Diplomacy & Crisis News

Robert Farley

Indian Military, Asia

India’s carrier force has developed a three-pronged rationale for its purpose.

Here's What You Need to Remember: India has committed to carrier aviation, and has the resources and experience to develop a successful force. 

With one large carrier in service and another on the way, India has become one of the world’s pre-eminent naval aviation powers. How did the program come about? Where is it going? And what is the strategic rationale for India’s massive investment in aircraft carriers?

The Origins of India’s Carriers

Despite considerable economic challenges, India took carrier aviation very seriously in the years after independence. Unlike China (or even the Soviet Union), India focused on carriers instead of submarines. INS Vikrant, a Majestic-class light carrier, served from 1961 until 1997, fighting effectively in the 1971 war. INS Viraat, formerly the Centaur-class carrier HMS Hermes, joined the Indian Navy in 1987 and served until 2016. These carriers gave the Indian Navy long-term experience in carrier ops, as well as a compelling organizational logic for maintaining a carrier capability.

The Current Situation

By the early 2000s, Viraat was showing her age. The supply of second-hand carriers, long dominated by the Royal Navy’s World War II relics, had narrowed considerably. Instead of building a new ship itself, India determined to acquire an older Soviet carrier, the former Kiev-class warship Admiral Gorshkov, which had been out of service since the 1990s. India paid in excess of $2 billion for a massive reconstruction that left the ship nearly unrecognizable, with a ski-jump deck and transformed weapon systems. When accepted into service in 2014, the new 45,000-ton INS Vikramaditya could operate around twenty MiG-29K fighters, along with utility helicopters. Despite cost-overruns and serviceability problems, the ship offered the Indian Navy the chance to redevelop its aviation muscles after years of operating only VSTOL (vertical and/or short take-off and landing) aircraft from Viraat.

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Vikramaditya was only the first step towards recapitalizing the aviation wing of the Indian Navy. The second step was the new INS Vikrant, a 40,000-ton ski-jump carrier built in India’s Cochin Shipyard. Laid down in 2009, Vikrant is expected to finally enter service around 2020, with an air wing similar to that of Vikramaditya. The construction process has witnessed a number of setbacks, many of which are to be expected from a first effort at carrier construction.

For the time being, India has decided to stick with the MiG-29K as its primary naval combat aircraft, rather than the Su-33, the F/A-18 or the Dassault Rafale. Both Boeing and Dassault remain at least somewhat hopeful of exporting carrier-borne fighters to India. Even Saab expressed an interest in converting the Gripen for naval service. The Indian Navy also contemplated developing a navalized version of the HAL Tejas, but (for now) has wisely rejected the complicated effort to convert the troubled fighter.

Strategic Rationale

India’s carrier force has developed a three-pronged rationale for its purpose. The first prong is support of a conventional war against Pakistan, which would involve strikes against Pakistani naval assets and land bases. Unfortunately, Vikrant and Vikramaditya would struggle in strike operations because of limitations on aircraft weight, although they certainly would attract Pakistani attention. Second, the carriers make the Indian Navy the preeminent force in the Indian Ocean, better able to command the area than any foreign competitor. Indian carriers will always have better access to bases and support facilities in the Indian Ocean than China, the United Kingdom, or even the United States, and the presence of the carriers facilitates the projection of Indian power and the management of trade protection.

The third prong involves geopolitical competition with China. With the anticipated commissioning of its second large carrier, China has managed to leapfrog Indian naval aviation development in a relatively short period of time. Although China lacks India’s experience with carriers, it boasts a remarkably efficient shipbuilding industry and an increasingly sophisticated aviation sector, making it less dependent on foreign technology. Although India may struggle to keep up with Chinese construction, it can leverage geography (proximity to bases) to its advantage in the most likely areas of any conflict.

What to Expect from the Indian Navy

The next step in India’s naval aviation project will be INS Vishaal, a 65,000-ton conventionally propelled, domestically produced CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) carrier. With experience gleaned from the experience with Vikrant, the design and construction of the carrier will hopefully go more smoothly. It appears as if India will have unprecedented access to U.S. technology for the construction of Vishaal, including the EMALS electromagnetic catapult system used on the Gerald R. Ford class. Unlike Vikrant or Vikramaditya, Vishaal will be able to launch and recover heavy strike aircraft, as well as early warning planes such as the E-2 Hawkeye. Vishaal is supposed to enter service by 2030, although that timeline may be optimistic.

More recently, a spate of rumors has suggested that India might try to acquire one of the variants of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Deciding to buy the F-35 (and then going through with it) would deeply tax India’s military procurement bureaucracy, however, and would require a great deal of forbearance from U.S. export control officials. Still, the F-35C is the world’s most modern carrier fighter, and INS Vishaal could surely operate the plane.

Next Steps

By the early 2030s, India plans to have three active carriers. At that point, the next presumed step will be to replace INS Vikramaditya; although lightly used, her hull is already thirty years old, and she will be less capable than the other two ships. If Vishaal is at all acceptable, India’s best bet would be simply to build more of that design, which would allow the capture of construction efficiencies will also enabling incremental improvements. Although the Indian Navy has toyed with the idea of nuclear propulsion, it really doesn’t need a nuclear carrier; the strategic tasks of the navy should keep it relatively close to home, and building nuclear propulsion into the design would result in three different carriers with three different designs, limiting efficiency and co-operability.

Conclusion

India has committed to carrier aviation, and has the resources and experience to develop a successful force. However, India still faces some big decisions, including the choice of a new carrier fighter and the design characteristics of its flagship class of fleet carriers. Much will depend on how successfully India masters the difficulties of large-scale shipbuilding, and how well it integrates new technologies into the design and construction process.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to the National Interest, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money, Information Dissemination and the Diplomat.

This first appeared in 2018 and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Robert Farley

Bombers,

These five bombers stand above the pack. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Current air forces have, with some exceptions, effectively done away with the distinctions between fighters and bombers, instead relying on multi-role fighter-bombers for both missions.

Bombers are the essence of strategic airpower. While fighters have often been important to air forces, it was the promise of the heavy bomber than won and kept independence for the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force. At different points in time, air forces in the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and Italy have treated bomber design and construction as a virtually all-consuming obsession, setting fighter and attack aviation aside.

However, even the best bombers are effective over only limited timespans. The unlucky state-of-the-art bombers of the early 1930s met disaster when put into service against the pursuit aircraft of the late 1930s. The B-29s that ruled the skies over Japan in 1945 were cut to pieces above North Korea in 1950. The B-36 Peacemaker, obsolete before it was even built, left service in a decade. Most of the early Cold War bombers were expensive failures, eventually to be superseded by ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

States procure bombers, like all weapons, to serve strategic purposes. This list employs the following metrics of evaluation:

· Did the bomber serve the strategic purpose envisioned by its developers?

· Was the bomber a sufficiently flexible platform to perform other missions, and to persist in service?

· How did the bomber compare with its contemporaries in terms of price, capability, and effectiveness?

And with that, the five best bombers of all time:

Handley Page Type O 400

The first strategic bombing raids of World War I were carried out by German zeppelins, enormous lighter than aircraft that could travel at higher altitudes than the interceptors of the day, and deliver payloads against London and other targets. Over time, the capabilities of interceptors and anti-aircraft artillery grew, driving the Zeppelins to other missions. Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and others began working on bombers capable of delivering heavy loads over long distance, a trail blazed (oddly enough) by the Russian Sikorsky Ilya Muromets.

