Le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018) vient de paraître ! Il consacre un dossier complet à la cybersécurité, enjeu désormais international, et un contrechamps à l’Inde, puissance émergente en devenir. Ainsi qu’à chaque nouveau numéro, de nombreux autres articles viennent éclairer l’actualité, en particulier sur la lutte de l’UE contre le terrorisme, les nouvelles options nucléaires des États-Unis ou la piraterie dans le golfe de Guinée.
Le cyber est sans conteste devenu un élément géopolitique, en ce qu’il façonne, à sa manière, les rapports entre acteurs du jeu international – le dossier proposé par ce numéro de Politique étrangère le rappelle. Mais en même temps qu’il les façonne il les subvertit, en ouvrant de nouveaux champs d’action à de multiples acteurs. Tenter de maîtriser ce nouvel espace stratégique, c’est s’interroger sur la grande diversité des pratiques cyber pouvant mettre en cause notre sécurité, sur l’ensemble des acteurs susceptibles d’y recourir – États, entreprises, groupes mafieux, individus… –, sur les réponses à mettre en œuvre, et sur les régulations internationales possibles. Le tout pour un enjeu essentiel : la sauvegarde de nos libertés individuelles, et de nos souverainetés économiques et politiques.
Au-delà de ce nouveau champ cyber, Politique étrangère s’arrête sur quelques logiques actuelles de recomposition de la puissance. Les pays d’Europe centrale tentent-ils désormais de se définir une place particulière, commune, dans l’Union européenne ? À Washington, les nominations de Mike Pompeo et John Bolton marquent-elles une inflexion « brutaliste » de la diplomatie trumpienne ?
Quant à l’Inde, elle est trop souvent marginalisée dans nos fresques géopolitiques. Son poids démographique, sa dynamique économique, ses choix diplomatiques lui garantissent-ils un poids décisif dans un futur proche ? Ou ses problèmes internes, ses disputes de voisinage brideront-ils durablement son envol de puissance ?
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According to research conducted by Professor Abdul Barakat of Dhaka University, who recently published a book titled “The Political Economy of Reforming Agriculture: Land Water Bodies in Bangladesh,” there will be no Hindus left within Bangladesh within 30 years. He told the Dhaka Tribune: “The rate of the exodus over the past 49 years points to that direction.” From 1964 to 2013, around 11.3 million Hindus were compelled to flee Bangladesh due to religious persecution.
Before the Liberation War, the daily rate of migration was 705 while it was 512 during 1971-1981 and 438 during 1981-1991, the report noted. However, it added that the number increased to 767 persons each day during 1991-2001 while around 774 persons left the country during 2001-2012.
Barakat’s study found that most of the Hindus fled Bangladesh during the Pakistani occupation of the country. According to Shipan Kumer Basu, the President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, “Pakistan’s feudal and military rulers were born anti Bengali language and anti-Bengali. In any way, if the vast majority of Hindus are displaced, it would be easy to rule by dividing the non-communal Bengali nation. From this point of view, the Pakistani military issued the Enemy Property Act in 1965, using the Pakistan-India war as an excuse.”
“Following that, 2.6 million acres of the original ownership of the Hindu community has been occupied or evicted,” Basu added. “Of the 2.6 million acres, about 82 percent is agricultural land, 29 percent is homestead, 4 percent is gardens, 3 percent are waterfalls, 1 percent are ponds and 19 percent of other lands were occupied. Abul Barakat mentioned in his study that the financial loss of the land and water and transferable assets under the Arms Vested Property Act amounted to Tk 650 million.”
Even though Barakat’s study found that most of the Hindus fled Bangladesh during the Pakistani occupation of the country, Dhaka University Professor Ajoy Roy told the Dhaka Tribune that due to the Vested Property Act, which led to the present government taking over the Hindu properties that the Pakistani regime seized as enemy property, 60% of the Hindus were left landless and this is one of the reasons that prompted their mass migration from the country.
Basu noted that aside from the Vested Property Law, there are also cases of Hindus falling victim to false accusations by the legal authorities in Bangladesh so that the authorities can seize their land with greater ease: “Due to a land dispute, Hindu senior lawyer Samar Chowdhury was falsely accused of crimes. The police attempted to portray him as a drug and arms dealer but in reality, he was framed. We demand that the authorities will release him as soon as possible without any conditions. Otherwise, ordinary people will lose their trust in you.”
Bangladeshi writer Sushanto Das Gupta added that under the Awami League government, the very lives of Hindus are also threatened as there are numerous cases of Hindus getting murdered, raped and physically assaulted: “Youth League President Ataur Rahman Selim threatened to murder a number of Hindu families in Habiganj’s Sunaru village. The only purpose is to grab our land without us being in the area. He is threatening us in so many ways, so that we will leave the area and go to India. If we do not leave this country, we will be forced to become Muslim. If we do not comply, then we will be burned in the fire.” According to Basu, this horrible reality is the fate of many Hindus such as a poor egg trader from the village of Dahor Chaluduri, who was critically injured after being attacked with a number of sharp objects merely so that his land could be seized.
