Diplomacy & Crisis News

Fergus Ryan

TikTok,

So how do policymakers deal with a Chinese-owned social media app that isn’t really a social media app but a modern-day interactive TV station, whose editorial decisions are made by an opaque algorithm developed and maintained in Beijing?

There’s one thing we’re all getting wrong about TikTok: it’s not really a social media app. As TikTok Australia’s general manager told the Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media in September last year, the app is ‘less about social connection and more about broadcasting creativity and expression’.

Put another way, think of TikTok more as the modern incarnation of a media publisher—like a newspaper or a TV network—than as a social forum like Facebook or Twitter. That’s because TikTok is much more assertively curatorial than its competitors. It’s not a forum, it’s an editor. Its algorithm decides what each user sees, and it’s the opacity of that algorithm that presents the most worrying national security risk.

It may sound like an insignificant distinction, but TikTok’s emphasis on an ‘interest graph’ instead of a ‘social graph’ took the app’s competitors completely by surprise, and has largely gone over the heads of most lawmakers. The app, owned by Chinese technology company ByteDance, hit 2.3 billion all-time downloads in August 2020, so it’s high time policymakers understood exactly what makes TikTok tick.

An essay by Eugene Wei should be at the top of their reading list. A San Francisco–based start-up investor and former Amazon and Facebook employee, Wei dissects TikTok’s strategy and shows how its recommendation engine keeps users glued to their screens. It does it not by connecting them with friends or family, but by closely analysing their behaviour on the app and serving them more of what they’re interested in.

Wei’s opus, which approaches 20,000 words and is only the first in a three-part series, explains how TikTok is not the same as the major social media platforms we’re more familiar with. Put simply, on Facebook and Twitter, the content that users see is largely decided by who they follow. On TikTok, however, the user doesn’t have to follow anyone. Instead, the algorithm very quickly learns from how users interact with the content they’re served in the app’s ‘For You’ feed to decide what it should deliver to them next.

The approach is similar to that of Spotify and Netflix, whose recommendation algorithms take note of which songs and movies you listen to or watch in full and which you skip to decide what new content to suggest. As Wei puts it, ‘TikTok’s algorithm is so effective that it doesn’t feel like work for viewers. Just by watching stuff and reacting, the app learns your tastes quickly. It feels like passive personalization.’

It’s a strategy, Wei argues, that allowed a team of Chinese engineers—who didn’t necessarily have a good understanding of the cultures in the places where the app is available—to take the world by storm.

TikTok didn’t just break out in America. It became unbelievably popular in India and in the Middle East, more countries whose cultures and language were foreign to the Chinese Bytedance product teams. Imagine an algorithm so clever it enables its builders to treat another market and culture as a complete black box. What do people in that country like? No, even better, what does each individual person in each of those foreign countries like? You don’t have to figure it out. The algorithm will handle that. The algorithm knows.

But that’s not the only thing the algorithm knows. In a recent Protocol China exposé, a former censor at ByteDance said the company’s ‘powerful algorithms not only can make precise predictions and recommend content to users—one of the things it’s best known for in the rest of the world—but can also assist content moderators with swift censorship’.

The former employee, who described working at ByteDance as like being ‘a tiny cog in a vast, evil machine’, said that even live-streamed shows on the company’s apps are ‘automatically transcribed into text, allowing algorithms to compare the notes with a long and constantly-updated list of sensitive words, dates and names, as well as Natural Language Processing models. Algorithms would then analyze whether the content was risky enough to require individual monitoring.’

There’s no doubt that TikTok and its parent company have these abilities to monitor and censor. The question is, will they continue to use it? Certainly, the blunt censorship that typified TikTok’s earlier approach to content moderation and is par for the course on ByteDance’s domestic apps is unlikely to continue, especially after the public scrutiny over TikTok’s censoring of content related to the Tiananmen Square massacre, Black Lives Matter protests and Beijing’s persecution of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities.

But there’s ample room for ByteDance to covertly tweak users’ feeds, subtly nudging them towards content favoured by governments and ruling parties—including the Chinese Communist Party. After all, it’s an approach that would be in line with the strategy that China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and state media are already deploying.

Beijing is exploiting pre-existing grievance narratives and amplifying pro-CCP Western influencers in the knowledge that Western voices are more likely to penetrate target online networks than official CCP spokespeople. The strategy, referred to as ‘Borrowing mouths to speak’ (借嘴说话), is reminiscent of the Kremlin’s approach and is perfectly suited to being covertly deployed on Chinese-owned and -operated social media apps.

Just as experiments have shown that TikTok’s algorithm can hurtle users from a politically neutral feed into a far-right firehose of content, so too can it easily be used to send users down any extreme rabbit hole. By design, the app groups people into ‘clusters’ (otherwise known as filter bubbles) based on their preferences. TikTok’s executives stress that they have measures in place to ensure people don’t become trapped in those filter bubbles. TikTok’s recommendation system ‘works to intersperse diverse types of content along with those you already know you love’, the company claims. The goal, they say, is to ensure that users are exposed to ‘new perspectives and ideas’, but who decides which new perspectives and ideas?

What’s to stop Beijing from pressuring TikTok to encourage communities of Xinjiang denialists to flourish on the platform, for instance? As our report revealed, there’s already evidence that this is happening. Our analysis of the hashtag #Xinjiang showed a depiction of the region that glosses over the human-rights tragedy unfolding there and instead provides a more politically convenient version for the CCP, replete with smiling and dancing Uyghurs.

The power of social media apps has been underestimated before. When Facebook started as a ‘hot or not’ website in a Harvard dorm room at the turn of the millennium, who would have expected it would go on to play a role in inciting violence 13,000 kilometres away?

So how do policymakers deal with a Chinese-owned social media app that isn’t really a social media app but a modern-day interactive TV station, whose editorial decisions are made by an opaque algorithm developed and maintained in Beijing?

It’s past time governments realised the unique problem TikTok presents and they must now tailor solutions to deal with it properly.

Caleb Larson

de Havilland Sea Vixen,

The dawn of the Jet Age saw a number of pioneering achievements in aerospace, from the first airplane to break the sound barrier, to the first Mach 3+ flight to name a few. And while these were both American achievements, products of the legendary U.S. Air Force X-series aerospace program, this lesser-known British plane has managed to well, slip under the radar, like the de Havilland Sea Vixen. 

The dawn of the Jet Age saw a number of pioneering achievements in aerospace, from the first airplane to break the sound barrier, to the first Mach 3+ flight to name a few. And while these were both American achievements, products of the legendary U.S. Air Force X-series aerospace program, this lesser-known British plane has managed to well, slip under the radar, like the de Havilland Sea Vixen. 

From the Drawing Board to the Sky

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Royal Navy needed a jet-powered airplane that could fly — and fight — in all types of weather, day or night. This necessitated several design factors. As the airplane would be jet-powered, it would need swept wings, unlike the straight-winged aircraft that previously flew during the War. As it would fly over the ocean, two engines would be necessary in case one engine was lost. And, the jet would need a crew of two in order to operate on-board radar, navigate, and to fly the plane.

Starting with some previous designs that the de Havilland Aircraft Company had come up with, their prototype was decidedly odd-looking — a twin-boom tail design with engines on either side of the fuselage. At first, the design was a success: their prototype actually exceeded performance expectations and earned the distinction as the first British two-seat fighter to break the sound barrier. Though the prototype seemed to be a solid airframe, disaster struck in 1952.

1952 Farnborough Airshow

During the 1952 Farnborough Airshow, one of de Havilland's prototypes disintegrated while performing a maneuver in flight: the engines separated from the airframe, one of which crashed into a crowd of spectators. The cockpit, still containing the crew, fell out of the sky onto the runway, killing both instantly and injuring more spectators. In total, 31 people died, with an additional 60 suffering injuries from the broken-up airframe.

In the aftermath of the accident, an investigation revealed that the airframe had been subjected to higher stresses than anticipated. The wing’s leading edges buckled and were shorn off, causing the plane to tumble and disintegrate. A redesign was necessitated.

de Havilland Sea Vixen

In addition to a strengthened airframe, the de Havilland Sea Vixen had redesigned landing gear to better handle the stresses of landing at sea and a slightly modified fuselage. Besides the immediately-noticeable twin-boom tail, one of the de Havilland Sea Vixen’s most notable features was its very unconventional cockpit layout. Rather than the pilot and navigator sitting in a tandem-style configuration, they sat side by side. However, the navigator’s seat was buried inside the right side of the airframe behind the nose and offered zero visibility. The pilot on the other hand sat in a left-offset seat just next to the navigator.

