Diplomacy & Crisis News

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère
(n° 4/2019). Isabelle Facon propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Strategy (Oxford University Press, 2019, 248 pages).

Après avoir présenté quelques notions clés de stratégie théorique, et en partant du postulat que « l’art de la stratégie ne réside pas dans l’aptitude à formuler un plan au début d’une crise qui anticipera toutes les contingences et fournira une voie claire vers l’objectif espéré » mais qu’« agir stratégiquement requiert de la flexibilité et souvent de l’improvisation », Lawrence Freedman revendique de souligner, à travers le cas ukrainien, « les limites de la stratégie », dont « l’aspect dynamique » est valorisé.

Selon Freedman, en termes de stratégie « les plus gros échecs ont été russes ». Prenant les autres protagonistes par surprise grâce à la rapidité de ses actions et la diversité des instruments mobilisés – jusqu’aux « références perturbantes aux armes nucléaires » –, la Russie n’a pas pris le temps d’évaluer les conséquences de ses choix, guidés par le projet de fragmenter durablement l’Ukraine et de compromettre son rapprochement avec l’Occident. Elle paie aujourd’hui le prix fort – sanctions, consolidation de la société ukrainienne contre la Russie, prudence des autres voisins, confiance réduite dans la parole de la diplomatie russe…

Freedman éclaire les limites du soutien militaire de la Russie aux séparatistes du Donbass, liées à son déni d’engagement dans la zone, et déconstruit l’idée d’une habileté particulière de la Russie dans la guerre de l’information. Ainsi décrite, la stratégie russe en Ukraine nous ramène au contraste entre l’efficacité relative de la politique de Moscou dans les espaces où les affects entrent peu en jeu (Moyen-Orient, Asie) et ses dérapages et erreurs d’appréciation récurrents dans les zones où ils sont exacerbés (ex-URSS, Europe). On appréciera les clarifications apportées sur la pseudo-doctrine Guerassimov et la question de la guerre hybride.

Autre contraste : la prudence de la réponse occidentale au regard du comportement agile de la Russie. « Il n’y a pas eu de tentative de dissuader l’action russe contre l’Ukraine », du fait du rythme des événements impulsé par les Russes, mais aussi des « divergences internes » de l’Union européenne (UE). Après l’annexion de la Crimée, le principal souci de l’UE a été de dissuader la Russie d’aller plus loin dans l’agression. L’administration Obama, en excluant le transfert de matériel militaire létal vers l’Ukraine, s’est privée d’un « levier diplomatique potentiel pour l’avenir ». En fait, il n’y avait pas d’option « qui aurait pu faire l’objet d’un accord des États-Unis et de l’UE tout en évitant de lâcher complètement l’Ukraine ou de risquer une confrontation encore plus profonde avec la Russie ». Néanmoins, selon Freedman, les initiatives occidentales – dont le soutien à l’économie de l’Ukraine – ont permis de contenir l’aire du conflit.

Sont également pointées les défaillances de la stratégie de l’Ukraine, comme l’annulation de la loi sur les langues, même si Kiev est revenue dessus peu après, ou les « méthodes brutales » mobilisées à l’encontre des séparatistes. Mais la « plus grande erreur […] a été d’utiliser la menace russe comme raison de relâcher l’effort sur la réforme intérieure et la lutte anti-corruption ».

Au final, selon Freedman, le conflit russo-ukrainien « offre plus d’exemples d’une mauvaise stratégie que d’une bonne ». Un ouvrage particulièrement intéressant à lire à l’heure où, après l’élection du président Zelensky, la diplomatie européenne relance l’effort sur le règlement de ce conflit.

Isabelle Facon

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Two important international events for Africa took place over the last 10 days of January 2020: the World Economic Forum in Davos and the UK- Africa Invest Summit.

The first event stuck in memory only by Patrice Motsepe’s ‘Africa loves Trump’ comment. But the London summit gave fruitful results for both parties.

Direct results of the UK- Africa Invest Summit

The event took place on January 20, 2020. 15 African heads of state, including the presidents of Egypt, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, representatives of business and international organizations participated in it.

The direct results of the summit are state initiatives worth over £1.5 billion and 27 business deals worth over £6.5 billion.

