Ideas on Europe Blog

The following report contains words and quotations that have been translated from German into English by Jolyon Gumbrell.

Secret political donations have allowed external actors to interfere with elections and referendums in EU member states, which is damaging the democratic process across Europe. Often the source of a political donation can be traced to a company or organization based in a tax haven such as the Isle of Man or Switzerland, but finding out who is really behind the source of these multi million euro or pound donations is more difficult.

In Germany an organization called the “Verein zur Erhaltung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und der bürgerliche Freiheit” – which translates as “club for the maintenance of the rule of law and citizens freedom”, also referred to in English as the “Rights and Freedom Club” – has supported the right wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party in several elections. The chaiman of the AfD, Jörg Meuthen denied in “ARD-Sommerinterview” the summer television interview with ARD of July 2018, that his party had ever worked with the Rights and Freedom Club. However the chairman of the Rights and Freedom Club, David Bendels is also the publisher of Deutschland-Kurier, a political newspaper that supports the AfD.

According to email and interview evidence presentented by the German television program “ARD-Politikmagazin Panorama”: David Bendels gave1500 free copies of Deutschland-Kuriers to the AfD’s regional association in Rosenheim. The copies of the newspaper were distributed by party volunteers to local mail boxes. This happened in July 2018 three months before the state elections in Bavaria for the “Landtag”, the state parliament in Munich.

According to a legal and constitutional expert, Prof. Sophie Schönberger interviewed by ARD-Politikmagazin Panorama: “the email evidence is a comprehensive connection between the club and the AfD, which means comprehensive proof that there was an agreement for election support between the AfD and the club. And this delivers plausible clues for the first time, that it concerns a type of illegal party financing.”

The AfD should have recorded the donation of the copies of Deutschland-Kurier in their accounts of election expenses. If the AfD had published and printed its own newspaper, then 1500 copies distributed in the Rosenheim area would have probably cost the party at least €3000 to produce. However Deutschland-Kurier did not pass this cost on to the AfD, and the newspaper has also been distributed in other locations in support of AfD election candidates. If the Rights and Freedom Club is funding Deutscland-Kurier, then the members of this club are in effect AfD donors.

Under German law political donations received from countries outside of the EU are illegal, unless they come from a German or other EU citizen, or a company which has at least 50 percent of its shares in German or EU hands. Anonymous donations exceeding €500, and anonymous donations passed on from a third party are also forbidden.

According to reports in the German and Swiss press from the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Wochenzeitung (WOZ), the secretive billionaire August von Finck is thought to be a donor to the Rights and Freedom Club. It is thought that Fink’s authorized representative Ernst Knut Stahl is one of the people behind the Rights and Freedom Club, who has in the past organized on Finck’s behalf, political donations to right wing parties and organizations.

August von Finck junior who is now 88, was heir to a fortune that came from his family’s business, the private bank Merck Finck & Co. His father also called August von Finck was the main shareholder of Merck Finck & Co., and sat on the supervisory board of several German companies in the 1930s. According to an article of 29th November 2018, published on the WOZ website entitled, “Ein schrecklich rechte Familie”, which translates as, “A right terrible family”: Finck senior was a member of a group of industrialists who met secretly with Hitler in 1933 and deceided to support the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) with a secret election fund of three million Reichtsmarks.

During the Nazi period Finck senior profiteered from businesses and property which had been stolen from Jews by the Nazis. He was also on the boad of trustees of “Haus der Deutschen Kunst”, an art gallery built between 1933 and 1937 in Munich, which used art for Nazi propaganda purposes. After the Second World War the Allies did not consider him as a serious Nazi War Criminal, even though he had helped fund Hitler’s rise to power. In 1949 he was able to re-establish the bank Merck Finck & Co. In 1973 Finck senior also known as “Freiherr” or Baron, bought a castle called Schloss Weinfeld in Switzerland. Finck senior died in 1980 and the castle has since then remained in the possession of his son August von Finck junior.

It has been estimated in the media, that August von Finck junior has a fortune of more than €8 billion. In 1990 he sold the bank Merck Finck & Co., to Barclays Bank PLC and moved the headquarters of his business group to Switzerland to avoid German taxes.

In 2010 Finck junior acquired the trading name of the precious metals company Degussa. This was at a time shortly after the financial crash, when gold and other precious metals were considered a safe investment option. Degussa Goldhandel retail outlets were opened in Germany, Switzerland, Spain and the United Kingdom in response to a revived interest in buying gold as an alternative investment.

If Finck had made large political donations to the AfD, then it would come as no surprise, that the AfD has a policy to reintroduce a gold standard for the Bundesbank in Germany. According to an article published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on 24th November 2018 entitle, “Die AfD und der Geheimnisvolle Milliardär”, which translates as “The AfD and the mysterious billionaire”: Finck was supposed to have supported a policy with good will – proposed by an AfD politician called Peter Boehringer – to bring gold reserves back to the Bundesbank in Germany.

This story is to be continued . . .

Sources

https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/afd-verein-103.html

https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afd-von-finck-1.4225837

https://www.woz.ch/1848/verdeckte-parteienfinanzierung/eine-schrecklich-rechte-familie

https://hausderkunst.de/en/history/chronical

https://www.merckfinck.de/unternehmen/geschichte.html

https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/parteispenden-faq-101.html

http://www.swisscastles.ch/Thurgau/weinfelden.html

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Democracy_in_the_Crosshairs_.pdf

©Jolyon Gumbrell 2018

The post Illegal political funding across Europe. Part I appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Since I last blogged about how the EU’s Rule of Law Framework works and why Article 7 have been triggered against Poland and Hungary, a long list political developments took place both in Hungary and in Poland, as well as in the UK; some are positive and some are negative, but then this is relative to where you stand politically.

Theresa May introduced her long negotiated Withdrawal Agreement to the British in November. It was as affective as a bombshell. It even surprised those who were actively engaged in the process of negotiating this deal; like former Brexit Minister, Dominic Raab, who happened to resign immediately over the deal and  who said that he could not support the deal. It was a bewildering moment that the Brexit Minister resigns over the deal of which he was part. It did not make sense and still does not. However the subsequent resignations, and disunity among and within the governing and the opposition political parties over the deal not only have overshadowed Raab’s resignation, but have also made everything more complicated to follow.

At least there was one certain thing until 10th of December, which was the vote in the House of Commons on the WA on the following day, until Theresa May delayed that too another date, upon realising that she could not guarantee a majority in the Commons. What happens now is the pressing question.

Both the Irish backstop and disunited political parties have been the main cause of volatility in the British politics in relation to Brexit. Whether order and stability can be restored into British politics with a tweaked WA (if agreed by Brussels), I don’t see how that is happening, thus the point of delaying the vote does not make sense, unless she knows something we don’t. Is more than a tweak to the WA possible? As of now the officials say that they could issue a statement clarifying that the EU does not want to trap the UK under the bloc’s authority. Can she secure any concessions? We all have to wait and see, but I believe that is highly unlikely. 

Moving on to alleged Polexit, the local elections of October and the reinstatement of the Supreme Court judges have been the highlights of the last two months for me, as far as the Polish politics in concerned. Plus there seems to be a degree of causality between the results of the October local elections and having the ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) opting to take a step back from its judicial reforms.  

When the PiS lost the control of some of the municipalities to the opposition political parties during the local elections of October, they began to reflect on what might have gone wrong or what they have done wrong. Since 2015 the PiS administration have not been harmonious with the EU, they not only they stood against a EU common policy, that is being the EU’s migration quote scheme, but have also domestically introduced and passed laws that are against the EU’s core values, the judicial reform is being one of them, threatening independence of judiciary and giving more authority to the politicians. Thus there has been an ongoing tension between the Polish administration and the EU institutions, be that the European Commission and the European Parliament. This meant that Poland was no longer seen as the beacon of stability in the Central and Eastern Europe, but as a troublemaker.

Although I have never heard it from anyone from the PiS, during the election campaign it was however suggested by the opposition political parties, such as the Civic Platform (PO), that the PiS was inching towards Polexit. This is something Donald Tusk, a former Polish prime minister and the serving President of the European Council, have also reiterated by comparing the situation in Poland with the situation in Britain before Brexit, and claimed that Poland could end up leaving the bloc as a result of miscalculation. It is true that Polish administration’s Conservative and illiberal policy choices make Poland distant from the core values of the EU and this is why Article 7 was triggered against Poland. 

However I would not stretch it that far to claim that Poland is inching close to leave the EU as the membership to the EU is very popular among the PiS and the public. Since the most recent survey published by the newspaper Rzeczpospolita found that 84 per cent of Poles wanted their country to stay in the union, while only 8 per cent wanted to leave. It may be that the opposition political parties’ campaign about Polexit and the existing tension between Poland and the EU have played up to the fears of the people that Poland might leave the EU, which then have shaped their voting intentions, contributing to the PiS’s loss of votes in October elections. In response to this the PiS officials denied any intention to leave the EU and is working towards neutering this line of attack before Poland holds European and domestic parliamentary elections next year. Plus the PiS’s latest u-turn on the judiciary reform do demonstrate how much EU membership is important for the PiS; particularly after having to agree to reinstate Supreme Court judges.

Whereas situation in Hungary is now  more bleak and alarming than ever. Just after a week an independent University, the Central European University, had been forced to exit from Budapest, Orban’s government did not miss any time to pass another controversial law, tightening the control of the courts, despite the ongoing Article 7 procedure. 

Despite having to complied to the last year’s law that required that the foreign universities to have classes in their home countries in order to enroll students in Hungary by opening a program in New York, Orban’s administration refused to sign the  necessary paperwork for the CEU to be able to operate in Hungary.

Once it became official, yes there were criticisms from different EU circles and the US over the forced exit of the CEU. None however were affective enough to change the fate of the CEU. Silence from the European People’s party (EPP), of which Fidesz is part of, were the most  deafening. At one point in the past the EPP had set the closure of the CEU as a red line, but they did not take any action which would stop this forced exit, which meant that  Orban’s administration was once again able to behave as they wished. Since European elections are fast approaching, and so the short term interests of the agents involved in these elections are prioritised at the expense of the EU’s core values on which the EU was once established. 

Since Orbán did get away with the CEU-exit, on the 12th of December, his administration  approved a law that will further tighten his hold over the country’s court system by creating a new high court to deal with public-administration cases and brought it under the government’s oversight. The legislation strips the supreme court of its ultimate authority over so-called administrative disputes — cases involving everything from elections and corruption to taxes and police abuse — and creates a new court overseen by his justice minister. From now on the Justice Minister pick the new court’s judges and control its budget. This meant that Orbán  continues to shape the Hungarian state structure in his own illiberal image, threatening the EU’s liberal standing. 

Above three cases show that either membership to the EU is a cause of instability for all the three countries  including the UK, Poland and Hungary or these countries are cause of worrisome for the EU. While there are now two option in relation to UK’s position in the EU:(1) no deal Brexit and (2) no Brexit: at  least that is some clarity in some form, that will be something for the UK and the EU to decide. However the situation for Poland and Hungary are totally different, they do favour the EU membership and do like to remain as members. Yet they opt for policy choices that are in contradiction with the EU’s core values. When it is in their benefit they agree to make a u-turn on these policy choices, like we have seen it in Poland, otherwise they push their agenda as far as they can however radical it is, like Fidesz did in Hungary.  Thus we should be concerned about the current state of affairs.

The post Voluntary, Alleged and Forced Exoduses–Brexit, Polexit and CEU-exit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It’s a mark of the times we live in here in the UK that a confidence vote in the leadership of the Prime Minister counts only as an incidental side-show in the performance of Brexit.

At least it wasn’t a musical.

Last night’s win by Theresa May was neither the emphatic crushing of her internal opponents nor the laying waste to her authority that it might have been.

Instead it was another demonstration of the blocked nature of the Commons at present: no one strong enough to impose their will; no one weak enough to get knocked out of the running all together.

This morning, as last night, everyone fancies their chances and there remains no obvious path forward.

Perhaps the most that could be said is that now that the Conservative no-confidence motion option is closed for a year, perhaps the range of next steps is a bit narrower than before.

Parliament still has to approve the Withdrawal Agreement that May negotiated in November for it to proceed with ratification, and that still doesn’t look likely.

If renegotiation is a non-starter and revocation or a second referendum are too unpalatable, that only leaves having to swallow the deal as is.

 

What is unclear is how much May has used last night to make her MPs an offer on this.

Absent a different text, it’s always been clear that May’s other gambit would be to note that the Withdrawal Agreement only deals with the ending of UK membership of the EU and not the future relationship between the two.

With that in mind, May’s explicit suggestions that she would step down once withdrawal had occurred would allow the party to choose new leadership to make decisions about the future path, which – lest we forget – is where much of the criticism lies.

This might work if one takes the view that the unwillingness of Tories to push for a leadership vote until now reflects an understanding of the limited options available to the UK if it desires a negotiated exit for the EU: better to keep May in and blame her for the necessary compromises than to kick her out and then have to owe the problem yourself.

 

Of course, by that logic, there wouldn’t have been last night’s vote at all.

And this is perhaps the key point in all this: logic is not necessarily in much supply right now in Westminster.

If we take the “what the absolute fuck is going on” view of this situation, a confidence vote on May looks like the option with the fewest down-side risks. Put like that, it’s a means of ‘doing something’ and venting steam, even if it’s also the option with the least chance of making a real difference to the final outcome.

May’s mantra that ‘nothing has changed’ always had the ring of desperation and denial about it, but in this case it does represent pretty accurately the reality of the situation.