Postscript

The de Havilland Sea Vixen would serve in Royal Navy service until the early 1970s when it was retired in favor of the American McDonnell Douglas Phantom. Less than 150 Sea Vixen airframes were built, with a high number of airframe losses. However, the Sea Vixen achieved one other first: the first British fighter to be armed entirely with rockets, air-to-air missiles, and bombs, without an onboard gun. Still, it is probably for the best that it served for only 12 years.

Caleb Larson is a defense writer based in Europe. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture.

Caleb Larson

Barretta APX,

Baretta APX: Despite offering the Army a solid pistol design--and enjoying several advantages--Beretta lost. Here’s why.

Baretta APX: Despite offering the Army a solid pistol design--and enjoying several advantages--Beretta lost. Here’s why.

The Competition

The XM17 Modular Handgun System competition was a joint U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force initiative to find a new service pistol common for both branches that would replace the Beretta M9. Though the M9 had been a good handgun choice when introduced into American service in the mid-1980s, advancements in sidearm design encouraged both the Army and Air Force to seek a better, more modern replacement.

The Contenders

The XM17 competition drew upon some of the oldest and most respected firearm manufacturers from around the world, including Glock, SIG Sauer, Smith & Wesson, CZ, FN Herstal, and of course Beretta.

Each of these firms submitted exceptional pistol designs, a number of which have achieved sales success numbering in the hundreds of thousands — a testament to how competitive the MHS completion would be.

Beretta

As the incumbent, Beretta was thought to have several advantages over the other firms in the running.

For one, Beretta had intangible advantages, including several decades of experience working with the U.S. military.

Initially, Beretta wanted to offer the U.S. Army an updated version of their M9, the M9A3. The update saw improved and customizable grips added to the M9 platform, removable sights, and a three-slot Picatinny rail for better shooter customization. Despite improvements over the M9 however, the Department of Defense opted for completely new pistol designs, rather than just improvements to the existing M9.

APX

Beretta’s APX seemed like a solid choice. The polymer-framed design was light-weight and had an aggressively serrated metallic slide. The pistol offered several different grip backstrap sizes, as well as ambidextrous slide stops and a reversible magazine release button.

One of the APX’s more unique features was its purported low bore axis, which Beretta claims direct recoil into a shooter's hand than most pistols, resulting in less muzzle rise between shots and therefore more accurate followup shots.

Down for the Count

Despite the advantages, Beretta enjoyed as the incumbent, and the high quality of their APX pistol design, they were ultimately unsuccessful, losing the Modular Handgun System competition to SIG Sauer and their M17 and M18 pistols.

Though Beretta's design was indeed a high-quality design, SIG Sauer’s bid offered something that no other entrant did: a combined pistol-ammunition package deal. SIG offered the Army not only their pistol design but also specialized Winchester-manufactured ammunition that offered advantages in stopping power and lethality over existing U.S. Military 9x19mm ball ammunition. The ammo-sweetened deal just couldn’t be beaten, and the Army declared SIG the winner of the Modular Handgun System competition.

Postscript

Though Beretta’s APX pistol design was ultimately unsuccessful with the Army and Air Force, it did find some success on the civilian market and internationally. In addition to private civilian shooters, the Baretta APX has been adopted by several police departments and law enforcement agencies in the United States and abroad.

Caleb Larson is a Defense Writer based in Europe. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture.

Caleb Larson

LRASM,

The LRASM would outclass the Harpoon anti-ship missile’s range, be hard to detect — and could be put in the hands of US Marines to sink Chinese ships.

Earlier last month, the Navy and Air Force inked a contract with Lockheed Martin for the company’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, also known as LRASM.

The agreement, worth $414 million, is for the fourth and fifth lot of missiles and is the biggest LRASM contract in the history of the Lockheed missile program, reportedly totaling 137 missiles, training and logistics support, as well as additional LRASM support equipment.

In the Lockheed Martin press release, David Helsel, the LRASM director at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control explained that the Navy/Air Force award “reflects LRASM’s increasing significance to our customers’ missions. Focused teamwork around a shared vision with our customers and our dedicated supply partners remains key to this program’s success.”

LRASM, Explained: 

The LRASM is a stealthy, ship-killing missile-based partially off of the earlier JASSM-ER missile and uses a “multi-modal sensor suite, weapon data link, and enhanced digital anti-jam Global Positioning System” to discriminate specific targets among groups of ships. It can receive targeting updates via a data link in real-time, or use its onboard sensors to find targets. Lockheed explains that the advanced missile is specifically designed to seek and destroy specific ships — sometimes on its own — in highly contested electronic warfare environments that could see GPS signals degraded, and where surveillance and reconnaissance would be difficult to conduct or unreliable.

The LRASM is the latest in a rash of newer, more lethal anti-ship weapons by several branches, but particularly by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, prompted in part by what is perceived as aggressive Chinese force posture in the Pacific region, as well as the PLA Navy’s increasing number of ships and so-called carrier-killer weaponry.

Why the U.S. Marines Need LRASM: China 

The Marine Corps and Navy are not only investing in increasingly sophisticated weaponry but also reevaluating how they conduct warfare. The USMC’s top Marine, Gen. David Berger has nudged and pushed the Corps back towards their amphibious roots as of late and even thinks that groups of highly-trained Marines could help the Navy hunt down and sink Chinese submarines.

The Corps is also undergoing doctrinal upheaval at the moment, in what is the biggest force posture and restructure of the past 25 years. Pivoting from the grinding land warfare campaigns of the Middle East, Marines are preparing for a fight in the Pacific, somewhat reminiscent of their World War II-era island-hopping campaign.

This time around, however, Marines would not simply assault and capture enemy-held islands, but turn them into tiny bastions of American firepower, holding enemy surface ships and submarines at bay and denying the use of the islands by the enemy.

The LRASM could first compliment, then replace the Harpoon anti-ship missile, long the United States’ standard ship killer. And the LRASM’s long stand-off range — thought to be around 350 miles — would push Chinese ship much farther out to sea than the Harpoon’s 150-mile range would be able to: enemies beware.

Caleb Larson is a Defense Writer with The National Interest. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture.

Stephen Silver

Shock Trial,

In the shock trials, per a recent USNI report, “the Navy will set off a bomb in the water near the new warship and measure how well it could take a hit.”

The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), named for the 38th president, is a leading naval aircraft character, currently in the Atlantic Ocean. As The National Interest reported back in 2019, the Gerald R. Ford contains 10 elevators, which can carry up to about 200,000 pounds of weapons from the main deck magazine to the ship’s flight deck preparation area.

Last week, USNI News reported from aboard the ship about life aboard the Gerald R. Ford under its new commanding officer, Capt. Paul Lanzilotta, as the ship begins preparations for its shock trials later this year. The visit took place on March 9.

Following 12 years of construction, the Gerald R. Ford was delivered to the Navy in May of 2017, replacing the U.S.S. Enterprise.

Lanzilotta is a 26-year veteran of the Navy and took over as Gerald R. Ford’s commanding officer in February. Previously, he spent nearly two years as the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Arlington.

The new commander, per the USNI News report, is overseeing contractors from Newport News Shipbuilding, who are finishing up construction on the ship’s  Advanced Weapons Elevators. They’re also conducting what’s known as Combat Systems Ship Qualification Trials (CSSQT.)

In the shock trials, per the USNI report, “the Navy will set off a bomb in the water near the new warship and measure how well it could take a hit.”

“During World War II, it was discovered that although such “near miss” explosions do not cause serious hull or superstructure damage, the shock and vibrations associated with the blast nonetheless incapacitate the ship, by knocking out critical components and systems,” a MITRE assessment from 2007, called “Navy Ship Underwater Shock Prediction and Testing Capability Study,” stated.

“Any complex system requires constant attention and maintenance. And the steam catapult system obviously still serving today overseas, deployed, doing the work of the republic every single day (on the Nimitz-class carriers), that requires a lot of manpower and a lot of man-hours and woman hours on the flight deck,” Captain Lanzilotta told USNI.

“When we stop flying here at the end of the day – so last night we finished – I don’t know, XO: what was it, midnight-30? Almost one in the morning? On a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, you would then have two to three hours of preventative maintenance to do on all that kit before you can close up shop for the night and get a bite to eat and get some rest for the next day of flight operations. On this ship, our sailors literally put (EMALS) in standby mode, and get the same bite to eat and go to bed. Those are hard-to-measure benefits, but in my mind they’re huge.”

 Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Stephen Silver

ICBM,

The Pentagon is reportedly working on a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs.) The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) missile program is seen as the successor of the existing Minuteman III ICBMs, with the new ICBMs eying 2029 for initial deployment.

