continue to enjoy similar membership benefits of frictionless trade with the EU after we have ended our membership, because they know that our economy’s survival depends on it.

In Parliament last month, Theresa May said:

“We’re committed to delivering on our commitment of no hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and ensuring we have as frictionless trade as possible with the European Union.”

Everything we’ve already got.

But the UK government has also said it wants to continue to enjoy these EU membership benefits after Brexit:

without being part of the EU Single Market or customs union;

without agreeing to the rules of the EU and its market;

without being subject to the European Court of Justice to oversee those rules;

without paying anything to the EU for access.

It’s not going to happen. Mrs May knows this.

Before the referendum she said clearly and persuasively:

“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”

Yet that’s exactly what Mrs May now wants. She says she aims to achieve a new trade agreement with the EU that’s unique to us, that no other country in the world has ever achieved.

Of course, it’s not going to happen.

What’s the point of a club if you are going to allow non-members to enjoy the same or better benefits as members? What club allows that?

So here’s the bottom line. Britain needs frictionless trade with the EU. We need free movement of goods, services, capital and people for our country not just to survive, but to thrive.

We need to continue with the status quo: the arrangement we have now.

Has this sunk in yet?

We’re leaving all the benefits of the EU, only to desperately try and get back as many of those benefits as we can after we’ve left.

We’re going to pay around £40 billion (the so-called ‘divorce settlement’) – money that will come from us, you and me – to try and achieve what we’ve got, but less of it, and on considerably inferior terms.

This is complete and utter madness. It will be much better to just keep the current arrangement. It will be cheaper, and we will all be better off.

As an EU member:

① We have a say and votes in the running, rules and future direction of our continent.

② We have full and free access to the world’s largest free marketplace.

③ We enjoy the right to live, work, study or retire across a huge expanse of our continent.

④ We enjoy state healthcare and education when living and working in any other EU country.

⑤ We enjoy free or low-cost health care when visiting any EU nation.

⑥ We are protected by continent-wide rights that protect us at work, when shopping and travelling.

⑦ We benefit from laws that protect our environment (and have, for example, directly resulted in Britain’s beaches being cleaned up).

⑧ We enjoy excellent EU trade agreements with around 60 countries, with more on the way, on advantageous terms that Britain is unlikely ever to replicate.

So, we’re going to throw that all away, just so we can get an inferior arrangement with the EU, in which we’d still have to agree to the rules of EU trade (over which we’d have no say) and we’d have less access to our most vital customers and suppliers outside of our home market.

And what are we gaining? Surely something?

No. All the reasons given to leave in the referendum were based on lies and false promises. There are no good reasons to leave.

More sovereignty? Nonsense. We’ll get less. In the EU, we gain a share of sovereignty of our continent. Outside the EU, we’ll still live on a planet and have to obey thousands of international laws and treaties. We share sovereignty with NATO, for example. Is that a reason to leave it?

Fewer migrants? Really? Just think about it. Most EU migrants in Britain are in gainful employment, doing jobs that we simply don’t have enough Britons to do. So if they all left, we’d have to replace them with about the same numbers of migrants as we have now to get all those jobs done. What’s the bloody point of that?

More houses, schools and hospitals? Think again. Without EU migrants, we’ll have fewer builders, teachers, doctors and nurses. Migrants are not the cause of our problems. Blaming them just excuses successive UK governments from investing sufficiently in our country.

Get our country back? We never lost it. If being in the EU means losing your country, why aren’t the 27 other EU member states planning to leave? (Really, none of them are: support for the EU is the highest its been in 35 years).

Our own laws? The vast majority of laws in the UK are our laws and passed by our Parliament in Westminster. But in the EU, we benefit from laws for our continent that no single country alone could ever achieve. Could our UK government have got mobile phone companies to scrap mobile roaming charges across the entire EU? Of course not. It took the might of 28 EU countries working together to achieve that, and so much more.

The EU is run by faceless bureaucrats? Another lie. The EU is run and ruled by its members, the 28 countries of the EU, along with its democratically elected European Parliament. The European Commission is the servant of the EU, not its master, and the European Parliament has the power to choose, and dismiss, the entire Commission.