Even the modest capabilities of the early bombers excited the airpower theorists of the day, who imagined the idea of fleets of bombers striking enemy cities and enemy industry. The Italians developed the Caproni family of bombers, which operated in the service of most Allied countries at one time or another. German Gotha bombers would eventually terrorize London again, catalyzing the Smuts Report and the creation of the world’s first air force.

Faster and capable of carrying more bombs than either the Gotha IVs or the Caproni Ca.3, the Type O 400 had a wingspan nearly as large as the Avro Lancaster. With a maximum speed of 97 miles per hour with a payload of up to 2000 lbs, O 400s were the mainstay of Hugh Trenchard’s Independent Air Force near the end of the war, a unit which struck German airfields and logistics concentration well behind German lines. These raids helped lay the foundation of interwar airpower theory, which (at least in the US and the UK) envisioned self-protecting bombers striking enemy targets en masse.

Roughly 600 Type O bombers were produced during World War I, with the last retiring in 1922. Small numbers served in the Chinese, Australian, and American armed forces.

Junkers Ju 88

The Junkers Ju-88 was one of the most versatile aircraft of World War II. Although it spent most of its career as a medium bomber, it moonlighted as a close attack aircraft, a naval attack aircraft, a reconnaissance plane, and a night fighter. Effective and relatively cheap, the Luftwaffe used the Ju 88 to good effect in most theaters of war, but especially on the Eastern Front and in the Mediterranean.

Designed with dive bomber capability, the Ju 88 served in relatively small numbers in the invasion of Poland, the invasion of Norway, and the Battle of France. The Ju-88 was not well suited to the strategic bombing role into which it was forced during the Battle of Britain, especially in its early variants. It lacked the armament to sufficiently defend itself, and the payload to cause much destruction to British industry and infrastructure. The measure of an excellent bomber, however, goes well beyond its effectiveness at any particular mission. Ju 88s were devastating in Operation Barbarossa, tearing apart Soviet tank formations and destroying much of the Soviet Air Forces on the ground. Later variants were built as or converted into night fighters, attacking Royal Air Force bomber formations on the way to their targets.

In spite of heavy Allied bombing of the German aviation industry, Germany built over 15,000 Ju 88s between 1939 and 1945. They operated in several Axis air forces.

De Havilland Mosquito

The de Havilland Mosquito was a remarkable little aircraft, capable of a wide variety of different missions. Not unlike the Ju 88, the Mosquito operated in bomber, fighter, night fighter, attack, and reconnaissance roles. The RAF was better positioned than the Luftwaffe to utilized the specific qualities of the Mosquito, and avoid forcing it into missions in could not perform.

Relatively lightly armed and constructed entirely of wood, the Mosquito was quite unlike the rest of the RAF bomber fleet. Barely escaping design committee, the Mosquito was regarded as easy to fly, and featured a pressurized cockpit with a high service ceiling. Most of all, however, the Mosquito was fast. With advanced Merlin engines, a Mosquito could outpace the German Bf109 and most other Axis fighters.

Although the bomb load of the Mosquito was limited, its great speed, combined with sophisticated instrumentation, allowed it to deliver ordnance with more precision than most other bombers. During the war, the RAF used Mosquitoes for various precision attacks against high value targets, including German government installations and V weapon launching sites. As pathfinders, Mosquitoes flew point on bomber formations, leading night time bombing raids that might otherwise have missed their targets. Mosquitos also served in a diversionary role, distracting German night fighters from the streams of Halifaxes and Lancasters striking urban areas.

De Havilland produced over 7000 Mosquitoes for the RAF and other allied air forces. Examples persisted in post-war service with countries as varied as Israel, the Republic of China, Yugoslavia, and the Dominican Republic

Avro Lancaster

The workhorse of the RAF in World War II, the Lancaster carried out the greater part of the British portion of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). Led by Arthur Harris, Bomber Command believed that area bombing raids, targeted against German civilians, conducted at night, would destroy German morale and economic capacity and bring the war to a close. Accordingly, the Lancaster was less heavily armed than its American contemporaries, as it depended less on self-defense in order to carry out its mission.

The first Lancasters entered service in 1942. The Lancaster could carry a much heavier bomb load than the B-17 or the B-24, while operating at similar speeds and at a slightly longer range. The Lancaster also enjoyed a payload advantage over the Handley Page Halifax. From 1942 until 1945, the Lancaster would anchor the British half of the CBO, eventually resulting in the destruction of most of urban Germany and the death of several hundred thousand German civilians.

There are reasons to be skeptical of the inclusion of the Lancaster. The Combined Bomber Offensive was a strategic dead-end, serving up expensive four-engine bombers as a feast for smaller, cheaper German fighters. Battles were fought under conditions deeply advantageous to the Germans, as damaged German planes could land, and shot down German pilots rescued and returned to service. Overall, the enormous Western investment in strategic bombing was probably one of the greatest grand strategic miscalculations of the Second World War. Nevertheless, this list needs a bomber from the most identifiable bomber offensive in history, and the Lancaster was the best of the bunch.

Over 7000 Lancasters were built, with the last retiring in the early 1960s after Canadian service as recon and maritime patrol aircraft.

Boeing B-52 Stratofortress

The disastrous experience of B-29 Superfortresses over North Korea in 1950 demonstrated that the United States would require a new strategic bomber, and soon. Unfortunately, the first two generations of bombers chosen by the USAF were almost uniformly duds; the hopeless B-36, the short-legged B-47, the dangerous-to-its-own-pilots B-58, and the obsolete-before-it-flew XB-70. The vast bulk of these bombers quickly went from wastes of taxpayer money to wastes of space at the Boneyard. None of the over 2500 early Cold War bombers ever dropped a bomb in anger.

The exception was the B-52. The BUFF was originally intended for high altitude penetration bombing into the Soviet Union. It replaced the B-36 and the B-47, the former too slow and vulnerable to continue in the nuclear strike mission, and the latter too short-legged to reach the USSR from U.S. bases. Slated for replacement by the B-58 and the B-70, the B-52 survived because it was versatile enough to shift to low altitude penetration after the increasing sophistication of Soviet SAMs made the high altitude mission suicidal.

And this versatility has been the real story of the B-52. The BUFF was first committed to conventional strike missions in service of Operation Arc Light during the Vietnam War. In Operation Linebacker II, the vulnerability of the B-52 to air defenses was made manifest when nine Stratofortresses were lost in the first days of the campaign. But the B-52 persisted. In the Gulf War, B-52s carried out saturation bombing campaigns against the forward positions of the Iraqi Army, softening and demoralizing the Iraqis for the eventual ground campaign. In the War on Terror, the B-52 has acted in a close air support role, delivering precision-guided ordnance against small concentrations of Iraqi and Taliban insurgents.

Most recently, the B-52 showed its diplomatic chops when two BUFFs were dispatched to violate China’s newly declared Air Defense Zone. The BUFF was perfect for this mission; the Chinese could not pretend not to notice two enormous bombers travelling at slow speed through the ADIZ.

742 B-52s were delivered between 1954 and 1963. Seventy-eight remain in service, having undergone multiple upgrades over the decades that promise to extend their lives into the 2030s, or potentially beyond. In a family of short-lived airframes, the B-52 has demonstrated remarkable endurance and longevity.

Conclusion

Over the last century, nations have invested tremendous resources in bomber aircraft. More often than not, this investment has failed to bear strategic fruit. The very best aircraft have been those that could not only conduct their primary mission effectively, but that were also sufficiently flexible to perform other tasks that might be asked of them. Current air forces have, with some exceptions, effectively done away with the distinctions between fighters and bombers, instead relying on multi-role fighter-bombers for both missions. The last big, manned bomber may be the American LRS-B, assuming that project ever gets off the ground.