The Pentagon is reportedly working on a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs.) The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) missile program is seen as the successor of the existing Minuteman III ICBMs, with the new ICBMs eying 2029 for initial deployment.

However, with a new administration in power in Washington and taking the usual new look at defense strategy, there have been multiple recent calls in the media to put the brakes on new ICBMs.

William B. Hartung, director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, wrote for Defense One this week that because the new ICBM is a “legacy system,” and the Biden Administration has hinted at wanting to cut spending on such systems, it’s time to cancel their development.

“There is one costly system that is not generally thought of in these terms but should be: the new ICBM — formally known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, but more accurately characterized as a money pit that adds nothing to our defense,” Hartung wrote. “ICBMs make the world a more dangerous place because a president would have a matter of minutes to decide whether to launch them in a crisis, thereby increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear war due to a false alarm.”

Hartung added that the Center for International Policy had recently published a report which referred to the “nuclear triad” of “air-, sea-, and land-based nuclear delivery vehicles” as “a relic of the 1950s and 1960s that was developed as much or more due to interservice rivalry and the fight for shares of the nuclear weapons budget as it was based on a well-thought-out strategic rationale.”

The Arms Control Association, earlier this month, made a similar argument while arguing that the new president has long spoken of the dangers of nuclear weapons.

“Biden can start by directing his team to put on hold the Pentagon’s scheme to develop, test, and deploy beginning in 2029 a new fleet of 400 land-based, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). If pursued, the new missile would cost in excess $264 billion over its anticipated 50-year life cycle,” Daryl G. Kimball wrote on the association’s website. “This GBSD program pause would deemphasize the role of ICBMs, allow for a serious evaluation of the option of extending the life of the existing force of 400 Minuteman III ICBMs at a lower cost, and provide for the pursuit of deep mutual reductions in the bloated U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.”

And writing for Slate, last week, journalist Fred Kaplan denounced “Congress’ ICBM caucus.”

"There is no good reason to buy the GBSD and several good reasons not to,” Kaplan wrote. “This past year we’ve been immersed in an abyss that’s disturbing enough, not least because it’s been real, and so it may be a fine time to ask how many nuclear weapons we really need—and to make those who say we need to build more explain very clearly just why.”

 Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Peter Suciu

MK17,

The Mk 17, which saw extensive use during the Global War on Terror (GWoT), has stood out for a few other notable reasons.

In 2004, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) issued a solicitation that called for a new weapon for special operators. However, the Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle wasn't just to be a single rifle, but actually, a platform that would be designed around two different calibers yet maintain a high commonality of parts while having identical ergonomics.

The weapon was to replace the various AR-15 derived 5.56x45mm rifles as the updated M-14s that were then in service with the special operators. Among the entries included the Heckler & Koch HK416 modular system, but in the end, the FN Herstal (FHM) Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle – or SCAR – won out.

The gas-operated, short-stroke gas piston drive, self-loading assault/battle rifle with a rotating bolt had an advantage in that it was designed and constructed with modularity at the forefront. Two distinct versions were selected – the FN SCAR-L (light), which is chambered in the 5.56x45mm NATO cartridge; and the SCAR-H (heavy), chambered in the 7.62x52mm NATO cartridge. The two versions share a 90 percent commonality among parts, while both were also available in Close Quarters Combat (CQC), Standard (STD) and Long Barrel (LB) versions ranging from 13-inch to 20-inch barrels.

Enter SCAR

The SCAR-H was adopted by the SOCOM as the Mk 17, while the SCAR-L was originally adopted as the Mk 15 – and deliveries of both commenced in 2009, and subsequently delivered to all branches of the U.S. SOCOM including the U.S. Navy SEALs, U.S. Army Rangers, Army Special Forces, MARSOC (Marine Forces Special Operations Command) and AFSOC (Air Force Special Operations Command).

In testing, however, it was found that the SCAR-L/Mk 16 offered only marginal improvements over the most current versions of the AR-15 platform and in the end wasn't actually suspended. At the same time, SOCOM saw the increased potential of the Mk 17, which is now manufactured in the United States by FNH USA, the American-based subsidiary of the Belgian-based company.

The selective-fire weapon has still maintained a modular design, which affords U.S. special operators with a variety of configurations and each rifle can be reconfigured even in the field in just a matter of minutes, and no previous weapon used by the U.S. military provided such ease of modification.

How it Performs in Combat

The Mk 17, which saw extensive use during the Global War on Terror (GWoT), has stood out for a few other notable reasons. It can be configured to fire .308 Winchester but also 7.62x39mm ammunition, and even accept standard 30-round AK-47/AKM magazines. The rifle is fitted with a full-length Picatinny rail for the mounting of various optics while a lower rail can be used to mount other accessories such as flashlights, laser pointers, vertical grips and bipods. The flash hider of the Mk 17 can also reportedly be used to cut barbed wire.

One complaint has been the potential failure of the plastic hinges that attach the folding stock to the polymer lower receiver, but the side-folding buttstock – which can be adjusted to length – can be completed removed or replaced.

As the U.S. military is refocused on near-peer adversaries, it isn't clear what the future holds for the SCAR Mk 17, but it seemed to have been the right weapon at the time – even if its little brother, the SCAR Mk 16, didn't quite live up to the promise.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps 2021 de Politique étrangère (n° 1/2021). Christophe Bertossi, directeur du Centre des Migrations et Citoyennetés à l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Tanja Bastia et Ronald Skeldon, Routledge Handbook of Migration and Development (Routledge, 2020, 600 pages).

Pour qui pensait que la relation entre migration et développement pouvait se résumer à une équation simple – plus de développement est égale à moins de migrations dans le monde – l’ouvrage dirigé par Tanja Bastia et Ronald Skeldon constituera une lecture des plus utiles. En quelque 600 pages, ce nouvel opus de la collection des Routledge Handbooks offre à voir toute l’ampleur et la complexité du lien entre deux termes qui nourrissent depuis quarante ans le débat public et politique sur les relations entre le Nord et le Sud. En évitant tout jargon, les 55 chapitres organisés en 7 parties rendent compte de l’état des savoirs sur ce thème, en alternant les niveaux « micro », « méso » et « macro » de l’analyse. C’est à ce jour la somme la plus complète disponible sur le sujet.

Un enjeu international majeur à reconsidérer

Le thème migration/développement informe depuis longtemps la réflexion et le débat sur l’efficacité des politiques migratoires des pays développés Il s’agit d’un sujet majeur. Certes, la population mondiale vivant dans un autre pays que celui de naissance est relativement stable à 3 %, ce qui est un niveau plus faible qu’au cours d’autres périodes historiques. Mais la population mondiale concernée par les migrations internationales est bien plus importante si l’on ajoute les membres des familles des migrants, leurs communautés et les sociétés entières que les migrants internationaux contribuent à transformer. Si l’on ajoute à cela les migrations internes (plus de 740 millions de personnes en 2010), la population mondiale concernée par le phénomène de mobilité dépasse le milliard d’individus. Il est dès lors difficile d’imaginer que la mobilité humaine n’ait pas un impact durable sur les sociétés et le système international.

Or les transferts d’argent envoyés par les migrants internationaux ont dépassé depuis la fin des années 1990 l’Aide publique au développement et sont aujourd’hui en passe d’atteindre le niveau des investissements directs à l’étranger dans les pays à revenu faible et modéré. C’est d’ailleurs par le biais des questions de développement que la question migratoire a été mise à l’agenda des Nations unies et qu’elle est devenue un enjeu de gouvernance globale.

Pourtant, une tension – bloquant traditionnellement le débat – existe entre les termes « migration » et « développement ». D’une part, un consensus assez large a émergé au niveau global pour souligner que les obstacles à la mobilité internationale des personnes constituent un frein au développement. D’autre part, le développement est envisagé comme un vecteur susceptible de réduire la « pression migratoire » aux frontières des pays du Nord, en permettant aux populations du Sud de trouver chez elles une alternative à l’émigration, à commencer par des opportunités économiques et un marché du travail capable de les intégrer localement.

La contradiction se dissipe en revanche si l’on saisit la complexité structurelle du lien entre « migration » et « développement ». C’est là la première réussite importante de l’ouvrage. Celui-ci parvient à clarifier cette contradiction apparente avec une force probatoire particulièrement convaincante car il articule, dans un bel équilibre, les aspects les plus empiriques des réalités décrites par le détail aux théories qui organisent aujourd’hui les études sur les migrations internationales, en variant les échelles et les angles d’analyse.