The post Bangladeshi Professor: “There will be no Hindus in Bangladesh within 3 decades” appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
The U.S.’ current tempestuous, or stormy, reversals of several recent agreements bode quite ill for its role as the major stakeholder in the current international system. While an argument can be made that these moves are part of a high-risk, possible high-return negotiating strategy, it’s still an unproven strategy at best, with China as the primary opponent in many of the scenarios.
StormRecently, the U.S. has indicated a possible willingness to reschedule its historic summit meeting with the DPRK, originally slated for June 12th in Singapore, after abruptly cancelling it. Actions by both sides have been blamed for the cancellation, ranging from the DPRK’s “unfriendly” tone towards senior U.S. officials, to alleged Chinese influence on the DPRK’s negotiating posture, to the continued U.S.-ROK military exercises (Max Thunder), to the conflation (deliberate or otherwise) of the 2003 and 2011 “Libya models” and their applicability to the current DPRK situation.
With some haling the DPRK’s apparent willingness to still meet with the U.S. at a later date as a victory, it’s a Pyrrhic victory at best, at least in the short-term. This is because the U.S. cancellation of the summit plays into two narratives, one bad and the other much worse. The first situates the DPRK summit cancellation within the context of the U.S.’s previous withdrawals from agreements addressing longer-term issues, such as trade (TPP) and the environment (The Paris Agreement). The second places it in the arc of security issues which could have been addressed in the short-term, but for U.S. capriciousness and schizophrenia. The U.S. violation of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) is the prime example in this line of argument.
Hot AirThe U.S.-DPRK summit had (has?) the potential to lead to a possible renewed Six-Party Talks format, which would address underlying Chinese security interests as well, as the Korean Peninsula is but one of several theaters of increasing great power competition between the U.S. and China currently. Related to this is the U.S. “disinvitation” to China to participate in the biennial RIMPAC exercises, after the original invitation was issued. While Chinese militarization of South China Sea islands was cited, the fact remains that more, not less mil-mil cooperation between the U.S. and China is sorely needed.
The U.S. is in a new (really old) game with China as its revisionist behavior has been cited in the U.S.’ latest National Security Strategy. As a consequence, the U.S. is a lot less hesitant to conflate trade issues with security ones as well. After tariffs, countertariffs, and various other trade actions were announced between the U.S. and China earlier in the year, seeming progress in trade relations was made recently, with ZTE being an example. However, inexplicably, the U.S. earlier this very week announced a list of Chinese items totalling $50 billion in U.S. imports to be subjected to 25% tariffs, with the list to be finalized by June 15th.
As has been noted elsewhere, U.S.-China trade is the primary ballast keeping U.S.-China security competition from truly spiralling out of control. Lastly, this apparent loss of face suffered by the ROK and China in negotiating with the U.S. to solve the DPRK and U.S.-China trade dispute issues, respectively, is not something that’s going to go unnoticed by the global community at large.
BlowbackU.S. recalcitrance on trade issues was, in part, a factor in the recent summit meeting between China, Japan, and the ROK to resolve outstanding trade and economic issues. U.S. tariffs, threatened against its own allies (Japan and ROK), whom it’s looking toward to help contain an adversary (China) through its Indo-Pacific Strategy, whom, in turn, it’s ostensibly looking toward to help it contain yet another adversary (DPRK) is a strategy quite worthy of the most scathing, unrelenting derision. This doesn’t even factor in initial U.S. efforts to also recruit Russia (yet another sanctionee) to help with the DPRK, as well as recent U.S. tarifffs against the EU, Canada, and Mexico.
U.S. frenetic uncertainty is going to have further consequences in the long-term as it finds itself shut out of various diplomatic venues convened to address yet more pressing security issues. Partners and allies aren’t going to fall on their swords and subordinate their own respective national interests to U.S. “resolve” forever.
Whether it’s the Astana talks regarding the Syrian peace process, or the Minsk Protocols (I and II) set to resolve the Ukraine Crisis, U.S. participation is going to have to rise above arming this faction or another, brush off some suits, and get back in the diplomacy game, double-quick. Although it’s not currently sexy, after the Iraq War, and the 2008 Financial Crisis, the Ukraine Crisis is actually the third and final straw which broke the unipolar camel’s back. If the U.S. is going to consistently explain any kind of strategy at all at fora like this week’s IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, also in Singapore, it’s going to have to let the stormy winds die down for a bit.
The post The Tempestuousness of U.S. Foreign Policy Blows in a New Order appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.