The main commercial agreements of the summit are:

• Infrastructure: Egypt (Airbus,Bombardier, GSK), Ghana (BHM, Contracta Construction UK, Tyllium and Ellipse), Kenya (Diageo), Uganda (Lagan Group, Unatrac, Nexus Green), Ivory Coast (NMS Infrastructure), Nigeria (Tex ATC, Trilliant), Mozambique (Baker Hughes, Lloyds Register).      
• Energy: Ghana (Aqua Africa), Nigeria (Low Energy Designs), Kenya (Globeleq).
• Minerals: Ethiopia (Kefi Minerals), Kenya (Tullow), Ivory Coast (Aggreko), Tunisia (Anglo-Tunisian Oil and Gas), Nigeria (Savannah).

The most important  government initiatives are the following:

• Launch of new collaboration tools: Trade Connect (to promote imports), African Investors (growth and investment), Manufacturing Africa (investment in West Africa), UK Center for Cities and Infrastructures.
• Special programs for women entrepreneurship; digital access programs for Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa (£ 45 million); climate initiatives with Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Senegal, South Africa, Mozambique.
• Financial aid to South Africa (£ 200m over seven years), Malawi (£ 95m), Ethiopia (£ 45m) to boost economic activity; Nigeria and South Africa to promote investments (£ 25 million); intensifying cooperation with the African Development Bank. 
• Infrastructure partnership with Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and African Development Bank to attract private investments in sustainable energy, transport and telecommunications.

New Round of UK-Africa Relations

The Summit is particularly important in the context of Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union. Post-Brexit Britain needs to strengthen its political and economic role in other regions. Particularly in Africa, which has a large potential market and growing political power.

Therefore, this summit is a direct evidence that Britain decides to participate actively in the so-called “struggle for Africa”.

Trade with Africa amounts to 4.2% in 2012 and 2.5% in 2017 of total UK trade. But it’s only 2% as large as Africa’s trade with China, its main partner.

But Britain wants to improve this situation. Representatives of the UK government have informed that by 2022 the UK aims to become the largest investor among the G7 in Africa.

In 2019, the UK trade with Africa increased by 7.5%. The country has 11 agreements with African countries on exports with reduced or zero tariff rates, and 35 countries fall within the trade preferences scheme. 

Britain’s interest on Africa is fully justified. For instance, 8 out of the 15 fastest-growing countries are in Africa and by 2050 one in four buyers will hail from Africa. Furthermore, the political role of Africa is becoming more important: 54 countries of Africa represent almost a third of the votes in the UN General Assembly

Global struggle for Africa

But Africa is a tasty morsel not only for the UK but for China, India, Russia and the EU either. From 2010 to 2018, Chinese leaders visited Africa 79 times. Emmanuel Macron visited the continent nine times since winning the 2017 elections. Russia expressed interest on the continent through a large-scale forum and debt relief. 

In the light of abovementioned, Britain, which has a negative image due to its colonial past and the fears of neo-colonialism trends, needs to offer a qualitatively new type of cooperation.

The UK government will not be able to provide the same level of financial support as China. Therefore, the British strategy should be based on soft power and the conveyance of the British worldview.

In addition, the United States recently declared a 10% reduction in military presence in Africa, and this creates a window of opportunities for other countries, including the UK. For example, France has already indicated its intention to increase its military mission in Mali, so Britain can act in the same direction.

Summing up, Africa is a continent of opportunities now. For the UK, as for the former colonial metropolis, it will be important to create a unique approach to Africa. The continent keeps multi-vector foreign policy. However, Africa needs equal cooperation, but in the case of China or Russia, this does not seem possible. And this leaves room for a stronger British role. 

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Les révoltes arabes ont fait émerger dans les médias la figure du cyberactiviste, documentant les conditions de vie de la population et le sentiment d'injustice qu'elles engendrent. Issus de milieux urbains et aisés, souvent dépourvus d'expérience militante, ces jeunes gens revendiquent pour la (...) / Maroc, Tunisie, Internet, Jeunes, Mouvement de contestation, Technologies de l'information, Maghreb, Répression, Réveil arabe 2011- - 2012/02