 

May’s still in Number 10, she still has the only negotiated deal on the table, she still lacks the majority needed to get it through Parliament, and her opponents all lack a majority to force her to change course.

As I’ve pointed out on previous occasions, Brexit is a negative-sum game: it’s about the allocation of costs between the parties and no-one gets to avoid carrying some of them.

Put more simply, Parliament faces a selection of bad options, each problematic in its own way: both to decide and not to decide will incur political, economic or social costs of some kind.

The danger now is that for each of those options there are enough people able to block that option happening that the only option left – not deciding and thus leaving without a deal at all – takes place, imposing much greater costs on the UK collectively.

 

Unless and until MPs recognise that this is the situation they face, it’s hard to see how this impasse can be resolved to anyone’s satisfaction.

May might have survived her vote last night, but she is certainly not out of the woods yet.

The post Nothing has changed (part 453) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This article may partially self-destruct soon, when it is likely that Parliament will decisively vote down Theresa May’s Brexit deal, known as ‘the withdrawal agreement.’ But then what?

Currently, according to Prime Minister, Theresa May, and EU Council President, Donald Tusk, the choice is the deal, no deal, or no Brexit. But who will end up making that choice?

Currently, not us, ‘the people’.

Theresa May has fundamentally ruled out any chance of a ‘people’s vote’ on Brexit, and realistically, a ‘people’s vote’ could only happen with the support of the government.

Yes, there could be a private member’s bill for another referendum, but the chances of that being successful without the government’s backing are very remote.

So, there would have to be a fundamental shift by the government, or a new government, for the idea of a ‘people’s vote’ to have a real chance of materialising.

• Did the electorate truly realise just how complicated Brexit would be when we had the referendum on 23 June 2016?

Clearly not.

Exiting the EU has taxed some of the best legal brains in the UK and the rest of the EU, and even many of them are now scratching their heads.

Brexit is not simple, but the referendum question was ridiculously simplistic – and the choice of just one of two one-word answers in response totally unrealistic.

The country clearly didn’t have enough information to make any realistic choice or decision in the referendum.

And even now, the details of Brexit are so arduous and perplexing that many people are struggling to understand what any of it means.

• Would the electorate have voted for Brexit if they had known on 23 June 2016 what we know now?

The evidence indicates definitely not.

Professor Adrian Low, who has been analysing all the polls since referendum day, told me:

“The latest polling figures, from YouGov on 3 and 4 December for Great Britain, are very grim reading for Brexiters.

“From a winning position of 52% at the referendum, their support has dropped to less than 44%, whilst those who think it wrong to leave are now at 56%.

“Poll after poll – more than 50 of them – since last year’s general election show that UK no longer wants Brexit

“One poll, or maybe a handful, can be wrong, but not this time. There are too many of them saying the same thing.

“The will of the people is to remain in the EU.”

[∞ Link to Professor Low’s latest analysis].

Given the choice of the deal, no deal or no Brexit, it is becoming increasingly obvious that ‘the people’ by a substantially clear majority want ‘no Brexit’.

Even by the government’s own independent assessments and admission, ‘no deal’ would be catastrophic for the UK, and many believe it would be entirely irresponsible to put such a choice on any ballot paper.

• So, the realistic choice comes down to ‘the deal’ (the withdrawal agreement) or ‘no Brexit’.

The EU asserts – and the government agrees – that ‘the deal’ is the only deal on the table and there cannot be any other deal offered or negotiated, especially as the government has ruled out remaining in the Single Market after Brexit (i.e. a Norway option, which would mean continuing with ‘free movement of people’).

• What exactly is ‘the deal’?

As my graphic shows, Theresa May’s deal means that from 30 March 2018 – known as ‘Brexit Day’ – the UK would continue to be ‘in’ the EU, as if we were a member as now, except we would have to obey almost all the rules of the EU, including any new rules, without any say in them.

This arrangement, called the ‘transition period’ would end on 31 December 2020.

• What happens after the ‘transition period’ has not yet been agreed, apart from the arrangements regarding Northern Ireland.

If by the end of 2020, a satisfactory arrangement has not been mutually agreed between the UK and the EU on how to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland, then something called a ‘backstop’ would automatically kick in.

Under the backstop the whole of the UK would enter a “single customs territory” with the EU.

There are many parts to this but essentially there would be no tariffs on trade in goods between the UK and the EU and some (though not all) trade restrictions will be removed.

Northern Ireland alone would remain aligned to some extra rules of the EU’s Single Market to ensure the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will remain open as it is today.

• The government doesn’t want the backstop to happen.

But in the withdrawal agreement, the backstop would go ahead regardless, unless both the EU and the UK agree that alternative arrangements to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland are acceptable to all sides.

In other words, both sides would have to jointly agree before the backstop could be stopped.

• Yes, it is complicated.

Fortunately, I have on hand the expertise of EU law expert, Professor Steve Peers of Essex University, who has written a comprehensive overview answering some of the key questions on what ‘the deal’ means, which I am summarising here.

• Does the withdrawal agreement cover the long-term relationship between the UK and EU after Brexit?

No. The withdrawal agreement governs only the details of leaving the EU, not the long-term relationship between the UK and EU.

• What if the withdrawal agreement is not ratified?

Unless the two sides agree to amend it and then ratify the amended text, in principle the alternatives are the UK leaving the EU without any withdrawal agreement (‘no deal’), or staying in the European Union (‘no Brexit’).

However, it remains to be seen if remaining by revoking the Article 50 notice of withdrawing is legally possible. (This will be clarified by a ruling of the European Court of Justice, expected on Monday).

A general election might be held, but that will not in itself change the options available.

The Brexit date could be delayed, but both the UK government and the EU27 Member States (acting unanimously) would have to agree to this.

– The EU Commission has issued preparedness notices setting out its view on what would happen if the UK leaves the EU without a withdrawal agreement. [∞ Link ]

– The UK government has also issued its own no deal notices. [∞ Link]

• Does the withdrawal agreement end free movement of people?

Yes, free movement ends at the end of the transition period (31 December 2020), unless the UK and EU decide to sign a separate treaty as part of the future relationship extending free movement in the future. Currently the UK government opposes this idea.

The ‘backstop’ relating to Northern Ireland, if it ends up applying, does not include free movement of people, but only the continuation of the UK/Ireland common travel area, which is more limited.

The withdrawal agreement also ends free movement for UK citizens already in the EU27, unless (again) a separate treaty as part of the future relationship addresses this issue.

• Does the CJEU (European Court of Justice) have jurisdiction in the UK indefinitely?

No. The Court will have jurisdiction during the transition period, and following that specific jurisdiction over EU27 citizens’ rights and EU law referred to in the financial settlement, as well as the protocols on Northern Ireland (in part) and bases in Cyprus.

After the transition period, UK courts can send the CJEU cases only in limited contexts.

The European Commission can sue the UK in the CJEU for failure to implement EU law correctly for four years after the end of the transition.

The Commission can also sue the UK to enforce State aid and competition decisions which were based on proceedings which started before the end of the transition period, but concluded afterward.

• Which EU laws does the transition period cover?

The simple answer is that the transition period covers all laws applying to the UK except a handful of exclusions.

• Can the UK be forced to stay in the transition period indefinitely?

No. Any extension of the transition period has to be agreed jointly.

Furthermore, any extension won’t be indefinite, since the negotiators will add a final possible date for extension when they agree the final text of the withdrawal agreement.

On the other hand, the UK might theoretically end up in the backstop relating to Northern Ireland indefinitely.

Although the withdrawal agreement says that this arrangement must be temporary, unlike the transition period, there is no final date to end it and the UK cannot unilaterally end it at a certain date.

• The article here contains just a brief summary of Professor Steve Peers 5,000-word analysis of the withdrawal agreement (for ‘non-lawyers’). To see his full article, with links to his other explanatory blogs about the legal aspects of Brexit go to EU Law Analysis.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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How do researchers contribute to policymaking? What facilitates policy learning? And how do big data influence research-policy nexus and policy-making in European cities and regions? These are some of the questions addressed in the new book ‘Knowledge, Policymaking and Learning for European Cities and Regions. From Research to Practice’, edited by Nicola Francesco Dotti. Here he answers some questions about its origins, key ideas and lessons learned.

 

Q1: What have been the rationales and origins of this book?

There are two main reasons, one very personal and the other one more ‘academic’. I start from the second one.

 

The debate on university-industry cooperation, technology transfer, national/regional innovation system and Triple Helix is extensive. Universities are more and more pushed to cooperate with industry to enhance economic competitiveness; while, very little is said about cooperation with governments to improve policymaking. Doing research across regional economics and policy studies, I have asked myself if there is a ‘Fourth Mission’ for the university to contribute to policymaking, besides education, research and technology transfer. I think so, though this requires new concepts and approaches because I often see confusion between policy-oriented research and consultancy, between being academic scholars and activists. These distinctions are quite clear when we speak about national or European governments, but it becomes more ‘blurry’ when assuming the perspective of cities and regions.

 

The second reason is very personal, though with a big mistake in it! When I was conceiving the book, I had in my mind my grandfather, Francesco Dotti. In the 1930s, he had an ‘itinerant chair’ in agriculture from the University of Bologna. Basically, he was a kind-of young PhD/postdoc travelling across the province of Bologna to teach farmers the best agricultural technics at that time. Then, I asked myself: how can a young scholar in urban and regional policy contribute to policymaking? While writing the book, my father explained to me that ‘itinerant chair’ was something different, more a kind-of consultancy and definitely not an academic position. My mistake! But the image of applied policy knowledge was still pointing out to the Fourth Mission of University.

 

Q2: Your book focuses on research-policy nexus in urban and regional policy. What are the main opportunities and challenges when researchers and policymakers collaborate?

Here, we need to make a preliminary distinction between academic disciplines. In policy studies, research focuses on processes of decision-making; in urban and regional studies, most of the scholars focus on the contents for those decisions. These two academic communities do not communicate, very rarely meet each other and, even worst, they do not realise this difference. In the book, I did my best to gather both communities. On these boundaries, we have started working on the notion of ‘knowledge brokers’ for urban and regional policymaking.

 

The primary opportunity for researchers is to get involved in real-world policy going out of the ‘Ivory Tower’, and understanding how ‘their’ knowledge is ‘used’ and ‘translated’ for policymaking; for policymakers, they can acquire the knowledge they do not have (yet). However, the main challenge is to recognise each other rationales: research and policymaking are different. In this perspective, the keyword of the book is dialogue, which in Greek means what goes through two ‘logos’. Researchers and policymakers have to acknowledge each other ‘logos’ and then engage in a dialogue. Otherwise, we end up in a monologue, which is a real risk: “blame politicians if they don’t do what I said!” vs “those academics do nothing, just a waste of public money!”.

 

Q3: An important concept in the book is ‘policy learning’. How does policy learning work? What facilitates policy learning?

This is the most challenging question, which is the frontier of research in policy studies. I do not know, I really do not know. In policy studies, I see many excellent theories, but when it comes to the case of cities and regions, these theories fail because of lack of critical mass, few and limited expertise and structural constraints on available resources. The new behavioural approaches applied to policymaking are really moving forward our understanding, but they mainly refer to larger scales, i.e. national/federal/European decision-making. In cities and regions, policy knowledge is structurally limited and context-specific, while policy challenges are urgent as much as for the upper tiers of government. In this perspective, I really appreciate the EU efforts on ‘administrative capacity’.

 

Here, I would like to turn this question as follow: how do you learn about a policy? From whom? When? What are you learning and what are you looking for? What is your background to understand that policy? What are the sources you refer? Why do you want to learn about a policy? Researchers can contribute to improving policymaking but are definitely not the only relevant actors: policy learning is a collective process. We pay a lot of attention to politicians, who do not seem so relevant in my view. On the contrary, civil servants, advisors, cabinet members and other stakeholders are more relevant because policy learning is mainly a social process. Politicians have a different role, which is essential, but different.

 

And here it come my research question. What are your core beliefs and preferences about policymaking? Do you know them? Are you ready to change them? What could make you change it? These open questions are, in my view, the frontier of research nowadays. Assuming the perspective of cities and regions, these questions are even more relevant because actors interact directly, in person, without intermediaries, and they have repeated, long-term interactions. This creates communities of practices that learn how to move forward together.

 

Q4: The book includes case studies of policy-oriented research in Spain, Italy, Belgium, Scotland, the Netherlands and Mexico. Why were these cases selected? And what other cities and regions can learn from them?

The book originated during a European workshop I organised in Brussels in January 2016. It was such a fruitful discussion that we decided to write a book, but we realised that a simple conference proceeding would not have worked because the two communities from policy studies and urban and regional studies were too different and, at first, had difficulties in finding common ground. Just half of the materials come from that workshop, while the other chapters were developed to provide a complete perspective.

 

In fact, the fracture between those focusing on decision-making processes and on decisions is so deep that I had to spend two years building up a (hopefully) consistent framework. Cases are presented in a way to provide general results, beyond the cases itself. Some of the authors were involved in policymaking, and some of them are even policymakers themselves, so it was difficult to take them out of those contexts. I think the result worked well because each author has also contributed as a reviewer of the other chapters taking lessons learnt into their own chapter.

 

Q5: The book addresses topics of open data, big data and information technologies. What changes do they bring to evidence-based policymaking and policy-relevant knowledge?

Thanks for this question. I waited to address this issue previously because it requires a specific discussion, as we do in the third part of the book.