Honorable Mention

Grumman A-6 Intruder, MQ-1 Predator, Caproni Ca.3, Tupolev Tu-95 “Bear,” Avro Vulcan, Tupolev Tu-22M “Backfire.”

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

This first appeared in 2018 and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

David Axe

People's Liberation Army, China

China's few veterans with combat experience are expected to retire in the next few years, leaving it without any firsthand experience at war.

Here's What You Need to Know: Today the U.S. military possesses arguably more combat experience than any other armed forces, owing to the long-term American-led operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But it's debatable whether this experience in low-intensity warfare would matter in what would probably be a high-tech war with China.

The Chinese military has almost no combat experience, analyst Timothy Heath wrote for the California think-tank RAND. But that inexperience might not matter very much, Heath explained.

“Today, China's military has an increasingly impressive high-tech arsenal, but its ability to use these weapons and equipment remains unclear. There are reasons to be skeptical.”

The last time the People's Liberation Army fought a major conflict was in 1979, when "a seasoned Vietnamese military demolished a bungled Chinese invasion," according to Heath.

At the time, the Vietnamese military was still fresh from its defeat of the U.S. and allied forces in the early 1970s. The Chinese Communist Party, by contrast, had gutted its own armed forces through politically-motivated purges.

"The deleterious consequences are evident in the PLA's reversion to discredited, but low-skill, tactics like the human-wave assault, as well as in the inability of infantrymen to navigate or read maps and the inaccuracy of artillerymen due to unfamiliarity with procedures for measuring distances and calculating firing distances," Heath wrote.

"The ghost of that defeat still hovers over the PLA," he continued. "In China, authorities have largely chosen to ignore an embarrassing conflict that fits awkwardly with Beijing's narrative of a peaceful rise, but the official silence has left many PLA veterans disillusioned about their participation in the war."

"The few combat veterans who remain in service will all retire within the next few years, which means the military will soon have no personnel with firsthand combat experience."

But that doesn't mean Beijing can't "win" a major war. Although it's debatable whether any party truly would "win" in such a conflict, given the potentially profound loss of life and the economic, ecological, and political chaos that surely would result from the war.

"Win" in this case can only mean: one side achieves its own immediate strategic goals while preventing its opponent from doing the same. Heath looked to history to explain the role combat experience plays in a war's outcome.

The U.S. military early in World War II lacked experience but possessed the resources, will-to-fight and institutional foundation -- training, education and capacity for official self-correction -- to quickly recover from battlefield defeats such as the German army's rout of American troops at Kasserine Pass in North Africa in 1943.

By contrast, the Iraqi military in 1991 was experienced, having fought Iran for eight years starting in 1980. But its equipment, doctrine and institutions were inadequate. A less-experienced U.S.-led coalition prevailed over the Iraqis, owing in part to the Americans' excellent equipment, training and readiness, all holdovers from the Cold War -- a conflict that involved very little shooting between the major rivals but ample preparation on both sides.

Today the U.S. military possesses arguably more combat experience than any other armed forces, owing to the long-term American-led operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But it's debatable whether this experience in low-intensity warfare would matter in what would probably be a high-tech war with China.

"At the strategic level, a war between Chinese and U.S. forces would likely involve high-intensity combat that neither side has experienced," Heath wrote. "The outcome of an initial clash could go either way. With adequate preparation and planning and under ideal circumstances, it is possible that China could prevail in a first battle."

"But since the initial clash probably would not end the war," he continued, "U.S. forces could be expected to use their formidable advantages to adapt and improve their performance in subsequent engagements, just as they rallied following their initial rout at Kasserine Pass to defeat Germany."

"Whether China had made sufficient efforts to overcome the sizable gaps in the quality of its command, training rigor, integration, and other factors could prove important if the conflict drags on. But even then, the ultimate outcome of a long war between the two global powers will likely be decided by factors beyond the control of generals and admirals, such as economic strength, political cohesion and national resolve."

David Axe served as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.

This article first appeared in December 2018 and is being reprinted for reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Caleb Larson

F-35 Jet, Europe

With help from the United States and Italy, the Royal Navy raised a sunken warplane.

A British F-35B stealth jet that plunged off the side of a Royal Navy aircraft carrier and into the sea has reportedly been found and raised to the surface. 

The warplane plunged into the sea off the deck of the HMS Queen Elizabeth, one of the British Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers, in November. 

A startling video surfaced after the crash. The video’s grainy images show a British F-35B jet slowly flying upward on the ski jump ramp on the HMS Queen Elizabeth, then rapidly losing speed and tip over the bow. The pilot bails from the aircraft as the airplane descends, and his parachute reportedly snagged on the edge of the aircraft carrier, forcing him to cut loose into the water. 

The British military authorities reportedly arrested the sailor who took the video, as yet unnamed, on suspicion of learning the video.   

Underwater Espionage 

Following the incident, the Royal Navy scrambled to locate the fifth-generation fighter, fearing the aspects of its advanced stealth technology could be compromised if a foreign country located and salvaged the airplane first. 

Russia topped the list of countries with both the interest and the means to recover sensitive military technology deep underwater. 

British National Security Adviser Sir Stephen Lovegrove spoke to the Commons Defence Committee, highlighting the risk and explaining that “the recovery of the flight data recorder and the wreckage are really vital for an accurate investigation to determine the causes of the crash,” and to prevent unwanted, clandestine technology transfer.   

Recovery Operations 

Although where the airplane entered the water was known, where the F-35B jet ultimately came to rest was not, as the plane may have glided through the water significantly before hitting bottom. It was located, however, about a mile from the ocean surface. As a result, the Royal Navy asked the United States Navy and Italian Navy for assistance in raising the F-35 fighter jet, a process that was somewhat hampered by adverse weather on the surface.  

What exactly caused the crash is not known for sure. However, some reports suggest that the airplane’s engine may have ingested an air intake cover, limiting the amount of air available for the engine to breathe and consequently the lift it could generate. 

Though indeed not good news for the Royal Navy’s air arm, an operations or maintenance error rather than faulty equipment onboard the F-35B jet would be a more manageable issue. Still, what exactly caused the airplane to crash—pilot error, foreign object ingestion, improper maintenance—might not be made public in national security interests. 

Caleb Larson is a multimedia journalist and defense writer with the National Interest. A graduate of UCLA, he also holds a Master of Public Policy and lives in Berlin. He covers the intersection of conflict, security, and technology, focusing on American foreign policy, European security, and German society for both print and radio. @calebmlarson 

Image: Reuters

Robert Farley

U.S.-Canada Relations, North America

Japan would have backed Canada. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: The British Army and the Royal Navy could, possibly, have erected a credible defense of Nova Scotia, preventing the United States from completely rolling up Canada.

The end of a war only rarely settles the central questions that started the conflict. Indeed, many wars do not “end” in the traditional sense; World War II, for example, stretched on for years in parts of Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

Even as the guns fell silent along the Western Front in 1918, the United States and the United Kingdom began jockeying for position. Washington and London bitterly disagreed on the nature of the settlements in Europe and Asia, as well as the shape of the postwar naval balance. In late 1920 and early 1921, these tensions reached panic levels in Washington, London and especially Ottawa.

The general exhaustion of war, combined with the Washington Naval Treaty, succeeded in quelling these questions and setting the foundation for the great Anglo-American partnership of the twentieth century. But what if that hadn’t happened? What if the United States and United Kingdom had instead gone to war in the spring of 1921?