Le 19 janvier, le FBI fermait le site de téléchargement Megaupload, déclenchant une riposte du collectif Anonymous : les sites de la Maison Blanche et d'Universal Music, notamment, étaient touchés. De New York au Caire en passant par Tunis, des réseaux virtuels à la rue, une nouvelle culture de la (...) / États-Unis, Informatique, Internet, Jeunes, Mouvement de contestation, Propriété industrielle, Propriété intellectuelle, Technologies de l'information, Technologie - 2012/02

« Si vous voulez libérer une société, vous n'avez qu'à lui donner accès à Internet. » Les événements égyptiens offrent un terrain d'étude unique pour vérifier la validité de cette maxime. En effet, une décision de M. Moubarak, alors au pouvoir, a constitué une expérience grandeur nature pour mesurer le poids (...) / Égypte, Désinformation, Information, Internet, Jeunes, Médias, Mouvement de contestation, Presse, Technologies de l'information, Télécommunications, Répression, Réveil arabe 2011- - 2012/02

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Savant éclairé, aristocrate romantique, intellectuel engagé : la quête du « vrai Shakespeare » s'est dotée de multiples Graal. Mais, à chaque époque, un point commun unit les sceptiques : une forme plus ou moins avouée d'élitisme. / Royaume-Uni, Culture, Histoire, Idées, Théâtre - (...) / Royaume-Uni, Culture, Histoire, Idées, Théâtre - 2012/01

Changer la politique, instaurer l'égalité entre hommes et femmes, inventer un nouveau mode de gouvernement, faire participer les citoyens... En 1871, le peuple parisien insurgé donnait à ces mots d'ordre une signification concrète. / France, Art, Citoyenneté, Culture, Démocratie, Droit, Histoire, (...) / France, Art, Citoyenneté, Culture, Démocratie, Droit, Histoire, Inégalités, Laïcité, Mouvement de contestation, Protection sociale, Travail, Socialisme, Socialisme libertaire, Droits des femmes - 2011/12

Warfare History Network

History, Europe

Impressive--but thousands paid the ultimate price. 

At 11 o’clock on the evening of June 23, 1812, the first elements of Napoleon’s mighty army marched on three pontoon bridges over the river Niemen and set foot on Russian soil; the epic invasion of Russia had begun. For this massive undertaking Napoleon had assembled an enormous force, drawn from every corner of Europe. Some 450,000 men poured into Russia that summer.

Napoleon hoped for a quick campaign and decisive engagement, the type he was used to, and he gave three weeks’ rations to his men. The Russians did not oblige. They pulled back in an orderly fashion before the invading host, withdrawing deeper and deeper into the heart of the Russian Empire. The Russian commanders, Barclay and Bagration, more by necessity than design, marched eastward and, with a combination of skill and staggering good fortune, succeeded in avoiding the decisive battle Napoleon so ardently sought.

The speedy advance into Russia wrought a terrible toll on the masses of imperial troops; Napoleon’s soldiers found themselves tormented by the heat of a Russian summer and an almost complete breakdown in supplies. Few, save for the ever-active vanguard, fired shots in anger before the Grande Armée reached Smolensk seven weeks into the invasion. There, in a confused and desperate battle, the two sides fought the first major action of the campaign. It ended in a defeat for the Russians and, having suffered 6,000 casualties, they slipped out of Smolensk, abandoning the burned-out remnant of a once-impressive city, and again resumed their exodus eastward.

Russia’s Terrible Predicament

Smolensk had not been the decisive confrontation the French desired. After the fighting died down, a number of senior commanders sought to end the interminable advance by advocating that the army halt in Smolensk, gain some respite from the relentless marching, and prepare winter quarters. But Napoleon still sought the specter of the battle that would end the campaign. He pressed his subordinates to continue the advance and push on toward the new goal—Moscow. The Russians would either defend the city or its loss would bring them to their knees so that the Czar, surely, would sue for peace.

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Warfare History Network

Security, Asia

Its destroyers and other warships being too large, the U.S. Navy developed the Swift Boat to patrol coastal areas and rivers during the Vietnam War.

In addition to standard aircraft carrier and warship patrol operations in the open sea, naval action during the Vietnam War developed a character of its own. While the U.S. Navy maintained responsibility for more traditional functions, the interior waterways of Vietnam became an area of operations that required a different approach.