 

Big and open data are the frontier for policymaking, definitely. In fact, there is a revolution in front of us, a Copernican revolution! We are moving from a world where we had to take decisions with structurally limited information to a world where we have too much information, more than humans can handle. This is a Copernican revolution! The scarce resource is no longer information, but our attention as Herbert Simon already pointed out in the 1970s. I see that most of the decision-makers at the urban and regional levels are not aware of this revolution causing a divide with upper tiers of government that seem by-far more advanced in experimenting big and open data for policymaking.

 

The big and open data revolution opens a set of critical, fundamental issues. Who is able to handle big data for decision-making? Knowledge is not information, then how to turn abundant information into policy-relevant knowledge? What about those who do not have such advanced knowledge? Should they be left out of decision-making? If so, democracy is over. When we have so much information, the challenge is to turn this into knowledge which is relevant for policymaking. I know we are already doing it, but I think most of us are not aware of this revolution. Again, here it comes back the question of how we learn about policymaking. I know someone can be disappointed because I have more questions than answers, but –in my view- questions are more useful to learn, and the book is about learning. The book does not have a thesis to demonstrate. On the contrary, we hope to stimulate questions. This is not a handbook; this book is a question mark towards the way we learn policymaking.

 

Q6: What are the main lessons from your book for practitioners and policy-makers?

Ask yourself: how do you learn about policymaking? From whom? When and where? Are we ready to question our core beliefs and preferences about policymaking? If the answer is yes, then we can start a dialogue, which implies acknowledging the different rationales between research and policymaking.

 

The book is conceived around shorter chapters, just 4,000 words at maximum. This decision that I imposed as editor was difficult for many authors, but it helps the readers to go straight to the point. This is not a book to read linearly, I see it more as a basket of fruit where experts in policy studies read chapters on regional and urban studies, where academics can read chapters from policymakers, and the other way round.

 

Q7: What would be interesting avenues for future research?

In our last two chapters, we propose a synthesis which is also a framework for future research by discussing the notions of ‘knowledge governance’ and ‘policy resilience’. Knowledge governance is a new type of governance where policy learning, knowledge sharing and collective actions are taken as building blocks. Policy learning is, then, no longer a by-product of governance, but a key element, a goal to achieve. In this way, we can develop policy resilience which is the capacity to act collectively adapting policy to emerging issues. To understand this, it is necessary to assume the cognitive-evolutionary approach: knowledge and policymaking co-evolve, analogously to ecosystems. It is the ‘fittest’ policy knowledge that survives, and this shapes decision-making processes. Accordingly, knowledge governance is the way to keep this ‘ecosystem’ alive.

 

These notions are proposed to provide a synthetic framework on knowledge, policymaking and learning for European cities and regions. Knowledge governance and policy resilience are the future research fields I would like to work on. Again, I hope we can open even more questions.

 

Q8: Anything else you would like to add?

Yes, one more thing. I hope readers won’t look for linear, clear answers. This book is for curious readers who like to challenge their beliefs. We do provide theoretical references and case description, but we mainly propose questions on the research-policy dialogue. This book is a question: do you know how to learn urban and regional policymaking?

 

Nicola Francesco Dotti is a researcher in Urban and Regional Economics and Policy at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). His main research interests are spatial dynamics of knowledge and research, knowledge for policymakingm EU Cohesion Policy and Framework Programme / Horizon 2020. He is currently researcher on data-driven university governance and coordinator of the RSA research network on Cohesion Policy. He recently edited a volume on “Knowledge, Policymaking and Learning for European Cities and Regions” (E-Elgar). He previously worked for the EU Commission, the Politecnico di Milano and the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB). He holds a PhD in regional economics and policy from the Politecnico di Milano.

 

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This wasn’t the post I was going to write this morning, but frankly after listening to Theresa May grind her way through another less-than-revealing interview, I want to consider one neglected aspect of the current debate on Brexit.

The content of the Withdrawal Agreement.

As May didn’t-really answer John Humphrys’ less-than-incisive questions, I was struck by how little substance there was to either side of the discussion.

May has her talking points; Humphrys’ his clever-clever jibes. But neither presented a close reading of the text that is actually to be voted on next Tuesday.

This has been the pattern of the entire Brexit saga: half- or quarter-understandings of things that people encounter, turned into the be-all and end-all of How Things Are.

Exhibit 1 is that bus, with its highly tendentious reading of, well, of some set of figures possibly related to the EU budget. I completely understand the logic for doing that – and it worked – but it did help to open the door to a much more emotive approach to the entire question.

And emotions do matter: even on much more narrow questions and issues, how we feel about matters of justice or fairness or community counts, in a way that can’t really be reduced to a rational balancing-out.

But here and now we find ourselves with a national debate – and a parliamentary debate – that is driven by more emotion than cold analysis.

Three examples will suffice for now.

Firstly, much of the parliamentary debate is framed by emotional ideals of parliamentary sovereignty: that it only has to say the word and things will happen.

But parliament is only sovereign within the UK: it cannot force the EU to renegotiate, or to change its preferences, any more than it can make other countries sign up to trade deals. Likewise, May can talk about giving parliament more power within the backstop process, but the limits to UK (and thus parliament’s) powers are already clearly set out in the relevant protocol of the Withdrawal Agreement.

Secondly,there continues to be minimal understanding of what the Withdrawal Agreement actually is. It’s not a commitment to the future relationship with the EU, but a resolution of the ending of UK membership of the EU. With the exception of the backstop, there is nothing in the Withdrawal Agreement that requires the UK to follow any particular path of interaction with the EU down the line, so anyone with the intention of an agreed exit from the Union might recognise that there will be an opportunity to change government policy on that future in the hiatus between leaving and the start of future relationship negotiations.

The liabilities from ending membership will be the same, whatever the future relationship, so why the government isn’t selling that as a way of building some more support seems strange.

Thirdly, there is a basic confusion between having the power to do something and that thing actually happening. This seems especially ironic in the week of three government defeats in a day. For all the talk by those who would remain about a second referendum amendment to the Meaningful Vote, that still would requires subsequent approval of a referendum bill and then the fighting of a successful referendum campaign: one does not necessarily lead on to the next.

Indeed, the only decisions you can count on are the ones that have been made already, most important of which is the decision on 29 March 2017 to notify the EU of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU. Unless and until another decision is reached, that decision will take effect on 29 March 2019.

In large part, this is all a reflection of the lack of trust between all involved.

Look at the forced release of the Attorney General’s advice on the backstop: there was nothing in it that wasn’t already clear in the Withdrawal Agreement itself (and in the copious comment from independent commentators and experts), but the suspicion that something was being hidden contributed to the push to secure it.

People do feel strongly about Brexit, but that shouldn’t be at the expense of having a good grasp of the detail involved. And that should be especially true of those who will be making a key decision on this next week.

The post I feel strongly about Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The EU is trying to deal with two headline issues at present: whether the Brexit deal agreed between the Commission negotiators can be agreed on the one hand by the British parliament and on the other by all 27 member states, the other is whether the Italian government’s budget which has been deemed to breach euro zone rules should be sanctioned and whether it leads to an Italian financial crisis, as would happen if interest rates on Italian government debt continue to rise until they become clearly unaffordable. The Italian crisis differs from the Brexit saga in that Italy is not leaving the EU. Nevertheless the Italian government, especially its most powerful member, the deputy prime minister and interior minister, Matteo Salvini, is hostile to the EU and the overwhelming support in Italy for EU membership until a few years ago has evaporated with only 44% of recently- polled Italians supporting EU membership (although with a lot of don’t-knows, this still exceeds those definitely wanting to leave).

 

In this situation the Commission is danger of setting itself up to be blamed by threatening to fine Italy for non-compliance of the euro zone budgetary rules. This only feeds the government’s narrative that Italy’s woes can be blamed on the EU. In defence of the Commission, it is carrying out its formal duty as defined by the euro zone rules established when the euro was formed, and it is also under pressure from some other euro zone members, such as the Netherlands and Austria overtly  and probably Germany more discretely, to take a hard line. However, the Commission is a political organisation whose duty is not just to blindly enforce rules but to act in the long-term interest of the EU. There is no point in allowing the EU to be portrayed in Italy as a scapegoat. Although so far investors have only higher yields which the government considers affordable, if the government budget plans become clearly unaffordable, investors will at some point refuse to buy government debt so forcing the government to back down. In the meantime the Commission may be right to think that short-term budgetary generosity may cost the Italian public in the longer term. It is entitled to say so but should otherwise stand back.

 

One possible argument for the Commission taking stronger action is the possibility of a government fiscal crisis leading to a banking crisis given that many Italian banks have less strong capital underpinnings than would be desirable. Already higher rates on government bonds have led to higher rates that banks must pay to issue their own bonds. However, banks in other countries have had nine years to rebuild their balance sheets since the euro zone crisis and would be likely to be able to resist. The most vulnerable other country Greece, which has been and continues to comply with strict (many would argue excessively strict) conditions, is still supported through the European Stability Mechanism.

 

The EU is not to blame for Italy’s government debt or general economic problems (some argue that the latter are partly due to euro membership but even if this were so Italy did not have to join the euro). The EU, or more precisely other member state governments, do, however, bear considerable responsibility for the rise of the right-wing Lega based on its hostility  to migration to Italy across the Mediterranean. They did hardly anything to help Italy tackle the issue whether by providing financial support for managing the inflow or sharing those with asylum claims and even blocked migrants crossing borders into Austria and France.  There are no easy answers to how to deal with migrant flows in a way which tries to respect the dignity of these desperate people, but EU countries should try to work together rather than against each other.

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Considering EU democracy promotion as an integral part of EU foreign policy, Evangelos Fanoulis examines the effectiveness of political conditionality in the EU’s advocacy of democratic reforms in developing countries.

© Vlad/AdobeStock

Since its inception in the 1950, the European Union (EU) has tried to spread its democratic principles and values worldwide. These endeavours are broadly known as “EU democracy promotion”.

To a certain extent, such pursuit has been due to a genuine belief that democracy can lead to peace and prosperity for all. From a more pragmatic point of view, the EU institutions believe that democratic governments are more stable politically and therefore readier to get into trading and diplomatic relations. Some scholars have also interpreted the EU’s democracy promotion as indication of guilt for the colonial past of European societies.

Whether the reasons behind EU democracy promotion are pragmatic, idealistic or psychological, the Union has advocated for democratic reforms in developing countries for many years. It does it primarily by imposing political conditions in trade or exchange for development aid.

This means that the EU provides preferential trade agreements and development assistance to regimes that promise to make democratic reforms for the sake of their citizens. In this way, the EU clearly pushes a certain agenda for example, the abolition of death penalty, fair elections, freedom of speech and of the press, the right to protest, in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe.

One crucial question is whether political conditionality has worked or not. The events of Arab Spring are telling. For example, the EU Commission funded Ben Ali’s regime with the European Neighbourhood Policy instruments in order to secure political stability in Tunisia. However, funds stayed with the country’s elites instead of being spent for the well-being of the Tunisian people. Promised democratic reforms agreed under the title of political conditionality got delayed, unemployment rose and the public uprising against the government followed.

Of course, it is difficult to say what could have happened if the EU had pushed more fiercely and openly for democratisation in Tunisia. Yet, there is a sense that having turned a blind eye for the sake of stability in the region the EU failed in its ambitions abroad.

Tunisia, as with other cases, shows that when country politicians are unwilling to stay firm to the agreed agenda of reforms, democratisation fails (Grugel 2007). For instance, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy criticised Guatemala in 2010 for the potential restoration of the death penalty; she condemned the violent suppression of protesters in Kazakhstan in March 2012; and in January 2013 warned Sri Lanka about maintaining an independent justice system. In all three cases, there were prior commitments by the governments of those countries to promote democracy in the context of their agreements with the Union.

The EU has acted in response where commitments have not been followed.  After the military coup in Fiji in 2006, the EU stopped development funds to the country. But to what extent is this an effective strategy to ensure democratisation? Political conditionality on development aid may eventually deprive people of much needed assistance. I doubt that this scenario can be seen as a success story of EU democracy promotion. At least, not from a normative perspective.

So far, the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion appears pessimistic. Yet, for the EU, both institutions and member-states, democracy promotion remains a policy priority. As I have argued, however, this sometimes fruitless effort is part of who EUropeans are. In an EU of different nations, languages, cultures, and historical experiences, the idea of democracy became a common point of reference. As the EU appears to move from an era of democratic politics to an era of populist politics, let us hope that this common point of reference will endure.

This piece draws on the article The EU’s Democratization Discourse and Questions of European Identification in JCMS Vol. 56 Issue 6.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of  Ideas on Europe, JCMS or UACES.

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Evangelos Fanoulis | @EvansFanoulis

Evangelos Fanoulis is Lecturer in international relations at Xi’an Jiaotong- Liverpool University (XJTLU). His main research interests lie within democracy and populism in the EU, Euroscepticism, European security governance, EU-China relations and post-structuralist IR theory.

 

 

 

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In all democracies, it’s essential that elections – including referendums – are run fairly, and that the regulatory authority has the power to annul an election or referendum if serious irregularities may have affected the result.

That’s not just my opinion. Such a requirement forms part of the Venice Commission’s ‘Code of Good Practice on Referendums’.

Although the code is voluntary and not legally binding, the UK is one of the 61 member states of the Commission and helped to form the Code, which was adopted in 2006. The Commission advised me:

“The Code was and is strongly supported by the Committee of Ministers recommending to the member States to respect its provisions.”

The Venice Commission is an advisory body of the Council of Europe, and the UK’s Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, currently sits on its Committee of Ministers.