The Liberation of Canada

The U.S.-Canadian border would have constituted the central front of the War of 1921. Although Washington maintained good relations with Ottawa, war plans in both the United States and the United Kingdom expected a multipronged invasion into America’s northern neighbor, designed to quickly occupy the country before British (or Japanese) reinforcement could arrive. Canadian declarations of neutrality would have had minimal impact on this process. Plans for initial attacks included the seizure of Vancouver, Winnipeg, the Niagara Falls area and most of Ontario.

Given the overwhelming disparity between available U.S. and Canadian military forces, most of these offensives would probably have succeeded in short order. The major battle would have revolved around British and Canadian efforts to hold Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and especially the port of Halifax, which would have served both as the primary portal for British troops and as the main local base for the Royal Navy. U.S. military planners understood that Halifax was the key to winning the war quickly, and investigated several options (including poison gas and an amphibious assault) for taking the port.

Assuming they held the line, could British and Canadian forces have prevented the severing of supply lines between Halifax and the main cities of Quebec and the Great Lakes region? Unlikely. The U.S. Army would have had major advantages in numbers, logistics, and mobility. Ottawa and Toronto might each have proven too big to swallow and digest quickly, but severing their connection to the Atlantic would have made the question of their eventual surrender only a matter of time.

And what about Quebec? The nationalism of the early twentieth century did not look kindly on large enclaves of ethno-linguistic minorities. Moreover, the United States had no constitutional mechanisms through which it could offer unique concessions to the French speaking majority of the province. In this context, Quebecois leaders might have sought an accord with Washington that resulted in Quebec’s independence in exchange for support for the American war effort, and Washington might plausibly have accepted such an offer. An accord of this nature might also have forestalled French support from their erstwhile British allies. If not, the U.S. Army planned to seize Quebec City through an overland offensive through Vermont.

Operations in the Atlantic

British war planning considered the prospect of simply abandoning Canada in favor of operations in the Caribbean. However, public pressure might have forced the Royal Navy to establish and maintain transatlantic supply lines against a committed U.S. Navy. While it might have struggled to do this over the long term, the RN still had a sufficient margin of superiority over the USN to make a game of it.

The eight “standard-type” super-dreadnought battleships of the USN flatly outclassed any British warship on any metric other than speed. The USN also possessed ten older dreadnoughts, plus a substantial fleet of pre-dreadnoughts that would have undertaken coastal defense duties. The United States did not operate a submarine arm comparable to that of Imperial Germany, and what boats it had lacked experience in either fleet actions or commerce raiding.

For its part, the Royal Navy had at its disposal nine dreadnoughts, twenty-three super-dreadnoughts and nine battle cruisers. The British ships were generally older, less well armored and less heavily armed than their American counterparts. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy had the benefit of years of experience in both war and peace that the USN lacked. Moreover, the RN had a huge advantage in cruisers and destroyers, as well as a smaller advantage in naval aviation.

But how would the RN have deployed its ships? Blockading the U.S. East Coast is a far more difficult task than blockading Germany, and the USN (like the High Seas Fleet) would only have offered battle in advantageous circumstances. While the RN might have considered a sortie against Boston, Long Island or other northern coastal regions, most of its operations would have concentrated on supporting British and Canadian ground forces in the Maritimes.

Operations in the Pacific

Both the United States and the United Kingdom expected Japan to join any conflict on the British side. The connections between the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy ran back to the Meiji Restoration, and Tokyo remained hungry for territory in the Pacific. In the First World War, Japan had opportunistically gobbled up most of the German Pacific possessions, before deploying a portion of its navy in support of Entente operations in the Mediterranean. In the case of a U.S.-UK war, the IJN would likely have undertaken similar efforts against American territories. These included many of the islands that Japan invaded in 1941 and 1942, although the invasions would have moved forward without the benefit of years of careful preparation.

Given the strength of the IJN (four battle cruisers, five super-dreadnoughts, two dreadnoughts) and the necessary commitment to an “Atlantic first” strategy, the United States probably could not have held the Philippines, Guam, Wake, Midway or most of the other Pacific islands. Hawaii might have proven a bit too far and too big, and it is deeply unlikely that the Japanese would have risked a land deployment to western Canada (although U.S. planners feared such an eventuality), but the war would have overturned the balance of power in the Western Pacific.

Would It Work?

The British Army and the Royal Navy could, possibly, have erected a credible defense of Nova Scotia, preventing the United States from completely rolling up Canada. London could also have offered support for resistance forces in the Canadian wilderness, although even supplying guerilla operations in the far north would have tested British logistics and resolve.

In the end, however, the United States would have occupied the vast bulk of Canada, at the cost of most of its Pacific possessions. And the Canadians, having finally been “liberated” by their brothers to the south? Eventually, the conquest and occupation of Canada would have resulted in statehood for some configuration of provinces, although not likely along the same lines as existed in 1920 (offering five full states likely would have resulted in an undesirable amount of formerly Canadian representation in the U.S. Senate). The process of political rehabilitation might have resembled the Reconstruction of the American South, without the racial element.

The new map, then, might have included a United States that extended to the Arctic, an independent Quebec, a rump Canada consisting mostly of the Maritimes and Japanese control of the entirety of the Western Pacific. Tokyo, rather than London or Washington, would have stood as the biggest winner, hegemonic in its own sphere of influence and fully capable of managing international access to China.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to the National Interest, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and the Diplomat.

This first appeared in 2017 and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

Chinese Navy,

However, it is not clear just how effective these new anti-submarine technologies would be against upgraded, high-tech, Virginia-class attack submarines equipped with new quieting technologies and stealth coating materials. 

China’s first quasi-stealthy new Type 055 destroyer is preparing for aggressive submarine-hunting missions near Taiwan and the South China Sea. How? By testing helicopter-dropped sonar and built-in anti-submarine technologies. 

Part of the exercise included cross-domain networking initiatives wherein the surface destroyer networked with helicopters and other aircraft to track threats and transmit target data in real-time, according to the Chinese Communist Party-backed Global Times newspaper. The four-day exercises included what the paper called “realistic scenario-oriented anti-submarine training courses.” 

In a manner apparently quite similar to how Arleigh Burke-class destroyers interoperate with Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, the new Chinese Nanchang destroyer dispatched a Z-9 search helicopter to deploy sonar equipment. The newspaper praised the Nanchang’s ability to discern submarine signals from other sources of undersea noise. 

“Despite fishing boat activities in the vicinity of the exercise zone, which disrupted the sonar equipment's detection of submarines, the Nanchang was able to use its acoustic data analysis and application system to accurately distinguish the noises of the submarine,” the Global Times writes. 

The extent of secure or hardened connectivity between the Nanchang and its sub-hunting helicopters would be crucial, as it may not parallel the U.S. Navy’s ability to quickly exchange threat data from undersea to helicopter and drones before reaching a host ship destroyer able to perform command and control. 

The Nanchang also fires rocket-propelled, submarine-killing torpedoes and has an ability to conduct “joint fire strikes,” according to the Chinese paper. 

The Chinese paper did say part of the intent of the anti-submarine drills was to ensure U.S. attack submarines could not operate near Chinese shores. However, it is not clear just how effective these new anti-submarine technologies would be against upgraded, high-tech, Virginia-class attack submarines equipped with new quieting technologies and stealth coating materials. 

Virginia-class attack submarines are increasingly being thought of as platforms capable of conducting undersea reconnaissance missions, due to navigational, acoustic, and sensing upgrades. 

Interestingly, it seems significant that the Chinese paper made no mention of undersea drones as being part of the Nanchang’s networked sub-hunting network. Many U.S. Navy surface ships, such as its Littoral Combat Ships, are able to launch and recover submarine-hunting drones and mine-hunting platforms. Any kind of effective submarine-hunting mission would benefit greatly from an ability to gather time-sensitive intelligence information from beneath the surface.  