Transition migratoire, pauvreté et inégalités

Le résultat peut se lire comme une déconstruction minutieuse des principales idées reçues sur le sujet. Il est impossible de restituer ici la richesse des analyses proposées par les différents chapitres mais le lecteur retiendra quelques leçons importantes. En premier lieu, le cadre de la discussion traditionnel (le développement œuvrerait à la diminution du volume de la mobilité humaine internationale) est erroné car il méconnaît ce que le développement fait aux migrations et les facteurs véritables qui produisent le départ des personnes de leur pays de naissance. Empiriquement, ce ne sont pas les plus pauvres qui émigrent. Les pays à revenu moyen tendent à être parmi les premiers pays de départ, à l’instar du Mexique, du Maroc et des Philippines. En Afrique, les flux internationaux proviennent du nord et du sud du continent, pas des pays subsahariens plus pauvres, car un capital économique mais aussi social et humain est nécessaire pour émigrer. De sorte qu’il faut retenir l’hypothèse centrale de la théorie dite de « la transition migratoire », selon laquelle plus de développement entraîne plus de migrations internes (exode rural) et plus de migrations internationales. Hein De Haas en conclut que « les migrations sont une part intrinsèque de processus de développement plus larges » et la relation entre migration et développement cesse d’être un jeu à somme nulle.

Un second enseignement que l’on peut tirer de cet ouvrage concerne la difficulté de trancher a priori le débat concernant le coût de la migration pour le développement des pays de départ (brain drain) ou, à l’inverse, son potentiel de développement (brain gain). Tout dépend du niveau auquel on situe l’analyse. D’un point de vue macro, les transferts d’argent des migrants ne créent ni brain drain ni brain gain : ces montants échouent en général à être transformés en développement durable dans des contextes marqués par des obstacles structurels au développement (corruption, népotisme, carence institutionnelle…). De ce point de vue, la migration n’apparaît pas non plus comme une panacée. Ingrid Palmary rappelle que les résultats de la recherche sur l’impact des migrations sur le niveau de pauvreté des pays de départ sont contradictoires. Des effets différenciés ont été identifiés dans certains cas où les transferts des migrants peuvent contribuer à augmenter le prix du foncier et placer les populations non migrantes dans une situation d’inégalité accrue par rapport aux familles et communautés qui comptent des émigrés parmi leurs membres. Dans d’autres cas, les transferts internes contribuent à diminuer les inégalités de revenu tandis que ceux des migrants internationaux contribuent à l’inverse à les accroître, comme c’est le cas au Mexique. Cela souligne l’importance des facteurs liés au contexte et leur impact sur les migrations, ainsi que le nécessaire examen de la structure des inégalités économiques autant que sociales liées au genre, au racisme ou à l’ethnicité. Ce qui pourrait apparaître comme des contradictions entre les chapitres quant aux leçons à tirer sur ces aspects relève en fait de différences de niveau d’analyse.  D’un point de vue « macro », le modèle théorique prédit que seuls ceux qui ont un capital humain important pourront accéder à des destinations lointaines tandis que les autres seront contraints à une « immobilité involontaire » – ou, dans le meilleur des cas, à une migration interne. Cela explique pourquoi les migrants subsahariens aux États-Unis sont parmi les plus diplômés (chapitre 1).

D’un point de vue plus proche des logiques des migrants eux-mêmes, le modèle peut prédire un autre résultat : les plus diplômés peuvent échapper à une migration internationale qui les conduirait à s’insérer dans un marché du travail moins qualifié et privilégient une migration interne vers les grandes villes où ils pourront occuper des emplois qualifiés dans les services. C’est le cas des Albanais les moins qualifiés qui émigrent vers la Grèce tandis que les mieux lotis travaillent dans la capitale dans le secteur bancaire, médical ou éducatif (chapitre 4). Cela peut soit réduire les inégalités de genre (la migration interne en Albanie donne aux femmes un accès à une meilleure formation) soit les accroître (comme l’illustre la situation des femmes dans les usines d’habillement des grandes villes asiatiques comme Dacca ou Pnom Penh).

Un enjeu de gouvernance

L’ouvrage offre enfin des éléments de réflexion pertinents concernant les politiques publiques tant de migrations que de développement et, plus généralement, la gouvernance mondiale sur des sujets très sensibles pour les opinions publiques nationales, particulièrement dans les pays développés mais pas uniquement. Si les gouvernements nationaux peuvent influencer dans une certaine mesure les niveaux et les formes des migrations, ils n’ont pas le pouvoir d’en modifier les tendances structurelles. Or des politiques des frontières inadaptées sont un obstacle aux possibles effets positifs des migrations sur le développement. L’ouvrage le documente dans le détail.

Par ailleurs, Mathias Czaika met en lumière le lien entre niveau de développement, solde migratoire et type de politique migratoire. En vertu de la théorie de la transition migratoire, les pays à revenu moyen ont un solde migratoire négatif et orientent leurs politiques vers la gestion de leur diaspora tandis que les pays développés ont un solde migratoire positif et orientent leurs politiques vers le contrôle et la sélection des immigrés. Il est alors possible de modéliser une transition des politiques migratoires sous les effets du développement. Cela explique comment des pays comme le Brésil, la Chine, la Malaisie ou la Turquie ont progressivement mis en place des politiques d’immigration qui empruntent de nombreux aspects aux pays développés (chapitre 27).

Enfin, l’ouvrage souligne un dernier élément : aucune politique de migration et de développement ne peut réussir sans prendre en considération la rationalité des migrants eux-mêmes, acteurs à part entière des relations internationales entre États et marchés. Or, l’analyse qui peut être faite des politiques mises en place dans différentes régions du monde souligne le décalage entre la rationalité de ces politiques et les pratiques des migrants et de leurs familles.

Christophe Bertossi
Directeur du Centre Migrations et Citoyennetés de l’Ifri

>> S’abonner à Politique étrangère <<

Peter Suciu

Panzerfaust,

As anti-tank weapons go, one, in particular, didn't have an extraordinary range, it had limited stopping power, aiming was rather crude and it was one shot only – yet the German-designed Panzerfaust ("armor fist") has become somewhat legendary.

As anti-tank weapons go, one, in particular, didn't have an extraordinary range, it had limited stopping power, aiming was rather crude and it was one shot only – yet the German-designed Panzerfaust ("armor fist") has become somewhat legendary.

The History

Only introduced in 1943, the Panzerfaust was very much a sign of the state of the war effort, which had turned against Nazi Germany and its once seemingly unstoppable military faced assaults on all fronts. Inexpensive to produce and simple to operate, the Panzerfaust gave a single infantryman a weapon that could take out enemy armor.

It wasn't exactly a new innovation, however, and rather was an evolution of technology that dated back to the 1880s – when it was first found that hollow space in an explosive projectile did more damage than a solid block. The jet of hot air helped intensify the explosive attributes of the projectile. While the knowledge was understood by American and German scientists very little was actually done with it in weapons development.

Then in the 1930s, German engineers began to experiment with ways it could be employed but yet it still wasn't until the war effort began to turn in favor of the Allies that a weapon was developed to utilize the breakthroughs in shape-charge technology.

At the time Germany had already copied the American M1 "bazooka" anti-tank rocket launcher and also "super-sized" it accordingly by increasing the size of the tube and projectile. The Panzerschreck ("tank's bane") was an 88mm reusable anti-tank rocket launcher, which proved capable of taking out American and British armor and even Soviet tanks; but it was heavy, required a team of two to operate and while reloadable, the rockets were also heavy. Moreover, the Panzerschreck produced a cloud of smoke and required the teams to shift quickly after firing – not an easy task with a weapon that weighed 24 pounds empty and was nearly as long as the soldier was tall.

The German military desperately needed a simpler platform.

The result was the Faustpatrone ("fist cartridge"), a truly crude weapon that was comprised of a shaped charge of a 50-50 mix of TNT and tri-hexogen mounted on a short wooden shaft with spring metal stabilizing fins. It was launched from a preloaded, low-grade steel launch tube filled with a black powder propellant. The Faustpatrone had a range of just 100 feet, yet it could penetrate more than five inches of steel.

A Gruesome Death for Any Allied Tank Crew

It was soon improved as the Panzerfaust, which had a larger warhead and could penetrate up to eight inches of armor. While still crude in design, it was easier and a lot cheaper to produce than the Panzerschreck, and each Panzerfaust cost only around 20 Reichmarks (around $40). It was essentially a recoilless rifle that could launch a small but powerful shape charge at distances up to 200 yards, and if it scored a direct hit it was deadly. The warhead didn't just explode, it could send a jet of hot metal into the tank's cabin – which could kill the crew or even set off the fuel and/or ammo.