Clause II 3. 3 e) of the Venice Code states:

‘The appeal body must have authority to annul the referendum where irregularities may have affected the outcome. It must be possible to annul the entire referendum or merely the results for one polling station or constituency. In the event of annulment of the global result, a new referendum must be called.’

In the UK, our Electoral Commission is the independent regulatory body for elections and referendums, set up by Parliament to “regulate political finance in the UK” and to “promote public confidence in the democratic process and ensure its integrity.”

I asked the Commission if they have the power to annul a referendum, in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Code.

They replied:

“In short, no we do not have the power to annul an election or referendum.”

If the Electoral Commission had the power to annul a referendum, then it’s unlikely that members of the public would now be needing to call on the High Court to declare the EU referendum “void” as a result of serious irregularities.

The Venice Commission’s Code states that a final appeal to a court must be possible.

The case of Susan Wilson & Others versus The Prime Minister is scheduled to move to a full hearing on 7 December.

The case will argue that Brexit must be declared void and the notification of Article 50 quashed because, “various criminal offences may have been committed”. 

Currently the National Crime Agency’s (NCA) is conducting an investigation into suspicions of “multiple” criminal offences committed by Aron Banks and the Leave.EU campaign that he founded.

Both Leave.eu, and the official Vote Leave campaign, have already been found guilty of breaking electoral law in the referendum.

The Independent reported this weekend that the government is expected to deploy Sir James Eadie QC – the star barrister who led the unsuccessful battle for the government to trigger Article 50 without parliament’s consent – in a sign of the case’s importance.

The lead litigant in the case against the Prime Minister, Susan Wilson, told me this evening:

“Since the outset, the behaviour of the Leave campaigns has undermined British democracy.

“Bad enough that they lied and misled the public on an industrial scale, but they added insult to injury by breaking electoral law.

“The Electoral Commission proved the scale of the misdeeds but have no power to act, so that task was left to members of the public like myself, who felt we had no choice but to act.

“The result of the referendum cannot be trusted and we will argue in court that it should be declared invalid.”

The Electoral Commission’s representative explained to me how the the current law is  time limited in so far as challenging the result of an election or referendum.

“The only way an election result can be challenged is if a petition is launched within 21 days to the Elections Petitions Office at the High Court. We include details in our guidance for candidates which you can see on this link (paragraph 1.10 onwards).

“With regards to the EU Referendum, the referendum result was likewise only subject to challenge by way of judicial review. Any challenge to the EU referendum result must have been brought before the end of six weeks beginning with the certification of the ballot papers counted and votes cast.

“This is set out in paragraph 19 of Schedule 3 to the European Union Referendum Act 2015.”

The spokesperson added:

“As you can see, these processes are set out in law. Any change to the law would be for the Cabinet Office to make. I should add that the UK’s Law Commissions’ made a series of recommendations in 2016 to modernise electoral law which we wholeheartedly support.

“One of their recommendations was to make it easier to challenge an election or referendum result. That would all require a change to the law. So again, you may want to contact the Cabinet Office.”

So, my next call was to the UK government’s Cabinet Office, which is a department of the Government “responsible for supporting the Prime Minister and Cabinet” and ensuring “the smooth running of government”.  In charge of the Cabinet Office is David Lidington, who was previously a Minister for Europe.

I shared the Venice Commission’s code with Mr Lidington’s office and reported back what the Electoral Commission had told me.

I queried why the Electoral Commission does not have the power to annul an election or referendum, as recommended in the Venice Commission’s code.

I also added that whilst the referendum result could only be challenged within six weeks of the referendum taking place:

“Only now are we discovering seriously irregularities in the conduct of certain parties in the EU referendum, long after the expiry of the six weeks.”

I put four questions to the Cabinet Office:

1. What is the government’s view about the Law Commissions’ recommendations, especially in regard to making it easier to challenge an election or referendum result?
2. If serious irregularities are discovered in a UK election or referendum, should it not be possible to challenge this beyond the current very short deadline?
3. Why doesn’t the UK follow the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice for Referendums, by allowing an appeal body (presumably the Electoral Commission in this case) to have the power to annul an election or referendum where “irregularities may have affected the outcome”?
4. Is the government planning any new legislation in this regard?

A spokesperson for the Cabinet Office replied:

“It would be helpful if you could let me know me what is the angle of your story? Are you making the case that the referendum should be annulled because of the Venice Commission’s Code?”

The spokesperson added:

“Your second question I think should be directed to lawyers, it’s not something we could answer.

“With regards to your third question, the Electoral Commission brought out their own report in the Referendum and said it was well run. If you want anymore on that I suggest you ask them.”

So, I went back to the Electoral Commission to ask them if it was still their view that the referendum “was well run” as claimed by the Cabinet Office?

The Electoral Commission responded:

“We published two reports on the EU Referendum. The first one – in September 2016 – focused on the administration of the poll. We reported that the administration of the poll was well-run and still stand by that view.”

The Commission spokesperson continued, however:

“We published a report on the regulation of the referendum in March 2017 and made recommendations to the UK Government about how there need to be improvements made to the rules ahead of any future poll.

“Obviously since the referendum we have concluded a number of investigations into EU campaigners and we continue to call for changes to the law that would make it easier to regulate any future poll.”

I went back to the Cabinet Office (on 13 November) with the following comments regarding their question as to whether my article would put the case for annulling the referendum:

“There are concerns about the conduct of the Referendum campaigns because evidence is emerging of alleged fraud, and criminal acts by Vote Leave, Cambridge Analytica, and Aggregate IQ: illegal overspending, psychologically profiling and targeting people with online ads, based on stolen data.

“This issue has become even more serious because the legal opinion of three barristers is now public on how Vote Leave, and its organiser Dominic Cummings, allegedly committed criminal offences.

“In addition, Leave.eu has been fined the maximum amount possible by the Electoral Commission for multiple breaches of electoral rules, and in addition fined by the Information Commissioner’s Office for serious breaches of data laws.

“Furthermore, suspicions about the source of millions of pounds loaned to Leave.eu by Arron Banks is now the subject of a criminal investigation by the National Crime Agency.

“However, I am not in a position to judge whether these irregularities in themselves were of such a magnitude as to have affected the result of the referendum.

“The point of my email to you, and of my article, was to enquire why it is in the UK that our Electoral Commission does not have the power, as specifically required in the Venice Code of Good Practice for Referendums, to annul an election or referendum result if it is deemed that such irregularities had affected the outcome.

“Are you able to provide an answer?

“I would of course, not expect the government to comment on such a contentious question as to whether the irregularities in the referendum were sufficient to have nullified the result.

“My question was more general: why is there no power by the regulatory authority to annul an election or referendum result if irregularities are discovered that could have affected the outcome? Lawyers may have an opinion on this, but it will depend on the current law, and the powers conferred onto the regulatory body.

“Which comes to my fourth question on what is the government’s view of the UK’s Law Commissions’ recommendations in 2016 to modernise electoral law, especially their recommendation to make it easier to challenge an election or referendum result?

“Does the government support these recommendations? Is the government planning any new legislation in response to the Commissions’ recommendations? If not, why not?

“I look forward to your reply.”

The next day (Wednesday 14 November) the Cabinet Office spokesperson replied:

“Apologies I’ve not been able to get a response today. I’m hoping to come back with a response first thing tomorrow.”

The next morning, Thursday 15 November, I received the following reply:

“An Act of Parliament is required before any UK-wide referendum can be held. There are thorough parliamentary procedures in place to ensure that any referendum legislation is scrutinised and debated.

“The European Union Referendum Act 2015 was scrutinised and debated in Parliament. The Act set out the terms under which the referendum would take place, including the means by which a challenge of the referendum result could be brought.”

This seemed to be an entirely inadequate response to my questions to the government.

I asked the Venice Commission to comment, but they replied that they did not ‘have a mandate’ to comment on the situations in member states. I also asked how many of the Commission’s member states have an appeals body that has the authority to annul a referendum or election result in the case of serious irregularity? They plan to have this information available next year.

The Venice Commission (also known as the European Commission for Democracy through Law) is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional law. The Council (which is not part of the European Union) was founded in 1949 to uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Europe.

Although the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Referendums is a voluntary code only, it was set up for a reason and has been accepted by the Committee of Ministers where all member states, including the UK, sit.

In a ‘solemn’ declaration regarding the adoption of the Code in 2004 it was stated that the Committee of Ministers recognised, “the importance of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, which reflects the principles of Europe’s electoral heritage.”

On 27 November 2008, “the Committee of Ministers adopted a Declaration on the Code of Good Practice on Referendums for the purpose of inviting public authorities in the member states to be guided by the Code of Good Practice on Referendums.”

It’s becoming increasingly clear that there were serious and illegal irregularities in the EU referendum of 2016 that, over two years later, we are only now learning more about, with criminal investigations still ongoing.

The law as it currently stands does not provide an easy or effective way to challenge an election or referendum result. This is wrong.

The Venice Code of Good Practice, in point 3.3 on funding also states that:

“In the event of a failure to abide by the statutory requirements, for instance if the cap on spending is exceeded by a significant margin, the vote may be annulled.”*

Leave.eu has been fined the maximum amount possible by the Electoral Commission for multiple breaches of electoral rules, including exceeding the cap on spending by a significant margin. These, I believe, are sufficient grounds to annul the referendum.

But also ongoing are criminal investigations as to the source of £8 million of funds that Arron Banks, the founder of Leave.eu, “loaned” to the campaign. The Electoral Commission suspect that these funds may have come from foreign sources, which would be illegal under UK law. This is currently the subject of a police investigation.

If proven, the case against the referendum being valid would be unassailable.

Commented Dr Ewan McGaughey, Senior Lecturer of Law at King’s College London:

“A fundamental principle of the common law is that votes can be declared void for substantial irregularity.”

He added:

“Most people voted for Brexit because they are honest: they believed promises and arguments about the EU’s democratic deficit or investing in the NHS. 

“It is clear that certain organisers of Brexit were prepared to say anything, do anything, with anyone’s support, to get the result. 

“We need to raise the integrity of public discourse, so this can never happen again.”

We await the verdict of the High Court.

But the bottom line? The referendum result is unsafe. We cannot possibly proceed to change our country forever based on such a dodgy ‘election’.

 

* Until last month, the English version of the Venice Commissions Code of Good Practice on Referendums stated that, “In the event of a failure to abide by the statutory requirements, for instance if the cap on spending is exceeded by a significant margin, the vote MUST be annulled.” However, a review of the Code’s translation from the original French to English revealed that this was a mistranslation and the word “must” should have been “may”. Subsequently, a revised English version of the Code was published on 25 October 2018. The Commission has written to give reassurance that the use of the world ‘must’ in the following code is, however, correct: ‘‘The appeal body must have authority to annul the referendum where irregularities may have affected the outcome.”

 

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________________________________________________________

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Here’s the hypocrisy of Brexit. Brexiters reject the Brexit deal on offer. But Britain is not allowed to reject Brexit.

From the outset of the EU referendum back in 2016, Brexiters couldn’t agree with each other what kind of Brexit they wanted.

Nothing has changed.

There was no agreed plan, blueprint or manifesto for Brexit. And there still isn’t.

Theresa May’s Brexit plan looks set to be roundly rejected by Parliament early next month.

By all accounts, most Brexiters hate it. They want a different kind of Brexit altogether.

But here’s a question for all Leavers: what kind of Brexit did you actually vote for? The answer has to be that you didn’t vote for any kind of Brexit. No one defined what Brexit meant.

Leave was just one word, and the implications of it were never properly spelt out. Brexit didn’t mean Brexit. Leave didn’t mean leave. It was never detailed.

Now we have the detail of Brexit, or “a Brexit”, shocked Brexiters say that isn’t what they wanted. Indeed, the so-called plan doesn’t even include all the details: that’s to be decided over the coming years, when it will be too late.

Brexit politicians only have themselves to blame. Nobody was told what kind of Brexit they might get if they voted for Leave. And we still don’t know for sure.

Brexiters want an opportunity to choose a different kind of Brexit. But at the same time, they want to deny the country an opportunity to choose to reject Brexit altogether.

Like a broken record, Prime Minister Theresa May says there cannot be another vote on Brexit.

“The people were given a vote,” she says ad nauseam. “The people’s vote happened in 2016. And the people voted to leave.”

• But the people didn’t vote for an almighty, calamitous mess, Mrs May.
• The people didn’t vote to have vital foods and medicines in short supply.
• The people didn’t vote to be poorer.
• The people didn’t vote to trash our economy – which before the referendum was the fastest growing in the G7 (now it’s the slowest).
• The people didn’t vote to put at risk peace in Northern Ireland.
• The people didn’t vote for utter uncertainty and chaos, just weeks before we are due to leave.

Now, the evidence is overwhelming that a majority of the UK public not only don’t want the Prime Minister’s Brexit.

They don’t want any Brexit at all.

On 15 November, just one day after the Cabinet “approved” Theresa May’s Brexit deal (although resignations followed later) YouGov sampled the GB population.

The results were that 47% said it’s wrong for Britain to leave the EU, 40% said it’s right to leave, and 13% didn’t know.

The figures have been analysed by Adrian Low, Emeritus Professor of Computing Education at Staffordshire University. He told me:

“If you take out the ‘don’t knows’, add Northern Ireland’s preferences and re-weight the data using the original referendum results, that adds about 4% to the remain majority.

“So, the majority of the UK as a whole (which of course, includes Gibraltar as they were included in the original referendum), it shows that now around 55% want the UK to remain in the EU, and only 44% want to leave.

“That’s a margin of about 11% for Remain. This figure has been growing since last year’s general election.”