Ultimately, the success of the Nanchang’s ability to truly find submarines would not only rest on the range and fidelity of its sonar and acoustic-data collection and analysis but also upon an ability to securely network that data across domains in real-time. Submarines can of course quickly change position, so an anti-submarine mission would need to find a day to move information quickly or develop an extended “continuous track” because an attack submarine on a clandestine surveillance mission is not likely to stay in one place for long.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Robert Farley

F-22 Raptor,

It might be impressive, but the F-22 is no F-35. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: The F-22 has enjoyed the unusual distinction of holding an almost universally acknowledged dominance in the core air superiority mission for over a decade, and yet has not participated in a consequential way in any military conflict.

The F-22 has been the world’s most formidable air superiority fighter since it first entered service in 2005. Although the Raptor has yet to kill a target in anger, aviation specialists almost unanimously agree that it can outclass any opponent, foreign or domestic. The only hard limitation on its ability to kill appears to be the number of missiles that it can carry.

But what if the F-22 had never been? Like all advanced technological systems, the Raptor has suffered from hiccups; in 2009 these hiccups were severe enough to excuse the ending of the production line. What if those hiccups had been more severe, or if the United States had decided earlier that the Raptor simply wasn’t in its strategic interest?

The Plane

The Air Force appreciated that the Soviet Union could catch up with the F-15 and F-16, the formidable air superiority pairing developed in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, it began to pursue the Advanced Tactical Fighter program, geared towards producing a revolutionary air superiority platform that would include stealth, as well as a wealth of blooming technological advances. Two teams made it to the prototype stage, producing the YF-22 and the YF-23. The YF-22 won the competition, and went into production and testing in 1997. The Raptor first entering service in late 2005, and immediately began dominating warfighting exercises.

The Problems

But the problems faced by the F-22 were immense. Any innovative new aircraft faces delays and cost overruns associated with managing new technologies. The F-22, however, ran into one of the most comprehensive military technological shifts since the dawn of the jet age; the digitization of warfare that ensued in the 1980s and the 1990s. This was over and above the “normal” problems associated with creating the world’s first supersonic stealth airframe.

The strategic situation complicated matters further. The end of the Cold War reduced the need for advanced air superiority aircraft, leading DoD to reduce the expected buy. The 750 became 648, which became 339, which became 277, which became 183. This represented a classic death spiral, in which development costs were divided between a smaller and smaller number of aircraft. This made the Raptor seem more expensive, even as the production process matured.

The U.S. response to September 11 further clouded the F-22’s prospects. Instead of facing off against peer competitors, the US military engaged itself in conflicts against significantly technologically inferior opponents, including insurgents who had no air forces to speak of. This made the spiraling expense of the F-22 unpalatable, even to many defense hawks, who could not identify any meaningful contribution that the Raptor could make to the current conflict. Moreover, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter seemed to offer a cheaper, more modern alternative. In 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates capped the overall production line at 187 (plus eight test aircraft) for all of these reasons.

The decision could have come sooner. The Joint Strike Fighter project began in 1992, and offered a more contemporary option for the US Department of Defense. The Wars of Yugoslav Disintegration demonstrated that the United States had presumptive air dominance over most foes, even without the F-22. And no peer competitor appeared, in the late 1990s, capable of challenging this dominance in the near term.

The Alternatives

The immediate, obvious alternative to the F-22 Raptor was its competitor aircraft, the Northrop YF-23. In some ways a more innovative design, the F-23 was faster and stealthier than the Raptor, and many have argued that the USAF made the wrong choice. At the time, though, the Air Force believed the F-23 was too risky, and that the Raptor represented the safe choice. The competition was not foreordained, however, and if the F-22 had not won then the F-23 probably would have; competitions of this sort very, very rarely result in the dismissal of both choices. Of course, the F-23 would have run into its own development problems along the way, just as the United States became embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan, and might have been cancelled for the same reasons.

 

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Alternatively, the Air Force could have simply waited for the F-35 to arrive. Although the F-35 was always understood to be a less formidable air superiority platform to the Raptor, it was also expected to be cheaper, in some sense was the aviation equivalent of a “digital native,” a person who grew up during the internet age and who incorporated the basic structures of the digital age into their day-to-day existence. Sensor fusion, networked communications, and a modular software build are intrinsic to the F-35 in a way that are not to the F-22, and it’s hardly impossible to imagine DoD simply giving up on the latter to await the former. Indeed, this was part of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reasoning for capping the F-22 buy at 187 units.

Finally, the Air Force could have continued to pursue improvements to its legacy fleet. Boeing has demonstrated that the F-15 design still has some life in it, having proposed both a stealthy version and a “missile truck” version. The IDF Air Force has doubled down on the F-15, supplemented but not replaced by F-35s, and it is hard to argue that the Israelis don’t value air superiority. Similarly, even before Russia gave up on the Su-57, it invested heavily in improving legacy platforms, especially the Su-27 family of fighters.

Wrap

The most difficult question associated with the Raptor may be this: Would anyone ever really have missed the F-22 if it had not existed? In an important sense the answer is “no,” at least thus far. The F-22 has enjoyed the unusual distinction of holding an almost universally acknowledged dominance in the core air superiority mission for over a decade, and yet has not participated in a consequential way in any military conflict. It is the world’s best boxer, and yet can find no one to fight. This may change, of course; the international system is unpredictable, and the window of the Raptor’s dominance does not appear to be closing. And indeed, as the United States increasingly shifts its attention to peer competitor conflicts, voices emerge calling for a restart of the Raptor line. Though there is undoubtedly something sad about such a dominant aircraft never finding a way to make a contribution.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

India, Asia

India has been aggressively emphasizing its “Made in India” program. Under this deal, it will receive what is considered one of the best modern assault rifles in production and build it domestically. 

Earlier this year the Indian Army signed a deal with the U.S.-based Sig Sauer to receive 72,400 Sig 716 G2 Patrol assault/battlefield rifles, which are intended to equip its 400+ infantry battalions. The deal, which was signed in March, was modified from an original plan to arm only the frontline troops with the latest weapon. In 2019, the Indian Army had procured the rifles under a “fast-tracked process” (FTP) for use with troops posted at the borders as well as those involved in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. 

Last December, the Indian Defence Acquisition Council had accorded approval for the procurement of additional 72,400 Sig 716 rifles for approximately Rs 780 crore. The contract with Sig Sauer was expanded after a much-awaited deal with Russia since the AK-203 assault rifle was delayed. 

At least two companies, about one hundred soldiers each, in all of the Indian infantry battalions would be armed with the Sig 716, which is chambered for the widely-used high-powered 7.62x51-millimeter NATO cartridge. The select-fire military assault rifle features a short-stroke pushrod gas system and an advanced operating system that was developed to reduce carbon fouling, excessive heat and unburned powder in the action. 

The Indian-made AK-203 

Now, it seems that India is finally moving forward with those Russian weapons as well. TASS reported this week that Russia and India have signed a contract for the delivery of more than 600,000 7.62x39 millimeter AK-203 assault rifles, which will be produced in India. The new model will replace the Indian military’s INSAS rifles, the domestically-produced assault rifles that were introduced in the late 1990s. 

“On December 6, a contract was signed as part of a meeting of the defense ministers of Russia and India on the delivery of over 600,000 AK-203 assault rifles produced in India to the Defense Ministry of India,” the Kalashnikov press office said in a statement. 