We are leaving for no good reason, not one. We are paying around £40 billion (money the UK has agreed we owe to the EU) to settle our debts with the EU, to enable us to have an inferior deal.

We will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power after we’ve left.

What’s the point? There’s no point. The country really has gone nuts.

 

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Perhaps the least remarked aspect of this week’s Parliamentary shenanigans has been the distraction from the loss of another week of time to reach an Article 50 deal.

Important as a meaningful vote in Parliament is, it does not intrinsically produce an increased chance of a deal being reached. Indeed, the confirmation of a push-back of the publication of the government’s White Paper until July means that not only can there not be a report of substantial progress at next week’s European Council, but also that reaching a deal for October’s meeting is also highly unlikely.

The reasoning behind this is simply that Article 50 has not and will not progress by focused moments of progress, but by gradual processes of consensus-building and compromise. Think back to last autumn and the Joint Report: that emerged from a series of negotiations, referrals back to domestic audiences and then confirmation by press conference.

That’s because while the UK government and the Commission might be in the negotiating room, they represent various constituencies, who have to buy into the proposals that emerge from that room. ‘Speaking for’ others isn’t the same as ‘deciding for them’.

In addition, the EU has hived off Brexit discussions to separate sections of European Councils, without the UK present, so getting national leaders around a table needs specific and special planning: it can’t easily be shoehorned into the agenda.

In practice, that means that whatever the government comes up with in July, it will take time for other member states to digest, then agree a common position with the Commission, then debate with the UK, then find common ground, then agree a means of moving things on, then entering several rounds of to-and-fro, and only then agreeing some text. Throw in the delays caused by holidays and October looks really very near.

“But they could ditch their holidays!”, you cry. Well, maybe the negotiating teams will do that, but that doesn’t help, not unless everyone else in their constituencies does the same. And given that Brexit remains low on the list of EU policy dilemmas right now, it’s unlikely to happen.

But so what? If we run towards Christmas then does it really matter?

Yes, it does matter, and for several reasons.

The biggest thing here is time, or its lack. Already the scant two years of Article 50 has seen the loss of a couple of months to the snap General Election, a couple more to the disagreements on ‘sufficient progress’ on Phase I, and yet another couple more to the lack of paperwork coming out of London since Easter. And that was on the parts of the agenda that weren’t the most difficult.

Leaving a deal until Christmas means there’s almost no scope for any further delay or bust-up, simply because there isn’t enough time: recall the deal needs not only to be signed, but also ratified by 29 March, and that can’t be done at the drop of the proverbial hat.

And yet we have to assume that delays and bust-ups will occur, if only because of the issues at stake. In particular, the UK has to make some crucial decisions on what it is seeking, which in turn are likely to mean running over some part of the red lines currently in position. Even an approach of creating new means of kicking topics into some longer grass will incur consequences that might be politically difficult to carry, especially with a Parliament that looks ever less conducive to letting things slide.

Which brings the next big issue: less time for a deal means less time to make a meaningful vote meaningful. The closer to 29 March that the government brings a package to Parliament, the less realistic scope there is to do anything other than rubber stamp it. If nothing else, the inclusion of a departure date in the Withdrawal Bill – which rescinds the 1972 European Community Act, on which all UK acceptance of the EU’s legal order rests – means that even asking for an Article 50 extension requires an additional Parliamentary procedure to amend that.

In short, it’s a game of chicken, with the risk of a no-deal exit as a price of failure to swerve.

Given that no group is seriously advancing a no-deal outcome as desirable, or even tolerable, that represents a real issue. Whether those involved appreciate that danger or how their (in)actions now are making that more likely next spring is open to discussion.

 

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The recently published Europe’s Brexit: EU Perspectives on Britain’s Vote to Leave concludes with several key themes about how the other 27 Member States and EU institutions approached and continue to handle Brexit.

As should be more than clear to many by now, the story of Brexit cannot be told from a British perspective alone. Nor can it be fold from one European perspective or from looking at a select few EU member states such as Germany or Ireland. Each of the other 27 EU member states, along with the EU’s various institutions, have been home to individual debates about Brexit, with each reflecting that country (or institutions) interests, links with the UK, and place in the EU.