Consequently, Professor Low wrote last week to all 650 Members of Parliament to advise them as follows:

________________________

Dear Member of Parliament

More than 50 polls, from a range of different polling companies (YouGov/BMG/Survation/National Centre for Social Research) have sampled Brexit opinion since the 2017 general election.

The results have been consistent and show a clear trend.

[ ∞ Link to graphs and data]

Since the general election, 98% of the polls have shown that the UK public no longer want to leave the European Union.

Two and a half years on since the referendum the majority has moved from 3.8% in favour of leave to between 8% and 12% in favour of remaining in the EU.

A single polling result has, typically, a potential 3% error, but when 50 out of 51 polls from different sources, agree, it is difficult to refute this new ‘will of the people’.

Statistically, the reasons for the changes are, almost certainly:

1. Over half a million older voters who voted 75%:25% in favour of leave, have died.
2. 700,000 new 18-20 year-olds are now able to vote. They have a 67%:33% preference to remain.
3. About 5% of remain voters accepted the democratic decision and 5% now undecided, but 90% still want to remain in the EU.
4. A lower percentage (80%) of leave voters still want to leave, but 20% have changed their minds.
5. Of the 12.9 million who did not vote, there is now a 2:1 majority in favour of remaining.

It seems to me important that you should know these figures, given the decisions you will be making in the near future.

As David Davis said, ‘If a democracy cannot change its mind, it ceases to be a democracy’, and there has been a substantial change of mind swing from the referendum of between 12% and 16% in the direction of remaining in the EU.

We have attempted to illustrate how a three-way ‘Peoples’ vote’ might be conducted at www.ThePeoplesVote.eu.

This does seem a very simple way to conduct a three-way vote and provides a way forward for dealing with the change of will in a democratic and stable manner that should appeal to much of the population.

Best wishes to you over the coming politically turbulent time.

Adrian Low

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If, as now seems close to certain, Parliament rejects Theresa May’s version of Brexit, then the case will be overwhelming to put the decision back to us, ‘the people’, who the Prime Minister so often refers to.

If Mrs May is really interested in acting on the ‘will of the people’ she will surely want to find out what that will is today, over two years after ‘the people’ were last asked.

Now we know what Brexit means, we need a new vote on that, for the very first time.

And if the country votes to reject it, and to remain in the EU, it will mean that’s the new ‘will of the people’.

After all, if Brexit is rejected in a new poll, it will mean that sufficient numbers of Leave voters have changed their minds since the 2016 referendum.

So, Mrs May, you shouldn’t worry that you’d be going against what ‘the people’ wanted two years ago, if they don’t want it any more.

Indeed, if you go ahead with Brexit when the country doesn’t want it, you will be going against the ‘people’s will’.

And you wouldn’t want to do that, would you?

 

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The post The hypocrisy of Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

“That way”

It’s obviously alma mater time for me, as I find myself giving a talk today at LSE on Brexit, just a few days after being back in Bruges. As is usual, I will be blaming any shortcomings on my education.

The LSE talk aims to consider how Brexit plays out and I thought it’s useful to share the general ideas with you here now.

The starting point is that Brexit is a highly unusual event, in comparative political terms. Technically, it’s a withdrawal from an International Governmental Organisation, but with a scale and impact that far exceeds any other instance (remember all that hubbub about the UK leaving UNESCO in 1985? Exactly).

But it’s not like a secession: there’s no monopoly of force issue, nor a heightened chance of armed conflict.

It’s also not like a break-up of an empire, either territorial or colonial; there’s no coercive element and it remains a one-off event.

All of which is to say that the lack of useful points of comparison make it hard to judge quite where this is all going.

Some dynamics

With that in mind, we have to fall back on what we can see happening in practice, to work out if it indicates paths of likely development.

Perhaps the most glaring aspect – for me, at least – is the hardy perennial of this blog: the lack of a strategic direction. If you don’t know what you’re trying to achieve, it’s particularly hard to work out how to achieve it, or even to know if you can or have achieved it.

The focus here is very much on the UK, since the entire process rests on the country’s decision to withdrawal, which the EU has no choice but to accept, given the formulation of Article 50.

That Article, as we’ve heard many times, was written with the assumptions that a) it wouldn’t be used and, b) anyone actually using it would only do so after very careful consideration.

Oops.

The entire period since 23 June 2016 can be characterised as a political system trying to work out why it’s enacting the decision it was handed by the referendum, and what kind of place it wants the UK to become.

The failure to do that reflects on the fracturing of power and mutual-reinforcing blocks that each interest has over the others. No one is strong enough to impose a dominant narrative, but no one is weak enough not to matter.

Not unreasonably, that lack of direction points to a second key feature, namely the efforts to keep change to a minimum.

At each step so far, the government preference has been to avoid making big changes, especially in the short-run. Hence sticking with Article 50 itself, then pushing for a transition period, all the while talking up the desire to keep as comprehensive as possible a future relationship.

The big exception in all this is free movement of people, which has been the most durable of May’s policy preferences. But every around that is intended to stay as close as possible to the current arrangements under membership. Which is to say not very close.

The second consequence of lacking direction has been the willingness to break up the steps of decision-making.

The Article 50 process now reaching its conclusion is not ‘Brexit’; possibly not even close. Yes, it manages the end of UK membership, but the focus of the Withdrawal Agreement is about closing-off past liabilities, rather than setting out the agreed plan for the future.

Anyone who thinks this has dragged on long enough will be in for a rude awakening when they wake up on 30 March next year and find – whatever happens now – that they are still a very long way from the new stable end-state of UK-EU relations.

Finally, the vacillations of the UK over what to do have also contributed to the lack of trust in the negotiations.

That’s most evident with the backstop debate: profound Irish concern about whether any UK government might keep its word on any aspect of maintaining the Good Friday arrangements led very directly to the push for legally-binding commitments, just in case. It’s also why provisions for citizens (and for finances) are in the Withdrawal Agreement, while there’s the best opportunity to avoid future uncertainty.

So where then?

If we take those as our starting points, then three scenarios suggest themselves. As to their likelihood, I’ll say that the first strikes me as much more likely than the other two right now.

That first pathway is muddling-through.

We’ve had repeated moments of crisis in British politics around Brexit, with people resigning and confusion and all the rest.

But in each of those moments, the outcome has been essentially one of sticking with the programme. You saw it in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, after the 2017 general election, after the December 2017 Joint Report, after Chequers.

The commonality was simply that while there was extensive and profound unhappiness with the programme, there was no clear alternative consensus that people had rallied to.

Paradoxically, because May’s plans have been challenged from all sides, that has made it harder to build a single pole of opposition.

With that in mind, we might expect that – somehow – May gets the Withdrawal Agreement through Parliament, the UK leaves the EU next March, then has another crisis as everyone realises they can fight over owning the UK agenda for the future relationship talks, which then drag on to the end of transition, in time for another couple of crises about signing and ratifying that text.

I’ll accept two criticisms of this: firstly, I really don’t understand how May finds that majority now in Parliament, and; secondly, it all sounds a bit self-serving, given my work as a commentator (contact info in the sidebar).

So let’s think about the other possibilities.

One is the ‘Moment of madness’ model.

Essentially, this everyone in Westminster pretending they’re Bobby Ewing and it was all a dream (kids, ask your parents) and stopping the process of leaving the EU. Others can offer you models of how this could happen.

I find this very unlikely, for all that I’ve already said here. There are already so many sunk costs following the referendum, and so many who have staked their political futures on working with that decision, that it seems improbably even at the political level, quite apart from the popular one.

To be clear, this option contains costs, despite what some claim: the past two and a half years can’t be swept under a carpet, with the hope no one brings it up again.

Most importantly, it raises even more questions about the role of politics and politicians than the first scenario.

Which opens up a more troubling third model: Rupture.

The distinct failure of the political class (as I’ll style them here) to manage the ‘simple’ decision contained in the referendum does nothing for a system where disengagement and disillusionment are already rife.

The complexities of any negotiated deal, the difficulty of not making compromises on positions and the continued feeling of uncertainty about this thing that people might not fully understand, but know is important, all open up an opportunity for a new populist agenda.

“How difficult can it be? Well actually, it’s dead simple” would be the general refrain of some charismatic individual, promising to sweep all this old politics away and do things right.

I’m hazy on how they suggest doing that, but I’ll say for sure that it involves a really simple solution.

(pro tip: complex situations never have simple solutions).

But really, where?

None of this is set in stone, or even in a much softer material, for the opening comments: this is not like anything that’s come before it.

Most important then has to remain the message that there are choices to be made and if you don’t make them, then others will.

The post How’s this all going to end? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Like an irritating parrot, the Prime Minister Theresa May keeps repeating that she’s delivering the ‘people’s will’ and ‘there won’t be a people’s vote’.

The two phrases are incompatible. They oppose each other.

The irritating parrot may as well say, “Welcome to my home” and “Get out of my house”. Or, “I believe in democracy” and “Shut up! You’re not allowed another say.”

Theresa May may be described as a tough bird, but as far as facing up to us, the people, she’s a chicken.

She daren’t ask us what we now think about Brexit, because she knows the likely answer will be, “Get stuffed. We don’t want Brexit.”

Nobody knew what Brexit meant in the referendum, and in that referendum Mrs May herself advised the country that staying in the EU was in our best interests.

Parrot or chicken, she’s got some neck.

• Telling us on the one side of June 2016 that Brexit will harm the country, our trade, our economy, our security and the cohesion of the United Kingdom.
• Then on the other side of June 2016, telling us that she’s the one who’ll deliver all the things she told the country not to do.

Ever since then she’s been squawking what Brexit means. It means Brexit. It’s red white and blue. But her phrases meant nothing to no one. It was for the birds.

But now, over two years after that fateful day on 23 June 2016, Mrs May has delivered over 500 pages of what Brexit means (or at least, what the divorce settlement means – we still don’t know what our future relationship with Europe will mean).

And what do you know? Nobody wants it. Remainers don’t want it. Brexiters don’t want it.

Several of her Brexit ministers, their feathers ruffled by a Brexit that was not in their image, have flown the nest.

They’re now roosting in a furtive corner, plotting ways to oust Mrs May and re-arrange the pecking order of the government.

The rest of the government are in a flap, running around like headless chickens. They’re hoping to get their Brexit plan through on a wing and a prayer.

Of course, it’s doomed. Brexit is one big bad egg.

Last Thursday, Mrs May went to the House of Commons to explain her recipe for Brexit. But she was in for a roasting. MP after MP stood up to say they didn’t want it. Her Brexit plan, they said, was as dead as a dodo.

Oh yes, Mrs May certainly looked as sick as a parrot.

But she was defiant too. She’d see Brexit through. She was delivering the will of the people. And no, you can’t have a people’s vote. Parrot, parrot, parrot.

Ever since Mrs May started on the road to Brexit (a road she previously told us not to travel) she has wanted to thwart democracy.

No, Parliament couldn’t have a say on triggering Article 50, she said. The decision was made by the referendum.

But she lost that argument in the courts.

Both the High and Supreme Courts confirmed that the referendum was advisory only. Only Parliament has sovereignty in the UK, the courts ruled, and Parliament must have the final say.

Last year, when the government produced impact assessments on Brexit, Mrs May and her government refused to reveal what they were. Parliament had to force the government to reveal them.

And it’s been the same this week.

Mrs May’s government didn’t want to show Parliamentarians the government’s detailed assessments of her Brexit plan, agreed last week with the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier.

Jo Johnson, a transport minister in Mrs May’s government, who resigned last week because he couldn’t support that plan, has turned out to be quite a wise owl.

During the Commons debate on this issue last night he said:

“If we have learned anything from the chaos of the past 30 months, it is that facts are sacred. This debate has been characterised by falsehoods and misinformation from day one.

“It is extraordinary that we have now had to force the Government, at this relatively late stage, to publish the vital information necessary for an informed public debate. Some may say that this horse has long bolted, but I say it is better late than never.”

That’s a feather in your cap, Mr Johnson (Jo, not Boris).

Today, Mrs May lost yet another attempt to thwart democracy and justice.

The Supreme Court ruled against a government attempt to stop the European Court of Justice from ruling on whether the Article 50 notice could be unilaterally revoked by the UK.

A cross-party group of MPs, MEPs and MSPs, along with Jolyon Maugham QC, the director of the Good Law Project, had asked the Scottish courts to rule that the case should be referred to the European court in Luxembourg for an urgent ruling.

So, despite Mrs May’s attempt to stop the course of justice, the European Court of Justice will now hear the case on 27 November.

At every awkward step of Theresa May towards her cloud-cuckoo Brexit, she has tried to circumvent both democracy and justice.

To pass Brexit, she has attempted to bypass Parliament, and spent millions of pounds of our money on legal fees in what turned out to be a futile, and time consuming, journey through the courts.

To pretend that her Brexit was democratic, she has had to keep referring to ‘the will of the people’:

• despite the fact that the referendum is now over two years old;
• despite the fact that the win for Leave was wafer thin;
• despite the fact that Leave only won with a pack of lies;
• despite the fact that only a minority of registered voters voted for Leave (just 37%);
• despite the fact that the referendum has now been entirely discredited, with irregularities so serious that the referendum result cannot be considered safe,
• and, despite the fact that poll after poll now show that most people in the country want another vote on Brexit, and that in a new vote, Remain would win.

So, it’s clear that Brexit is not now the ‘will of the people’ (and probably never was – nobody really knew what it meant).

Mrs May thinks that those who are calling for a new vote are ‘the enemies of democracy’. But this is what psychologists call ‘projection’.