In addition, the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL) further highlights the new Russian-Indian military-technical cooperation. India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi first announced the plans in early March 2019 to set up a joint Indo-Russian venture for the production of Kalashnikov assault rifles in the country.

The joint venture IRRPL for the manufacture of AK-203 assault rifles has already been established at a production facility in the town of Korwa of the Amethi district in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Under this agreement, India will become the first foreign country to produce the two hundredth series Kalashnikov assault rifles.

“Russian and Indian specialists have carried out large-scale preparatory work over three years to optimize the project’s price and technological parameters,” said Kalashnikov CEO Vladimir Lepin. “Now that the contract has been signed, we are ready to start the production of advanced AK-203s in the town of Korwa in the coming months.”  

India has been aggressively emphasizing its “Made in India” program. Under this deal, it will receive what is considered one of the best modern assault rifles in production and build it domestically. 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. 

Image: Reuters

Paul Richard Huard

T-34, Eurasia

"The T-34, for all its faults, is now often referred to by tank experts and historians as possibly the best tank of the war."

Here's What You Need to Know: The T-34 in the hands of determined Soviet tankers routed the Germans at Kursk, the greatest tank battle of all time.

On June 22, 1941, Nazi German launched Operation Barbarossa, a massive attack on the Soviet Union that was the largest invasion in history.

More than three million German soldiers, 150 divisions and 3,000 tanks comprised three mammoth army groups that created a front more than 1,800 miles long.

The Germans expected to face an inferior enemy. Giddy from victories in Poland and France, Hitler and many in his military high command believed it was the destiny of Germany to invade Russia. “The end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state,” Hitler announced in his manifesto Mein Kampf.

For months Germans won victory after resounding victory. But then the attack stalled—and the appearance of a new Soviet tank stunned the Wehrmacht.

It was the T-34. The new armored vehicle had an excellent 76-millimeter gun and thick sloped armor and cruised at more than 35 miles per hour. It possessed many advanced design features for the time—and it could blow German Panzers to Hell.

The T-34 had its problems—something we often forget when discussing a tank with a legendary reputation. The shortfalls included bad visibility for the crew and shoddy Soviet workmanship.

“They were good, but they were not miracle weapons and they had their faults,” writes Philip Kaplan in Rolling Thunder: A Century of Tank Warfare. “But the T-34, for all its faults, is now often referred to by tank experts and historians as possibly the best tank of the war.”

World War II German Field Marshall Ewald Von Kleist was more succinct. “The finest tank in the world,” is how he described the T-34.

The origins of the T-34 are simple enough. The Red Army sought a replacement for the BT-7 cavalry tank, which was fast-moving and lightly armored for use in maneuver warfare. It also had Christie suspension, one reason for the tank’s increased speed.

But during a 1938-to-1939 border war with Japan, the BT-7 fared poorly. Even with a low-powered gun, Japanese Type 95 tanks easily destroyed the BT-7s. Tank attack crews also assaulted the BT-7s with Molotov cocktails, reducing the Soviet tank to a flaming wreck when ignited gasoline dripped through chinks between poorly welded armor into the tank’s engine compartment.

The T-34 was the solution. It kept the Christie suspension, replaced the gasoline engine with a V-2 34 V12 diesel power plant and offered the crew speeds that were 10 miles per hour faster than the German Panzer III or Panzer IV.

Furthermore, the T-34’s high-velocity gun was capable of killing any tank in the world at the time.

“In 1941 when Hitler launched Barbarossa, the tank was indisputably the best in the world,” Jason Belcourt, a veteran of the U.S. Army who served in the armor branch, told War Is Boring. “The combination of sloped armor, big gun, good speed and good maneuverability was so much better than anything the Germans had on tracks.”

By mid-1941, the USSR had more than 22,000 tanks—more tanks than all the armies of the world combined, and four times the number of tanks in the German arsenal.

By the end of the war, the Soviet Union had produced nearly 60,000 T-34 tanks—proving the point that quantity does have a quality all of its own.

At first, the Germans were at a loss when it came to countering the threat the T-34 posed. The Germans’ standard anti-tank guns, the 37-millimeter Kwk36 and the 50-millimeter Kwk 38, couldn’t put a dent in the Soviet tank with a shot to its front.

That left the Germans with a limited set of tactics. German tankers could attempt flank shots with their guns. The Wehrmacht could lay mines. Soldiers risked their lives in close assaults employing satchel charges and Molotov cocktails.

In what could be called an act of desperation, the Germans even used modified 88-millimeter anti-aircraft guns to stop attacking T-34s with direct fire.

But the Russians never had enough trained crews for the tanks the Red Army fielded. The Soviets wasted the T-34 and its crews in vast numbers.

By the time the Soviets trained enough crews to man the T-34s, the Germans had tanks with high-velocity guns and better anti-tank weapons like the Panzerfaust, a recoilless anti-tank weapon with a high-explosive warhead.

But the Russians always had more T-34s than the Germans had Panzers or Tigers.

“Where the tank was decisive was in the battle of production,” Belcourt said. “From June 1941 until the end of the war, the Soviets were always producing a tank that was often good and never worse than adequate.”

The final verdict on the T-34 perhaps is less glowing than the legend that the Soviets weaved around the tank—but is still complimentary. The T-34 tipped the balance in favor of the USSR when it came to armored battle; mass production of the tank outmatched anything the Germans could do when it came to manufacturing.

The T-34 in the hands of determined Soviet tankers routed the Germans at Kursk, the greatest tank battle of all time.

The T-34 was “undeniably revolutionary, but it was not the first in anything except how to combine thick sloped armor with a diesel engine, wide tracks and a big, relatively powerful gun,” Belcourt said. “They had all been done before, but never together.”

This piece first appeared in WarIsBoring here. 

Image: Wikimedia Commons

The COVID-19 pandemic is rolling back progress on key childhood challenges such as poverty, health and access to education, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said in a new report on Thursday, representing the biggest global crisis for children since the agency was founded 75 years ago. 

Peter Suciu

China, Asia

China currently maintains a single overseas naval base in the nation of Djibouti, located on the “Horn of Africa” at the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which separates the Gulf of Aden from the Red Sea.

The United States is home to more than forty naval bases spread along the eastern and western coasts, while there are also overseas bases in the U.S. territories of Guam and Puerto Rico, as well as twenty-some bases around the world. These bases are critical to the global reach of the U.S. Navy but are also a crucial part of the national defense. 

Now, China is looking to change that and according to a report in the Wall Street Journal, citing classified intelligence, the People’s Liberation Army Navy could create its first permanent military presence on the Atlantic Ocean on the coast of the small African nation of Equatorial Guinea. 

While the plans for the PLAN haven’t been described in detail, the facilities at the port city of Bata would escalate the threat China poses to the United States. The deepwater port at Bata, which was already upgraded by the China Road & Bridge Co. between 2009 and 2014, could be used by Chinese warships to rearm and refit opposite of the East Coast. According to the report, U.S. intelligence first learned of the possibility of the PLAN base in 2019. 

Gen. Stephen Townsend, commander of U.S. Africa Command, told the Senate in April that China’s “most significant threat” would be “a militarily useful naval facility on the Atlantic coast of Africa,” The Hill reported. Such a facility might enable China to “rearm with munitions and repair naval vessels,” Townsend added. 

President Joe Biden has said that it remains a top priority of his administration not to let China surpass the U.S. military during his presidency. The Defense Department recently announced plans for major infrastructure improvements to be made at the U.S. military airfields in Guam and Australia as part of larger efforts to counter China.  