Europe’s Brexit looks more closely at these multiple European views of Brexit. As Kevin Featherstone makes clear in his endorsement, taking into account these European views of Brexit is important ‘if you want to understand the negotiations and the possible outcome better. Ignore it if you prefer costly assumptions and think in one-dimensional terms.’

The book, with a foreword from former European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, is the product of a network of researchers in universities and think tanks across Europe dating back to 2013, the year David Cameron gave his Bloomberg Speech to which the origins of the 2016 referendum can most clearly be traced.

From 2013 onwards, the aim of the network was not only to broaden analysis beyond the UK but to ensure that the analysis covered as wide a range of countries as possible. Through publications with the DGAP, the LSE’s EUROPP blog and the LSE’s Brexit blog, the network followed the idea of a referendum become reality, the UK pursue a renegotiation, the shock of a referendum vote for Leave, and the EU’s response as it came to terms with the departure of the UK. The book, reports and blog series leave three sets of conclusions.

Europe’s Britain

Europe’s history of Brexit is a story of 27 different Member State governments and the EU’s institutions attempting to deal with a partner they all wanted to keep inside the EU tent. Britain might have been ‘an awkward partner’ but it was not ‘the awkward partner’, as some misquote the title of Stephen George’s 1990 book. Whether in balancing against French and German domination of the EU or pushing forward with European integration in a number of areas, the rest of the EU often (but not always) found the UK a constructive partner.

However, UK governments, especially since 2010, have increasingly appeared determined to isolate the UK. Why the UK did this is a story of growing British (and especially Conservative Party) political ignorance and disdain for the EU, growing UK isolation because of changing trade and Member State alliances within the EU, and a changing EU where the Eurozone was increasingly the centre of EU politics.

The UK failed to develop the institutional links and political outlook that would have connected it more closely with the rest of the EU. As a result, British politicians especially have increasingly taken the EU and its positions for granted, if they have thought about them at all. Witness how until the Brexit negotiations got underway, the UK’s debate about what new relationship to seek with the remaining EU rarely if ever considered what the other 27 Member States might think or agree to.

Too often British debate has been one of ‘Britain’s Europe’ without ever thinking much about ‘Europe’s Britain’. Even today, some in the UK – including in HM Government – struggle to understand why and how the EU is approaching Brexit and Britain as they do. As a result, they have struggled to understand how the rest of the EU has been as united as it has been. They have failed to appreciate, as touched on in Europe’s Brexit, that Brexit has not been seen as a test of EU-UK relations, but as a test of the EU’s unity.

Europe’s Brexit Themes

Five themes can be identified throughout Europe’s Brexit. First, if the rest of the EU has been united in its response to Brexit then the reason lies in a concern amongst the elites of many other EU Member States that it would fuel populism, Euroscepticism and illiberalism in the rest of the EU. In some Member States, Brexit may have helped drive up support for the EU, but populism, Euroscepticism and illiberalism remain strong.

Second, this political concern did not mean the governments of the other 27 Member States overlooked economic calculations. The UK ran a trade deficit with 23 of the 27 Member States, making the UK an important market for a majority of the EU. But that importance varies, and as is made clear throughout the book, maintaining the unity and coherence of the remaining EU Single Market is of greater concern.

Third, this is not to say Britain is unimportant. The UK is an important trade, security, social, and political partner to many other EU Member States. That importance, however, is relative to the importance of the remaining EU and close relations with its remaining leading players, especially Germany.

Fourth, the UK’s importance may be best understood by viewing it in terms of the importance of Brexit to the EU. Brexit is not necessarily at the top of the ‘to do’ list when it competes with problems in the Eurozone, Schengen, in relations with Russia and the USA, growing levels of illiberalism across Europe, to say nothing of domestic problems in various Member States.

Fifth, there is some debate elsewhere in the EU about how well the Union has so far performed over Brexit, especially compared to the other problems it faces. There are important lessons to be learnt, not least what role the rest of the EU may have played in helping create a situation in which the citizens of one of its largest Member States voted to Leave.