Since the early 20-century, the patrol workhorse of the U.S. Navy had been the destroyer, which rose to prominence during the two world wars. Destroyers provided perimeter security for formations of surface ships, anti-submarine and antiaircraft defenses, and search-and-rescue duties among others. These warships rendered invaluable service; however, during the Vietnam War the ocean-going vessels were unsuited for operations along the deltas, coastal areas, and rivers of the country.

A Holdover From World War II

The American Fletcher-class Navy destroyer was a weapon of World War II. Armed with main batteries of five-inch guns, 40mm Bofors antiaircraft weapons, 20mm cannon, torpedoes, and an array of machine guns and automatic weapons, these were formidable warships, and a number of them remained in service through both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. These destroyers displaced 2,500 tons fully loaded, were more than 375 feet long, and their draft exceeded 17 feet.

Clearly, a smaller warship was needed to navigate the confines of Vietnam’s coastal areas and to patrol the waterways of the country’s interior. By 1965, the Navy recognized the need for such craft, and the primary weapon of the so-called “Brown Water Navy” was born. The Patrol Craft Fast (PCF) became commonly known as the Swift Boat and was the most prominent of the Navy’s riverine patrol craft during the Vietnam War.

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Nate Anderson

Security, Americas

If men and women are going to sacrifice their lives for this country, we should demand nothing less than Congress taking back its war powers and having a louder voice on foreign policy.

As the House of Representatives earlier this month debated a nonbinding resolution re-affirming the constitutional war powers of Congress, Rep. Matt Gaetz gave an address on the House floor. 

The Florida Republican spoke for just a few moments but boldly proclaimed “If the members of our armed services have the courage to go and fight and die in these wars, as Congress we ought to have the courage to vote for them or against them. And I think it’s ludicrous to suggest that we are impairing the troops from doing their job by not doing our job articulated in the Constitution to speak to these matters of war and peace.” 

Earlier that day, Gaetz had attended the burial of a constituent at Arlington National Cemetery. That soldier died in service to this country just a few weeks prior while deployed to Afghanistan, in the very war Congress refuses to cast a vote on. 

Gaetz’s words were especially meaningful to me because I served with that fallen service member. We trained together, deployed together and fought together. He was a father, a friend and a warrior. 

As a special operations soldier with multiple deployments to Afghanistan, this service member and his teammates have remained on the front lines of a war that has claimed the lives of more than two thousand American service members.  

His remains arrived on Christmas Day for the dignified transfer at Dover Air Force Base—a scene that has occurred all too many times since the war in Afghanistan began more than eighteen years ago. 

Stories such as this are uncomfortable to hear. They should be. 

War has extreme consequences. Every flag-draped coffin is a child, parent or spouse who won’t be returning home.

Gaetz is right. The courage to make that sacrifice should be met with the courage to make tough decisions about war.

But in the last several decades, we’ve seen Congress choose to back away from tough decisions. Many have ceded their responsibilities, choosing instead to stand with their own party, or against the other party, or simply to avoid executing their constitutional duty because they lack the courage to lead. 

But constitutional duty should never take a back seat to party politics, not when there are service members’ lives on the line.

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Richard Javad Heydarian

Security, Asia

In geopolitics, even nations’ interests and their willingness to stand up for them are not permanent.

One of the great clichés of politics is the iron belief that there are no permanent enemies or permanent friends, only permanent interests. Upon closer examination, however, Bill Clay’s immortal dictum should be understood in even more radical terms in twenty-first-century geopolitics. After all, nation-states’ interpretation of their interests themselves can dialectically evolve, not to mention the range of interests themselves. This is most especially true in the case of rapidly rising powers such as China.

As perspicacious observers such as Robert Kaplan have noted, “China is only able to act aggressively in its adjacent seas because it is now, for the time being, secure on land to a degree it has never been in its history.” Since the fall of the Ming Dynasty at the dawn of the modern age, China has never been a legitimate maritime power. Within the last generation, however, the Asian powerhouse not only strengthened its economic foundation but also secured much of its land borders, crucially with Russia and Central Asian nations.

As political scientist Taylor Fravel explains in his seminal work, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, Beijing patiently and skillfully resolved seventeen border disputes, including with post-Soviet nations of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan as well as Russia, not to mention with Southeast Asian neighbors of Vietnam and Laos. In most cases, China abandoned as much as 50 percent of its original claim to facilitate its big-picture border-stabilization strategy. This historic strategic achievement, overseen by the Jiang Zemin administration, has allowed Beijing to upgrade from a primarily continental power into increasingly a “two-ocean” global force.