It was simple to operate but required that the operator be close to the tank. The weapon was thus proved more effective as the fighting reached Germany's towns and cities, where Allied and Soviet tanks had to navigate narrow streets. Armored crews quickly learned that if the enemy targeted their tanks at close range it was likely over before they knew what hit them. In the closing months of the war as many as 70 percent of Allied tanks were destroyed by Panzerfausts, a testament to the weapon and those daring enough to actually use it.

A number of variations of the Panzerfaust were produced, which increased the size of the warhead and increased the range of the weapon. In the end, however, even with 6.7 million produced, the Panzerfaust couldn't turn the tide of the war. The semi-experimental Panzerfaust 150M served as the pattern for the Soviet's RPG-2 – and during the Cold War most nations began to see how a cheap to produce, one-shot anti-tank weapon could give infantry the fist against enemy armor.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Peter Suciu

Leyte Gulf,

Ask any armchair historian to name the largest naval battle in history and a typical response is the "Battle of Leyte Gulf," fought in October 1944 off the coast of the Philippines. It involved hundreds of ships, had nearly 200,000 participants and it spanned some 100,000 square miles. Battleships, Aircraft Carriers, and Cruisers all duking it out--oh my.

Ask any armchair historian to name the largest naval battle in history and a typical response is the "Battle of Leyte Gulf," fought in October 1944 off the coast of the Philippines. It involved hundreds of ships, had nearly 200,000 participants and it spanned some 100,000 square miles. Battleships, Aircraft Carriers, and Cruisers all duking it out--oh my.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf also involved the United States' Third and Seventh Fleets, which comprised some eight large aircraft carriers, another eight light carriers as well as 18 escort carriers and a dozen battleships. The Allied forces won a decisive victory over the Japanese forces, which lost a fleet carrier, three light carriers and three battleships.

In terms of sheer numbers, it is easy to see why Leyte Gulf should have the distinction of being the largest naval battle in history. But some historians will argue it really was a combination of four major subsidiary battles that happened to take place at the same time. Moreover, Leyte Gulf didn't have the largest number of participants or even ships that were engaged in one battle.

There are several other notable battles that have also been called the largest or greatest naval battle in history. Check out the below and make your own mind.

Battle of Lepanto

On the shortlist of greatest battles in naval history is the Battle of Lepanto, which was fought between the Holy League, which included the forces of the Spanish Empire, the Papal States, the Republic of Venice and other Italian states; and the Ottoman Empire on October 7, 1571. It didn't involve quite as many men as Leyte Gulf – the Holy League mustered around 40,000 sailors and another 20,000 soldiers while the Ottoman Empire had some 84,000 men including 37,000 slaves who acted as oarsmen.

However, the Battle of Lepanto involved some 500 warships, mostly galleys, and in the end, nearly a third of the Ottoman force was killed, over half its warship sunk and a substantial number captured. It marked a major turning point for Europe and has been hailed as the greatest naval battle of the late Middle Ages.

Battle of Yamen

Fought in March 1279, the Battle of Yamen took place in the South China Sea between the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the Song Dynasty. It could go down as the most one-sided naval battle as well – and with an outcome that on paper seems improbable.

The Song had more than 1,000 ships, which were carrying around 200,000 people while the Yuan had just 50 warships and only around 20,000 soldiers. A closer look at the numbers tells another story. Most of the Song vessels were transports, carrying court officials and servants/slaves. The actual fighting capacity was just a fraction of the total strength.

To make matters worse, the Song commander Zhang Shijie ordered his fleet to be chained together – to prevent any from fleeing. While prepared for a skirmish and not a full-blown battle, Zhang Shijie quickly was overwhelmed and lost seven ships and most of his best fighters. Unable to support the middle or retreat, a slaughter ensued. At least 100,000 Song were killed, and for days after the battle thousands of corpses floated to the surface. Those included the boy emperor Zhao Shi. Within a year the Song Dynasty, which had ruled China for nearly three centuries, came to an end.

Battle of Salamis

Described as one of the most decisive military engagements of all time, the Battle of Salamis took place near Athens in 480 B.C.E. during the Greco-Persian Wars. It was another battle where on paper it seemed to be one sided affair – upwards of 1,200 Persian galleys (other estimates claim just 800) against 370 Greek triremes.

However, the Greek commander successfully drew the Persian fleet into the small Saronic Gulf. Without room to maneuver, the Persian fleet was overwhelmed by the more agile Greek ships. The Persians lost some 300 ships while the Greeks lost just 40.

Battle of the Red Cliffs

A millennia before Salamis, another decisive naval battle took place in China. It was the Battle of Red Cliffs or Battle of Chibi. Fought not on open water, it was actually an amphibious battle fought along the Yangtze River. It involved some 800,000 troops under the forces of northern warlord Cao Cao, against 50,000 troops under the allied forces of the southern warlords Sun Quan, Liu Bei and Liu Qi.

Yet again the numbers would suggest a very one-sided affair, but the southern forces had better ships and knew how to best navigate the river. The allied forces then set many of their boats on fire and rammed Cao's fleet, destroying much of his invasion force. He was unable to conquer the lands south of the Yangtze River. It has become famous as an example of Chinese history where the smaller and weaker successfully defeated a larger and stronger force.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

The UN chief on Monday issued a statement saying he was "appalled" by the reported killing over the weekend of dozens of protesters calling for the restoration of democracy, at the hands of the country's military. 

Peter Suciu

Military History,

When studying military history, battles and campaigns can often be confused. Generally speaking, a battle is seen as a continuous engagement between two warring forces whereas a campaign is a large-scale, long-duration military strategy that can meet its planned goals and objectives through combat and noncombat operations.

When studying military history, battles and campaigns can often be confused. Generally speaking, a battle is seen as a continuous engagement between two warring forces whereas a campaign is a large-scale, long-duration military strategy that can meet its planned goals and objectives through combat and noncombat operations.

Thus a battle can be part of a campaign, and yet some battles have been far longer than the original goals of a planned campaign.

With that said, here are my picks for the three longest and bloodiest battles in all of history

The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest

Long overshadowed by Operation Market Garden and the Battle of the Bulge, the Battle of Hürtgen Forest took place during the Second World War in the massive timberland on the Belgian-German border from September 12 to December 16, 1944. What began as a side objective for the U.S. First Army just days before the Market Garden offensive into the Netherlands soon became a slugfest as the Germans dug in and refused to give any ground.

It resulted in the longest battle on German ground fought during World War II, and was the longest single battle the U.S. Army ever fought. For three months little progress was made, and then on December 16 the Germans began the Ardennes Offensive – the Battle of the Bulge – and the American effort to break through ended. Even after the German offensive was halted in early January it took until February 17 – more than five months after the battle began – for the forest to be cleared. Between 30,000 and 55,000 Americans were killed or wounded, making it among the bloodiest battles in American history.

The Battle of Verdun

No battle sums up the carnage and futility of the First World War better than the Battle of Verdun. For just shy of 10 months from February 21 to December 15, the German Army attempted to break through the French lines – and while it experienced early success including the capture of Fort Douaumont in the first three days, the advance slowed and resulted in an endless exchange of back and forth assaults that left more than 400,000 dead and at least double that wounded.

Lasting 302 days, it was the longest and most costly land battle in history. In France, the battle also has come to symbolize the determination of the French military but also to put an emphasis on the destructiveness of the war. Even today the scars remain and parts of the battlefield are still off-limits due to unexploded mines and munitions.

The only good to come from the battle was that it has become a symbol of Franco-German reconciliation.

The Battle of the Atlantic

Lasting from September 3, 1939 to May 8, 1945, the Battle of the Atlantic was the longest continuous battle and military campaign of the Second World War. While it peaked from mid-1940 after the fall of France to end of 1943, it was also the largest battle by territory of the war – spread from the North Sea to the Arctic to the Gulf of Mexico.

While arguably more than a single engagement, the military significance of the battle cannot be overstated. The Germans failed to stop the flow the strategic supplies to Britain, which allowed the build-up of troops and supplies needed for the D-Day invasion.

It involved hundreds of warships and involved hundreds of thousands of men. Some 175 Allied warships and upwards of 50 German and Italian warships, and some 783 submarines were lost. In total more than 36,000 Allied sailors, as well as an equal number of merchant seamen, were killed; while more than 30,000 German sailors also lost their lives during the Battle of the Atlantic.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Peter Suciu

B-1B Lancer,

In recent years, the Air Force has continued to upgrade and update the aging warbird – and the plan is for the B-1 fleet to remain in service well into the 2030s when the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider enters service.