Psychological projection involves someone denying the existence of bad qualities in themselves while attributing them to others. (For example, a person who is habitually rude may constantly accuse other people of being rude.)

This is what Mrs May is doing every day. She is attempting to project on to us her crimes, so that we are blamed.

But it is her that is guilty. She is the enemy of democracy. She is the enemy of justice. She is the enemy of the people.

Her Brexit plan is bird-brained. Both Brexiters and Remainers want to kick it into the dust. The chances of it getting through Parliament are close to zero. It’s a dead duck.

Brexit is out of control. The Prime Minister can’t fix it. Parliament can’t fix it.

It’s time for us, the people, to come to the rescue. Ask us. Find out what is today’s will of the people, then act on that. Don’t chicken out.

 

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The fantastic Brexit offered to the nation in 2016 was a mirage. It doesn’t exist. It never did. It can’t be delivered. It was a con-trick.

The ‘alternative’ Brexit now being fobbed off to the nation would never have won approval in the referendum. We don’t want it. Even Brexiters don’t want it. Nobody, absolutely nobody, voted for it.

So, said the Prime Minister Theresa May, it’s her Brexit deal, or no deal, or no Brexit.

Put that on a ballot paper, Prime Minister, and let us have a real choice on this, for the very first time.

(Article continues after 5-minute video).

This is our country. It’s our lives, and our futures, at stake.

How dare you, Prime Minister; how dare you government; how dare you opposition, for not allowing us, ‘the people’, the final say on this.

We demand a new vote. A new vote is entirely democratic. Another vote means more democracy, not less.

As I assert in my 5-minute video(above), in a true democracy, voters are allowed to change their minds.

Put your deal, or no deal, or no Brexit, to the country. Let us decide. Put your trust in the people.

If you don’t, this matter will never be settled. It will sit, like festering, fetid, faeces, smouldering forever in the pit of the nation’s stomach, never to be expelled.

You cannot do this to us.

Relieve yourself of the burden of responsibility for this entire mountain of shit that you and your lot have created.

Put the choice back to us, the people. Only dictators would do otherwise. Restore democracy to Britain. Give us a new vote on Brexit. And do it now.

*Latest polling shows that a majority of Britons now want another vote on Brexit, and don’t want Brexit.

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We demand a new vote

→ Britain demands a new vote on Brexit – Please shareVOTERS ARE ALLOWED TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS – 5-min videoThe fantastic Brexit offered to the nation in 2016 was a mirage. It doesn’t exist. It never did. It can’t be delivered. It was a con-trick. The ‘alternative’ Brexit now being fobbed off to the nation would never have won approval in the referendum. We don’t want it. Even Brexiters don’t want it. Nobody, absolutely nobody, voted for it.So, said the Prime Minister Theresa May yesterday, it’s her Brexit deal, or no deal, or no Brexit. Put that on a ballot paper, Prime Minister, and let us have a real choice on this, for the very first time.This is our country. It’s our lives, and our futures, at stake. How dare you, Prime Minister; how dare you government; how dare you opposition, for not allowing us, ‘the people’, the final say on this. We demand a new vote. A new vote is entirely democratic. Another vote means more democracy, not less. As Jon Danzig asserts in his 5-minute video, in a true democracy, voters are allowed to change their minds. Put your deal, or no deal, or no Brexit, to the country. Let us decide. Put your trust in the people. If you don’t, this matter will never be settled. It will sit, like festering, fetid, faeces, smouldering forever in the pit of the nation’s stomach, never to be expelled. You cannot do this to us. Relieve yourself of the burden of responsibility for this entire mountain of shit that you and your lot have created. Put the choice back to us, the people. Only dictators would do otherwise. Restore democracy to Britain. Give us a new vote on Brexit. And do it now.• Words and 5-minute video by Jon Danzig. Please share to the nation – before it’s too late.* Latest polling shows that a majority in Britain now want another vote on Brexit, and don't want Brexit. news.sky.com/story/majority-of-brits-now-against-brexit-and-back-second-eu-referendum-sky-data-poll-11555078• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1063342664601530369

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Thursday, 15 November 2018

 

The post Britain demands a new vote on Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Yesterday’s publication of the provisional final text of the Withdrawal Agreement (and associated Political Declaration) marks a crucial point in the process of Brexit, opening the door to an approval and ratification process and the first major step in establishing a new basis for UK-EU relations.

Weighing in at nearly 600 pages of text, it’s easy to get lost in the details, so what basic messages can we extract from it?

Most of this is about the past, not the future…

As the name implies, the Withdrawal Agreement is largely concerned with the ending of the UK’s membership of the EU. That means the tying off of existing arrangements and the creation of interim management structures and processes.

Hence a lot of the text is occupied with marking out what stops and what liabilities remain and require attention. In that latter camp we can find provisions on finances and on citizens (who have been a rather marginal concern in the negotiators’ scheme of things, it has to be said).

In that sense, the main thrust of this is backward-looking and points to the extent of the EU’s entanglement with the UK that now has to be unpicked: bear in mind that this document – lengthy though it is – is dwarfed by the pile of acquis that the UK will have to work through under the mechanisms of the Withdrawal Act.

This might be a source of frustration to the casual observer, who might be forgiven for thinking that all the debate might have produced light on the future direction than the rather bland Political Declaration.

…but what there is on the future will matter

However, that Declaration – with its commitments to work together to maintain cooperation in a wide range of areas – is not the only part of the text that concerns the future.

As has been discussed at very great length, the Withdrawal Agreement also contains provisions on the ‘backstop’ to the Irish dimension.

As anticipated, this now takes the form of a complex protection of the current open border between the two parts of the island of Ireland: should it not be possible to put into effect a comprehensive future trade deal by the end of transition, then a UK-wide customs arrangement will come into effect, with lots of regulatory alignment to ensure that border checks are kept to an absolute minimum. That alignment also reduces the risk to the EU of the UK exploiting its access to the single market by undercutting standards.

If this had been evident for some time, it is important to stress two aspects of this that were less so.

Firstly, the Political Declaration places this customs arrangement in a central position for the future relationship, forming the basis for that comprehensive cooperation. This is likely to cause many headaches for the hard Brexit opponents of the text, given the potential limiting of UK free trade agreements with other countries.

Secondly, while there is now a one-off extension to the transition period, this will still not be long enough to conclude the treaties envisaged in the Declaration. Indeed, it is telling that the published draft doesn’t actually say how long that extension will be (although it’s likely to be one year, given other references in the text), highlighting just how contentious this point will be.

The brevity of transition means that all of the backstop arrangements are very likely to come into effect, raising the stakes for all involved, despite Michael Barnier’s words on the intention never to have to use them.

There will be no simple model of Brexit

Often overlooked in all this is the fact that this stage of Brexit – the ending of UK membership – was always going to be the easier and more contained part. It’s been overlooked mainly because it has been so difficult and sprawling.

But the agenda was very limited in Article 50 negotiations and the options relatively constricted: there were only a small number of ways to handle each of the elements.

By contrast, the future relationship contains multitudes. Each paragraph of the Political Declaration contains possibilities that might run to many hundreds of pages of a future deal, all framed by the same legalese that we find in the current texts.

And this is not very transparent.

Possibly, it’s not meant to be: the burying of the specifics of the backstop is a case in point on the political exigency of not saying too explicitly what you mean.

But for a British public that already has low levels of confidence in the process and the outcomes, such obfuscation can only heighten their sense of disengagement.

It also raises the risks of individuals misrepresenting what this represents: a considered attempt to move to a new post-membership relationship.

It may not be pretty, but for now it is the only text on the table and it cannot and should not be ignored.

The post Three messages from the Withdrawal Agreement appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Workshop participants

How do new technological developments influence security in Europe? What role do drones, artificial intelligence and social media play in contemporary European society and security? And what to expect from recent trends in European Union’s (EU) security policy such as plans to fund defence research? These were some of the questions addressed at the workshop ‘Science and Technology Studies and the study of Europe’ that took place at University of Bath, UK on 6-7 November 2018.

 

This workshop was organized by the ‘INTERSECT: Technology-Security-Society Interplays in Europe’ research network that promotes academic research and public debate in this novel area on the interplays between technological developments, security practices, and societal changes in Europe. Its focus includes topics such as cybersecurity, surveillance, counter-terrorism and dual-use research and development. Launched in 2017, INTERSECT is one of research networks supported by UACES – The academic association for contemporary European Studies. The workshop was organized in cooperation with the Nordic Centre of Excellence for Security and Technologies and Societal Values (NordSTEVA). This was the second INTERSECT workshop following ‘Rethinking the Technology – Security Nexus in Europe’ last year in Malmö, Sweden.

 

The programme of this thought-provoking two-day workshop in Bath included a range of interrelated theoretical and empirical topics that explored changing technology and security interplay in Europe by combining insights from Science and Technology Studies (STS), European Studies, International Relations as well as other disciplines and research fields. These were presented and discussed by some 20 researchers from all over Europe in three sessions, a keynote address and a concluding roundtable.

 

In the first session, Derek Bolton discussed information warfare in the modern age, while Tom Hobson suggested to use STS concepts of co-production and socio-technical imaginaries to think more critically about relationship between technology and warfare. In light of EU’s recent developments of setting up defence research programme, Jocelyn Mawdsley asked some timely questions about what can be expected from EU defence research funding and what can be learnt from the United States in this respect.

Keynote by Professor Mireille Hildebrandt

In the second session, Brett Edwards presented his forthcoming book ‘Insecurity and Emerging Biotechnology. Governing Misuse Potential’ discussing ethical considerations and security dilemmas related to emerging technologies. Chantal Lavallée explored the EU’s support for the development of drone sector, while Raluca Csernatoni focused on power dynamics in another ‘hot’ dual use technology field, namely, Artificial Intelligence. In her broad-ranging keynote ‘Law, Science, Technology and Security (LSTS) Studies: Legal Protection by Design’, Professor Mireille Hildebrandt addressed numerous conceptual and empirical questions emphasizing the need to scrutinise security technologies and to involve those who will suffer the consequences.

 

In the third and final session, Inga Ulnicane presented on responsible dual use research and changing research funding landscape in the EU that involves support for civilian, dual-use and since recently also defence research. Two final presentations in the workshop showcased research from the European Research Council funded project ‘FOLLOW – Following the Money from Transaction to Trial’. Tasniem Anwar demonstrated how social media activities such as WhatsApp messages have become essential legal evidence in terrorism financing court cases. Her colleague Esmé Bosma explained her research on how private banks use transaction monitoring system to counter terrorism financing.

Inga Ulnicane talking about responsible dual use in the European Union

In the final workshop roundtable, André Barrinha, Kristofer Lidén, Karen Lund Petersen and Bruno Oliveira Martins took stock of and identified future directions in this highly interesting and relevant research and policy area. One of the themes that emerged was the importance of bringing in public in anticipating and evaluating future technologies, their ethical and legal aspects as well as their potential uses in security field. That would democratize and make the process of developing and applying security technologies more transparent. A number of exciting topics and questions for future research and debate were outlined including the need to overcome gendered nature of security and technology fields, to go beyond artificial distinction between politics and economics of technologies in international relations and to address dilemmas such as security versus academic freedom.

 

The post Making sense of changing relationships between technology, security and society in Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On Remembrance Sunday we commemorate the contribution of British and Commonwealth military and civilian servicemen and women in the two World Wars and later conflicts.

November 11, 2018 also marks the 100th anniversary since the end of the First World War, Armistice Day.

Of course, we must never forget those who gave their lives in service to our country. We especially owe a great debt to all those who helped to save this country – and the rest of Europe – from the terrible onslaught of the Nazi regime in the Second World War.

But as well as remembering all those who fought so hard and valiantly during times of war and conflict, we should also remember all those who worked so hard and valiantly to help to avoid wars and conflicts.

The European Economic Community – later to be called the European Union – was started in the aftermath of the Second World War with one purpose and one purpose alone: to avoid wars on our continent ever happening again. (Article continues after 4-minute video).

That was the passionate resolve of those who are regarded as the eleven founders of the European Union, including our own war leader, Winston Churchill.

After all, Europe had a long and bloody history of resolving its differences through war, and indeed, the planet’s two world wars originated right here, on our continent.

So the EU was never just an economic agreement between nations.

It was always also meant to be a social and political union of European nations to enable them to find ways not just to trade together, but to co-exist and co-operate in harmony and peace on many levels as a community of nations.

The goal, in the founding document of the European Union called the Treaty of Rome, was to achieve ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (which is rather different to ‘ever closer union of nations’.)

Just one year after the Second World War, in 1946, Winston Churchill made his famous speech in Zurich, Switzerland in which he said:

“We must build a kind of United States of Europe. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important.”

At the time Churchill did not envisage Britain joining the new Union of Europe, but he was later to change his mind.

In March 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) was established by its six founding nations, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg.

This was a remarkable achievement, considering that these countries only a few years previously had been fighting in a most terrible war, and four of the founding nations had been viciously subjugated by another of the founders, Germany, during their Nazi regime.

In a speech four months later in July 1957 at Westminster’s Central Hall, Churchill welcomed the formation of the EEC by the six, provided that “the whole of free Europe will have access”. Churchill added, “we genuinely wish to join a free trade area”.

But Churchill also warned:

“If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us. It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.”

Maybe this is the point that many Brexiters simply don’t get.

Here in Britain we don’t seem to understand the founding purpose of the European Union – and on the rest of the continent, they don’t understand why we don’t understand.

The European Union isn’t just about economics and trade, and never was.