The EU’s Post-Brexit Europe

Debates in the UK, and to some extent elsewhere in the EU, about the future EU-UK relationship can overlook three things. First, debates similar to those in the UK have been held in the rest of the EU about the pros and cons of the Norway model, a Free Trade Agreement and so forth. If there is one aspect about a new relationship that is repeated throughout the book, it is that the UK’s dreams of getting a better deal than when it was in – the ‘having your cake and eating it’ option – is firmly rejected. As Donald Tusk made clear: ‘Buy a cake, eat it and see if it is still there on the plate.’

Whatever new relationship is agreed – and it’s worth recalling the EU and UK have not even formally begun negotiations over it – one of the problems Europe’s Brexit points to is the ratification minefield that lies ahead. If the new relationship is, as expected, a mixed agreement then it will need the approval of the other 27 Member States national parliaments, which in some cases will entail both upper and lower houses of parliament and, in the case of Belgium, the five regional parliaments. So far, the EU has succeeded in compartmentalizing Brexit into a technical and legal process, with the European Commission doing most of the work. It’s a reminder of how the EU can be a very effective way of depoliticising an issue through EU-level arrangements that can weaken the input from the domestic politics of the Member States. Ratification of treaties and agreements such as that which it is hoped the EU and UK will agree, is one of those moments when the domestic politics of Member States kicks back in.

It’s a reminder of the final concluding point of Europe’s Brexit: that making Brexit a success is about securing three sets of successful Brexits. First, successful deals over the UK leaving the EU and a new EU-UK relationship. Second, for the UK to come to terms domestically with the domestic causes of the Brexit vote. Third, for the remaining EU – 27 Member States and the EU’s institutions – to come to terms with a changed Union. For some of those remaining 27, a successful Brexit for the remaining EU is not just one that holds together, moves forward, and delivers for its citizens. It’s also one that avoids becoming a Union dominated by a ‘Carolingian model’ of France and Germany.

Europe’s Brexit: EU Perspectives on Britain’s Vote to Leave is out now from Agenda.

This blog post first appeared on the LSE Brexit Blog.

The post Europe’s Brexit: a successful outcome of negotiations for all? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

With the pound so much lower following the Brexit vote, many more Britons are now holidaying at Britain’s seaside resorts. And it’s thanks to the EU that 95% of our beaches are now clean enough to wade out into the sea.

It wasn’t always like that. Back in the 1970s, we used to pump our untreated sewage straight into the sea. It’s only because of EU laws that the UK was forced to clean up its act.

As reported by Friends of the Earth, who campaigned during the referendum for the UK to stay in the EU for the sake of our environment:

“The EU’s 1976 Bathing Water Directive – and successful legal action by the European Commission – has made our beaches as clean, clear and swimmable as they are today.

“But it wasn’t easy going…The UK fought hard to maintain the right to continue polluting.

“Successive UK governments exploited whatever loophole they could find. They pumped untreated sewage into our ocean until 1998 – longer than any other European country.

“Now, water quality at beaches is better than at any time in living memory, according to the Environment Agency.

“Some of the UK’s most beautiful and loved beaches are protected in this way: Watergate Bay in Cornwall, Druridge Bay in Northumberland, Croyde Beach in Devon and hundreds more which have reached good and excellent water-rating standards.”

But, warns Friends of the Earth, not all of Britain’s beaches reach the crystal clear standards that we have now come to expect. Only around 60% of UK bathing waters meet the new “Excellent” standard of the revised 2006 EU Bathing Water Directive.

When Britain leaves the EU, we will no longer be subject to the Bathing Water Directive.

Commented Friends of the Earth:

“Without external EU pressure it seems likely that standards will slip. Staying in the EU delivers a win-win scenario of cleaner beaches and economic gain for sea-side economies.”

After Brexit, leaked documents suggest that Theresa May’s government plans to “scale down” climate and environmental protection laws to secure post-Brexit trade deals.

Does Britain really want the return of the dirty beach?

• Photo:  Jon Danzig at Tolcarne Beach at Newquay, Cornwall. The beautiful beach, one of the most popular in Newquay, has received a 5-star rating on Trip Advisor, with over 260 ‘excellent’ reviews.

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