The United States Air Force has tested ways that the Cold War-era Boeing B-1B Lancer could be used to carry hypersonic weapons externally. External pylons were originally designed for use on the B-1s but were later scrapped to comply with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Recently the Air Force has taken the opinion that the return to the use of external hardpoints would not violate the New START agreement.

While the B-1 was originally designed for nuclear capabilities, the aircraft were switched exclusively to a conventional combat role in the mid-1990s under the Conventional Mission Upgrade Program. This was brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War – and President George H.W. Bush ordered the $3 billion refit, which included the removal of nuclear arming and fuzing hardware – while provision under the New START treaty additional modifications were further made to prevent nuclear weapon pylons from being attached to the aircraft. The conversion process was completed by 2011, and Russian officials have been allowed to inspect the aircraft yearly to verify compliance.

The conventional upgrade program included a series of upgrades: Block C, which was completed in 1997 gave the aircraft the capability to drop cluster bombs; Block D, completed in June 2001 included the deployment of the JDAM defensive system, new navigation and communications systems; while the Block E, which was completed in September 2006, added capability to deploy joint stand-off weapons (JSOW) and joint air-to-surface stand-off missiles (JASSM). An additional Block F, which included the defensive system upgrade program (DSUP), was terminated.

In recent years, the Air Force has continued to upgrade and update the aging warbird – and the plan is for the B-1 fleet to remain in service well into the 2030s when the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider enters service.

Flying High Work Horse

Since the conversion to a conventional bomber, the Air Force has employed the B-1B Lancer fleet in countless sorties. While six of the B-1s flew just two percent of the strike missions during Operation Allied Force in 1996, those aircraft dropped 20 percent of the Ordnance; and during Operation Enduring Freedom, B-1s flew two percent of sorties and dropped more than 40 percent of precision weapons.

The aging aircraft have put in a lot of miles, and B-1s have been nearly continuously deployed in combat operations over Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001.

Today the B-1B is not armed with nuclear weapons, but it is still capable of carrying the AGM-86B air launch cruise missile (ALCM) and the AGM-69 short-range attack missile. The B-1s feature three internal weapon bays, as well as six external hardpoints over the fuselage – and the aircraft have a maximum internal weapons payload of 75,000 pounds and a maximum external weapons payload of 59,000 pounds.

The Air Force maintains a fleet of just 62 B-1s, and today the Lancers remain part of the service's spearhead – and continue to effectively address the threats in an ever-changing world.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Peter Suciu

Russia Battleships,

The Soviet Union failed to build much of a navy before World War II, but Josef Stalin had dreams not all that different from Hitler's of building a fleet of powerful battleships.

A reoccurring theme among dictators, despots and totalitarian regimes is to build a massive fleet of powerful warships. China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is currently engaged in an effort to build aircraft carriers as part of its world-class navy, while the Islamic Republic of Iran has been rumored to harbor plans to develop its own aircraft carriers.

However, before the Second World War, it was the battleship that was the envy of the world. It was Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II's building of the "High Seas Fleet" that pushed the UK closer to France and Russia, while Nazi Germany attempted to "rebuild" a "High Seas Fleet" that was to be made up of massive battleships. Imperial Japan also sought to build such large battle wagons, before refocusing on aircraft carriers.

The Soviet Union failed to build much of a navy before World War II, but Josef Stalin had dreams not all that different from Hitler's of building a fleet of powerful battleships.

Stalin's Battleship Dreams

In 1938, the final five-year plan to be started before the outbreak of the war, Stalin called for a fleet of 19 ships of the line. Among those was to be the Sovetsky Soyuz class that would have been the largest warships produced by the Soviet Union up to that time. The plan was for a Pacific Fleet that could defeat the Japanese if war came, while the Baltic and Northern Fleets were supposed to be capable of defeating the German, as well as the navies of Poland, Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic States. The Black Sea Fleet was to be able to defeat the Italian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish Navies.

However, while a total of 15 of the massive warships were planned and four were laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad before the program was scaled back to just three in 1940, while all were cancelled in 1941.

The ships, which soon earned the nickname "Stalin's Republics," at 65,000 tons would have been 13,000 tons larger than Germany's Bismarck, and more on the scale of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Yamato class and the U.S. Navy's planned but canceled Montana-class, yet it has been noted that the Soviet ships may have been less heavily armed with just nine 406mm (16-inch) main guns. That was compared to the nine 460mm (18.1-inch) guns of the Japanese warships and the dozen 16-inch guns on the proposed U.S. vessels.

Why It Never Occurred

The Soviets would likely have had to cut corners to build the warships, which would have cost 1.180 billion rubles, a not-so-small fortune even in the late 1930s. From the onset, steel was plagued by quality problems and short supplies. Only 1,800 metric tons were even delivered for the project in 1939 – ten times less than what was actually required. To address the issue, thinner plates were made harder, but then proved to be too brittle and failed to pass acceptance tests. The purges of the military further seriously hampered efforts to keep the project on schedule, while Soviet industry simply wasn't up to the task of building the massive warships.

After canceling one of the four vessels under construction, with the resources redirected to the Red Army, production on the remaining three slowly advanced until the German invasion in June 1941. Work was initially halted on all three battleships, but then throughout the summer work resumed at a near snail's pace on the lead warship Sovetsky Soyuz, until work on it and its two sister ships was canceled on September 10, 1941. The ships were stricken from the navy list.

The unfinished lead vessel was lightly damaged by German air attacks during the Siege of Leningrad, but it survived the war. While consideration was given to completing the ship, experience gained during the war highlighted the fact that the ship was largely obsolete and the era of the battleship all but over. Sovetsky Soyuz, Sovetskaya Rossiya and Sovetskaya Ukraina were all scrapped in the late 1940s.

As a side note, material for the fourth vessel Sovetskaya Belorussiya, which had been canceled after it was found that some 70,000 rivets in her hull plating were of inferior quality, was used to construct a floating battery that was used during the defense of Leningrad.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

In eastern Sudan, renewable energy is being trialled as a power source in UN-run refugee camps, where an influx of thousands of people fleeing conflict in Ethiopia is putting a strain on local resources, and host communities.

Peter Suciu

Gun Laws,

Such a move couldn't happen in the United States, right?

Our neighbor to the north doesn't have a "Second Amendment," so there is little that gun owners can do if Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau passes his sweeping gun reform legislation. Not only would it ban the ownership of so-called "assault-style" firearms such as AR-15s, but it could allow municipalities to even ban handguns – all handguns regardless of age.

In a press conference earlier this month, the Liberal Party PM said he would move forward with a buyback program in the coming months, but also said that the legislation would empower municipalities to restrict storage and transportation of handguns within their boundaries. Breaching of the law would carry a maximum penalty of two years in prison.

Such a move couldn't happen in the United States, right?

Actually, it almost did – and already some communities have sought to ban guns. While court cases such as District of Columbia v. Heller (554 U.S. 570) from 2008 and McDonald v. City of Chicago (561 U.S. 742) two years later essentially ensure that municipalities can't infringe on an individual's Second Amendment rights with an outright ban, many people today forget that the U.S. lawmakers actually considered a nationwide regulation of handguns back in the 1930s.

The NFA Almost Included Handguns

The National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA), which was passed into law to address gangland violence including the St. Valentine's Day Massacre of 1929, as well as the attempted assassination of then-President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, didn't actually ban machine guns and short-barreled rifles/shotguns, but rather it highly regulated them.

The 1934 Act required those (and other) items to be registered and taxed. Buyers of those firearms had to undergo a thorough, almost methodical, background check and "transfer" those items via a $200 tax. That was roughly the price of a Thompson submachine gun at the time – and while it is not entirely clear on how Congress settled on that amount, it has been suggested that it essentially doubled the cost of buying the firearm. It is also worth noting that the $200 tax was likely considered quite prohibitive at the time, it has fortunately for buyers not increased in the nearly 90 years since its enactment.

According to Gregg Lee Carter's 2002 book Guns in American Society: An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, and the Law, "the legislation would use the tax power as a means to impose near-prohibitory controls on machine guns and handguns."

As that noted, handguns – pistols and revolvers – would have been regulated as strictly as machine guns, due largely to the fact that such firearms could be so readily concealed. It should be noted that Presidents Lincoln, Garfield, and McKinley were in fact all assassinated by handguns; whilst Giuseppe Zangara, FDR's would-be assassin, also carried a handgun.

Today, many opponents of the Second Amendment like to maintain that the National Rifle Association (NRA) wasn't always a political lobbyist group and that it really was only focused on promoting shooting sports. As Carter noted, this wasn't the case, as even in the 1930s the NRA maintained enough clout that it dropped its opposition of the proposal only when a compromise was made in which handguns were removed from the bill.