It was in October that Jon Finer, Biden’s principal deputy national security adviser, traveled to Equatorial Guinea to meet with President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and his son, Vice President Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue. He urged them to reject China’s proposal to build a naval facility.   

“As part of our diplomacy to address maritime-security issues, we have made clear to Equatorial Guinea that certain potential steps involving [Chinese] activity there would raise national-security concerns,” a senior Biden administration official said, according to Wall Street Journal. 

China currently maintains a single overseas naval base in the nation of Djibouti, located on the “Horn of Africa” at the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which separates the Gulf of Aden from the Red Sea. It protects the approach to the Suez Canal. The African nation is unique because it hosts the United States Naval Expeditionary Base next to the Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport and other foreign military bases including a French airbase, an Italian support base and the Japan Self-Defense Force Base Djibouti—the first JSDF full-scale, long term overseas base—as well as PLAN’s first overseas military base.   

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. 

Image: Reuters

David Axe

Strategic Bombers, Guam

The abrupt end to the Continuous Bomber Rotation effort in Guam could signal a further decline in the Air Force’s ability to project long-range firepower.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Bombers aren’t necessarily going to deploy less often or in fewer numbers, the Air Force implied. Rather, they’re simply going to deploy less predictably under a new scheme the service calls “dynamic force employment.”

In mid-April 2020 the Air Force abruptly ended its 16-year-old rotation of B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.

At least one expert believes the abrupt end to the Continuous Bomber Rotation effort signals a further decline in the Air Force’s ability to project long-range firepower.

“The Air Force knows this mission area is stretched too thin,” retired Air Force major general Larry Stutzriem and Douglas Birkey wrote in Defense News.

Stutzriem is the director of studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in Virginia. Birkey is the institute’s executive director

The flying branch, however, put a happy spin on the decision to halt the bomber rotation, which since 2004 has maintained a small force of bombers in the western Pacific region in order to deter Chinese aggression.

Bombers aren’t necessarily going to deploy less often or in fewer numbers, the Air Force implied. Rather, they’re simply going to deploy less predictably under a new scheme the service calls “dynamic force employment.”

“Our diverse bomber fleet – B-52, B-1, and B-2 – allows us to respond to global events anytime, anywhere. Whether they’re launched from Louisiana, Guam or the U.K., long-range strategic bombers have and will remain a bedrock of our deterrence!” Air Force Global Strike Command tweeted on April 16, 2020.

The Air Force six days later launched its first dynamic bomber sortie. A single B-1 took off from its base in South Dakota and, over the course of a 30-hour sortie, flew all the way to Japan and formed up with Japanese air force F-2 and F-15 fighters and locally-based U.S. Air Force F-16s before turning back toward the United States.

The B-1 sortie might have seemed to underscore the Air Force’s continuing commitment to a global bomber presence despite the flying branch also planning on cutting its 157-strong bomber fleet by one B-2 and 17 B-1s.

The service as part of its 2021 budget submission has asked Congress for permission to begin decommissioning the bombers. The B-1s, in particular, suffered from overuse over Afghanistan and the Middle East in the decades following the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks -- and also suffered from a dearth of maintenance.

The result in 2019 was an abysmal readiness rate for the swing-wing bomber. In July 2019 just seven of 62 B-1s were fully mission-capable, South Dakota senator Mike Rounds revealed. Readiness somewhat improved in 2020.

The Air Force framed the first “dynamic” B-1 mission as evidence of the service’s enduring an undiminished ability to deploy long-range airpower. But Stutzriem and Birkey see the situation differently.

The defunct bomber-rotation was “a tremendous success,” they wrote. “It clearly communicated U.S. readiness to act decisively when U.S. and allied interests were challenged.”

Halting the bomber rotation “now sends the opposite message, just as the region grows more dangerous,” Stutzriem and Birkey added. “This is a decision with significant risk, yet it is an outcome compelled by past choices resulting in a bomber force on the edge.”

David Axe was defense editor at The National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.

This article first appeared last year and is being reprinted for reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Trevor Filseth

Iran, Middle East

The Iranian government has criticized the most recent sanctions and warned that they would not help the United States achieve its goals in the Vienna talks.

As nuclear negotiations between the United States, the other P5+1 nations, and Iran enter their second week in Vienna, Austria, the Biden administration has imposed a new round of sanctions on Iranian officials, leading Tehran to warn Washington that further sanctions could not be considered a source of leverage in the talks.  

In the most recent round of economic sanctions, the Treasury Department placed restrictions on the Special Units of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and Counter-Terror Special Forces, accusing them of human rights violations. Several Iranian officials associated with the two organizations, including LEF commanders Hassan Karami and Seyed Reza Mousavi Azami and Basij militia commander Gholamreza Soleimani, were also blacklisted. 

The Treasury Department issued a statement on Tuesday that said the sanctions were put into place after those organizations violently suppressed civilian protests in Iran in November 2019. The statement included sanctions implemented against accused human-rights violators in Syria and Uganda, sanctioning them on the basis of the 2017 Global Magnitsky Act. 

The Iranian government has criticized the most recent sanctions and warned that they would not help the United States achieve its goals in the Vienna talks. Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh slammed the move on Twitter, arguing that “doubling down on sanctions won’t create leverage—and is anything but seriousness & goodwill.” 

The most recent sanctions on Iran, and the Iranian response, are further strains on the nuclear negotiations, which have struggled to move forward in spite of rhetorical support from both President Joe Biden and Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi. American officials have sought to re-enter the deal, but have argued that Iran has attempted to gain more from the deal while conceding less. For their part, Iranian negotiators have insisted that all U.S. sanctions be lifted prior to the agreement’s restoration—a demand that has been criticized as a non-starter in Washington. The most recent talks between the two sides ended on Friday after U.S. negotiators accused the Iranian delegation of acting in bad faith. 

“What we’ve seen in the last couple of days is that Iran right now does not seem to be serious about doing what’s necessary to return to compliance, which is why we ended this round of talks in Vienna,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during the Reuters Next conference, which was hosted by the Reuters news agency on Friday. 

Nuclear talks are expected to resume this Thursday in Vienna. 

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest. 

Kris Osborn

Chinese Navy, Asia

The new Chinese ships are armed with rocket-propelled torpedoes, operate sub-hunting helicopters and advanced sonar systems. 

China has now already built eight new Type 055 stealthy destroyers, a class of next-generation destroyers likely intended to rival the U.S. Navy’s emerging Arleigh Burke-class DDG 51 Flight III destroyers or even Zumwalt-class warships. 

Three of these new Type 055 destroyers are already operational. 

While the weapons, technologies, and stealth characteristics of these ships are likely to be of interest to Pentagon officials, the sheer pace of Chinese shipbuilding continues to be a cause of concern. China’s industrial apparatus and ability to rapidly build ships enable the People's Republic of China (PRC) to continue its large-scale Naval expansion at a pace that is tough for the United States to match. Multiple reports say China is on pace to double its fleet of destroyers within just the next five years. The concern, however, is by no means restricted to pure numbers but also grounded in uncertainties related to the relative sophistication and capability of China’s new destroyers. Having more destroyers does not necessarily equate to any kind of maritime superiority if they cannot compete with the range, precision, networking, and overall capability of U.S. destroyers. 

Furthermore, the U.S. Navy has as many as ten DDG Flight III destroyers under contract and is moving quickly to modernize their sensors, radar systems, computing, and ship-integrated weapons. 

The Chinese Communist party-backed newspaper the Global Times reported that the Type 055 destroyers are engineered for multi-mission operations to include land-attack, open water maritime warfare, and anti-submarine missions. The new Chinese ships are armed with rocket-propelled torpedoes, operate sub-hunting helicopters and advanced sonar systems. 