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Ankit Panda

Security, Americas

The United States remains the most innovative nation in the world, but much innovation is unlikely to find itself into useful national defense applications without the right incentives.

In today’s changing geopolitical environment, concerns in Washington that the United States is falling behind in critical emerging technologies are commonplace. China and Russia—both identified as great-power competitors of the United States by the current administration—are forging forward with critical investments in technologies ranging from quantum computing to artificial intelligence.

But the United States is still by far the most innovative nation on earth. America’s strengths run from its fundamental pull to brilliant minds the world over through its relatively open immigration system to the unparalleled resources of its universities. The free-market structure of the economy, vibrant venture capital ecosystems, world-class universities, and government support of R&D combine to form the most innovative ecosystem in the world. 

However, when it comes to defense and positioning for future competition with Beijing and Moscow, the government has not figured out how to tap this flow of innovation emanating from the civilian sector. 

Commercial firms that do little business with the U.S. Department of Defense have much to offer in the way of expertise, but often have little idea where to start when it comes to the byzantine acquisitions process that longstanding defense industry stalwarts have grown accustomed to navigating.

There’s already some awareness of this among the community of China-watchers in Washington, many of whom have watched China pursue its strategy of “military-civil fusion”—a top-down, stage-managed marriage between the country’s fast-growing and increasingly innovative technology sector and the Communist Party-led government.

The United States isn’t China—and it shouldn’t be. A top-down, government-managed effort to wring out every last drop of innovation in Silicon Valley is anathema to American values and to the rugged, do-it-yourself spirit of free enterprise that has been the engine of American innovation. The challenge is not how to improve innovation, but rather, how to facilitate innovation finding its way into applications in defense—as needed?

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Robert Farley

History, Europe

The eastern front was hell. 

Key point: Berlin and Moscow tore each other apart, killing millions in the process. The fighting was utterly brutal, with few-to-no holds barred.

The war between Germany and the Soviet Union officially began in late June 1941, although the threat of conflict had loomed since the early 1930s. Germany and the USSR launched a joint war against Poland in September of 1939, which the Soviets followed up with invasions of Finland, Romania, and the Baltic states across the following year.

After Germany crushed France, and determined that it could not easily drive Great Britain from the war, the Wehrmacht turned its attention back to the East. Following the conquests of Greece and Yugolavia in the spring of 1941, Berlin prepared its most ambitious campaign; the destruction of Soviet Russia. The ensuing war would result in a staggering loss of human life, and in the final destruction of the Nazi regime.

The Fight on Land

On June 22, 1941, the German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe struck Soviet forces across a wide front along the German-Soviet frontier. Romanian forces attacked into Soviet-occupied Bessarabia on the same day. The Finnish armed forces joined the fight later that week, with Hungarian troops and aircraft entering combat at the beginning of July. By that time, a significant contribution of Italian troops was on its way to the Eastern Front. A Spanish volunteer division would eventually join the fight, along with large formations recruited from Soviet prisoners of war and from the local civilian population of occupied Soviet territories.

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Warfare History Network

History, Asia

A bloody assault.

The city of Hue was the capital of a unified Vietnam from 1802 until 1945. With its stately, tree-lined boulevards, Buddhist temples, national university, and ornate imperial palace within a massive walled city known as the Citadel, Hue was the cradle of the country’s culture and heritage. As late as 1967, Hue remained an open city, unscathed by the various wars that since World War II had raged up and down the Indochinese peninsula. But when Communist leaders in North Vietnam felt compelled to alter their strategy and launch a massive offensive in South Vietnam in early 1968, Hue suddenly found itself the focus of some of the heaviest fighting of the Vietnam War.
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Stung by reversals on southern battlefields and fearful of an American invasion of their homeland, North Vietnam’s Politburo members voted to abandon protracted-war tactics and mount a three-phase general offensive that would reverse the course of the war against the South Vietnamese and their American allies. When Defense Minister and Chief of Staff General Vo Nguyen Giap, vanquisher of the French in 1954 after a brutal eight-year war, voiced opposition to the offensive, command was given to General Nguyen Chi Thanh, leader of Communist Viet Cong guerrilla forces in South Vietnam. When Thanh died unexpectedly, Giap reassumed command and rapidly massed six North Vietnamese Army infantry divisions in South Vietnam’s northernmost province, Quang Tri.