Had the NRA not stepped up, handguns might have been as difficult to own as machine guns – but it questionable, even doubtful, as to whether America would be any safer.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Peter Suciu

MiG-31,

The Mikoyan MiG-31 was developed during the Cold War era as a home-defense interceptor. Codenamed "Foxhound" by NATO, the long-range, two-seat supersonic aircraft has maintained a certain mystique in the west, in part because there remains much speculation over all of its capabilities. It took its maiden flight in September 1975 and was designed to work efficiently in all weather conditions.

In early February, the Russian Central Military District conducted an exercise against a notional intruder and while such exercises aren't that unexpected, this drew attention as it involved a Mig-31BM, a supersonic high-altitude interceptor-fighter. The pilots reportedly performed around 30 sorties in the drills, which were conducted near the Ural Mountains and involved practicing measures on their own to detect, track, forced to land, and notionally eliminate airspace intruders.

"The pilots visually detected an aircraft and locked it on," the Central Military District's press office told Tass. "The crews of MiG-31BM interceptor-fighters acted in pairs, forcing the intruder to climb to ultimate altitudes."

MiG-31 Foxhound: The History 

The Mikoyan MiG-31 was developed during the Cold War era as a home-defense interceptor. Codenamed "Foxhound" by NATO, the long-range, two-seat supersonic aircraft has maintained a certain mystique in the west, in part because there remains much speculation over all of its capabilities. It took its maiden flight in September 1975 and was designed to work efficiently in all weather conditions.

Derived from the MiG-25 Foxbat interceptor and equipped with state-of-the-art digital avionics, the aircraft was never exported by the Soviet Union, and of the more than 500 produced, most remained in service with the Russian Air Force, while some thirty are in service with the Kazakhstan Air Force.

While Syria had reportedly ordered eight of the MiG-31E aircraft in 2007 the order was suspended due to Israeli pressure along with a lack of Syrian funds. Turkish news media has reported that six of the aircraft may have been delivered for use by the Syrian Arab Air Force, but Russia has denied that it actually sold the aircraft to Syria.

During the late Cold War, a MiG-31 Foxhound may have been used to chase after the U.S. military's SR-71 Blackbird spy plane and reportedly locked on with its missiles, but as the American reconnaissance aircraft was never employed to actually overfly Soviet airspace, whether the incidence occurred has remained a matter of conjecture at best.

More recently it has been reported that the Russian military had upgraded the MiG-31 Foxhound and has explored the option of arming the home-defense interceptor with hypersonic missiles, which would make the airframe a very serious threat. Despite the fact that the aircraft dates back to the 1970s, Russia has an established trend of preserving original aircraft designs by integrating modern weapons and avionics and this has resulted in the MiG-31BM upgrade from a decade ago. The upgrades provided network-centric combat control, as well as phased array radar.

The upgraded MiG-31BM can also employ R-33 long-range air-to-air missiles and R-73 short-range air-launched weapons. It is powered by two D-30F6 engines, which provide a take-off thrust of 15,500 kgf each, and the fighter-interceptor has a maximum speed of 3,000 km/h and a ceiling of 20,600 meters. It is also outfitted with a mid-air refueling system.

It is unknown how many of the original MiG-31s have been upgraded to the 31BM standard but it has been reported that it is less than 100 of the original 500 aircraft produced during the Soviet era.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Ted Galen Carpenter

Security,

Iran has been preparing for years.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Beyond utilizing its direct military capabilities, Tehran might well call upon its network of Shia political and military allies in the Middle East to create havoc for the United States. Iran maintains very close ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon and several Shia militias in Iraq.

Kenneth Adelman, a former assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and a prominent figure in the U.S. foreign policy community, famously predicted in 2002 that a war to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein would be a “cakewalk.” President Donald Trump apparently learned nothing from Adelman’s hubris and rosy optimism. Although he aborted a planned airstrike on Iran at the last minute, Trump later warned Iranian leaders that the military option was still very much on the table. He added that if the United States used force against Iran, Washington would not put boots on the ground but would wage the conflict entirely with America’s vast air and naval power. There was no doubt in his mind about the outcome. He asserted that such a war “wouldn’t last very long,” and that it would mean the “obliteration” of Iran.

(Note: This first appeared several years ago and is being reposted due to reader interest.) 

But history is littered with examples of wars that political leaders and the general public erroneously believed would be quick and easy. When Abraham Lincoln opted to confront the secession of the Southern states with force, his initial troop request was merely for 90-day enlistments. People in Washington, DC, were so confident that the Union army would crush the upstart rebels at the impending battle of Manassas that hundreds drove out in carriages to view the likely battlefield. They treated it like a spectator event, in some cases complete with picnic baskets. Four years later, more than 500,000 American soldiers were dead.

Leaders and populations in the major European capitals in 1914 exuded optimism that the new war would be over in a matter of months—with their side winning a glorious victory, of course. Once again, the situation did not turn out as planned. The projected quick and relatively bloodless conflict became a prolonged, horrific slaughter consuming millions of young lives, toppling established political systems in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, and ushering in the plagues of fascism and communism. 

A common thread in the various blunders was the assumption that the initial phase of a conflict would be utterly decisive. That was Adelman’s error. Washington’s military encounter with Saddam’s forces was fairly close to being a cakewalk. The decrepit Iraqi army was no match for the U.S.-led invaders. When Saddam fell from power, President George W. Bush flew to a U.S. aircraft carrier that displayed a huge (later infamous) “Mission Accomplished” banner. 

However, the initial military victory proved to be just the beginning of a giant headache for the United States. Within months, an insurgency arose against the U.S. occupation force, and political instability bordering on civil war plagued Iraq, paving the way for the rise of ISIS. At last count, more than 4,400 American troops have perished pursuing the Iraq mission, and the United States has spent well over a trillion dollars. Not exactly a cakewalk.

That is what makes President Trump’s cavalier attitude about a war with Iran so worrisome. He implicitly assumes that the United States has control over the twin processes of retaliation and escalation. U.S. officials made that same faulty assumption in Iraq—and decades earlier in Vietnam. But even adversaries that are inferior in terms of conventional military capabilities may have numerous options to wage asymmetric warfare. And that strategy can become a war of attrition that inflicts serious damage on the militarily superior United States.

Iran may be especially effective if it adopts that course. Indeed, just in the narrow military sense, Iranian capabilities are far from trivial. Retired Admiral James Stavridis notes that Iran has “exceptionally strong asymmetric warfare capability” in several areas. “Cyber [attacks], swarm small-boat tactics, diesel submarines, special forces and surface-to-surface cruise missiles are all high-level assets,” Stavridis stated. “They are also very experienced at employing them in the demanding environment of the Middle East.”

Beyond utilizing its direct military capabilities, Tehran might well call upon its network of Shia political and military allies in the Middle East to create havoc for the United States. Iran maintains very close ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon and several Shia militias in Iraq. The residual U.S. force deployed in the latter country could be especially vulnerable to harassment and lethal attacks. And one should not ignore or discount the potential role of the angry, oppressed Shia majority in Bahrain. If their seething discontent at the Sunni-controlled regime that Washington backs explodes into outright conflict, the Trump administration could find it increasingly difficult to continue basing the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.

Going to war against Iran would be no minor matter, and President Trump is irresponsible to act in such a flippant manner. Attacking Iran could trigger a prolonged, costly nightmare in both treasure and blood. Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI), a Democratic presidential candidate, likely is prophetic that a war against Iran would make the Iraq War look like a cakewalk. Tehran certainly has a multitude of ways to retaliate for U.S. aggression and to escalate the bilateral confrontation. U.S. leaders would be wise not to venture farther down that perilous path

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest, is the author of twelve books and more than eight hundred articles on international affairs. His latest book is Gullible Superpower: U.S. Support for Bogus Foreign Democratic Movements (2019). This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

Armata Tank,

Good things come to those who wait, and in the case of military hardware, some of the best things take time to finally enter service – at least in significant numbers. This is most certainly the case with the Russian military's T-14  Armata tank, which has truly been a slow time coming.

Good things come to those who wait, and in the case of military hardware, some of the best things take time to finally enter service – at least in significant numbers. This is most certainly the case with the Russian military's T-14  Armata tank, which has truly been a slow time coming.

However, on Thursday Defense Minister Army General Sergei Shoigu said during a ministry conference call that a "pilot batch" of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and repair and evacuation equipment based on the Armata combat platform will be delivered to the Russian troops sometime next year.