The first Type 055 Chinese destroyer, the Nanchang, looks a bit like a hybrid between the U.S. Zumwalt-class and Arleigh Burke DDG 51 class destroyers. It does have what appear to be some stealthy attributes such as a rounded front hull and smooth exterior with fewer protruding structures, but there are mounted antennas and what look like masts on the back end as well. The helicopter landing area on the back of the Nanchang also looks like that of a U.S. DDG 51. 

China's three operational Type 055 destroyers seem to match the U.S. Navy’s plan for three Zumwalt-class destroyers. The kind of weapons range, radar, fire control and computing aboard the Nanchang will most likely determine the margin of difference regarding its ability to rival its U.S. counterparts. 

Perhaps of greatest consequence is the question of whether these Type 055 destroyers have any kind of Aegis-radar-like ballistic missile defense technology. Does it have the ability to link fire-control, air and cruise missile defense, ballistic missile defense, and interceptor missiles capable of firing from deck-mounted Vertical Launch Systems?

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

But Biden’s talk of accommodating Russia has Congress worried.

David Axe

F-5E Tiger II, Iran

All things being equal, the F-5 might still possesses the agility to gain the advantage over an F-35 if it can close the distance.

Here's What You Need to Remember: If an Iranian pilot can survive a merge with an F-35 and engage the stealth fighter in a turning dogfight, the Iranian might just bag himself a stealth fighter.

Amid escalating tensions between Iran and the United States, in part resulting from U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision unilaterally to withdraw the United States from the 2015 deal limiting Iran’s nuclear program, the U.S. armed forces have deployed a wide array of ships, planes and other weapons to the Middle East.

The American arsenal in the region includes F-35 stealth fighters. If tensions turn into warfare, the factory-fresh F-35s could face an Iranian air force operating some of the oldest active fighters in the world.

The Iranians with their four-decade-old F-4s, F-5s and F-14s might not seem to have a chance against the Americans flying arguably the world’s most advanced fighter aircraft. But history, and recent testing show how Iranian pilots flying old planes could defeat Americans flying brand-new ones.

For one, the F-35, while new, isn’t necessarily a stellar aerial performer. In 2015 someone associated with the F-35 test effort leaked an official report explaining the stealth fighter’s limitations in air-to-air maneuvers with an F-16.

“The F-35 was at a distinct energy disadvantage,” an unnamed F-35 test pilot wrote in a scathing five-page brief. “Insufficient pitch rate,” he added. “Energy deficit to the bandit would increase over time.”

The complaints continued. “The flying qualities in the blended region (20 to 26 degrees [angle of attack]) were not intuitive or favorable,” the pilot wrote, adding that there’s no point for an F-35 pilot to get into a sustained, close turning battle with an enemy pilot. “There were not compelling reasons to fight in this region.”

The pilot’s revelations underscore what many observers long have suspected about the F-35. While its radar-evading qualities and high-end sensors might allow it to gain a favorable position for long-range missile shots, in a close fight the F-35 hardly excels.

If an Iranian pilot can survive a merge with an F-35 and engage the stealth fighter in a turning dogfight, the Iranian might just bag himself a stealth fighter. It’s worth noting that the Iranian air force flies scores of fighters that excel precisely in that regime.

American-made F-5 Tigers, for instance. Former U.S. Navy pilot Francesco Chierici who flew F-5s in the adversary role, sang the plane’s praise in a 2019 article for The War Zone. “The Tiger was clean, just an AIM-9 and a telemetry pod on the wingtips, and occasionally a centerline fuel tank,” Chierici wrote. “She slipped through the ‘number’ (Mach 1) easily. … The F-5 was a pair of engines and wings. It was so simple …”

Aerodynamically, the F-5 will always be what we call a category-three fighter, where the F-35 and F-22 are now category-five fighters. Compared to modern jets, it is underpowered, slow and bleeds airspeed badly in a sustained turn, not to mention it has no stealth other than its tiny size.

But with just a few modifications, the F-5 is being turned into a threat plane with a legitimate sting. The newest upgrades include an [electronically-scanned] radar, good [radar-warning] gear, chaff and flares, a jamming pod and a helmet-mounted cueing system for a high off-boresight IR (infrared-guided) missiles. 

A Tiger so outfitted can provide Super Hornets and F-35s a legitimate threat, especially in the training environment.

Iran indeed has been upgrading its F-5 fleet, although the modifications likely will not include the latest sensors and helmet sights.

Still, all things being equal the F-5 despite its age might still possesses the agility to gain the advantage over an F-35. Again, provided the F-5 pilot survives the merge to a close-in fight.

That’s a big assumption. F-35 pilots understand the limitations of their aircraft and certainly would do their best to avoid a dogfight. The Iranians might have to ambush the Americans in order to force the fight to close range. It’s unclear how the Iranians might do so, given the Americans’ huge advantage in sensors and situational awareness.

David Axe was Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

If Imran Khan cares about foreign investment and economic growth, he must abolish the country’s blasphemy law.

The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) on Wednesday expressed outrage over an attack on a convoy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in which one of its vehicles was hit, wounding three staff members

Trevor Filseth

Insurrection, Americas

Former president Donald Trump has sought to prevent the committee from questioning former members of his administration.

Former North Carolina Republican senator and White House chief of staff Mark Meadows has abruptly ceased his cooperation with the House Select Committee on the January 6 Attack, according to his lawyer, George Terwilliger. 

Terwilliger indicated that Meadows had pulled out of the scheduled hearings because he was concerned that the committee, which includes seven Democrats and two Republicans, would have “no intention of respecting boundaries” with regard to topics that former president Donald Trump regarded as off-limits. The lawyer added that Meadows had reached his decision after learning that the committee had “issued wide-ranging subpoenas for information from a third-party communications provider,” ostensibly violating the agreement that Meadows had reached with the committee. 

From political exile in Florida, Trump has sought to prevent the committee from questioning former members of his administration. The former president has issued legal challenges to the committee’s authority based on “executive privilege,” a legal doctrine giving presidents some ability to withhold information from the public. It remains unclear, however, if executive privilege can be invoked by former presidents; President Joe Biden has expressly indicated that he will not invoke it on behalf of Trump administration officials. 

Although the matter of executive privilege is still being decided in the courts, Meadows, along with former Trump administration officials Steve Bannon, Dan Scavino, and Kash Patel, have all been subpoenaed to appear before the committee. All four men initially indicated that they would not testify to the committee while the question of executive privilege was being decided. After the committee initiated legal proceedings against Bannon, Trump’s former White House Chief Strategist, Meadows changed his mind and agreed to testify. Bannon has persisted in his refusal and was indicted in November for contempt of Congress; his trial is scheduled for July 2022. 

White House Chief of Staff, Meadows is the highest-ranking official to be called before the committee. His testimony could ultimately make or break the committee’s hypothesis that Trump was directly responsible for the storming of the U.S. Capitol, an attack in which more than one hundred police officers were injured and five died within days. To date, the connection between the officers’ deaths and the Capitol riot remains tepid. 

January 6 Committee members Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.) and Liz Cheney (R-Wyo.) indicated in a joint statement that Meadows would face legal consequences for his refusal. 

“If indeed Mr. Meadows refuses to appear, the Select Committee will be left no choice but to advance contempt proceedings and recommend that the body in which Mr. Meadows once served refer him for criminal prosecution,” the two representatives said in the joint statement. 

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest. 

Image: Reuters

To show the world the United States is back as a democratic leader, Biden should hold the U.S. military and its allies accountable in warfare.