It’s about peace, and a community of nations of our continent working together for the benefit and protection of its citizens.

We are now rebuffing our allies in Europe, telling them by our actions and words that the precious, remarkable and successful post-war project to find peace and security on our continent isn’t as important to us as it is to them.

Will our friendship and relationship with the rest of our continent ever recover?

• Article and video production by Jon Danzig

• Photo: central Rotterdam on 14 May 1940 after the bombardment by German war planes. Around 900 people died and vast swathes of the city were destroyed in the bombing. Almost 80,000 people lost their homes when parts of the city became ‘a sea of fire’. Photo: German federal archives via Wikimedia Commons.

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The EU was started for peace

→ On Remembrance Sunday, let's also remember peace – Please shareTHE EU WAS STARTED FOR ONE PURPOSE: PEACE – Video 4 minsOn Remembrance Sunday we commemorate the contribution of British and Commonwealth military and civilian servicemen and women in the two World Wars and later conflicts.November 11, 2018 also marks the 100th anniversary since the end of the First World War, Armistice Day.Of course, we must never forget those who gave their lives in service to our country. We especially owe a great debt to all those who helped to save this country – and the rest of Europe – from the terrible onslaught of the Nazi regime in the Second World War.But as well as remembering all those who fought so hard and valiantly during times of war and conflict, we should also remember all those who worked so hard and valiantly to help to avoid wars and conflicts.The European Economic Community – later to be called the European Union – was started in the aftermath of the Second World War with one purpose and one purpose alone: to avoid wars on our continent ever happening again.That was the passionate resolve of those who are regarded as the eleven founders of the European Union, including our own war leader, Winston Churchill.After all, Europe had a long and bloody history of resolving its differences through war, and indeed, the planet’s two world wars originated right here, on our continent.So the EU was never just an economic agreement between nations.It was always also meant to be a social and political union of European nations to enable them to find ways not just to trade together, but to co-exist and co-operate in harmony and peace on many levels as a community of nations.The goal, in the founding document of the European Union called the Treaty of Rome, was to achieve ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (which is rather different to ‘ever closer union of nations’.)Just one year after the Second World War, in 1946, Winston Churchill made his famous speech in Zurich, Switzerland in which he said:“We must build a kind of United States of Europe. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important.”At the time Churchill did not envisage Britain joining the new Union of Europe, but he was later to change his mind.In March 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) was established by its six founding nations, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg.This was a remarkable achievement, considering that these countries only a few years previously had been fighting in a most terrible war, and four of the founding nations had been viciously subjugated by another of the founders, Germany, during their Nazi regime.In a speech four months later in July 1957 at Westminster’s Central Hall, Churchill welcomed the formation of the EEC by the six, provided that "the whole of free Europe will have access". Churchill added, "we genuinely wish to join a free trade area".But Churchill also warned:“If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us. It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.”Maybe this is the point that many Brexiters simply don’t get.Here in Britain we don’t seem to understand the founding purpose of the European Union – and on the rest of the continent, they don’t understand why we don’t understand.The European Union isn't just about economics and trade, and never was.It’s about peace, and a community of nations of our continent working together for the benefit and protection of its citizens.We are now rebuffing our allies in Europe, telling them by our actions and words that the precious, remarkable and successful post-war project to find peace and security on our continent isn't as important to us as it is to them.Will our friendship and relationship with the rest of our continent ever recover?• Article and video production by Jon Danzig, a campaigning journalist and founder of Reasons2Remain.• Photo: central Rotterdam on 14 May 1940 after the bombardment by German war planes. Around 900 people died and vast swathes of the city were destroyed in the bombing. Almost 80,000 people lost their homes when parts of the city became ‘a sea of fire’. Photo: German federal archives via Wikimedia Commons.• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1061571453169082368• This video is now available on the Reasons2Remain YouTube channel. Please share to your friends who don't use Facebook: youtu.be/7CjzrmUjres Before commenting on the Reasons2Remain campaign page, please read our new Rules of Engagement: Rules.Reasons2Remain.com********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend Reasons2Remain in the reviews section. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE #FINALSAY

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Sunday, 11 November 2018

The post The EU was started for one purpose: peace appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In one of those “politics as cock-up not conspiracy” moments, this week saw the (aggressive) leaking of a document purporting to be the government’s plans for selling the Withdrawal Agreement.

I say aggressive, since the leaker pushed it out to several media outlets at once, so really wanted it out there, spelling mistakes and all.

The government has distanced itself from the paper, and the general view seems to be that – at most – it’s an early draft from someone not that central to the negotiations. Even the reflected glory of seeing the guy I work with get mentioned as a thought-leader doesn’t make it any more valuable than that.

But it does raise the question of how the government will go about selling whatever deal it gets.

In that, the leak does point towards a pretty credible direction.

Rather than trying to pretend it’s all hunky-dory, the suggestion is that it be presented as a “measured success”, where the UK has fought for its interests and done as well as could be expected in the circumstances. That allows defenders/promoters to deflect some of the criticism by saying that while there are indeed some parts that aren’t ideal, they are the price of getting concessions elsewhere and/or they were points that the EU absolutely couldn’t be bidded on.

From that starting point, the plan would then move to a twin-track approach: pushing the necessary legislation hard and fast through Parliament, while simultaneously gridding up media activity to get buy-ins from the great and the good. In essence, the momentum of all of this would be beneficial to getting things over the line, in terms of UK ratification.

But does this stand up?

In one sense, the government isn’t going to have much choice in the matter, since they cannot achieve an agreed text that gives them everything they want, because the EU will not agree to it. That means they have to accept that there are compromises, since it would be completely indefensible to pretend it was an unqualified success, leaving them open to the charge of being out of touch with the realities of the situation.

Given this, and assuming they don’t want to go down the route of pleading for mercy from the Tory backbench and Parliament – also not a hot look – they have to play the line of “we’ve done our very best and we’re pretty happy about it, generally speaking”.

The difficulty comes in whether this necessity can be transformed into a successful ratification.

The first issue will be that of timing: can the government move rapidly from a signed deal to a legislative proposal? Even if one assumes that there is a draft Withdrawal and Implementation Bill floating around, waiting for some Ctrl-C-V action, there will still be a number of delays. Any European Council agreement-in-principle will then need some times – probably weeks – to produce a legally-tight text for signing, just as the draft Bill will need work to review in light of the final deal.

Given the speed of modern politics, that’s a huge window in which opposition can mobilise on specific issues and own the debate.

Secondly, much of the potential support from outsiders is likely to be a bit ambivalent. Yes, a deal is good, for the certainty it provides into the transition period, but by necessity it doesn’t commit the parties to a particular form of future relationship, so there’s a lot of wait-and-see about it. So everyone with a preference about the future will be torn between stressing what they do like about the omens contained therein, and worrying about the bits they don’t like.

Put differently, the Withdrawal Agreement is about ending the UK’s membership, not setting out the future.

Finally, the plan relies on a relatively cohesive Cabinet, willing to go out and sell the deal. While the Chequers reshuffle of the summer removed the most problematic individuals on that front, it’s not hard to imagine further ructions as the grid swings around to the less-enthusiastic members. Any resignations will give an opportunity to opponents to switch the narrative to ‘Cabinet splits’, potentially freeing backbenchers from some of their sense of duty to support the party line (and encouraging opposition parties to prod the wound in the hope of forcing a motion of confidence and early elections).

But notwithstanding all these dangers, we come back to the earlier point: the government doesn’t have much choice in the matter. Right now, as staffers work to produce a similar-but-different version of the leaked document, the emphasis will have to be on how to manage and mitigate the risks that have to be run. And we’ll see how that goes sooner, rather than later.

The post Selling the Withdrawal Agreement appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Before discussing any implications of Brexit for UK standards and regulations, let us remind ourselves what are standards and why are they important.  Standards are a range of powerful marketing and business tools for businesses and institutions of all shapes and sizes. They can be used to adjust performance and manage risks, while operating more sustainably and efficiently. They allow businesses and institutions to demonstrate the proof of quality for their products & services to potential customers and can assist to merge best practices into the corporate structure. Standards represent a range of very coherent ways of information sharing between governments and businesses about what should be considered as a norm.

The British Standards Institution, (aka BSI, which produces technical standards on a wide range of products and services, and also provides certification and standards-related services to businesses), has been appointed by the UK Government (HMG) to act as the UK National Standards Body (NSB). In this role, BSI is responsible for the structures that enable the UK to participate in national, European (please note – ‘European’, not EU) and international standards-making systems and for overseeing the range of these standards which are currently valid in the UK.

Through the BSI, the UK participates in the European  (please note again – ‘European’, not EU) Standardisation System, with BSI as a full member of CEN (European Committee for Standardisation), CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation) and ETSI, as well as in two international standards-making systems ISO and IEC.

This is a very important distinction. Although CEN, CENELEC and ETSI  develop European standards, not ‘EU standards’ (they include NSB from countries outside the EU, including Ukraine, and are not official agencies of the European Union but rather private members associations owned by their members  including BSI, are entirely private bodies, and therefore not part of the EU’s institutional framework), nevertheless, their standards are “EN” EU (and EEA) standards, according to EU Regulation 1025/2012.

Such ‘Single Standard model’ is valid among many industries and enables companies and individuals to work and trade in the EU single market. This principle is called reciprocity, to make business as smooth as possible across national borders.

The overwhelming majority of standards being in existence in the UK are international in nature (over 95%), while the number of UK-only standards is rather small. Over 1,500 of them are withdrawn annually (e.g. there used to be 160,000 British Standards, now reduced to 19,000 Single Standards).

However, some standards are conjoined with relevant EU regulations (less than 20% in Europe) and are known as ‘harmonised standards’ (we have discussed them briefly in a previous blog).

Immediately after the Brexit referendum in 2016, the British Standards Institution , has conducted a webinar on the Brexit implications for standards and regulations in the UK. This webinar was further endorsed/supported in 2018 by another BSI statement.

As regard CEN and CENELEC. the BSI’s continued membership should not accordingly be affected by Brexit. Some adjustment to the internal rules of CEN and CENELEC may be necessary to assure this and steps are in hand to bring this about. There are no such adjustments required in the case of ETSI.

If the UK does not maintain its full membership of CEN and CENELEC through BSI, British stakeholders would lose their influence over the content of the standards used in the 33 other member countries and British industry would face increased barriers to trade (BSI membership of the two international standardization organizations, ISO and IEC, will be unaffected by the UK’s exit from the EU).

In its position paper “European standards and the UK” the BSI raised a series of five principal questions:
1. What are standards and why are they important for industry?
2. What is the European Single Market?
3. What benefits do European standards bring to the European Single Market?
4. How are these benefits delivered?
5. What would be the impact of a UK exit from the EU in terms of UK participation in the European standardization system?

In the same paper the BSI attempted to offer some solutions, which in their opinion will be instrumental in maintaining the status quo. We will analyse some important points of this position paper in the subsequent blogs.

The post Possible outcomes of UK departure from EU and its implications for British standards and regulations appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Professor Amelia Hadfield and Chris Logie
Centre for European Studies (CEFEUS), Canterbury Christ Church University

For keen followers of US politics – and the very many beyond – yesterday’s mid-term elections provided the expected spills and thrills as the results flowed in from east to west. There was a general expectation that the outcome would produce a decent split between a House of Representatives reclaimed by the Democrats and a consolidated Republican Senate.

The House of Representatives: I told you so

© vchalup / Adobe Stock

After a wobble before 2am GMT where the House of Representatives looked close based on the earliest results, the Democrats pulled off a result that largely met expectations. The mid-terms represent the first US-wide elections since the surprise election victory of 2016 when Donald Trump not only assumed the Presidency, but Republicans claimed both branches of Congress.

While it was not precisely the kind of ‘shellacking’ bemoaned by Obama in the 2010 midterm when he lost 63 seats in a Republican wave, the Democrats gain of approximately 34 seats (they needed 23 to ensure a majority) still easily deserves the same ‘wave’ moniker and all the connotations it comes with. The 7% popular margin that the Democrats are estimated to have won with compares very favourably to other ‘Blue wave’-like elections, including 2014 (5.7%), 2010 (6.8%) and 2006 (9.0%). As such the Democratic take-back of the House of Representatives has dealt Trump a clear message from suburban U.S. voters in particular that they are displeased with the ‘toxic rhetoric’ that has characterized Trump’s governing ethos in the past 2 years, and which reached objectionable new heights during the final days of mid-term campaigning. In scooping up these 34 seats, Democrats appear to have been lifted by backlashes in suburban congressional districts, which contain voters who have largely swung back against Trump and the Republican Party from the original 2016 figures.

Indeed, Democrats performed best in districts carried by Mitt Romney in 2012, and Clinton in 2016. A good example of this is the surprise Democrat win in Oklahoma’s 5th district, which registers as 13.5% above the national average in terms of its Republican affiliation, but is also dominated by urban and suburban Oklahoma City, where a range of very different viewpoints helped dilute the overall Trump message. This particular win means that victor Kendra Horn will represent the area as a Democrat for the first time in 44 years. Another seat representative of this same trend is Texas’ 7th district, which voted for Romney by a whopping 21.3% in 2012 but swung dramatically towards Hilary Clinton in 2016, who won it by a mere 1.4%. This year, Democrat Lizzie Pannill Fletcher took the seat from incumbent Republican John Culberson by around 4.7%, which means that the seat has swung even further since 2016. Representing wealthy suburbs near Houston, this seat is something a microcosm of the seats where Democrats did best nationally.