The Tet Offensive Begins

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Authorities in Mexico are being reminded by the UN children’s agency, UNICEF, of the need to protect the rights of migrant children who enter the country.

David Axe

Security,

The prototypes are here.

Key point: "The idea of a robot wingman is that it can keep pace with manned planes, but be tasked out for parts of the mission that you wouldn't send a human teammate to do."

Boeing is preparing to test prototype wingman drones, apparently at a secretive site in the Australian Outback.

The Australian subsidiary of the Chicago-based plane-maker is developing the so-called “Airpower Teaming System” using company funds as well as $27 million from the Australian military.

Boeing revealed the 38-feet-long Loyal Wingman drone at the Australian International Airshow at Avalon in February 2019. The drone has the distinctive, sharp angles of a radar-evading stealth aircraft.

But the most novel part of the Airpower Teaming System/Loyal Wingman is invisible. Algorithms and radio datalinks allow human operators aboard manned planes or on the ground to command the highly autonomous drones.

“The idea of a robot wingman is that it can keep pace with manned planes, but be tasked out for parts of the mission that you wouldn't send a human teammate to do,” said Peter W. Singer, author of Wired for War.

A Boeing video depicts the Loyal Wingman drone flying in formation with an F/A-18 fighter and an E-7 radar plane, both of which Boeing builds for the Australian air force. "The Boeing Airpower Teaming System is designed to team with a wide range of existing military aircraft from fighters to commercial derivative aircraft," said Ashlee Erwin, a Boeing spokesperson.

Fast, armed and highly autonomous drones could scout ahead of manned planes and add their missiles to an aerial dogfight. It's a compelling concept for a small air force such as Australia's that trains to fight much larger air arms such as China’s. The Australian air force has just 110 fighters. The Chinese air force has no fewer than 1,400.

“Forces around the world are looking to maximize and extend their current fleets in a way that balances the need for quantity, capability and affordability,” Erwin said.

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Warfare History Network

History, Europe

Just terrible. In December 1944 the vaunted Third Reich was in its death throes, crushed by Allied forces on all sides. While Stalin’s Red Army thrust its way through Eastern Europe, Anglo-American forces had liberated France and were on Germany’s western borders. Adolf Hitler had enough resources to stage a final offensive, a last throw of the dice to stave off an inevitable and ignominious defeat.

The result was the Ardennes offensive of December 1944 to January 1945, usually called the “Battle of the Bulge,” in reference to the how the Allied line gave way to the German onslaught. The goal of Hitler’s plan, which even his generals thought was quixotic, was to seize the port of Antwerp, at the same time dividing Allied forces in two.

But thanks to the heroic resistance of such units as the 101st Airborne, and the return of good weather, which meant Allied planes could once more take to the air, Hitler’s offensive ran out of steam. Allied forces advanced, reducing the “bulge” and pushing the Germans back to their original starting point.

In January 1945, Lieutenant Herndon Inge, Jr., was serving with the 94th Infantry Division, part of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s famous Third Army. The 94th was in the process of punching through Germany’s fortified Siegfried Line (West Wall), but progress was slow, and the weather bitterly cold. Lieutenant Inge was cut off near Orscholz and captured by the Germans.

Eventually Inge found himself in Oflag (Offizierlager) XIII-B, an officers’ POW camp that held some 1,200 American and 3,000 Serbian officers at the German town of Hammelburg, near Schweinfurt. Lt. Col. John Knight Waters, Patton’s son-in-law [married to Patton’s oldest daughter, Bee], who had been captured in North Africa, was also in the camp, setting the stage for one of the most controversial episodes of the war. Patton ordered XII Corps commander Manton S. Eddy to have William M. Hoge’s 4th Armored Division form a task force (Task Force Baum) and send it on a mission 50 miles behind enemy lines to liberate Oflag XIII-B. Patton later denied all knowledge of his son-in-law’s whereabouts at the camp, but there is evidence to the contrary.

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The top UN official in Iraq is calling on the country’s newly designated Prime Minister to urgently deliver on reforms and demands for accountability, amid ongoing protests.