In 2022, there are plans to deliver a pilot batch of T-14 tanks, T-15 infantry fighting vehicles and T-16 armored repair and evacuation hardware to the troops," Shoigu said, as reported by Tass.

In December, the Russian Ministry of Defense had announced that the serial production of Russia's "prospective military hardware," including the latest T-14 'Armata' main battle tank (MBT) as well as the T-15 infantry fighting vehicle, would begin before the completion of all trials. The goal was to speed up the delivery to the Russian armed forces.

Russia's Armata heavy tracked universal platform was developed to carry various hardware including the T-14 tanks, T-15 infantry fight vehicles and T-16 overhaul and evacuation armored vehicles. The T-14 had already undergone preliminary trials in 2019.

The new MBT, which differs fundamentally from its predecessors. The T-14, which was developed by Uralvagonzavod, was first demonstrated at the May 9, 2015, Victory Day parade in Moscow. It is a revolutionary design that features fully digitized equipment, along with an unmanned turret and an isolated armored capsule for the crew, which was designed to reduce the risk of personnel loss in combat.

Armata Tank: Amazing Capabilities, High Costs

Russia had originally announced plans to acquire upwards of 2,300 T-14s by 2025, but given the high cost of each tank, Moscow has scaled back considerably. Likewise, the arrival to troops has also been slow going and has become akin to "Waiting for Godot." One issue has been that the T-14 Armata is so revolutionary that it has its share of "teething problems," many of which are based on the design.

The crew compartment doesn't rotate with the turret and requires greater emphasis on optical equipment and electronics, which some analysts have warned could fail in battle – a potentially catastrophic situation if there ever was one. As a result of the costs and problems, Russia has opted to upgrade much of its existing tank fleet.

However, it has continued to press forward with the T-14 Armata and in the summer of 2020, it was announced that Russian designers were considering ways that the tank could be employed without a crew at all.

"The appearance of heavy unmanned combat vehicles is a matter of the near future," the T-14's manufacturer UralVagonZavod announced during the Army-2020 forum.

UralVagonZavod's Deputy General Director Vyacheslav Khalitov has previously stated that the company had carried out theoretical and experimental work to create a robotic tank on the Armata-heavy military tracked vehicle platform. It is also the first tank in the world to incorporate so-called “network-centric warfare” technologies. In normal speak this means that the T-14 can be conduct reconnaissance missions, operate as a target designation and fire adjustment vehicle for self-propelled guns, surface-to-air missile systems, and even T-90 tanks.

To offset the high costs of the tank, Russia has been seeking to find foreign customers for the T-14, and it was unveiled abroad at the IDEX 2021 arms show in Abu Dhabi last month.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Michael Peck

Security, Asia

The 1971 India-Pakistan War was the third major conflict between the two nations in twenty-five years.

Here's What You Need to Remember: In the end, India had demonstrated its military superiority. Pakistan lost half its territory and population. Perhaps more important, Pakistani illusions that an Islamic army could rout the “weak” Hindus had been disproved.

This is what happens when you chop a nation in half.

Before December 3, 1971, Pakistan was a country suffering from a split personality disorder. When British India became independent in 1947, the country was divided into Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. The problem was that East Pakistan and West Pakistan were almost a thousand miles apart, and wedged in between them was archenemy India. Imagine if the United States only consisted of the East Coast and West Coast, and Russia controlled all of North America in between.

Thirteen days later, Pakistan had been amputated. Indian troops had conquered East Pakistan, which became the new nation of Bangladesh. More than ninety thousand Pakistani soldiers were taken prisoner, half the Pakistani Navy had been sunk and the Indian Air Force came out on top. It was total humiliation, and not just for Pakistan. The United States and Britain sent aircraft carriers in a futile attempt to intimidate India, and ended up facing off against Soviet warships. Pakistan’s defeat also spurred its rulers to begin the development of nuclear weapons.

The 1971 India-Pakistan War, the third major conflict between the two nations in twenty-five years, was sparked by unrest in East Pakistan. The Bengalis of East Pakistan, who constituted 54 percent of Pakistan’s population at the time, chafed under the rule of West Pakistan. The two Pakistans belonged to different ethnic groups and spoke different languages.

Bengali demands for autonomy were rebuffed. By mid-1971, an East Pakistan guerrilla movement had emerged, supported by India. Pakistan’s military-controlled government cracked down hard, killing up to three million Bengalis in what has been described as a genocide. By November, both India and Pakistan were preparing for war.

On December 3, Pakistan launched a preemptive air strike against Indian airfields, ironically trying to emulate how the Israeli Air Force had destroyed Egyptian airpower in 1967. The difference was that the Israelis committed two hundred aircraft and wiped out nearly five hundred Egyptian aircraft in a few hours; Pakistan committed fifty aircraft and inflicted little damage. The air war featured the full panoply of Cold War jets, pitting Pakistani F-104 Starfighters, F-86 Sabres, MiG-19s and B-57 Canberras against Indian MiG-21s, Sukhoi-7s, Hawker Hunters and Folland Gnats, as well as Hawker Sea Hawks flying from the Indian carrier Vikrant.

Both sides claimed victory in the air war. Chuck Yeager, who was in Pakistan advising their air force, claimed the Pakistanis “whipped their asses.” The Indians claim Yeager was crazy. However, it does appear that India had the upper hand in the air, controlling the skies over East Pakistan and losing about forty-five aircraft to Pakistan’s seventy-five. The maneuverable little Indian Gnat, a British-made lightweight fighter (its predecessor was called the Midge), proved so successful against Pakistani F-86s that the Indians dubbed it the “Sabre Slayer.”

At sea, there is no question that India won. The Indian Navy dispatched missile boats, armed with Soviet-made Styx missiles, to strike the western port of Karachi, sinking or badly damaging two Pakistani destroyers and three merchant ships, as well as fuel tanks. Indian ships blockaded East Pakistan from reinforcements and supplies. Notable was India’s use of the carrier Vikrant to conduct air strikes on coastal targets, as well as conducting an amphibious landing on Pakistani territory.

Pakistan retaliated by dispatching the submarine Ghazi to mine Indian ports. While stalked by an Indian destroyer, the Ghazi mysteriously blew up. However, the submarine Hangor did sink the Indian frigate Khukri.

As for the ground war, the best that can be said is that if Napoleon himself had faced Pakistan’s strategic dilemma, he would have sulked off to St. Helena. Isolated by land and blockaded by sea, no army could have defended East Pakistan against even a moderately competent foe, let alone the nine Indian divisions that quickly captured the East Pakistan capital of Dhaka. East Pakistani forces surrendered on December 16.

To add insult to the defeat of Pakistan and its proudly Muslim rulers, the Indian campaign was planned by Maj. Gen. J. F. R. Jacob—an Indian Jew descended from a family that fled Baghdad in the eighteenth century.

One issue that hampered Pakistan’s war effort would soon become familiar in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and other ethnically divided nations. In 1971, Bengalis comprised a significant part of the Pakistani military, especially in technical jobs.

Meanwhile, the superpowers were flexing their muscles. Despite its cruelty toward the Bengalis, and the opposition of U.S. diplomats, President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger backed Pakistan against pro-Soviet India (see the Nixon-Kissinger transcripts here). Task Force 74, centered on the aircraft carrier Enterprise, steamed into the Bay of Bengal, as did the British carrier Eagle. Why India would have been intimidated into a cease-fire, even as its tanks were rolling into Dhaka, is a mystery. America’s attempt to deter India from defeating Pakistan became a case study of the limitations of relying on the threat of force to compel other nations to change their behavior.

In fact, what the U.S. Navy accomplished was to chill U.S.-Indian relations for years. Even more disturbing were the Soviet cruisers, destroyers and submarines shadowing Task Force 74. A war between two Southwest Asian nations could have triggered a superpower showdown at sea, and perhaps World War III.

In the end, India had demonstrated its military superiority. Pakistan lost half its territory and population. Perhaps more important, Pakistani illusions that an Islamic army could rout the “weak” Hindus had been disproved. Following the 1947 and 1965 wars, the 1971 war was the third major conflict between India and Pakistan. It was also the last. Despite some hostilities in Kargil and other spots on the border, India and Pakistan have not fought a major war in forty-five years.

Unfortunately, Pakistan’s humiliation in 1971 spurred it into developing an atomic bomb. With India also armed with atomic weapons, South Asia now lives under the shadow of nuclear war. The next major India-Pakistan clash could be the last.

Michael Peck is a frequent contributor to the National Interest and is a regular writer for many outlets like WarIsBoring. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook. This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Reuters.