House dynamics for the lower chamber look set to provide some drama. Early this morning, Trump rang Nancy Pelosi, the House Minority Leader to concede defeat. After eight years in the minority wilderness, Pelosi is now a strong bet to reclaim the speaker’s chair, which makes her the single most powerful Democrat in the US, at least until a viable presidential candidate is chosen. What Pelosi chooses to do with this power is key. Can she steer through a batch of new legislation? Or is she destined to be the figurehead of Democrat-instigated gridlock in a Democrat-controlled House, attempting to withstand “the growing pressure on her to step aside for a new generation of Dems”?

The House election was also characterised by the sheer variety of candidates, most notably female representation in Congress, which looks set to reach a record high. This is a trend primarily driven by the Democrats, who fielded more female candidates for congress than any other party has before. The 2018 mid-terms also heralded other exciting female firsts, with Sharice Davids in Kansas’ 3rd district beating the Republican incumbent, to become the first Native American woman in Congress. To this we can add Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, whose victories in solid Democratic seats are truly ground-breaking, as the first Muslim women in the House of Representatives. US veterans are also likely to do well in the House, with a number of Democratic vets successfully challenging Republican incumbents in seats such as Jason Crow in Colorado’s 6th district, as well as Mikie Sherill in New Jersey’s 11th district, Mike Rose in New York’s 11th district and Elaine Luria in Virginia’s 2nd district. While this representation is very different from 1971, when 73% of Congress was veterans, it is an upswing since 2017, when it was just under 19%.

The Senate: be careful what you wish for

On balance, the image of a Trump bloodied at the ballot box hasn’t precisely come to pass. The anticipated “blue wave” of Democrat support was simply not strong enough to erode key states in Senatorial or Gubernatorial areas, particularly in rural areas, as well as the crucial swing state of Florida. The result is that Republicans have retained control of the Senate. The outcome is nowhere near the blustering assertion by Trump that the entire outcome has been a “tremendous success” for his party (you’d expect him to say that, wouldn’t you), but there is a good chance of tremendous ideological impasses that could gum up American governance between 2018-2020.

The US Senate meanwhile represents a terrain in which the average battleground state was 16% more Republican than the US as whole, and unsurprisingly saw incumbent Democratic Senators in red states like North Dakota, Missouri, and Indiana ultimately swamped by basic partisanship. While some Democrats hoped that the moderate stances of these incumbents would ultimately go their way, what carried the day were the substantial margins in races which that were predicted to be far closer. Of the states carried by Trump in 2016 by double-digits (North Dakota, Missouri, Indiana, West Virginia, Montana), only Senator Joe Manchin in West Virginia and Jon Tester in Montana bucked the trend and held on; arguably testament to the strong personal brand of each candidate and their mastery of retail politics in what are relatively small states.

Democrats will also be bitterly disappointed with the loss of their Senate seat in Florida by the narrowest of narrow margins, along with their probable loss in Florida’s Governor race. Both results highlight clear Democratic underperformance in the Southeast, leaving Floridian Democrats scratching their heads wondering what went wrong.1 Interestingly, the one area where a clear return to base partisanship in the Senate has worked in the Democrat’s favour is Nevada, where challenger Jacky Rosen has beaten incumbent Republican Senator Dean Heller by wider margins than the polls had suggested in the only state with a Republican running for reelection in a state that Hilary Clinton won in 2016.

Meanwhile Arizona’s Senate race is also proving to be a close run thing with Republican candidate Martha McSally still slightly ahead of Democrat Kyrsten Sinema. All in all, Republicans look likely to extend expand on the current 51 Republican, 49 Democrat split in the Senate by around three seats, which is arguably near the higher end of their predictions, but within the bounds of what was expected.

In terms of trends, Democrats’ concentration of support in larger US states is becoming a key structural issue regarding their chances in the Senate, a pattern reinforced once again by these mid-terms. We need to bear in mind that while Donald Trump lost the popular vote in 2016, he won 30 states representing 60 seats in the US Senate. This kind of structural challenge is likely to provoke deep concerns among the Democrats regarding their future chances of achieving a Senate majority in the near future.

Of special note are the results from Texas, where charismatic Democrat Beto O’Rourke ran incumbent Ted Cruz in a surprisingly close race, with Cruz only winning by less than 3% (he won in 2012 by 16%) in what amounted to the most expensive Senate race in US history. Despite the outcome, O’Rourke’s narrow margin will give Democrats hope that Texas might at some stage be added to a future ‘blue splash’, with party members suggesting O’Rourke as a presidential contender for 2020.

Governors: Start your engines

At the gubernatorial level, Democrat expectations of a strong showing where largely borne out. Democrats successfully took Illinois, New Mexico, Michigan, Maine, Nevada, Wisconsin and Kansas out of Republican hands. By taking Wisconsin from Governor Scott Walker, Democrat candidate Tony Evers finally achieved what the party had been seeking to do in 2014 and in 2012, when Scott Walker won a rancorous recall election after being elected in the Republican wave of 2010. Meanwhile in Kansas, Democrats scored a real upset by handily beating Trumpian Republican Kris Kobach (who had beaten the incumbent Republican governor in the primary) by over 5%, in a state that Trump had carried by a whopping 20% in 2016. Democrats’ losses elsewhere proved sobering, including Ohio, Georgia and Florida, all of which were considered to be tight races. Democrats had high hopes in particular for Stacy Abrams in Georgia and Andrew Gillum in Florida, to whom recent polls had given a lead. With Ohio and Florida reinforced as 2020 key swing states, Democrats will be disappointed they could not bolster their chances by having incumbent Democratic governors helping drive those states.

Implications: Déjà vu?

Clearly, a Democrat-controlled House has the opportunity to cause major problems for Trump during the final two years of his term as president. This can take a number of forms: first, in general by blocking his legislative plans; second, and more specifically, by dominating key House committees from January onwards to redress legislative decisions in the previous two years, or refashioning policy ambitions between now and 2020; third, both ad hoc and Committee-based requests that are not primarily policy-specific, but aimed at either impeaching Trump, or making his final 24 months in office as uncomfortable as possible (e.g. using subpoenas to request the president’s unpublished tax returns, to insist on a more robust inquiry into Trump’s links with Russia, or any form of behavior deemed to be ultimately unconstitutional.

More broadly, for America as a whole, the results suggests yet more partisanship in Congress as a whole, and ongoing levels of social acrimony, particularly in closely-fought battleground states. Jody Avirgan from Nate Silver’s prediction website FiveThirtyEight for instance argued that “the election is reflecting just how divided we are — urban, rural, rich, poor, different education levels. That gulf continues to grow”. The key themes are ugly ones: anti-migration, anti-immigration, racism, sexism, corporatism, and even unconstitutional options all vie as leitmotifs capable of being boiled down into the reductivist idiocy that passes for Trump’s tantrum tweets. Any and all of these agendas were ushered into DC in 2016 and they have had precious little opposition from members of both houses. Failing to repudiate these narratives may seem a clever strategy helping to speed the Democratic Party’s suburban ambitions across America for the 2020 campaign, but they represent a dangerous blend of toxic populism that operates as blind nationalism at best and deliberate fascism at worst.

What Now?

For some, this is a wasted two years, with the Republicans destined to close ranks behind Trump, whatever their private opinions, increasing the likelihood of his re-election. For others, the race for 2020 is wide open, and the shopping list of both Democratic and Republican contenders is on. Post-election prognostication is a high stakes game, but some are keen to get the party started as early as possible, including Ohio Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown, whose victory speech focused on celebrating “the dignity of work, how we honor organized labor and all workers”, suggesting that Ohio’s message “is the blueprint for our nation in 2020.”

Facts and Trivia

• • Despite their Republican leaning, Idaho, Nebraska and Utah all voted to expand Medicaid access (US Federal health insurance), created by the Affordable Care Act, a.k.a. Obamacare.
  • In a surprise turn of events, Democrats took South Carolina’s 1st district from the Republicans: a seat 10% more Republican than the US as a whole. Incumbent representative Mark Sanford, who had been somewhat critical of President Trump, lost his primary to Trump-backed candidate Katie Arrington, making this loss something of a Republican own-goal.
  • In California’s Orange County-based 48th district, incumbent Republican Dana Rohrabacher lost his seat to Democrat Harley Rouda. Rohrabacher is notable for his strongly pro-Russian views, and referred to in some quarters as “Putin’s favourite congressman”.
  • Thanks to Max Rose’s upset victory in the pro-Trumpy Staten Island district of New York 11, Democrats now hold every single house district in New York City.

• The three states that lifted Trump to the Presidency in 2016 (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan), all have swung back and voted for both Democratic Senators and Governors this year.
• While West Virginia voted for Donald Trump in 2016 by a huge margin of over 40% in 2016 (making it the second most Republican state in the US) popular Democratic incumbent Senator Joe Manchin still managed to win his race by defeating his Republican opponent 49.5% to 46.3%.

1 Caveat Emptor: Due to the thin margins, as of late Wednesday, 7 November 2018, incumbent Democrat Bill Nelson has announced his campaign will request a recount. This is likely to be granted; it is however unlikely that the recount could swing the race by the required 35,000 votes.

The post The Blue Splash? Or Resurgent Red? Assessing the 2018 US Mid-Term Elections appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Journal of Contemporary European Research (JCER) recently published a special issue on the role of civil society in European Union policymaking and democratisation. Editors Rosa Sanchez Salgado and Andrey Demidov explain how it constitutes an original account of what is happening in the member states, beyond the world of well-established organisations in Brussels.

© yuri4u80 / Adobe Stock

This special issue shows first that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play a significant role in EU policymaking in a few member states. Research on Sweden, Spain and Slovenia shows that many CSOs predominantly engage in advocacy activities at the national level to influence EU policymaking. Wealthy national CSOs that would have the means to lobby in Brussels still mainly engage in national advocacy when trying to influence EU affairs; they only seem more inclined to go directly to Europe when there are potential conflicts between the EU level and the national level, as can be the case when it comes to gender equality in Sweden.

When civil society beyond Brussels is taken into account, the picture of the role and functions of European Civil Society Organisations becomes much more diverse and nuanced. The Brussels’ bubble often appears as an elite-system of interest representation with a strong business bias, while CSOs are considered to play a small role in the democratisation of the EU. These findings are valid, but just for a relatively homogeneous context: the Brussels’ system.

When national CSOs in new and old member states and third countries are taken into account, the overall picture is much more nuanced. There is evidence that CSOs usually characterised as weak also take an active role in EU policymaking. Even if those CSOs rarely contact EU institutions directly, they are active members of EU umbrella organisations with regular interactions with national decision makers on EU affairs. These CSOs also play a relevant role in the process of implementation of EU policies by serving as communities that inform and educate their electorates. Further, EU-related topics and ideas are often picked up at the national level by social movements to mobilise citizens or increase the level of politicisation and therefore debate on vital matters, as was seen with the TTIP campaign in Spain.

National CSOs have also contributed to the democratisation of the European public space in ways that would be difficult to comprehend from the perspective of the Brussels bubble. Current studies assessing the democratic potential of CSOs focusing on Brussels-based mechanisms of consultation and participation, while interesting, tend to rely on high normative standards. The picture is very different when scholars actually take stock of current practices of participation or when they take into account how CSOs themselves understand their role in the democratisation of Europe. Thus, our work exposes the gap between normativity as rhetoric and normativity in action.

Many studies on the contribution of European CSOs to democratic governance conclude that EU-based CSOs do not sufficiently represent their members and supporters. This special issue contributes to this discussion with an in-depth examination of the relations between national CSOs and EU umbrellas. Different scholars cover environmental CSOs in Belgium, CSOs defending bi-national family rights in France and feminist CSOs in France and Belgium. These studies show that national CSOs’ expectations regarding EU umbrellas are very different from current normative standards. National CSOs value more the function and the effectiveness of CSOs than the degree to which they represent the view of their members. It therefore suggests that we need to refine or expand our views on what is significant in the minds of societal actors.

These studies also show that the degree of participation of national CSOs and their members depends on a variety of factors, including organisational and cultural factors, without neglecting the individual dimension. The level of internal representation is explained by a complex combination of factors including resources, organisational constraints and cultural specificities. Representation and participation is also related to individual personal and professional backgrounds, as well as the specific vision of Europe held by CSOs’ staff and members.

The same difference between high normative standards and perceptions of CSOs is found when the analysis focuses on CSOs’ functions, as is shown by research on CSOs in four central and eastern EU states and CSOs in two third countries (Georgia and Ukraine). While public officials and the EU seem to focus on input legitimacy, partnership and the representative function of CSOs, CSOs see themselves mainly as political watchdogs. The normative orientations of CSOs focus on increasing the transparency and accountability of the policy process and its deliberative quality.

All in all, the focus on national CSOs beyond Brussels shows the predominance of diversity. This requires original approaches to causality, including multiple causal pathways and openness to a plurality of perspectives regarding normative standards.

This article is based on the authors’ introduction to their co-edited special issue in the Journal of Contemporary European Studies (JCER) Vol 14 No 2 (available open-access here).

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, JCER or UACES.

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Andrey Demidov | @anddemidov

Andrey Demidov is a scientific coordinator at the Institute for Advanced Study at Central European University in Budapest. His research interests include European governance, the role of civil society in EU public policy and participatory governance in Central and Eastern European countries. 

 

Rosa Sanchez Salgado

Rosa Sanchez Salgado is Assistant Professor of European Public Policy at the Department of Political Science of the University of Amsterdam. Her research focuses on European politics and civil society organisations and social movements.

The post Beyond the Brussels Bubble? National Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the European Union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.